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Source: *The American Journal of Theology*, Oct., 1915, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 1915), pp. 550-576

Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3155611>

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## THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION AND THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

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The one far-reaching contribution of the nineteenth century is the inductively formulated concept of evolution. The researches made by Darwin and other biologists were so convincing that not only the fact of evolution but also its methodological and theoretical implications have become fundamental in all organic and social sciences. Theology for a time stubbornly resisted the theory of evolution in its field. But so empirically convincing is the theory and so universally is it applied in other fields of investigation that theology cannot remain immune from its influence. The theological application of the doctrine, however, has been limited to the history of theology. It has not yet been made to its basal object, God. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the significance of the doctrine of evolution for certain elementary problems connected with the conception of God.

The method employed in this study is as follows: First, we shall indicate the problems due to the attempt to relate the traditional conception of God to the doctrine of evolution. Secondly, we shall make a brief criticism of the solutions of the problems as given in Royce's absolute idealism and Eucken's philosophy of life. This will be followed by a statement of the results and the theological implications of our study.

### I. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE RELATION OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF GOD

One of the essential evolutionary ideas is that of change. The static view of the world was characteristic of the prevailing philosophies and theologies prior to the dawn of modern science; and the satisfactions of life were found in absolutes, finalities, immutabilities, eternities, fixities. With the growth of biological science

the view of reality as changing has been gaining ground and has come to dominate the very thought and life of the modern world. Bergson, indeed, universalizes the idea of change, making it the very essence of life.<sup>1</sup>

Another element of the evolutionary theory is the notion of growth in the being of reality. Previous to the full sway of organic science, evolution meant an unfoldment of something already given. Reality was held to be ready-made; hence it was not subject to the process of growth. Over against this closed view of the world, the modern theories of evolution stand for an actual growth in the being of things; for organic beings are not merely evolving what were their latent potentialities, but they are growing in the content of their being. It is particularly one of the radical contentions of Bergson that there is a *real* growth in things. Reality, for him, is not ready-made; but it is constantly creating, becoming, growing, adding to itself new worlds.<sup>2</sup>

The theories of evolution, moreover, hold to the view of the continuity and solidarity of organic beings. Lamarck constructed a phylogenetic tree showing the oneness of organic forms. The enormous amount of inductive data accumulated by Darwin in his works, *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man*, is intended to establish the organic relation of all living beings, man included. This belief is shared by all biological scientists. Bergson apparently differs from them in his view of the evolution of life as taking place in divergent lines; yet he is fundamentally one with them in his recognition of the unity of all living forms by virtue of the original impetus of life.<sup>3</sup>

What now are the factors of this process of change, growth, and continuity? Here, as to the philosophy of evolution, opinion differs. According to Lamarck and Darwin, the actual forces of evolution are natural, although the agency of God is admitted in their deistic view of him as the first cause.<sup>4</sup> In opposition to their view, Bergson maintains the *élan vital* as the fundamental cause

<sup>1</sup> See *Creative Evolution*, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 251 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, chap. ii; cf. pp. 251 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Lamarck, *op. cit.*, I, 113; Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, pp. 424 f.

of the evolutionary process.<sup>1</sup> But however various their views as to the ontological nature of the factors of evolution, they all agree in the idea that these factors are immanent in the organisms and in their environment.

This leads, finally, to the question of teleology in the process of evolution. This is another mooted problem. Lamarck believed that forms of life were tending from less perfect to more perfect forms.<sup>2</sup> Darwin considered that the organic evolution has reached its summit in man; but he refused to commit himself to any definite view as to the ultimate destiny of human life.<sup>3</sup> Bergson repudiates radical mechanism and radical finalism alike, but does not deny all purpose in the evolutionary process.<sup>4</sup> That there is some purpose in the process is not denied by these evolutionists. The purpose they would admit, in view of their conception of the organic world as involved in the process of change and growth, marked by accidents, setbacks, and the like, is bound to be a changing, growing, and therefore finite purpose.

We may, then, summarize the meaning of the evolutionary theory in the statement that, according to it, all forms of life are characterized by the process of change, growth, and organic continuity, which is effected by the forces immanent in the organisms and in their environment in accordance with a limited, growing purpose.

Turning now to the traditional conception of God, we note that it embodies the two essential ideas, namely, God as the transcendent supernatural personality and as the absolute being. The conception of God as the transcendent supernatural personality underlies all systems of orthodoxy.<sup>5</sup> The world-view underlying this conception of God is a philosophy which divides reality into two realms: a natural and a supernatural. The connection

<sup>1</sup> For views on this matter, see Jordan and Kellogg, *Evolution and Animal Life*, pp. 9 f., 468 f.; Kellogg, *Darwinism Today*, p. 378; Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, pp. 305 ff.; Wallace, *Darwinism*, chap. v; Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, pp. 254 ff.; Schmucker, *The Meaning of Evolution*, chap. xix

<sup>2</sup> See Packard, *Lamarck the Founder of Evolution*, pp. 323, 345 f.

<sup>3</sup> *The Descent of Man*, pp. 702 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Greene, "The Supernatural," *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 142 ff.

between the two is effected by means of supernatural acts of God. Accordingly, the emphasis in this view of God is placed upon his specifically supernatural deeds in his relation to the world of nature and of man.<sup>1</sup> Now, it is this insistence on the supernaturalness of God in his relation to the world that leads orthodox theologians to oppose the modern doctrine of evolution. To hold that the world and man have come to be what they are by the process of a slow and gradual evolution means atheism.<sup>2</sup> It should here be noted that their antagonism to the evolutionary theory is due mainly to the desire to maintain intact the finality of their system deducible from the infallible scripture given by the transcendent, supernatural God, and to furnish a positive basis of assurance to men that he is powerful to perform even miraculous deeds, if necessary, for their ultimate victory.

