

PART I. Book Length Works

Summaries and Critical Evaluations

Royce's Theoretical Works¹

1. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1882-1884)

Boxes 1-4

Box 127, folder 2; Box 129, folder 4

Description – This work reflects Royce's first experience with the world of powers. Trying to find an ethical root leads him to the argument concerning the possibility of error. The possibility of error presupposes a consciousness of error and the fact that this error cannot be erroneous without the apprehension that there is the Truth known by some mind.

FMO Evaluation: Overall, the manuscript shows cut-and-paste construction. The condition of the manuscript, despite the fact that this work gained him considerable fame for his work in philosophy, shows a Royce so rushed to reach publication promptly that he did not take time to revise his text thoroughly nor even to create an index.

FMO estimates that Royce himself would not have included the whole of this work in some later critical edition since he proved himself a methodical reviser of his later works. The primary thrust of *RAP* is preserved, synthesized and much deepened in his mature writing. See, for example, Royce's response to Peirce's Neglected Argument in *The Problem of Christianity*. See also Royce's late metaphysical works of 1916. There the "appeal function," implicitly at work in his original argument," is described at length, and the later Royce also makes sure to emphasize the interpersonal aspect of the consciousness of error, apparently not at work in the original argument.

2. *California, from the Conquest in 1846 to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco [1856] (1886)*

[MS absent from HARP collection, but see Box 103, folder s 4-8]

Description: See *BWJR* 2: 1179, under the heading, 1886, 3.

¹ Part I of this *Comprehensive Index*, The Book Length Works, is divided into two principle sections: Royce's Theoretical Works, and his Practical Application Books. The list is not, therefore, entirely chronological. Indeed, Royce's first book, his *Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students*, precedes *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. Notes on Royce's *Primer* are included below as item 15, in the Practical Application section.

**3. *The Feud of Oakfield Creek: a Novel of California Life (1887)*
[MS absent from HARP collection]**

Description: *BWJR* 2: 1182-83, under 1887, 3.

**4. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy: an Essay in the Form of Lectures (1889-1892)*
[MS absent from HARP collection;
Box 55, document 10, contains a fragment of the text.]**

Description: A very readable volume which fills a great need in American education. Royce's exposition of the philosophers treated remains important to our present day. The last sections that touch on systematic philosophy build on his basic insight. This "Part II: Suggestions of Doctrine" was written at the height of Royce's self-confessed Hegel period. Despite this fact, Royce does not give Hegel more time or attention than other philosophers, such as Kant. Royce does not address Nietzsche's writing here but saves that topic for a later date. In the *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, for the first time, Royce develops the distinction between the world of description and world of appreciation. He is also restating the argument of *RAP* concerning the truth of God's existence. The latter is no simple matter since the discussion of sin, as something recognized as to be detested and as an infraction against the will of the supreme goodness and wisdom, begins to take center stage at the end of the work.

FMO Evaluation: This work comes on the heels of his Australian experience and reflects the insights of the trip. Royce is coming to realize that the Absolute must include not only thought but also will and feeling.

**5. *The Conception of God (1895)*
Boxes 5 & 6
Box 91, documents 1 & 2; Box 97, document 7**

Published in 1895 simply as an Address with Comments from three Participants, but re-edited and re-published in 1897 with Royce's new book-length "Supplementary Essay" under the new Title: *The Conception of God: A Philosophical Discussion Concerning the Nature of the Divine Idea as a Demonstrable Reality*.

FMO Note: After the 1895 "CG" Address, Royce delivered three papers "to the Union," (his expression) (*See* Box 97, document 7):

- (1) "The Conception of Will as It Relates to the Absolute," [*see* CG 182].
- (2) He delivered as his second minor paper to the Union "The Anomalies of Self-Consciousness," first delivered in 1894 to Boston's Medico-Psychological Association.

[see CG 169-97].

- (3) Finally, he gave as his third minor paper to the Union on September 4, 1895, Part IV of his “Supplementary Essay,” “The Self-Conscious Individual.”

Fragments of two of these minor addresses *may be* the fragments found in Box 91, documents 1 and 2. As yet, there is no strict parallel of texts found, although the subject matter is often parallel.

“I should prefer [as the title] ‘The Idea of God’ if Fiske had not already a mortgage on that title.” [Letters 336]

The MS, including “Supplementary Essay,” is found in Boxes 5 and 6. Royce’s deletions (*see* below) probably indicate his edits for publication, and probably were also read to the Philosophical Union.

Much of the MS is written on pages previously drafted and used, and then renumbered. (“Fresh” = “not previously used.”)

Numbers 1-5 are fresh.

Numbers 6-8 were used.

Numbers 9-32 are fresh.

Numbers 33-39 were used.

Numbers 40- 44 are fresh.

Numbers 45-103 (the end) were used.

Box 5 contains a 104-page MS, with an introduction and nine sections. Pages 98 to 100 are missing from the MS, but are included in the published text. These missing MS pages are copied by Ron Wells from the published text.

The text of the book inserts headings for each section, headings not found in the MS.

In both Boxes 5 and 6, all edits which Royce makes to the manuscript and typescript are included in the printed text. In the cases of the typescripts, this indicates Royce had the manuscript typewritten before he edited it.

The Introduction and Section I contain no deletions of a sentence or longer.

Section II:

On page 33 of MS, page 15 of the published CG text, after sentence ending “... the theory of human knowing,” Royce deletes the following six lines: “The ingenious device by which Ferrier, in his charming *Institutes of Metaphysic* makes a positive use of the theory of the nature of ignorance to demonstrate something with regard to the constitution of Reality, is a device that influenced what little of that wisdom it is even given us to attain.”

Section III:

On page 46 of MS, page 21 of *CG* just before the sentence beginning “The relatively indirect ...” Royce deletes from MS the following lines: “In this sense, however, our human ignorance, so far as it is defined in these physiological [or rather psycho-physiological] terms is known to us only insofar as we are supposed to have, contrasting with this sensory ignorance, another sort of knowledge, viz., physical knowledge.”

On page 47 of the MS, page 21 of *CG*, after the sentence ending “... a wider experience indirectly acquired reveals to us” Royce deletes the following 14 lines: “But the current doctrine that I am analyzing taken as one usually finds it stated, confuses inextricably these two utterly diverse points of view viz., the hyper-physical and the psycho-physical. Human experience is inadequate to grasp the absolute, the hyper-physical reality, the *Ding an Sich*. Why? Because our experience comes to us through our sensations, and our sensations depend rather upon their specific nervous conditions than upon the natures of external physical facts. But how does one know this latter assertion to be true? Answer: This is the “verdict one need not question their relative consistency.” [*sic*]

On page 49 of the MS, page 22 of the *CG* text, Royce deletes ten lines which read “On the other hand, the view that we are now analyzing proves by an appeal to what science is supposed to know, that no experience can reveal to us anything but our passing sensory states, and the presence of something else unknowable. Thus what science knows is used to prove that no true science is possible. To assert this, however, is to seek to destroy the very branch upon which the fruit of science grows. “

Section IV:

Page 50 of the MS, page 22 of the *CG* text, after retaining first sentence ending “... much truth.” Royce deletes nine lines: “... or rather concealed it. A conception is not always unenlightening because it is unenlightened. It is something to meet with what sets us to thinking. As a fact even the conception of the *Ding an Sich*, – a conception which, as you are no doubt now accustomed to suppose, an idealist abhors as a New York banker abhors free silver, – is, as I must assure you, not without its relative usefulness even in the contemplation of an idealist.”

On page 57 of the MS, 25 of *CG*. Royce deletes three lines namely: “Platonic ideas. One who is trained to think is not therefore protected from chance experiences.” He replaces this with a text that starts “... as it torments his neighbor,” and ends just before the text “Remember how full of mere chance ...”

On the same page, after “that one suddenly feels,” Royce deletes this line “in head or in leg, the stray tickling that troubles this or that point on the skin,” then continues with text “confusion our associative mental... ”

Just before page 59 of the MS, page 26 of *CG*, after “the interruption of intruding sensations,” Royce deletes six lines: “the explosion of a mass of giant powder at yonder factory, the trembling of a passing earthquake, the tickling of a point on your forehead, the chance memory of the moment when your awkwardness offended or amused that formidable lady”

Sections V through IX:

No major deletions in MS, but some heavy editing of previously drafted and used pages.

**“The Absolute and the Individual:
A Supplementary Essay
by Professor Royce”
[titled “Supplementary Discussion with
Replies to Criticisms” in the manuscript]**

The 2-page outline placed before the typescript text in Box 105 parallels the Table of Contents of Book V of *CG*.

The MS is contained in Boxes 5 and 6 (pages 1 to 27 in Box 5). Pages 1 to 38 of the text are typescript. Most of 38 and 39 are manuscript. MS pages 41 to 150 (except for six lines on 44 and four lines on 150) are all typescript. From 151 to 169, the work is all manuscript. The document ends with typescript from 170 to 176.

For tracking the composition by Royce and the final acceptance by Howison, *cf. Letters*, 324-29, ff. to 360-61.

The published “Supplementary Essay” in *CG* does not seem to parallel precisely the three minor lectures given to the Union after the main public lecture.

In Box 97 (document 6) a brief 4-page MS refers to these talks. It is titled “Suggestions Concerning the Metaphysics of the Individual Self-Consciousness.” This is remarkably similar to Royce’s own reference to one of the papers he wants to deliver to the Union. (*See Letters* at 336)

One he calls “The Conception of Will in its Relation to the Absolute,” (the title of Part II of the printed “Supplementary Essay” in *CG*, as well.) In this same short MS, however, he refers to another paper, a “psychological” essay he calls “The Anomalies of Self-Consciousness.” This title does *not* appear in *CG*. Rather it appears in *Studies of Good and Evil* at page 169. He calls it a paper he read before the Medico-Psychological Association of Boston, March 24, 1894 (page 169, n.1), before he went to Berkeley.

See Letters at 336, Royce to Howison, in which Royce explains the papers he plans to give as:

1. On the Conception of Will as applied to the Absolute.
2. On Some Aspects of the Empirical Psychology of Self-Consciousness
3. Considerations on the Metaphysics of the Individual Self-Consciousness (with a few hints as to the possibility of immortality).

Letters at 336, n.157: “Royce addressed the Philosophical Union on these topics on September 2, 4, and 6, 1895. It appears that the first paper became Part II of the “Supplementary Essay,” *CG* (1897), and that the second and third papers were versions of “Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness,” *Psychological Review* 2 (1895): 433-57, and “Self-

Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature,” *Philosophical Review*, 4 (1895): 465-85, 577-602. Both were reprinted in *SGE*, pages 169-97, 198-248.” All we can say for certain is that the “Anomalies” lecture follows *The Conception of God*.

Introduction to “Supplementary Essay”:

At end of first paragraph, Royce deletes the sentence in MS: “To this end the Union grants the most kindly freedom as to the space to be taken up and wishes the one who began the discussion to have here the last word.”

MS and published text run parallel.

Part I: The Conception of Reality

Introduction to Section IV:

From the introduction to the First Part, through its section IV, the text and MS run parallel.

Section V:

In Box 6 this section begins the continuation of the text of the “Supplementary Essay” (*see* page 171 of the printed text). Royce’s additions (sometimes entailing five or six lines of manuscript edits) have been incorporated into the printed text. Thus the typescript was edited prior to sending it to the printer.

Part II: The Conception of the Will and Its Relation to the Absolute

Begins on page 182 of printed text.

Introduction:

This introduction is part typescript (2 ¼ pages), part manuscript (2 pages). Manuscript and typescript run parallel with printed text.

Sections I to III:

All three sections of typescript and manuscript run in parallel with the printed text.

Part III: The Principle of Individuation

Introduction through Section VII:

Edited typescript runs in parallel with the printed text.

At pages 65 and 66, Howison inserts four marginal notes in his own hand into the typescript.

Part IV: The Self-Conscious Individual

Introduction:

The introduction to this Part IV appears as a penciled MS in **Box 97 (document 7)**. The 13-page MS and the printed text of *CG* (pages 272-76) run in precise parallel. The MS is headed “Part IV: The Self-Conscious Individual.”

Sections 1 – VII:

The typescript runs in parallel with the printed text.

On page 114 of the typescript, Howison inserts “NB” at the paragraph starting “A plan in life ...” (cf. published text page 290.)

On page 140 of the typescript, 323-24 of the published text, Howison inserts short margin note, and asks the question: “Error? Transformed from copy?”

Part V: Replies to Criticisms

Introduction through Section III:

Manuscript and typescript run in parallel with the printed text.

On page 145 of the typescript, page 329 of the printed text, at the end of the “thesis/antithesis” columns, Howison inserts a large marginal note. “For the sake of the proper balance of thesis column, when printed, I take the liberty of endeavoring to equate the length by omitting from the 2d [column] every word or clause not absolutely indispensable. I think you will approve, GHH.” Several lines are edited out by Howison.

On page 149, bottom, Howison inserts two separate notes. “I think the tone of ridicule employed here is unsuitable to this order of discussion, and I hope you will feel willing to modify this passage. GHH”

Royce follows his suggestion, and omits the following typescript language, after the sentence ending “... all other realities, “Comparing then this postulated isolation of this world of freedom with the unity which, as rational knower, he detects in the world of truth, he perhaps rejects knowledge as a guide, talks of the inadequacy of “mere logic,” proclaims the nobility of not understanding who you are or what the world is, professes “stainless allegiance,” and passes in general into that form “*Das Unglückliche Bewusstesein*,” which Professor Howison, in common with many other ethical theorists, exemplifies.” (149)

“GHH has not done this at all, nor would do it. My sole object, in the passage to which you now evidently refer [is] to call emphatic attention to the need of a better logic - one that wd. include the” [text almost illegible at this point].

Section II:

Royce returns to manuscript, for pages 151 to 169. At 170, he reverts to typescript to the end at page 176.

- 6. *The Conception of Immortality. (1900)***
No MS seems extant in HARP for Royce's Ingersoll Lecture.
Box 48, document 1, "Immortality"
(the basis for Royce's 1906 essay in *WJO*)
Box 61, document 3, "The Conception of Immortality," 112 pages of an unpublished fragment (circa 1900, perhaps delivered in Britain)

See *BWJR* 2:1203 under the heading, 1900. This Ingersoll Lecture should not be confused with a similarly titled lecture, probably given by Royce in Britain in the same year.

The 112-page manuscript fragment titled "The Conception of Immortality" in Box 61 is very important for real intentionality, for a clearer view of immortality as not simply a series of pulses of ongoing consciousness as we now experience it, and for realism in the 1899 Royce. The fragment is not dated by Royce but internal evidence points to 1899 or thereabouts. FMO sees it as an essay drafted on a different track than the *Conception of Immortality* address. Yet it remains quite different because in it Royce tries to work from "internal and external meanings of an idea" to each finite Self's immortality ("A Self is a conscious meaning -- a series or a total of experience embodying a purpose -- a plan of life more or less fully expressed in an actually present life." page 93 of this MS), but not with anything like the concentration on Individual which marks the published *Conception of Immortality*. This latter may have come to greater clarity through the long drafting of this incomplete MS. The unpublished 112-page manuscript builds its argument on the Quest for Self-Identity whereas the published *Conception of Immortality* text builds its argument on the unique individuality of any human Self.

- 7. *The World and the Individual: First Series: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being (1897-98)***
Boxes 8-14
[cf. Box 105, folder 3, esp. documents 8-10, and Box 102, folders 12-14]

Description: Skrupskelis has a very detailed outline of the three drafts that Royce writes for *The World and the Individual*. Royce wrote the first series of *The World and the Individual* volume rather rapidly (1897-December 1898) and then the "Supplementary Essay" (1899). The "Supplementary Essay" was accepted for publication on the condition that it be set in smaller type.

There is only one MS version of *WI:1*, unlike the three series of *WI:2*. The only manuscript for *WI:1* does not contain the thirty printed pages found in *WI:1* at pages 270-300.² Clearly,

² This equals 70 pages of manuscript for Royce. As of August 1, 2009, it was unaccounted for in HARP. We did *not* run into the MS of Royce's treatise on truth in judgments. Notice that early MS drafts of this material *may* be loose manuscript pages located in Box 105, folder 3. (The topics are certainly similar.) Specifically, document 8 in that folder, a manuscript fragment with pages numbered pages 36 to 50, may be preparatory material for Lecture II. Document 9 in that folder, a manuscript fragment numbered pages 1 to 14, may be preparatory work for any number of these lectures. Document 10 in that folder, a manuscript fragment numbered pages 78 to 102, may be preparatory material for Lecture I.

however, these *are* present in the published volume. After submitting the overall manuscript to Brett, Royce somehow added these two new sections concerning “judgments: their Truth and our relation to Truth” (1:270) as an indispensable part (“so far neglected”) of Royce’s approach to his argument toward an adequate conception of Being.

This is the case because real Being is encountered only if our knowing is true, but our only avenue to true knowing is true judgments. For humans have only two other avenues of knowing: concepts and reasonings. Since concepts give us universal types or forms (neither true nor false as concepts) and since reasonings give us only inferences (valid or invalid but not true or false), hence, Royce saw “judgments: their Truth and our relation to Truth” as an indispensable part of his argument toward an adequate conception (or interpretation--Royce preferred the latter term) of Being. A true interpretation gets beyond the first three historical conceptions of Being by judging truly the unique individuality of Being.

The World and the Individual second series (WI:2) is an attempt to apply the idealistic position rationally reached in series one to the usual problems of philosophy. The second series (summer 1901- fall 1901) is titled “Nature, Man, and the Moral Order.” Its first two chapters, which might seem to be mainly a theory of experiential knowledge, are viewed by Royce as presupposed for his theory of Nature – a theory he then presents in lectures III to V. After that he focuses on “Man,” the human self. In his application of the position of Series (or Volume) One to the issues of Series (or Volume) Two, Royce often refers back to the “Supplementary Essay.” After 1904 he rarely mentions it. The Peirce Cambridge Conferences of 1898 were, as Royce acknowledged, “epoch marking for me” and “started me on such new tracts.” (*See Letters* at 422) Very likely, Peirce’s lectures of 1898 also changed Royce’s approach to topics treated in *The World and the Individual*, especially in the second series.

Significant hints about Royce’s revision of the second series are contained in an unpublished (and completely unacknowledged) notebook begun in 1896 and completed in 1901. This notebook can be found in Box 118 (formerly the second box among the Logicialia Boxes). On February 5, 1901, Royce proposed what he called a “possible reform of the Gifford Lectures” to be presented in his “Phil. 9” class taught in the spring. He noted, however, that the Idea is developing, and in doing so becomes more comprehensive and more concrete. Most of this entry is concerned with planning his “Phil. 9” class. Yet on July 4, 1901, Royce returns in this notebook to the Gifford revisions. He reminds himself that he should recur to the diary entry for this date in 1901. That diary is contained in Box 103, folder 9, and its entry of “Thursday, July 4, 1901” reads:

“Natural classification depends on the fact that the range of validity of a given process may be such as to exclude possible definable objects from this range (so that the limit of a series is excluded from the series, the range of validity of the Euclidean parallelism from that of the non-Euclidean axiom) But where a process is defined that includes all the limits of a validity which exclude each other, we have a continuum. This by Dedekind’s definition can the inclusive process P be defined as a single process despite the manifoldness of the included and mutually exclusive processes p1, p2, p3. Yes, but at a sacrifice of the Continuity of the range page The continuum, as such, is opaque fact. – The single process P

is to furnish a single *Wohlgeordnete Menge*. [well-ordered set (or multitude)] – Application to metaphysics of communication is of various individuality.”

In the notebook from 1901, Royce proposes a new section that concentrates on the concept of continuity and the relation between the part and the whole as being that of *Mchtigkeiten* (multitudes, math.) This section becomes very heavily logical as Royce walks us through the first two lectures of the second series. He states that he is going to add the “Time-Theory” which becomes Lecture III, so that Royce’s interpretation of nature becomes postponed into Lecture IV³ about “our relations to nature [as] essentially social” (*WI:1*, at 417] and then into Lecture V about “any deeper reason that we may have for interpreting our experiences of Nature as a hint of a vaster realm of life and of meaning of which we men form a part, and of which the final unity is in God’s life.” (*WI:2*, at 204) Only thereafter will Royce engage with the “human Self” in his ethical and religious lectures that follow. In this 1901 Notebook, then, it seems clear that Royce is moving toward a finalized outline for Volume Two of his Gifford lectures.

CHAPTER COMPARISON

How did Royce insert or delete material into the only extant manuscripts for Lectures I to X and for his “Supplementary Essay”?

Lecture I: Introduction: The Religious Problems and the Theory of Being

Box 105, folder 3, document 10, a manuscript fragment (whose pages are numbered pages 78 to 102) may be preparatory material for Lecture I. At the close of this MS, pages 100-02, Royce “confesses” the practicality of his Four Conceptions of Being, calling them “intensely practical attitudes towards life.” (102)

Note that Wells does not add as he does with the Second Series which draft this is. As far as we can make out, it seems to duplicate the final draft fairly closely, although Royce adds certain things to the final draft that do not appear in this preparatory draft.

Here are some to the most glaring differences between the published work and this draft (Box 105, folder 3, document 10).

On pages 22 to 23 of the published *WI:1*, Royce gives his famous definition of “Idea” as he uses it when he exposes his positive view (i.e., after *WI:1*, at 265). In this document 10, Royce indicates that he wants to underline (emphasize) the last three lines of that definition, viz., from “...any state of consciousness ... [to] ... a single conscious purpose.” This wish was not honored in the final draft. In addition, he originally wanted to use another kind of emphasis which would read: “... whether RELATIVELY simple or RELATIVELY complex” as contrasted with: “I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present is then and there viewed at least as the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose.”

³ In 1906, Charles Peirce wrote, “Whoever has read *The World and the Individual* will understand . . . that purpose is the very fatherhood of evolution.” (*CP 2*: 395)

Please note, too, that in the preceding paragraph (*WI*:1, at 22) Royce's reference to G. F. Stout is significant to the extent that in 1914 a dying Peirce asked Royce to send him a copy of Royce's review of Stout's *Analytical Psychology*. See also Royce's 1915-1916 Metaphysics lecture, pages 40-41 for William James's influence on the development of this conception of the "Idea."

On page 35 of the published *WI*, MS page 74, Royce makes an addition to this document 10 which seems significant. In the first draft of the MS, Royce wrote: "And such reference not only seems at first very sharply different from the internal meaning, but must for our purposes, first be sundered by definition from that internal meaning even more sharply than common sense distinguishes the two." Then Royce adds to his original text this sentence: "For abstract sundering is, in us mortals, the necessary preliminary to grasping the unity of truth." Originally, Royce simply continued: "The internal meaning is a purpose here embodied." Such is the MS's first draft but later Royce qualified this statement by adding another: "The internal meaning is the purpose present in the passing moment, but here imperfectly embodied."

Again, Royce originally wrote: "Common sense calls it an affair of Will." Later Royce qualified the statement into: "Common sense calls it such an expression of transient living intent, an affair of Will. Yet again, Royce originally wrote: "Psychology explains the laws of motor processes and association." He revised this to read: "Psychology explains the presence and the partial present efficacy of this purpose by the laws of motor processes, or Habit, or of what is often called association."

In the published book (page 36) just before section VI, Royce originally underlined the final sentence of Section V: "To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain Absolute System of Ideas ... " The capitalization of Absolute System of Ideas was removed in the final MS – perhaps reflecting Royce's attempt to distance himself from Hegel.

Lecture II:

Box 105, folder 3, document 8, a manuscript fragment with pages numbered 36 to 50, may be preparatory material for Lecture II.

At the bottom of page 54 in the published book, just before the start of Section II (and on page 34 of the MS), we focus on the last three, very brief sentences of Section I. In the MS Royce did not emphasize "depend on," "... genuine," or "... true." In the final text, however, Royce clearly wanted these terms emphasized with italics.

Lecture III: The Independent Beings

NB: Critical editors -- please take account of "Realism and the Individual," a 55-page MS from Box 102, folder 13 (or according to former, now superseded system: Box G, item 4). This MS is a highly polished and carefully edited 55-page MS, on fresh and redrafted pages. On page 18 of this MS, Royce notes he has removed pages 11 to 17, and used pages 10 and 18. As a penultimate version of *WI*, Chapter III, it deserves careful comparison with the published version of Chapter III.

Page 7 of this MS is missing. There is no substantive change between the MS and the final published draft. In the margins of the MS Royce has written in reading instructions for himself at Aberdeen.

Page 16-17 from the MS represent page additions to the original draft. These additions are carried through to the published work.

On page 20 of the MS, Royce deletes six lines in the MS that focus on the difference between *materia prima* and the unfolded character of the world. Royce states that in *materia prima* all things are present in *potentia*.

NB: Royce adds footnotes to page 100 and 101 of the published text after the completion of the extant MS. At page 106 of the published book, there is a typo in the last sentence of section II. Note that “one” should be “once.” The MS does not bear the designation of section V which should appear at the bottom of page 50 in the MS. Also, Royce does not designate a section VII in the manuscript which should appear at the top of page 82 in the manuscript.

In this MS a clear parallel runs between *WI:1*, at 100-104 and Royce’s sketch of the extreme realism of the Sankhya system. To deal with “a possibly ambiguous conception” like realism of this kind, Royce finds the “only way” is to shift readers’ focus to the “distant land” of India and its “Hindoo” philosophy in order to unveil Western philosophy’s extreme dualism, e.g., soul and body. For Royce, the two, primary, and distinctive essential marks of this extreme “realism” – marks indispensable for defining such “realism” – are: a) the total and mutual independence of knower and object, and b) such realism’s abstract sundering of the real’s *what* from its *that*. These two marks became Royce’s central focus when dealing with such realism.

How, then, did Royce view “Realism” around 1898? Beyond the two (above) essential marks in Royce’s definition of “realism,” and also beyond its frequent but non-universal association of real objects with “permanence” and “unchangeability,” FMO identifies six noteworthy facts about this realism:

1. Ordinary popular consciousness holds such realism as an inevitable, if half-conscious, tenet.
2. It seems to Royce as “a sort of Apollyon [Destroyer], standing in the way of those pilgrimaging towards the Celestial City, boasting himself as master in the City of Destruction to which we belong.”⁴
3. It evokes from Royce the deep hostility which he feels he should feel toward “Satanic powers” and “principalities and powers” with which he is called upon to wrestle (pages 4-5).
4. It is an “abstraction” which fails to be nearly concrete enough in its relations to contextual communities and to the All-Intender.
5. It has a profoundly important relation to religion because, more significantly, it entails intensely practical issues.
6. The chasm widely claimed to exist between the human knower and humanly known physical objects lays the foundation for the realisms of common-sense and “philosophy.” Hence, the most pressing need is to identify the socio-practical origin of this claimed

⁴ Royce’s view reflects how deeply Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* had etched itself upon his mind and spirit.

chasm. (18-27)

Lecture IV: The Unity of Being and the Mystical Interpretation

The MS of this lecture is substantively the same as the published chapter. Only minor revisions are made by Royce as he crafts the final draft and the proofs.

Lecture V: The Outcome of Mysticism and the World of Modern Critical Rationalism

NB: In Box 105, folder 3, document 1, a typescript numbered pages 2 to 13 may be an early version of this lecture.

Royce deletes this lecture's original title, "Reality and Validity"

NB: on MS pg. 39 to 44 (Book pages 205-207), Royce wrote on different and whiter paper which he had originally numbered as pages 7-12. As a result of inserting them as pages 39 to 44, subsequent pages had to be renumbered. In fact, most of them show four page-numberings, the first three pointing to an earlier placement in this chapter for section V and following sections, which now come after MS page 44.

A most striking difference between Royce's original MS and the published text occurs at MS page 33, at the paragraph starting "To this question comes next an answer..." In the published text, Royce postpones the following MS pages and inserts a wholly new Section II, starting on page 195 "Our answer to this question ...[over to page 202] ... of its most recent forms." (No manuscript form of this newly inserted Section II has been identified in HARP as of September 2009.)

After this insertion into the published text, Royce employs the MS's interrupted Section II by making its pages 33 ff. become Section III in the printed version, (pages 202 ff.).

In the published text, bottom of page 219, just before the sentence beginning, "This more indirect method..." Royce deletes from his original MS ten lines, which read as follows:

"Thus for instance, if by given substitutions of trial values of an unknown quantity x you change the sign of a given algebraic polynomial into whose terms x enters in various powers, you know that somewhere between the values of x in question, there must exist a value of x that makes the polynomial zero. But this value would be a root of the equation produced by setting the polynomial equal to zero." (See MS, pages 75-76)

At the conclusion of Lecture V, (page 84 in MS, page 222 in book), just after the phrase, "... whose unity is in One Individual," Royce deletes from the MS the following eight lines:

"At present the gray light of pure theory half reveals to us, half conceals, the rigid outlines of these valid truths. But when our eyes are once opened we shall find that the light which really fills this region full of warmth of the central sun of true Being..."

Royce cancelled these lines and concluded "and that theory means, etc ..."

Lecture VI: Validity and Experience

Royce deletes his original title, “The Valid and the Empirical.”

Book at page 227, footnote 1 is added. It is not present in the manuscript. Similarly with other footnotes in this Lecture, they appear added later to the edited pre-publication proofs.

The manuscript and book run in parallel for this lecture’s introduction, and sections I and II (except for the added note on Avenarius, at book page 289).

Section III:

At manuscript page 47 (book at page 242 bottom), after writing in the manuscript the sentence ending, “...even if physically inaccessible conditions”, Royce inserts the sentences: “At the outset of an inquiry, you to be sure define as possible much that you later find to be unreal. Yet so far you have only the provisionally possible. But” and he continues with the text in the MS, “for instance, the liquid or solid state ...” as in the bottom of the book’s page 242.

Section IV:

This section of the manuscript ends at “... from the realm of ideas” on page 67 (at page 250 in the published book). Yet Royce disregards his marker of Section “V” in the manuscript, and has the entire rest of the Lecture (MS 67-95; book 250-262) appear as the rest of one extensive Section IV. The MS and book run in parallel to the end of this Lecture.

Lecture VII: The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas

Royce viewed this lecture as the heart of *WI:1*.

In his Preface to *WI:1*, Royce states, “Lecture VII, in particular, has been much lengthened in the final preparation for publication.” (page xiii of Dover edition, 1959) The MS of Lecture VII runs for 104 heavily edited pages. The typed version runs for six sections. The published version of Lecture VII runs for 78 printed pages (265-342) and consists of nine sections. (It is small wonder that Royce placed markers in the margins “Omit in reading” on more than a few of his MS pages for this Lecture.)

Seventeen years later, looking back to *WI:1* and especially at this Lecture VII, Royce declared, “I do not myself view the argument of *The World and the Individual* as one that depends on setting up four different conceptions of Being, pointing out that three of them fall and declaring that the fourth of them alone is left. On the contrary, the whole argument of the book is contained in the seventh lecture, if you presuppose enough of the previous discussion to understand what is at issue.” (Royce’s Metaphysics lecture of May 23, 1916.)

Introduction:

To the MS text ending in “... and to estimate.” Royce adds the sentence. “That task, to be sure, is itself no light matter.” (Book page 265)

Section I:

The edited MS and published text run in parallel, except that near the conclusion of the MS of

Section I, at "... still in obscurity." Royce adds the sentence, "It is this which lies so near us, and which still, because of manifold misunderstandings, we must long seek as if it were far away." (Book page 270).

Sections II and III:

This section of the MS begins "A time-honored definition of Truth." But the section is transposed by Royce to start Section IV (page 300) of his published book. Meanwhile, Royce inserts what becomes 30 pages of **totally new** printed material (i.e., about 75 pages of manuscript) that constitutes both Section II (which starts, "Our course in approaching our final definition of Truth will divide itself into two stages" page 270) and Section III. This third section begins: "Yet there remains one further aspect of this whole situation of our judging thought." (290).

The page-numbering where this insert occurs offers no hint that 2 new sections will be added here (at pages 12 to 13. The hole is indicated by Royce's cramming into the bottom half of page 12 twenty autographed lines of what in published book will start Section IV.

NB: The manuscript(s) for these two new Sections are not found in HARP Box 11, and as of September 2009 have not been identified in Royce's *nachlass*.

Why is Royce's new Section II (Book pages 270-90) so needed for his analysis of our judgments? FMO sees Royce's procedure in Section II this way:

Royce is seeking the "very essence of truth," i.e., "the final definition of truth." He does this by scrutinizing what's behind and inadequate in the two common definitions of truth:

- 1) Truth is "what is found in judgment." (the topic of new Sections II and III), and
- 2) Truth is "the Correspondence between our Ideas and their Objects." (see Sections IV *et seq.*)

New Section II is built upon the provisional assumption of a complete sundering of internal and external meaning, of idea from object known. By this assumption of a complete sundering we discover through analysis of the traditional logical forms of Judgments--categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive [273]--that whether in the universal or the particular format, no such judgment gets us to "genuine reality." Universal judgments remain abstract and are primarily negative in force. Particular judgments can lead us thru negation closer to genuine reality, thanks to the addition of experiences. But we never have a "pure experience" since every experience of ours is always conjoined with "carefully and attentively *selected* ideas." [285c]

Notice that each of your judgments assume the "you suppose yourself to be asserting something about a real world ... But never can you judge without some sort of conscious intention to be in significant relation to the Real." [272d]. We find, then, that our assumed sundering of idea from object, of internal meaning from external meaning is vain. For "If you can predetermine, even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the object then cannot be *merely* foreign to you. It must be somewhat predetermined by your Meaning." [282 c] Notice, too, how this complete sundering characterizes the Third Conception of Being and confers on it only validity,

without being really true of the individual Reality intended.

Section III:

Royce moves on, asserting, “As we have seen, all our universal and particular judgments leave Reality, in a measure, **indeterminate**. Can we tolerate this view of Reality as final?” (290, FMO emphasis added)

“Neither do our internal meanings ever present to us, nor yet do our external experiences ever produce before us, for our inspection, an object whose individuality we ever really know as such.... Neither internal meanings nor external meanings, in their isolation, are in the least adequate to embody individuality. ... For an individual is unique. There is no other of its individual kind. . . .” [292]

“But if ideas, as internal meanings opposed to external objects, cannot express the nature of the individuality of the world or of any one Being in it, whence, then do we ever get this belief that Being is, in fact, individual?” [293]

We use this belief from childhood on, “But it is an essentially metaphysical presupposition, never verifiable by your external experience. In this presupposition lies the very mystery of Being.” [294] How would you prove that *no other* is like your neighbor in the whole realm of Being? “It is this *no-Other*-character that persistently baffles both the merely internal meaning, and the merely external experience, so long as they are human and are sundered.” [295] So Third Conception of Being “tries to rest content with abstract universals, more or less determined by particular observations” [ibid] and thus further shows its inadequacy.

“... if we can neither abstractly define within, nor yet empirically find without, the individuals that we seek, there can be no doubt that our whole interest in Being is an interest in individuality. For the Other that we seek is that which, if found, would *determine our ideas to their final truth.*” (295)

“... while we never abstractly define individuals s such, we certainly love individuals, believe in individuals, and regard the truth with which we are to correspond as determinate.” (275)

“... What have we learned?

“We have found that every step towards Truth is a step away from vague possibilities and towards determinateness of idea and of experience ... Being, then, viewed as Truth, is to be in any case something determinate, that excludes as well as includes.” [296]

“And, finally, our experience, whether internal or external, never shows us what we, above all, regard as the Real, namely, the Individual Fact ... But never, in our human process of experience do we reach that determination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of desire and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present finding ... This Individual Determination itself remains, so far, the principal character of the Real; and is, as an ideal, the Limit towards which we endlessly aim.” (297)

For Royce, the Real or “Being is not an object that we men come *near at will* to finally observing ... it always lies Beyond.” (298) Therefore, “The Real, then, is, from this point of view, that which is *immediately beyond* the whole of our series of possible efforts to bring, by any process of finite experience and of merely general conception, our own internal meaning to a complete determination.” [299]

It’s such a determination that our judgments seek and thus reveal the indivisible linkage between our internal meaning and external meaning. [As FMO sees it, such a linkage reveals the deepest teleological direction of our human consciousness.]

Our “highly significant” result, then, “shows us what the Third Conception lacks, namely, a view of the Real as the finally determinate that permits no other. It also shows us that the mere sundering of external and internal meanings is somehow faulty. **Their linkage is the deepest fact about the universe.**” (299, FMO emphasis added) [This linkage is what Royce aimed to show in new Sections II and III.]

“And thus the *first* of the two closing stages of our journey is done. We have learned how the internal meaning is related to its own Limit, in so far as that is just a limit. But thus to view Being is still not to take account of what seems to common sense the most important of all our relations to the Real...the relation of *Correspondence*.” (299) To complete our definition of Reality, we must undertake to fathom this Correspondence. (300, FMO emphasis added)

Section IV: On Correspondence

And so we return to a comparison of the first draft with the Book.

In general, the text of the Book follows the MS text closely, but with the following significant differences:

At the book page 301, with the paragraph beginning “Let us next attack...”, Royce has substituted “attack” for “turn” in the manuscript.

At the book page 303, near top paragraph’s end, before the sentence beginning, “In the very familiar case...,” Royce has marked “Om” [= “Omit from reading”] from page 18 of the original manuscript the following lines:

“... and by the corresponding points in the projected curve and in the projection, you will mean precisely your points with regard to which some of the most fundamental of these projective relations will be equally true, so that if a is a point in the first curve, and a’ is the corresponding point in the shadow or other projection, there will be certain fundamental statements that you can make about a which will also hold true of a’.”

At page 303, eight lines down in the “But in consequence...” paragraph, after the sentence ending “... your number series,” Royce has marked the following lines “Om” (Omit from reading) on original MS page 19:

“That is, it is indifferent, so far as mere numerical result is concerned, which one of the objects you call the first, which one the second, and so on. It is only necessary that you count, in some order, and so avoid counting any object twice.”

Page 304, five lines from top, “But in any case ...” In the book Royce does not maintain this as a new paragraph, as it was in the MS.

Page 305, 12 lines from bottom, sentence beginning, “The modern X-ray... insight into objects.” Royce has marked this section of MS pages 25-26 for Omission in reading.

Page 306, nine lines from bottom, after the sentence ending, “... certain very general relationships,” the sentence, “It is, then, usually... [down to] ... place of its object.” is marked for omission in reading at MS 27.

Page 308, paragraph ending “...be false acoustical ideas.” Here Royce immediately skips to the “In vain...” paragraph of the book by eliminating from pages 30 to 31 of the manuscript a large section containing the following language:

“Do you want to sympathize with your friends feelings? Then your attempted sympathy involves false ideas unless these ideas lead to actually harmonious relations with your friend’s expressions of emotion. But are you a physician, say a neurologist or an [*sic*] chemist, and so you want to know, in a physician’s sense, how the patient feels, and of what elements his mental conditions is composed, then merely sympathetic emotions, if pursued beyond a given point, will constitute ideas that, for the purpose, will be wholly false, and you will best get at the truth about the patient’s inner state, not by feeling as he feels, but by making your system of comments correspond to certain relations amongst his mental states which may wholly escape his own notice.”

Page 309, from line 3, ”When Mr. Spencer ... [down to first word,] ... edge.” on page 310, Royce marks these MS pages 33 to 34, “Om” from reading.

Section V:

This section in the book (page 311), is marked “III” on manuscript page 36, thus reflecting Royce’s later insertion of the two Sections II & III in the book’s chapter 7. Again, the MS and published text generally continue to run in parallel with some exceptions:

At page 311, the typesetter errs by omitting “meant” from his sentence, although the middle of manuscript page 40 does carry Royce’s written “meant” in the sentence starting, “We are here asking what is meant by the Being of anything whatever.”

At page 316, from “For even of the monotonously...in this case his own?” is marked in MS page 43, “[In reading omit here, from the [mark to] page 48 [IV].” Royce’s directive starts at MS page 43: “[But if one attempts...” (and runs to the top of MS page 48) ... Is not all the fresh creative activity in this case his own?” In printing, however, this entire section, MS 43 bottom until MS 48 middle was preserved in the printed book. (Recall that “IV” in the MS equals “VI” in the book.)

At page 318, lines 2 to 6, “Just as truly ... selection of the object” are marked in MS page 51 for omission in reading. Similarly, in next paragraph, starting “Our preferences however ... [to] ... what object we mean” is marked “[Omit in reading]”

Yet it seems noteworthy that on May 20, 1916, in his Metaphysics class, Royce selected the section “Just as truly... [to the paragraph’s end] “... space and time, that I meant.” for making comment to his students; and similarly he selected the entire section, pages 319 to 335 of *WI:1* for detailed commentary. See his 1915-1916 *Metaphysics* lectures under this date.

Section VII:

At page 321, after “Again, my idea of my own past experiences,” Royce deletes the words from MS page 58: “... say of my own past griefs, or my own past deeds, may to any extent resemble your past griefs, or your past deeds” and connects immediately with the text in the MS and book: “may resemble your past experience.”

At page 322, nine lines down to “... characterizing its object,” Royce strikes out of the MS the following lines:

“If the idea had intended to refer to Caesar, you would in vain have tried to judge the idea by its relation to Napoleon. If the idea had intended to take note of the properties of space, you would have been unfair to impose upon it, as its object, time. And now, just so, if the idea did not intend that the object should stand to it in the relation that you have imposed, by what means do you identify this relation as the one characteristic of the object of the idea?”

On that same page, regarding the phrase “If you, having somehow... results of ideas” Royce marks on MS pages 61 to 62 “[In reading omit]”

On page 323, after “the essential point”, Royce strikes out from manuscript page 63 the following sentence: “The object of the idea is such because the idea [“idea” stricken out] has intended it and selected for this office, and” after which Royce starts new and published sentence, “The relation to the object is so far predetermined by the idea.” Thereupon Royce strikes out a longer sentence at first intended to start a new paragraph on MS page 63:

“But if the object is determined through the selection made by the idea, the sort of correspondence to this object which the idea intends to win, and by which it proposes to stand or to fall, is also, as we saw, the selection of the idea.”

Then, in the manuscript at page 63, Royce starts a new paragraph --not observed in print version--but reading, “Hence, as we now...” down to “altogether predetermined” where, on manuscript page 64, he again strikes out the following words:

“... since the two questions about an object, viz., what object is it, and in what way the idea corresponds to it, are to be answered solely through taking account of what the idea itself intends.”

He then continues, “In brief, the object ... “ as in manuscript page 64 (book 323), nine lines from top.

At page 324, after the first word, “...self-contradiction.” Royce brackets as “Omit in reading” the next sentence, “Or, again,....[down to] ... error that it excludes.”

Section VIII:

This section begins on page 324 in the book, but is marked section VI on page 70 of the manuscript.

At page 325, Royce italicizes the sentences in the book (not emphasized in MS) as follows: “The idea, I have said, *seeks its own. It can be judged by nothing but what it intends.*”

At pages 326 to 27 of the book, Royce inserts a new sentence to introduce the paragraph beginning “Nevertheless, when an idea of any grade...” at MS page 74. This new sentence reads, “But now, in order that we may also take account of our former problem about the determinateness and individuality attributed to Being, let us add yet one further consideration.” Royce then ties into the starting sentence of the manuscript by asserting, “Whenever an idea of any grade....”

At page 329, the book and MS texts in parallel each other, except that Royce italicizes in the book the three sentences, “*In seeking its object,Other that is sought.*”

At page 331, Royce puts un-emphasized sentence of MS into italicized form: “*Whatever the object, is till...because that idea wills it too be such.*”

At page 332, second line from bottom, (manuscript page 86). This MS page is distinctly rewritten into an unusually crowded page, as if seeking to squeeze more lines onto one page, which flow over to top of MS 87.

Wells notes some changes of verbs on page 335 in the book from the manuscript form.

Section IX:

Bottom of page 335: (unmarked as a new section in the manuscript at the bottom of page 90)

Page 337, 9 lines from top. Royce italicizes six lines: “...*the idea itself would....idea, could be substituted.*”

Middle of page 338; Royce italicizes two lines: “I answer, *You would experience . . .determinate idea.*” AND the seven lines near close of page: “...*the complete fulfilment of....realization of the idea.*”

Bottom of page 339: The sentence, “*What is, or what is real meaning of finite ideas.*” is emphasized in both the MS and the book.

Page 341, eight lines from top, whereas MS p 102) underlines “would be if it were complete present”, Royce reduces emphasis in book to *italicize* only the words, “...*if it were* ...”

Lecture VIII: The Fourth Conception of Being

In his Preface (WI:1 at xv), Royce says that his argument “is especially developed in Lecture VII, and is defended against objections in Lecture VIII” (FMO emphasis added). This eighth lecture consists of FIVE sections, both in the MS and in the published book. Its page-numbering runs from 1-91, but many of the sheets are “re-numbered” and represent earlier drafts; namely, page 15-17, with the omission of pages 18-20 and the making one page be numbered 21a, and with more multi-numbered pages 48-65, and 76-90.

From the introduction through to Section VIII, the MS and book texts run in parallel

Section I:

The book and manuscript run in parallel up to pages 345-46 of the book, to the lines ending “...only ultimate form of Being.” At this point, Royce omits “...only ultimate form of Being...” from the published version of the text.

But, Royce added in near the top of page four of the manuscript:

“An Individual is a being such that in the realm of reality no other can take its place. In other words, an individual is an unique being. Amongst the forms of being ordinarily and provisionally recognized by common sense, we distinguish such types as light and gravitation and human nature from beings such as yonder light house, or the earth, or Socrates. Any one of the latter group of beings is regarded by common sense as unique. There is to be only one lighthouse in the universe meant by you when you point out yonder light house. There is supposed to be only one planet that you mean when you speak of the earth. There is only one Socrates. This at least is the opinion of common sense. But light is a name for a certain type of physical phenomenon. Gravitation names a general law of the behavior of material phenomena. Human nature is something shared or exemplified by all men alike. These then are names for general laws or characters. The names call to our minds abstract universal conceptions.

“Now as opposed to an individual an abstractly universal character, or a merely general nature, is one whereof no instance is unique. If you have found a case of such a general fact, any other case of the type in question could so far take the place of this one, as an example of this same general nature. This light or another light would do equally well as an instance of the nature of light; this man or any other man, could illustrate human nature as such. Therefore it follows that when you have a mere abstractly universal type presented in your ordinary experience, you never have the whole possible embodiment of this type thus presented. You would have to look elsewhere to get other instances of this same type, if you wanted to survey the type as a whole, in other words as a collective individual. An abstractly universal, or merely general fact, thus sends you seeking for other instances of the same type if you want to win the whole truth that is merely suggested by the single instance. On the contrary, in so far as you meet with an

individual fact, whether simple or complex, whether as collective individual or not, you suppose yourself to meet something of which there is no other instance; and therefore, in this case, you regard yourself as in presence of a sort of finality.

