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Notes

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NOTES.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

Of most philosophers it may be said that what they make of philosophy is often less obvious than what it makes of them. When the great man appears this contrast between the thinker and his work vanishes. Each through the other now gains a vicarious importance. This is eminently true of Josiah Royce. The description of him which is at once the simplest and the truest is this: a great man. And his greatness was that of the sage who is invested with the quality and the dignity of some universal wisdom. You could not separate philosophy from Royce nor Royce from philosophy; he ennobled it even as he was ennobled by it.

If one were to try to analyze this impression I think one would detect first the vast scope of his mind. By this I mean not so much his learning,—although both in his knowledge of his own field and in those of the sciences he was certainly the most learned philosopher of his day,—but rather his power of lending to every subject that he touched an undreamt of significance, of taking it out into the open, putting it in perspective and setting the free air of the mind to play round it. A notable example of this is his treatment of the Four Conceptions of Being. We knew in our own way perhaps what mysticism meant and what realism meant, yet who but Royce in our time could have so shown them moulding a universe? We have to go back to Plato to find a philosophic imagination so comprehensive. In smaller things this quality was just as noticeable. Any one who was ever a member of one of Royce's seminars will recall the shock of pleased surprise when behind the pin-point of one's question Royce built up a great wedge to be driven deep into some problem. In one's innocence one had never suspected that one was raising an issue so profoundly disturbing. Under Royce's guidance one discovered that one had been talking philosophy without knowing it. Everything that fell into that mind took on something of the vastness which it there encountered.—Strange contrast between that small awkward frame and the splendid untrammelled gestures of the mind it housed!

Yet the great range of Royce's ideas did not set him apart on some inaccessible height. It is rarely that a man so consistently succeeds in inspiring affection as Royce did. He was loved by his fellows, and the cause of it was that he loved them. His sympathy and his friendship were given to persons of the most diverse types. Lawyers and doctors, parsons and engineers, undergraduates and children and professors all found much in him because he found much in them. In his writings this gift of sympathetic interpretation of human character is very marked. We may think of his accounts of Spinoza and Kant in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, of his essay on John

Bunyan in *Studies of Good and Evil*, or we may recall how in all his work the illustration drawn direct from human life is never far away. His gift was clearest of all perhaps in his teaching. Some years ago he was giving undergraduate courses at Yale and it was the business of the assistant to read the weekly essays, prepare a report on them and pick out those which he thought Royce ought specially to read. But Royce read many besides the selected group. Although he would reach New Haven late in the day from Cambridge he would often sit up far into the night reading these essays and writing comments on them. Sometimes his note would be only a few lines in length, but often when his attention fell on some document of religious confession or some 'instance of loyalty' he would cover an entire page. As long as behind what the student wrote there was a personal conviction Royce would spend himself in encouragement or wise criticism.

Royce's love of his human kind is, I believe, the most important single factor in the development of his philosophy. Critics of Absolute Idealism are fond of warning us against rigid monisms and closed systems. But Royce's monism was flexible to the end. As each new volume of his work appeared one found in it a modification or re-interpretation to meet the objections to his doctrine. Pluralists, pragmatists, exponents of personal idealism, the idolaters of intuition,—Royce undertook to come to terms with them all. But the main changes in the structure of his system were introduced to 'save' the individual. As Professor Dewey, and indeed Royce himself, have shown, Royce was never a thorough-going 'intellectualist,' yet, as compared with *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, *The World and the Individual* with its absolute voluntarism marks a noticeable change of emphasis. The change was largely due to the fact that personal idealists were pleading for the value and the initiative of the finite self. Later when Royce bade us make our pragmatism absolute it was because he as much as any pragmatist realized the value of human ambition and human work. Still later when the Absolute becomes almost identical with the Beloved Community it is plain that Royce was anxious to refute the charge that his doctrine cancelled the differences between finite persons. Royce loved the human individual in theory as well as in fact. As his thought advanced he came always nearer to that wayward creature. But he knew that you do not find 'the individual' by taking away his 'world.' The permanent metaphysical significance of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* lies just in the power with which it states the central truth that you do not make the individual great by making his universe small.