The other essential element in the traditional conception of God is the idea of him as the absolute being. This is the philosophic view of God which orthodoxy endeavors to combine with the conception of the supernatural and individualistic God of popular Christianity. Philosophically conceived, God is the ultimate reality, the source and ground of all existence. God so viewed possesses such attributes as spirituality, infinity, perfection, personality, immutability, and the like.<sup>3</sup> God as such is beyond all the limitations of time and history. He is absolutely immutable in his essence, attributes, and purpose.<sup>4</sup> With this insistence of traditional theology on the absoluteness of God goes also its effort to retain the finality of its system. The absoluteness of the divine revelation, the uniqueness of Christ, the completeness of Christianity, all stand or fall with the doctrine of the absoluteness of God. Hence he must by all means be conceived of as the absolute being free from time and historical change.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I, 535 ff., 550 ff., 151 ff.; II, 378 ff.; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, I, 393 ff., 61 ff.; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, I, 353 ff.; II, 371 ff., 669 ff., etc.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, II, 11 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 499 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Strong, *op. cit.*, I, 248.

<sup>4</sup> See Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 390 f.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 351 f.

<sup>5</sup> The absoluteness of God, from the standpoint of orthodoxy, does not, however, signify that he embraces the whole of reality (see Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 382 f.).

In brief, these two elements—God as the supernatural personality and as the absolute being—constitute the basic ideas in the traditional conception of God. They represent the practical ethico-religious and philosophical interests of man in his attempt to interpret the world and human life. But it is this very view of God as the supernatural personality and the absolute being and the presuppositions which it implies that are opposed to the theological implications of the evolutionary theory. Hence there arise many problems in the attempt to bring the traditional conception of God into relation with the doctrine of evolution. Some of these problems we may now state.

The problem of method comes to our first notice. The method followed by science in the formulation of the evolutionary theory is antithetical to that employed by traditional theology in the construction of its conception of God. The former employs the inductive, empirical method; the latter, the a priori appeal to revelation. The one outstanding feature of evolutionary theories is that they are formulated as result of more or less careful empirical investigations of the processes in the organic world.<sup>1</sup> It is quite otherwise with traditional theology. It maintains that God has made his final revelation of himself in the Scripture. Its conception of God, therefore, is obtained by a systematic analysis of the content of this infallible revelation.<sup>2</sup> Which method should, then, be used in the formulation of the conception of God? This is a critical problem, for on its solution depends largely the character of any conception of God.

The problem of method is closely connected with the other problem: that of the relation between theology and science. This involves a metaphysical problem, viz., Can the affirmations of science be held final on the ontological realities with which theology deals or must theology maintain that there is more to reality than is revealed by science? Traditional theology, having an infallible source for its affirmations, does not make any real use of

<sup>1</sup> One may question this statement with respect to Bergson. It should be replied, however, that he, too, set forth his theory of evolution after years of study in the field of organic evolution.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I 182 f., 364.

the results of scientific investigation. This dogmatism of traditional orthodoxy has been polemically transferred to what Perry calls naïve, uncritical naturalism<sup>1</sup> which assumes that it has the last word on the matter of reality. Manifestly here we have a conflict between the two dogmatisms. What then shall be done with the conflict?<sup>2</sup>

Another problem is that of God as the supernatural personality. Traditional theology, as we have seen, holds the view of God as the sovereign person who has determined the course of the world and who expresses his relation to it in specific supernatural acts. The evolutionary theories know only this world where the forces that carry on the evolutionary process are immanent in the organisms and in their environment. These theories know no such supernatural interventions from an unknown realm of reality as is assumed by traditional theology. Thus is raised the problem of the transcendence and immanence of God. Is God organically related with the life-process or is he to be identified primarily in miraculous interventions? This question is closely bound up with the next problem, namely, that of God as the absolute being.

The traditional conception of God tenaciously maintains his freedom from the exigencies of time and history; evolution is wholly foreign to the character of God. But in the evolutionary theory change and growth are held as characteristic of all the forms of life. Accordingly, absolutes, finalities, eternities, perfections are not found anywhere in the realms open to scientific investigation. But is God free from change and growth? All admit that our ideas of God have changed from the days of primitive man. But do change and growth hold true only of our conceptions of God and not of the object of these conceptions? Is God absolute or is he in any sense finite? This is the most critical problem that calls for a careful consideration.

And there is yet another problem to be mentioned, namely, that of God's relation to the world and man. The traditional conception of God assumes the distinct creation and absolute control of the world by the divine will. The theories of evolution, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, chap. iv.

<sup>2</sup> See, on this point, Perry, *op. cit.*, chap. v, "Religion and the Limits of Science."

reduce existing things to so small beginnings that the creation of them seems scarcely worthy of the supreme being. The evils involved in the process of natural and human evolution also cast a serious doubt upon the assumed absolute control of the world by God. What, then, is the real nature of God's relation to the world and man?

The foregoing may be said to constitute the essential problems involved in the effort to effect a tenable relation between the evolutionary theory and the traditional conception of God. We shall now turn to certain typical recent attempts at their solution.

## II. A CRITICISM OF CERTAIN TYPICAL RECENT SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS

Here we shall take certain aspects of the discussions in Royce's absolute idealism and Eucken's philosophy of life in order to illustrate the problem we have in mind. For these philosophers of religion, more than any of the professional theologians of our time, recognize the inadequacy of the traditional conception of God and are fully conscious of the problems raised by modern scientific concepts, including the evolutionary theory.

In general it can be said that Royce works out his conception of God from the standpoint of his absolute idealism. He analyzes human temporary and fragmentary experiences and absolutizes them into an all-inclusive, absolute experience.<sup>1</sup> Or he analyzes human ideas or thoughts and reaches his theory of being and considers this theory as the basis of his system.<sup>2</sup> Thus he makes the Absolute Experience or Being the ultimate basis of our finite experience and thought. It is from the standpoint of such an Experience or Thought that Royce finds the criterion of his evaluation of the world and man. Accordingly, the method of Royce is opposed to that of the empirical theories of evolution. The intellectualism and apriorism of his method are in full accord with his general system of thought.<sup>3</sup>

But it should not be overlooked in this connection that there are numerous statements in Royce's works, which are not in agree-

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, lecture iii.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 339 f.