“Well, at the last time, we declared that whatever is real, is in so far as concerns Individually what common sense supposes all realities to be, namely an individual being, a being essentially unique, and such that no other can take its place.” (manuscript page 7, middle)

The next sentence, starting “In so far we returned...” is where both the manuscript and the book (at page 346) again begin to run in parallel.

At page 348, after the line ending “...unique fulfilment of purpose.” Royce omits in the book the following sentence from the MS:

“Or again, our conception of Being asserts that your real world, by virtue of the necessary definition of its reality is, as Schopenhauer said, Your Will, only your Will completely embodied, absolutely expressed.” Manuscript pages 11-12.

Section II:

The MS and book run in parallel until page 359. But at that point, after the phrase ending “...whatever finite ideas seek”, Royce omits 1¼ MS pages from the published book, a passage following “... whatever finite ideas seek” (MS page 9). That passage reads as follows:

“For if you were to turn back from this definition of Being, what would you have then left as your alternative definition of Being but, once more, a world of objects that ideas must define as other than themselves, and that while other than the ideas, would still be definable only as possessing that merely abstract and universal correspondence with the ideas which we have not studied in all its forms, and have found absolutely incapable of constituting either the Being of any objects, or the truth of any ideas. The only alternative to our definition of Being is then a world where objects merely possess external correspondence with ideas. And that world is just insofar nothing. It is just because only the individual, and not the abstractly universal can be finally accepted as real, that we have now refused all such forms of ontology as are content with the mere general character called the correspondence of idea and of object. It is because an idea means its own object, that our ontology can define its objects only as the fulfilment of its ideas. It is because an idea is a meaning, or, in other words, is a will partially embodied, that the object can be this will fulfilled, meant, referred to, that is sought, intended, willed by the ideas.” MS pages 44 (bottom) to 46 (top).

At this point, with the sentence beginning “It is because the finite idea essentially seeks its Other ...,” the MS and the published text (at 359) again run in parallel to the end of Section II.

Section III:

The texts of the MS and of the book run in parallel throughout this section, except that Royce recognizes a need to break up his 2 to 3 page paragraphs. As a result he inserts new paragraphs

(same text) at the following points of the published version:

- At 362, “Nur en ...”
- At 365, “For human experience...”
- At 366, “Our empiricist may...”
- At 366, “But if the empirical...”
- At 368, “And so, we say, ...”

At 368, Royce alters MS’s final two words, by capitalizing them, to read: “...and is real only as a Meaning Embodied.”

Section IV:

The texts of the MS and of the book run in parallel throughout this section.

Section V:

At page 374, unlike the MS, the book shows in italics “*You reason in vain...against you.*”

At 378, Royce breaks up long paragraphs (unbroken in the MS) by indenting as follows:

At 378, “I have emphasized death...;”

At 379, “As Mary passionately cried”

At 380, “Now our theory...”

At 381, “For tragedy wins...”

Royce takes care to have lower case used for the MS’s term “Spirit” while the printed version employs “spirit,” both at the middle of page 381 (“the spirit wins its best conscious fulfilment”) and at page 382, the end of the lecture (“... perfection of the spirit.”)

Lecture IX: Universality and Unity

Section I:

The MS and book-text generally in accord. Notice, however, that:

At the middle of 390, instead of the MS’s version, “Schopenhauer bids me recognize in my world my own will.” Royce edits this sentence into the book’s “Schopenhauer defines my world as my own will.”

At the bottom of 391, where the manuscript closes at “...excludes its presence,” Royce adds a new closing sentence: “The very possibility of our ignorance and error implies the presence of the whole self-conscious truth.”

Section II:

The MS and book run in parallel.

Section III:

At the middle of page 396, the first sentence, after, “...idea of Being”, Royce added in the a third

phrase in the manuscript: “and of every complete idea as a case of this one idea demand our next attention.” Most of this phrase failed to make it into the published text.

For in the next sentence, after “...our Fourth Conception,” Royce makes a long insertion (about 5 printed pages) which runs from 396 middle (“involves the absolute unity...”) down to the top of 401 where the paragraph ends with “... our own insights.” As of early September 2009, FMO knows of no manuscript in HARP on which this insertion was based.

After the top of 401, Royce picks up the thread of his manuscript text with the paragraph there starting, “Our Fourth Conception of Being / is through and through, in one of its aspects, an empirical conception...” down to the close of Section III with “...our theory of the unity of Being.” Unlike the MS, Royce inserts “IV” in printed text and starts the new section (page 402) with “For, apart from ... “

Section IV:

Page 403: Four lines from bottom, when sentence ends “...chance, or freedom.” Royce deletes from MS (page 29) the following sentence: “It is, for instance, now true either that I shall be alive a year from now, or that I shall not be alive.” Otherwise, this section parallels the MS version.

Section V:

Page 35 of the manuscript shows a deleted “II” and an old insert “IV” over what is printed as “V.”

From page 406 to the bottom of page 411, the MS and book version run in parallel, but at page 411, just before the paragraph beginning as “Despite all the contrast,...” Royce deleted from the MS the follow beginning of a paragraph:

“Thus the idea of valid or possible Being, is, for common sense, inseparable from the other ordinary ideas of past, present, and future Being. And the converse is also true.”

Here thereafter the MS and book are in parallel.

Section VI:

The book marks a section “VI” where the MS text shows a section “V.” Other than this, the manuscript and book run in parallel with one exception: at the bottom of page 417, unlike the manuscript, the book adds indentation at “There is a sense, as . . .”

Section VII:

The book marks a section “VII”, where the MS shows a section “VI” (MS page 65).

The MS text, from page 65 to the bottom of page 80, parallels the published text (pages 417-24).

Section VIII:

The book begins a section “VIII” at 422, while the manuscript shows no such section mark at its corresponding page 80, “In sum...”

Otherwise, the manuscript and book run in parallel.

NB: In HARP Box 12, a complete unedited typescript copy of Lecture IX (42 pages) follows the manuscript of the lecture.

Lecture X: Individuality and Freedom

[See note immediately above.]

A 12-page manuscript fragment of the beginning of Lecture X follows the manuscript and typescript of Lecture IX in Box 12. This fragment is an early only slightly edited draft of Lecture X. The manuscript lecture fragment quickly diverges from the printed text. The draft is clearly far less developed than the manuscript drafts of the previous lectures in the series. Indeed, at times, the manuscript shows only a vague resemblance to the first several pages of Lecture X as published. As of September 2009, we not aware of a fuller, more complete manuscript for Lecture X in HARP.

Supplementary Essay to *WI:1* “The One, the Many, and the Infinite”

This “Supplementary Essay” has four Sections, which are in turn divided into subordinate portions, which FMO refers to as “Parts.” The divisions can be a bit confusing. Each of the “Parts” is—misleadingly—and also preceded by a Roman numeral in the text, I-VI, but not preceded by the word “Section.” *Caveat lector.*

The Table of Contents, at *WI:1* page xxii, lists the titles of these Sections as follows:

- Section I. Mr. Bradley’s Problem (with four Parts) 473
- Section II. The One and the Many within the Realm of Thought or of Internal Meanings (with 2 Parts) 489
- Section III. Theory of the Sources and Consequences of Any Recurrent Operation of Thought (with 6 Parts) 501
- Section IV. Infinity, Determinateness, and Individuality (with 4 Parts) 554

The 1st half of this lengthy text is contained in Box 13 (203 manuscript pages). The second half is contained in Box 14 (202 manuscript pages). The manuscript in Box 13 is written in Royce’s hand, except for pages 125-33, which are penned by another hand. As the handwriting belongs to neither Royce nor Katharine, it was likely written by a secretary who took the copy by dictation or another draft.

Query: How heavily did Royce edit this MS? With the exceptions of pages 58-62, 67-68, 96-98, 144, 147-48, 167-70, and 183-91, Royce’s text in Box 13 rolls smoothly on, with only small emendations here and there.

Section I: Mr. Bradley's Problem

NB: Royce opens by summarizing Mr. Bradley's Problem in Section I. The introduction to the section runs from pages 1 to 5 in the manuscript, and pages 473 to 77 in the printed text. The entire Section I runs from pages 5 to 57 in the manuscript, and pages 473 to 89 in the book. In this Introduction, Royce points up in his manuscript the role which the "Infinite variety and plurality" play in the "problem of the One and the Many." (MS pages 2-3) Even though the book's pages often echo the earlier manuscript, Royce develops his published text of this introduction notably beyond the 5 brief pages of his earlier MS version.

Royce changes the title of Section I several times from "Mr. Bradley's Theory Regarding the One and the Many in the Realm of Internal Meaning," to "Mr. Bradley's Theory Regarding the One and the Many," then finally to the title in the book: "Mr. Bradley's Problem." (at page 473).

Part I (Sec. I): Mr. Bradley's First Illustrations of the Problem (MS 5-12)

Royce begins his exposition of problem as set forth in the 2nd edition of Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1897), an analysis that he continues for over fifty pages, through several other Parts, providing many page-citations to Bradley's work.

The printed text (at page 477) of this Part I begins by running in parallel with the MS. But shortly after the paragraph beginning "A thing is..." (page 478), Royce creates 9 new lines, only to pick up the MS text again in mid-478, at the sentence "Mr. Bradley replies,..." Royce drops some of this material for some newer fresher lines. At mid-479, "But although Mr. Bradley asserts..." Royce rewrites a few new lines, only to close this Part by returning to his early manuscript for the final four lines.

Part II (Sec. 1): The General Problem of 'Relational Thought' (MS 13-22; book 479-82)

The MS and printed text run in parallel.

Part III (Sec. 1): The Problem of the One and the Many as Insoluble by Thought, yet Solved by the Absolute (MS 22-41; book 482-85)

The MS and book run in parallel at the beginning of this Part, from MS pages 22-28 top, and the printed text pages to 482- 484 top. Yet at page 484 of the book, Royce skips 8 pages of the MS to continue with "Thought desires a consummation . . ." The skipped MS pages run from the top of page 28 from "Thought seems essentially...[down to] . . . the relative "suicide" of a thought once supposed complete." on page 35.

NB: These 8 pages, omitted from the MS, attached in COPY form.

After this omission from the text of the MS, both book and MS again run in parallel, with minor

emendations; i.e., from page 484 of the book (“Thought desires ...”) to the close of this Part III at book page 485 (“...experience to ourselves.”) .

Part IV (Sec. 1): Mr. Bradley’s Definition of “What Would Satisfy the Intellect,” as to the One and the Many (MS 41-57; book 485-89)

The MS and book run in parallel.

Section II: The One and the Many within the Realm of Thought or of Internal Meaning

The brief introduction to this section runs parallel in the MS and book.

Part I (Sec. 2): Thought Does Develop its own Varieties of Internal Meaning (MS 59-70; Book 490-94)

The book and MS run parallel until page 491 of the printed text, where, after “...its own Other,” Royce deletes the following two sentences from the MS page 62: “Of that we affirm just here as yet nothing. Let the result prove that thesis. Moreover, the “intellect,” like the “Self,” may be “mere appearance.”

Then the text again runs in parallel from “Yet Reality owns the intellect too” until end of paragraph, “....itself in the other.” (MS page 70; book page 494). At this point Royce:

ADDS to book’s text 2 new paragraphs [starting with “May we not , then...” and “ I conclude, then,...argument is sound,” and even more significantly OMITS two additional Parts from the manuscript (from pages 70-90). As a result, the shortened text of the book reveals no omission. These two originally intended Parts, “II. Further Illustration of the One and Many as known to Thought” and “III. Replies to Objections.” These omitted manuscript pages (70-90) are attached in copy form.

Part II (Sec. 2): The Principle of Thought which is Responsible for the Infinite Processes. Definition of a Recurrent Operation of Thought

NB: The manuscript numbers this Part “IV”, as a result of the long omission from the printed text noted above.

From the bottom of manuscript page 104, and after “...whether in Appearance or in Reality.” (book 499 top), Royce deletes in MS these lines: “But in order to see so much, we do not have to see what Time is, nor how thought, as an existent psychological Activity, is able to operate or to be active at all, nor what is the ultimate relation of thought to the material upon which it operates.” In their place Royce inserts one sentence: “And here, then, the relation of Unity and Variety is clear to us.”

Thereafter, from “Our generalization...” (MS 105; book 499 top) down to this part’s close at “give our Theory of Being true definition.” (book 501 middle), both the MS and the book run in

parallel.

Section III: Theory of the Sources and Consequences of any Recurrent Operation of Thought.
The Nature of Self-Representative Systems.

The introduction text (MS pages 113-114; book page 501) runs in parallel in the MS and book. As for the long inserted Note, (starting at page 501 bottom and extending through page 502), Royce asserts at “...*Acta Mathematica*, Vol. II.” “With this theory of *Machtigkeiten* [multitudes] I shall have no space to deal in this paper, but it is of great importance for forming the conception of the determinate Infinite.” Thereafter, the book and MS run in parallel. There is, however a slight change in the book concerning the date of the Kerry book. In the MS it is dated 1896. In the book, the date is given as 1890. (The book has it right.)

Part I (Sec. 3): First Illustration of a Self-Representative System

Footnotes are in parallel.

There is a break in the text of the manuscript that seems to be in another hand. This passage comes on 504-506 of the book. Starting at the phrase “this one purpose.” This passage is eight manuscript pages. Ms. 125-133. Please note that this addition is neither in Royce’s nor Katharine’s hand. There are light editorial corrections made in it by Royce. Yet this passage matches the text in the book quite closely, with a two marked exceptions, where Royce added two things to the MS pages neither in his nor Katharine Royce’s hand:

1. Near the top of printed page 505, Royce adds, “We would now, indeed, have to suppose the space occupied by our perfect map to be infinitely divisible even if not a *continuum*.”
2. To this added assertion, Royce adds a footnote on page 505 of the book (which would have appeared atop page 128a of the MS)—a footnote important insofar as it deals directly with the issue of continuity. It reads:

“In the older discussion of continuity, this concept was very generally confounded with that of infinite divisibility. The confusion is no longer made by mathematicians. Continuity implies infinite divisibility. The converse does not hold true.”

NB: To this comment, Peirce replies in *CP* 5.71 that Royce avoids this position because it does not suit his philosophy.

Starting with “But so far we ...” (book 506 middle; MS 134), the manuscript resumes in Royce’s hand and runs in parallel with the book up to page 507 bottom, “...realm of general theory.”

Part II (Sec. 3): Definition of a Type of Self-Representative Systems

MS and book run in parallel, with the marked exception of the long footnote 2 on pages 511-12. This very important addition appears only in the book. The footnote highlights the different directions that Royce and Peirce take in addressing metaphysical systems. Royce moves from

the One to the Many, whereas Peirce insists that we start the Many and move to the One.

Part III (Sec. 3): Further Illustrations of Self-Representative Systems of the Type Here Defined

After Royce wrote MS page 157, and after the sentence ending with “. . . in our present sense, self-representative systems,” (book 514 middle), Royce penned the significant footnote 2, which reads:

“Mr. Charles Peirce, as noted above, has indeed given a perfectly positive and exact definition of a finite system; but in order to set that definition to work, you have first to suppose your Many externally given, while in order to define the *Gedankenwelt*, or the Self, or, as we shall later see, the *Real World*, you have only to presuppose a single, and unavoidable, internal meaning. The infinity then follows of itself.”

Notice this addition reflects a point in an ongoing interaction between Royce and Peirce which must have occurred between, or been remembered after, the time when Royce had completed this manuscript and when he submitted it to editor Brett.

As previous omissions from the MS indicate, clearly Royce was trying eagerly to shorten his MS. We have seen several passages that never appeared in the book. Another instance—this time an omission of two and a half MS pages, beginning at MS 130 middle—reads as follows:

“Thirdly: If each series be viewed as an image or as a representative of the immediately previous series, insofar as each has a first term to correspond with, or to represent the first term of the former series, and a second term to correspond to the second term of that series, and so forth, - then we can also say that each series is an image or representative of its predecessor in precisely the same way in which the second series is an image or representative of the first. As a fact, the first series presents to us, in their natural order, a first, a second, a third ideal object, and so on, endlessly. The second series presents to us, in a precisely similar order a first ideal object, namely here, the first of the even numbers; a second object, namely the second of the even numbers, and so on endlessly. The third series, however, presents with us, as its first ideal object, the first on amongst the even numbers which occupies an even numbered place in the order series of even numbers. And so the series succeed in an order which is itself endless. But the law of the sequence of the various series is that, precisely as the second series imitates or corresponds to the first, just so does each of the later series correspond to its predecessor. Each selects, namely, the even numbered objects in the preceding series. But all of the later series are themselves constituent portions of the second series. It will therefore be observed that, -

“Fourthly: The later series bear to the earlier series a relation altogether parallel to that which characterized the members of the series of maps in our first illustration of the present type of self-representative systems.”

Beginning the bottom of page 518 of the book, with the paragraph starting, “For just as . . .” the book and manuscript again run in parallel.

Part IV (Sec. 3): Remarks upon the Various Types of Self-Representative Systems
(Book 519-525, MS 177-190)

In this fourth Part of Section III the texts of the MS and book run very largely in parallel. Royce relies almost exclusively on the Dedekind article which at one point in his life served as a stand-alone piece. Evidence: Royce has to re-number the sections and MS 179-80 reflects his cut-and-paste procedure.

Notice that soon the MS text shows Royce using a distinct manuscript which runs through folio 13 and most of 14; i.e., from page 188 of Box 13 to page 277 of Box 14.

Near the end of Part IV, Royce adds several sentences to the proofs of the MS; 1st, at book 523-24, “It will always be true...so on without end.” 2nd, at book 525, last paragraph, after first two sentences, Royce adds, “Hence, one process...maps of England.” He lets the next sentence stand, but adds the final sentence: “Self-representation of the type here in question...within self-representations.”

NB: It seems that Royce is using an older manuscript as the core of his close of Part 4. Evidence: in MS 188-191 Royce uses a previously written manuscript which begins, “We have illustrated this truth. We now need to develop it...” This is an interesting difference in this passage between the manuscript and the book. In the manuscript, Royce uses the language of demonstration and in the book uses the language of development. For instance, in this case, the original manuscript read, “We now need to demonstrate it...” in contrast to the book’s “need to develop it.”

Part V (Sec. 3): The Self and the Relational System of the Ordinal Numbers. The
Origin of Number; and the Meaning of Order
(MS 191, folio 13; book 526-38)

The MS and the book run largely in parallel. The MS numbers this Part as “IV.”

This section includes an important critique of Hegel’s *Logik*; see book 526 and 527 n, 1.

Royce decides to excise 3 lines from the manuscript page 221 (book 535, eight lines down, between “be defined” and “where.”) These excised lines read: “... and elements can be set in a one-to-one relation with correspondence to other objects, and whose number is not already defined as finite.”

Part VI (Sec. 3): On the Realm of Reality as a Self-Representative System
(MS 235 folio 14; book 538-54)

The MS numbers this Part as “V.” The book and the MS run in parallel for this Part VI.

Notice two important footnotes:

- Royce’s significant critique of Spinoza’s supposed parallelism between thought and extended substance (book page 544), and
- Royce’s insight into Schroeder’s *Algebra der Logik*, vol. I: “The true totality of Being

can therefore only be defined by an endless process, or is an endless reflective system.” This necessity “is not dependent upon any one metaphysical interpretation of the world, whether realistic or idealistic.” (book 553-54, n.1)

Section IV: Infinity, Determinateness and Individuality (book 554-88)

Part I (Sec. 4): The Objections to the Actually Infinite (book 554-63)

This Part I of the MS runs largely in parallel with the book.

On book page 556, Royce adds a footnote: “The force of the argument no longer exists for one who approaches the concept of the Infinite through that of the *Kette*. Cantor observes as much in his answer to Gutberlet in the same journal. The puzzle turns upon falsely identifying the properties of finite and infinite quantities.”

Again, on page 558 of the book, Royce adds to the footnote: “If infinite multitudes corresponding to his [Dedekind’s] definition can be proved real, these paradoxes will be simply obvious properties of such multitudes.” As a reference, this footnote is found on manuscript page 304.

Notice this Part and the book lack the same indentations. So, it becomes difficult to track their correspondence which, however, is very strong. E.g., MS 312 matches book 560.

Note that footnote 2 (on book 562) does appear in the MS. It states that Peirce seems “almost alone among recent mathematical logicians outside of Italy, in still regarding the Calculus as properly to be founded upon the conception of the actually infinite and infinitesimal.”

Part II (Sec. 4): The Infinite as One Aspect only of Being
(MS page 321, Book page 562)

The book matches the MS very closely, e.g., MS page 328 matches Book page 565. Again, at book, 568-69, where Royce numerates his seven concluding theses for this Part, the book reflects the MS nearly verbatim.

Part III (Sec. 4): The Infinite as Determinate.
(MS page 343, Book page 570)

Royce reworks this section while it is still in manuscript form, making several cross-outs at MS 344. Points of matching: MS page 355 & book pages 573, 365 and 575, and 385 and 561.

A typo on page 579 of the book as first published – two footnotes numbered “1” in the text – is corrected in the paperback edition.

Part IV (Sec. 4): The Infinite as a Totality
(MS page 387, Book page 581)

MS page 387: In numbering this Title, Royce seems to have so quickly written “IV” that it can be taken as “IX”.

At book’s page 582 middle, after the italicized “...*all at once*,” Royce inserts the clause, “as we saw in dealing with $f_1(n)$, and the rest of those series involved in any *kette*.” Thereafter, the book returns to parallel the MS.

1/3rd down 583, after the sentence, “That we have seen.” Royce inserts the premises, “Whatever can be precisely defined, however, can be supposed immediately given.” Thereafter, the book returns to parallel the MS.

At middle of book’s 583, Royce changes the “Now one challenges you:” of MS 393 to the more direct: “And now I challenge you.”

Partly similarly but more, at bottom of 593, Royce both changes “I answer:” of MS 294 to “I rejoin:” and adds two sentences: “There is finality and finality, completion and completion. The sort of finality possessed by the series is expressly of one sort, and not of another.” Thereafter, the book returns to parallel the MS.

Near top of book’s 584, Royce adds the insertion: “Your reply to this statement will doubtless at last appeal to the decisive consideration regarding the nature of any individual fact of Being. You will say...” and from there on, the book and manuscript run briefly in parallel to “But the determinate presentation...”

In same paragraph, Royce, capitalizes “Individual Whole” in book, and qualifies the manuscript’s text (396), “presented as an individual in experience,” to read in book, “presented as such a complex individual in experience.” To close this paragraph, Royce adds to the manuscripts last phrase, “...finished by a last member,” both a new sentence, “Otherwise it would lack... from a general idea.” and adds a new note 1: “Here, as I believe,... true essence of Individuality.

At book 584, in the fifth line of the paragraph starting “If the objection be...” after the phrase “...minutely developed elsewhere,” Royce inserts a 2nd footnote which reads, “*Conception of God... do not individuate.*”

On manuscript page 397, after “...Infinite, I must here insist upon.” Royce inserts two utterances in the book, (584): “That every individual Being is determinate, I fully maintain. But how and upon what basis does such a determination rest?” Thereupon both the manuscript and book continue, “When and upon what ground...”

At the bottom of 585, where Royce is listing his three “features” implied for a “true definition” of an individual, Royce italicizes the texts following “Secondly” and “Thirdly” until “...*precisely the purpose*,”

And then at top of book 586, Royce adds four brief sentences: “It is the third of these features which is the really decisive one. The satisfied Will, as such, is the sole Principle of

Individuation. This is our theory of individuality. Here it comes to our aid.”

At manuscript page 406, Royce finishes his text with the words. “. . . can furnish the adequate warrant and realization.” found near middle of book’s 587, BUT afterwards Royce adds two long PARAGRAPHS, beginning respectively with:

- “Our own definition of individuality . . . determinate satisfaction of its Will.”
- “And thus, having vindicated . . . reach determinateness of expression.” (book pages 587-88).

**8. *The World and the Individual: Second Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1901)
Boxes 15- 26 (cf. Box 105, folder 3, esp. docs. 1-2, 4-7b)**

See *WI:1* above for discussion of the relationship of the two series of this work. Possible early MS drafts of this work *may* be included in Box 105, folder 3.

**AN ANALYSIS VIA A SERIAL COMPARISON OF *WI:2* –
*Nature, Man and the Moral Order***

How did Royce insert material into or delete it from the original MS of his Preface and Ten Lectures to develop it into the present first draft (1st D), then the Revised Non-Final Draft (RNF), and then into his Final Draft (FD), which he then presented to Publisher for publication?

Abbreviation and Methodology: This comparison will be done in three parts. First, where possible, we compare the first draft (1st D) with the Revised Non-Final Draft (RNF). Second, we compare the RNF to the Final Draft (FD). Lastly, we compare the final draft (FD) with the published book (B).

Note: Royce’s quotations, inserted in or deleted from a draft, are **set in italics**.

Preface:

There is no Preface in 1st D and RNF. There is a Preface in FD that is substantively identical with B.

Lecture I - Introduction: The Recognition of Facts

Box 105, folder 4, document 6, represents a typescript fragment whose pages are numbered 10-24, has a note at the top written in Royce’s hand: “Gifford Mat’l. Rejected Ms from the 1st Lecture 2d Series.”

Box 15: First Draft of Second Series (= Projected 1st Lect. of Vol. II of *WI*)

[NB The chapter Lecture I: “Retrospect and Outlook” was NOT used in later drafts]

In the 1stD, Royce wrote a 72 page MS lecture entitled “**Retrospect and Outlook**” which he did

not revise or use as such in subsequent drafts. A survey of this MS follows:

pages 5b to 7e: good description of a philosophical truth-seeker, wandering in the dark woods of life with its weak philosophy, one is called to be a “keeper of the city” (echo of O.T. & perhaps of Plato).

Pages 24 to 25: Royce revisits philosophical mysticism, highlighting the immediacy of union that the *process* of interpretation cannot occur.

Pages 28 to 30: good summary of “Critical Rationalism”—the 3rd Conception of Being.”

In it, there’s a repugnance to abide in one’s private present experience. “I can’t tolerate the separate instant, the mere present state of my finite consciousness, taken in isolation from the rest of life’s wholeness. I need a world.”

Page 36. I’m in “a war against my own fragmentariness.”

In the RNF the first lecture, its “Introduction: The Recognition of Facts” was started by Royce because of his revisions in the summer of 1901. See Box 19.

As for the relation of the Recognition of Facts between RNF (revised non-final), FD (final draft) and B (book):

FD of this chapter is a 50 pg. typescript seemingly done in carbon copy except for an autographed 29-33. Both the typescript and autographs are only marginally edited or inserted. From the RNF form, Royce detaches pages 3 to 9 and attaches them to the FD. He removes two sentences from page 11 of the RNF version and reinserts them into FD.

Sections I, II and III:

These sections are taken over with RNF into FD with minor editing only.

Section IV:

This section is taken over with only small changes. It does have a marginal note (inserted before the second paragraph): “While then philosophy is unable to predict a priori the special contents of human experience, it is forced to insist that by the term “human experience” we always mean more than the facts that are verified by individual men.” In B this sentence will appear at the top of pg. 22. Also in this section, after 2 pages of typescript, Royce inserts two groups of autograph sections, each of five pages. In this Section IV, there seems to be some use of older writing, evidenced by older paper and different ink.

Section V:

This section remains virtually unedited.

Section VI:

Royce starts this section with a new introductory sentence and heavily reworks the final paragraph before Section VII.

Concluding Estimate: It seems that Royce has revised the RNF draft and then used the typed carbon copy of the RNF as the core of his final draft. The autographed and inserted comments are then used to refine Royce's thought and reveal and steadily move toward the final form of the manuscript as given in B. As the start of his two-chapter mid-career theory of knowledge, he has developed these chapters and has become much more precise than in his dissertation at The Johns Hopkins University. At *WI:2* at page vi, Royce references this dissertation as founding his studies of epistemology.

Lecture II: The Linkage of Facts

NB: To grasp what Royce thinks he is doing in this Lecture, it seems necessary to re-examine his Preface (at *WI 2: ix-x*), starting 6 lines from the top of page ix with, "Accordingly, in the second lecture..." and ending near the bottom of page x, just before the paragraph starting "The Theory of Time and Eternity..."

The RNF draft is contained in Boxes 19 and 20. The FD is contained in Box 22.

Section I:

In P, Royce does not include the fact that the world of will is also the "world of appreciation." One aspect of reality we shall later find embodied is the conception that something in nature's laws is invariable. The other aspect will receive embodiment in our social consciousness." This appears in FD and B.

Section II:

A nine page autographed addition to the manuscript that is not included in the RNF. In the Final Draft, this addition runs from 72a to 72i: "Here however we meet, in its most elementary form, a consideration that will suggest to us very..." The addition ends immediately before the paragraph beginning, "We return then soon..." (To find this passage in B, see pages 62 bottom to 66 top.)

Section III:

Royce adds an important comment to RNF that appears in FD. This addition reads: "As we shall see, the general concept of Series is common to the World of Description and to the world of actual life of the Will." Royce concentrates on this passage in the galley proofs and revised FD in order to produce an additional passage in B. The final book form of the *World and the Individual* adds an additional and very critical section that Royce must have added to the galley proofs. This addition turns on the issue of the importance of the well-ordered series. Only the types of Series differ in these two worlds, the Well-Ordered Series being characteristic of the life of the will just in so far as it is self-conscious, and consequently always knows what next to do, while the world of description is characterized in general by another and less perfect type of serial order." (B 72, FD 89)

Also in the RNF of Section III, there is a footnote that is missing. The footnote, that appears in the FD of the manuscript and in B is as follows: "That plans of action, reflective systems of

ideas, and the structure of the Self in general, illustrate the concept of Series in the form of the Well-Ordered, or self-representative Series, we have shown in the Supplementary Essay, and we shall have occasion to return to that fact soon." (B 75)

At the end of Section III in the FD, Royce makes two footnotes, one crediting Peirce, the other James. Both of these footnotes reflect Royce's indebtedness to them on the topic of serial order. Neither of these notes are found in RNF. Only the James footnote is typed in the FD of the MS, whereas the note on Peirce is added later in pencil. At the end of the third section and at the beginning of the fourth, Royce breaks out in a flurry of credits to Kempe, Peirce, James, Cantor, etc.

Section IV:

A caution to students in a footnote is absent from RNF but is added in FD and B of *World and the Individual*. Royce cautions students to pay attention to Kempe's work:

"Published in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Vol. XXI, for the year 1890. Another statement of his main results was printed by Mr. Kempe in Nature Vol. XLIII, pages 156 to 162. These papers have been far too much neglected by the students of the exact logic to whom they were addressed. Their interest goes far beyond that of the special idea which I here borrow from it." (FD 93; B 77)

Section IV:

Royce adds "The possibility of observing this relation is due to the fact that since our discriminating attention is a voluntary act, possessed of its own internal meaning, we are able to see, by reflection, how one discrimination follows another." (FD 97; B 80)

Section IV:

Royce adds "Here, then, I have one of those "bare external conjunctions" of the One and the Many of which Mr. Bradley in his Appearance and Reality, has so much to say, and which for him, constitute the insoluble problem of our finitude." (FD 98; B 81)

On the next page, Royce adds: "If one of the triads is such that upon reflection we observe a particular dependence amongst the acts whereby we distinguish the three objects." (B 82; FD 100).

Also the footnote on the next page is expanded from the penultimate: "Hence, as I there (in the Supplementary Essay) said, the order of the number system is the original type of all order in heaven and upon earth. But we are here following out a process that leads us to a conception of order systems very different from the number-system. For in the latter, each term has a next following term. In the system that we shall now be led to conceive, no term has a next term. Yet we reach these other systems by means of the first form of order, since, as we shall see, the recurrent character of our discriminations is the source of these derived order systems." (F 101; B 83)

Royce adds: "I can try this experiment with exactness, because in making it, I am observing ... " (B 84; FD 101). On the next page, he also adds: "And in doing so, I also find what structure my

objects themselves, as far known to me, appear to possess.” (B 85; FD 102)

Section V:

Royce adds: “We then seek for this fact in experience. If we find it we are helped towards an understanding of the One and the Many.” B 87; FD 104.

On the next page of B and FD, Royce adds: “Hence, while the process of defining the intermediate terms is a Well-Ordered Process, that leads us from each stage to the next one, it tends to make us conceive a series of facts in which no term has any next neighbor, because as we conceive, there is always another between.”

Immediately following, this is added: “and this is the process upon which all scientific description of given facts depends.” (B 88-9; FD 106-7).

Royce adds part of footnote: Instead of “another” on line 5, he states “by an infinity of other series of intermediaries.” Similarly, the last four lines of the footnote are added: “But the spatial relations ... ” (B 90; FD 107).

Section VI:

Royce adds part of footnote 1: “Owing to the irreversible character of many of the serial process present in our experience, the “Group” character, in the narrow sense of that term, will be absent from many of the systems of transformations with which science has to deal. But a law will still be the expression of the invariants of a system of transformations.” (B 95; FD 112).

In the same section, Royce adds two small fragments: “For such, as we saw in the Supplementary Essay...” (B 98; FD 116), and “We all if we find this sort of truth, shall come ...” B 99; FD 117.

Section VI:

Royce adds: “Now the reality is not the world apart from the activity of knowing beings – it is the world of the fact and the knowledge in one organic whole.” And also “The true series is that of the variety of Selves, who together constitute, in their unity, the Individual of Individuals, the absolute. Beyond our circle of concretely known facts, there are not merely series of data to be discriminated, but volitional processes to be estimated, appreciated, and conceived in their true serial order, as the stages of the world’s life.” (B 102; FD120-1).

Royce adds in FD. “And the world, in permitting this experience reveals its true essence better than the mere description of the serially arranged data reveals the final truth of things.” And also the last part of section 6 which reads: “That is why...Life of Divine self-expression.” (B 104; FD 122). And also, “It is a world with which we stand in Social Relations. It is a world with which we stand in social relations. Its life cooperates with ours.” (B105; FD 123).

In Section VII, Royce adds “The world of values or of appreciation” and also the fragments

“One self. This world would appear to such an insight of the social order. For the categories of the World of Appreciation, as we shall later more fully see when we come to the study of our human consciousness, are the categories of the Self in Social form and expression.” (B106; FD124).

In the same section, Royce adds “socially related” and “And the world as we describe it, is the world viewed in the order of our own processes of description, which as incident in our human life, have their value, but are expressions of the true world order, only in so far as they reveal the life of things.” **NB:** After this quotation, Royce adds ANOTHER section of text on the galley proofs which does not appear in FD: “Our conclusion is that the true series of facts in the world must be a Well-Ordered Series, in which every fact has its next following fact. The series discoverable by us in the World of Description are characterized by the prevalence, for our view, of the relation Between. Hence they do not appear to us as a Well-Ordered Series. But just in so far they are inadequate expressions of truth.” (B 107; FD125).

Lecture III: The Temporal and the Eternal

NB: Box 105, folder 3, document 7b is a manuscript fragment, numbered 7-49, is likely a preparatory work for this lecture. Clues: the manuscript refers to the sound of the church bell, cites a similar poem used here, and (like this lecture) deals with the irreversibility of time.

Analysis of the First Draft

First, comparison of Royce’s Original Draft **as emended into what’s called “1stD:**

[**NB:** Single words added or deleted are ordinarily not recorded here. This editor’s eye is set on clauses or sentence that are deleted or added. He places Royce’s addition in italics.] **Please note** that the additions that Royce makes to this draft are ambiguous to the extent that it is impossible to determine the time at which Royce makes these corrections.

Top of page 2 top, after “... intensely practical.” Royce inserts new sentence. “it will need therefore a close and deliberate scrutiny.” and continues, “Time, as we shall soon see ... ”

Bottom of page 3, start of Section I: Royce deletes and adds as follows: “Time is known to us, [delete “empirically”] both perceptually, as the psychologists would say, and conceptually. [three words deleted] that is, we have a relatively direct experience of time, and a relatively indirect conception of the temporal order of the world. But our conception OF time far outstrips ... ”

Bottom of page 4, beginning with the sentence. “We fail to observe how, in case of [4 words deleted] our more direct experience of time and of its meaning [2 words deleted] various elements are woven [2 words deleted] into a certain wholeness,--namely, the very elements which, [delete “to”] *when* our artificial conception of time has sundered them, we are prone ... ”

Middle of page 11, after the sentence ending “when I speak the line.” Royce adds a new sentence:

“For only by virtue of experiencing this wholeness do I observe the rhythm of the music, and the meaning of the line.”

Bottom of page 14, well before the sentence starting “ Sometimes, for the sake of...” and after the phrase, “our whole conception of time, and,” Royce adds “as I may at once add, for our conception of eternity.” yet this is also a matter very frequently obscured ...”

Bottom of page 16, after the paragraph starting “This interpretation... to our time experience as anyone may observe” Royce adds, “it for himself. For we do experience succession, and at once we do take note of facts that are in different time. For, I ask you, What word of mine is it that, as this single present word, you just now hear me speaking.”

Middle of page 19, after the sentence ending, “... that you hear me speak.” Royce inserts the following italicized words: “*not thus do you escape our difficulty. For a spoken word is itself a series of temporally successive sounds. Can you hear at once the whole spoken word, or can you grasp at once the whole series?...*”

Middle of page 21: after the sentence ending “...become, in isolation, an object of experience,” Royce deletes “As a fact you...,” – his former start of a new sentence – to start instead this way: “on the other hand, an event not temporally indurs [illegible] so brief that in it you were unable to perceive any succession, would help you in no whit to get the idea of time until you experienced it along with other events. as a fact you never experience any event as something merely present in time, without any difference of former or of latter within the present that, as a temporal whole, you observe.” [Royce continues “What is now before you is a succession,...”]

Bottom of page 21: describing “a succession” in this sentence, and after “... which are parts;” Royce qualifies closely, adding the clause: “and of those parts each, when, AND IN SO FAR AS once your attention once fixes it, and takes it in its time relations, is found as a present that in time both precedes and succeeds other facts, while these other facts are [22] also just as truly before you... ”

Top of page 24: just before paragraph starting, “I have now characterized...” Royce adds to the previous sentence’s phrase, “... and I cannot make” the clause, “this datum of experience any more definite by calling it a synthesis or the mere result of a synthesis.”

“I have now characterized *THE MORE DIRECTLY GIVEN FEATURES IN OUR* our [sic] consciousness of succession.”

Bottom of page 25, at close of sentence starting “But all data of...” Royce adds to “relation to the interests” the clause: “whose play and whose success or defeat constitutes the life of our will.”

Bottom of page 27, in the paragraph starting “Our temporal form of experience...” in its third sentence, speaking of “false Realism, Royce adds after “...therefore tend to be viewed” the clause: “as merely in relations of coexistence and the space world is the favorite region of realism.”

Middle of page 28, in the section, “As the kitten ignores...”, Royce points out the parallel: “so

facts in general *tend to* appear to us *all dead and indifferent* when *we disregard* their processes. But in the movement of things lies *for us just as truly, as in her small way, for the kitten, all the glory and the tragedy, all the life and the meaning of our observed universe. This concern, this interest in the changing binds us then to the lower animals...*

In the middle of page 29, to the sentence ending "...but undramatic details." Royce adds a new one: "*for space furnished indeed the stage and the scenery, but the world's play occurs in time.*"

At the bottom of page 29, Royce modifies as follows the sentence starting, "Time, whatever else it is, is given *to us* as that within whose successions, *in so far as for us they have a direct interest and meaning*, every event, springing from, yet forsaking, its predecessors, aims on, towards its own fulfilment and extinction."

At the bottom of page 30, after the sentence ending "...mystic's point of view," Royce deletes the starting words of the next sentence and writes, *as for the higher justification of this aspect of our experience, that indeed belongs elsewhere. but as to the facts*, every part of a succession is present in so ... "

At the middle of page 31, just before the sentence beginning, "But as a fact, no serious experiences upon which..." , Royce qualifies the close of the preceding sentence, "...and speak of the endless flight of time as an incomprehensible brute fact of experience, and as in so far seemingly meaningless. But as a fact, no serious experiences ... "

At the middle of page 34, just after the sentence ending "...ideal mathematical TIME. Royce adds: "the present time in case of the world at large has an unity altogether similar to that of the specious present moment of our inner consciousness."

At the middle of page 41, just before the paragraph beginning, "For, in a similar fashion..." Royce inserts a final sentence: "*but within the present, if conceived as a section of the time stream, there are internal differences of present past and future.*"

At the bottom of page 43, to the top of page 44, Royce edits the paragraph starting: "For *the time series differs in constitution* from the constitution of a line in space [p 44] or from the characters belonging to a *mathematically described physical movement of a body* in ways which can only be expressed in terms of significance."

Section III:

Page 49: shortly before the paragraph beginning, "And so, first, the real world ... ", Royce revises the close of the preceding sentence at "inevitably, defined eternity;" by writing: "and a temporal world must needs be, when viewed in its wholeness, an eternal world. we have only to review the structure of reality in the light of the foregoing analysis in order to bring to our consciousness this result."

Top of page 51: Royce enlarges the sentence starting "Hence" to read: "Hence, our only ways of expressing the general structure of our idealistic realm of being is to say that wherever an idea exists as a finite idea, still in pursuit of its goal, there *appears to be* some essentially temporal

aspect belonging to the consciousness in question.”

Middle of page 52: before paragraph starting “I have advisedly used...” Royce qualifies the preceding sentence to read: “For the finite world in general, then, as for us human beings, the distinction of past and future appears to be co-extensive with life and meaning.”

Top of page 54: After “for the Self” Royce adds in its entirety is the whole of a life and is not the mere last moment or stage of that life. In the middle of the page, after “a finite life seeking its goal is therefore indeed essentially temporal” Royce inserts but so just as music is temporal. For every work of musical art involves significant temporal series in which there is progression and passage from chord to chord, from phrase to phrase and from movement to movement.

Middle of page 56: Just before the paragraph “In this sense” Royce writes “And so a distinction, of both the past and the future of this self from the content of any one stage of the process when the stage is viewed as the present one.”

Bottom of page 57: After “content of this temporal order.” Royce inserts whether it is viewed from any one temporal instant as past or as present or as future is at once known, i.e. consciously experienced.

Pages 57-58: “And I use this expression at once in the very sense we before used it when we pointed out that to your own consciousness, the whole musical phrase ... ”

Page 59 bottom: In sentence starting “But even in this ambiguity”...after “This present fact of consciousness *and still to view it as an event in time you are still always led upon closer consideration to a observe or to conceive that this temporal fact is a complex event, adding a true succession within itself.*

Page 60 middle: Every now is also a succession; so that every temporal fact *every event so far as we men can observe it, has to be viewed as present to experience in both the senses of the term present; since this fact when present maybe contrasted with predecessors, etc. etc.*

Page 66 bottom: Sentence starting “A consciousness related to the whole of ... ” Royce adds *the worlds events and the whole of time, precisely as our human consciousness is related to a single melody or rhythm, and to the brief but still extended interval of time which this melody or rhythm occupies - such a consciousness I say is an eternal consciousness.*

Page 69: Just before last section of section III, Royce adds. “length of its present moment *so that its view includes the whole of time at once.*”

Page 79 bottom: Sentence starting “If you view the temporal order of the world as forming such an endless whole *expressing a single plan and a will* (as I think you have the right to do) then the argument associated with the “Supplementary Essay” can apply to our present problem.

Page 86 top: Royce writes “I am not one with God *and I am not one* with my own eternal individuality, *especially and peculiarly because* this passing temporal instant is not the whole of

time and because the rest of time is no longer or else not when this instant passes.”

Analysis of the Final Draft

New Introduction to the Chapter

Royce adds this introduction to the final draft (FD). “*The world of the facts that we ought to acknowledge...face the question.*” Book (B) 111-2; FD 126-7.

Royce adds: “*That is, we have a relatively direct experience of time at any moment, and we acknowledge the truth of a relatively indirect conception that we possess of the temporal order of the world.*” B113; FD 129.

Royce adds: “*It is obviously related to that direction of the acts of the will whose logical aspect interested us in connection with the consideration of our discriminating consciousness discriminating.*” Also “*to our consciousness, in precisely the sense in which the unity of our knowing mental life always finds present at once many facts.*” B114-15; FD 131-2.

Royce adds several revisions to the in FD and B: “*in terms of the conceptions of the World of Description and so we conceive it as infinitely divisible*” B 128; FD 145.

Also: “*...even when viewed in relation to the World of Description, still differs*” B131; FD 149.

Additionally: “*...that the time-consciousness is a ‘part’ or ‘aspect’ of the striving.*” B 135; FD 152.

Finally on the same page: “*Self-representative or recurrent process, and note the mere last moment or stage of that process. As we shall see, there is no last moment.*” Royce expands a subsequent comment: “*- except indeed that music is not only temporal, but temporally finite.*” B 135; FD153.

Royce adds: “*...takes place, or else as one of the finally simple stages of the discrete series of facts which the absolute insight views as the expression of its Will*” The next paragraph continues in a new way in the final draft “*As to the one hypothesis, an absolute instant in the mathematical sense is like a point*” Also “*..within which something happens...*” B 139; FD 158.

On the next page, Royce adds twice to this section, once in the final draft and once in the book on the galley proofs. On the final draft, he adds “*As to the other hypothesis, it seems clear that we human beings observe no such ultimate and indivisible facts of experience...*” But then he adds another section on the galley proofs “*just because, so far as we observe and discriminate facts, we are more or less under the bondage of the categories of the World of Description.*” (B 140; FD 158).

“*...includes an observation of every passing away, of every sequence, of every event and of whatever in time succeeds in following that event, and includes all the views that are taken by the various finite Selves.*” (B 141; FD 160).

Final Draft 161-2

In the final draft, in this case is a carbon copy of the penultimate draft, Royce decides to **cut out** approximately 18 lines and the last paragraph of the penultimate draft in order to create the FD. The excised portion is as follows:

“Our hypothesis regarding nature has already made use of the conception of a possible consciousness which, although finite, should still differ from ours in the length of the present moments, i.e. in the duration which such a consciousness could grasp at once. If it is possible to grasp at once, as we now can, a sequence three seconds long, which already includes past and future elements, then a consciousness is conceivable which could grasp at once the events of a geological period, or of the evolution of the stellar system. Such a consciousness would in a sense be nearer than ours to the Eternal; but would still be finite type of consciousness. Its present moments would contain what are for us ages of sequence, but to a consciousness whose span i.e. whose present moment was the duration of a single vibration of violet light our own present moments would appear as world cycles seem to us. Quantities are relative; but the principle is the same so soon as facts that are in temporal succession at all viewed at once. For the Absolute we simply suppose that no limitation exists to the length of its moment, so that its view includes the whole of time at once. And that is all that we mean by speaking of Absolute consciousness as Eternal.”

