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Review

Reviewed Work(s): *The Sources of Religious Insight* by Josiah Royce

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the whole Utilitarian School than the following (almost Professor Hudson's sole) reference to Hume's ethics: "Of course if there is no self, the same yesterday, today and tomorrow, there is no such thing as 'duty.' And Hume accepts this consequence. Morals becomes *mores*, custom. Morals may be spelled 'manners,'—no necessary law is involved" (p. 78). Now there are two facts that an appeal to history in the interests of ethical theory cannot afford to neglect. The first is that, prior to the Nineteenth Century, European ethics was almost exclusively English, for ethics never flourished among the Continental Rationalists, where the *a priori* method was strongest. The second is that for a century the fortunes of English ethics were closely bound up with those of the Empirical Philosophy. Moreover, the *a priori* method was not neglected among the English moralists. Cudworth asserted the need for an active and timeless self as vigorously as Professor Hudson does, and many English Rationalists down to the middle of the Eighteenth Century reasserted it. Yet ethical rationalism is insignificant in importance as compared with the work of the Utilitarians. And when ethical rationalism reappeared in substantially the same form in Kant, it is marked by crudities that would be unthinkable in an English moralist of the same date and its elements of value for ethics need not be regarded as the product of the *a priori* method. Judged by the verdict of history, at least, apriorism has been relatively a sterile ethical method, and even if all Professor Hudson's criticisms of the Empiricists are admitted, his main point still remains to be proved.

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*The Sources of Religious Insight.* By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.—pp. xvi, 297.

The seven lectures which make up the present volume constitute the fifth series of Bross lectures delivered by Professor Royce at Lake Forest University, November 13 to 19, 1911. The titles of the lectures are as follows: I, The Religious Problem and the Human Individual; II, Individual Experience and Social Experience as Sources of Religious Insight; III, The Office of the Reason; IV, The World and the Will; V, The Religion of Loyalty; VI, The Religious Mission of Sorrow; VII, The Unity of the Spirit and the Invisible Church. The book represents a restatement of some of the central positions, well known to readers of the REVIEW, of Royce's voluntaristic idealism, and a somewhat more conscious attempt than the author has heretofore made to bring these principles into relation with the more fundamental religious interests and problems.

The postulates which underlie the greater religions are that there is some highest end of life, some chief good, and that man, by nature, is in great danger of failing to attain this good. The central interest of religion is man's salvation from this failure, and the essential problem of religious insight is to find out the way of salvation. What are the sources of this insight?

The leading traditional dogma regarding the source of religious insight, the

dogma of external revelation, involves the paradox that the believer already knows the marks by which a divine revelation is to be distinguished from any other sort of report. If he already possesses this knowledge, revelation is unnecessary; if he does not possess it, revelation is impossible. Genuine sources of religious insight are individual experience, social experience, the reason, and loyalty, the practical devotion to a cause. Individual or private experience, so ardently espoused by James, is indeed the beginning of all insight, but it is difficult to say just how far such insight extends. Men's private feelings and intuitions regarding ideals, values and needs vary endlessly. Nevertheless, our individual feelings and caprices, just because they are various and conflicting, bring us into sight of the absolutely valuable ideal, the ideal of spiritual unity and self-possession, and of our ever-present and insistent need, to bring our caprices into some sort of harmony. "We need to give life sense, to know and to control ourselves, to end the natural chaos, to bring order and light into our deeds, to make the warfare of natural passion subordinate to the peace and the power of the spirit."

A higher source of insight to the way of salvation is our social experience, love for man and serviceableness. "Our social responsibilities tend to set limits to our fickleness. Social discipline removes some of our inner conflicts by teaching us not to indulge caprices." But human society is after all, like the individual, a chaos of needs, of fickleness, of turmoil and bickerings, and, as such, is itself in need of salvation.

Our third resource, then, is reason, meaning by reason not something opposed to experience, but the power "to see widely and steadily and connectedly." May not abstract ideas, so criticized by recent writers, "be merely a means toward helping us toward an easier view of larger unities of fact than our present sort of human consciousness could grasp except for this auxiliary device? May not analysis be merely an aspect, a part of our live thinking?" Reason is, in fact, "the process of getting connected experience on a large scale." It is "a coherent view of many facts in some sort of unity." Reasonable experience can of course not dispense with "instinct, feeling, faith and the inarticulate intuitions. These are the basis upon which the genuine work of the reason, the wider view of life, must be carried toward its fulfilment. For whoever is to comprehend the unities of life must first live."

The deliveries of reason have interesting implications for epistemology and religion. In every deliverance of reason there is at least an implicit appeal to some form of wider or deeper or richer insight than that of the individual, an insight which is taken as normative for our own imperfect opinions and judgments. "True is the judgment that is confirmed by the larger view to which it appeals. False is the assertion that is not thus confirmed. Upon such a conception the very ideas of truth and error depend. Without such a conception truth and error have no sense." This all-inclusive insight is not to be regarded as something merely virtual, a possible unity of experience (Kant), but rather as something "more live and real and concrete and conscious than are any of our passing moments of fleeting human experience."

"It must be viewed as an actual and inclusive and divinely rational knowledge of all facts in their unity. And the very nature of facts, their very being as facts, must be determined by their presence as objects in the experience of this world-embracing insight."

But what has the all-wise knower of truth to do with our salvation? The recognition of an all-seeing insight, as something real, is in itself calming, sustaining, rationalizing. It awakens in us "the ideal of knowing ourselves even as we are known, and of guiding our lives in the light of such a view of ourselves." Such an ideal cannot remain wholly a matter of theory: it is from its very nature an appeal to the will. In fact, "there is no such thing as a purely intellectual form of assertion which has no element of action about it. An opinion is a deed." "If a man proposes to let his ideas be tested not by his momentary caprice, and not by any momentary datum of experience, but by what proves to be their workings in the long run, then already he is appealing to an essentially superhuman type of empirical test and estimate." A practical proof of absolute reality and absolute truth is the irrevocable deed. "The pragmatist who denies that there is any absolute truth accessible has never rightly considered the very most characteristic feature of the reasonable will, namely, that it is always counselling irrevocable deeds, and therefore is always giving counsel that is for its own determinate purpose irrevocably right or wrong precisely in so far as it is definite counsel."

The practical devotion to a cause implies the same reference to a super-individual reality as does the theoretical judgment. "The cause . . . is some conceived, and yet also real, spiritual unity which links many individual lives in one, and which is therefore essentially superhuman, in exactly the sense in which we found the realities of the world of reason to be superhuman."

The last two lectures, somewhat less closely connected with the theme of the volume than the preceding five lectures, deal with the place of evil in human life, and with the definition of the invisible church. The book as a whole is a notable exhibition of Professor Royce's well-known dialectical skill, and abounds in passages of sustained eloquence. It is needless to say that it is an addition to our philosophical literature which is as valuable as it is welcome.

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*The Teacher's Practical Philosophy.* By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York and London, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1911.—pp. viii, 331.

This book is based on a series of lectures given in Japan, Korea, and Hawaii during the academic year 1906-07. But these lectures have been specially prepared for an audience in the United States. After an introductory chapter, in which a serious philosophical point of view is clearly set forth, there follows the main body of the book which is divided into four parts. Part I, with the general title "The Function of the Teacher," includes five chapters which describe the function of the teacher as a species of intercourse between persons,