<sup>3</sup> See *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 84 ff., 109 ff.

ment with his dialectic method. In the work, for example, which is distinctly devoted to the problem of religious knowledge, Royce speaks much of individual and social experiences as sources of religious insight and appeals to the actual experiences of those who practice religion as guides for us to the truth.<sup>1</sup> These and other assertions of Royce<sup>2</sup> show that one real interest of the author is to ascertain the data of our common individual and social experiences and to construct his theory of the world and human life on precisely such experiences. Hence just so far as he deals with our experience in its varied aspects, Royce is not in line with his absolutist method; one must pass by a metaphysical leap from the method of experience to an all-inclusive experience or thought.<sup>3</sup> But on the other hand, just to the extent that Royce makes use of the data of our experience he is in agreement with the inductive method of the evolutionary theory; and to that degree he has worked out the bearing of the theory in the formulation of his conception of God.

To speak next of his attitude toward science, it is not difficult, in view of the fact that philosophically Royce does not employ the empirical method, to ascertain what it would be. He is not satisfied with the interpretation of the world given by science and offers his idealistic theory as the final view of the universe.<sup>4</sup> There is much truth in his statement: "The modern naturalistic and mechanistic views of reality are not, indeed, false within their own proper range, but they are inadequate to tell us the whole truth."<sup>5</sup> But to maintain that the theory of being, as Royce holds, must determine all the interpretation of nature and of man<sup>6</sup> is against the empirical temper of our age. But on the other hand, the very fact that Royce affirms even the temporal reality of our experience

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26 ff., 37 ff., 166 ff.; Cf. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 12 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 55, 401; II, 362.

<sup>2</sup> See, *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 387 f.; II, 5.

<sup>3</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 11 ff.; cf. *The Sources of Religious Experience*, pp. 109 f., 137, 144 f.

<sup>4</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 207 ff.; *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 60 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 8 f.

of the world and assigns this temporal order to the work of science shows that he is interested in viewing the facts of life from an empirical point of view; and so to this extent he must modify his absolutist philosophical theory. But to the degree that Royce takes such an empirical attitude he illustrates the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the problem of God.

To come now to the nature of God, we find that Royce conceives of him as the Absolute Being, Thought or Experience, and Will or Purpose.<sup>1</sup> It is evident that such a conception of God is fundamentally different from that logically growing out of the evolutionary view. This demands that if there be a God, he must not only be immanent in the world but must himself be actually involved in the process of change and growth. The God of Royce is, it is true, immanent in the world of thought—engaged in the work of interpreting the world. He is not such a static absolute as that of Spinoza. But he is eternally what he is—there is no change and increase in his being.

Yet it is worthy of note in this connection that this conception of the eternal absoluteness of God needs modification in the light of many of Royce's statements which indicate finite aspects of this God. To cite a few, we note the following:

The only way to give our view of Being rationality is to see that we long for the Absolute only in so far as in us the Absolute also longs, and seeks, through our very temporal striving, the peace that is nowhere in Time, but only, and yet absolutely, in eternity. Were there no longing in Time, there would be no peace in eternity. . . . The right eternally triumphs, yet not without temporal warfare. This warfare occurs, indeed, *within the divine life itself*. . . . I sorrow. But the sorrow is not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow.<sup>2</sup>

These and similar expressions of Royce indicate clearly a God striving to attain the goal of his perfection. But in the last analysis Royce would maintain that this impression of God's finitude is due to our finite temporal point of view. From the point of view of the Absolute, his will is completely expressed, his tasks perfectly done,

<sup>1</sup> See *The World and the Individual*, I, 339, 341, 394 ff.; II, 335, Lectures iii, vi; cf. *The Conception of God*, pp. 1 ff.; *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 296, 324, 373 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 386, 398, 409; cf. *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 183, 296.

his moral life absolutely finished.<sup>1</sup> If God is thus eternally complete in himself, why does he suffer, struggle, and long to be perfect at all? Is his suffering and struggle only apparent and his eternal perfection an actual fact? In other words, Royce, to be consistent, has to affirm either the suffering of God as real and so his God as finite or his sufferings as an illusion and hence his God as eternally complete. Royce does not wish to do either. He feels too keenly the realities of our life to pronounce his God all-complete and perfect, untouched by our finite experiences. Yet impelled by his absolute idealism, Royce maintains that the all-inclusive perfect being is at the heart of the universe.<sup>2</sup> But just in so far as he interprets God in terms of our evolutionary experience, Royce departs from his absolutist philosophical position and approaches the conception of God necessitated by the evolutionary theory.

These two aspects—those that are in agreement with his absolute idealism and those that are in accord with the evolutionary theory—we may note finally in connection with his conception of God's relation to the world and to man.

It is maintained by Royce that God is morally perfect.<sup>3</sup> This moral perfection of God is not a result of struggle on his part.<sup>4</sup> Royce, moreover, declares that God is not merely immanent in the world but is identical with the totality of the universe in all its expressions.<sup>5</sup> This being the case, the world of nature and of man must be absolutely good.<sup>6</sup> But the theories of evolution indicate to us that there are connected with the evolutionary process of the world merciless struggles, miseries, wastes, anomalies, sufferings. These forms of evil we cannot deny, nor can they be explained away. Yet Royce holds that the world is good when it is viewed in its entirety.<sup>7</sup> An empirical evolutionist would, however, scarcely

<sup>1</sup> See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 442 ff.; *The Conception of God*, pp. 8 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, II, 302.

<sup>2</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 436 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 441 ff.; *The Conception of God*, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 448.

<sup>5</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 168 f., 285 f.

<sup>6</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 444.