Royce adds the following passages:

“But to say this is as if one were to speak of observing at once the meaning or character of the whole phrase or rhythm by simply failing to take any note at all of the succession as such once.” B 144; FD 163.

“I may be permitted to anticipate some of our later results about the Self, and, for the sake of illustration, to point out that from our point of view, as we shall latter explain more fully.” B 147; FD 167.

“And so, in discussing this most elementary category, we are preparing the way for a most significant result as the whole life of any man.” B 149; FD 168.

“That inattention of which we spoke in our last lecture, is especially an inattention to all but this act, as it now appears to me ... with” B 149; FD 169.

“So much it has seemed that I might here venture to anticipate of later results, in order that the true significance of our elementary categories might be, however imperfectly, defined for us from the outset. For all the questions as to our deeper relations to the universe are bound up with this problem of Time and Eternity.” B 151; FD 170.

Lecture IV: Physical and Social Reality

The first draft, of “Physical and Social Reality,” originally designated Lecture II, was housed in HARP Box 15. In this original draft, in Royce’s first effort “to apply our idealistic Theory of

Being to the problems of human life and destiny” Royce finds that “Man’s relation to Nature” sets the First Problem. This thrust contrasts sharply with his next drafted Lecture--the “RNF” version, entitled “Introduction: The Recognition of Facts.” For now Royce shifts his way of starting this application of *WI:1* to the problems of human life and destiny--part of the application constituting the whole of *WI:2*. For in his “RNF” draft, he chose to lay his basis in a revised human theory of knowing--one needed to know Nature, rooted in experiencing facts, and complemented in his Final Draft by a Second Lecture, “The Linkage of Facts.” In this pair of new lectures the infrastructure of a revised logic is clearly discernible.

What occasioned this shift in Royce’s thinking? On June 21, 1901, Royce told William James that “I seem to myself to be on the track of a great number of interesting topics in Logic” [*Letters* 422], even as he acknowledged that Peirce’s lectures of 1898 were and always would remain “quite epoch marking for me. They started me on such new tracks.” [*Ibid*]

Interestingly, to start his Second Series at Aberdeen in January 1900, Royce had had two lectures drafted. (These he may have delivered there.) Yet thereafter, in his revisions of his Second Series, both his original Lecture I “Retrospect and Prospect” and Lecture II, “Physical and Social Reality,” lost their position in Royce’s FD. He won needed space by simply laying aside that Lecture I and by postponing what had been Lecture II into becoming Lecture IV. In place of these two lectures, Royce created and inserted two distinctive chapters:

- I. “Introduction: the Recognition of Facts” (produced for his “RNF” Second Series), and
- II. “The Linkage of Facts”

For both of these new Lectures, he employed a Peirce-inspired Logic of Relatives to support Royce’s new and more explicitly empirical theory of knowing.

On Aug. 22, 1901, after having, as he admitted, “worked very hard,” Royce shipped to Brett at Macmillan the finalized manuscripts of his ten Chapters for *WI:2*. It still lacked Index, Preface and Table of Contents--they would come later. Royce regarded what he sent as “revised, and in very large part rewritten, ... very variously gotten into shape--two or three different typewriting machines, and some pretty variable masses of my own hand-written sheets making up the whole. But after going pretty carefully over the finished MS,” Royce felt his Second Series would be shorter than *WI:1*, which was weighted down with that “Supplementary Essay” which became more than a hundred printed pages of smaller font.

Now to compare Royce’s versions of his Lecture “Physical and Social Reality” (presently housed in Box 15), and his lecture “Physical and Social Reality” (presently housed in Box 20). The former exists in a heavily-edited autograph form, and seems to have been placed as Lecture II in Royce’s stack of First Draft MSS for *WI:2*. The latter is a faithful typescript in purple carbon of the former, the autograph. The former is now set among the MSS of Royce’s First Draft. The latter is set among the MSS of Royce so-called RNF Draft and called Lecture IV. There is no change of thought, no additions, and no omissions occurring between the autograph as Royce revised it and this typescript form of “Physical and Social Reality” The Typescript copy can hardly be labeled as a “Revised” form, except in an esthetic sense of looking clearer and neater and as containing the earlier revisions which Royce inserted into his 1stD of this

manuscript before he had it typed in multiple copies.

In these identical texts, Royce early on uses the simile of a once-beautiful, broken statue within a heap of rubble and sand, Royce hints that similarly his “applied” philosophy (in volume 2) must interpret the broken fragments of our experience, especially, as found in the present moment (with all its inputs and relations to other elements in the universe), must be based on the findings of the empirical sciences, and recognize how the hypotheses resultant from such experience are just that--hypotheses, not constant truths. Royce holds that his 4th Conception of Being shows itself to be sound since its opposite “is itself self-contradictory. Our application is “more practical [than volume 1 is] in its interest, and less exact in its method of procedure.” (p. 14) But our application results not in “mere conjecture” since our task “is guided throughout by a definite if inadequate notion of the final unity. “For provisional hypotheses have the same sort of value in philosophy that they may have in science--the value of guiding our progress and of defining our purposes.” (15)

What about the development of the drafts --one that resulted from a seriated process moving from “1st Draft” into what finally became Lecture IV “Physical and Social Reality” through its faithful typescript form (presently labeled RNF at Harvard Archives and housed in Box 20), on into its “Final Draft” form (FD)--housed as the first lecture in Box 23—which lecture was accurately reproduced in Book Form (B)?

First, then, WHICH EDITORIAL TOUCHES did Royce insert into his own 1stD before having it typed in duplicate copy to make the RNF a far more readable version of itself? This 1stD, housed in Box 15, is almost exclusively in Royce’s hand, composed of various MSS, pages 1-89, with the exception of one page in typescript, numbered “(18) (19) (20). [Reference in this section is made to page numbers of this 1stD, Box 15, as edited by Royce **NOTE: ITALICIZED LOWER-CASE WORDS OR PHRASES REPRESENT ROYCE’S EDITIONS to this First Draft.]**

At page 2, Royce deletes two original lines, and after “...very general characters” inserts instead, “*resulting from our conception of reality. As for the first point, --the fragmentariness of our human type of experience, you may see through a comparison how it limits our insights. For even if you precisely knew*” [and continues] the form and the beauty of some ancient statue...”

At the top of page 3, at the sentence starting “You can...” Royce replaces two deleted words with the phrase, “*often judge something of the sense of the*” fragments when once ...”

At the middle of page three, after the sentence that ends “...will come to light.”, Royce inserts “*but secondly, as to the limitations imposed upon us by our very definition of the ultimate reality,*” [and then returns to his earlier draft] “it is not true that our Idealism pretends to know (if we may continue the metaphor), – viz, the precise form of that lost statue. . .”

Page 3 bottom, after “...to constitute its perfection,” Royce inserts the new sentence: “*For our theory of the absolute has a decidedly positive tendency.*”

Page 5 middle, after “...organization of the Universe,” Royce inserts the new sentence: “*Nor is*

this something of small moment, ignorant though we are.”

Page 7 top, following “...found: This fact,” Royce qualifies: *taken even in abstraction, and by itself, is already*” something unique, without . .

Page 7 middle, after “...contributes to the Whole,” Royce inserts “*and, viewed even as God knows it, still*” stand out within the Whole, as just this fact and no other. Here then, *as you can say in presence of the very least fact,--here is something individual; etc..”*

Page 13 bottom, after “...our effort to interpret,” Royce deletes four words and replaces them with “*various types of facts known to human experience*” [inserting] *and to interpret them* in the light of our Idealism.”

Page 14 bottom, after “...for our” Royce inserts “*interpretation of the various special regions of fact in our world could only be demonstrably and absolutely, exact and final, if we had before us at a glance...*”

Page 14 bottom, after “We must content ourselves with...”, Royce adds “glimpses, [+deleted word] hypotheses, and [+deleted word] mere illustrations.”

Page 15 bottom, just before start of paragraph beginning “In the present lecture ...”, Royce adds after “of practical service.”[the new sentence] “*for provisional hypotheses have the same sort of value in philosophy that they may have in science,--the value of guiding our progress, and of defining our purposes.*”

“In the present lecture, [+deleted word] *and in the lecture immediately subsequent to this one, I propose to state some general groundsetc”*

Page 16 bottom is made distinct by a torn off 2/3 of the former kind of paper and the glued on different kind of paper, starting “I shall begin the inquiry ...” [Is Royce using an earlier manuscript for 1½ pages?]

Page 17 top, after “... is a realm of [+deleted word] laws,” Royce inserts “whose rigidity and stability seem to establish a vast contrast between material and mental reality.”

Section II:

A page numbered “(18) (19) (20)” starts this Lecture’s Section II by using its unique typescript page, heavily edited, and having an autograph appendage at its close to start a new paragraph, “And now, in the next place: Why do we believe that Nature exists at all? ...but in terms of our Fourth Conception of Being, needs not a little scrutiny. The answer is by no means directly obvious.”

Bottom half of page 21, Royce heavily deletes and revises this description on how our human sense work, as follows: “FOR the senses never directly show us, by themselves, the Being of anything whatever, [+ 3 word deletion] *not even the being of their own facts. that the senses*

cannot [1 word deletion] *show us being is true*, just because whatever is real, is, in its inmost essence, *and in its wholeness, an Individual*. And the senses never show us individuality, but only [+ 3 word deletion] *the presence of sense qualities,--colors, sounds, odors, and touch--impressions, [+ 3 word deletion] and all such facts, taken as they come [+ 3 word deletion]* are, so far, facts of a highly general type. Moreover, what the [p. 22] Senses show us is [+ 3 word deletion] a mass of more or less imperfectly immediate facts.”

Page 23 top, Royce revises as follows: “Our Idealism knows no *group of presupposed* axioms, and, since it depends upon a process of thoroughgoing self-criticism, knows nothing whatever of presuppositions which are beyond criticism.”

Page 25 middle, after “... existence of natural objects.” Royce revises his first draft to read: “*and it indeed appeals to a certain [6 word deletion] axiom, namely, to the supposed axiom of causality, [4 word deletion] it is usually more critical in its statement than most of the views that make the whole issue depend upon irreducible innate convictions.*”

Page 26 middle, after “...experiences of resistance and of limitation to the” Royce revises his first text to read: “*external* existence of things, upon the ground that *there must indeed be a cause for every effect, and therefore, in this case, a cause which* resists and sets limits to our will. *as this cause is not found within ourselves, we assume it is external [3 word deletion]*. No theory of our belief . . .”

Page 27 middle, after “...Fourth Conception of Being,” Royce explains: “it is *the fulfilment,--[1 word deleted] the always [2 words deleted] relative and imperfect fulfilment [1 word deleted] --but still the fulfilment of our internal meanings, and not the opaque resistance which the world offers to these meanings, ...*”

Page 27 bottom, after, “finding that the universe has Being,” Royce continues: “and our *only and our valid* means for defining wherein that Being consists. [3 word deletion] *the proof that a real world is here about us is never the mere* opaqueness of fact, the blind presence of something which besets us; but [1 word deleted] *but rather is it the* relative transparency of our inner life, the observed manifestation of meaning in OUR experience, ...”

Page 28 bottom, after “...the completion of our incompleteness,” Royce revises, “and not *any* fate that *overcomes us*. *I cannot express the whole lesson of our former series of researches better than by insisting upon just this fact.* [1 word deleted] We do indeed experience resistance. Our *solid* physical world does impress its presence upon our organisms.”

Page 31 middle, after “...where what happens is explicable,” Royce revises heavily to read: “[4 words deleted] already presupposed as valid, and as valid for a real world beyond you, from the very outset of your whole inquiry. Is there not here, then, a belief deeper than your mere experience that your will is [1 word deleted] *at any time resisted?* [1 word deleted] *for unless* you had this principle of *causation* in your possession, and unless you first believed the principle to be valid and applicable to a realm beyond your private experience [1 word deleted], your will would be resisted *in vain; so far as your power to learn about a real world [1 word deleted; inserted word illegible] then go.* *for you would then learn nothing....*”

Page 35 middle, after sentence ending “...internal meanings” and one word deleted, Royce revises to read: “*for any idea that we understand possesses already its internal meaning. This meaning of [1 word unintelligible], whatever it is, is, even as an internal meaning [1 word deleted] one that has, for us, its [1 word deleted] value for our rational will, its interest as a means of explanation. somehow or other it [1 word deleted] helps us more clearly to grasp the Internal sense, the observed inner significance of some of our [1 word deleted] conscious states, to observe what we call their causal connections.*”

Page 36 middle, after “...first of all embodies,” Royce revises text to read: “*onl[y] our own deepest and most rational purposes. If the external world said to be present in nature, is, as this view holds, above all causal, and is such as to explain the particular facts which are found in our experience, then that world is above all a real embodiment of the very purpose which, in us, appears as [line and a half deleted] our purpose of explanation, [2 lines deleted]*”

Page 38: “*we must first assume then, that our external world is real as in general an expression of our own [1 word deleted] rational meaning, or in other words of our own deepest will, before we can even begin to view this or that fact in [1 word deleted] nature, as a real cause . . .*”

Bottom of page 41, after sentence ending “...so far as they are men. Royce deletes two words and starts over: “*as a matter of religious faith, one might well believe, for instance, that upon a given occasion God had revealed his will to a single prophet, or other inspired person, and that this revelation not only remained, but had to remain, by God’s will, [p. 42] a secret quite inaccessible to all other men. In the reality of the revelation in question one might [1 word deleted] nevertheless believe, simply because, by hypothesis, God would be conceived by a believer in such a revelation as a real person, and the prophet as also a person. [1 word deleted] And whatever . . .*”

Page 46 top, after “...unable to verify our observations.” Royce begins by inserting: “*a nature that is not only by accident observable just now to me alone, [1 word deleted] that also is such that nobody else amongst all men besides myself can observe it, becomes, at once, to my mind, either . . ., or else...to a realm of spirit, whom I may then fancy to exist apart from men. In either case, [1 word deleted] such fact observable by me alone no longer is to be conceived as belonging to the well known material world of common sense and of science.*”

Middle of page 51, after “...if you abstract from [1 word deleted]” Royce revises his text to read: “*so much of our knowledge as is bound up with our consciousness of what we believe to be the manifestations of the presence of our fellow men, [3 words deleted] if you leave out of our minds the stores of information, which we have won through the aid and presence of our fellows and of social tradition, the knowledge of Nature which each one of us possesses, as a matter of his own purely personal and private acquaintance with the routine of Nature’s facts, although this knowledge is indeed of great practical importance to each one of us, still not only reduces itself to a mere fraction . . .*”

Middle of page 52, after “...possible in any definite terms.” Royce revises his text with deletions

and thus converts it to read: “Let *even* the greatest *and most independent* observer of nature, in field or in laboratory, *attempt to* leave out [1 word deleted] *of his present knowledge of nature* so much [1 word deleted] *as is due to the fact that he even now* [4 words deleted] interprets y of explaining our belief that our fellows exist is still, to my mind WRONG. [5 words deleted] *it is not the analogy with ourselves which is our principal guide to our belief in our fellows. The view that analogy mainly guides us is defective as an account of the psychology of* [1 word deleted] *our social consciousness,...*”

Middle of page 59, after sentence ending with “... consciousness of ourselves”, Royce heavily revises his text to read: “This [1 word deleted] *thesis which will later prove* important for our whole theory of the Self, will [4 words deleted] *be again illustrated* in connection with that theory. We are social beings *first of all by virtue of our inherited* [1 word deleted] instincts and *we love, fear, and closely watch our fellows*, in advance of any definite ideas about *what* our fellows *really are*. Our *more explicit* consciousness that our fellows exist is [1 word deleted] *clue to a gradual* interpretation of these our deepest social instincts. *Our belief in the existence of our fellow, therefore, does not* come to our consciousness, [1 word deleted] through a mere *argument from analogy . . .*”

Page 60 top: Royce revises the sentence beginning with “*our assurance about our fellows arises* [1 word deleted] by means of those very interests whereby we gradually come to our own self-consciousness. [1 inserted word deleted] *it is nearer to the truth to* [1 word deleted] *say that we first learn about ourselves from and through our fellows, than that we learn about our fellows by using the analogy of ourselves. not even now do we* mainly trust to analogy to guide us in interpreting what we most want *at any instant* to know about the inner life of our fellows.”

Page 61 middle, after “any close analogy between his meanings or his expressions and ...” Royce inserts: “*my own. His difference from me makes him seem more real to me.* [1 word deleted] *thus of the truly* original poet, the Shakespeare or the Goethe, seems to us, *as we study him*, to possess his own wondrous inner life, *just* because, while we read *him*, we meet novelty. Wonder arouses the social sense more vigorously than does recognition. *The child’s period of liveliest growth in social insight is his questioning age when every new mind is a mysterious realm to be explore by inquiries.*” The new paragraph begins. “And now,...”

Page 62 bottom after “...to our fragmentary meanings.” Royce inserts a new sentence: *hence since reality is through and through what completes our incompleteness, our fellows are real.*” [text continues] “Wondering ...”

Page 67 bottom, after paragraph beginning “Thus then, to speak in idealistic terms, my fellow is known to me” Royce adds: “*primarily as a* [1 word deleted] *group of ideal* [2 words deleted] meanings, localized [1 word deleted] *in the universe by the fact that they are discovered* in connection with these looks and words” etc.

Page 68 bottom, after “to me as a fact present in experience”, Royce adds: “*In precisely what sense my fellow is, in all* [‘this’ deleted] *life of his, an individual self we have later more fully to see. The present questions is as to the means whereby I find my fellow to be a real life at all.*”

Bottom of page 80 to top of 81, to the sentence starting “Moreover, while...” Royce deletes two words and adds “*nature is a realm thus meant by us all, we, [2 words deleted] nevertheless, for the reasons just indicated, are socially viewed as isolated from one another so that no [5 word clause deleted] human experience can hope to observe just where and how, all these various meanings of ours, which we have in mind whenever [2 words deleted] in common we deal with nature, actually win the intended unity, and come to be parts of one meaning.*”

Page 81 bottom, after “as we presuppose from OUR childhood,” Royce inserts “*up, all men see the same sun, walk upon the same earth, and, in general, [1 word deleted] all men deal with the same nature objects.*”

Hence, the heart of this text’s development occurs in the heavy revision itself of the unedited First Draft into which Royce inserted so many emendations and deletions. Later, he would have a secretary type up what is called the “Revised but Not Final form.” This embodied all of Royce’s emendations of this Lecture, “Physical and Social Reality,” up to that time. Still further development would occur, however, not in the RNF version, but when Royce touched up his final draft for the printer.

Generally, Royce’s letter of submission of the body of WI 2 in MSS form to Brett, (quoted above) with its indication of the text’s development, holds true, in particular, of the MSS that became Lecture IV “Physical and Social Reality.” The latter, too, is as Royce acknowledged to Brett, “revised, and in very large part rewritten, ... very variously gotten into shape—[using] two or three different typewriting machines, and some pretty variable masses of my own hand-written sheets making up the whole. But after going pretty carefully over the finished MS” Royce judged it ready for publication. For instance, in the FD’s Section V of Lecture IV, after 2 ½ pages of somewhat edited, typescript-copy from Royce’s “1st D,” Royce concluded the Section with ten pages of fresh autograph material (pp. 204-213 in FD, and in B from page 182 bottom to 186 middle). In brief, Royce greatly reworked Lect. IV.

Analysis of Final Draft of Lecture IV

In its final draft, (which is identical with the published book), Lecture IV, “Physical and Social Reality” differs from its form in the first draft (which, as edited, is identical with its typescript copy NRF) as follows:

Introduction, plus Start of Section I:

1stD and FD present two different texts up to the paragraph beginning “More to the point,...” [B 159] Whereas in 1stD, Royce starts with an Introduction of 1 ½ typescript pp., Royce starts in the FD with a new autograph of 7 ½ pages (or 2 ¾ pages in print). In 1stD, Royce posits “Man’s relation to Nature” as the basis for starting an application of WI:1 to the human “problems of life and destiny” and offers the analogy of the broken classical statue whose pieces lie in rock, sand and debris to a mental excavating situation which is analogous to our present perceptions trying to get something of unity out of a chaos of sense perceptions. In the FD, however, Royce focuses on our psychological motives which lead us into the World of Description and into the World of Appreciation. These two motives are in parallel with our two

limitations: our ignorance of facts and our ignorance of others' wills.

Section I:

In 1st D, Royce stresses the hypothetical nature of our interpretations of Nature, compares our phenomenal Worlds of Description and Appreciation to “an entire and connected Symphony of the Truth,” whose whole is teleological but of whose details we have no knowledge, only hypotheses. He recurs to perspectives offered by his Four Conceptions of Being, and says that applied idealism “must, in the end, [be] of practical service.” He closes with a prospect of *WI:2*. As for Section I in FD, from the bottoms of B's pages 178 to 187, Royce doesn't repeat 1stD materials. His work is new, but preserved in a black carbon typescript.

Section II:

This section occupies nine pages of RN.

Section III:

See below in Section IV.

Section IV:

On page 24 of the RNF copy of 1stD, at the start of the paragraph beginning, “Our belief in man, then, . . .” begins FF's Section III (B 191-97). It contains some edits and omissions of the 1stD material. To close Section IV of FD (and B), Royce inserts a large marginal addition, published in B, pages 178-80. This addition starts from the paragraph beginning in autograph “A confirmation of this theory...“and concludes in autograph, “...all a World of Description.“ Yet most of this addition consists mostly in 1 ½ pages of old typescript in black carbon. I could not find a parallel to the typescript body of this addition in the typescript of RNF nor in the 1stD.

Section V:

This section of the 1stD and RNF copy end with Royce's pointing to his following two lectures as further defending an idealistic interpretation of nature's laws. Yet Royce carved new sections VI and VII for both his FD and B, thus verifying his report to Brett of having “largely rewritten” parts of *WI:2*. That part of Section V of the 1stD (copied in RNF's page 31 bottom to page 34), parallels the text of FD and the B version. This part begins from the paragraph starting, “The organism of my fellow man...“

Lecture V: The Interpretation of Nature

NB: Box 105, folder 3, several typescript and manuscript fragments may be found which may constitute early versions or preparatory material for this lecture.

document 4 in this box, a manuscript fragment numbered pages 10-35, may be an original version of this lecture. On page 18 of the manuscript, Royce speaks of the “Supplementary Essay” to the second edition Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1897). On page 22, Royce refers to “the world and the individual.” This fragment deals with the irrevocability of the past.

Similarly, document 5 (a manuscript fragment numbered pages 2-19) may be preparatory of this lecture (or perhaps lecture IV).

Document 7a, a typescript numbered 14-25, may *perhaps* constitute preparatory material for this lecture.

Comparison of First Draft as revised by Royce in the Final Draft

Introductory observations on the development of the text from the 1stD, through the so-called RNF, and the FD, into what appears in B.

- As found in Box 16, the 1stD of “The Interpretation of Nature” is a 57 page document, a seven page first autograph section, followed by 27 pages of typescript (varying in blue and black carbon). The typescript includes a page-numbering gap from 8-18, followed by the final 20 page autograph, which completes this Lecture. This last manuscript portion begins within the first paragraph of this Lecture’s Section V as published in B.
- In B, the pagination is as follows: Introduction pages 207-209; Section I pages 209-213; Section II pages 214-219; Section III pages 219-224; Section IV pages 224-33; and Section V pages 233-42.
- The 1stD of this Lecture, “The Interpretation of Nature,” presents a puzzle--and not merely that Royce still starts this MS with “IV,” not yet placing it in its final site as Lecture “V.” The puzzle arises from the triple division of this MS. Although it starts with seven pages of MS and ends with 20 pages of MS, the intervening 30 pp are in typescript (in a mélange of pages whose type is sometimes black ink, sometimes blue ink. Furthermore, the entire type-scripted RNF bears no marks of Royce’s autographed editing, and is throughout typed with black carbon paper. Problem: If one estimates that 2 ½ pages of Royce’s MS reduces to about 1 page of typescript, what happened to the approximately 75pp. of MS which, when typed, became the 30 pages of the middle portion of this 1stD? Any sign that they may still be extant? Interestingly, the first 7 pp of 1stD are in autograph MS, as one would expect. But these same 7pp. of handwriting, when put into typescript (purple carbon), are used by Royce for the first pages of his FD and its slight emendations. Secondly, I find no autographed MS for the middle portion of this supposedly 1stD Lecture. Lastly, the final pages 41 to 60 of this 1stD are, as one would expect, in an autographed manuscript.

How much did Royce edit this 1st Draft of “The Interpretation of Nature”?
(page numbering refers to 1stD)

Royce leaves virtually unchanged in FD the Introduction of 1stD whose preserved text starts with a seven page autograph.

Starting Section I, Royce deletes from FD, the phrase, “as we have already seen,” a phrase which he took pains to insert in the 1stD’s black typescript copy. (Royce here in 1stD begins using this typescript copy for over 20 pages, from pages 18 to 41.)

Introduction and Section I:

These sections are not altered by Royce in FD — they are the same as in 1stD.

In the Introduction, up to the end of the autograph and the start of the typescript, (numbered 18) and ending with “to be unconscious matter”, Royce makes small deletions or a change of diction, nothing more.

At page 18 of the 1stD, after starting the future Section I with “At one extreme of nature” he inserts: “-ure, as we have already seen,”

At page 18, at paragraph beginning “What I here wish first . . . Evolution, in its modern form,” Royce inserts “is our largest generalization of all our human view of Nature, and that this doctrine seems to show,” before “that, if the extremes...” [see B 209 bot.]

At the top of page 19 of the 1stD, in the sentence ending, “. . . taken nature at all seriously,” Royce adds the lengthy insertion: “now if man’s experience of nature has any sound basis at all, the modern doctrine of evolution seems to be an account of a process and has a real basis in the nature of things. I shall here assume as known the general outlines of this doctrine, and the general sort of evidence upon which it rests. I shall ask, what light does this doctrine tend to throw upon our problem.” (See bottom of B page 210.)

On page 20, in paragraph beginning “Meanwhile it is easy,” in 3rd sentence “But matter, as physical science” Royce adds “conceives it, is, for the reasons mentioned at the last time, viewed by us as subject to stable laws...” (See middle of B page 212 mid)

At the bottom of page 20 and top of page 21, after “. . . still a little deeper,” Royce inserts “than we have yet done into special problems of the philosophy of nature--yet as I do so, I shall for the time, keep my idealistic theory of being in reserve. That theory furnishes a deep warrant for the speculations here in question. But let us next give these speculations a merely empirical basis. Then, when our idealism returns upon the scene, it will find the facts ready to accept its authority.” (See bottom of B page 213)

At the bottom of page 22, at the start of paragraph, Royce inserts “in order to adapt this, our former general result, to the present inquiry, let us” and continues, “for instance, consider our...” (See bottom of B page 214)

Except for one spelling emendation, Royce leaves Sections III and IV as typewritten until the end of Sect. IV “. . . is a problem that this.” where Royce adds “lecture still leaves open for later consideration.” [See B 233 bot.; and notice that Royce does not yet add the footnote 1 that became visible in B 233.]

At the middle of page 41, Royce changes from depending on typed copy as a basis for editing this so-called “1stD,” and returns to handwriting the rest of this Lecture, pages 41 bottom to 60.

At the middle of page 42, Royce adds to “through laws of causation,” the qualification, “and through overruling providence.” [See B 235 top]

At the middle of page 52, after "... determined by a single creative act" Royce inserts "*nor do we suppose that, from its creation, nature is...*" (see B 239 top)

At the middle of page 54, after "...separate elements of Mind-Stuff." Royce starts a new sentence, "*Nor do we admit that such elements,*"...(see B 239 bottom)

At bottom of 57 and top of 58, after "what we chance to view as the individual animal constitutes a mere" Royce inserts: "*...fragment, brought within our observation by conditions whose relation to the innermost facts of nature is doubtless very arbitrary.* (See middle of B page 241)

In sum, then, how much did Royce edit the FD of Lecture V, "The Interpretation of Nature"? Answer: In the Introduction and Section I there are trivial emendations; Section II, contains a few qualifications; Section III contains the heaviest edits in this Lecture; Sections IV & V have no edits. For details on Sections II & III of FD, see what follows, where FMO uses italics to quote Royce's added statements:

Section II:

1st paragraph, 16 lines down, at "...exactly stated of," Royce adds, "*the laws of the World of Description, i.e., of our conceived unvarying laws of nature, explicitly represent not observed fact*"

Note that in B 214, Royce's added clause, "i.e., of our conceived unvarying laws of nature," does not appear.

Next paragraph, starting "In order to adapt..." Royce inserts a new 3rd sentence, after "...ethereal processes." viz.:

"These are interpolated series of ideal objects conceived as between the systems of facts that we can observe." Royce closes the next sentence (which started with "The laws of atomic...etc.") after the phrase, "numbers of facts" with "*or to construct in an abstract way the relation of one and many.*" [See B 215]

To the next paragraph, starting "In strong contrast...", " Royce closes the 2nd sentence with a period at "... grows young." and starts a new sentence with: *but the nature that we all acknowledge is full...* Two sentences later Royce deletes "when humpty-dumpty, once fallen, cannot be picked up again," and soon adds, after "generalizes in the principles." *(I) of the tendency of energy to pass from available to unavailable forms, and (ii) of the tendency of matter, etc.* A bit more than two sentences later, after the expression, "hard fact," Royce adds, "*that is, fact that you ought to acknowledge in case you accept the verdict of our social experience at all.*" [see B 216-17]

In the next paragraph, starting "But now observe...", about ten lines down, ending in "... books of science." Royce explains "*they are typical examples of formulas of the world of description.*"

In the last paragraph of this Sect. II, Royce adds the emphases indicated by italicized words or

lines.

Section III:

In the first paragraph of this section, after the sentence ending "...as is Nature herself," Royce deletes 3 sentences from the 1stD, namely: "And it is not directly explicable that we know about that permanent nature which is attributed to matter and to energy by the ideal conceptions of scientific theory. Rigidly mechanical processes, viewed in their ideal uniformity, ought on the whole to be reversible. Hence irreversibility is, in general, a mechanical puzzle."

The next paragraphs starting [in B 219 bot.] with "Here, the..." and "For (2)..." are Royce's efforts to break up a very long paragraph in the layout of his 1stD.

About 15 lines into the "But (3):" paragraph, Royce corrects a misspelling of Spencer's work into: "*rhythm of motion*", and "*equilibration*." After deleting a line from 1stD, adds, "*but whether or not one undertakes to conceive such phenomena as results of absolutely unvarying laws, certain it is that physical nature is full of approximate rhythms. Now an approximate rhythm is a temporary law of nature. It is a law to the effect that a given observable process....etc.*" (See B page 221)

The remainder of FD in Sections IV and V of Lecture V bear no editing marks by Royce. This completes the present comparison of the 1stD, RNF, and FD of Lecture V, "The Interpretation of Nature."

Lecture VI: The Human Self

Continued: THE COMPARISON OF DRAFTS OF LECTURE VI, "THE HUMAN SELF"

And first, concerning Royce's significant revisions of his 1stD of this Lecture VI (i.e., where he inserts or deletes sentences, & long clauses).

Title: Royce deletes original, now-illegible title, and substitutes "The Human Self" to revise his 1stD.

Introduction After "...Cosmology is, in its details, provisional and tentative." Royce inserts a proviso, "*Only its general type as an idealistic hypothesis about nature, seems to me to be sure of permanent confirmation.*" Note: in his FD, Royce will alter the last four words to read "a sure representative of the truth."

At the end of the introduction, Royce adds two final sentences: "*I am sure that in its most general outlines, this hypothesis is sound. But all its details are subject to correction.*"

Section I: only trivial emendations.

Section II:

At manuscript page 25, Royce deletes six words in order to read: "And the indefiniteness of

customary opinion *regarding our problem* most of all appears in the practical aspect... Self.”

At manuscript page 27, 18 lines before paragraph which starts “But even more familiar...”, Royce adds a new sentence after “All evil and all baseness must always lie without and beyond the Self”, namely, “*The self sins not through self-assertion but through self-abandonment.*”

At manuscript page 30, just before the paragraph beginning “Now the opposition...” Royce adds : “*and George Eliot also sings in praise of the “scorn for miserable aims that end in self.”*”

At manuscript 35, after “...contemplation of their uncreated perfection,” Royce inserts the clause: “*in this foreign authority the soul found all that is good.*”

At manuscript page 37, in paragraph which starts, “Now this well known ...” Royce adds “*as well as in Plato*” after “...exist in Hindoo philosophy”.

At manuscript page 40, Royce breaks up long paragraph with fresh paragraph marker and clause: “*For if we are internally [+ deleted word] in any sense more than one self, then we consist not merely of the lower and the higher Self, but*”

At manuscript page 47, Royce revises last sentence before Section III, to read: “And the reason is that common sense does not *in the least* know, when it appeals to the Self, whom it is addressing, *nor when it talks of the self, what object it is meaning.*”

Section III:

At manuscript page 50, after paragraph which begins, “First, then,...” Royce deletes his once revised line, and then after “more or less immediately given,” qualifies his sentence by adding: “*but as distinguished from the rest of the world of being.*”

Section IV:

At manuscript page 57, just after start of section IV, Royce deletes “And I reply . . . upon which I have elsewhere insisted,” in order to insert: “*and by what marks is the self to be distinguished from the rest of the world? I reply* by pointing out the fact [+ deletion of “upon which I have elsewhere insisted in more detail.”] *of central importance for the understanding of the empirical ego.*”

At manuscript page 66, in the paragraph starting, “Now just such social contrast-effects...,” just after “...wide and countless differences,” Royce adds the clause: “*just as all color contrasts are in a measure alike, so too are all social contrasts.* Always the contents, which constitute the Ego at the very moment of their contrast with *the remaining contents present during* the social contrast-effect, have been associated with certain relatively warm and enduring organic sensations, *viz., sensations coming from within our own bodies.*”

At manuscript page 69 bottom, at sentence starting, “My reflective life,” Royce qualifies by adding: *as it empirically occurs in me from moment to moment, is a sort of abstract and epitome*

of my whole social life.”

At manuscript page 70, just before close of Section IV, Royce adds the sentence: “*And thus my experience of myself gets a certain provisional unity. But never do I observe my self as any simple and unambiguous fact of consciousness.*”

Section V:

At manuscript page 73, after “monads of Leibniz,” Royce adds: “*the Einfaches Wesen which Herbart laid at the basis of his psychologie.*”

At manuscript page 76, after the sentence which starts, “Whatever the Self is, it is not a Thing.” Royce inserts: “*it is not, in Aristotle’s or in Descartes’ sense, a substance.*”

At manuscript page 88, after the phrase, “...other conscious life that,” Royce qualifies: “*from the absolute point of view.*”

At manuscript page 95, at paragraph which starts, “And now this very consideration,” Royce underlines “ought to be able” and continues without emphasis “to select”

Comparison of 1sD with FD of “The Human Self”:

The text of 1sD (in Box 16) is one continuous autograph, running from page 61 to 104, with moderate editing by Royce. The text of FD (in Box 23) is all in typescript, in blue carbon (except p 304--beginning of Section III--seems done in purple carbon). Page numbering of this Chapter is taken from that of the typescript, pages 290 to 322.

Interestingly, what Royce did to ready FD for publication was to take his carbon copies of his 1stD, AS revised, before his typist copied that revised version into what has been called his Revised Not Final form. There he inserted small corrections as follows. (For FD FMO will use page numbering from B, since these versions seem practically identical.)

Middle of B page 245: Royce deletes 1sD’s “sure of permanent confirmation” and substitutes: “*sure representative of the truth.*”

Top of B page 247: Royce changes “not or wisely” to “*notoriously*”

Bottom of B page 247: Royce changes “changes in our point...” to “*changes as we alter our point...*”

Top of B page 260: Royce changes “...principle guides us from the Self from moment to moment or in distinguishing it....” to make two insertions, to read: “*...principle guides us in defining the Self from moment to moment in the world of common sense, or in distinguishing it....*”

Top of B page 261: Royce adds footnote reference to his *SGE* and to Prof. Mark Baldwin as seen in B.

Bottom of B page 265: Royce qualifies, “its endless varieties” to read “*the sources of its endless varieties.*”

Top of B page 267: Between the sentence ending “...distinct and independent entity.” and “For such views, the true Self...” Royce deletes from the 1stD and RNF drafts the following sentence:

“The independent souls of the Sankhya philosophy, the substantial human soul of the Scholastic Philosophy, the *Res Cogitans* of Des Cartes, the Monads of Leibniz, the *Einfaches Wesen* which Herbart laid at the basis of his Psychology, and the Soul Substance of many other metaphysical doctrines, belong here.”

B page 271 1st line: Royce substitutes “*are dependent each upon the other*” for the 1stD’s phrasing, “are continuous each with the other.”

Lecture VII:

This runs 99 pgs. The INTRODUCTION is in autograph. Section I is typescript (blues and purples); Section II is in autograph for first six pages. Section III contains 23 autographed pages. Section IV is in autograph for 8 pages. Section V is autographed 16 pages. Section VI is autographed 22 pages. Section VII is one page in autograph and several pages of typescript. The fact that FD is typescript, however, does not indicate that RNF is being used as the core of FD. Rather, it seems that Royce cut and pasted many typescript pages to construct FD.

Introduction:

This introduction is autographed, indicating that Royce did not have this Introduction in the 1stD. Also there seems to be an addition during the writing of FD that reads as follows: “*During the present lecture I shall by the term self, denote unless I expressly declare to the contrary, the human Self as defined and not the Absolute Self as the Absolute.*” B 281; FD 323.

Section I:

Without an Introduction, Section I of RNF starts as follows:

“In the former series of these lectures, when I defined the four historical conceptions of being, I pointed out that each one of them expresses a certain essentially practical attitude toward the problem of life. Realism, in asserting the finality of Independent Beings, expresses, in the form of technical Metaphysics, the practical view of those who are partisans of an authority external to the knowing process, an authority which is assumed to be absolute. Mysticism, essentially reflective in its beginnings, nourishes an intense inner life of sentiment and self-purification - a life which ends indeed of all finite strivings, and in a sense of the utter vanity of all will that is not lost in God. Critical Rationalism, at once submissive to the authority which its realm of idealized experience seems to impose upon it, and reflective as to the source and meaning of this authority, moves in a world where law is universal, but where reason which reigns is impersonal, and where the meaning of existence depends wholly upon conscious good order, while religion and practical fervor then to lapse into a cold loyalty to the valid but lifeless truth. As for the practical attitude which our own idealism implies, we have already indicated how this attitude depends upon the

assurance that the divine life is not only something concrete and definite like our own life, but also something infinitely more concrete and conscious of the definite than is our present fragmentary experience of life. The Idealist's relations to his universe are, as we have now come to see, essentially social. Whatever is, is to him a fellow being. Authority means to him only the reasonable call that the live universe makes upon him for his cooperation in its common self-expression. God is not a fathomless depth in which his individuality is destined to be lost, not an independent Being to whose power he has simply to submit, nor yet a merely valid law, but a living will, in union with which his own conscious purposes are to win their fulfilment. His finite fellows are, like himself, conscious embodiments of the divine plan, precisely in so far as they are rational beings at all. And for him they are indeed in their true expression through and through rational. Where, as in the lower animals, he catches mere glimpses of mental life, but finds not his own type of unity of purpose, he supposes himself still to be in the presence of hints of personality, only of a type of personality whereof the life that seems to his human view an individual animal, with a mind of its own, is but a fragment. He deems this larger personality, not of the individual animal, but perhaps of the whole animal race, to be rational and to be conscious of its rationality, as is any human self. Where, as in apparently lifeless Nature, he finds only a routine whose inner significance is different from any that he can now grasp, he still supposes that even here too there is a conscious life and meaning; only, as he assumes, this life of nature has another relation to time than that which characterizes our own more flickering type of consciousness, so that some far more august period of time than that which our human experience, at any instant, ever spans, is needed in order to bring about those changes of routine, those novelties in the Nature process, which are the basis of the conscious activities that nature also exemplifies..." [RNF, pp 1-3; underlining added]

Section I of FD substantially changes from the RNF text. From RNF Royce excises a page and a quarter of this section. In this excised passage Royce applies the fourth conception of being to the knowledge of the that and the what of the human self. "Neither God nor man has any immediate or direct knowledge of anything." [This seems a germinal opening of Royce's later articulated, theory of mediated interpretation. See page 10 of Lecture 7 in .RNF.]

In Section I, at FD 326 ; B 283, Royce adds note 1, which concludes thus "Nietzsche's conception however, cannot be properly placed here [end of FD addition]. Royce then, via the galley proofs, adds his reason for excepting Nietzsche: "... *in view of the idealistic element which, as a I think, can justly be recognized in his conception of the individual.*" [NB :Nietzsche is clearly in Royce's awareness by 1901.]

"The self, in the view of such [Critical Rationalist] theories, does not first exist as an Independent Being and then either originate or else acquire as an external addition its system of rights and of duties. (B 285) Royce crosses out from RNF, "then determine by its essence and such a Being acquire by later determinations an external..."

At B 289, Royce italicizes, via the galley proof, the concluding part of the sentence beginning, 'So that, while it is, indeed...' as follows: "...we still retain our individuality, and our distinction from one another, *just is so far as our life-plans, by the very necessity of their social basis, are mutually contrasting life-plans, each one of which can reach its own fulfilment only by recognizing other life-plans as different from its own.*"

B 290; FD 334 Royce adds the clause: “*And that our theory of nature has also been needed as a preliminary for the study of the self.*”

B 292; FD 336-37. Royce changes text in three ways. He appends the phrase, “*subject to the most varying interpretations and estimates.*” He deletes the opening lines from 337: “*in one life, your life therefore occupies its one unique place, and does so, through its relation to the unique whole.*” Then he starts a new paragraph, “*Yet fear not to find...*” [Note, especially, at this point he excises two pages from the FD.]

B 292; FD 336-337. The excision comes after “*subject to the most various interpretations and estimates.*” His two page excision deals with interpretations of the human self, again according to the four conceptions of being. He describes the way in which individuals can be torn free of their relations with others. Looking again at the Critical Rationalist view, Royce notes that this view establishes an impersonal God whereas the fourth conception maintains that the individual always exists through its relation to the Absolute, and through the uniqueness of its social selfhood.

B 293; FD 337. Royce replaces “*these many lives.*” with “*Nature and Society*” (including upper case) and adds in the FD. “*That is, whatever character it shares with others, implies dependence on others.*”

B293; FD 337. Excised orienting remark from RNF. “*Look then, once more at the psychological and physical dependence on the world.*”

B 294; FD 338 Via a galley-proof insertion, Royce italicizes most of Section One’s third last sentence, as follows: “*And this I say on the sole ground that in you, precisely in so far as you know the world as one world, and intend your place in that one world to be unique, God’s will is consciously expressed.*” Then, Royce adds a new closing sentence to Section One in both FD and B “*Hence our theory of the Self assigns to it the character of the Free Individual, but maintains that this character belongs to it in its true relation to God, and cannot be observed, at any one instant of time, as an obvious and independent fact.*”

There is a very long excision from RNF (about pages 19- 31) which does not appear in either in the B or the FD. The excision contains many important threads of Royce’s philosophy: the relationship between selfhood and purpose, the denial of causality as the principle determinant of nature, and the necessity of science for the development of the World of Description. Royce underscores the fact that for a cause to be identified there must be a seeking agent with a purpose to seek this selfsame cause. Royce also addresses the relationship between uniqueness and purpose. This mirrors closely the work that he is presenting in his seminars on Growth which the Cabots take part in the years during 1898-1902. The use of a musical metaphor is extensive Royce uses the metaphor of the singer to express the way in which self-realization is a two-fold movement: the self must express a distinct desire in the song AND the audience must be present in order to interpret the utterance or expression. To have a life plan (which is a necessity for the realization of selfhood), there must be a dramatic contrast between the self and the non-self: “*For upon such a contrast of self and non-self, all our conscious plans depend.*” Also “*For the very verb to be, means, according to our theory, to express a purpose; and to be also means: to express*

the very purpose of which every finite desire and meaning is a fragmentary hint, i.e., to express the interest of the absolute will. Hence there is not some power that fashions persistent facts so that by the acts of this external power, they become able to embody purpose.” (RNF 22)

Note: Sections II through VII are in autograph and therefore between the RNF and FD a substantial difference arises. There is, however a very close similarity between FD and B.

FD 342 & B295 bottom: here the text, “our assurance that all the temporal facts . . . to the Absolute, and that“ has been added. Note that both the addition and the FD text are in autograph form. Hence, it is difficult to determine when and how the addition was made.

FD 346. B 297: In Section III Royce attempts to overcome the duality of “the One and the Many” by saying that they are contained “in the unity of the Absolute Consciousness,” a phrase that he inserted as a type of afterthought, -- or as something that was not to be left out.

FD 355 B 301: The footnote about Groos is extended in the B version beyond the words “... *Spiele des Menschen*” where it ends in FD.

FD 354-55, B304: Royce adds the qualifying sentence, “*It [the finite Self] is cut off. . . stage of life-purpose*” to the FD, without its readers knowing when this was added prior to receipt of galley proofs.

FD 367, B 305: Royce adds two clauses for the published text: Middle of 305: “... *just because its present interest ... take into account.*” and “*This is the sole question ... can undertake to deal with.*” as the final sentence before new and final paragraph of Section III: “Our answer ...”

Section IV:

This section runs closely parallel in FD and B, but Royce has often inserted many small emendations and qualifications.

Section V:

While for RNF, this section is largely excised from FD, in FD 376-392 & B 309-323 this Section runs in close parallel, with an occasional autograph insertion by Royce (without clues when added to FD), e.g., at FD 380; B 310, just before the sentence starting, “And, as we saw, . . .,” Royce inserts the sentence, “*It [the search for the between] differs from what we usually call a definite course of action by virtue of the way in which it deals with experience.*” Or again at FD 389, B 313, Royce adds a final sentence to the paragraph, ”

At FD 392, B 315, Royce simply continues Section V, by overlooking the “VI” division marker in FD 392, and starting a new paragraph “So much for the two processes, . . . ,” thus continuing Section V.