No memoir of Royce may omit a reference to his humor. Of him as of another great man it might be said that "his laugh was broad as ten thousand beeves at pasture." The story of him that I think I like best comes from a friend who studied under him while he was giving his lectures on Christianity at Oxford. On one occasion Royce quoted

"He would answer to 'Hi!' or to any loud cry,"

and my friend did not recognize the allusion. Whereupon, although it was the middle of the morning and lectures were in full swing, Royce haled him up to his room with the remark, "Your education is incomplete." Once there Royce recited from memory *The Hunting of the Snark* from beginning to end and sent his amazed pupil away with, "Now go and read it for yourself." Royce's humor had much in common with that of Lewis Carroll. With a solemnity belied only by the twinkle lurking in his eyes, he liked to build up some portentous narrative or fable until the whole edifice came toppling down in laughter. Who that ever heard it can forget the story of that frantic search by the man who was trying to prove by experience the universal negative "There is no horse in this room," how in his eagerness he searched even between the leaves of books only to realize at last as the result of his efforts, "What I have found is not horse." The experiences of the shepherd with the 'infinite collection' of sheep were almost as remarkable. But perhaps most memorable of all is the introduction to his address as president of the American Philosophical Association. The philosophers of absolute novelties were having a considerable vogue at that time. In gentle ridicule of them Royce undertook to relate his first experience of an absolute novelty. With profound gravity and a patient elaboration of detail he described his emotions when in his childhood a small friend offered to show him something absolutely new,—something he had never seen before and would never see again,—and then proceeded to crack and open a nut and eat the kernel! Perhaps these seem trivial things to recall now, yet it is to the wise and kindly Royce of such moments that the memories of those who knew and loved him will most often turn.

In this brief note I have deliberately avoided any biographical references. In the number of *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* published in his honor Royce himself has given us the account of the facts of his life and philosophical development which we should most wish to possess. As for an estimate of the quality and extent of his contribution to scholarship, that can be found in the same number of the *REVIEW*. Because at this moment I am, like most of those, I imagine, who knew him, most sensible of a personal loss, I have simply tried to record something of my impression of him as a friend and as a teacher.

I trust I may be allowed to end with a personal experience which I record only because I believe it expresses what many others have felt. On the morning when I read in the papers of Royce's death my first feeling was one of dismay and grief. And then almost instantly there followed a feeling such as I have never had about the death of any one else. It was simply a supreme confidence that all was well with him. In this all other emotions were obliterated. He had lived too close to the heart of things for death to be anything but an episode in his life. I knew of a certainty that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death."

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CHARLES A. BENNETT.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 19: *Ralph Barton Perry*, The Truth Level; *David F. Swenson*, The Logical Significance of the Paradoxes of Zeno.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXIII, 5: *Joseph Peterson*, The Nature and Probable Origin of Binaural Beats; *J. Victor Haberman*, The Intelligence Examination and Evaluation, Part I; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, A Substitute for an Artificial Pupil; *W. F. Dearborn* and *H. S. Langfeld*, Portable Tachistoscope and Memory Apparatus; *Herbert S. Langfeld*, Portable Self-Registering Tapping-Board and Counter; *H. M. Johnson*, A Note on Ferree and Rand's Method of Photometry; *H. C. McComas*, Extravagance in the Motor Theories of Consciousness; Discussion, *Truman L. Kelley*, Further Logical Aspects of the Binet Scale.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORAL, XXIII, 3: *A. N. Whitehead*, La théorie relationniste de l'espace; *F. Colonna d'Istria*, La religion d'après Cabanis; *L. Brunschwig*, Sur les rapports de la conscience intellectuelle et de la conscience moral; *R. Hubert*, La théorie cartésienne de l'énumération; *C. Guy-Grand*, Impartialité et neutralité.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLI, 8: *L. Dauriac*, Contingence et Rationalisme; *L. Proal*, L'anarchisme au XVIII^e siècle (premier article); *Dr. Philippe*, Sur la forme de perception des sensations tactiles de Weber; *F. Picavet*, La philosophie de Bonald; *Ossip-Lourie*, La Calomnie.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA, II, 4: *Rodolfo Rivarola*, Reflexiones sobre la introspección psicológica; *Camilo Meyer*, La filosofía de las matemáticas y su evolución en le siglo XIX; *C. O. Bunge*, Las tres leyes de la actividad psíquica; *J. Laub*, Los teoremas energéticos y los límites de su validez; *Carlos de Velasco*; El pensamiento de la revolución cubana; *José Ingenieros*, La cultura filosófica en la España teocrática; *José Ingenieros*, La renovación de la cultura filosófica española.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, VIII, 3: *P. Martinetti*, La dottrina della conoscenza e del metodo nella filosofia di B. Spinoza; *G. Rensi*, La morale dell' "attuazione dell' Io" (Seth e Wright); *E. di Carlo*, La dialettica engelsiana; *C. Pulcini*, L'ora presente e la filosofia nella scuola; *P. Nicoli*, La funzione del tirocinio nelle scuole normali.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA, VIII, 3: *Mons. Mario Sturzo*, L'eroismo: sua natura e sua funzione; *Amato Masnavo*, L'articolo nella *Somma Teologica* di S. Tommaso; *Francesco Olgiati*, Il problema della conoscenza in Josiah Royce; *Luigi Botti*, I problemi filosofici; *G. B. Biavaschi*, Intorno alle origini del potere civile.