<sup>7</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 379.

consider the processes of nature so idealistically as does Royce.<sup>1</sup> The actual process of nature suggests either that the God immanent in it is impotent to carry out his plans without evil consequences, or that there are evil forces which are counteracting his activities. But Royce admits neither hypothesis. He must contend for the view that the world considered *sub specie aeternitatis* is perfect. Yet he does not deny all reality to the evils in the world; he admits their temporal reality and seeks to give significance to their existence.<sup>2</sup> Here again we see a deviation from absolute idealism and a tendency on his part toward the standpoint of the evolutionary theory.

To speak now of Royce's view of God's relation to man, we need to observe that since God is the all-inclusive Individual of the world, embracing all finite beings and since the latter have no existence apart from the former, a logical consequence would be that finite beings possess no real freedom and individuality. Yet he distinctly attempts to show that finite spirits possess their own individuality and freedom.<sup>3</sup> In view of the fact that each finite being expresses in his unique manner the will of the Absolute, he holds that he possesses freedom and individuality. Hence there are provided all the possibilities for a genuine moral life.<sup>4</sup> And in the temporal order of the world there are real moral deeds done and real achievements toward a better world.

But this insistence of Royce upon moral activity leads us to ask: Why should we struggle against the apparent forces of evil to create a better world, when the world in its essence is all complete and finished? Why must we struggle through the evils of life to obtain perfection, as is held by Royce,<sup>5</sup> when there are no *real* evils in the world, and we stand before our God all complete.<sup>6</sup> Unless there are possibilities for change and growth in the world, we cannot see how there could be real moral life for us finite beings.

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, pp. 219 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 380 ff., II, 388 ff.; *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 215 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, lecture vii.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 343 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 171 ff., 287 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 150.

If the world is finished in reality, even now, as Royce holds, so that we cannot change its course, the only course open to us is to deny the reality of movement and progress in the world of our experience and engage in mystic contemplation of an "eternal" world. Moreover, as God is not ultimately found in the world where actual evolution is taking place, we can find him only in escaping from such a world. What other course than this can we follow when we are told that the real world is perfect, but that this perfection is not to be found in time, and that our comfort lies in the knowledge of the Eternal?<sup>1</sup> But Royce would not tolerate such a life. His interests lie in the actual experiences of the social realm.<sup>2</sup> A consistent absolute idealism would give up all real interest in our evolutionary experience and urge a life of speculation as to the eternal perfection of the world. Royce declines, however, to accept this path. The moral and religious appeals of our world are so great that he must accept and deal earnestly with them. In following this course he deviates from the standpoint of his absolute idealism and comes to the position of the evolutionary theory that stands for the reality of the time-process in which God and man are actually engaged for the creation of a better world.

With the criticism of Royce's solution of the problems raised by the evolutionary theory, we may now pass to another typical solution, that given in Eucken's philosophy of life.

The central thought of Eucken is his conception of a world-transcendent spiritual life, a whole of reality, which he identifies with God. This God, the cosmic spiritual life, furnishes the solution to all the problems of human life. A pertinent question is: How does Eucken come to his conception of such a God? He repudiates the intellectualism of idealistic philosophy, the subjectivism of Romanticism, and such voluntarism as that of Schopenhauer.<sup>3</sup> In place of these methods Eucken uses what he calls the noölogical method. "To explain noölogically," writes Eucken, "means to arrange the whole of the Spiritual Life as a special

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 379, 411.

<sup>2</sup> *The Problem of Christianity*, lectures ii ff.

<sup>3</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 73 ff.

activity, to ascertain its position and problem, and through such an adaptation to illumine the whole and raise its potencies."<sup>1</sup> It is through the use of such a method that Eucken arrives at his conception of an independent spiritual life and views all things from the standpoint of such a life.<sup>2</sup> And this a priori procedure of Eucken is in full accord with his philosophical position. Nevertheless, in spite of his interest in an absolutist metaphysics, Eucken, like Royce, is constantly concerned with the actual struggles and conflicts of our experience; he is incessantly engaged in setting forth the life-process in its progressive development. It is not something beyond human experience with which Eucken deals; but he investigates the living interests of the life-process itself. Yet believing that we cannot discover a stable basis of life in the empirically ascertained facts of life, Eucken distrusts this method and falls back on his a priori procedure. Thus we see in Eucken, as we saw in Royce, a double tendency: a tendency to deal with the facts of life empirically, and a tendency to view them from the standpoint of an a priori assumption.

This double tendency appears also in his attitude toward science. Eucken fully appreciates the worth of science as it enables us to control the forces of nature.<sup>3</sup> This appreciation of science is made manifest in his repudiation of the naïve supernaturalism of traditional Christianity,<sup>4</sup> and in his acceptance of the fact of evolution.<sup>5</sup> He holds that it is not natural science that creates trouble for us, but our weakness in spiritual convictions.<sup>6</sup> But a question here is: Can he really appreciate and do justice to scientific concepts, the evolutionary theory included, without accepting the method by which these concepts are formulated? The method and theory of evolution seem so closely bound up with each other that one will find it very difficult to accept the one and reject the other with any consistency. Eucken is willing to view

<sup>1</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, p. 178; cf. pp. 453 ff.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 154, 242 f., 351 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 129 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 345 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 521 ff., 549 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 257, 262 f., 278.

<sup>6</sup> *The Problem of Human Life*, pp. 541 f.

man as a product of nature, provided he is allowed to maintain that in man there appears in the course of his evolution an independent life.<sup>1</sup> This insistence upon the superempirical factor in the evolutionary process is, indeed, in line with his absolutist position. But the very fact that Eucken views so much of reality from the standpoint of the evolutionary theory is significant.

Now in regard to the traditional conception of God as the transcendent supernatural personality we find that Eucken has set aside its supernaturalistic features and retains what he regards as its eternal element.<sup>2</sup> It is this retention of an eternal element—an Absolute Spiritual Life in union with man—that at once opens up the problem of God as the Absolute Being.