At FD 39(?), B315, to Royce’s “tentative hypothesis” which starts with “...*the process of the evolution...of the same general type,*” he adds, continuing in italics, “*as that which we observe when we follow the evolution of new sorts of plans, of ideas, and of selfhood in our own life.*”

At FD 395 B 316, before new paragraph, “But in another..”, to the previous one, Royce adds the following sentence, “*A corresponding union of two elements, with a resultant that lies between formerly existent beings, characterizes sexual generation.*”

At FD 396-97 B 316, Royce adds italics to B, that is missing in FD, for the sentence, “*But the whole process is analogous, in structure and in result, to the recurrent processes of the conscious will that has found what it has to do....*”

At FD 403, B 319, Royce qualifies FD’s italicized phrase, “...habitual, that is, the recurrent form” by an insertion, so as to read in B “...habitual, that is, *the more or less definitely and permanently recurrent form,...*”

At FD 404, B319, Royce revises FD’s paragraph which starts, “In view of these analogies, ... It is rendered possible by *the fact...*” so as to read as follows in B: “*In view of this analogy, I suggest that the evolution of the new Selfhood in our own conscious case, and of new forms of life in Nature, is a process subject everywhere to the same sort of selection, whereby new tendencies are accepted or rejected according to their relation to pre-existent tendencies. The evolution of the new Selfhood, as I conceive the matter, is rendered possible by the fact ...etc.*”

At FD 406-407, at “These new expressions of purpose are tentative, like our trials and errors, or like our imitations,” in B 320, Royce italicizes a sentence and a clause not italicized in FD, namely: “*These new expressions of purpose are tentative, like our trials and errors, or like our imitations.*” and “...*they are unadapted to their environment, and so pass away.*”

At FD 413, B 322, Royce revises FD’s phrase, “finite other purposes,” to read in B, “finite experimental purposes,” without emphasis. [B 322 has important lines on the immortality of the human Self, as well as some autobiographical self-description by Royce, “For in God, I am this seeker after God....”]

NB: at FD 413, the paragraph starting, “The appearance of *new* Individual Selves...” breaks off incomplete with the next sentence which ends, “...tentative play of the Discriminating Attention.” **But** B 323 continues with two, new, long sentences to complete the paragraph in its published form: “...Discriminating Attention. *And thus, in completing the sketch of our hypothesis regarding the interpretation of Nature and Evolution, we have brought this hypothesis into definite relation to our former contrast between the World of Description and World of Appreciation. This contrast appears, not merely as a fact of our own consciousness, but as a consequence of a tendency that is responsible, in Nature, for the whole process of Evolution. What appears as the conflict between science and practical life, is an example of the struggle for existence in Nature.*”

FD’s Sections VII (414-17) and VIII (418-22) become B’s Sections VI (323-27) and VII (327-31). In FD, page 414 is a one page autographed linkage to the typescript in blue carbon (415-22) which comprises the rest of this Lecture and Chapter, except for small autographed emendations inserted by Royce.

FD 415 completes the linkage to this new Section with Royce's insertion atop page 415: "*the Self thus, is to make its life an object in the psychologist's own World of Description. The undertaking will be as much justified as any other undertaking of science. To*" [=close of the handwritten linkage and start of blue carbon transcript]: "an external observer..."

FD 415, to link this page's long paragraph with what follows, Royce adds a final bonding question. "*When we admit all this, do we not endanger our own doctrine of the freedom of the Individual Self? I answer: No, for...*"

FD 417, B 326; in B Royce italicizes: ". . .then I answer: *Just my conscious intent to be, in God's world, myself and nobody else.*"

FD 421, B 330, Onto FD's typescript, Royce inscribes the sentence: "*That this dependence involves a temporal origin, is due to the very nature of Time.*" Two sentences later, Royce inserts with emphasis "*my private or individual purpose. This.*" The emphasis was omitted in B.

Lecture VIII: The Moral Order

For this Lecture both FD and RNF have 8 Sections, unlike B's 7 Sections. The FD and RNF forms employ the same typescript copy--RNF in black carbon, and FD in blue carbon--so that for the most part they are identical, except for two major additions to RNF in FD, namely:

1. In FD 450-51, Royce inserts by hand the long paragraph (published in B, 359-60), beginning, "*The sole possible free moral action is then . . . [over to] . . . But such freedom is, upon our view, possible and actual.*" and
2. In FD 459-60, Royce, after describing the world of the evil-doer, inserts by hand (after "his own range of efficacy, as he chooses") the following lines, published in B 367: "*The means by which he can freely do this we have seen, viz. his free attention or inattention to the good. As for the consequences of this free choice of his, they may, in a closely linked world, prove to be as grave, extended, and as lasting as temporal conditions may determine.*"
"*So much then for the possibility of free and significant moral choices of good and of ill. Consequently, as to the charge that our view is a moral fatalism, what we*" [return to blue carbon typescript] "say to the moral agent is this: You act as you will, just in so far as you are free. And you are free in the before-defined sense." [Return to Royce's addition in FD] "*That is, you are free to attend or not attend to the Ought as you already, at any moment, have come to know it.*"

Compare FD with B (Lecture VIII):

After the sentence ending "... you acted counter to this Ought." (FD 438), Royce had added the sentence, which he deleted from B, "How such a rule is possible, concerns us not here, but perhaps to the distinctly ethical aspect of philosophy."

Similarly, (at FD 438 bottom and B 348 top), the sentence which starts in FD, "It is enough . . ." was--before it was excluded from the B text -- preceded by the lines: "Now, so I say, our present

interest lies not in showing how such a consciousness of the Ought can arise within the circle of any finite and temporal consciousness. That problem belongs to ethical doctrine. But” [return to FD and B text as published] “Now it is enough for our present purposes ... ” (B 348).

FC 442-3, B 351 Royce amends the sentence “Here I am only interested in..” to read “*defining the alternative courses of action that are possible in a finite being, sufficiently to show that a moral*” (continuing in typescript) “act, when once ... ”

In sum, the Introduction and Sections I to IV in both FD and B are practically identical.

Lecture IX: The Struggle With Evil

B pages 379-411; FD pp 469-508 (page numbers written in blue); RNF 1-39 (page numbers typed); FD typescript in blue carbon; RNF identical typescript in black carbon.

B Intro + 5 sections; same structure in FD and RNF. RNF text has no marks of editing. FD has moderate editing in Royce’s hand.

B 385 follows FD 477 where after “. . .have repeatedly stated.” Royce deletes the following sentence, “In abstract terms, from the very moment when, in the former series of these lectures, we began our criticism of Mysticism” and skips to, “Simple Oneness is nothingness...”

Similarly, three sentences later, B 386 follows FD 477 where after “. . .towards the goal.” Royce deletes the following two sentences: “being implies and presents the final expression of an internal meaning. But the meaning, in order to find any conscious completeness and totality of expression must first be a concrete meaning, an aiming towards something determinate” and skips to “Where there is the aim....”

Similarly, one sentence later, B 386 follows FD 478 where after “. . .various stages of the aim.” Royce deletes the following three sentences: “The mystic wanted his Absolute to be simply perfect. We found that, as a result of his Absolute, the simply perfect was the perfection of nothing at all. But what the mystic himself actually experienced we found to be a certain contrast-effect, whereby our endless longing was lighted up by its difference from our eternal goal; and whereby our finitude was set over against God’s peace.” and skips to “The only way to give our view” without a new paragraph.

On B 386’s sentence, “Were not God’s will in . . .” Royce changes FD 478’s qualifiers, “in the end, and upon the whole,” to read, “its totality” and adds after “to be triumphant” the phrase “*in the struggle that goes on*” before “ upon the earth.”

Section II:

In this section, Royce expands the sentence in FD 480 which starts, “For it is also, presumably...” with two additions: 1) “*either directly due to the magnitude and ideality of our finite plans, or else . . .*” and 2) the conclusion after “. . .extra-human moral agent”: “. . .*or of the*

inadequacy of such an agent to his own ideals.” Both FD and B 387-88 show these additions.

In the long sentence, starting “In general, I shall then be entering upon a vain search...” (FD 482-83; B 390). Royce expands its conclusion by inserting after “all ill fortune results from the defect,” in the RNF text the new lines, “*or at least from the defective expression of some finite will.*” Then he adds to the RNF text: “*This finite will is in general unknown to me. I do well not to trouble myself to impute blame. Yet presumably every such defect of finite will*” before Royce closes with “...has, like our worst defects, a genuinely moral significance.”

FD 483, B 390-91, at the sentence starting, “I shall undertake to...” Royce adds “*atone for the ill that the unknown agent has done and so to*” before he closes with “show how even the seemingly accidental natural ill can be made an element in a life of significant devotion and of positive meaning.”

Section III:

At FD 488, B 395, Royce adds a footnote reference to his “Problem of Job.”

Section IV:

At FD 497, B 402, Royce adds just before the new paragraph starting, “For, as a fact,” a concluding sentence: “*This view gives us in truth no intelligible Theodicy whatever.*”

Section V:

At FD 508; B411, in the last line of this Lecture, Royce qualified “life” with the adjective, “*temporal.*”

Lecture X: The Union of God and Man

Note: Neither in a First Draft, nor in an RNF draft does a manuscript for this 10th Lecture appear. It appears only in FD form and in B form. FD in Box 25, is an uninterrupted autograph, running from pages 509 to 600 (with printer’s page numbers in large blue ciphers at top of p.). B = 415-52.

In general, Royce has edited his apparently first and final autograph manuscript of Lecture X by making insertions, deletions, and emendations in diction--all of which are followed in the published B.

Section I:

At FD 515 B 418, in the B form of this Section’s final sentence, Royce omits the 6 words, “of God and of the Self” which in the FD version concluded the section’s last sentence which started, “Let us indicate...”

The remaining Sections, including footnotes, appear in FD as it was presented to the publisher for typesetting and is reproduced in B.

After examining how Royce himself edited his own first drafts of his Lectures for *WI 2*—for its Second Series--, we want to run a “**spot-check**” so the reader can contrast its findings with those found by our usual method employed in the previous pages examining *WI*. To do so, we select Royce’s crucial Lecture III of *WI*: 2. Where possible, we will compare this Lecture as Royce moved from his **first draft** of it into his **next draft**, and then how he moved from this to his **final draft**.

COMPARISON OF LECTURE III: “THE TEMPORAL AND THE ETERNAL”

First, a comparison of the lecture’s 1stD with the RNF version. Recall, however, the vast number of emendations and deletions, (listed above), which Royce inserted into his original “first draft,” before he handed it to the secretary to create the neat, easily legible RNF version, which faithfully renders Royce’s “original draft” **as emended** by all Royce’s additions and deletions.

Introduction:

The Introduction to the 1stD and its faithful copy in RNF, as well as the partly parallel Introduction to FD and B, show that Royce has undergone a change of mind about positioning this Lecture. Royce originally planned to situate this material as Lecture VII but during his redrafts he advanced it significantly to become Lecture III. Royce signals in this introduction his change of view concerning how basic the consideration of Time and Eternity is for a scrutinizing study of Being and our meaning of Being. He came to realize that the study of Time and Eternity had to come immediately after his study of “our Recognition of Facts” and “our Linkage of Facts” and before our study of “Nature’s Physical and Social Reality.” It became clear to him that a 7th position for this Lecture, originally planned for it, was not accurately planned.

After a few lines in the Introduction of 1stD and RNF, Royce drafts the latter half of the Introduction as published (in B 112), from “...the question, In what sense has the Self...” down to “...are now fully prepared.” This important parallel foretells how much Royce will use his edited 1stD for both his FD and B.

Royce reworked his 1stD with further autographed insertions, qualifications, and some deletions, but on the whole his so-called RNF form of Lect. III faithfully copies Royce’s 1stD AS EMENDED. Hence, we continue by now focusing the comparison to that between 1stD and FD, as follows:

Section I:

Royce adds onto the blue carbon typescript of the FD’s 2nd sentence, after “. . . experience of time,” the phrase “*at any moment, and we acknowledge the truth of a relatively indirect conception that we possess of the temporal” order of the world.*” [See B 113.]

2/3rds into the next paragraph, Royce qualifies his “The next aspect...” sentence, by adding after “. . . it is definite” the phrase: “*and wherever it accompanies definite successive acts of attention,....*”

Royce closes the next paragraph, by adding a new final sentence. “*It is obviously related to that*

direction of the acts of the will whose logical aspect interested us in connection with the consideration of our discriminating consciousness.” [See B 114-115.]

Several pages before the end of Section I, in the paragraph beginning “But it remains here...”, Royce begins the 3rd sentence in this new handwritten way, “*But, as we have already in passing remarked, regarding the direction of the flow of time, all our .. [end of Royce’s insertion] “experience also has relation . . .etc... the life of our will.” BUT THESE INSERTED WORDS OF ROYCE DID NOT GET INTO THE PUBLISHED VERSION --either because the galley-setter omitted them, or because Royce deleted them from the galley-proof. [Given the importance which Royce places on “the *direction* of the flow of time” as connected with irrevocability of past time, FMO doubts that the latter occurred.]*

Section II:

In section II of the FD, [see B p 127 bot., for sentence beginning “Moreover, we usually view [/128] the world time in ...” (128) where Royce adds without emphasis: “*question in terms of the conception of the World of Description, and so we conceive it as infinitely divisible, and... “ as 1stD continues: “measurable by various mathematical....stream of occurrence.”*

Similarly, at B 131, at the beginning of this Section’s last paragraph, “For the conceived time-series...” Royce edits it as follows: “For the conceived time series, even when viewed in relation to the World of Description still differs in constitution from the constitution of a line in space...” [underlined words are Royce’s edited addition to FD here, an addition preserved in B 131.

Section III:

In the third paragraph, starting “I have advisedly used, however, the phrase *that the time-consciousness is a ‘part’ or ‘aspect’ of the striving. For* from our point of view, the Other...” [italics indicate Royce’s qualification]

And near the end of this long third paragraph, to the sentence beginning: “For the Self in its entirety is the whole of a *self-representative or recurrent process*, and not the mere last moment or stage of *that process. As we shall see there is in fact no last moment. A life seeking its goal is, therefore, indeed, essentially temporal,--but is so just as music is temporal,--except indeed that music is not only temporal, but temporally finite. For every work . . .”* [Italics represent Royce’s additions; see B page 135 bottom to 136]

The paragraph that starts “The infinite indivisibility...discrimination *ad infinitum.*” (See pages 137-38) represents a new insertion by Royce in his autograph; so that the interrupted blue carbon typescript picks up again with the paragraph; “But now secondly ...”

Towards the ends of this paragraph starting “But now secondly...” . (see B 139 middle, at the “So that the *now...*” sentence), Royce inserts edits [put into italics by FMO] to read “So that the now of temporal experience is never a mere now, unless indeed it be viewed EITHER as the ideal mathematical instant within which nothing takes place, or as one of the final simple stage of the discrete series of facts which the absolute insight views as the expression of its will.” “As to the

one hypothesis, an absolute instant in the mathematical sense is like a point, an ideal limit, and never appears as an isolated fact of temporal experience. Every now within which something happens is therefore also a succession....”

Just before section III’s last published paragraph which begins “In order to conceive...,” [See B 141], Royce qualifies the previous paragraph’s last sentence by adding, ‘*and includes all the views that are taken by the various finite selves.*’ [Royce’s clause, FMO’s emphasis.]

Where the published form of Section III ends with “more than a very few seconds.” [see B 140], Royce deleted a long paragraph from the 1stD which hypothesized about a finite, yet higher than human consciousness which had a time-span of three seconds. He compared such far wider yet still serial knowing to that of the Absolute which includes the whole of time at once.

Section IV:

No significant editions by Royce.

Section V:

Royce begins by inserting “*in order to refer*” and in the same sentence, after “this present lecture...”, adds “*I may be permitted to anticipate some of our later results about the self, and, for the sake of illustration, to point out that from our point of view, as we shall later explain more fully*” [before he continues with the typescript FD text, “your life, your Self, etc.” [see B 147]

To the paragraph starting, “It is this view...,” Royce adds the concluding sentence, “*and so, in discussing this most elementary category, we are preparing the way for a most significant result as to the whole life of any man.*” [See B 149]

In the paragraph starting “The temporal man ...” and after the italicized word in the phrase, “... a *temporal* isolation,” Royce adds into the FD a new autographed clause which reads: *that inattention of which we spoke in the last lecture, is especially an inattention to all but this act, as it now appears to me. I am not one with my own individual individuality ...*” [See B 149, with its slight edits upon the FD text.]

To section V and to Lecture III itself Royce adds to the FD the entire final paragraph which begins, “*So much it has seemed... [down to] ... problem of Time and Eternity.*” Then from FD text he deletes one and a half lines: “*his own experience as an organism, part of the integral whole [1 word deleted] called man’s knowledge of Nature.*”

In FD at page 53 top: after “... recall his skill ... discoveries,” Royce adds: “... of the *directly observed connections amongst these facts of his own experience.* [1 word deleted] He will remain sure that ...”

In FD at the paragraph starting, “This view,” Royce revises: “*of the reason why we believe our fellow men to be real* is therefore more in harmony with our own Fourth Conception of Being

than is the ordinary account of our relief in material nature. [1 word deleted] *For what I learn to view as real is here defined rather as what is in harmony with my internal meanings than as what thwarts my meanings. Yet even this customary way ...*”

9. *Outlines of Psychology: An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications.* (1903)

See *BWJR*:2 1206, under heading 1903, 3.

Evaluation: There are important new ideas in Royce’s “Introduction.” The rest seems largely practical applications. Note Royce’s parallels with, and his divergences from, James’s *Principles of Psychology*.

10. *Herbert Spencer: An Estimate and Review.* (1904).

See *Basic Writings 2*: 1207, under the heading. 1904, 3.

11. *Lectures on Modern Idealism (“The Baltimore Lectures”)* (delivered 1906, published posthumously 1919) Boxes 41-42

Box 41 contains Lectures 1, 2, and 3; Box 42 contains Lectures 4, 8, and 9; but neither box contains Lectures 5, 6, 7, and 10. As of September 2009, traces of these last 4 lectures have not been found in Royce’s *nachlass* (esp., in Boxes 102-106).

According to Editor Loewenberg’s prefatory note at the head of his bibliography of Royce’s unpublished works [*Philosophical Review* XXVI (1917) page 578], Royce entitled these lectures “Aspects of post-Kantian Idealism,” and also referred to them as his “Baltimore Lectures.”

Royce apparently left no index for this lecture series and Loewenberg seems to have created the index published in this volume of 1919.

In Loewenberg’s Preface (1919), he writes:

“The lectures here published were first delivered at the Johns Hopkins University in 1906 under the title “Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism.” They were, in their present form at least, not originally intended for publication, but a note, dated 1907, found among Professor Royce’s manuscripts mentions these “Baltimore Lectures” as material “worth publishing.” This entitles them to head the list of his posthumous works. Written as they were for oral delivery the lectures required much revision; the editor hopes he has not used his pen too freely.”

Loewenberg edits the MSS with a red pen, used sparingly. Very rarely, some hand makes further edits in pencil. It seems more likely that the hand behind these penciled edits was that of

Royce polishing his text for delivery in 1906 or later publication.

Not directly related to the 6th of these lectures, entitled “Hegel’s *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*,” Loewenberg’s *Selections from Hegel* (1929) seems to reproduce the first MS in HARP Box 51, entitled “Phenomenology of the Spirit.”

Lecture I: Kant’s Conception of the Nature and the Conditions of Knowledge

Box 41. Royce entitled this entire lecture “Introduction.” But Loewenberg changed its title to “Kant’s Conception of the Nature and the Conditions of Knowledge.”

The 70-page MS consists of fresh pages in six sections. The text is heavily edited by Royce himself, and then, relatively rarely re-edited in red ink by Loewenberg.

The MS for the first lecture runs parallel to the printed text, incorporating Loewenberg’s edits.

Introduction:

Royce writes 10 MS pages for this introduction, which occupies 4 pages in published book.

Section I thru VI: Text of book parallels that of Royce’s MS, except that editor Loewenberg deletes Royce’s closing sentence of Section VI: “At the next time we are to begin to see what the Idealists did with this conception of a virtual self, to whose unity all facts must conform.”

Lecture II: The Modification of Kant’s Conception of the Self

In the title for this lecture in Box 41 Royce writes “Modifications” (the plural). Royce had originally entitled this lecture: “Fundamental Conception of the Early Post-Kantian Idealism: The Modification of Kant’s Conceptions [pl.] of the Self”

The 62-page MS is divided into five sections.

Section 1.

On page 7 of the MS, which appears on page 33 of the printed text, Loewenberg deletes “in the sense which Locke had in mind” and “according to those whom Locke opposed.”

On page 9 of the MS, before the paragraph beginning “The third thought” (page 34 of the printed text), Loewenberg deletes the following lines: “So far then for two thoughts. We know things only in so far as the nature of our own intelligence determines how phenomena are present to us. But this a priori nature of our intelligence itself we can know.”

On page 12 of the MS, before the sentence beginning (page 35 of printed text) “To say: This is a fact” Loewenberg deletes these words: “the presupposed subject to which we attribute our knowledge.”

Section III:

On page 13 of the MS, after the sentence ending “...the experiences into actually present

experiences,” Loewenberg deletes Royce’s “Our real dealings with our world are such processes.”

Section IV:

Royce himself heavily edits pages 45-48 of the MS, starting with the paragraph “It seems impossible...” (page 47-48 of the printed text).

Lecture III: The Concept of the Absolute and the Dialectical Method

Box 41

A 61-page MS, divided into 3 sections. Royce’s title is identical, except he inserts a semi-colon after Absolute.

Section 1:

At page 11 of the MS, after the words “... political reconstructions...” Loewenberg deletes “(since the French came to hold during these years, the ‘empire of the land’); ...[down to] “...were these activities reflected in Germany.” Loewenberg leaves in Royce’s “but after” in the middle of that ellipsis.

Section 3:

At the bottom of MS page 42, after “of such a tendency, [and continuing onto 43], (page 79 of the printed text), Loewenberg deletes “as thus becomes explicit in the dialectical method of the idealist.”

On page 52 of the MS, after the words “a closer view shows” Loewenberg transposes Royce’s clause “that this dialectical tendency belongs rather to the active will than to the mere emotions.” to precede the sentence beginning “Upon this both Hegel and his bitter enemy Schopenhauer, though in very different ways, are agreed, and upon this they insist.”

Lecture IV: The Dialectical Method in Schelling

Box 42

Royce writes in the manuscript above “Lecture IV” “Post-Kantian Idealism.” Loewenberg inserts the lecture title “The Dialectical Method in Schelling.”

The 68-page manuscript is divided into five sections. It is moderately edited by Royce, with occasional editing marks in red by Loewenberg. The manuscript consists of fresh pages (no re-numbered ones).

The MS runs in parallel with the printed text, incorporating the edits.

Section II:

On page 10 of the MS (page 91 of the printed text), Loewenberg adds to Royce’s sentence: “The self is primarily unconscious of even those most necessary deeds whereby it becomes an informing principle to which is due the form of all objective phenomena” the phrase “and their submission to intelligible laws.”

Lecture VIII: The Dialectical Progress of Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*

Box 42

A 72-page MS in eight sections. Royce had titled the lecture "Hegel's *Phaenomenologie* Complete." The title above (and printed in the book) is inserted in red by Loewenberg.

At MS page 44, printed text page 203 bottom, Royce makes a noteworthy reference to the tragic "twoness" of loyalty (to visible government and to an illegal "underworld") : "In brief, the ideal commonwealth lives through an unconsciousness as to what its own inner doubleness of loyalty means. It is unstable. Its only resource is in exercising its loyalty through active conflict with other states."

Loewenberg inserts sections "VII" and "VIII" for more ready reading, thus dividing Royce's last MS section into three parts.

On page 49 (section VI) of the MS, middle of page 205 in the printed text), there is an edit in pencil. It is difficult to ascertain whether it is in Royce's hand (later pencil edits do appear to be his handwriting). The edit works as follows: By pencil, six words are deleted from the inked MS and the word "underlies" is inserted. Thus the MS reads: "Whatever principle underlies this world-process is an unknowable Supreme Being."

Prior to this edit, Royce's first editing had read: "Whatever principle there is that lies beneath and behind this world process is an unknowable Supreme Being."

The printed text is very faithful to the MS.

Lecture IX: Hegel's Mature System

Royce's original title had been "Hegel's Mature System; Later Problems of Idealism."

A 54 page MS in six sections, only slightly edited by Royce and Loewenberg. It is written on fresh pages.

In the last sentence of the lecture, MS page 54, book page 231, Loewenberg changes the last sentence from "...are eternally at once present" to "... are eternally present together."

Some later pencil edits seem likely to be Royce's hand.

The printed text is very faithful to the MS.

Overall evaluation: FMO agrees with John Clendenning that these "Baltimore Lectures" present a more penetrating portrayal of modern idealism than Royce reached in his earlier lectures of *SMP*.

12. *The Philosophy Of Loyalty* (New York: Macmillan, 1908) Boxes 27-28 (cf. Box 101, folder 15; Boxes 102 & 103)

FMO does not find a MS for Royce's "Preface" to *PL*, (published under date of March 1, 1908) in HARP. FMO does find, however, that Boxes 27-28 contain MSS for a total of eight lectures of Royce's *PL*, but these are usually the non-final manuscripts. All but one of the final manuscripts for *PL* are contained in Box 102, folders 1-7. Box 102, folders 8 and 9, contain an "Outline" and the "Index" to *PL*, which need to be double-checked. And other Boxes, (e.g., Box, 102, folder 10, bundles b, c, d, and g seem other preparatory work for *PL*, and Box 103, folder 1 may also contain relics of preparation for *PL*.

FMO notes:

First, HARP Boxes 27 and 28 contain those MSS for *PL* which E. F. Wells mounted in binder form in 1940. An easy prejudice might lead one to think that here is the definitive copy for all of this work. Examination, however, has revealed this as a fallacy. Although the MS for Lecture I in Box 27 is indeed the later text (as published), FMO finds that the later definitive MSS for Lectures II-VIII of *PL* lie in HARP Box 102, folders 1-7. For as FMO construes it, the manuscripts in Boxes 27 and 28 were not the ones sent to Brett for typesetting. Therefore, in Box 102, folders 1-7, look for some additions to the manuscripts and perhaps also some deletions from them, to find how they were finally presented and published. As examples only:

1. In Box 27, Lecture II, page 32, at the paragraph starting "For Japanese loyalty ... oppressors to use", the Box 27 text lacks the next sentence "Herein, it has indeed strongly differed from that blind and pathetic condemned loyalty." (This text does occur in the Box 102, folder 1 text at page 12, and also at page 36 in the version published by Vanderbilt U. press.
2. In Box 27, Lecture II, page 52, a paragraph starts "Whoever pursues powerunhesitatingly face." Yet in Box 102, folder 1, page 29 (and in the original published version, as well as on page 43 of the Vanderbilt reprint), Royce here deletes "Now it is notable...." and inserts "But you may retort and in reply I call attention They..." I.e., Royce inserts a three line addition of phrases.
3. In Box 27, the last line of Lect. II lacks Royce's insertion "of romantic story" which appears in Box 102, folder 1 and in the published version at page 47.

Second, FMO suggests that scholars take pains to set *PL* in the context of Royce's overall intellectual development, rather than make it appear as his one book on ethical theory and practice. Yes, he published several significant ethical essays in his early and middle periods. Yet after this compact and popular work of *PL*, Royce achieved more ethical focus in his "Loyalty and Insight" of 1910 (*WJO* 49-95). Then, in 1912, he underwent his "Peircean insight" which echoed into "The Doctrine of Signs" (*PC*'s 14th chapter), then his 1st Berkeley Lecture (1914), and perhaps most profoundly in his "The Spirit of the Community"—on mediation and mediators—the lecture he planned for his 1914 address to Berkeley's Philosophical Union). All this development became even more integrated in his 1915-1916 Extension Course in Ethics, which still offers a grounded point of comparison and contrast with *PL*, his first "book" on ethics.

Lecture I: The Nature and Need of Loyalty

See Box 27, document 1, Box 101, folder 15, and Box 103, folder 1. Box 101, folder 15 contains two drafts of this lecture--one pre-final and one final. (The final forms of the remaining seven lectures of *PL* are found, **not** in Boxes 27-28, **but rather** in Box 102, folders 2 to 8.) Box 103, folder 1 is a preparatory draft of Lecture I, and Box 103, folder 3 is an undated fragment.

FMO note: The MS of Lecture I in Box 27 is not final. A typescript, with several copies, was made of this manuscript. Both the *unedited* typescript (which is a simple transcription of this MS) and the typescript *with* the final edits may be found in Box 101, folder 15. Again, for clarity, the typescript with the final edits in Royce's hand may be found in Box 101, folder 15, 1st Document.

There is a very early draft of this material at Box 103, folder 1, a 33 page manuscript. This MS appears to be incomplete, a very early version of the ultimate Lecture I. It begins the same way, and yet before the close of the first sentence, the text begins to diverge.

The manuscript of this first lecture has several notations in the margins that read "Omit" or "om." These so marked passages, however, *do* make it into the published version of the text. Generally speaking, this text in Box 27 is, as edited, the basis for the published version of Lecture I.

MSS pages 1-13, 18-35, freshly drafted.

Pages 14-17, 36-69 (the end) on redrafted pages, sometimes more than twice.

There is an autobiographical note on page 21-22 of the non-edited MS in this folder 15. HARP labels this folder "Lecture I: The Nature and the Need of Loyalty." **Yet**, beyond the first few sentences, the text does not parallel the first lecture as printed in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, although it does deal with the same material.

NB: The section-numbering in the final edited MS of *PL's* First Lecture runs up to "V" Sections but in the published book it reaches "VII."

Introduction: Book parallels MS faithfully.

Section I:

Book parallels MS faithfully, except on MS page 16, after sentence ending "in revising my opinions." Royce deletes: "That is what, at Harvard, all we who teach there are required to do. That is a part of our business; it is one of the best-known demands upon our loyalty to the very spirit of Harvard."

At MS p.14, Royce uses a previously written MS's pages 14-17 to conclude Section I.

On MS p.16 [book 11], after "moral standards," Royce deletes the following clause: "and most critically reviewed my ethical doctrine," to continue "I am always able"

Section II: Book and MS run parallel.

Section III:

At MS 25 [book 16 bottom] Royce omits paragraph that started the MS section, namely:

“I must first attempt a partial and provisional definition of the term loyalty, as I shall use that term. I wish that I could begin with a final and adequate definition; but I cannot. Why I cannot you will see in later lectures. At the moment, I shall try to direct your minds, as well as I can, merely to some of the features that are essential to my conception of loyalty.”

Subsequently, the MS and book run in parallel.

Section IV: MS runs parallel in book.

Section V:

In the MS, from page 36 to the end of the lecture, page 69, Royce uses formerly drafted MS (formerly pages 25-59), adding his own later additions. In the process, he deletes a phrase at the top of page 36 “by the difference between right and wrong and between good and evil”

Page 44 of the manuscript: At the end of the first paragraph, ending “... many undesirable objects,” Royce adds the following to appear in the published text (pp.29-30): “The burnt child, indeed dreads the fire ... occasional fall.”

The previous MS may have derived from the “Loyalty and Insight” lecture delivered before *PL*.

The rest of this section of the MS runs parallel to the book.

Section VI:

The MS strikes out “IV” and uses the “V” of his old MS. The whole of Section VI runs parallel to the book.

The bottom of page 55 is torn off to end Section VI.

Section VII: (In MS, this reads “V”.)

At MS 57 middle, after the sentence ending “the man’s life,” Royce deletes a half sentence reading “You all know of such conflicts in your own case. You know that ..”.

Royce indicates omissions in reading of this lecture with brackets and “om” notes.

In the last sentence of Section VII of Lecture I in the book, Royce omits the term “modern” from

the MS phrase “common modern need of loyalty.”

Lecture II: Individualism

Except for pages 5-7 (which replace old MS pages 6-8), all of these MS pages (1-63) are freshly written.

Introductory Paragraph: MS and book parallel.

Section I: Because of insertion of old MS, the transition (between pages 4 and 5 of the MS) from fresh to previously used MSS omits the term “need” in the phrase “and, if need be, to dying for the endangered country” (book 53).

On book page 55, just before paragraph that starts, “But, whatever...”, Royce adds this sentence (not found in MS page 6): “The practical man of the world and the seemingly lonely student of science may be equally loyal.”

On MS page 6, bottom, Royce cuts off bottom of sheet following “preliminary definition,” and ties it to next page by deleting “our present illustrations now suggest “ from a former page 7 MS.

Thereafter, book and MS run in parallel.

Section II:

At top of book page 67, at question ending “and nobody else?”, Royce deletes from MS page 22 these two questions: “If the true, as Pragmatism tells you, is the expedient, what can be more expedient for you than to have your own way? What ideal then, can be truer than this one.” [By this deletion JJK finds that Royce avoids trodding heavily on William James.]

In book page 68, MS page 23, at close of first paragraph, Royce adds “and illustrated” to the MS text for the book.

Otherwise, MS and book run parallel.

Section III: MS and book run in parallel.

Section IV: MS and book run in parallel.

Section V:

At book page 83, bottom (MS 44), after “the social order” Royce adds these lines to the book: “He may become fairly happy for a longer or shorter time; but that is so far mere chance. He may even think himself fairly contented, but that is upon this level, mere callousness.”

At book page 87 at bottom after the clause “sages are at one;” Royce adds “and the cynics join in the verdict.” (Missing in the MS page 49.)

At book page 89, just before paragraph beginning “Whoever pursues,” Royce deletes the passive of MS 52 “Power, therefore, is pursued, only as fate is [illegible – perhaps “favorable”?].”

At book page 91, just before “Such considerations may suffice,” Royce adds the closing sentences to previous paragraph (MS 55) comparing Napoleon and his soldiers: “They had their will, and then slept. He lived on for a while, and failed.”

At book atop page 92, (MS 55), Royce adds “Any financial crisis with its tragedies can serve by way of illustration” to end the paragraph ending “to us anew today in MS.”

From this point to book page 98, MS and book run in parallel.

Lecture III: Loyalty to Loyalty

Box 27 (*cf.* Box 102, folder 2)

No editing has been done to this 32 page typescript in Box 27, which corresponds to book pages 101-46, FMO finds no apparent reason why the MS form is missing in Box 27.

Section III: Typescript, page 11, Royce deletes a paragraph, which, after the paragraph closing, “...and practical virtue for everybody.” does not appear in book page 114:

Well then, loyalty, viewed as a spiritual gift and as something good for the loyal, is not for the few moral heroes of humanity. It is for all mankind, if only you enlighten them enough to let them see some cause that they can love and can loyally serve. This point, that loyalty is generally an accessible, a practical, and a universally valuable spiritual gift, must be clearly fixed in mind, in order to proceed in our argument.

Section IV: Though the book runs parallel with the typescript, it frequently has italicized lines not underlined in the typescript. For example, book page 121, (just before the paragraph beginning “This precept,”) italicizes the sentence following “More briefly:”.

On book page 123 bottom, Royce adds this sentence (to MS page 18 top) to start a new paragraph in the book as follows: “In these lectures I do not found my argument upon some remote ideal. I found my case upon taking our poor passionate human nature just as we find it.”

To typescript page 20, (book page 127, middle), Royce adds italicized phrases in the following sentence: “I should know, meanwhile, that if indeed loyalty, *unlike the “mercy” of Portia’s speech*, is not always mightiest in the mightiest, it certainly, *like mercy*, become the throned monarch better than his crown.”

Bottom page 127, Royce adds “universal human” to the statement of “the [*universal human*] cause of loyalty to loyalty.”

Section VI: MS and book run in parallel, with occasional italicization added in the book.

Section VII:

While occasional italicization is added in the book, page 32 of the typescript ends at book page 142, with the paragraph closing “Herein consists your entire duty.” Thereafter, for no clearly discernible reason, Royce **adds in his own hand the following 2½ pages of text**, (not in the text found as the 3rd Lecture in Box 27, but rather as a conclusion to the document found in folder 2 of Box 102):

“Review in the light of this simple consideration, the usually recognized range of human duties. How easily they group themselves about the one principle: *be loyal to loyalty*.

“Have I, for instance, duties to myself? Yes, precisely in so far as I have the duty to be actively loyal at all. For loyalty needs not only a willing, but also an effective servant. My duty to myself is, then, the duty to provide my cause with one who is strong enough and skilful enough to be effective according to my own natural powers. The care of health, self-cultivation, self-control, spiritual power -- these are all to be morally estimated with reference to the one principle that, since I have no eyes to see or tongue to speak save as the cause commands, I will be as worthy an instrument of the cause as can be made, by my own efforts, out of the poor material which my scrap of human nature provides. The highest personal cultivation for which I have time is thus required by our principle. But self-cultivation which is not related to loyalty is worthless.

“Have I private and personal rights, which I ought to assert? Yes, precisely in so far as my private powers and possessions are held in trust for the cause, and are, upon occasion, to be defended for the sake of the cause. My rights are morally the outcome of my loyalty. It is my right to protect my service, to maintain my office, and to keep my own merely in order that I may use my own as the cause commands. But rights which are not determined by my loyalty are vain pretense.

“As to my duties to my neighbors, these are defined by a well-known tradition in terms of two principles, justice and benevolence. These two principles are mere aspects of our one principle. Justice means, in general, fidelity to human ties in so far as they are ties. Justice thus concerns itself with what may be called the mere forms in which loyalty expresses itself. Justice, therefore, is simply one aspect of loyalty -- the more formal and abstract side of loyal life. If you are just, you are decisive in your choice of your personal cause, you are faithful to the loyal decision once made, you keep your promise, you speak the truth, you respect the loyal ties of all other men, and you contend with other men only in so far as the defence of your own cause, in the interest of loyalty to the universal cause of loyalty, makes such contest against aggression unavoidable. All these types of activity within the limits that loyalty determines, are demanded if you are to be loyal to loyalty. Our principle thus at once requires them, and enable us to define their range of application. But justice, without loyalty, is a vicious formalism.

“Benevolence, on the other hand, is that aspect of loyalty which directly concerns itself with your influence upon the inner life to human beings who enjoy, who suffer and whose private good is to be affected by your deeds. Since no personal good that your fellow can possess is superior to his own loyalty, your own loyalty to loyalty is itself a supremely benevolent type of activity. And since your fellow-man is an instrument for

the furtherance of the cause of universal loyalty, his welfare also concerns you, in so far as, if you help him to a more efficient life, you make him become more tractable to being loyal. Thus benevolence is an inevitable attendant of loyalty. And the spirit of loyalty to loyalty enables us to define wherein consists a wise benevolence. Benevolence without loyalty is a dangerous sentimentalism. Thus viewed, then, loyalty to universal loyalty is indeed the fulfilment of the whole law.”

Lecture IV: Conscience

The first 4 MS pages are new. Pages 5-13, 19(a), 23, 34-37, and 44 are pages from a previous draft in Royce’s hand. Pages 14-19, 20-22, 24-33, 38-43 are freshly drafted.

Introduction: Parallel in MS and book.

Section I:

Royce tears off bottom of MS page 11. (book page 156) to continue with paragraph beginning “To each man”

MS and book run parallel.

Section II:

MS and Book run parallel.

Section III:

On MS page 21, book page 165 top, after the words “...requirements of conscience”, Royce deletes the following lines: “You may admit that loyalty to loyalty is as far as it goes, a reasonable maxim capable of being interpreted as to justify many well-known duties and virtues and to solve many paradoxes.”

Otherwise, MS and book run parallel.

Section IV:

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle (d): for some early notes on section IV on family and “tie-breaking”.

Royce cuts lower third of bottom of MS page 25. On MS page 26 (book page 168, just before “But the answer to”) Royce deletes these following six lines of MS: “Live, in general, lives whose significant and purposeful activities will very nearly resemble one another. Hence whoever says: “I am a Russian,” or “I am a Japanese,” prepares us for a further knowledge of his functions, plans and purposes.”

Otherwise, MS and book run parallel.

Section V:

MS page 31 bottom torn off.

MS page 36, bottom fourth torn off.

Otherwise, MS and book run parallel.

Sections VI and VII:
MS and book run parallel.

Lecture V: Some American Problems in Their Relation to Loyalty
Box 28

NB: The MSS for Lectures V -VIII are found in HARP Box 28. But later forms of these lectures are found in Box 102, folders 4 to 7. E.g., Box 102, folder 4 has MS edits to the typescript text which reflect the final published form. For instance, manuscript pages 10-10e were added to form a new section II, as it appears in the printed form, pages 211-15.

In the MS for Lecture V, pages 4-15 and 30-35 are in typescript, the rest is manuscript. Both are edited by Royce. Including the typescript pages, the MS runs 44 pages, whose emended text runs in the book from 199-248. Note, however, that while pages 4-15 are freshly numbered, the previous page numbers of pages 30-35 have been struck out, and fresh page numbers inserted.

Introduction:

Book 199-200, manuscript 1-2 (of Box 28). Both texts (of MS and book) generally run in parallel, but in the first sentence of the MS, after "...foregoing lectures" Royce had written, "There is one feature to which I wish, at this point; to attract especial attention. This is the effort that I have made, from the outset to reconcile the conception of loyalty with that of a rational and moral individualism." In the book, Royce shortens this after "...foregoing lectures" by saying simply "I have made an effort to reconcile ... " etc.

Section I:

At the start of the typescript of the MS page 4, he deletes: "in the last lecture how the very nature of loyalty tends to make us conceive the plan of harmonizing these countless forms of loyalty into one system of universal loyalty."

MS picks up in new paragraph "As our philosophy of loyalty" book page 201.

At the bottom of MS page 6, after the phrase: "the object with which he busies himself," Royce deletes the following eight lines:

"Just as Darwin's servant had no right to accuse Darwin of leading an idle life, because she could not see what it was that he did except to walk about a little looking at his plants and to carry on various other useless little activities. As a fact Darwin was not only intensely busy; he was actually loyal for years to an enterprise which was of the greatest importance for our whole civilization, and he was so with a full consciousness of the meaning that a scientific enterprise may have"

MS page 10, at end of section I, paragraph "Profoundly different...", Royce corrects typescript with "So long as you are sure of your own loyalty, and keep your faith, I can not judge ..." But, in book page 210, the underlined edit reads "and do not break your trust." Otherwise, Section I runs parallel in MS and book.

Section II:

Big change here. Both in the book and in the MS (albeit with much rewriting of the latter), appears the opening paragraph, “Such are our general . . . of the people intact.” BUT then, with the book’s paragraph “Liberty without loyalty--” (p. 211), Royce creates afresh all the remainder of his NEW Section II --evidently to clarify his complete synthesis of loyalty with a rational and moral individualism, “which constitutes our whole ethical doctrine.” (bk. 200).

FMO note: Scholars need to check whether in Box 102, folder 4, one finds the equivalent of this MS for Section II which is missing in the MS found in Box 28, 1st item.

In what follows, JJK comments on the differences between the book’s Section III and the MS’s Section II.

Both (MS 10-11, book 215-16) start with the same opening phrase, “From the point of view . . .” but soon diverge: with MS saying “best you can for the moral welfare,” but book saying, “best you can to teach loyalty’ . . . and then the MS recommends, “you should do two things;” whereas the book says (216 top), “you should do three things.” [Royce’s “third thing” in the book is “. . . explicitly show them that loyalty is the best of human . . . real meaning of all loyalty.” (216 bottom)]

From this long sentence, Royce had in the MS deleted an insertion he had still earlier added: “you cannot furnish all the people with a ready made list of causes to which each man should be loyal. Loyalty cannot be mechanically defined for other people. In order to help people, a whole nation, a great mass of, say a whole nation . . . ”

Royce omits in the book (216 middle) his summary sentence: “In brief, you can help on loyalty in a nation at large by giving people power to use in a loyal way and by giving them opportunities and inducement to be loyal and to know what loyalty is.” (MS 11 middle)

At book 218 bottom, after, “What is needed is loyalty,” Royce deletes 4 sentences from the MS (p 12, bottom): “Without loyalty, you may capriciously give all your goods to feed the poor, or even you body to be burned, and you are sounding brass and tinkling symbols. You may revel in sympathy and be persistently altruistic, and yet never learn what genuine loyalty is. Our examples in the last lecture attempted to make plain the loyal attitude. What I insist upon is that without the attitude genuinely right conduct is impossible.”

From MS 112, last 2 lines, “Meanwhile since loyalty . . .” (Book 218 bottom), MS and book run in parallel.

But at the end of this section, Royce drops the final sentence of the MS: “Let me illustrate some of the well-known relations between our American social position and some of the traditional forms of loyalty”

Section IV:

(in book; but Section III in the manuscript)

In the middle of page 221 in the book, after "...say without hesitation." Royce deletes from MS 15 middle this sentence: "Surely it was never the ethical advantage of the family that its ties were maintained merely by brute force, or by blind custom."

At book 227 top., to close the paragraph, Royce adds the sentence, " My cause has always been a tie, an union of various individuals in one." – a sentence absent in MS 21.

Otherwise, the text of the MS and of the book run in parallel for this section.

Section V: (but IV in MS)

At 229 in book, Royce changes "Trades-union" of the MS 24, to "labor-unions". Otherwise, in this Section, the text of the MS and of the book run in parallel.

Section VI: (but V in MS)

MS p.30 bottom of typescript is torn off at "...secure position." and at top of MS 31, Royce strikes through "than our own president is secure if he decides in any formally legal way, to exercise the recognized executive power."

At MS 32 bottom-33 top, Royce inserts what becomes 9 lines in book 237 bottom-top 238: "Now, all this state ... history, we are entering."

At MS 35 bottom, Royce fills in 4 lines to tie the typescript into his manuscript (36); corresponding in book page 243, from "I speak here of loyalty to [MS addition: "the separate states ... possessed when it"] was able to bring on civil war."

Otherwise, in this Section, the texts of the MS and of the book run in parallel for this section.

Section VII: (but VI in MS)

Last paragraph page 248, Royce adds new starting sentence (absent in MS 44): "The present tendency to the centralization of power in our national government seems to me, then, a distinct danger."

Otherwise, the text of the MS and of the book run in parallel for this section.

Lecture VI: Training for Loyalty

Cf. Box 102, folder s 5 and folder 10. In Box 102, folder 5, there is a typescript that is identical to printed text. In folder **10, bundle b**, the second manuscript fragment, pages 24-33 seems to be a parallel attempt to work out the concept of training of people in loyalty.

In addition, cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundles b, c, d, and g for other preparatory work.

NB The MS for this Lecture bears new page numbers on pages 1-14. Renumbered on 15-16, new

on 16a-20, renumbered from 2-23, new 24-30, renumbered from 31-62, and new from 63-65; in brief, quite an inter-weaving of already once-drafted with first-time drafted pages.

MS page 28, Section III ends with "... training for a loyal life." but in the text preserved in Box 102, folder 5, Royce adds two sentences: "It belongs to the task of our social leaders to invent and to popularize such substitutes. Herein lies one of the great undertakings of the future." (book page 268)

Section IV - VI:

MS and book run parallel.

Section VII:

MS and book run parallel until page 55 where book begins new section VIII on page 291.

Section VIII:

MS and book run parallel.

Lecture VII: Loyalty, Truth and Reality

In Box 28 lies a MS of 65 pages, mostly freshly drafted, but pp.16-20 and 46-54 of the MS are renumbered pages, previously drafted.