Eucken conceives of God as the Absolute Spiritual Life above the limitations of time and history.<sup>3</sup> Such a God, for Eucken, is the very foundation of all time-order. Man cannot find satisfaction in history, if there is not disclosed in it to him “an over-historical nature.”<sup>4</sup> We seek for a basis of life. But we cannot find it in our immediate experience, thought, or activity; for in the whole life of immediate existence all is change and uncertainty. We must seek it beyond our psychic state—in a whole of life which is not subject to time.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, to conceive of God in terms of history and evolution means to surrender the absoluteness of all truth.<sup>6</sup> There are, however, many elements in his philosophy which would naturally lead him to conceive of God in terms of the evolutionary theory. For example, his emphasis on activity rather than on thought as an essential means of appropriating reality;<sup>7</sup> his recognition of movement and history as characteristic of the modern age;<sup>8</sup> his view of God as immanent in the world of

<sup>1</sup> *The Life of the Spirit*, p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 576 ff., 544 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 208 f., 214.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>5</sup> *Life's Basis*, etc., p. 154, cf. pp. 275 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 379 f.; cf. pp. 537 ff.; *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 41.

<sup>7</sup> *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 220 ff., 255 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *The Life of the Spirit*, pp. 104 ff.

man, helping him to be one with himself—all these and the other like elements call for the view of God as a changing being. But instead of carrying out the logic of these elements, Eucken would insist upon the view of God as the Absolute Spiritual Life above the changes of time.

This affirmation of God's unchangeability, however, can be consistently maintained by Eucken only as he views the ultimate meaning of the world of experience in static terms and conceives of God's relation to the world and man somewhat after the fashion of traditional supernaturalism. But his activist faith does not permit him to accept the traditional supernaturalism of Christianity. He conceives of God as involved in a vital relation with the movements of history.<sup>2</sup> If Eucken consistently followed out this conception of God's relation to a growing world and humanity in dynamic terms, it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain his absoluteness. For how can a God who is in dynamic relation to the world and who is involved in the processes of change and growth remain unaffected by such processes? We have sufficiently indicated many features in his philosophy that are irreconcilable with his contention for the unchangeability of God. And these very elements show clearly that he has not been able to escape the bearing of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God.

This influence of the theory appears also in his view of God's relation to the world and man. Eucken ultimately conceives of God's relation to the world in terms of immanent idealism.<sup>3</sup> This conception, however, conflicts with his opposition to immanent idealism seen in his indictment of the evil processes of the natural world.<sup>4</sup> The irrationality of the world and its oppositions to the values and aims of human life force Eucken to acknowledge that evils present to us an insoluble enigma of life.<sup>5</sup> Eucken's admission of the reality of evil in the world and its consequent irrationality

<sup>1</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 221 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See *Christianity and the New Idealism*, pp. 45 ff.; *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 188 ff.; *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 318 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 220 f., 165 ff.; *Main Currents*, etc., p. 459; *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 270 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Life's Basis*, etc., p. 20; cf. *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 290 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 280 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 490 ff.

suggests either that his God is impotent to control the evil forces in the world, or that they are due to some non-divine factors. In either case God would be finite in power. But Eucken, impelled by his avowed philosophical position, maintains that the world, despite its insoluble evils, is due to the immanent activity of God.<sup>1</sup>

To come now to Eucken's view of the relation of God and man, we observe that he considers this relation from the standpoint of the practical interests of human life. God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is absolutely necessary to give content and subsistence to the life of man; without such a God man would be bound by the evil forces of the natural world and so could not attain to his destiny. It is through struggles, sufferings, conflicts, that we come to the sense of our union with God; we must fight with all our might against the forces of evil if we are to possess the life of God in our soul, for in the hardest fight we gain the clearest vision of God.<sup>2</sup>

A question arises at this point: What is God's relation to us in our struggle? Is he implicated in our conflicts with the antagonistic forces of the world? Eucken flatly denies that God participates in such depressing aspects of our experience. All that we need to know, according to him, is that God does help us out of the apparent defeats of our life.<sup>3</sup> This is because Eucken desires to preserve the freedom of God from the changes and experiences of time. But we should particularly note that he gives very little space to an exposition of his contention that God is above the changes and sufferings of our existence. On the other hand, abundant space is given to his exposition of the life-process of man in its historical development. Moreover, the very phrase most used by Eucken to represent God, namely, "spiritual life," stands for a reality which is derivable in and through our changing experience.

### III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION

First, as regards the methodological problem, the result of our study of Royce and Eucken may be stated as follows:

Royce, whose method is fundamentally based on an Absolute Experience or Thought, or an All-inclusive Insight, which he

<sup>1</sup> *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 270 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 246 f., 255 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 432 ff.

assumes a priori, nevertheless gives much space to the examination of the facts of changing, growing, temporal social experience. He is fully aware of the movements of empiricism, especially since the days of Kant, and so is unable to ignore inductive investigation in matters of philosophy and religion.<sup>1</sup> In very marked degree, the same attitude toward empiricism in method characterizes Eucken. He has given up the power of thought relied upon by all intellectualistic systems of philosophy, for he finds it incapable of giving us the true insight into the problems of human life. True, philosophically Eucken undertakes to view the problems of life from the standpoint of an independent spiritual life. But in reality he is constantly dealing with the actual experiences of the life-process in its struggles, conflicts, oppositions, tasks.

This methodological tendency suggests that if theology is to keep in line with the inductive, evolutionary method of contemporary sciences, it cannot follow the method hitherto employed. The traditional method of expounding and systematizing a given quantity of supernatural revelation located in an infallible church or scripture<sup>2</sup> is becoming more and more untenable; for the investigations in biblical science are constantly bringing to light the differences between the content of biblical revelation and that of modern religion.

An increasing number of theological thinkers, who have felt the power of scientific investigations, especially in the field of religion, can no longer follow the traditional method. These men feel that theology, in order to take its place among the sciences of our age and to accomplish its work for the furtherance of religious life, should employ the method demanded by the evolutionary theory. In adopting such a method of experimentation and verification theology will indeed lose its claim to finality in content, but it will find a vaster field for its investigation and gain scientific worth for what it discovers through the medium of the new procedure.<sup>3</sup> Theology, then, in following the inductive method of the evolu-

<sup>1</sup> See his article, "The Eternal and the Practical," *Philos. Rev.*, XIII, 113 f., 142.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 182 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 70 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 320; "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, X, 232.

tionary theory will seek for the sources of its doctrines in the common religious experiences of people as these experiences are critically expounded in investigations dealing, particularly, with the history of religions and the psychology of religious experience. Christian theology will, of course, study its religious inheritance in the records, especially of the Hebrew and Christian peoples, in order to gain suggestive contributions toward the solution of its religious problems. Significant personalities, notably the prophets and Jesus and his apostles, will constitute a specially valuable source of religious insight. Yet theology will not be limited to their contributions. It will, in accordance with its empirical, evolutionary method, deal with contributions on matters of religion coming from any other worthy source. It is thus the great field of human religious experience in the largest sense with which theology would empirically deal.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, what is the relation between theology and science? Royce, in accordance with his absolute idealism, maintains that philosophy has the last word on the subject of reality. Yet he recognizes the truths of science as inductive descriptions of the temporal order. Moreover, he gives a high value to the deeds and events of our temporal experience.<sup>2</sup> What he opposes in science (natural science) is its uncritical affirmation that all reality consists of physical elements and that all forms of existence are explicable in terms of such elements. Eucken likewise appreciates the place and worth of science in modern life. But he cannot tolerate the scientific naturalism which reduces all reality to the plane of physical mechanism. Thus these philosophers of religion hold that the discoveries of natural science do not constitute the whole of reality; and that, accordingly, theological or religious affirmations must be given their due validity; and yet they tend to ground these affirmations on the facts of evolutionary experience. This implies that both science and theology are called upon to face the facts of life and of existence in a thoroughly empirical fashion, and to consider themselves as co-operating means of furthering the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Johnson, *God in Evolution*, chap. ii, "Concerning Method."

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., "The Reality of the Temporal," *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, 296 ff.

ongoing evolution of life. This implication of our study calls for a brief comment.

It is fully manifest that such theories of evolution as those of Lamarck and Darwin are based on a more or less thoroughgoing empiricism; and that they assume an undogmatic attitude toward their theories. Bergson, too, does not claim finality for his system.<sup>1</sup> This undogmatic attitude of the evolutionists is characteristic of the best of our contemporary scientists. Pearson, for example, points out the incompleteness of science and considers its concepts or laws as mental shorthand, useful to the work of man.<sup>2</sup> This thoroughly empirical attitude of the evolutionists is not what we find in the case of traditional theologians; their theological declarations are marked by some dogmatic absolutism. They maintain that they have absolute truth in some form, and they contend for the immunity of their theological doctrines from the encroachments of science; for them the findings of empirical study cannot form the foundation of their theological affirmations—they must be grounded on some a priori principle underivable in and through human experience.

It is quite clear, then, that such a theological position does not seem to be in agreement with the implications of the evolutionary theory. It is quite apparent that the best way, in so far as our present age of culture and civilization is concerned, is to adopt the hints given both by the historians of religion and by the men of science and conceive of the doctrines both of science and of theology as working hypotheses, which we acquire through the process of experimentation, for the achievement of the higher values of life.<sup>3</sup> In thus conceiving the work of science and of theology in relation to the interests of human life there is suggested a tentative relation between them, namely, the relation of co-operative activity in the interest of promoting the development of man in his struggle for existence. The whole realm of existence,

<sup>1</sup> See *op. cit.*, pp. 44 ff., 265 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See *The Grammar of Science*, pp. 25, 86 f.; cf. Ostwald, *Natural Philosophy*, pp. 28, 31; Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, pp. 340 f.

<sup>3</sup> See Ames, "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, X, 219-32; *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. xvi; I. King, *The Development of Religion*, chap. xiii.

then, will be open to science for investigation,<sup>1</sup> so that it may go on with its work of observation, description, classification, explanation of the processes of nature, of human society, and of our psychological phenomena in order to have control over them in the behalf of man; while theology is to proceed with its task, aided by the results of scientific investigation in various fields, of interpreting particularly religious phenomena and of formulating concepts, doctrines, hypotheses of the objects of religion which will best further, in a given age, its ideal ends. Such a theory of the relation of theology and science seems to be the implication of the result of our study in so far as this relation is concerned.

Thirdly, let us look at the problem of God as the supernatural personality. Royce, as has been observed, has completely abandoned the Kantian things-in-themselves and conceives of God in terms of immanent idealism. For him there is no other world than the world of thought and will, and God is organically bound up with such a world. Eucken cannot indorse the view of God as belonging to a supernatural world and as coming to us by means of miraculous donation. God is considered by him to be the very basis of all existence, in spite of the appearances to the contrary.

The significance of this result for theology may be stated as follows: that, to be in line with and represent helpfully the evolutionary view of the world, theology must abandon its traditional way of conceiving God in terms of dualistic supernaturalism and must think of him as immanently active in the world of nature and of man. But orthodox theologians generally decline to carry out this implication; they refuse to view God in terms of dynamic immanence; and they are not wholly willing to surrender the supernatural transcendence of God in the traditional sense of the word. The underlying reason for the disinclination to conceive God completely in dynamic relations with the world is twofold: theologians have not, on the one hand, acquired scientific confidence in the normal evolutionary activities of the immanent forces in the world; and, on the other hand, they desire to preserve the supernatural character of their religion. This attitude is expressed by orthodoxy in its affirmation of the Scripture as the supernatural

<sup>1</sup> Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

revelation of God, of the incarnation of Jesus as the miraculous intervention into the course of history, of salvation as the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit—in fact, the whole system of orthodoxy is based upon specific supernatural acts of God interposed into the course of nature and of human history.<sup>1</sup>

A suggestion toward an immanent conception of God's relation to the world is given by G. A. Gordon in his book *Religion and Miracles*, where he points out that religion does not stand or fall with the fate of miracles.<sup>2</sup> Thus to conceive of God in terms of dynamic immanence and to have confidence in his normal activities in the world would, indeed, be in accord with the evolutionary theory which eliminates the miraculous from the organic realm<sup>3</sup> and would be also working out the implication of the result of our study on the problem of God as the supernatural personality.