Introduction:

MS runs parallel to book.

Section I:

At MS 11, just before last paragraph beginning "to sum up", Royce deletes this line "Or to drop the metaphor: Is Life, at its best worth living at all?" (absent from book).

Section II - III:

MS runs parallel to book.

Section IV:

At MS 37, Royce wrote extra sheet now glued onto page 37, ending with "not indeed as original" to continue with MS 38 "as it seems to suppose itself to be...."
Otherwise, MS runs parallel to book.

Sections V and VI:

MS runs parallel to book.

Lecture VIII: Loyalty and Religion

A 63-page MS, with only one page (39) previously drafted, now renumbered.

Introduction through Section IV:

MS runs in parallel with the book.

Section V:

On revised page 39 in MS, page 377 of book, From his previously drafted MS now numbered page 39, Royce deletes the phrase “and through a worthy emotion” after the word “imagination” in his italicized definition of religion (in its highest forms).

Section VI:

MS page 49, book page 385-86, Royce adds three significant phrases to the paragraph beginning “In such cases....” [additions are bolded as follows]

In such cases, loyalty and religion may long keep apart. But the fact remains that loyalty, if sincere, involves at least a latent belief in the superhuman reality of the cause **and means at least an unconscious devotion to the one and eternal cause.** But such a belief is also a latent unity of reality and religion. **Such as service is an unconscious piety.** The time may come, then, when the morality will consciously need this union **with the religious creed of the individual whose growth we are portraying.**

Bottom of MS page 54 after “our science forsakes us,” Royce adds two sentences to the book, with his own italics, at page 390: “We can know *that* we are thus linked. *How* we are linked, our sciences do not make manifest to us.” MS 55 begins new paragraph at top “Hence the actual content....”

At bottom of MS page 55, after the “speaks to his friend,” Royce adds to book page 391: “In recognizing these facts, we have before us what may be called the creed of the Absolute Religion.”

Except for these changes, the MS runs parallel to the book.

Section VII:

No section-marker “VII” in the MS. On page 56 of the MS, before paragraph marking “Two things...” Royce inserts in the book page 392 a new sentence to begin Section VII: “And now, finally to sum up our whole doctrine of loyalty and religion.” Royce then continues with “Two things...”

On page 63, in the concluding lines of the MS, Royce changes MS word “world “ to “truth” in the book, page 398, in this phrase “from the whole circle of the heavens of that entire self-conscious life which is the world [truth].”

Except for this, the MS runs parallel to the book.

13. *The Sources of Religious Insight* (New York: Scribners, 1911): The Bross Lectures Box 98

Royce delivered his Bross Lectures in November 1911 in Lake Forest, Illinois, and their collection in the Scribners volume was published soon after.

HARP contains a typescript (in third copy) of *The Sources of Religious Insight*. Question: What editorial markings were inserted by Royce into this typescript? We have neither his original MS, nor the first and second typescript copies. The slight editing seems to be in the hand of Katharine Royce.

Since the editor (Katharine Royce) makes slight insertions which appear in the published text, she could not have had the published text in her hand and find her own additions in the text. Therefore, this third typescript copy predates the typesetting and publication of *SRI*.

Lecture I: The Religious Problem and the Human Individual (published text pages 3-34)

The typescript runs to 31 pages. The text runs parallel to the typescript, which contains only the minutest corrections of spelling or typing.

Lecture II. Individual Experience and Social Experience (published text pages 37-45)

The typescript runs to 40 pages. The printed text and typescript run in parallel except for minor corrections in spelling and punctuation.

Lecture III: The Office of the Reason (published text pages 79-116)

The 38-page typescript and published text run parallel except for the following. Katharine Royce's underlines are incorporated into the printed text.

On page 28 of the typescript (page 106 of the printed text), Katharine Royce's insertion "other men are. They are fallible...." is included in the printed text.

On page 31 of the typescript (middle of page 110 in the printed text), Katharine Royce's insertion "as the actuality to which...." enters the published text.

Lecture IV: The World and the Will (published text pages 119-161)

The 47 page typescript runs parallel to the published text, except for the following: Katharine Royce's underlines are incorporated into the published text.

On page 22 of the typescript (page 138 published text), Katharine Royce inserts ‘And our “concrete situation”’

On page 32 of the typescript (page 148 published text), Katharine Royce inserts “not future “workings,” not past expectations, but the present” before -- “this is what he more immediately gets”

On page 45 of the typescript (page 160 published text), Katharine Royce changes the typescript’s “temporal” to “eternal,” so that the sentence reads in the published text: “just now complete, and therefore there is nothing eternal.”

The penultimate paragraph (160-161 in published text) is clearly in Royce’s hand, reading from “To assert this, I insist ...” down to “.... in all moments of time.”

Lecture V: The Religion of Loyalty

(published text pages 165-210)

The 47 page typescript runs parallel to the published text except for the following: Katharine Royce’s underlines are incorporated in the published text.

On page 44 of typescript (page 207 printed text), Katharine Royce, after deleting the word “divine,” adds the following (here italicized) phrase, as follows: “For loyalty, though justifying no ‘moral holidays,’ shows you the [divine deleted here] will *of the spiritual world, the divine will*, and so gives you rest in toil, peace in the midst of care.”

On page 47 of typescript (page 209) Katharine Royce inserts “personal” to the phrase “his personal infinitude.”

On the same page, page 210 of the published text, Katharine Royce inserts the quotation “midst of hell’s laughter and noises appalling” to the typescript after the “storms of fortune.”

Lecture VI: The Religious Mission of Sorrow

(published text pages 213-254)

Typescript of 45 pages runs parallel to the published text without any significant change.

Lecture VII: The Unity of the Spirit and the Invisible Church

(published text pages 257-297)

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle (o): A one page outline in MS, headed “Lecture VII The Unity of the Spirit, and the Invisible Church.” This is preparatory work for Royce’s page x (Introduction) of the published version of *SRI*

A 46-page typescript runs parallel to the published text, except for the following: Katharine Royce’s underlines are incorporated into the published text as italics.

On page 7 of the typescript, page 202 published text, Katharine Royce amends the following sentence, by adding the underlined words, and deletes a word: “The wisest souls as we

throughout seen agree with common sense prudence in the desire to see at any one instant [delete once] greater varieties of ideas ... ”

On page 26 of the typescript, Katharine Royce changes “For a perfectly real...” to read “In the spirit of a perfectly real...”

On page 45 of typescript, page 297 published text, Katharine Royce makes two additions about Pauline charity. She changes the text “...but that nevertheless rejoices in the truth,” to read “...but that still, like charity, rejoices in the truth.” More significantly, several lines later, she changes the sentence “Tolerance is charity” to read “Tolerance is what charity becomes when we have to deal with”

14. *The Problem of Christianity*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1913)

Boxes 31-39

Box 101, folder 14, pages 40-59, Revision of the Gifford Lectures

Box 102, folder 10, bundles k, m, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, and aa.

Box 102, folder 11, 3 manuscripts.

Box 104, folder 4, documents 10 & 11.

Box 105, folder 4, previously unarranged material, now [Sept. 2009] in accordion folder , document 11 on *PC*, and “two small MS fragments” (early drafts for *PC*),” and a bundle of 4 pp, on the 2nd essential Christian idea (humankind’s “moral burden”) –early preparation for *PC*.

Box 112, folder 6, Journal of Royce’s 4 Voyages in summer 1912, containing his timing of the writing *PC* lectures, I –VII.

Box 113, folder 2, “Notes on the Hibbert Lectures

Box 113, folder 5, “Triads in the System: The Problem of Christianity, 1912.”

The book is based on the eight Lowell Lectures delivered in the fall of 1912 and the 16 Hibbert Lectures delivered at Oxford in the spring of 1913. (*Life* 341) The MSS of these lectures are housed in HARP Boxes 31-38. A loose manuscript was discovered in Box 105 that relates to Lecture XII. In Box 31, there is no MS for Royce’s Preface. He labels these manuscripts “Lectures,” not “Chapters.”

Evaluation: Royce’s late masterpiece needs to be contextualized within at least two facts: the dawning of Royce’s “Peircean insight” during 1912 and his promise in the *Sources* that he would “attempt to ‘apply the principles’ there laid down to the special case of Christianity” in *PC*.⁵ That context also needs to picture the development of Royce’s many plans for *PC*. Of this *Forarbeit* to *PC* many pages contain important quotations which highlight central points of the

⁵ *PC* 37; see also *SRI* 10.

lectures in *PC*. For instance, in an early outline of *PC*'s Chapter 12, Royce writes, "... the art of interpretation is the chief amongst all the humanities, and can neither be taught in a lecture, nor learned in many lifetimes."⁶

Outlines and Synopses Hibbert Lecture Plans or Outlines.⁷ Serially, Royce drafted many "plans" for his *PC* lectures. At this site (HARP; Box 113, folder 4), the "final" plan (on page 20) is his fifth. Yet Royce seems to have drafted at least seven plans. Royce entitled the first five versions of these plans, found in HARP Box 113, folder 4: "Notes for a Voluntaristic Approach to the problems of the proposed Hibbert Course (General Metaphysical Problems)."⁸ In these outlines what strikes at least some readers is Royce's focus on tradition, as well as on the concepts of atonement and sin. The five plans show Royce toiling to revise the interpretation of his task at hand,⁹ creating plan after plan until, in his sixth or seventh or still further plan,¹⁰ he begins to feel more satisfied with what he wants to do.

He sums up the core of his 5th plan as follows:

"Essence of the previous plan: Defence [*sic*] of a rationalized form of the Atonement Doctrine as the true interpretation of the permanent office of religion in human life.
- For the doctrine of sin as needing penalty is to be substituted the doctrine that the essential penalty of sin is the fact that, as irrevocable, the disloyal act takes its place in the whole of life, and is valued as an irrevocable stain, affecting that whole, and the personality involved, precisely in proportion as the spiritual self-consciousness [*sic*] concerned takes on integral and concrete form and "memory."
- This can be very concretely worked out. For the doctrine of "substitution" atonement is to be substituted-- the concept that each disloyal deed is an opportunity for a new loyalty, in so far as the new loyalty is initiated by another person than the one who does this disloyal deed. Hence the symbolic doctrine that only the sinless can atone.

⁶ HARP Box 105, Folder 5, Document 1 (not dated, but likely in 1912).

⁷ Box 113, Folder 5; (formerly Logic Box 4, item 4).

⁸ Although the whole of Plan #1 and Part II of Plan #3 deal with "General Metaphysics" (which, as published, would become *PC* 2), the other parts of these Plans point toward *PC* 1 as published. In more detail, Plan #2, Part I of Plan #3, and all of Plans #4 and #5 deal more with Christianity. This fact counters these Notes' long title which stresses that they would be an approach to the "General Metaphysical problems," the problems of the second half of the proposed Hibbert Course. Evidently, too, when drafting these Plans, Royce was relying heavily both on his 1909 lecture-series, "What is Vital in Christianity," and no less on his *Sources of Religious Insight*, a book published in early 1912.

⁹ A proposed map of these five outlines (pages 1-20) and of the appended notes (pages 21-23) may help:

Page 1: Introduction

Page 1-6: Plan 1

Page 7: Plan 2

Pages 8-15: Plan 3

Pages 17-19: Plan 4

Page 20: Plan 5

Pages 21-23: "Essence of the previous plan", i. e., of Plan #5.

¹⁰ Royce's fifth plan does not track with ROYCE's final organization of his Hibbert Lectures. For the latter, Royce's "finalized plan," see the Outline ROYCE offered to his Oxford audience and soon published in *PC* 49-54. Hence, FMO hypothesizes at least a sixth and seventh, if not more, versions of his plan for *PC*. No MS form of these latter plans seem extant in HARP.

- The resulting transformation of Christian doctrine is to be viewed as an absolute religion that must, in various lands, times, etc., take on endlessly new forms. Each new form is an hypothesis to be tested by religious experience.”
(21-23) [Royce’s emphases]

Royce wrote a series of “Plans” for the Hibbert Lectures. Of these the fifth (on p.20) is the last contained in HARP. Yet there had to be at least seven plans altogether. Box 113, folder 5 (old Logic Box 4, document 4) contains five different versions of these plans. The five plans show Royce toiling to revise the interpretation of his task at hand, creating plan after plan. However, the gap between the fifth plan and the “programme” for the Lecture Series which Royce gave to his Oxford audience [PC 49-54] is so great that must have drafted further outlines, e.g. six, seven, etc. Cf. Royce’s own attempts to start Lecture I (Box 113, folder 5). Having reached his Oxford “programme” (or plan), he felt satisfied with what he wanted to do. For a more detailed analysis of the “Plans,” see the following tentative “chronology and dates.”

Tentative chronology and dates for these five outlines (pages 1-20) and the appended notes (pages 21-23):

By March 29, 1912: Royce tells Brett “my Oxford engagement is not yet quite officially settled” and “my plans for the book are prospering as well as could possibly be expected under the circumstances.” This sounds as if he feels his plans for his book on Christianity are developing. On March 29th, he tells Brett “I propose to expand my recent essay on “What is Vital in Christianity” into a volume of lectures on the same topic.” This title is identical with what he used for “Plan 4,” whereas he had entitled his 3rd plan, “The Vital in Christianity.” [See *Letters* 566-568.]

By June 5, 1912: Royce acknowledge to Brett, “I am busy on the ‘Christianity book. The present plan is to deliver the book both as a course of Lowell Lectures, and as a longer course of (say 16) Hibbert lectures in Oxford. The present proposed title is *the Problem of Christianity.*” [Letters 571] If we take “present plan” here to refer less to procedure and more to intended content, then Royce has clearly moved to a 6th or 7th draft of his plan,¹¹ which aims at two volumes, including a volume on “the Christian Ideas” [the ultimate title of Part I being “The Christian Doctrine of Life“], and a second volume on the “general metaphysical problems and its application to Christianity,” [the ultimate title of Part II being “The Real World and the Absolute Ideas“].

Therefore, it looks as if Royce started what we call Plan 1 sometime before March 29th, perhaps around March 15 or earlier. (This is only a month and a half after his stroke.) By March 29, his “plans for the book are prospering well,” and he is “certainly not neglecting the Christianity plan.” By that time, he has already reached what we call Plan 4. He entitles this plan “What is Vital in Christianity,” and gave this as the tentative title to Brett. Royce only needed to settle his speaking arrangements with Oxford (and perhaps with the Lowell Institute) to reach clarity on the form his lectures would ultimately take.

Cf. Box 113, folder 5. Royce drafts three brief beginnings of Lecture I of *The Problem of*

¹¹ See note 1 *supra*.

Christianity—3 MSS of 1, 2, and 3 pages, respectively. These manuscripts were probably drafted after Royce's 5th plan for *PC*.

By June 5: the title *The Problems of Christianity* and the two sets of 8 lectures each had been fixed (although the titles of the two parts are not yet indicated). After this date, Royce's diary records of his four sea voyages to the Caribbean and Port Limon in Costa Rica¹² tell the story of when he drafted almost all of Part I of *The Problem of Christianity*.

Questioning the dating of the Plans: Plan 1 shows references to William James. Bergson appears there too, as well as in Part II of Plan 3. Yet in all five plans C. S. Peirce is not mentioned. Might this be a sign that he drafted these already in late February or early or mid-March before he did his careful survey of Peirce's early, middle, and late published writings which led to Royce's "Peircean Insight"? The difficulty, of course, is that Royce's "apoplexy" attack occurred on February 1 of this year. Could Royce have recovered so quickly as to begin drafting these plans by mid-February? He speaks (by June 5) of another plan as "the present plan" (beyond our Plan 5?) But the more definitive Plan 6 or 7 (no MS surviving) would have contained the Peirce section for what would become Chapters 11-14 of *PC* and then the basis for his "programme" to his Oxford audience (*PC* 51-54 + 49-50).

This gives a clue that Royce's "Peircean Insight" would have been "well-seeded" by June 5. He may also have done some intensive Peirce studies after June 5 (thus giving the initial insight time to grow).

The thinking behind Royce's notes (for "a Voluntaristic approach" to the problems of the Hibbert Course) reveals itself in the final version. Even a preliminary search of *PC* reveals sites where "Voluntarism" shines through:

Pages 135-36: the voluntarism needed for acts of love under Grace in "the Realm of Grace" because one needs to get beyond ordinary human consciousness to believe the Logos-Spirit present in any petitioner;

Page 198: willing to believe in any ordinary human to contact the judge of all the earth who identifies with this ordinary person. In "The Christian Doctrine of Life."

Pages 349-50: In the key "Doctrine of Signs," the absolute Voluntarism needed to adopt the one right attitude toward life and toward the universe, and to do lovingly loyal deeds toward the "judge of all the earth."

Pages 382-83: "Historical and Essential" How much human will does it take to do daily deeds of charity and atonement, ever in contest with evil? This theme runs through *PC* and comes to a head in these pages (382-83). It takes right-willed acts to do lovingly loyal deeds that fit in with the Spirit's overall true interpretation of this processing universe. And secondly, the Interpreter Spirit of the Universal processing Community wills absolutely the attainment of the goal of the universe.

Page 403: It takes will to "Hold fast that Faith!" of the Pauline Communities (that the spirit is alive, active, and dwelling in the church and to cooperate with this process by practically willing to acknowledge the presence of the Spirit of the Universal and Beloved Community.

NB: There are other places in *PC* where Royce's emphasis on Voluntarism comes through

¹² See HARP Box 112, Folder 6.

strongly, even though Royce tries to keep the rational mind always steering this Voluntarism.

For the transcripts of the “Plans” pages 1-23, *see* document 8.

Comparison of MS with Published Text:

Our aim is to compare the MS copy in HARP boxes 31-38 with the emended published version of *The Problem of Christianity* by Catholic University of America Press (2002), first published by Macmillan in two volumes in 1913, then reprinted in one volume by the University of Chicago press (1968).

Box 39: “Summaries, Early draft, Proof”

Wells’s title to this box is misleading. What Box 39 contains is in fact an outline of Lecture I, a collection synopses or summaries of the other lectures, and a “page proof” of lecture XVI, materials created before the Lectures themselves. (The lectures themselves are contained in Boxes 31-38.)

An important note: Royce handed a hand-out to his Oxford audience entitled “Topics of the Individual Lectures.” These ‘topics’ may be found at pages 51-54 of the printed book.

The eight short summaries that open this box (called variously outline, summary and synopsis) currently prove puzzling. They may be Royce writing to himself, or presenting short drafts of his Lowell lectures. In several of these synopses, he begins using the past tense, suggesting that the lecture has already been given. Yet, the pieces are too long to be a hand-out or a newspaper report. If taken as internal studies by Royce, following a long series of plans, preparations, first and second drafts, a pause by which he reconsiders what he has already said, and tries to synthesize this for a clear reading of the final draft. FMO, without clear historical evidence as to the possibility of Royce’s repeating the Lowell lectures in a shorter version is left with a puzzle.

**Document 1: “Outline of the First Lecture on the Problem of Christianity Lowell Institute Course,
Nov. 18, 1912”**

A 13-page manuscript. FMO wonders at first whether this may be a report of how the lecture *went*. The first sentence begins “The lecture opened”

In this outline, Royce reflects back on the themes of this Lecture. The ideas presented here is much closer to the printed version than the manuscript found at Document 11 in this box below. (An early version of this text.) “The present lectures propose to make the “Problem of Christianity” depend, for its solution, not indeed upon a study of the supposed supernatural basis of these ideas, but upon a portrayal of their verifiable foundation in human nature, and of their vital meaning for the life of man as we daily observe that life. The second lecture is to undertake such a study of the Ideal of the Church.” With this Royce leads into his next synopsis.

Although Royce calls this first short version an “outline,” and the next short versions “synopses”

or “summaries,” these appear to be the same form of writing: a short draft of a particular lecture. Frequently, there are ways of putting things in these summaries which are more pregnant than he achieved in the final published version. **Hence these are important, and deserve the attention of the Critical Editors.**

Evaluation: FMO is puzzled by these synopses/outlines. Taking them as reports for newspapers doesn’t seem likely. This synopsis seems a Roycean way of reflecting, in short form, the purpose of Lecture I. This is what Royce sees as the basic structure Lecture . This synopsis comes close to the final version of lecture I. Even the final Lecture I, however, does not take up the issue of method to be used in the study.

No scholar can avoid comparing this, and the following, eight documents as crucially important pre-final drafts of the lectures of *PC I*.

Document 2: “Synopsis of the Second Lecture”
A 15-page manuscript.

Document 3: Synopsis of the Third Lecture The Moral Burden of the Individual”
A 22-page manuscript.

Document 4: Synopsis of the Fourth Lecture
14-page manuscript

Document 5: Synopsis of the Fifth Lecture
15-page manuscript

Document 6: Summary of the Sixth Lecture
15-page manuscript

Document 7: Summary of the Seventh Lecture in the Lowell Institute Course
7-page manuscript

Document 8: Synopsis of the Eighth and Final Lecture of the Lowell Institute Course on the Problem of Christianity
A 13-page manuscript

Document 9: Synopsis of the Third Lecture
A 7-page typescript, with a few slight non-substantive edits.

Document 10: Wells note: The Problem of Christianity Lecture I (unrevised). (Wells quotes Royce.)
“This M.S. is superseded by the draft of Lecture I which by June 24 was typewritten and is in K.R.’s hand.”

Document 11:“Lecture I. The Master, the Religion, and the Modern Spirit”

A 65-page manuscript (with many page doubles and additions) Pages 47 to 52 are missing. Many

pages are redrafted.

The manuscript is apparently an early draft of the essay as eventually published. The first line of the manuscript is very similar to the printed version. The literal text diverges at that point. The manuscript is quite different from the published lecture I. FMO believes it deserves critical attention.

Section I: he deals with the issue of distinguishing “the” problem of Christianity, from “that” problem of Christianity, and the particular problem of that specific age.

Section II: Pages eight and nine on the underlying education of the human race, and of the sort of religion implied by the mere idea of modern man because of the view of human history. (page 8) Royce explores the notion of “modern man,” and the notion of the “religion of modern man.”

Section III: In the manuscript, Royce gives three characteristics of the modern man. First is his “interest in what is usually called scientific method. The second characteristic is his estimate of the place and the office of faith, that is his valuation of the believing or trusting attitude of mind as a factor in religion. The third characteristic is the modern man’s attitude towards reports of miraculous events, and towards the legendary elements of religious tradition.” (12-13)

Royce looks at these three characteristics as pointing convergently to a vague religion marking modern man, which he points out deals with the “very issues that the faith of the fathers faced.” (14-15) **This discussion is not in the published version. Query, why did Royce drop this from the final version.**

Section IV: Royce discusses modern man’s interest in science (his characteristic of modern man number 1). The subordination of the scientist to the entire community of inquiry. (Humbly submissive to what other people find.) Again, this large section on the scientific spirit is not in the published book. At the end of this section he refers to the “Councils” of the church. (FMO notes that this is the first time he remembers Royce using this phrase.)

Section V: Royce discusses modern man’s second characteristic: the *faith* that is at the heart of scientific method. He moves into discussion of William James and *The Will to Believe*. (He sees it as a weather-changing book.)

Section VI: Discussion of the modern man’s third characteristic: the critical attitude toward miraculous events. Influenced by the high development of the historical sense. “The development of the historical spirit has altered the whole treatment of the problems of religion.” (41) “The Eighteenth Century rationalists ... rejected the miraculous tales, or at best explained them away, as due to ignorant misunderstandings, or to distorted reports of ... natural happenings.” (42) But in the wake of the rationalists and their critique, a renewed emphasis on the second characteristic of modern man – romanticism, radical sense of our own limits and of natural laws – makes us more open to the possibility of miracle. A good summary of this argument may be found on page 45a. Royce deals with the issue of the

inclusiveness or exclusiveness of religion.

Section VII: “Christianity has two principle and contracting characteristics.” After one page of section VII, there are pages 47-51 missing. Page 52 appears, then there is another gap until page 59, then page 60 is skipped, then page 61.

Nevertheless, even with these missing pages, the gist of this section is apparently this: Is Christianity supposed to be centered on Jesus? Or is it supposed to be centered on the response to Jesus. Royce describes what he sees as the “religion” of modern man: the tendency to see history as the education of the human race. Royce gets into the hypothesis: “What if this faith should after all prove to be, in its deepest spirit, one with what is most permanent and vital in the faith which the imagination and the meditation of the historical church has embodied in legends, in formulas, in symbols.”

The distinction is made between what is essential, and what is historical is critical to Christianity.

Section VIII: There is no section VIII in this manuscript. The printed version of the work ends, however, with a Section VIII. The manuscript seems to be complete (as he ties this in to the second lecture). But it does not end the same way as Lecture I of the book ends.

Evaluation: Although this manuscript differs considerably from the published Lecture I of *PC*, it nevertheless shows Royce interpreting the problem of Christianity in a way that space considerations in the published version did not allow. His use of the three characteristics of the modern man as the way to develop this lecture is unique. They form the backbone of sections IV, V and VI of this Lecture. He treats the way scientific method affects the modern mind, but does not completely absorb it, because of the modern mind’s sense of history, and the recognition of the role of change in that history.

Therefore, FMO recommends that the scholars consider this early unpublished draft of Lecture I as an important text against which to compare (via footnotes ?) the final text of *The Problem of Christianity*.

Document 12:

Unedited page proofs for the “Summary and Conclusion of Lecture XVI: Summary and Conclusion.” The text is complete. On the last page, Wells adds certain words/lines that have inadvertently run off the page.

Document 13: Synopsis of the Fourth Lecture

A four page typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 4 in this Box.

Document 14: Synopsis of the Fifth Lecture

A four page typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 5 in this Box.

Document 15: Summary of the Sixth Lecture

A four page typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 6 in this Box.

Important note to scholars: for a full draft of Royce's method in *PC*, *Cf. Box 102, folder 11, bundle (c)*: This bundle contains A manuscript fragment, pages 52-61, somewhat edited. Its topic is Royce's method to be used in *PC*. To FMO, it seems that limits of space have forced Royce to drop this MS's more specific picture of his method and settle for a mere sentence on method to summarize his hint of method at the close of Chapter I (p.74). He will give a fuller picture of his method at *PC* 210-11 and again at *PC* 230-31.

Part I: The Christian Doctrine of Life

Chapter 1: The Problem and the Method (57-74) Box 31

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle j: A manuscript fragment, numbered pages 61-69, slightly edited, seems an early draft of section VII of Chapter I of *PC*; *see* parallels in the published version, *PC* 70-75. The page numbering of this fragment, pages 61-69, suggests a lengthy yet unused lead-up in Chapter I to its section VII.

Box 31. MS for this first Chapter is written on fresh pages 1-40. With a few exceptions, from 41-70, Royce uses previously drafted MS pages (sometimes with several repaginations on one sheet. He then concludes with freshly written pages from 71-91.

MS copy does not reflect later paragraph insertions. Otherwise it runs concurrently with published text, with the following exceptions.

In section three, MS copy does not reflect later paragraph insertions. Otherwise it runs concurrently with published text, except for:

At the end of the section, the printed text ends with "... the great common religious interests." Royce had originally added in the MS, after interests "...of our own time, and of all coming times."

In section four, the printed version (page 62, MS page 23) omits the words at start of section "...and by saying that," starting new paragraph with "What I am minded"

Page 44 of the MS (66 of published text), shortly after Royce begins using previously drafted pages (and just before the paragraph beginning "Whatever the reason), he deletes the following lines "It is useless to pause here for even the briefest statement of the actual reasons why such an interpretation of the mast, of his nature, , of his office, and of his divine relationships has come to exist."

The sentence immediately prior to the paragraph beginning "To mention ...", Royce inserts in pencil the sentence "This fact stands in the way of all such attempts to simplify our problem as is the attempt which I have just outlined." (page 45 MS, page 67 published text).

In section VI, Royce reworks the formerly drafted pages, editing them heavily. In the printed text at page 71, Royce deletes (without crossing out in the MS, page 62-63) the following sentence: “The principal feature of the master’s teaching which has seemed to later times to need interpretation in the light of some further development of this true meaning, is his counsel concerning the Kingdom of Heaven itself.” [the bottom right corner of MS page 62 is cut off from rest of page.]

As to section VIII: The MS marker “VIII” does not conform to the printed text. In the printed text “VIII” occurs directly before the paragraph (page 76-77 of the MS) “The idea of the spiritual community”, but in the MS, “VIII” occurs before the paragraph “We have in outline sketched” and after considerable edits to page 78 of the MS as follows:

On page 78 of the MS, page 74 of the printed text, after the phrase “... after his earthly period of teach had ceased,” the printed text deletes the following sentence from the MS: “ I propose, in the following lectures, to discuss the essential meaning of each of these three ideas, to show how it is related to the most general lessons of Christian history, and to the insight which, as we may hope, tends to find its embodiment in the modern mind.”

Then, after the MS sentence ending “... the Problem of Christianity,” the following sentence is added to the printed text (does NOT occur in the MS): “The justification of our enterprise lies in the fact that, familiar as these three ideas are, they are still almost wholly misunderstood, both by the apologists who view them in the light of traditional dogmas, and by the critics who assail the letter of dogmas, but who fail to grasp the spirit.” (page 74 printed text)

Then, the final paragraph of the printed text omit’s the final 10 lines of the MS as follows: “At the next lecture I shall proceed to discuss the meaning of the first of the three essential ideas of Christianity, - the idea of the universal spiritual community as the possessor of the means of grace, as the necessary condition of human salvation, and as the means whereby the divine spirit is to find its earthly expression.” (MS pages 80-81, text page 74)

Chapter II: The Idea of the Universal Community

Box 31

An 86 page MS (taking the doubling of page 79 and 37a into account). Pages 1-4 are fresh pages, 5-12 redrafted pages, 13-32 are fresh pages, 33 is redrafted, 34- 37 are fresh pages, 37a-73 are redrafted pages, 74-78 are fresh pages, 79 (first) is used, 79 (second) - 84 is fresh.

This MS is more than usually heavily worked, both the fresh and redrafted pages.

In section three, pages 14-16, although they are written on fresh pages, they are still heavily edited

In section four, page 18-19 of the MS, page 79 of text, several sentences deleted from MS “.... after our present problem.” These sentences, not in text, read as follows: “The ideal of the universal community, we have said, has its foundations in human nature, and in needs which reason can grasp, apart from dogma. On the other hand, this ideal, has entered into the history of

Christianity, and, in so entering, has assumed a meaning which, without the aid of Christianity, never could have been attained. We wish to see both these aspects of our problem, and to view them together.”

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle (f) for some manuscript fragments that parallel *PC* Chapter II, sections VIII and IX.

Chapter III: The Moral Burden of the Individual (pages 99-119 of published text)
Box 32

A 75-page MS. The first pages, 1-30, are fresh pages (page 8 is skipped, 13-14 are one page), 31-32 are redrafted, 33-38 are fresh, 39-58 are redrafted, 59-68 are fresh, 69 to 74 are redrafted, 75-76 are fresh, and the last page, 77, is redrafted on a previously used sheet.

At the end of section one (page 5 MS, 100 text), the last sentence of the MS section is deleted: “I must try to interpret at least a part of its meaning, enough to prepare the way for a later discussion of its truth.”

At the end of MS section four (pages 32-33, page 106 of printed text), nine lines of the MS are deleted from the printed text: “Remember, in any case that we are just at this stage of our exposition, chiefly concerned, not with theology, nor with Paul’s religious opinions, but with the natural history of the moral life of man. Both religion and theology will alter become again central in our interests. For the moment, we must be content to be superficial.”

Page 35 MS, 107 text, shows Royce’s penciled-in editing “such as would” following “to give directions to a stranger.”

Indeed, from MS pages 35-37, Royce edits heavily in pencil. The edits return to ink at page 39. On page 53 of the MS, Royce returns to editing in pencil, with some pencil edits occurring on page 55, alongside ink edits. The pencil edits continue through the rest of the MS, alternating with ink edits, to the end of the Lecture.

The editing in many places in this MS is quite intense, especially with his “see-saw” use of fresh-previously drafted pages.

Chapter IV: The Realm of Grace (121-142 of printed text)
Box 32

Box 32

An 80 page MS (more or less ... a few doubled and skipped pages).

Pages 1-17 fresh (including a doubled 13/14)

17a redrafted

18-22 fresh pages

23-49 redrafted

50 fresh

51-79 redrafted

80

Royce mistakenly marks the new section at page 50 “VII,” when in fact this is section VIII. (His first section VII is on 40.) Hence, his section numbers are off to the end. His “VIII” then appears twice (on 57), and then again, which he corrects to “XI” on page 69. (But this is really X.)

On page 63 of the MS, no indication of a footnote to Troeltsch is given. (The footnote *is* included in the printed text at page 136-137, quoting Troeltsch in “Ergebnisse.”)

On page 66 of the MS, after the sentence ending “. . . I have just sketched”, Royce does not insert a fn. 3 in the MS. (The footnote appears in the text at page 138.)

Chapter V: Time and Guilt (143-163 of printed text)
Box 33

A 76-page MS, in nine sections. Slightly edited. All fresh pages except 5, 22-24, 35-36, 65.

Section 1:

In section 1, page 8 of the MS, Royce deletes the end of the quotation “Sin is not a monster . . .” He takes out: “All thinking about it, beyond what is indispensable for the firm effort to get rid of it is waste of energy and waste of time” - “a brooding in which so many have perished.” (145 of printed text). He picks up again with “Arnold praises Paul. . .”

On page 9, at the MS ending of section I, Royce deletes from the MS “. . .his definition of what constitutes excess in thinking about sin? Is he right when he says “Sin is an impotence to be got rid of.”

Otherwise, text and MS run in parallel.

Sections 2-9:

Text and MS run in parallel.

Chapter VI: Atonement (165-186 of printed text)
Box 33

An 78-page MS (numbered “80,” but with pages 13, 14, 15 combined), in ten sections. Except for pages 3 and pages 21-34 (sections II-V), all pages are fresh.

Sections 1-10 are parallel in text and MS, except the late insertion of a footnote. At section IX (page 60 MS, page 181 printed text), Royce inserts a footnote not included in the MS. Royce encounters Allen Dinsmore’s book *Atonement in Literature and Life* (Boston, 1906) after the MS was written. The note was inserted in the galley proof.

Chapter VII: The Christian Doctrine of Life (187-208 of printed text)
Box 34

Cf. Box 102, folder 11, bundle (a): This bundle contains 30-page manuscript, titled “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity. Lecture VII. The Christian Doctrine of Life.” Based on the way

these pages are grouped, these MS pages, 1-30 (with 15-19 omitted) seems to be a fragmentary draft of the start of Lecture VII of *PC*. [It seems highly important from several perspectives.]

At Box 34, a 75-page MS (with 6, 7, 8 combined, and an 11a, and numbered “76”) in ten sections, all on fresh pages.

All sections run in parallel, in the MS and printed text, except for the very last line. In that line, Royce adds the words “both labor” to the printed text, so that it reads “...for that coming of the Kingdom, we both labor and wait.” (208 printed text)

Chapter VIII: The Modern Mind and the Christian Ideas (209-226 of printed text)
Box 34

A 75-page MS, in ten sections (30, 31, 32 combined, 13-17 combined, 5 and 6 combined, 3 and 4 combined). From page 45 to page 71 of the MS, the pages are not fresh, having been reworked, sometimes several times. Otherwise, the pages are fresh.

The sections run in parallel, except for the fact that the MS ends (at the bottom of page 83) with “...the spirit of Christianity.” (The penultimate text paragraph.) The last paragraph in the printed text was either added by Royce later, or page 84 of the MS has disappeared. We do not know.

The last paragraph in the text reads: “So much, and only so much, our survey of the Christian doctrine of life permits us to assert concerning the relations of the Christian spirit to the modern mind, without essaying the grave tasks of a philosophical theory of the real world. Herewith the first part of our task is done. The second part calls for another method.

Part II: The Real World and the Christian Ideas

Chapter IX: The Community and the Time-Process (229-249 of printed text)
Box 35

***Cf.* Box 102, folder 10, bundle (i):**

A manuscript fragment in this “bundle” is titled “Lectures on the Problems of Christianity Vol. II. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. Lecture IX. The Conflict of Selves.” The fragment is numbered pages 1-7, and is minimally edited.

FMO: These pages in Box 102, folder 10, bundle (i) were drafted upon an **earlier** plan of *PC* (where “The Conflict of Selves” was to be the 1st Lecture of Vol. II). In his final plan, Royce recognizes how basic to his Vol. II (Metaphysical Questions) is the “Time-Process,” and so, in final draft, Royce makes Lecture IX be “The Community and the Time-Process.”

A 90 page MS (numbered “89” with these page adds/doubles 77a 76a 57/58) in 12 sections. All fresh pages except the following:

88

75

45-53

29

16-17

10-13

On page 21 of the MS (page 234 of printed text) no marking for section V as in the book. Royce's marker for section VI occurs on MS page 26 (he just missed the V marker).

The MS and text run in parallel, except for the following:

At the end of this chapter, the MS contains 2 extra paragraphs not contained in the printed text (88-89):

“To such a study our further lectures are to be devoted. Our analysis of the concept of the community has shown that our two main problems are to be: First the problem as to the truth of our interpretations of the Self, and secondly the problem of Time.

“Just at the present moment these problems stand at the focus of philosophical interest. Let us next consider the question: - What is an Interpretation and wherein consists the truth of an interpretation?”

Chapter X: The Body and Its Members (251-271 of printed text)
Box 35

A 74-page MS (numbered “75” with the following pages doubled and added: 47/48, 25a, 17a, 12/13, 7a, 4/5) in 13 sections. All the pages are fresh except for: 4/5-6, 66-70.

The MS and printed text run precisely in parallel. (Royce, in the MS, marks section XII twice, misnumbering section XIII.)

Evaluation: On MS pages 63-65, *on fresh pages*, Royce expresses his well-known doctrine of the two levels of human existence: “the nature of a real community; the sense in which there can be, in individual human beings, despite their narrowness, their variety, and their sundered present lives, a genuine consciousness of the life of a community whereof they are members....” **Might this be connected with the first clear recognition of this famous doctrine?**

Chapter XI: Perception, Conception and Interpretation (273-295 of printed text)
Box 36

Cf. Box 120, folder 11, bundle (b): contains a fragmentary manuscript, pages 13-29. Generally it is on fresh pages, and edited in parts by Royce, this manuscript is related to the final form of *PC*'s Chapter XI, Perception, Conception and Interpretation. However, **it contains a critique of William James's Theory of Knowing that is omitted in the final form.** Instead, in the published piece, Royce turns to Bergson.

Box 36

An 81 page MS (numbered “82” with the following adds and combined pages: 54a, 68a 10/11/12, 5/6) in 16 sections. All pages are fresh except the following:

54

44-50

31-37

19

9- 10/11/12

On page 54a of MS, Royce marks section “XII” ; the printed section has no section marker at this point, before sentence “This may at first seem....”

On page 55, after the sentence “A perceives B,” the MS reads very differently from the printed text (287): “A pair of objects is in question and this pair suffices. But when A interprets B to C, a triad of members is necessary to make the interpretation possible; and herein lies an essential difference between the cognitive processes of perception and of interpretation. Now it is perfectly possible that” [at this point, the new paragraph in the printed text picks up with “When a process”

This is substantially different from the printed text.

On page 56 of the MS (page 287 of printed text), the paragraph markings do not correspond with printed text. Also, minor style changes are made.

Section XII:

On page 57 of the MS, after “...is conveyed to the future self,” the printed text inserts section marker “XII.” There is no section marker at this point in the MS.

For our purposes here, we refer to this section XII of the printed text, not in the MS.

The MS of page 57 includes language not in the printed text as follows: “We may next readily generalize the relations involved in the past illustration.”

At this point, the printed text substitutes two paragraphs for this MS language beginning with “The illustration just chosen” and up to “...the process of interpretation.”

Until the last paragraph of this section (page 61 of MS), the text and MS run in parallel, except for minor language changes.

Royce adds a final one-sentence paragraph in the printed text at the end of this section (page 289), after the last MS sentence which ends “...in terms of the other.” This last paragraph in the printed text reads “This analogy careful consideration.”

Sections XIII and XIV:

Except for minor language changes, this section runs in parallel in the MS and the printed text.

Section XV:

In this section, the MS and printed text run in parallel until MS page 75. At the top of this page, after “... removed therefrom,” the beginning of the new MS sentence is not in the printed text: “If one thus views the time-process, one will inevitably say, not for merely conceptual reasons, nor because of any intellectualism, that.” At this point, the printed text inserts the word “Hence” and begins the last paragraph of this section. In that last paragraph, the MS and printed text run in parallel.

Section XVI:

The beginning of this section is markedly different in the MS and the printed text. The MS (75)

begins with a sentence not included in the text (293): In brief, the world of interpretation, which is neither the world of conception, nor....” Then, the language at the top of page 76 *does* pick up on page 294 of the printed text after the printed text words “Metaphysically considered, ...” (These words do not appear in the MS.)

The printed text adds an entire beginning to this section that is not included in the MS, from “Let me summarize” (293) to “.... and motives foreign to the act of interpretation” on page 294. In brief, paragraphs numbered 1-6 do not appear in the MS. Significant additions to the section, therefore, were apparently made to the page proofs.

In the MS, at page 75, Royce begins “In brief....” In the printed version the section starts 293, with 8 enumerated points, beginning “Let me summarize the main results of this lecture: ...” These point numbers are not included in the MS.

On MS page 77, point “7” of the printed text (295), the language appears to start tracking in parallel with “Bergson has eloquently referred us” Point “8” occurs on page 81 of the MS (without a point number), beginning “Do you ask” (page 295). Enumerated items 7 and 8 of the printed text are thus in parallel with the MS, except for the lack of numbers and paragraph entries in the MS.

Chapter XII: The Will to Interpret (297-319 of printed text)

An 84-page MS in twelve sections (two extra pages, two combined pages 13a, 13b, 6/7, 4/5). All are fresh pages, except for 13, 13a, 14.

Except for the following, and differences in paragraph markings, the MS and text run in parallel:

In section X (page 68 MS, page 315 of the text), after the sentence ending “...three constitute a community” Royce adds two sentences: “Let us give to this sort of community a technical name. Let us call it a Community of Interpretation.” With a minor language change, the MS and printed text resume running in parallel.

Box 105, folder 7

A one page, front and back, manuscript in Box 105, folder 7 is headed “Lecture XII. The Will to Interpret.” In the MS, Royce begins to write, but then breaks off, to outline the entire chapter in eight sections. In the final printed version of this Lecture in the published *PC*, however, there are 12 sections.

This MS reads as follows:

“Lecture XII. The Will to Interpret

If the principal theses of the last lecture contained any truth, the art of interpretation is the chief amongst all the humanities, and can neither be taught in a lecture nor learned in many lifetimes. But our interest in this art is limited by the

Outline of lecture -

I. Interpretation establishes a community, consisting of Object (at the very least), Interpreter, and Person to whom interpreted. Interpreter called in for loyalty to this community; is on the whole, in the position of the spirit of this community. The community one of hope, - sometimes also of memory. A few examples to show the importance of such communities. Interpretation as basis of all learning.

II. The truth ideal of the interpreter. "Not my pragmatism but thine be made to 'work'." "Know as I am known."

III. How this truth ideal conceived to be attained. The conjunctive realm's [sic ... realms?] of James inadequate.

IV. Psychological instances of ideal attained. The conspectus.

V. Absoluteness of interpretation ideal. Scoring metaphor repeated.

VI. Induction and the community of Interpretation.

VII. Return to Idealistic argument.

VIII. Loyalty and the Spirit outlined in conclusion."

Chapter XIII: The World of Interpretation (321-342 of printed text)

Box 37

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle h for manuscript fragment which may be preparatory material for this chapter.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle (I): which contains a large important manuscript, apparently drafted before the final version of *PC*. The manuscript runs from pages 3-54. There is much exposition and criticism of Henri Bergson in the latter pages of this manuscript. The first two pages of missing, and some others are missing at the close, after page 54. The MS is heavily reworked, on many redrafted pages. Perhaps the clearest hint of its place in *PC* occurs on page 5 where Royce refers to "using the three terms whose mutual relations I have explained in the last two lectures." FMO takes the three terms to be Perception, Conception and Interpretations, and thus guess that the last two lectures were Lectures XI and XII, making this manuscript an early reworked draft of what become Lecture XIII, "The World of Interpretation."

A MS of 83 pages, with 14 sections in the MS (with misnumberings), and fifteen sections in the printed version. All pages are fresh except the following:

74

64

51-59

34

Royce, at the beginning of the MS, crosses out the original title “The World of Signs and the Universal Interpretation” to rewrite “The World of Interpretation.” [see Lecture XIV “The doctrine of signs.]

On page 27 of the MS, Royce misnumbers section V as “IV”. After this, the MS section marks run one behind the printed text until page 51 of the MS, when Royce repeats his section marker “VIII,” thus falling two numbers behind the printed text.

On MS page 68, the first paragraph of section XII (which Royce calls X) runs parallel to the printed text. At this point, Royce inserts a new paragraph into the printed text, which begins “We all of us” and ends “....some of these consequences.” (337).

After this paragraph, the printed text again runs parallel to the MS.

Royce adds several lines in the printed text to the last paragraph of the MS section . The insertion comes after the phrase “...and their mediator or interpreter.” Royce continues this sentence with “whatever or whoever that interpreter may be,” and goes on to add two new sentences, ending in “... *there is no real world.*” (printed text page 339) (emphasis in printed text).

On page 80 of the MS, the printed text inserts a section marker (XIV) before the paragraph beginning “Nothing is more concretely known.” (page 340 of printed text)

Page 83 of the MS, and the MS chapter, **ends** with “...this universal community.” **BUT** the printed text adds a whole new Section, section XV. (page 341) This two page section begins with “The method by which this doctrine” and ends with “...the life of the Spirit and of the Community.” (342)

Chapter XIV: The Doctrine of Signs (343-362 of printed text)

Box 37

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle (m): Titled, on a smaller piece of a paper, “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity, Lecture XIII. The World of Signs”, the small paper precedes a manuscript fragment pages 41-65. The manuscript in this bundle chiefly consists in material moving up to a section VII at page 48, giving many pages, 48-58, to section VII, and then entering section VIII at page 58, but closing at 65. It is considerably edited by Royce. It seems, perhaps, to be an early fragmentary draft of what would become in the published *PC*, Lecture XIV, “The Doctrine of Signs.” [NB: Page 55, Royce gives CSP’s definition of “sign.”]

Compare with the deletions quoted below from Box 37.

A 95-page MS of 15 sections in the MS, and 14 sections in the printed version. (Royce numbers the MS pages as “87,” with the following combinations and additions: 40/41/42, 35/36, 21/22, 16a, 15 a-e, 13a-f, 7/8.) The pages are fresh except for the following:

71/72-80
69
61
39
15, 15a-e-16
13a-f
13 fresh,
6-12

On page 346, the printed text omit's section marker "III." (The marker is on page 13 of the MS.)

On page 16 of the MS, the last sentence of Section IV is not included in the printed version (page 350), e.g. "How can he test the metaphysics of the community?" (Section IV ends, instead, in the printed text: "...with ordinary human experience?")

The *printed* text section V begins "James declared that the typical pragmatist is a man" (page 350-51). Sections V-VIII of the MS do not appear in the printed version. Instead, the printed version begins a brief section V (page 350) with the words "James declared that the typical...." and ending with ".... realm of actual or of possible deeds." These words appear at the top of MS page 39. In essence, Royce deletes 16a to 38 of the MS from the printed text.

These deletions read as follows:

V

I can best begin my answer to this question ["How can he test the metaphysics of his community?"] by sketching the form in which the problem of the community presented itself to us at the outset of our study of metaphysical problems, and then by indicating the results to which our philosophy of interpretation has now shown the way. Both the earlier and the later phases of our inquiry are here to be summarized in their practical aspects. What attitudes of the will towards the real social order were expressed by the theories of the community with which we began? What change in these attitudes is required by the new view of our social situation to which the discussion of the cognitive process of interpretation has set before us?

In stating the Christian doctrine of life, we tried to bring into unity certain ethical counsels, and certain results of religious experience. The outcome of this effort was the assertion that the salvation of man comes through practical devotion to the Universal Community. Ethically speaking, loyalty to this community is the supreme virtue. From the religious point of view, the spiritual union of the individual with the life of the community constitutes the very essence of the redeeming process. The grace that saves is the love which the community awakens in its members. The essence of original sin is that hatred towards the authority of the social will which our natural cultivation awakens and inflames. The source of this love which redeems the individual is, indeed, for the traditional Christian consciousness, a divine mystery. The transforming magic of loyalty is regarded, by Paul, as due to the spirit who vivifies the community. And this spirit, when we look into it from the level of our natural life of moral detachment, seems divine.

VI

The Christian ideas, when estimated in the light of such a survey, were distinctly practical ideas. They expressed attitudes. They also appear to us to be at once human and mysterious. That they have saved men, and why, when they have indeed taken hold upon men's lives, they have done this saving work, we could indeed at least partially learn from history and from human experience. But whence the Christian ideas came, and for what metaphysical truth they stood, we

could not thus fully determine. It therefore became our business to inquire further into these matters. We needed to discover, if possible, the relation of the Christian ideas to the real world. In voluntaristic terms we could express our problem by saying that we needed some deeper justification for the loyal will, and for our hope that it will triumph, than is yet visible to man.

To this end we passed over to our study of the sense in which a community such as any stable social order brings before us, is a reality and furnishes a firm foundation for the values which we now so imperfectly find, but which we hope to understand more richly as the human world grows wiser.

At the outset of this part of our work, we consulted social common sense. The first result of this appeal was that our ordinary account of the nature of human individuals appears to emphasize, but not to solve the problem of the community. For common sense views individuals as sundered streams both of feelings and of ideas, as mutually inaccessible realms of feeling, as mutually secretive lives, as divided from one another by chasms, and as capable of communicating with one another only through the intermediation of physical processes. And this intermediation seems to depend upon the mysterious union of body and mind!

On the other hand, the same common sense which thus regards men as monads, also knows that sometimes their lives seem actually to blend; and that, under certain conditions, some strange compounding of consciousness appears to occur; so that communities are, after all in some sense realities which have the value of souls.

We turned to still other sources for light upon our problem regarding the meaning of this singular union of divisions and of interpenetrations, -- this alliance between the conditions which keep men apart, the powers that engender human hatreds, and the grace which, whatever its nature may be, nevertheless saves those whom it joins in spirit, and of whom it makes one undivided soul.

The next stage of our inquiry first made us of what we have since learned to call the cognitive process of interpretation. A community, we said, is a real unity by virtue of the fact that many selves, despite their various lives and their social chasms, can so interpret their individual lives that selves who are now many and who are at present divided possess in common, various past and future events; and can for that reason view themselves as in spirit one.

For when many men extend, each his own ideal life into the far off past and future, the social divisions of the present moment become perfectly consistent with a common recognition that, in some respect, all these selves possess an identical past and future, the social divisions of the present moment become perfectly consistent with a common recognition that, in some respects, all these selves possess an identical past and future. Thus we may indeed form an idea of a community of hope or of memory wherein we the many live and move and have our being.

Such a recognition first appeared, in our discussion, in its purely practical forms. Festival days, and the reverence of many men for their common ancestors, the hopes of patriots for the one coming event which means the triumph of their country; Paul's unification of his churches through the memory of the divine deed to which all the members owed their salvation; and through the hope of the united resurrection in which all were to share, -- these events and processes serve to illustrate that, by virtue of a perfectly intelligible interpretation of the various selves and of their temporal relations, the unity and the reality of communities can be defined; and can become, not merely a mystery, but a reasonable and practical force in men's lives.

Communities thus formed, thus unified, thus inspired through their common hopes and memories can be loved as unities. Such communities not only possess a genuine reality; but they have part in the working of the grace which wins loyalty. And such communities can aid in teaching the otherwise divided human individuals to acknowledge the common life of the spirit.

The result thus reached attracted our attention to the nature of the process of interpretation itself. Hereby we were gradually led, first to a study of the logic and of the psychology of interpretation and then to our metaphysical theory of the world of interpretation. And thus we have gained a new view, first of how a human community can be real, and of how

its constitution can become definite, and then of how the world itself can be interpreted as a real community.

Looking back over the course of this study, we see that, the whole process had involved a profound change in the attitude of the will, in terms of which we had learned to estimate the lives of men. At the outset, it was the sundered individuals who seemed to be the primarily important realities, while the community seemed to be either a divine mystery, of a figure of speech, or an unsolved problem of social psychology.

But at the conclusion of our study, the typical community of interpretation offered itself, by virtue of its form, as worthy to be the dwelling place of the interests and of the unity which we sought. The members are the mind which is interpreted, the mind to which the interpretation is addressed, and the mediator or interpreter. This community has offered itself as, in form at least, a solution of the problem regarding the sense in which a community can be real, and can possess a more concrete reality than belongs to its individual members. A community of interpretation is an union of individuals whose very being consists in their becoming members one of another. In such a community there is one who is interpreted, and one who is addressed, and a third who interprets. When we recall the fact that the foundations of all higher civilized life rest upon processes of mutual interpretation, whereby men come to a better mutual understanding, when we recall the fact that a reasonable love amongst men cannot exist until they have learned to understand one another, when we remember too that every advance in mutual understanding furnishes to individuals new opportunities for love, --we see that the theory of interpretation tends to throw light both upon the nature and upon the unity, and upon the value,--the saving power, the spiritual meaning of genuine communities. Let us see wherein such light may be of further aid to us.

VII

You will remember that interpretation occupies in our literal social life a place precisely analogous to the place which the process of explicit comparison fills in the inner life of any one individual. This, in fact, is why we are all accustomed to say that two men who are in conversation are comparing ideas. We here mean that each man is interpreting his own ideas to his fellow man. We thus speak as if each were comparing ideas that were really before him.

Now when I compare two ideas of my own, I do so for a purpose. This purpose is to find some third idea. And the third or mediating idea is to bring the two ideas which we compare into a closer union with each other than existed before the comparison. Yet this closer union, in cases wherein Peirce's type of triadic comparison takes place, never annuls or blurs the contrasts. Comparison unites ideas without permitting them to blend. It removes their estrangement without confounding their distinctions. Or, as we have already said, it so mediates between contrasting ideas, that it neither confounds their persons, that is their distinct meanings, nor divides their substance.

Such an unification of ideas by means of an interpreter, solves before your own internal vision, the problem of the One and the Many. Your own internal processes of comparison produce, when they are successful, communities of ideas, communities such that, in each of them, the body and the members are as clearly distinguished as they are intimately linked. This community of three of your own ideas is and remains, while you compare and mediate between contrasting ideas, One. Yet this One has three members, and the being of each member consists in its belonging to this inner community. One of the ideas is interpreted to or in the light of the other, while the third idea acts as the mediator.

The result of any such comparison, when it is followed out with a definite purpose, and succeeds, is that some question is answered, some problem is solved, some doubt is clarified, some embarrassing diversity or inner estrangement of your own meanings and activities is diminished or removed. Yet all this occurs without a blending of the ideas in question and without any loss of their diversities. The unity of the ideas becomes at once a fact, and a fulfilment of a purpose. Their unity is simply inseparable from the diversity.

Comparison is an instrument of simply indispensable value for all our insight. Whatever art or science or practice or business we follow, such triadic comparison of ideas is our constant instrument; our constant means of solving problems. There is no sort of explanation which you cannot reduce to a series of comparisons, each belonging to the triadic type which Peirce defined. There is no issue, personal or social, logical or practical, moral or religious, which cannot be rendered more controllable through processes of such comparison, through observing differences and finding mediating ideas.

So far, then, we speak of interpretation as it goes on within the individual life of each of us. Comparison is a sort of inner conversation, wherein our ideas are mutually interpreted one to another. And all this inner activity expresses our will, and constitutes a sort of drama of inner self-enlightenment.

But when we turn from internal comparison to our literal social life, we have further seen that there is no social function which more serves to unify men while keeping them from losing their distinct individualities than does the social function of mutual interpretation. Whatever else you seek to do for the true good of mankind, and whatever form of social unity you intend to bring to pass among them, one practical rule for your enterprise might be stated, in our own technical terms, thus: -- Form them into communities of interpretation. That is, so join them that each man is adequately interpreted to those fellow men with whom, for good cause, he is grouped. And this, in general, requires for each pair of men the presence of a third member, the interpreter. The will to interpret is therefore the most fundamental expression of the civilized social will. Herein lies the true basis of spiritual progress. Without mutual interpretation, no rational love, no lasting loyalty, no life in the spirit.

Through any community of interpretation, moreover, whatever be the special purpose for which it may be formed, the problem of the many members and the one body is peculiarly well exemplified --and solved. For whenever an interpretation is taking place, each participant in the process exists, for the purposes of this community, only in his office, in his place, in the community. The diversity of the members is essential to the common task. The goal is one for all concerned. Yet these members must be many in order to define the common goal.

Such a community is peculiarly well adapted then, both to present to us a solution of the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many, and to furnish a basis upon which all the higher forms of spiritual unity may develop. In any individual case, acts of interpretation may be trivial. But for mankind in its larger unities, interpretation is the expression of the will that all may be One.

VIII

Such then, was the advance which our doctrine of the human community made in consequence of our study of the process of interpretation. Our last lecture generalized the theory of the social relations which our elementary doctrine of interpretation had already exemplified: Our metaphysical thesis became this: The real world has the constitution of a community of interpretation.

For this was what our doctrine of Signs really means. The doctrine of Signs is an assertion that the world contains its own interpreter. There are ideas and there are minds whose diversities are interpreted. There are minds to which this interpretation is addressed. And through the total process of this community which constitutes the universe, the ideal of interpretation is fulfilled, while the end of interpretation is the very purpose for the sake of which the whole world, with its endless histories and its manifold varieties, exists. This, then, constituted our doctrine of Signs. Whatever is in the world of temporal events, is a sign calling for interpretation. And every sign finds its interpreter.

I am not asking you, at this point, to estimate the very incompletely stated argument whereby we reached this result. Our present concern is with the mental attitude, with the will, with the life-purpose, with the interest; which such a thesis is fitted to arouse in the mind of one who accepts it. We shall soon see that, in characterizing this attitude, we shall furnish new

evidences for our metaphysical thesis.

Mystics seek to come, through contemplation, into immediate touch with the real, by winning some final, some immediate, some universal perception, beyond which there will remain no further reality to perceive.

Those whom it is now customary to call intellectualists, or rationalists, possess, as we all possess, an acquaintance with certain universals, with certain laws, relations, orders. These are realities. And such thinkers seek to define the real, as Plato or as Spinoza did, in terms of some final, some all-sufficient, some necessary system of conceptions. Thus then are framed those philosophies of perception or of conception which we have now repeatedly characterized.

But one who believes in our world of interpretation: How is his acceptance of this world as a reality related to the actuality of his will?

Then, on MS page 40/41/42, the MS and printed text again run in parallel, with different section markings. On page 40/41/42 of the MS, MS section IX begins “The first of these modes” This language begins section VI in the printed text (351).

From this point, until page 62 of the MS, the text and MS run parallel. Then, on page 62 of the MS, the printed text inserts a section marker not included in the MS before the paragraph beginning “Now this third attitude of the will.....” For the printed, this is section X; in the MS we are still in section XII.

On page 77 of the MS, the paragraph beginning with the question “Why then do I indeed postulate your mind?” the MS shows no section marker. But the printed text here inserts section marker XIII.

Chapter XV: The Historical and the Essential (363-384 of printed text)

Box 38

A MS of 92 pages, all on fresh pages except for pages 13-17, and page 19. There are eleven sections.

At page 61 of the MS (Section IX), there is a pencil notation not in Royce’s hand that attempts to clarify Royce’s handwriting. There are here small differences between the MS and the printed text (at page 378). Royce appears to have changed some language, and added a phrase, to the page proofs as follows: where MS reads “error,” the printed text reads “blindness, - to the original sin of man the social animal.”

Other than this, the MS and printed text run totally in parallel. There are a few pencil corrections not in Royce’s hand. Some of the fresh pages are very heavily edited by Royce.

Chapter XVI: Summary and Conclusion (385-405 of printed text)

Box 38

A MS of 90 pages, all fresh pages, in 14 sections.

In Section XIV, at the very top of page 76 of the MS, “Simplify your traditional Christology.... To this end” is not emphasized in the MS, but is in the printed text (page 402).

Further down on page 76 of the MS, again there is a phrase that is not emphasized in the MS, but *is* emphasized in the printed text: “the Christology of the future The visible Christian church.”

However, the underlines in page 78 of the MS are included as emphasis in the printed text (402-03)

On page 403 of the printed text, there is again an emphasis (“The name of Christ and have been one”) that is indicated in the MS (page 80).

Several other emphases occur in the printed text and not in the MS, most significantly on page 87 of the MS “Does this help towards the coming of the universal community.” -- *not* emphasized in MS, *is* emphasized in printed text (404-05).

Royce’s Practical Application Books

Royce usually linked his theoretical writings with practical applications. This balancing seemed essential for his philosophizing. Frequently, only three books are pointed to as Royce’s practical works, namely, *SGE*, *RQP*, and *WJO*. However, *War and Insurance* as well as *The Hope of the Great Community* can fairly be considered Royce’s practical applications to crisis situations breaking out. Therefore we list five: *SGE*, *RQP*, *WJO*, *W&I*, and *HGC*.

15. *Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students* (1881) [MS absent from HARP collection]

Description—See Skrupskelis, *Basic Writings of Josiah Royce 2*: 1176 [hereafter *BWJR*:2]

Evaluation: Royce acknowledged “[o]f logic as a philosophic science they [these pages] tell nothing,” this booklet should not be considered one of Royce’s logic works. Nevertheless, his introductory pages attest to his concern for developing “an understanding of the exact meaning of the complex forms of language,” and his early pragmatism as practiced.

16. *Studies of Good and Evil* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898)

**“Introduction to Paper on Problem of Job, as read at Philosophic Conference
168 Brattle St., November 22, 1896”**

**Unpublished
Box 52**

This title is as given by Royce on the MS. This MS is *not* a part of the Job article as printed in

the book *SGE*.

Evaluation: This Introduction deserves reproduction in the critical edition.

An 11-page MS, as yet (2008) unpublished. This Introduction should be reproduced in the *Critical Edition* because Royce had not delivered any such frank Introduction to the Ministers gathered at Concord on October 1, 1898. Yet when scheduled to again read his Job address on November 22nd to a Philosophical Conference, not at his own Irving Street home, but at Mrs. Ole Bull's conventional meeting place for "more elevated" discourse, Royce foresaw a more critical Cambridge audience—some Harvard faculty and other serious thinkers from Cambridge environs. Upon reflection, then, Royce chose to draft an even more forthright Introduction--one better suited for his different expected audience. After a new and startling Introduction, he would offer the address delivered to the Ministers at Concord. His new Introduction, however, shows far better Royce's intimate confrontation with evil in all its dimensions and depth.

“Introduction to Paper on Problem of Job...” [MS of 11 pp.]

The following paper assumed its present shape in answer to a request very nearly made on behalf of the ministers' Conference held at Concord, about October 1 of the present year. The request was that I should take part in a discussion of the philosophical problems suggested by the Book of Job. Other speakers, who were the logicians and philologists, had already been appointed to discuss before the Conference the problems of scholarship that centre about the book in question that recently much clarified, but always problematic document of the closing period of Old Testament thought. When I consented to undertake my part of the task, I made free use of an older MS of mine, upon the general problem of evil, - a MS wherein as it chanced, I had already made some illustrative references to Job. As it also chanced, I have, years since, printed into other papers on the philosophy of the problem of evil, but the topic has its own diabolical exhaustlessness, and easily lends itself to repeated efforts. The present paper has never been printed.

As I introduce the essay to this audience, I must say a word as to its method and its necessary limitations. The paper, after its introductory summary of the problem of Job, has something to say of various solutions that have been offered as meeting the problem of evil. One of these solutions I shall defend. It is the solution offered by philosophical Idealism. An Idealist, in the sense in which I use the word, is one who maintains that the world that we behold, and that we live in, is a phenomenal manifestation of the life of one absolute Being, conscious, personal, all-embracing. In this Being we live and move and have our being. He is the Self of our Selves, the life of our lives, the unity whereof we are fragments, the absolute to whom all finite existence is relative. Apart from what he is, from what he knows, from what he wills, there is no Reality whatever. And this being as the Absolute is, in the highest logically possible sense of the world, perfect. No better world than his can be. Were a better logically possible[,] it would have been real. In him is the fullness of life.

Now in this paper I shall use this theory as involving a solution of the problem of evil. I shall use it; but, in this paper I shall not for a moment try to prove the truth of that idealistic theory of the Absolute. I shall employ it only as an hypothesis. And this I shall do, not because, even for an instant, I want this theory to be accepted on faith, nor because I think it unable to bear the sharpest possible critical assaults, nor because I am fond of dogma or of mystery in philosophy, but solely because this is one chosen

limitation of this paper. I am not here, today, to tell you why I am an idealist, but solely to illustrate for you how an idealist views the problem of evil, i.e. how he reconciles the perfection of his Absolute with the existence of God. The monism of the idealist, his assurance that God, as the Absolute, is one and all, is one with the world, includes every finite life in the organism of his single life, and, on the other hand, is a conscious and personal God -- all this today, I shall ask you to view merely as an hypothesis about Reality which today I shall not try to prove. I shall in the end apply this hypothesis of the all perfect and conscious Absolute, apart from whom nothing is that is, to the question of the nature and meaning of evil. Such is the first deliberate limitations of my paper.

The second limitation belongs to the other aspect of my topic. There is a curious and at first sight horribly lurid contrast between the perfection of God, of which the idealistic hypothesis speaks, and the often ghastly facts of our poor visible fragment of the world. One cannot explain evil unless there is evil to explain. And so, from the outset, I must call attention to just this lurid contrast. I am to undertake the grave task of explaining why, in a perfect world, it is logically necessary that there must be evil. To begin with I have therefore to call your attention to the presence of ill in the world. Unfortunately, unexplained evils, of the grossest sort, lie all about us in the world that we see, as we begin to grapple with our problem. And in this paper I shall not attempt to reconcile you easily to these observable evils of the finite world by assuming you cheerily that they are few, or light, or in process of being rapidly eliminated by evolution. I shall be forced, on the contrary, to emphasize the evil aspect of things, before trying to explain evil, by showing what place it occupies in the word, yes, in the very life of, the absolutely perfect being. Now whoever emphasizes evil, as Job himself did, is easily open to the charge that he ought not to trouble people with any cheerless talk. If he has solutions, let him give them, one says. Let him not first worry us with gloomy words. Now Job's words were gloomy; and it is the second limitation of my paper that I shall have to emphasize precisely that aspect of human experience which Job had in mind when he cursed his day. But, as I repeat, this is not what most people like to hear. A philosophical lecturer, as most people feel, may indeed be dry, if it is his nature to be so, but he ought not to seem pessimistic, even for a moment, he ought not to look on the dark side of things. Now it is my business, today, to ask you to look on the dark side of things, and to do so steadily, while I try to deal with the relation of just that darkness to the Absolute light of our idealistic hypothesis. If this universe of God is perfect, it nonetheless, as a matter of daily experience, has in it a vast, to our eyes an apparently endless collection of ugly, dark, sorrowful, hideous facts in it, -- of facts which it is the duty of every heroic soul to hate, of every righteous soul to make better where possible, of every tender soul to contemplate with pity, and of every intelligent soul to recognize, not indeed as ultimate realities, but as the hard and fast data that they are. Now these facts, not to be sure in their often ghastly and detestable detail, but in their general quality, I ask you, for the time, to face as Job faced them. These facts are our real text. I ask you not to ignore them. Their antithesis to the hypothetical perfection of God, is at the outset of our discussion, apparently unconquerable. I want you to dwell on that antithesis. Therefore it is the limitation of my paper that I am here to emphasize just what our more cheerful common sense often finds it most wholesome to ignore. To keep our weak selves from failure, many of us have to live upon a certain collection of deliberate self-deceptions as for instance such self-deceptions that, after all, our personal and private future fortune is sure to be pretty comfortable, whatever our past has been, or that most men have, on the whole, a fairly happy time, or that the average man succeeds in what he undertakes, or that sin, disease, death, degradation, oppression, weariness, despair, madness, wounded affection, and the other tortures of our finitude are comparatively exceptional phenomena. Now if I ask you for awhile, not in a mood

personal bitterness, but precisely in the lucid calm of philosophical meditation, to lay aside these self-deceptions, and to look the facts of life in the face, I do so not because I want you to cultivate your own private grief's, but, first, because it is simply humane to recognize the relative universality of finite sorrow, and, secondly, because whoever wants to discuss the problem of evil must come prepared for some very plain speech. I speak to men and women who have sorrowed. I speak of sorrow as it is. And herein following Job, I simply refuse to mince matters. Whoever wants the delights of the softer forms of optimism, had better keep out of philosophy.

First Essay: The Problem of Job (SGE 1-28)

Royce first published this article in *The New World* in 1897. ("The Problem of Job," *The New World*, 6 (1897): 261-81. See Part II, item 193 at page [285] below.)

The manuscript texts for the essay may be found in HARP Box 52. The text is compiled from two separate manuscripts, one that runs from pages 1 to 39, and another that is paginated 35 to 87. Section IV of the second manuscript (from the middle of page 35 to the middle of page 75) concludes this essay, "The Problem of Job." The first half of page 35, and the entire Section V (pages 75 to 87) have not been previously published.

In one of the more remarkable discoveries of the 2008-09 "dig" in the Harvard Archives Royce Papers, it has been found that this second manuscript, grouped with "The Problem of Job" papers in Box 52, in fact completes Lecture V of Royce's August Graham lecture series. Discussion of the evidence that substantiates this hypothesis may be found below in Part II, item 181, beginning at page __. Previously, Lecture V, as it was grouped with the other four Graham lectures in Boxes 67 and 68, appeared to exist in HARP only as a fragment, with page numbers running from 1 to 34.

This entry limits itself to a discussion of the essay, "The Problem of Job."

For the first 39 pages, the first manuscript related to this essay, no section marks appear in the MS, although in the book there are to this point sections I to IV. Then at the second page 35, the first section number -- either a "II" or a "IV" [indistinguishable] -- appears. Then at page 59, a second section "IV" appears. The section numbers in the MS do not correspond to the section numbers in the book.

Introduction through Section II

The MS and book run parallel. However, just before the end of Section III, page 36 in MS, and page 13 in the book, Royce deletes the following lines found in the MS from the published piece: "To sum up then: explanations of evil as due to finite free will or to ends produced [by] Karma, logically involve one hopeless dilemma, viz., either some agents suffer for and from the free will sins of other agents (but then such suffering is unjust and so far unexplained); or everybody suffers solely for his own sins, & then nobody can help his fellow [brother to the?] moral order [illegible]" (MS page 36)

From the end of MS page 39, ending "the logical solution of the problem of evil" (page 14 in the book), Royce picks up the second MS to start at book page 15 "In endeavoring to grapple ..."

BUT, this means that the previous paragraph in the book, starting with “The doctrine of philosophical idealism,” until the paragraph’s end “...just indicated as its answer to Job’s problem” is not found in the MS. In contrast, Royce’s second page 35 carries with it 10 lines of text that do not appear in the final book form. They simply run “presence. And such a spirit, I say ...” on to “clear to themselves.”

On MS page 41, Royce recounts having recently heard a Hindu story which is not contained in the book. It reads as follows:

“I lately met with a Hindoo story, one of the sort so often told against philosophers in all nations, –a story well-fitted to illustrate the logical state of every doctrine of the absolute illusoriness of any central type of experience. The great Hindoo commentator on the Vedanta system of philosophy, Sankara, taught just such a doctrine of the total illusoriness of all finite experience without exception. Finite joy and finite pain, nature and mortal mind, are for Sankara alike illusory. A Hindoo source narrates that during the philosopher’s life, enemies of Sankara’s person and doctrine, desiring to hold the sage up to the scorn which is so often the sage’s portion in the unlearned world, one day let loose an elephant, which charged, trumpeting, I suppose, at the philosopher. Thereupon the erudite commentator of the Vedanta system prudently ran away. But when he had escaped, the Scoffers approaching said: “Behold, all is illusion; yet you ran from the elephant, as if he were real. But Sankara replied, not altogether unskillfully: “It is true as you say. All – all is illusion. There was no true elephant, and, in very truth, I did not run. That too was illusion.” Well, even so with the doctrine, there is no evil, since evil is mortal error. One would next be forced to add that there is no mortal error, since that too as a source of ill is evil, and is therefore an illusion.” (MS 41-42)

On page 75 of the MS, the parallel of MS with book text ends with the phrase (which ends the essay in the book page 28) “...the truth of his eternity.” BUT the MS, however, continues from page 75 to 87 starting with the words “In concluding let us return to our theoretical problem for yet one moment and say a word as to the positive aspect of the theistic interpretation of the natural order.....” continuing to page 87 with this as the last sentence in the MS:

“We have not been evolved from dead nature, but as it were apart from the rest of the community of the city of God, whereto, after all, the Eternal Purpose binds us with sacred ties that we know not, save in so far as man be in general assured of the divine and transcendent harmony that amidst all the conflicts and separations link the spiritual world in one.” [The 13 page MS text of this unpublished conclusion is available in this Comprehensive Index’s Appendix B, item 3, below.]

Second Essay: The Case of John Bunyan (SGE 29-75)

Background

Box 101, folder 7 contains a small notebook with background on his essay “Notes on Bunyan.” The notebook’s opening page shows Royce is familiar with eleven sources on Bunyan’s life, starting with Allebone. Royce makes a note that Offer’s edition of Bunyan’s work is the best. Royce notes that Brown’s biography, in Venable’s opinion, is the most painstaking Bunyan biography.

The notebook contains Royce's notes while doing research on Bunyan.

Royce finds both McCauley's and Tane's accounts of Bunyan's visionary experiences (e.g. with "hobgoblins") as insufficient. Tane sees *Pilgrim's Progress* as a result of an "inflamed brain" and his early and other work is not recognized. The notebook reveals that Royce has done a prodigious amount of reading and research.

The manuscript for the *SGE* article on Bunyan does not appear to be extant in the Harvard papers.

Third Essay: Tennyson and Pessimism (SGE 76-88)

There is no indication in *SGE* where Royce originally presented this essay, nor does there appear to be a copy of the manuscript in HARP. Skrupskelis states that the essay was first published in the *Harvard Monthly*, 3 (1886-87):127-37.

Compare Royce's essay "Pessimism and Modern Thought" in the *Berkeley Quarterly* in 1881 (see *BWJR* 2:1176). A partial manuscript for this second essay is in folder 5, Box 105. Although section II of this article is titled "Pessimism and Modern Poetry," there is no mention of Tennyson, nor any other detectable similarity to this third essay. Both essays witness to Royce's grappling with the issue of pessimism during his instructor period at Berkeley.

Fourth Essay: The Knowledge of Good and Evil (SGE 89-124)

Of this essay, Royce writes: "The idealistic theory of the meaning of evil, here gets again presented, but this time in reference to the delicate ethical question as to how far 'the knowledge of evil' contributes to moral perfection." [*SGE* viii] Royce sees this question as leading to a study of the metaphysical issue, "namely, that of the ethical interpretation of reality, both human and extra-human an interpretation hindered... by the general presuppositions of modern naturalism and the essential limitations of the human type of consciousness [e.g. our human time span]." (*ibid.* ix)

Royce attempts here "to explain some of the relations between moral and intellectual development," trying to avoid controversy with Professor Georg Simmel.

The problem is "to what extent does our experience of evil add to our intellectual ability?"

Royce notes as a complex question, but offers only a tentative response

Moral goodness as an attainment "is only won through a conflict with the forces of evil, which involves a pretty deep knowledge of evil."

HARP does not appear to include this manuscript.

Fifth Essay: Natural Law, Ethics, and Evolution (SGE 125-139)

Royce's contribution to a discussion in response to the "well-known address of Prof. Huxley." (footnote at *SGE* 125) Royce's paper was published in the *International Journal of Ethics* in July 1895.

[cf. *The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy (1881)]

Royce writes this as a young man, and new teacher. The Fifth *SGE* essay does not precisely track this earlier 1881 MS “The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy,” a MS originally bound with “Logic as an English Study” and “Matter and Consciousness.” [See Box 60] Yet there are clear echoes of the first in this *SGE* chapter. There is in fact a great development and refinement in the later essay, written about fifteen years later. For instance, see Royce’s introduction (dated August 19, 1902) and notes to John Fiske’s *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*. [BWJR 2:1205-06]

In the 1881 evolution piece [Box 60], Royce acknowledges some wish to make evolutionary theory into a basic philosophical position. He wants to test whether it deserves that rank. (1-5) Pages 6-39 are missing. Section II of the MS begins at page 40, with the heading “Evolution as a Philosophical Doctrine.”

Royce’s analysis: “Science is very far from universality.” (42) “Any assertion about the world as a whole must be tested by philosophy, and cannot otherwise be tested.” (44) Royce offers two possibilities of evolution: endless growth or endless retrogression. If the latter is true, evolution is not a cheerful doctrine. (51) “Evolution is not an ethically important doctrine” as it lacks the presence of the eternal. (53) From a philosophical viewpoint, difficulties in evolution as a doctrine arise from “infinite time, infinite space, and infinite series of causes.” (54) Royce refers to Spencer’s principles. Spencer counters with Wundt’s hypothesis. (65-66)

In light of issues of infiniteness, Royce comes to the conclusion that “[t]he world cannot be a theatre of endless evolution,” and therefore is not tenable as a philosophical doctrine. But if we suppose infinite space, mass, time, “then the evidence in favor of the law of universal evolution breaks down. This evidence is founded upon these physical laws, and amounts to nothing of [illegible] are not accurate.” (75)

According to Royce, this leaves us with the following possible evolutionary doctrines.

“(1) The history of the universe is a series of rhythmic alternations of evolution and retrogression“; “(2) The universe tends toward some stationary condition of stable moving equilibrium ... (3) The universe, as the result of a creative fiat, has no infinite duration, and develops or retrogrades just as its creator may desire.” (76-77)

On page 80, Royce inserts a German excerpt from his own notebook into his MS.

Royce calls the 1881 MS a “fragmentary sketch.” (86) He notes that the creation hypothesis, from a philosophic light, “solves difficulties only by creating new and simply tremendous difficulties.” (87)

Near the close of the MS, Royce “the greatest weakness of evolution as a philosophical doctrine is first in this, that it is a doctrine using a very few meager conceptions as materials for building a philosophic scheme of reality”, and they are ill-handled. “After all the question, What is the world? Will always be more important than the question “Whence comes and whether goes the world?” The evolutionary philosophy, in Royce’s view, has nothing to say about What is the world. (92)

“There is in fact very little connection between the *Origin of Species* and the meaning of life. My conclusion is that evolution has very little importance for general philosophy.” (94)

Royce objects to making science into philosophy, and also to the “inquisitorial intolerance” that disciples of Spencer (in his opinion) promote. Royce rebels against positions responding to evolution that grow out of Calvinism and the Athanasian Creed, strongly asserting his desire for “freedom of thought.”

A year earlier, on September 19, 1880, Royce writes William James to “beware of *Grant Allen*.” (*emphasis in original*) [Royce to WJ, *Letters* 90]

Sixth Essay: The Implications of Self-Consciousness (SGE 140-168)

Royce refers to this essay’s topic as “[t]he grounds upon which the idealistic interpretation of the world depends.” (*SGE* iv) “An effort to set forth in brief some of the evidence for an idealistic interpretation of the nature of reality.” (140)

Royce claims the essential features of this article are identical with chapter 7 in *RAP* and pages 368-380 in *SPM*. [140, *see also BWJR* 2:1189] Royce says he offered this doctrine in a more extended form in *Conception of God* in 1897.

The essay as it appears here is practically identical with an article Royce published in *The New World* (June 1892) 289-310.

Royce calls the argument in this essay “merely a suggestion,” or “an effort to make a beginning.” “I’m attracted by a train of thought to which the whole of modern philosophy seems to me to lead.” (*SGE* 166)

Apart from the basic arguments, but regarding the textual content, there seems to be no identification between the 1892 text here reprinted and the text of the supplementary to *CG* (1897).

Questions:

1. If Royce had already gotten his arguments as clear as he had in the first *Implications* article, why did he present a loosely organized argument (punctured by Howison) in 1895?
2. Why did he not mention it more in his “Supplementary Essay” 1897 to *CG*?

Seventh Essay: Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness (SGE 169-197)

This originated as a paper read before the Medico-Psychological Association of Boston March 21, 1894. Royce gave a version of this paper on September 4, 1895 at Berkeley. Royce regards this essay as novel in so far as here he applies his “theoretical consideration to the study of the pathological variations of self-consciousness.” (182)

Box 97 contains a four page manuscript entitled “Suggestions Concerning the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness” a significant note for the structure of the papers following the *Conception of God* lecture. Royce writes on this four page MS, “I refer here [in this MS] to the psychological paper on the ‘Anomalies of Self-Consciousness’, - a paper read to the Union immediately after the previous philosophical paper of this series on ‘The Conception of Will in

its Relation to the Absolute.” (page 4)

Royce calls this essay “altogether an empirical study necessary as a preliminary to make comprehensible my position in the third paper a reflectively philosophical study.” By “the third paper,” Royce means “Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature,” the Eighth Essay below. Royce also called this 8th Essay “Consideration on the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness.” [See FMO, *SGE* 169; *Letters* 336, n.157] [*cf.* Manuscripts on Self-Consciousness, Box 97, Documents 7-11]

Some significant quotes:

“For a man is self-conscious in so far as he has formed habits of regarding, remembering, estimating, and guiding himself.... If a man regards himself, as this individual Ego, he always sets over against his Ego something else, viz.” some particular object represented by a portion of his conscious states, and known to him as his then present and interesting non-Ego.... Accordingly, I then exist for myself, as the beheld of all beholders, the model.” (180)

“... Conscience is then the colder non-Ego, the voice of humanity, or of God.”

Beyond fragmented references in the “Self-Consciousness Manuscripts” [Box 97, documents 7-11], HARP does not appear to have the original MS for this Seventh Essay.

Eighth Essay: Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature (SGE 198-248)

This paper was read before the Philosophical Club of Brown University, May 23, 1895, and later considerably enlarged and supplemented. The paper deals with issues of human consciousness and nature.

Royce calls a version of this paper “Considerations on the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness (with a few hints on the possibility of immortality)” and regards it as needing the previous empirical study [i.e. Royce’s 2nd Talk after *CG*] “as a preliminary to make comprehensible my position [here]” [Royce to GHH, *Letters* 335][See FMO’s copy of *SGE* page 198 for references to *Letters* 336 and to footnotes explaining alternate titles and sites of deliveries of these lectures.]

The heart of the essay is indicated in Section II, where Royce summarizes his six theses, all of which tend to “a sort of universal sociology” (206) implied by evolutionary doctrine. “... [T]he history of the differentiation of one colony [our earth], as it were, of the universal society from the parent social order of the finite world in its wholeness.” (207) The rest of the article is a detailed argument and defense of his six theses.

Beyond fragmented references in the “Self-Consciousness Manuscripts” listed below, HARP does not appear to have the original MS for this Seventh Essay.

Ninth Essay: Originality and Consciousness (SGE 249-260)

First published in *The Harvard Monthly* June 1887. The essay entails a “supplementary statement concerning certain general aspects of the nature of human consciousness” (SGE xi) Royce focuses on the tragedy of good and evil, as it is connected with the limitation of the span of human consciousness. If this span were to be lifted, Royce feels that we would grasp the whole of what we actually mean from our finite point of view.

“[O]ur own finite meaning does not become perfectly clear to us, and our own conscious processes are not themselves to their own very depths, presented to our fleeting finite moments of consciousness.” He clarifies that we are thus “hindered by this mere narrowness of the moment’s view of its own sense, and not by any gulf which separates us from real Things in Themselves.” (xii)

There does not appear to be a manuscript for this essay in HARP.

Tenth Essay: Meister Eckhart (SGE 261-297)

In Germany, 1875-76, Royce studied Middle German in order to read Meister Eckhart’s sermons. In this essay, Royce relies on early translations of these sermons. Later, he will confess the more scholarly editions, both of the theological doctrines and also the sermons, according to the Latin treatises, were created Fr. Denifle. Royce confesses felt limitations in writing this essay.

He did believe, however, that Meister Eckhart had been neglected by philosophical students writing in English. The key of this article for Royce are the intimate relations that must always exist between philosophical idealism and traditional mysticism, which, Royce holds, may not be identified. Royce points out the practical danger of “seeking a human’s relation to the absolute in holy, remote realms, apart from concrete human experience.” (SGE xiii) For a direct immediate grasp of the absolute, our human consciousness would have to be “transformed.”

Unquestionable for Royce, the idealist and the mystic have much in common, and mysticism has kept alive the sense of intimacy of our human relation to the divine reality.

Viewing Meister Eckhart as a practical advisor of his disciples and hearers, Royce feels that hardly a word need be added to transform Eckhart’s practical doctrine into “willingness to accept finitude, even while seeing in finite life an infinite meaning - a willingness which is to my mind the very essence of the idealistic spirit.” (SGE xiv)

Notes from Royce’s German student days may be found in Box 120, folder 1. Otherwise, there do not appear to be manuscripts related to this essay in HARP.

Eleventh Essay: An Episode of Early California Life: The Squatter Riot of 1850 in Sacramento (SGE 298-348)

Royce relied on his California documents from folders 3 and 4 in Box 107 as background for this address. He originally sent the original manuscript to the *Overland Monthly*, vol. VI September 1885 (second series) no. 53, pages 225-46.

In the *Overland Monthly* article, there is a relatively brief introduction crediting his sources, giving tribute to H.H. Bancroft. Because Royce assumed that his reader audience for the *Overland Monthly* was generally quite familiar with the history of the early California settlers, he had no need to set the historical context for them. However, when Royce republished the article in *SGE*, almost fifteen years later, he recognized he had a very different audience. Hence, in a five page orientation to the Chapter (pages 298 through 302), he introduced his audience to the historical and political background to set the scene. He concluded this Preliminary Note, however, with the very first paragraph of his *Overland Monthly* article, substantially as it had originally appeared.

SGE adds paragraph at 337 before Section V that is not included in the *Overland* article, beginning with “What other squatters thought ...” and ending with “He was himself present at the fight and speaks authoritatively.”

SGE adds two sentences at the end of first incomplete paragraph, top of 341: “But the armed men displayed their weapons freely, and were ready for whatever might result. Thus everything was done to tempt disaster.

SGE keeps but completely revises the first full paragraph at 341 that tells of the confrontation with the Mayor. At the bottom of this page, Royce revises details about those killed, from “three squatters” in *Overland* article to “two squatters and one of the citizens’ party” in *SGE*.

At 342 in *SGE*, Royce inserts four sentences after the first sentence of the second complete paragraph. On page 343, at the paragraph beginning “As a fact, Royce has made deep cuts in the *Overland* article. It picks up again with “Their late attorney ...”

At 346, Royce cuts a sentence from the *Overland* article, “And soon the cholera and then the winter, closed the autumn scene” at the end of the first full paragraph.

In sum, significant editing has occurred in the *SGE* text.

The Harvard Archives does not possess the original manuscript for this essay.

Twelfth Essay: Jean Marie Guyau (SGE 349-84)

This paper was delivered to the *Cercle Français* of Harvard University in the Fogg Museum, March 18, 1896, (see *Crimson* March 19, 1896) Guyau had written *Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, Paris 1885. He concerned himself with the true form of moral consciousness.

Guyau was educated by Alfred Fouillée, a contemporary French philosopher. By this essay, Royce attempts to introduce Guyau to his audience. Royce cites Guyau as criticizing English empiricism. “Think about your pleasures too much and they will please you less.” Royce notes: “the merely scrupulous join to their other instinct the instinct to reflect.” (An obvious reference to Bunyan.)

Royce presents Guyau as a clear, honest thinker who combines these qualities with an affectionate nature that he never paraded, but did express.

Significantly, this essay shows Royce working with emotions and deep feelings, e.g., consideration of Guyau's affectionate interactions with his wife. (*SGE* 368) Guyau holds that the most profound things in us are our instincts.

There do not appear to be original manuscripts related to this essay.

17. *Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems* (New York: Macmillan, 1908)

Of this volume, Royce says in his Preface that it “attempts to be,--a series of illustrations prepared in the course of number of years, but all bearing upon the application of a certain philosophical doctrine and spirit to some problems of American life.” [*RPQ* viii-ix] Royce adds that his mention of the Japanese more than once in these essays, [along] with the characterization of their national spirit (occurring in the essay on “Provincialism) “here appears substantially unchanged.” [*id.*, ix]

a. “Race Questions and Prejudices” (1-53) Box 47

Of this essay, Royce writes in his preface to *RPQ* (vi) that in this essay, Royce tried to express and justify, in the special case of the race problems, the spirit which I have elsewhere defined as “loyalty to loyalty.”

A 76-page MS (adds 14a-c, combines pages 9&10), in six sections. Some pages fresh, some formerly drafted as follows: 1-14 are fresh pages. 14a-14b are previously drafted pages, 14c-40 are clean pages, 41-62 are previously drafted 62. Starts section six. 63-73 clean. Last page 74 is redrafted.

Published in *International Journal of Ethics*, xvi, 1906, 265-288. From a paper delivered to the Chicago Ethical Society in 1905.

The published version in *RQP* very faithfully follows this MS.

The text deals with the issue of how illusions play a role in race prejudices.

Page 9/10, Royce confesses that as a student of ethics he has “been a good deal baffled trying to discover just what the results of science are regarding the true psychological and moral meaning of race-differences.

Royce recognizes that the scientists of the *Rassentheoretiker* (race theorists) frequently use

science to support their prejudices. “Therefore I cannot use scientific results, but begin with events I have experienced.” (14) He begins with a story about Japan, then moves to the “Southern question” (19), i.e., “[t]he very constant and explicit insistence upon keeping the negro in his proper place, as a social inferior.” (20) He then considers how the British dealt differently with the race question in Jamaica. (21) White people may move freely among the black population on the island. “The negro is on the whole neither painfully obtrusive in his public manners, nor in need of being sharply kept in his place.” (25) “Yet there is no doubt whatever that English white men are the essential controllers of the essential destiny of the country.” (25-26)

“Administration has done the larger half of solving Jamaica’s race problem.” (29) Royce also cites “reticence” as a productive element: “Superiority is best shown by good deed and by few boasts.” (32)

In the East Indies, Royce notes the British used native peoples as constabularies. (33)

Page 63 of the MS, page 47 of the printed text, the last paragraph on the page begins “Now, the mutual antipathies ...” in the MS, but “Now, the mental antipathies ...” in the book. The MS is pretty clearly “mutual.”

(71)

The effect of social training on the race problem: “Our social training largely consists in the elimination, or in the intensification, or in the systematizing of these original reactions through the influence of suggestion and habit.” (71)

Royce concludes as follows:

“I have said little or nothing, in this paper of human justice. I have spoken mainly of human illusions. We all have illusions, and hug them. Let us not sanctify them by the name of science. For my part then, I am a member of the human race, and that this is a race which is, as a whole, considerably lower than the angels, so that the whole of it very badly needs race elevation. In this need of my race I personally and very deeply share. And it is in this spirit only that I am able to approach our problem.”

At the end of the MS, page 74, Royce adds in red ink “Harvard University Josiah Royce” (This is not in the book.) Then, having used a previously used page, he deletes the following lines evidently intended for another article:

“So much, merely by way of a confession of my personal limitations, at the outset of the discussion. But not for a word as what has led me to undertake in your presence a discussion for which my own learning has rather ill-prepared me. I shall not confine myself merely to general principles. My attention has been attracted to the general problems by the different lessons that experience has taught me regarding [illegible]. II. I have been [illegible] interested, of late year, in the work [text breaks off]”

b. “Provincialism: A Plea for Stronger Local Sentiment to Restrain National Heedlessness” [subtitle of original pamphlet] (55-108)

Royce delivered this address at the commencement of the Iowa Alpha chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa in Iowa City on June 10, 1902. It was published in the *Boston Evening Transcript* June 30, 1902 page 32. It was reprinted with extensive additions as “Provincialism” in *RQP*. Royce’s additions to the *Transcript* text -- some a sentence, some a paragraph, some two pages or more -- suggest how much he has read and learned in the six years between 1902 and 1908 (the publication date of *RQP*). The additions occur as follows:

In 1909, Royce published another study entitled “Provincialism Based on Early Conditions in California,” *Putnam’s Magazine*, 7 (1909).

The *Transcript* article is titled: “Provincialism: A Plea for Stronger Local Sentiment to Restrain National Heedlessness.” It does not have numbered sections marked, as does the book. Small changes in diction and connectives are not indicated.

RQP edition has an introductory sentence lacking in the *Transcript* article: “I propose, in this address, to define certain issues Make both prominent and critical.” (57)

On page 58 of *RQP* The sentence “Thus the ‘provincialism’ applies Maintains these habits” is added. Then, Royce inserts from “This word, however ... “ at the bottom of 58 to the top of 61 “.... organized politically a province must be..“ as new material in *RQP*. Then the rest of *RQP* section 1 follows the *Transcript*.