Fourthly, we come to the problem of God as the absolute being. This is the most critical problem of our investigation. For it immediately opens up the question of absoluteness and finality versus finitude and relativity in matters of religion and ethics. The evolutionary theory stands for the relative and finite view of all reality. God, from this evolutionary view of the world, is to be conceived in terms of change and growth, the essential characteristics of the living world with which he is vitally related. Traditional theology, on the contrary, contends for the system of absoluteness and finality in religion and ethics. This contention of traditional theology is a direct consequence of its view of God as the eternally complete and perfect being of the world. With respect to the problem which arises in view of the antithesis involved in the two systems, Royce presents God as the All-inclusive, Absolute Being of the universe, free from the temporal aspects of our experience. Yet we found that Royce attributes to God such

<sup>1</sup> See William and Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology*, Vols. I, II; Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 151 ff., 617 ff.; II, 378 ff., 675 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 61 ff., 533 ff.; II, 261 ff., 353 ff.; etc.; cf. W. B. Greene, "The Supernatural," *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 143 ff.; C. W. Hodge, "The Finality of the Christian Religion," *ibid.*, pp. 452 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See especially pp. 7, 33, 82, 130, 165 ff.; and for a very suggestive contribution on this subject of God's relation to the world, see G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, especially chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> Weismann, *op. cit.*, I, 6; cf. Pfeiderer, *Evolution and Theology*, p. 9.

characteristics of our evolutionary experience as suffering, striving, satisfaction. Hence God, at least when viewed from our finite point of view, is involved in the process of change and growth, so is a finite being, although he is held to be the Absolute Being, when viewed from an eternal point of view.<sup>1</sup> God, for Eucken, is the Absolute Spiritual Life, the independent basis of all temporal order. But from the standpoint of actual experience, we must view God in terms of our conflict, struggle, and activity. Thus God, according to Eucken, would be involved in the evolutionary features of human experience. Thus we may say that Royce and Eucken tend, in spite of their absolutistic positions, toward the conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience.

The implications of this tendency would be a full cognizance of the evolutionary and finite characteristics of the conception of God, which appear in Royce and Eucken and which are hard to unify with their absolutistic position. Theology should conceive God in terms of those qualities that are in accord with the results of empirical investigation of the world and particularly of human religious experience. In assuming this attitude toward the facts of the world and life, we should be led to a theory of reality positively involved in the processes of change, movement, development. In fact, one of the clearest indications of our immediate experience is the consciousness of the time-process, of history, of something done. Höffding points out that in view of the fact that our empirical world is not finished but that it always presents new experiences and riddles, we are unable to have a complete knowledge. He suggests the idea that this unfinishedness of our knowledge "may perhaps be connected with the fact that Being itself is not ready-made, but is still incomplete, and rather to be conceived as a continual becoming, like individual personality and like knowledge."<sup>2</sup> So far, then, as our scientific studies and our empirical experiences show, we ourselves and the realities with which we are related are characterized by change, incompleteness, unfinishedness, growth, development.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 133 ff.; "The Reality of the Temporal," *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, 270 f.; *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 394 f.

<sup>2</sup> *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 120; cf. p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> See Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, essay xix; cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 f.

Now a critical question is whether God can be conceived to be free from the process of evolution. We have observed that from the standpoint of our actual empirical experience, the philosophers of religion above consulted attribute to God in some measure the evolutionary features of human experience. This experiential mode of conceiving God, it would seem, should be made dominant, for it is not in accord with the empirical temper of our age to find reality outside of evolutionary experience and to define it other than in terms of such experience.<sup>1</sup> There may be a realm or realms in the universe where change, unfinishedness, development are not found and where God may be exempt from time and history; but the world of our empirical science and experience and God as he is known in the experiences of the race are all marked by temporal features. Consequently, God should be conceived under the category, not of completeness and of immutability, but of becoming and of development.

This conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience, rather than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded by our religion and ethics. If by religion we mean pietistic contemplation, philosophic knowledge, or passive receptivity, then the conception of God as the absolute being, free from the finite aspects of our world and experience, may be satisfactory. But if religion means not merely faith in the conservation of values,<sup>2</sup> but also an effort of life to attain to its highest values in the world, then we must conceive of God, not only in terms of immanence, but primarily as vitally and actively related with us in the achievement of the values of religion.<sup>3</sup> The God demanded by practical religion must be a being who really shares in our struggles, conflicts, failures, successes, victories. Such a God, as James suggests, has really been the God of the Hebrew and Christian religions. Practical religion demands, not the Absolute who includes all beings by his all-embracing knowledge, nor the Absolute who is completely independent of the world of his creation, but a God who really hears our prayers and who is actually co-operating with us to real-

<sup>1</sup> See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 26, 317 f.

<sup>2</sup> Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 9 ff., 215 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, pp. 173-83.

ize the aims and values of human life. Moreover, from the point of view of our ethics, we need such a conception of God. The futility of the traditional view of God as the absolute being who has determined the course of the world and of human history in accordance with his eternal plan becomes self-evident when we see that our moral life demands that it ought to and really can change the character of our moral universe. Höffding remarks thus on this point: "If Being were finished, harmoniously and unchangeably, Ethics would be impossible. All Ethics demands that there be effort. But there would be no room for effort, if everything were in eternal and actual completeness."<sup>1</sup> Thus both religion and ethics call for a view of God, not as an absolute, but as a relative being, actually interrelated with us in our religious and moral life.