The second paragraph of *Transcript* begins section II of the *RQP* chapter, without the *RQP* introductory sentences: “I have defined the term used as my title. But now in what sense do I propose to make provincialism our topic?”

In the *Transcript*, after the sentence ending “...able to fulfill (64 *RQP*), Royce deletes from *Transcript* the sentence: “For the great modern nation has developed new social dangers.” Several lines down, Royce deletes the clause “...in order to contend against these new social dangers” after the words “highly organized provincial life.” (64 *RQP*)

On page 65 *RQP*, Royce adds several sentences to *Transcript* text, after “.... following discussion.” These lines begin with “My main intention is in the wholesome sense provincial.”

At the end of section II (page 66 *RQP*), after sentence ending “...henceforth grow together,” Royce adds about 20 lines, to the end of section II (page 67 *RQP*).

Section III (sections are marked in the *Transcript* article with slash marks, but no numbers), begins with an extra phrase in *RQP*: “With this programme in mind”

On page 69 bottom, after “....for his community.” Royce inserts one long sentence in *RQP* beginning “A sound instinct, therefore, The advantages of his community.” to the *Transcript* text.

On page 70 top, after "...in my own state, Royce adds three sentences, beginning with "How swiftly.... History of our own." to the *Transcript* text.

On the bottom of 70, Royce adds "Such a foundation object of pride" (71) to the *Transcript* text

On page 71, Royce adds sentence "In fact, that we all do thus glorify ... for ourselves."

At the bottom of 72, the *Transcript* article ends its section with "... the Australasian colonies." Royce adds to *RQP* a page and a half of text to finish the book's section III.

On page 75, Royce deletes from the *Transcript* text the sentence "The great modern nation expresses today far too much the results of such a process." To the *Transcript* text, Royce adds in *RQP* several sentences ("The independence of the small trader moral destiny as an individual." (76)

On page 78, at end of first paragraph (continued from previous page), Royce adds the sentence "Hence he tends to lose independence of spirit."

Royce ends section differently in *Transcript* and *RQP*. The differences occur at the bottom of page 79 in *RQP* after the sentence ending "...besetting his life at every turn."

Section V (page 80 *RQP*) adds text to *Transcript* article after "... may accomplish," through to "...Le Bon characterizes" on page 81.

Royce adds to the beginning of the first full paragraph on page 81 several sentences to the *Transcript* text, from "I use the term 'mob-spirit'" to "...more strictly normal social activities." (82)

At the top of 84, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "...a helpless member," and up to ".... or even of ignorant persons" on 85.

On page 86, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "...of the mob-spirit" and up to "They cannot be safe rulers." on page 87.

On page 89, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "... may get embodied," through page 90 and most of 91, up through "... suggestions of the moment," returning to the *Transcript* text with "If follows that ... " **This is a significant addition as it pertains to Royce's recognition of the power of language, and its usage.**

On page 93, Royce adds one sentence in the *RQP* text regarding literature: "Consider modern literature with its disposition to portray any form of human life ... "

On page 94, Royce inserts a large addition, beginning with "The result is that modern mobs ... " and up to (on page 95) to paragraph beginning "Yet, as we have seen ... "

On page 96, at the end of section V, Royce closes with an addition sentence: “The lesson would then be: Keep the province awake, that the nation may be saved from the disastrous hypnotic slumber so characteristic of excited masses of mankind.”

On page 96, after the first sentence of the section, Royce inserts about 25 lines to the *Transcript* text, from “As I review ...” up through “... in common with Schiller’s words” on page 97.

At the top of page 98, Royce adds two sentences to the end of the *Transcript* paragraph ending “... in the provincial life,” with “The nation by itself ... save the individual.”

On page 99, Royce adds one sentence after “worthless abstraction.” (“We love the world better when we cherish our own friends the more faithfully. We do not grow in grace by forgetting individual duties in behalf of remote social enterprises.”

At the bottom of 99, Royce adds several sentences and a new paragraph to the *Transcript* text, from “... own unique wisdom” through “... of which I have spoken.”

From mid- page 101 (“... in our hands”) to mid-page 102 (“... our human weakness“), Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text.

At the top of 103, after “...you the learner,” Royce inserts several sentences before the next paragraph.

On bottom of page 103, Royce inserts one sentence “They seemed to be adopting ...”, then after “... independence of spirit” inserts a couple more sentences through page 104, up through “...to remain themselves.”

On page 106, after “...in the service of their home,” to page 107 “... and most active of their young men,” Royce adds a page and a half of material to the *Transcript* text.

On page 107, after “... nobility, dignity and beauty”, Royce writes a completely different ending for *RQP* from the concluding paragraph in the *Transcript* text.

Royce says of this essay that in it he discusses “in general terms the need and uses of that spirit [of provincialism] in our American life. “ (vi)

In the article published in *RQP* Royce says “My thesis is that, in the present state of the world’s civilization, and of the life of our own country, the time has come to emphasize, with a new meaning and intensity, the positive value, the absolute necessity for our welfare, of a wholesome provincialism, as a saving power to which the world in the near future will need more and more to appeal.” (*RQP* 62) In his Preface to *RPQ*, Royce says that while he could only sketch provincialism in *PL*, in this essay, he continued “the study which first took form in my volume on the history of California ... in 1886.”

He mentions our having to deal with “very grave evils due to false forms of provincialism.” (63)

But he also discusses “an enlightened provincialism.” (*see e.g. RQP Preface vii*)

[A copy of the *Transcript* article should be compared the book-published version to try to find what the “extensive additions“ Royce made after giving the address 1902, but before he published *RQP* in 1908, including this revised essay.]

c. “On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America” (111-65)

HARP MS is found in Box71, 88 pages in five sections. There are no cross-hatched page numbers. (Pages 28-29 are combined into one page.) The MS text is only slightly edited. Royce rolls along. Page 1-7 appear to be old, brown pages of manuscript. Pages 8-15 are a lighter colored paper. Then at page 16, the pages are again the darker brown up to 59. Pages 60-64 are again the lighter paper. Page 65 to the end at page 88, return to the darker brown paper. Page 87 is marked with unique marginalia. Manuscript tentatively dated 1897-1899 in the tentative finding aid. The MS may be earlier. But it must be dated post-1890, given references (at page 63-64) to William James’s chapter on “Habit” in *The Principles of Psychology*.

Section I:

On page 4 of the MS, fourth line, after “But elsewhere ...” Royce inserts qualifying phrase: “found home [tentative reading] the consequences of long continued and oppressive, sometimes...” then back to the word “militarism” in the text.

On page 6, after sentence ending “...regions of our American life”, Royce inserts and qualifies the next sentence: “Side by side with the excesses of mere luxury, you find among our people [a true ... ?] love - a self-sacrificing and intelligent love of the beautiful for its own sake. Side by side, with the misuse of money you observe the frequent [mention?] of the great deeds that wealth can do. Nor is this all. An ardent and often successful struggle for social reform, and a civic pride that aims, at even sometimes from the very depths of municipal degradation, at the accomplishment of great and honorable public services....”

On page 9, middle, in sentence on Mr. Henry George, Royce qualifies the MS “of his progress and poverty,” “A man quite unknown to the national at large, - a California newspaper man, with no serious authority to teach concerning economic problems. His book received at the time of its appearance little or no support from the professional economists., and excited at first, I believe, little very close attention from their side. George himself needs [?] no party manager. He used hardly any stirring devices for attracting popular attention. He was simply in earnest. Yet we all know now the sect of his followers has grown.”

At bottom of page 10, speaking of Mr. Bellamy, after “Mr. Bellamy’s book” Royce replaces his first description “plan of social salvation” with the title *Looking Backward*.

Page 15, middle, Royce revises a new paragraph “As a consequence, if new sects thus easily find followers, and often faithful and permanent followers, there is also the other side of the picture. There are those of our people who waste life in merely floating from doctrine to doctrine. In such minds, the art of holding fast has wholly been lost”

At top of 16, Royce edit's the first full sentence: "The more ardent amongst such people grow enthusiastic upon every new occasion where they listen to more what they cannot comprehend. The more disillusioned find the novelties in doctrine more or less of a bore, just as some always plays and parties tedious."

Section II:

On page 34, middle, after his sketch of the strong points of "the typical American," Royce summarizes his shortcomings, "In brief, he begins his new settlements by a feverish endeavoring to ruin the landscape. Now all this he does not at all because he is a mere materialist, but as [an old gold miner goes to work?], just because mere nature is as such [vaguely?] unsatisfactory to his soul, because what is merely found must never content us, and because our present life itself is felt to be not yet ideal. Hence the fond desire is to change, to disturb, to bring the new with us." This paragraph is part of Royce's "tale of too many of our newer communities." (39)

Section IV:

On page 56, middle, Royce inserts in a very small hand after "to win others to these ideals. Or against some lovers of the ideal even when they propose not to argue, but to be followers of intuition, still in many cases are too fond of [illegible phrase] or catch [illegible]. Such mistake facts for eternal truths."

Royce recalls and carefully relates, with important psychological detail, an incident regarding a violinist friend from the music Conservatory during his student days in Leipzig. (57-)

At 61-62, Royce unveils his autobiographical sketch of himself as a reasoner, but never as mere reasoner, in the following words. "I am indeed not nearly so much of a reasoner as I desire to be. My skill in this art is far below my ambition. Moreover, poor as I am, reasoning is indeed my own art. I love it. I prize it. I cultivate it. It is a great part of my life. And yet, -- and yet I still insist: - let that reasoner, that thoughtful lover of ideals, that philosopher, if such there be, let him be confounded who cannot do anything but reason. 'And in the same way I say to you of the thoughtful public: woe unto the man or woman who can do nothing but be thoughtful. Yet why do I utter this warning in your presence? Pedantry it will be said, is a disease of professors and of bookish men....'" Royce concludes his autobiographical sketch with "The love of abstract formulas, of mere phrases, or of falsely simplified thought processes, is not confined to the professors." (62)

An interesting story follows of the young lady asked to comment on William James's chapter on "Habits," in his *Principles of Psychology* (63-64).

On page 87, the marginal addition reads as follows: "In brief then I say to our thoughtful public, overcome your limitations, first by minute and faithful study of a few writings and by clearness of ideas about them. Then by childlike simplicity in the rest of life, by faithfulness to enlightened leaders, by resignation as opposed to restlessness and above all business [continuing on page 88] rather than by idle curiosity. Organize a willingness to recognize that we must often differ in insight, and that what we need is to do something together. Avoid this restless longing for mere variety. Learn to wait, to believe in more than you see, and to love not what is old or

new, but what is eternal.” This ends the manuscript.

d. “The Pacific Coast: A Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilization” (RQP 167-225)

In his preface to *RQP* Royce describes this essay as “sketching ... the bases upon which rests that particular form of provincialism to which I, as a native Californian, personally owe most.” This address was prepared for the National Geographic Society in 1898.

There are some parallels between this later article of 1898 and his earlier article, circa 1884-85, “The Opening of the Great West.” (Box 92) Yet while Royce does bring up factors like climate and terrain in the earlier article, he does much more so and more directly in this “Pacific Coast” article.

e. “Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America” (RQP 227-87)

This essay closes *RQP*. Royce writes in the preface (v-vi): “The closing essay of the present volume contains in fact a summary of the theses upon which my “Philosophy of Loyalty” is based, as well as a direct application of these theses to a special practical problem of our recent education.”

Royce gave this address before the Boston Physical Education Society in the spring of 1907 (Royce to George Platt Brett, July 14, 1908, *Letters* 524) “It sketched my views on ‘Loyalty’ applying them to the problems of the physical trainer.” (*ibid.*)

**18. *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1911)
Box 29**

a. “William James and the Philosophy of Life” (WJO 3-45)

Phi Beta Kappa Oration delivered at Harvard University, June 19, 1911.

Box 29, a 65 page MS (counting page 53(a)) in four sections, mostly freshly written pages, but few previously drafted pages, as follows:

1-11 fresh pages

12-13 are previously drafted

14-18 are fresh

19 was previously drafted

20-46 are fresh

47-52 are previously drafted

53-64 are fresh

Only slightly edited; no easily detectable major deletions.
Nothing but brief stylistic variations between the MS and the printed text in *WJO*.

The third document in Box 29 consists of a 26 page typescript, slightly edited, of the 65 page MS.

Evaluation: This deserves to be in the critical edition.

b. “Loyalty and Insight” (*WJO* 49-95)

Box 29, a 68 (including 16(a) and (b) page MS, not divided into sections. A typescript of the MS is also included in Box 29. (There are no edits to the typescript.) Except for pages 1-16(a), the MS consists of previously drafted (and renumbered) sheets. (A 33 page typescript, slightly edited, is also found in Box 104, folder 3.)

Pages 1-16(a) - are fresh

Pages 16(b) - 67 he is revising previously written pages.

Royce views this essay as a summary of *PL* (*WJO* Preface at vii.)

A commencement address delivered at Simmons College Boston, in June 1910. Wells notes that Royce also gave this address at Kansas University on June 8, 1910.

Royce delivered the address *after* his near final draft of *SRI* on insight, and his Smith College lectures of 1910, as well as after three years of trying to save Christopher, mentally and physically. The address is given three months before the deaths of William James and Christopher. Royce feels like the Job he quotes here at 64.

Pages 1 and 2: Initial penciling adjustments to identification of College.

Pages 6 to 14 in the MS (52-58 in the printed text is one paragraph by Royce. He calls this long paragraph his “bare indication of what I mean by loyalty.” 14 of MS, 58 of text.

On page 51-52 of the MS, page 85 of the *WJO* text, Royce adds emphasis (italics) to “that human experience has, or can by the loyal...” through “of any set of detached observers, however large.”

On page 23 of the MS, he deletes these words: “But the further pressing question is this of the philosophy of life which result from this situation are well know to you. In my opening lecture I indicated them.”

On page 25 of the MS, he deletes: “Such are the problems that at the close of our opening lecture, I emphasized as the central problems of the philosophy of life, as its task is today defined.”

On page 26, Royce deletes: “In talking about a purely human and practical ideal I seem then to

have been simply avoiding problems about reality. I have said nothing about how this ideal is related to nature's mechanism. I have not founded the doctrine of loyalty upon any express theory of the ultimate nature of the universe. I have had nothing to say regarding the old conflict between natural science and superstitions."

On page 27, Royce deletes, in reference to the so-called conflict between science and religion: "[that conflict] It has been presented so far simply as a moral doctrine, as a solution for the personal question: How can I plan my life wisely, if indeed nature gives me any chance to plan and to live at all. [new paragraph] But now in this concluding lecture I have indeed to take a further step. I have ..."

On page 34, Royce deletes: "In order to make plain what I here have in mind, I must call your attention to matters which have been, in part, incidental to my former discussions but which must now for the first time in these lectures appear in their true light."

Evaluation: These deletions appear not merely for the sake of proper linkage, but hint that originally these sheets were drafted for a concluding lecture in something like the problem of loyalty itself.

c. "What is Vital in Christianity?" (WJO 99-183)

Prepared for a series of addresses to the Young Men's Christian Association of Harvard University in 1909. Royce gave the three conferences composing this text on March 18, 25 and April 9, 1909.

The manuscript for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents.

d. "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion" (WJO 187-254)

An address before the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, in September, 1908.

The MS for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents. **There is, however, an "outline and sketch" for The Problem of Truth address in Box 111, folder 3, Document 2.**

**e. "Immortality" (WJO 257-298) [Box 48]
(see also section IV in Appendix B, below)**

To find the final manuscript of this lecture as printed in *WJO*, go to Box 48 for a 78 page manuscript, written on entirely fresh pages, may be found. The footnote to the essay title in *WJO* reads "An address prepared for an Association of Clergymen in March 1906." The name of that group was Congregational Ministers' Association in Boston. Royce deletes the first 4 ½ pages from the MS for the final version of the text printed in *WJO*.

The Box 48 Immortality MS runs parallel to the published version in *WJO*, except for the deletion in the latter of the introduction for the Congregational Ministers.

19. *War and Insurance: Manuscripts, Published Book, Memorandum, and New York Times Article*

Box 51, Documents 2 & 4; Box 104, folders 8, 9 & 11; and Box 127, folder 33. plus some more fragments:

1. Box 108, folder 1.

Four fragments, three of one page each, one four page manuscript (“18-21”) - shows Royce straining to organize ideas for his address “Interpretation of the Present Crisis.”

2. Box 97, document 1.

A 15-page manuscript, beginning at page 14. The themes are taken up in *W&I*, sections four and five, with special emphasis on the idea of mediation. MS text does not parallel the book *W&I*, but has themes repeated in the postponed address, “The Spirit of the Community.”

Fragments 1 and 2 above show no parallel with the *W&I* text published by Macmillan in 1914.

BUT MSS of Royce’s 40-paged “Introduction” to *W&I* (pp. ix-xlvii) and of his 5 “Notes” to *W&I* (pp. 83-96) seem non-extant in HARP.

Context: To discover the development and refinement of Royce’s thought on this application of Peirce’s theory of interpretation to the special case of war and peace, it is very helpful to follow the chronological order of these successive ever-tentative writings on this topic from 1914 to 1916.

Tentative Chronology of Royce’s writing and publishing on this topic. (For Royce’s initial chronology, see his “Preface” to *W&I*, iii-vi.)

July 1914: Royce in Berkeley, gives 6 lectures in Summer School, on “processes of interpretation” and “communities of interpretation,” on the importance of the writings of C. S. Peirce (recently deceased) and on Royce’s recent “insight into the thought of CSP.” (*W&I*, iii-v; *JRLW* 2: 1-59)

August 1, 1914: WWI breaks out. Royce lays aside his planned major address to Berkeley’s Philosophical Union—a paper on mediation which he entitled, “The Spirit of the Community.” He tries to meet the changed situation by creating a new application of CSP’s triadic thought

through a study he called an “Interpretation of the Present Crisis.”¹³ By nurturing international insurance he aimed to meet national tragedies like war, earthquakes, famine, etc., and to alleviate them in the future.

August 2-27, 1914: Royce in and around Los Gatos, CA, writing many drafts on his changed topic, *W&I*.

August 27, 1914: Royce delivers his then final sketch, yet ever tentative, to the Philosophical Union at UCB. It deals “with problems about which I have had to think in new ways since August 1.” [*Life*, 362]

Ca. September 3, 1914: Royce leaves California and returns to Cambridge, Mass.

September 15, 1914: Royce dates his Preface to *War and Insurance* (*W&I*, iii-v) and about this time drafts his long, often overlooked “Introduction” to the book *W&I*, pages ix-xlvi; i.e., 40 pages in the printed text—and not to be confused with *W&I*, pp 1-3, Royce’s first 3 pages introductory to Section I.

October 1914: *War and Insurance* is published, “this first outline sketch of our plan” [*W&I*, 70-71]

December 5, 1914: David Starr Jordan, Chair of Peace Day Committee, invites Royce to be a member of this member of this member of this Society. Royce responds by penning his Memorandum to the International Insurance Congress, and mails it to Jordan. [*JRLW* 2: 197-203]

December 26, 1914: Royce replies to a reviewer of *W&I* in the *New Republic* 1 (1914): 23.

February 10, 1915: Royce sends “Memorandum . . .” to Chancellor David Starr Jordan, Chair of the Exercises for the International Insurance Congress. [*See JRLW* 2:197-203 and HARP Box 127, folder 33]

July 25, 1915: *The New York Times* (part 4, pages 2-3) publishes “Professor Josiah Royce of Harvard Advocates Insurance by the Nations of the World.” Reprinted in *HGC* as “The Possibility of International Insurance,” but without *NYT*’s section-numbers and sub-titles; e.g., IV. “State Insurance and International Reinsurance.” [see Box 51, document 2 and *HGC* 83-87].

Ca. Feb. 15, 1916: during the final semester of his teaching career, Royce tells his Ethics Class of the need for careful rather than mechanical application of his principles about “dangerous pairs” and about triadic “communities of interpretation.” One must take into account “the extremely various conditions” which almost demand a non-uniform application of one and the same principle. Royce continues:

“When, later on [in the Course], I state my own case for some form of international

¹³ Later, in published form, this address was entitled *War and Insurance*.

insurance,¹⁴ I shall indeed be obliged to show that conditions over which I have no control, but which, as I believe, are actually present¹⁵ in the modern international world, bring a practicable form of international insurance somewhat near to us. Otherwise my scheme of international insurance will remain what most of my critics have so far supposed it to be, a mere professor's scheme."

["Comments upon the Problem of the Mid-Year Examination Paper," *ca.* 15 February 1916), HARP Box 95, document 2, p.14; see *JRLW* 136-171]

Evaluation: IF the most mature and refined MS or MSS is/are set in the context of the late Royce's many efforts to apply insurers' statistical and actuarial modes of economic interpretation to offset both human and natural tragedies, then a sample of his latest building upon *War and Insurance* will fit in the Critical Edition, as one of Royce's works of practical application.

a. "War and Insurance"

Royce called this address "Interpretation of the Present Crisis" and only later entitled it "War and Insurance." [*Life*, 362]

HARP seems not to possess the MS underlying the version published in book form by Macmillan. As for Royce's long "Introduction" (*W&I*, pages ix-xlvi), this needs to be published at least as an Appendix in the Critical Edition, as Royce's revised background for the earliest of his public papers on this topic.

In the published version, page 50, n.1, Royce regards this work as new insofar as he applies Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of "interpretation to the philosophy of war and peace." Royce dates his Preface to *W&I* on September 15, 1914, shortly after he presented his public address to the Philosophical Union at Berkeley on August 27th.

b. "Memorandum on International Insurance"

See *JRLW* 2: 197-203. As a member of the Peace Day Committee which directed Exercises at the International Insurance Congress to be held in San Francisco amid World War I, Royce addressed this Memorandum on February 10, 1915 to Chancellor David Starr Jordan, Chairman of these Exercises. A typescript of his Memorandum is reserved in HARP Box 127, folder 33.

Royce wrote this Memorandum more than five months after his book *War and Insurance* and five months before his *New York Times* article of July 25, 1915, reprinted as "The Possibility of International Insurance" in *HGC*, 71-92. Unlike these other two writings, Royce here seems to strike some distinctive notes: the duty of seizing the present opportunity to start an international application of the insurance principle, the wide network of linkages to be created in this way, and their tendency to promote the

¹⁴ In Feb. 1916, Royce has not relinquished his scheme, despite criticism.

¹⁵ Royce had previously contrasted thinking up conditions by "arbitrary imagination" over again this realistic belief focused on the actually existing situation.

movement toward humankind's Great Community.

c. "The Possibility of International Insurance"

Royce published this article in the *New York Times*, July 25, 1915. The *NYT* article is reprinted in *The Hope of the Great Community* (1916) pages 71-92.

A manuscript of the article appears in HARP Box 51, document 4. An unedited 12-page typescript entitled "The Possibility of International Insurance" is found in Box 51 and in Box 108, folder 2. The typescript in HARP [Box 108, folder 2] runs in parallel with the *NYT*'s version of this article except for the following:

1. The *NYT* article has an introductory paragraph not found in typescript.
2. The typescript is divided into four sections, each with its own heading but these are omitted from the *NYT* article.
3. The typescript does not include the concluding paragraph in which Royce talks of submitting his "general plan" to his colleagues, and gives acknowledgements.

20. *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan 1916)

This collection of Royce essays was published after his death. Katharine Royce, writes in her preface to the book that they represent Royce's "latest phases of thought." As they were "in the press" at the time of his death, she viewed them as a memorial volume.

The essays were not written in the book's order of presentation. Rather, they were written in the following order. [The book's order appears in right margin.]

1. "The Destruction of the Lusitania," pre-June 1915; (II)
2. "The Possibility of International Insurance," pre-July 25, 1915; (IV)
3. "The Hope of the Great Community," pre-Nov. 12, 1915; (III)
4. "The Duties of Americans in the Present War," pre-Jan. 30, 1916; (I)
5. "Words of Professor Royce at the Walton Hotel," Jan-March. 1916 (VI)
6. "First Anniversary of the Sinking of the Lusitania," pre-May 7, 1916 (V)

Essay I: The Duties of Americans in the Present War

This essay was first delivered as an address in Tremont Temple on January 30, 1916. [See *Life* 377] The text of his address was published in *The Boston Evening Transcript* on February 2, 1916. [See HARP, Box 108, folder 18.] The version printed in *HGC* edits the address as delivered.

The MS consists of 12 pages, slightly edited. [Box 51] The manuscript and *The Boston Evening Transcript* run in parallel, except that pages 9a-9e are inserted in the middle of page 9. The text returns to the bottom of page 9 for eight lines, then picks up again on page 10. The manuscript's last lines are illegible as the paper page has deteriorated. After "We shall not thus escape

suffering,” the MS is illegible. We must rely on the newspaper transcript, which concludes: “... but we shall begin to endure as Belgium today endures, for honor, for duty, for mankind.” [Box 108, Folder 18]

The editor of the printed version of the address in the book *HGC* has somewhat altered (polished?) the text of the Manuscript and its more faithful version in *The Transcript*.

Essay II: The Destruction of the Lusitania

The text consist of extracts from a letter Royce wrote to L.P. Jacks in the latter half of June 1915. [Letters 627-631, n.41] As Clendenning explains in the footnote, the letter manuscript does not appear to have survived.

Published in the *Hibbert Journal* in October 1915.

Essay III: The Hope of the Great Community

The manuscript for this essay seems absent from HARP. Two identical 40-page typescripts entitled “The Hope of the Community” are contained in Box 51 (document 2) and in Box 105, folder 1.

This piece was originally written for *The Yale Review*. (See Part III of this index: Published Articles.) A comparison of the Yale text, the typescripts in HARP, and the text as printed in *The Hope of the Great Community* follows.

A comparison of the Yale text and the version as printed in *HGC*:

The *Yale Review* text and the printed book text run in precise parallel. Both are titled “The Hope of the Great Community.” (The typescript, by contrast, is titled “The Hope of the Community,” although Royce does expressly refer to “Great Community” in the title of section I, and in the text of the piece.)

The only difference, outside small editorial changes between the Yale and *HGC* texts, is a footnote in the Yale text at page 290 following the paragraph ending “... the conclusion of the present war.” The footnote does not appear in the printed text (page 66). The footnote in the Yale text reads as follows:

“In his ‘War and Insurance,’ Professor Royce proposed that in order to make such a beginning, the victors in the war devote the indemnity paid by the vanquished to ‘establish the first mutual international insurance company against national calamities, including wars.’ After this fund is deposited ‘with the trustees, and under the formal care of Switzerland or Sweden,’ he suggests that the victors then proceed to ‘draw up their rules, and thenceforth invite all sovereign states, great and small, including the vanquished states, to insure.’ - The Editor.”

A comparison of the printed *Yale Review* text with the HARP typescript is more complicated. Not only is Section V of the HARP typescript not included in the Yale Text. Substantial revisions have been made to parts of the text. Furthermore, the HARP typescripts are titled “The Hope of the Community,” but the Yale Text and the Book Text are titled “The Hope of the

Great Community.”

In a letter to Professor Wilbur L. Cross, editor of the *Yale Review*, dated November 8, 1915, Royce talks about the article.

I enclose herewith the manuscript of the article which you requested me to prepare for the December number of the *Yale Review*. The article has been a good deal revised and condensed. I hope that, in its present form, it is not too long. You did not assign any precise limits to its length. In your letter of October 7th you named the tenth of November as the date when you wished to have the manuscript in your hands. With thanks for your kind request.... [Letters at 639]

Query: Does Royce use the word “manuscript” literally? (HARP does not contain a manuscript for this piece, just the typescripts.) The fact that there are no manuscripts of this piece in HARP may suggest that this manuscript was both sent to Cross and later not returned by him—a common editorial procedure.

The typescript has titled Section numbers, but the printed texts (in the *Yale Review* and the *HGC* book) do not.

Section I: “The Great Community and the Nations.”

Section II: “International Ties”

Section III: “The Non-political Community of Mankind”

Section IV: “The Social Arts of the Great Community”

Except for small editorial changes, the typescript and printed texts are identical until typescript page 12. After the fifth line of typescript, page 12, ending “spiritual union,” the typescript and printed texts diverge completely. This break happens directly before section II of the printed texts.

At the end of the article, from the paragraph in section IV beginning “Were such an international board” (page 36 of the typescript, page 66 of the book text, page 290 of the Yale text) to the end of section IV, the typescript and printed texts also run parallel. (This is the end of the printed article in both the *Yale Review* and the book.)

But between these two parallel sections, which appear like bookends, lie three noteworthy sections in the typescript version. Hence, the typescript text has been substantially re-written and shortened in the printed version by non-publishing all these three intervening texts. The question becomes whether the longer typescript’s pages 12-36 (which have never been published) deserve to be included in the *Critical Edition*. This unpublished material deals with the themes of Royce’s “Great Community” in considerably more detail. It explicitly addresses the “three theses” of the Great Community and offers a much wider body of references.

**Essay IV: The Possibility of International Insurance
Box 108, folder 2**

This was published in the *NYT* July 25, 1915. The article is reprinted in *HGC* at pages 71-92.

A 12-page unedited typescript entitled “The Possibility of International Insurance” is found at Box 108, folder 2. A manuscript for this article, identical to the typescript, is found in Box 51, the third document. Royce wrote the first nine pages of the MS on fresh paper. Starting at page 10 (section III), Royce used previously drafted, now-renumbered pages. Starting his fourth section, he uses fresh paper again, and starts pagination over at 1 through 11. The manuscript is thus 29 pages long.

Portions of the manuscript are heavily edited by Royce.

Like the typescript, the manuscript runs parallel to the book text, except for the essay’s final paragraph.

Following the manuscript in Box 51 is found a typescript identical to the one found in Box 108, folder 2.

The typescript [Box 108, folder 2] and manuscript [Box 51] run parallel to the republished book text except for the following:

1. The NYT article has an introductory paragraph not found in typescript.
2. The typescript is divided into four sections, with headings; these are omitted from the NYT article.
3. The typescript does not include the concluding paragraph in which Royce talks of submitting his “general plan” to his colleagues, and gives acknowledgements.

Essay V: “The First Anniversary of the Sinking of the Lusitania, May 7th, 1916”

The address was published in *The Boston Evening Transcript* on May 8, 1916. [Box 108, folder 18] No manuscript appears to be available of this address in HARP.

Essay VI: Words of Professor Royce at the Walton Hotel at Philadelphia, December 29, 1915

Originally delivered [extemporaneously?] as an address to the American Philosophical Union.

Reprinted from *The Philosophical Review* 25 (May 1916) 507-14

John Clendenning suggests the following hypothesis for the essays genesis:

“I am inclined to take the footnote [on the first page of the essay in *The Philosophical Review* and in the published book] at face value. This is how I would write the scenario. Royce gave the speech extemporaneously on the evening of December 29, 1915. Afterwards the sponsors of the program decided to publish the proceedings as a festschrift, and asked Royce for a copy of his “Words.” It was at that time -- say, January-March, 1916 -- that Royce actually wrote the text for publication. Some of his

friends helped him by offering notes they had taken during or after the address. These notes were used by Royce when he wrote the piece.” (John Clendenning to FMO, June 3, 1980)

For one eye-witness account of the speech, *see* an article by Theodore de Laguna in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 13 (1916): 97-102 (esp. 101-02).

PART II

Josiah Royce's Articles, Essays, Lectures and some Fragments (Published and non-Published) Chronologically Arranged, Described and Evaluated

Ignas Skrupskelis' Annotated Bibliography, appended to *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, 2: 1167-1226, supplies the basic structure of the list below. Yet, since this Part II also includes unpublished shorter manuscripts and lectures discovered in the Harvard Archives, the present list expands Skrupskelis's chronologically arranged bibliography with new content, descriptions and evaluations. To the degree that some items below were incorporated into full-length books, they will overlap with Part I.

Manuscripts unpublished as of 2009 are for the most part noted as such.

1. "Pussy Blackie's Travels" (1863)

Unpublished

Box 114, folder 2

A 31-page typescript of a story Royce is said to have written as an 8-year-old. The typescript must have been created much later in Royce's life, either once he had become a prominent figure, or perhaps even after his death.

On the first page of the typescript, under the title, is a parenthesis, a summarizing subtitle that reads as follows: "(long story of the imaginary travels of a cat, written by R when eight years old. Remarkable for its psychological and ethical masteries)." Clearly Royce did not write this himself.

Some noteworthy items. The family scene early does not include a father. Rather it is simply Sarah Eleanor (Royce's mother) and the other children. There is another scene of sister Ruthie calling the cat "Blackie" to come for milk and supper.

The work shows amazing talent of mind, getting the adventurous cat from California to Richmond, Virginia, and back. This tale is all imaginary. The cat is seized by an eagle, thrown by a bull, etc.--all things a boy's imagination would delight in. The young Royce pictures a loving home, and a lovely family life, seen through the eyes of an 8-year-old, a "poor lad." He mentions works by Sir Walter Scott, his poems, including the *Lady of the Lake*. Such references reflect the books that Sarah Eleanor almost certainly had in her home.

A scene from Canada on page 17 possibly reflects a story that Sarah Eleanor had told of her own life, or possibly of her mother, earlier in her life there.

Yet, does even a very talented and well-read 8-year-old have by himself a vocabulary that uses first-hand expressions such as the following?

- ejaculation, page 2,
- hardened in his sin, page 16,
- foolish determination, page 20,
- until they succumb page 22,
- a sultry afternoon, page 25,
- the circuit of the whole, page 29.

Such terms are clearly not in the vocabulary of an ordinary eight year-old. Is his mother, or perhaps a sister or two at least “polishing his diction? Or is this the product of Josie’s reading books over his head?

Except for the last two, the chapters are very brief, attuned to a child’s attention span and fit for children. The local color is very apt, spiced with dialogue. The author calls Cincinnati “Porkopolis”—its old popular name when (ca 1840) that city was the Midwest’s largest center of pork slaughter-houses.

The author displays psychological rapport, a whole gamut of emotions and a strong ethical tone. Several times he or she repeatedly mixes a sense of guilt and shame (18), emphasizes the need for truthfulness (16, 18), the role of forgiveness, and the joy of receiving it (27-28). The folly of killing one’s fellowmen in war is a closing theme of the story. (30-31).

The story is left unfinished. Comparison of the diction used here with that of Josiah’s early high school pieces shows that there is a use of more elevated words and phrases in Pussy Blackie’s Travels than in his high school work.

HARP contains this story only in typescript form. If a MS form were found, Josie’s misspellings might be distinguishable from those of the typist.

There is evidently a tradition inside the Royce family that Royce “wrote” this piece. Is this tradition founded on fact wrapped in an exaggeration? What we have is a typescript. Bypassing the authenticity question, it puzzles the reader with this question: Even if the family later embellished “Josie’s” original writing, what kind of mind might this 8-year-old have already been presenting in 1863 or 1864?

Evaluation: Although this writing is a bit long, it is an amazing piece, if in fact it was in its final form written by 8-year old Josie. How critical should a reviewer be, as to whether this piece was actually written by Royce, as it is reflected in the typescript, or rather whether, at the prompting of his mother, the 8-year-old Josiah did draft an imaginative adventurous story of a stray cat, and then someone older (a sister and/or his mother) edited it into a piece whose vocabulary is so singularly above 99% of all 8-year olds that the typescript we possess beggars the reader’s imagination whether one is reading the original work of even an eight-year-old genius. The text of this typescript belongs in the Critical Edition as a precious family heirloom of a story that young Josiah may well have first composed. The typescript also may “puzzle” the reader

whether he or she here encounters, albeit with later embellishments, a genuine child genius.

2. “Is The Assassination of Tyrants Every Justifiable,”
***The Lincoln Observer* vol. 2 (June 1869): 2.**
Box 116, folder 1

A very early essay written shortly after Lincoln’s assassination.

Evaluation: Very important. It reveals a 14 year-old Royce who resolves the vexed tyrannicide problem from a theocratic perspective, without ignoring the need to insist on very strict limits and to measure the temporal situation.

3. “The Miner’s Grave,” (ca 1870)
Unpublished
Box 53, document 3

Labeled by Wells “1.” This appears to be Royce’s designation, too. An undated high school essay with outline. It is undated. Cf. (former) Box H, “A,” a 10 page MS in which Royce reflects on a visit to a grave. *See Life 3* as another reference to his fascination with these themes.

Note the ethical-religious tone at the end, contrasting the restlessness of men with the quiet of God and nature.

See also Box 114, folder 3. Another 10 page manuscript, headed “No. 1,” that an archivist has labeled “Miner’s Grave” — confusingly, according to FMO, since its grave is of a lady, a “Lonesome Lover.”

4. Untitled Essay; [Proposed title: “The Lonesome Lovers’ Grave”] (ca 1870)
Unpublished
Box 114, folder 3

This is an important MS, once reserved but “lost” in Non-Logicalia Box H, amid “A[utograph] material, several hundred pages...” but transferred in 2009 to Box 114, folder 3.

An early Royce MS, inscribed on page 1 by Royce as “No 1”--that is, positioned by Royce as first in his Index of his Early Writings. The present ten page MS describes Royce walking to a lonely grave outside Grass Valley, learning from a passing friend the history of this grave, and then discovering the tragedy of two genuine but deceived lovers, who were finally united by their grave only after death.

Evaluation: A witness to Royce’s high school work, and his familiarity with Shakespeare’s

Romero and Juliet theme.

5. “Fairy Tales, The Greeks,” (ca. 1872)
Unpublished
Box 143, folder 2

The misleading title (drawn from the first lines of the manuscript) distracts from the heart of this early work, written on both sides of nine legal size pages. The title fails even to suggest the deep question and message which young Josiah conveys through this unpublished yet complete work, namely: “Is morality based only on ‘circumstances,’ or also on a deeper, communal, hereditary ‘pedagogy’?”

The handwriting is Royce’s, but is more cursive and less precise than his undergraduate hand. This date is more likely 1870 or 1871 than as shown, for Royce seems still to be in high school, or in his pre-collegiate year at the University of California. There is no date given on the sheets themselves. This work likely stems from Royce’s 1870-1871 preparatory year, just before entering UCB as a freshman. [*Cf.* the typeset text of Royce’s undergraduate thesis on Aeschylus (Box 114, folder 9).] The present MSS shows that Aeschylus may have attracted Royce before his full entry into UCB.

This very early group of manuscript pages in Royce’s hand, constituting three organic manuscripts, written on both sides of eight sheets. The three parts break down into a piece title “Points,” an original text, heavily edited, and a finalized text (slightly edited). Royce is here concerned with a famous passage about Antigone and Creon. It is unknown how the archivist arrived at the 1872 date, but 1870-1871 seems a closer estimate.

1st MS, Royce’s “points” (p. 8, reverse side):

“1st. The Greek Tragedian took his ideals from the commonest stories. Thus resulted unity of Hellenic culture. The same tale serving as an illustration and as an amusement. Thus were the emotions of the Greek complicated.”

2nd MS, Royce uses the reverse sides of the eight pages to create parts of his first draft..

3rd MS, after describing the impact of poets and dramatists on the Greek mind, and retelling the story of Antigone’s obeying the “Eternal Law” rather than the king’s decree, Royce moves at page 5 to elaborate the meaning of this story:

“We now know that every human being is subject to influences from an indefinite period of time before him, influences that can in no wise be summed up in the word tradition, or yet in the word law. These influences are those which are the common property of the race and which are transmitted from generation to generation by the laws of heredity. They consist of tendencies, sensibilities, emotions, in which is more or less summed up the whole experience of the race since it had existence. And among them our ideas of right and wrong no doubt hold a prominent place. Morality is with us two-fold. There is one portion of it which does depend upon circumstances, which does change with changing seasons and which we call expediency. But there is another portion which is

our property by virtue of our humanity. We have promptings to follow it, because this universal transmitted instinct, this summed up experience of the past, says it is best to do so. This part of our nature is independent of circumstances, and because it is the result of a higher and wider experience than our own it is to be obeyed. This transmitted moral law is something that is for the individual not to be transcended or violated.

“Thus far we follow the teachings of science. We advance nothing that is not advanced by it. But now how does all this make us stand as regards the poet’s words. “They endure forever, and no man knows whence they sprang.” “Ah,” says the objector “but we do know whence they sprang; science has told us. In the very fact of showing that these principles are unchanging because they are the common property of the race, science informs us of their origin.” Does it inform us of this, I would reply. It tells us something of the origin of these things, enough to show whence their authority comes, but from what hidden sources they themselves had their origin far back in the wastes of time, what steps of progress they passed through, yes still more even how they as instincts have come to have such power over us today, all this must remain unknown. In them we stand in presence of one of nature’s greatest mysteries. Like the poet we know enough of them to feel that they endure forever. Like him we have a theory of their origin which time may modify. And like him we must say of them as we say of all the other deeper emotions of our nature; no man knows which [*sic*] they spring.”

“If science had revealed all to us, if there were no mystery in the matter, still would the truth remain that principles arising from a higher experience than that of the individual, being the property of the race, must be obeyed. And now when science only partially explains the mystery, when she but tells us enough for us to see how much remains unknown, there is added to our intellectual assent something of the poet’s reverence. We not only obey, but we worship the eternal principles.

“And so the words of Sophocles continue to ring in our ears, bearing with them what is truth to us as much as it was to the ancient. Among the other influences to which his heart was attuned even as ours, let this influence, the tendency to do right be numbered. Let poetry take its place by science, and let us feel that with him we stand before a mystery that is to be revered, even as we know, better than he could that we are the subjects of a moral power in our own natures which must not be resisted.

“Perhaps we are taking the Greek mind a little out of its usual mood when we can find in it the expression of so lofty a morality. But let us remember that all this delight in beauty which made the Greek an artist rather than a moralist, did not yet prevent him from knowing what is piety. And when he worshipped, we may be sure that it was some object worthy of worship. Even because he so seldom bowed before the thought of his moral responsibility, because of that very thing, when he did bow before it, we may be all the more sure that it was presented in some of its grandest forms.” [5-8]

Evaluation: For a very early composition, this seems to FMO to be **a most valuable document**, and most relevant to our situation in contemporary U.S. culture. Its focus through Sophocles on Antigone’s dilemma and decision, and its confrontation with the deeply human moral dilemma of whether the basis of the moral life is “merely conventional” or “also higher than current human law.”

6. “A Nocturnal Expedition,” (ca 1870)
Unpublished
Box 53, document 1

Another undated school essay, concerning a dream about Australia. The piece brings out the fear of loneliness.

7. Untitled Essay (ca 1870)
Unpublished
Box 53

This undated and incomplete student essay begins “One fine morning ...”, the piece concerns Phoebus Apollo, who comes down to teach music in “...the regions of the setting sun which bore the name of California.”

8. Untitled Essay [proposed title: “Meditation in a Graveyard near Webster Street and the Lake”] (ca 1870-71)
Unpublished
Box 53

This 6 ½ page manuscript has not been dated, but he refers to “our college.” Perhaps written during his preliminary year (1870-1871), while waiting to attend regular classes at UCB.

Royce begins this essay by reflecting on a classmate who has died. On page 4, Royce begins musing on a recent experience in the graveyard next to Webster Street and the lake. Although his tone is pessimistic and cynical for the most part, toward the close of the MS he seems to hear a voice, a call asking him to serve humanity.

On page 2, Royce refers to “this assembly.” On the last page Royce labels this MS “no. 4”.—perhaps referring to his Index. (No Christian images, no signs of Christian faith mark this reflection on death.)

9. “An Incursion into the Regions of the Sentimental: In Imitation of Certain Novelists” (ca 1870)
Unpublished
Box 53

Royce labels this “no. 7”. It is a seven page MS.

In the story, Royce awakes with a vague feeling of dread, then falls back asleep. He recounts a rather Poe-like dream which he then had (“an exaggerated wild grotesque dream, it was, though expressing with great monstrosity, what may be the shadow of the fate of any of us who have

tried to place our main hope of happiness in the world“), ending with a reflection on “the dim shadowy region of the Unattainable.”

Might the novelists to whom he refers include Poe and Washington Irving?

10. “Personification in Early Tongues,”
***Neolean Review*, 1 (October 1871); I, 3**
Box 53

A MS on 16 smaller 5” X 8” sheets, and one final sheet turned sideways (or a regular size sheet cut in half). This piece appeared the *Neolean Review*, vol. 1 (October, 1873):1, 3. Skrupskelis (1170): Initialed “J.R., [class of] ‘75” Attempts to explain why some languages have a masculine and a feminine gender for inanimate objects. This is attributed to the tendency of primitive man to personify inanimate objects.”

The topic is not all that significant: why certain languages should use gender for inanimate languages.

Does refer on pages 6-7 to Max Muller.

On the back of the one of the MS pages Royce makes reference to one of early indexing techniques “No. 1.” (See Skrupskelis, *BWJR* 2: 1170 no. 3.)

11. “Our Union” ca 1871
Unpublished
Box 53

Labeled “No. 3” in Royce’s early index. A folded page MS, written on three of the four sides. On the fourth side, it is labeled “Editor Scrap Book”. It is signed mysteriously something that looks like “Trauth.” or “Trauts.” or “Trants.” [Royce’s Society member name?] Once again, it seems an MS for the Neolian Society.

This appears to be an endeavor or call for balance in thinking of preserving our national union in time of trouble. A plea for greater recognition of the political science, “the profound science” that government is.

12. “Sound and Silence,”
***The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1873): 1.**
Box 116, folder 3

The article is signed “X.Z.,” but Skrupskelis attributes it to Royce. *BWJR*:2 1170. The importance of work “in silence” (not accredited or “bugled”).

Evaluation: Significant for the *non*-public side of Royce’s life – his inner agency during the hours of his quiet reading and almost endless writing.

13. “Personification in Early Tongues,”
***The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 7 (October 1873): 3**

Skrupskelis lists this article in his annotated biography. However, no October issue of *The Neolean Review* exists in HARP. (see number 11, *supra*)

14. “No. 2. Mr. President and Fellow Members,” (ca 1873?)
Unpublished
Box 53

This is an address to the president and fellow members [perhaps of the Neolean Society], “no. 2” by Royce’s index. There is no date, but if it is “No. 2” in Royce’s index, it would seem quite early.

The first page of the MS is written front and back (with the bottom torn off), then it goes on to 7 more MS pages.

Though verbose, its theme of the universal progress of the human race is a theme underlying much of Royce’s later thought, especially in *The Problem of Christianity*.

Despite this interest, it is hardly worth inclusion in the *Critical Edition*.

15. “Casual Observation of Human Nature” (ca 1873)
Unpublished
Box 53

E.F. Wells refers to this as “manuscript #1” of sophomore year. It is a 5 page MS, with page 3 missing. The key question here: how valuable is this casual observation for discovering human character? How valuable are “sweeping assertions, and vague generalizations in questions often exhibited in this branch of inquiry.” (2) But, he says, appearances are not always deceptive.