But thus to bring relativity and becoming into the very being of God means, of course, that we must abandon that absolute ground of religious and ethical assurance which is believed to be given to us by traditional conceptions of God as the absolute controller of the world and human life. An evolving God does not guarantee beforehand the ultimate success of our moral universe.<sup>2</sup> But as a matter of fact the most staunch believers in the traditional view of God must admit that the absolute certainty as to their salvation is not a question of fact but of faith; they are to be religious and ethical in the hope that they may be saved. This uncertainty as to final victory will not necessarily lead us to pessimism and inactivity. For we are so constituted that even when we are thus uncertain of our ultimate success, we work so much the harder, hoping that we may, with God's help, bring the world to a happy issue. God, then, from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, may be conceived of as that great environing reality of the growing universe, who is ever responsive to the calls of our need, who represents our highest ethico-religious ideals and values, and who is constantly working with us for the achievement of these ideals and values. At any rate, such seems to be the theological

<sup>1</sup> *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 151; cf. pp. 158 ff.; Schiller, *op. cit.*, essay xviii on "Freedom."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 259 f.

implication of our study as to the problem of God as the absolute being.

And, fifthly, the problem of God's relation to man and the world calls for a brief comment. It has been partly discussed in the consideration of the preceding two problems. To begin with the problem of the relation of God and man, we observe that the philosophers, whom we have considered, differ on this point from the standpoint of their philosophies, yet in the main agree from that of empiricism. Royce's absolute idealism would reduce man to the plane of complete dependence on an all-inclusive being of the world, yet Royce, moved by his moral experience, contends for the ethical selfhood of man. Eucken is not interested in finding out the exact ontological relation of God and man; his interest is primarily a practical one: How can man be saved from the forces of this antagonistic world? His answer is that it is God who is the fundamental presupposition of man's salvation. Yet this salvation is not a matter of donation; man must achieve it through struggle and work. Thus Eucken assumes the dignity and power of man.

This suggests that the primary concern of theology should be to conceive the relation between God and man on the basis of the facts disclosed by experience. Theology, working from this standpoint, will be aided by such sciences as anthropology, biology, sociology, psychology, the history of religions, and the like. In studying the results of such sciences and in consulting the experiences of actual men and women, we discover their sense of dependence on, and independence of, the enviring world. Man as we find him is conscious of his dependence on his social as well as his physical environment. But this consciousness of man's dependence on his environment is not all of his experience; he often finds himself superior to his natural environment, and while he feels himself closely bound up with his social environment, he refuses to surrender the sense of his own initiative and responsibility. Theology must take account, not merely of the consciousness of man's dependence on, but of his independence of, his environment, so that it may not define his relation to God wholly in terms of receptivity but perhaps primarily in terms of co-operative activity

directed toward the establishment of a society of love and righteousness. In thus conceiving the relation of God and man, we are enabled to meet the view demanded by the evolutionary theory which, as we have seen, holds that the forces making the evolution of life possible are resident in the organisms and in their environment.

To speak now of the problem of God's relation to the world, we must frankly admit that we cannot, so far as we know, give answer either to the question concerning the beginnings of the world or to that concerning its present ontological relation to God. The theory of cosmic evolution traces the development of our world to small beginnings, and the doctrine of organic evolution conceives life as arising from some protoplasmic germs; but we do not know, as James says, the whence and how of the world—they are matters, as yet, of speculation. Meanwhile, what religion wishes to ascertain is whether God is now in some way related with the process of the world. This raises at once the question of teleology and of evil.

With regard to these questions, Royce, as we have seen, considers the world of nature as embodying, though in a partial manner, the will of God; and affirms, at least, the temporal reality of the evils in the world. Eucken could not tolerate the idea that nature as such is the cause of human evolution; for him God must be working in the process of nature for the production of man. As to the problem of evil, he admits its reality, but confesses its insolubility. Thus, the tendency of thought is to hold that there is some purpose discoverable in the evolutionary process of the world and to assume a practical attitude toward the problem of evil.

That there is some limited purpose in the world-process is admitted by many evolutionists. Lamarck, Darwin, Bergson would hold that higher forms of life are produced through the evolutionary process.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, that there are evils in the world is admitted by all the evolutionists, though opinions differ as to the explanation of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, pp. 81 ff.; Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 257 ff.; Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, pp. xxvi ff., 367, 371 f.

evil. One may conjecture that God is a limited being and hence he is unable to control the world without involving it in evils. Or one may say that the elements in the world are not yet harmonized, hence the presence of evil.<sup>1</sup> This is indeed a dark problem. Theology must deal with it wisely and critically. But from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, it seems sufficient to say, in view of our inability as yet to give a satisfactory explanation of God's relation to the evils in the world, that what is demanded of us is to recognize their existence and to struggle and work with God in opposition to the evils in us and in the world in order to create a world of love and righteousness.

We have been concerned in this study to show that men like Royce and Eucken who do not profess to stand philosophically for empirical evolutionary method and theory nevertheless employ many elements derivable in and through experience and make certain affirmations concerning God on the basis of these empirical elements. The theological implication of our study is that in order to be in harmony with the empirical temper of our age, theology is called upon to follow the inductive method demanded by the evolutionary theory and to formulate its conception of God on the basis of the facts ascertainable, particularly, in the field of religion and ethics. This, in short, seems to be the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the conception of God; and the typical recent philosophies of religion which we have examined give fruitful suggestions for the theologian who desires to grapple seriously with the problems raised by the doctrine of evolution and to construct a tenable conception of God in an age of evolutionary science.

<sup>1</sup> So Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 368; cf. Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 136, 150, 158 ff., 173 f.