We frequently meet characters of contrary behaviors, Royce says, a sort of double monster inside. But we may know something of what a man is not (fallible negative knowledge). Royce concludes wanting knowledge, but committing himself to following the facts that are found, to proceed in this as in all other inquiries, only so far as fact will lead us “and not to sacrifice facts to pedantry.”

Royce signs himself “J. Royce. Jr.”

16. “Recent Discussions on Class Feeling,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1874): 7**
Box 116, folder 7

Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title. The piece is attributed to “J.R.”

Evaluation: Royce’s desire for community, union and cooperation is evident in this piece.

17. “The Problem of Class Feeling,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 2 (February 1874): 5**
Box 116, folder 8

Again, Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title of this piece, which is signed “J.R. ‘75”. By class, Royce means school classes, viz. freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. He notes that “Class jealousy must follow the separation of classes from each other by the space of the year.” Royce offers his analysis of the causes for the friction between classes. They are separate from each other (viz.). The feeling of the more senior class that “I’ve already done it.”

Royce not only returns to the topic from his previous *Berkeleyan* piece, but focuses on “B. True’s” proposed Congress of Class.

Royce expresses his hope for the future this way: “And my belief is that the result [in the future] will be accomplished by the diffusion among students of that true spirit of freedom which is so much to be aimed at.”

Royce proposes a kind of “live and let live” doctrine, that each should be free to be themselves. “He who feels how small a part he and his fellow atoms make of the great living, moving whole, Humanity, will appreciate how minute are all the distinctions in college when compared with the truly great ends of life, the bettering of the knowledge, or the furthering of the advance of the whole race, a task in which each individual is but a drop of water, but the aggregate is the vast tidal wave of progress.”

[FMO note: Collegian Royce foreshadows his well-known response in “Meditation Before the Gate.” His desire for global human unity is already evident.]

18. “The Modern Novel as a Mode of Conveying Instruction and Accomplishing Reform,”
***The Berkeleyan* vol. 1, no. 4 (April 1874): 10-11.**
(Copy not present in Box 116)

Skrupskelis notes of this piece: “Prize oration delivered on March 23, 1874. The topic is one of a number of stock topics available for orations to college students of the day.” *BWJR*:2 1170. Copy of this issue of *The Berkeleyan* is not, however, included in HARP Box 116 with the other

Berkeleyan issues.

19. “Literary Education,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 5 (May 1874): 4-5.**
Box 116, folder 10

Again, Royce marks the title in the copy with a handwritten “J.” and signs the piece “J.R. ’75”.

In this piece, he replies to the article by “Albion” in the earlier April issue of the *Berkeleyan* (vol. 2 no. 4, found in Box 116, folder 9).

Evaluation: Good, particularly as to the importance of literary education for scientists.

20. “Comments Suggested by a Principle in the Science of History,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. (August 1874): 4**
Box 116, folder 13

Royce notes a “J.8” in a handwritten note by the title on page 4. The article is signed “J.R. ‘75”.

The importance of the impact of ideas upon historical events.

Evaluation: An important idea.

21. “The Prince of Denmark,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 12 (December 1874): 3-5.**
Box 116, folder 16

This is a very long article (9 columns of newspaper text). The article is signed “J. Royce ’75”.

The article evinces a tremendous admiration of Shakespeare. If the character of Shakespeare lies behind the form of Hamlet, “a critical examination of the play in comparison with other great works of art will be necessary to ascertain whether the author has hidden himself beneath the form of Hamlet.” (3) Royce wonders what part of Shakespeare is being revealed.

After preliminaries, Royce says “I believe that the parallel between Faust and Hamlet is, in this province, perfect. He admits that in Hamlet and in Faust we find points that are inextricable until the spirit of the poet is fully entered into. About Shakespeare’s poems, he says “And so, within this mighty soul, is waging ever a fearful battle. His poems are but the reliefs which he must have for his emotions.” (5)

Another quote hints at the mystery of Shakespeare: “Doubtless he [Shakespeare] was outwardly often mirthful. But many times no doubt to his own heart, outward mirth was keeping time with the spade of the gravedigger of Hamlet.” The focus on the piece is more on Shakespeare, and the

mystery of his genius, than Hamlet.

22. “The Literary Artist and the Work of Literary Art,”
***The Berkeleyan* vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1875): 3-5**
Box 116, folder 17

Royce writes “S2” beside the title in the margin. It is signed “J. Royce ‘75”

Royce aims to focus on the relation of the literary artist to the artistic production. But he can only give us suggestions. The artist *and* his production have to express art and feeling. Homer’s *The Iliad*, Tennyson’s *In Memoriam*. Clearly “if we are seeking for a poet’s personality, we must not expect to get more than glimpses of it from his writings.” (4)

23. “McCollough’s Hamlet,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 5.**
Box 116, folder 18

Royce gives his appraisal of the performance.

24. “Editorial Responsibility,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.**
Box 116, folder 18

The *Berkeleyan*’s editors, including Royce, publish their different responsibilities.

25. “The Death of President Durant,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.**
Box 116, folder 18

26. “Draper’s Religion and Science,”
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 9.**
Box 116, folder 18

Instead of entitling his book *The History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, Royce suggests that Draper title it *Treatise on the Ignorance of Our Ancestors*. Royce views Draper’s book as repressing righteous indignation sufficiently to write a charitable indictment of past generations. Royce criticizes Draper for not coming up to the standards of genuine historians.

Royce differs with Draper's judgment that St. Augustine suffered from a mental aberration in the *Confessions* and suggests that we treat Augustine scientifically with all fairness.

27. "Henry Durant,"
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-11.
Box 116, folder 18

Evaluation: A eulogy.

28. "The Exercises on the Day of the Funeral Monday, January 25,"
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-12.
Box 116, folder 18

This piece is unsigned, but is initialed here in Box 116's copy of this issue of *The Berkeleyan*.

29. "Notes on Exchanges,"
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 12.
Box 116, folder 18

In these exchanges, Royce foreshadows his own editorial work on the *IJE* by skim reading many college periodicals, and then offering his comments.

30. "Turgenieff's 'Liza,'"
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 6.
Box 116, folder 20

Royce writes and signs a long piece that exhibits his talent as a literary critic.

31. "The Vassar Miscellany and 'Middlemarch,'"
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 8-9.
Box 116, folder 20

Unsigned, but Royce does make a mark in the margin by this title. The effect of Eliot on Royce appears in "For our part, we rather find encouragement in the fact that so many of life's vexations and dangers have been anticipated and pointed out by so truthful and sympathetic an advisor as George Eliot." [Royce has already experienced the problem of evil and found a balance to deal with it.]

- 32. “Irving and his Critics,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 10.
Box 116, folder 20

Irving is an English actor.

- 33. “Notes on Exchanges,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 11-12.
Box 116, folder 20

Not all of this article is written by Royce, notably the third paragraph.

- 34. “Truth in Art,”**
The Oakland Daily News (March 2, 1875): 1.
Box 116, folder 19; Box 143, folder 3.

The article heading reads: “Prize oration delivered by Josiah Royce of the Senior Class of the State University.” The speech had been delivered on February 26, 1875.

In *BWJR*:2 1174 Skrupskelis describes this newspaper article, which differs notably from its appearance in the April issue of *The Berkeleyan*, as follows: “Oration for the “President’s Prize in Oratory,” delivered on February 26, 1875, apparently the winning entry. The topic was a common one.”

Evaluation: This piece documents the emotional side of Royce, the seed of his interest in the Romantics. It also reveals his standard as a literary critic.

NB: HARP lacks the 1875 April issue of the *Berkeleyan*. Hence, the following six pieces (items 35 to 40) from that issue will not be found in HARP.

- 35. “Berkeley Sunsets,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 4 (April, 1875): 7.
- 36. “Darwin Answered, or Evolution a Myth,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 4 (April, 1875): 8.
- 37. “T. Hardy’s ‘Far from the Madding Crowd,’”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2 (April, 1875): 8.

See *BWJR* 2:1173, 25.

38. **“The Foundation Idea in Poe’s Poetry,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2 (April, 1875): 11.
39. **“Notes on Exchanges.”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2 (April, 1875): 12-13.
40. **“A Resolution,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2 (April, 1875): 13.

See *BWJR* 2: 1173, 28.

41. **“Elaine and Ophelia,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 4.
Box 116, folder 21

Again Royce as literary critic. Royce counteracts the unfavorable criticism imposed on Rosenthal’s painting in San Francisco of these two women together. Such a painting suggests that they are equal. This results in a great misinterpretation, not against the painter. Royce sees that Tennyson tells us much more of Elaine than Shakespeare does of Ophelia. Accordingly, Royce writes, “Let us be reverent when we utter these names.” And again:

“For the ideal of female perfection partakes much more, perhaps, of the character of that mysterious creation, Undine, that unfathomable union of tenderness and gaiety, of affection and sternness, of glowing humanity and half-conscious dreaming divinity.” (5) [In mythology, the Undine is a water nymph without a soul, which she receives only later in the story.]

42. **“A Chess Club,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 5 (May, 1875): 8.
Box 116, folder 21

Royce calls chess “this finest and profoundest of all games of skill,” and calls for the formation of a chess club.

43. **“The Aim of Criticism,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 9.
Box 116, folder 21

On controversies between college papers. About the literary critic’s purpose, Royce writes:

And if, finally, he be an artistic or a literary critic, his task is to separate true from false art, to give means of distinguishing the one from the other in cases in which they seem indissolubly joined, and greatest of all, to enter into the soul of the artists and to interpret to himself and to others the divine thought which the inspiration of the beautiful gave in full form, but which the

duller eye of common life sometimes fails to catch sight of. (9)

- 44. “The Commencements Appointments,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 10.
Box 116, folder 21

On controversies between college papers.

- 45. “On a Passage in Sophocles,”**
Oakland Daily Transcript (June 10, 1875): 3.
Box 116, folder __

Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1173: “The Classical Oration delivered during commencement ceremonies at the University of California, on June 9, 1875.”

- 46. “The ‘Holy Grail’ of Tennyson,”**
The Berkeleyan, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 4-6
Box 116, folder 22

Royce doesn't put an “S” marking by the title of this piece. His discussion of the higher religious sentiments hints at a theme in his later thought.

[A noteworthy point: Royce quotes the conclusion of *The Idylls* in this article, including these last three lines: “And one hath seen the vision face to face,/ And now his chair desires him here in vain,/ However they may crown him elsewhere.” Forty years later, Royce uses these lines to conclude his last course in metaphysics, 1915-16.]

Royce writes:

“No one fails of understanding the Holy Grail stands as the representative of the highest and noblest ideals of the soul, those which call forth the religious, as opposed to the passionate emotions. Each one attains to an understanding of these highest things in proportion as his life is elevated and harmonious.” (4)

This was, says Royce, Tennyson's principal ideal.

The question of the relative reality of the object itself (the cup) or is the cup a phantom, versus the issue of the reality of the grail lying in the quest itself. Royce sees the Holy Grail as the representative of the beautiful. In beauty, the religious and passionate emotions meet and blend.

In this piece, Royce goes into the embryo of his later notion of “lost causes.” For example, he writes:

“over some spots where universal but superficial opinion has said ‘failure, defeat, disgrace,’ where some cherished plan has met its death-blow, where some life hope has seen its final day,

we should write the wiser inscription; Sacred to the memory of a cherished, a divine, but now forever departed delusion. While it lived it gave strength and courage in endeavor, persistence in duty, faith in the noble and the right. Now when it is dead, when it is known for a delusion, we cannot look upon it as worthless. The thought of it is still strength, its former counsels still give persistence, the beauties it revealed still inspire faith. The Beautiful and the True shone through it, and lost though it be, we will worship its memory.”

[Royce will apply this to General Lee and the cause of the Confederacy, as well as to any proponent of a scientific theory that has proven inadequate, but which by its being there has advanced science. And of course, Royce will come to apply this perspective to the life of his son Christopher.]

Evaluation: This article shows Royce considering the issues that first roused him to philosophy. FMO finds it difficult to identify a later Royce passage that so clearly states the function of that purifying away of delusions connected with the experience of “lost causes.”

47. “The Aim of Poetry,”
***Overland Monthly*, XIV (June 1875): 542-49.**
(cf. Box 80, items 1. 5 & 6)

See *Letters* 45-46, Royce to D. C. Gilman June 14 and July 11, 1875. This article was written before Royce’s departure from California June 30, 1875, for New York, Boston, and then Germany.

The article begins with Aristotle’s *De poetica*, then takes up Plato’s treatment of poetry in the *Phaedrus*. Then Royce moves to more modern examples, Shakespeare and Goethe’s *Faust*. Royce says “Poetry aims to express fully the whole emotional side of life in such a way as to enlarge, to purify, to elevate the emotions themselves.” The feelings that would be petty without its aid become noble under its influence.

In the concluding page, 549, Royce offers that poetry is supposed to lead human beings to life “on the heights.” But Royce is skeptic enough not to buy this proposition as a certain truth.

48. “The Intention of the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus, Being an Investigation in the Department of Greek Theology,”
***Bulletin of the University of California*, 16 (June 1875): 113-37.**

For a typeset copy of Royce’s undergraduate thesis, see **Box 114, folder 9**.

Evaluation: At least certain sections (section III, e.g.) deserve close attention by the committee and inclusion in the *Critical Edition*.

49. “The Last Days of ’75. From a Manuscript [Fictively] Written about 1975 (A.D)” (1875?)

Unpublished

Box 53

A 6-page MS on full pages. On the back of page 6, Royce once again enters his own index number as “No. 2”. Page three is in pencil. All the rest is in ink.

An exercise in romance, the imagined view of someone living in 1975 looking back at the class of 1875. A sole survivor being able to meet all his former classmates mysteriously come to greet him in the old university classroom.

[NB]: This is an early instance of what will become explicit in Royce’s final writing, the *Cult of the Dead*. Trying to arrive at the communion of all his classmates, the communal image of his classmates, now separating but united emotionally in the future. In sum, not worth *Critical Edition*. **But** it does foreshadow his Community of Hope.

Evaluation: An interesting addition to the collection of his early work.

50. Untitled MS (1875?)

Unpublished

Box 53

A 4 ½ page MS (with some notations on backs of pages) dealing with the topic of how Plato’s argument to an “unmoved mover” (basically Soul) lies useless through 2,000 years, but becomes pregnant with useful results by transfer to the modern scientific notion of the indestructibility of force.

51. Untitled Fragments (1875)

Unpublished

Box 53

Two small pieces of paper on one page of the box volume. One folded horizontal slip is title, on one half “Notes.” The first piece of paper is written in pencil, the second in pen.

The first 4 inch by 5 inch scrap is almost illegible.

The second long strip of paper (2 inches by 8 inches) is headed “[X.]” [note for a Chapter Ten?] “Arrangement of Essay on the Connection of Lit. Art. and his Work.” The last line of the fragment is crucial: “Art is not an old ruin merely whose builders mostly excite curiosity.”

[NB]: These notes appear to violate his state principle that he did not wish to have a biography written about his own story.]

52. Untitled MS (1875?)
Unpublished

3-page MS in which Royce tackles the argument of Parmenides against Plato's Doctrine of the Ideas. Royce does so in first, second, and third arguments. This presents an interesting summary of his reading of the Dialogue of Parmenides.

53. "The Life Harmony,"
The Overland Monthly, vol. 15 (August 1875): 157-64.

Royce's friend Milicent Shin (editor of the *Overland Monthly*) accepted this piece before Royce left for Germany. A very important piece.

Although HARP contains a published version, no complete manuscript appears to have survived, and Skrupskelis mentions none. HARP does contain, however, a 6 ½-page fragmentary manuscript as the fourth document in Box 53 which may be part of the start of Royce's work, "The Life-Harmony."

The overall question of this article: does mental life develop harmoniously and regularly, or does it evolve by sudden changes? Because of its great interest and significance, Royce wants to focus on one aspect of life. He is not looking for a final answer (he is hesitant about "having" the answer). Royce focuses not on the physiological side of the human being but on his (normal, not abnormal) mental life.

Royce takes up the objection that the question seems unnecessary since obviously some lives are more regular, and others are inharmonious. Although organic beings develop from single cells in a regular rapidly changing development, there is basic harmony in their changes. Royce recognizes, however, that some insects go through dramatic metamorphoses. The question of what is the nature of the unity underlying the diversity in these developments, these growths. Turning to Hegel, with whom he claims no "extended acquaintance," we find him holding a striking contrast between inanimate and spiritual development. Spirit progresses only by the very dint of conflict. "Every step onward must involve struggle in which the destruction of the old and the introduction of the new is involved. Even worse, spirit must destroy itself in order that it may live a higher life."

Royce summarizes Hegel's view as excluding harmony or unity in man's mental development. Royce thinks Hegel's view to be one-sided. He adduces the example of Greek historians and astronomers who find that they proceed regularly, but without care for the "unlettered and the unscientific."

At page 160, second column, he describes an amazing global view for touching this problem of either catastrophic change or regularity. He takes the Vedas, Buddhist poetry, "the songs and epics of the childhood of all nations" into account in order to attack this problem.

"...the strongest tie that can be mentioned as binding together the race is the fact of common sensibilities and common emotions and the most certain and universally

intelligible proof of this is found in art, and especially in poetry.” (161)

Royce contrasts intellectual progress (jagged) with emotional development (consistent). Royce reflects on the purpose of art: not imitation, but expression.

He illustrates his point by reference to religious poetry (as distinct from religious dogma). Poetry is the property of the race, whatever may become of dogma.

“We can bring ourselves into sympathy with every sincere human heart of whatever age.... It is in the emotions in which life truly consists, we have called this grand fact in history the life-harmony.... The foundation of an essential unity in the spirit of all times.”
161-62.

Royce questions whether emotions are really the foundation of life.

Royce ends by applying this analysis to the individual, and the sense of emotional accomplishment this gives to the individual, how it weaves in with our change-filled intellectual life. Royce attempts to take in all the varieties of our lives.

NB: Also, note Royce as an undergraduate makes a global outreach to world religions and cultures.

[FMO notes: a) Royce here shows himself to be far more than “a brain,” since he also shows himself a person deeply involved emotionally. b) He here expresses a “global sense,” the seed of his later doctrine of community, which calls for emotional as well as intellectual contacts with one’s past deeds and future hopes. c) As a teenager, Royce is reading much of Hegel, but is independent enough from him to already distance himself from Hegel in at least two ways. d) When Royce writes that the “Spirit progresses only by the very dint of conflict,” Royce adopts an “ethics of effort.” e) The professor, qualified and called to further educate this late teenager, who already had so much background in history, literature, and world religions, would find a challenging delight in the engagement.]

Skrupskelis: Here Royce “Discusses the question whether human life develops in a harmonious way, or through a series of sudden changes. Contains references to Hegel which are biographically significant.”

54. Miscellaneous Documents relating to Royce’s Study in Germany ***Unpublished*** **Box 53 (?)**

- Certificate for Royce’s registration at the university at Leipzig.
- Envelope fragment with his German address.
- Department of State traveling papers.
- Royce’s degree from the Leipzig university.
- A university “college book.”
- Royce’s grades.

- Royce's signature, accepting the obligations of the university's study requirements.

55. "Certain Points in Aristotle's Treatise of Poetry considered in relation to the light thrown on the Subject by the Developments of Modern Poetic Art" (April 1875?)

Unpublished

Box 80, item 1

An incomplete MS fragment composed of six, non-paginated, legal-sized pages. The handwriting does not appear to be Royce's. (Perhaps his mother or one of his sisters copied the text out in a readable hand.) The text is totally unedited. As the text refers to the limited time of presentation (2), the work was apparently meant as an address. The fragment left in HARP is really only an introduction to an address.

Wells suggests (on page one above the title) that this may be an essay from Royce's days at Johns Hopkins. FMO, however, dates the essay to Royce's undergraduate days at Berkeley, and specifically as preparation for his address (of April 22, 1875) given to a literary society, the Science and Literary Association, two months before his graduation. The fact that Royce published "The Aim of Poetry" two months later in *The Overland Monthly* on a similar topic (including a discussion of Aristotle's *De poetica*) supports this conclusion. (The texts of these two essays do not correspond.)

If given in April 1875, Royce, a college senior, shows a knowledge of philosophy (especially of Plato and Aristotle) and also a knowledge of the Eliatic and Adriatic schools. He significantly notes the importance of Aristotle's work, saying that "more was accomplished for the science of criticism in this one short book, than has been accomplished since by any single treatise whatever, however bulky or profound." (2) Royce picks up that by "poetry," Aristotle means in fact all the fine arts, and not our own narrow definition of verse. And Royce has the courage to criticize Aristotle whose stress on imitation, writes Royce, seems over-extended.

56. "The Circulating Library,"
***The Berkeleyan*, 6 (November 1875): 222-24.**

57. "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (October 1877)

Unpublished

Box 55

This MS, never published, seems to be a review of Francis Bowen's important work *Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann* (New York: Scribners, 1877). But its larger part consists of an outline of much of Royce's dissertation at Johns Hopkins. If this piece *had* in fact been published, it is likely that Royce never would have secured his appointment at Harvard. Bowen sat on the admissions board of the Philosophy Department at

Harvard.

Frank Oppenheim analyzed this article in a piece published in the *Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society*. In essence, Royce does not believe Bowen has “the spirit of modern philosophy.”

A 62-page MS, carefully inked, with footnotes in red, all in Royce’s hand, ready for publication.

FMO note: The latter two-thirds of this piece stands as a clear factor in the development of Royce’s doctoral dissertation.

58. “Fragment” (circa Dec. 1877)
Unpublished
Box 55

Appears to be an introduction to a course of lectures at Johns Hopkins. An eight-page MS, with page five missing. Once again, Royce’s handwriting is immaculate and careful. The date (“about Dec. 1877”) is in Royce’s hand, as is the notation “Fragment.”

Royce raises the issue of the ethical aspect of thought. There is no mention of Schopenhauer, who was the subject of his first series of lectures. (*Life*, 67).

59. “Of the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge, an Investigation of the Problems of Elementary Epistemology, in Two Chapters, with an Introduction on the Principal Ideas and Problems in Which the Discussion Takes Its Rise”
Box 119, folder 6
Box 54
Box 50

Royce’s doctoral dissertation, presented to the John Hopkins University, dated April 2, 1878. The manuscript of the dissertation may be found in the Johns Hopkins University library. A bound typescript copy was donated to the Harvard Archives by Walter Rothman, and may be found in Box 119, folder 6. Various drafts of different parts of the dissertation may be found in HARP at Box 54 (*see* Fragments of Ph.D. Thesis/Notes Preliminary to Degree” below). *See also* Box 50, and the unpublished article “The Spirit of Modern Philosophy” which tracks Royce’s dissertation themes.

Evaluation: John Clendenning gives a fine exposition and summary of the dissertation (*Life* at page 70). By its central thesis, that there are no independent beings, Royce lays a foundation for his phenomenism.

This material is not “reader friendly.” However, this text is very fundamental to Royce’s

epistemological outlook. FMO believes Royce condenses the basic position of his dissertation in some of his early papers from UCB and Harvard. Royce himself made no effort to publish his dissertation. The 6-page preface is a particularly useful summary of the entire work.

Fragments of Ph.D. Thesis/ Notes Preliminary to Degree (1877-78)

Unpublished

Box 54

The fragments are listed as they appear in Box 54.

***“Introduction and Argument”**

Twenty-one pages of manuscript, very neatly executed, with red ink page numbers and section markings, as well as notes and marginalia, throughout, as if set for printer. The Wells heading notes it as “Ph.D. Thesis.

***“Part I. Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge: Of the Basis of the Theory, and of the Nature of the Principles of Knowledge”**

Royce notes in his own hand at the top of this “Part I” title page “Fragments of the Ph.D. Thesis. Dec. 1877, Jan. 1978”. Again, there are red ink markings in Royce’s hand, underlining the subtitle. The pagination of this “part” is continuous with the above “introduction and argument.” After page 30, however, Royce ceases to write the page numbers at the top of the page in red ink, but merely relies on the pencil notes in the left margin that refer to the part and section numbers (e.g. “I.a.31”).

Part “I.a” encompasses pages 31 to 52 (following the pagination of the introduction).

***“Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge.**

Sec. I. Of the Fundamental Assumptions of the Theory of Knowledge”

Royce, in his pencil notes, refers to this section as “I.b.” There are 11 pages of this manuscript.

***“Part I. Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge”**

Pagination continues from above (“I.b.”), e.g., pages 12-31.

***Untitled “II.a.”**

Four pages of manuscript, with Royce’s own pencil notations in the margin identifying the MS (e.g. “II.a.4”)

***“Part II. Of the Definition of Knowledge; and of the Bearing of the Same upon the Principles of Knowledge”**

Royce’s pencil notations call this “II.b.” The MS runs for six pages.

***“The Natural Ideas of Existence of the Forms of Existence”**

Royce’s pencil notations call this “II.c.” An eight-page MS.

***“Fragment (of use further on)”**

The “title” note is given in Royce’s hand. The fragment continues for five pages, and is numbered “35” to “39.”

***Untitled Fragment**

Pages 1 and 2 (as Wells notes) are missing from this MS which continues to page 41 (paginated in Royce’s hand) without title. At page 42, the heading reads “Chap. 2. - Of the Subject as Capable of Assessing Knowledge - &: Of Knowledge and True Opinion, and of certain Conditions whereby alone the Former may be made Possible” The whole MS runs to 45 pages.

***“Preliminaries to the Degree-Essay (’77-’78)”**

The above title in red ink in Royce’s hand. Also at the head of the page “Notes on Essay”.

A nine-page MS.

60. “Spinoza’s Theory of Religious Liberty in the State” (1878)

Boxes 55 and 40

Cf. “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty,”

The Berkeley Quarterly, 1 (October 1880) 312-16.

A lecture “[r]ead before the Historico-Political Science Club, Friday, March 1, 1878.” [A note at the top of the MS in Royce’s hand.] Royce writes this 49-page MS at Johns Hopkins (again in a small and careful hand characteristic of his earlier work). See also footnote 1, page 90, *FE*. This MS has several incarnations over the years. But this first longer version was never itself published. Furthermore, this 49-page MS does not appear to be complete. (See Skrupskelis.)

Royce condenses the long MS of Box 55 to a shorter paper (a 23-page MS) in Box 40. This shorter Box 40 MS was eventually published posthumously by Loewenberg in *Fugitive Essay* (290-99) as “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty.” [A comparison of the *FE* chapter and the Box 40 MS reveals the two texts to run in perfect parallel.]

Between this longer Box 55 MS and the shorter paper in Box 40, there is a parallel in both the analysis of Spinoza and in the recognition of the prior thought of Hobbes.

But Royce himself published a third version, an even more condensed version of the Box 40 MS as a brief (5-page) article in *the Berkeley Quarterly*, “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty,” vol. 1 (October 1880) 312-16.

J. R. K. Kantor, archivist at the Bancroft Library UCB, states that “There are many changes in the text between the two publications”, that is, the versions in *Fugitive Essays* and in *The Berkeley Quarterly*. In FMO’s copy of *Fugitive Essays*, the portions of the essay *not* included in the *Berkeley Quarterly* are specifically noted.

[**NB:** It seems significant that Royce turns here to Spinoza as an important political science founder. This is an early hint that he regards Spinoza as the founder of Modern Philosophy, a hint that becomes evident in his 1892 *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Without careful reading, I would judge the (previously unpublished) Box 55 MS certainly deserving review by an expert political scientist.]

61. Group of Essays and Essay Fragments (1878) Box 55

Wells notes that these essays seem to have been bound together at some point, given “similar holes in the MS sheets.” Notes in Royce’s handwriting on two scraps of manila envelopes reference *five* essay titles and mention “Fragments.”¹⁶

a. “In the Footsteps of Kant” (1878)

An 11-page manuscript fragment that was not apparently published. The pages are somewhat edited. Wells dates the essay by reference to the manila envelope that contained this bundle of manuscripts.

Royce notes a vast, existing misunderstanding of Kant. This essay was apparently prepared for a periodical: Royce makes a reference to an idea having “lately appeared in this Review.” (Page 2 of the MS)

The article aims to analyze and criticize the worth of the studies of Kant by President McCosh and Professor Mahaffey. Royce was strongly empathetic toward the “Return to Kant Movement” he experienced in Germany.

Royce opposes the “handmaid” doctrine of philosophy, one that either supported the interests of the theology of the scholastics, or the common sense philosophy of “a more modern” school.

Royce gives a pretty strong critique of McGosh. McGosh felt that youth going to Germany to study at a university would be poisoned. Royce sees this as a baseless charge. Though Royce has hinted at his similar distaste for Mahaffey, the MS breaks off before he can enter into a detailed critique.

Evaluation: Interesting as a revelation of Royce’s early thought at UCB. It reveals his

¹⁶ Royce often made notes on the manila envelopes and/or folders which contained the manuscript(s) to which he refers. Over time, either he or the people organizing his work clipped his notes from these folders, and mounted them separately.

willingness to wrestle with the leading philosophers of his day. (See also the attack above on Francis Bowen.)

b. “Historical Method in Sociology - Its Significance and Its Principles” (1878)

A 20-page MS dated 1878, and another MS fragment dated 1878, with the same title. The first 20-page MS devolves in its final pages into a list of topics and notes. Up to about page 17, the prose is continuous, in essay form. The text is occupied with the question of whether sociology can be a science.

In the shorter MS fragment with this title (five pages), Royce admits his limitations on this topic. He finds difficulties in ways to discuss the topic. He then addresses how historical study can benefit sociology. Royce is uncertain of the relation of psychology and sociology, and also concerning the level of generality that sociology seeks. Royce begins a section “I” on the last page of the fragment. In it, he tries to discover the laws of phenomena, presupposing that we know what a law is. (His text breaks off.)

c. “The Truth Seeking Instinct”

Wells dates this 3-page MS fragment as either 1878 or 1880. The MS begins with “Chap. I. Of Truth-Seeking as an Activity that is Largely Instinctive.” The three pages contain three subheads.

It is not clear whether Royce actually intended a book on this subject. But this fragment doesn’t give us enough to worry about or consider for the *Critical Edition*. ***Cf. rather Box 125, folder 6: “The Work of the Truth Seeker”***

Two folios of 24 and 28 manuscript pages each, (12 and 14 leaves written front and back). Without page numbers. If these dates are accurate, this is Berkeley writing of which much will go into *RAP*. The fact that the last 9 pages of the second folio are in Katharine’s hand may help to date this piece. They were married on October 2, 1880.

(1) “Folio 1”

The first folio (with a crossed-out title “Truth-Seeking and its Consequences”) is completely in Royce’s hand. However, in the left margin Royce gives the title as “The Work of the Truth-Seeker (a Lecture for a Learned Society).” Whether delivered or not, Royce drafts these 56 pages because he wants to create this draft. Whether this shows Royce’s judgment of its importance will depend on its inner content and judgment of the *Critical Edition*.

Royce begins by alluding to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s formulation of the “six people in dialogue, when there are only two,” from *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*. This allusion sets the whole tone of the manuscript essay.

The manuscript is originally written in blue ink, and edited in black.

A note (in black, inserted across the text) on the fourth page: “See concerning the following the communication of Mr. Francis Galton to the journal Nature at various times within the past two years and his article in Mind for July 1880 [perhaps 1888?]” The text reveals Royce editing, sometimes heavily, as on page 7.

“All this illustrates the fact that we live in worlds differing far more from one another than we commonly like to think. Our normal man would surely be hard to choose. If we chose him we should hardly comprehend him to be more particular in our study. Let us glance briefly at the wide range of what I may call purely general impressions ...” (7)

Page 10-11: “The difference between Herbert Spencer and Cardinal Newman, or between Prof. Huxley and Mr. Ruskin, or between Hegel and Heinrich Heine, shall we call it merely a difference in the interpretation of the recorded facts of experience. No, evidently there are here different kinds of experience concerned, actually different worlds, different orders of truth. These men cannot come to a good understanding, because they have qualitatively different minds, irreconcilably various mental visions. Each of two such individuals may be inclined to regard the other as perverse. Both are in fact shut up within the narrow bounds of the poor individual experience. They will never understand one another so long as they remain what they are, finite minds, full of fallacy and self-confidence and of a darkness that is broken only here and there by flashes of light. If the world’s leaders are thus such narrow men, what are we who follow?”

Royce leads into the problem “why should we be truth-seekers?” At page 13 he begins to state the problem. “To this problem we are led thus irresistibly. Here is a chaos of various minds, whose simpler ideas seem to vary very greatly, whose feelings grow so far asunder that each man becomes a mystery to his neighbor, whose conflicting opinions in consequence are all the results largely of accident, and certainly of narrowness of view. Yet it seems to be thought an excellent thing for each one of them to form fixed opinions about at least some matters, a sane undertaking of them to look for some sort of abiding truth, and a grand act to suffer loss or even death for the sake of the strongest and highest at least among one’s beliefs. Why should this be the case? What is the use of truth-seeking, when so little truth will ever be found on this planet? What is the worth of remaining true to one’s opinions, when everything tends to make them fleeting? These questions must, I think, come into the mind of every active person at some time during his life. I have not in the foregoing stated the sceptic’s [*sic*] case nearly as strongly as I could state it. The more you consider human knowledge the more you will see that some of the dearest pretenses are found upon examination to be only pretenses. And when you see this you are, if of vigorous mental constitution, once for all aroused from what a great philosopher called the ‘dogmatic slumber’ and sent out upon a new search. The questions you then propose to yourself can thus be stated: What kind of truth may I hope to discover? In what spirit ought I to search for truth? Am I to hope for much

success? And to bear myself as one to whom truth will certainly be revealed if he but work for it? Or shall I in a humbler spirit say that I am probably to remain in doubt so long as I live? Or finally shall I, neither confident of success, nor resigned to defeat, rise with all my strength and declare that whether finding or baffled, whether a wanderer forever or one who at last is to reach secure harbor of faith, I will through confidence and through doubt, through good and through evil report, search earnestly for truth though I never find anything that it is worth my while to call abiding? Some suggestions about the answer to this whole series of questions forms my subject in the rest of this lecture. And for the first, what is the spirit in which we should search for the truth that now, from this skeptical point of view, seems so far away from us.” (13-14)

At this point, Royce deletes several paragraphs.

(2) “Folio 2”

In the second folio, the last nine pages are in another’s hand, probably Katharine Royce. This folio does appear to continue the essay in the first, although the first ends with a completed sentence and the sentence begins with a new one. This folio, like the first, is heavily edited, with whole paragraphs and pages crossed out.

At page 48, Royce concludes the lecture with a section III, pointing out the solid reasons for avoiding either naïve complacency with one’s belief, or complete skepticism and despair of finding any dream by stressing various consequences of truth-seeking, consequences which ground the hope of the truth-seeker.

This entire article is like a trumpet call to the complacent who don’t want to be bothered with the call to scrutinize their beliefs for solid evidence. It is not, however, a call to nihilistic skepticism, but a fierce yet humble commitment to searching for truth for these hoped for consequences:

- to liberate the widespread states of narrowness, intolerance and instability of many (48);
- it keeps people from an exaggerated confidence of reaching important truths without working through the community (49); and
- achieving the overall benefit for all humankind of a genuine truth discovered.

Evaluation (of folder 6, Box 125): This material and its guiding ideas are here put forth in longer and darker terms than the introduction to *RAP* allowed. But the themes of *RAP* page 9-14 are clearly foreshadowed in this 52-page manuscript which shows a fairly careful later editing, cross-outs, deletions and re-working of a piece that seems never to have gotten to birth as a “lecture to a learned society.” In *BWJR*:2 1177, this manuscript, because it is only a list of publications by Royce, may have been overlooked. Yet as an unpublished source of *RAP*, at least

pages 9-14, should be considered for the *Critical Edition*.

[**Autobiographical Note:** Prior to his religious insight of January 1883, Royce drafted this far longer lecture with its dark tones and its hopes for one facing the problem of truth-seeking. It shows how much he was struggling with the problem personally.]

cf. Box 79, and the three “Truth Seeking” manuscripts, as well as “Doubting and Working” in *Fugitive Essays*. Page 322, n. 1 says that this essay is a “[r]evision of an earlier essay on ‘The Work of the Truth-Seeker,’ read before the Literary Society.”

Evaluation: As FMO sees it, Truth-Seeking is at the core of Josiah Royce’s philosophical life. Somehow, the editorial board needs to show its readers that this is so central in Royce’s writings. Even in his late period, he clarifies this in his introduction to Sampter’s *The Seekers* (see item 285 below).

d. “The Definition of Knowledge”

Again, the fragment begins with a “Chapter 1.” The aim of this 6-page MS is to establish a “general theory of truth.” “Our subject will lead beyond the limits of formal logic.”

Royce focuses on any consciousness becoming aware that “x is true” by way of a rational process (he is not talking about intuitions here). Then Royce says he will consider the elements in such a rational process.

Not worth inclusion in the *Critical Edition* or further evaluation.

e. “The Critical Theory of Knowledge”

A 9-page MS fragment. The MS begins with the heading “Part I. Chap. I” This appears to be a take-off from Royce’s dissertation. The fragment reads like an introduction to a longer work (implied by the heading on the first page). It is only slightly edited.

Royce notes that the search for a critical theory of knowledge begins with Descartes and Hume, whom he quotes at the close of this fragment.

Not worth inclusion in the *Critical Edition* or further evaluation.

f. “Of the Principles of Ethics: An Essay in Lectures” (1878)

A 5-page MS, this is evidently an introduction to a series of lectures on ethics, “Moral Science or Ethics.”

Royce identifies three topics (1) the distinction between right and wrong, (2) “Ethics as an Inductive Science” (3) “Ethics as a Philosophical Science.” Unclear whether Royce ever gave this lecture series. Only this introduction survives.

g. “Notes”

An 11-page MS, with detailed section marks at the top of the pages in Royce’s hand. [e.g. “§1.IV.4”] These are apparently notes to himself, not meant as footnotes, but notes of his own thinking on topics. There are four notes contained in this MS.

1. The authoritarian teacher is without doubt about all things in his field, being able to withstand all the other opinions.
2. How these ideals can appear conflictive when a judgment is made.
3. If the ideals are worthy of a thinker, which ideal may he pursue. “What he seeks is in conformity with reality.” (7) “His object is to know what is and what happens, and so his ideal ought to be submission.” He would be the recorder of reality.
4. That position leads people to rest only on convictions, frequently not harmonized. “I am driven to this: that the highest demand that I can make as to my assertions is this, that they should give satisfaction, either by holding their own in the struggle of rival opinions, or by remaining permanently acceptable to myself.” (11) His criticism leads back to his first two contrary ideals.

h. Untitled Fragment (1878)

The MS fragment lacks a page 1, consisting of pages 2 to 13. A piece of literary criticism, referring e.g. to George Eliot as a “great romance writer,” but then going on to criticize her. Hence he moves beyond his previous admiration of her, when he was an undergraduate.

He notes a second trait of writers as psychologists, “conscientious observers of mankind.” He is fairly harsh, with phrases like “an old maid’s tea-party.” (5)

He comes to focus on Heinrich von Kleist, then on Lessing. The fragment breaks off at page 13 mid-sentence. (*See Letters* 53 re: mention of Kleist.)

i. Untitled Fragment (1878)

An untitled 12-page MS missing pages 1 and 2. The MS is only slightly edited.

At page 3 (the first page here) he mentions Shadworth Hodgson (about whom he never wrote the article requested by Harris for the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.) The MS deals with the concept of Space, the need to start from Space-Feeling, rather than the question of Space-Cognition, how many dimensions Space has.

These feelings do not explain the axiom of Space as such. Implicitly Royce distinguishes questions of origin from questions of “truth” (validity).

He looks to the difference between the Space of science and the Space of common sense.

At page 10, Royce lists a section “I. Of Knowledge in General.” (Up to this point is

apparently introduction.) He returns to themes from his dissertation.

On page 12, Royce simply stops writing mid page, with an incomplete sentence. But the fragment closes with the idea that “The eternal Now is ever with us. Our synthetic thought constantly posits an Other than this Now. But this Other cannot, as Other, be realized. It remains eternally beyond, and its only universal characteristic is that, as Other, i.e. as Past or Future, it is perfectly unknowable.” (11-12)

This fragment therefore contains a written expression of his doctrine of our Psychic Extensions to Past and Future, and in consequence their infallibility.

Evaluation: Interesting on the details of notion of “Psychic Extension.”

62. “On the Poetry of the German Romantic School” (1878) Box 56

These manuscripts were written for a lecture series Royce gave at Johns Hopkins. He later reworked these lectures for his classes at UCB. (*See Letters* 67, 68, 72, 91; *see Life* 69.) *See* Evaluation at Lecture 3 below, the only recommendation for the *Critical Edition*.

Part I: Introductory

a. Lecture 1: “Introductory” (1878)

This first MS contains a note at the top: “Written April 15-18, for delivery on April 24.” A 36-page MS.

b. Lecture 2: “The Romantic Critics and the Critics of Romanticism”

The pagination continues from the above Lecture, on an unnumbered page 37. (Wells incorrectly notes that pages 2-37 are missing from HARP. But there is no break in the text from the unnumbered page 37 to page 38.) Lecture 2 then continues until page 46.

At the top of unnumbered page 37, Royce gives a reference to notes in Appendix A.

Part II: The Individuals

c. Lecture 3: “Novalis (Friederich von Hardenberg)” Box 56

A 33-page MS. with a small inserted introduction that deals with von Hardenberg’s pseudonym (Novalis). Also, an inserted footnote.

Royce begins with a good articulation of his view of Romanticism generally, as well as a sense of how emotional reflection fits into the “Roycean” scheme. He then moves into reflection on Novalis’s life.

Royce inserts a long quote from a Novalis letter to Schiller. He goes into Novalis's development into a poet (his relationship with Sophie), and then moves into reflection on the Romantic poet, employing classic "Roycean" categories, e.g., self-consciousness and will.

"Philosophy, says the poet, is in truth home-sickness." (17) Royce goes on to give a description of the nature of philosophy in Novalis that seems to reflect Royce's own sense of what philosophy is. On page 18, he moves into use of the Fichtean social philosophy categories, e.g. Ego and non-Ego, the root of Royce's own social philosophy.

Royce finds in an unfinished philosophical romance "The Disciples at Sais" Novalis' philosophical work at its best. (19) Royce notes Novalis's tendency to stress a religious perspective in philosophy, similar to that found in the medieval church. Royce calls his "Spiritual Songs" great beauties.

At page 22, Royce gives what is apparently his own translation of Novalis's poem on the Communion, with a deliberate attempt to adhere to the original German meter.

Evaluation: Royce's 1915 confession of the role of mysticism and romanticism in his philosophical life, even if disciplined logic takes priority, suggests the importance of letting the *Critical Edition* reader taste Royce's love of a genuine romantic poet. The entire collection of these lectures is too long for inclusion, but serious consideration should be given to inclusion of this one lecture on Novalis.

d. Lecture 4: "Ludwig Tieck"
Box 56

A 26-page MS, on all fresh pages.

Evaluation: Not for inclusion in the *Critical Edition*.

e. Lecture 5: "Tieck (concluded): Minor Romanticists"
Box 56

There is a break between the Tieck conclusion at page 27, and the next topic of the minor romanticists. The MS goes on to 34 pages.

f. Lecture 6: "Minor Romanticists (concluded)"
Box 56

A 33-page MS.

g. Lecture 7: "Hoffman - Heinrich von Kleist"
Box 57

A 60-page MS. It may be that this is a draft of the final version of the seventh lecture, given its length. Or it may be two lectures included in one draft. (There is a change of ink between pages 32 and 33.) However, this lecture 7 has nearly twice as many pages as the other lectures. There is no discernable break in its middle section.

h. Conclusion
Box 57

Wells suggests this may be the eighth lecture. But there are only five pages. Royce doesn't title it as a lecture, beyond titling the page "Conclusion." But he clearly closes the series of the lectures with his comments. He may have simply closed the previous lecture with these remarks.

Royce deals with the nature of Romanticism, and gets into Hegel.

i. Appendix A: "Authorities on the German Romantic School"
Box 57

This 15-page MS evinces a great deal of concern for getting in touch with the German Romantics and their philosophical roots.

j. Appendix B: "Translations and Abstracts: Novalis: Die Lerhlinge zu Sais"
Box 57

This 8 page MS includes more evidence that Royce is translating Novalis himself.

h. Drafts for the Lectures
Box 57

After Appendix B, the rest of Box 57 is comprised of numerous drafts for these Romanticism lectures. Several of the lectures are very tightly worked, with several drafts each. There is at least one previous draft for each of the first five lectures. But there are at least FIVE drafts for the first lecture. No first drafts exist for lectures 6 through 8.

63. "What Constitutes Good Fiction?" (1878-79?)
Box 80

There are two texts. First, a 40-page MS. Then a 6-page MS that is apparently part of an earlier rougher draft of the same piece.

In the address, Royce says "I come before you a thorough believer in the art of the novel writer." There are three parts to his talk:

1. How modern fiction arose.
2. Examination of the novel to discover characteristics of great workmanship.

3. Relation of the novel to its highest aims, to present “human life in an ennobled and earnest aspect to the mind of the reader.” (3)

[**Autobiographical note:** At pages 20-27, Royce relates a long memory of a personal meeting in a Baltimore literary club, being “one man, the central figure to whom we all did homage ... A tall man he was, our leader, and a bit handsome.” (20-21) This person is later identified as being from New York City. Royce expects him to eventually author the long-expected Great American Novel.]

Royce reflects back on the “golden evenings” of such meetings. (27) On pages 28-40, Royce gives a careful exposition of the rules for description, plot and character portrayal. Royce describes (page 38) the successful study of character as the chief constituent of great fiction. “Through every great work of fiction, we are brought nearer to Humanity and understand it better.” (39)

A focus on character draws us to the possibility of an ideal humanity.

Evaluation: An interesting aspect of Royce’s interest in literary art, and in his own study of literature.

64. “Knowledge and Nature” (date ?) Box 79, document 4

A 13-page MS. Royce’s more thoroughgoing effort at a critical method of reflection on the question “how is knowledge possible?” Royce criticizes Mill and Hume as not accurate enough on “faint and lively impressions.” Is each judgment an action? he asks. (13) His answer is yes.

The MS is undated. It may be estimated to be from his Berkeley period.

Evaluation: A significant work, but hardly an 8 on a 10-point scale.

65. “Friedrich Albert Lange and his Ethical Idealism” (1877?) Box 79, document 3

A 9-page MS written on Royce’s 1877 summer stationery (embossed), very carefully written out, as if for publication. The MS is incomplete.

An earlier draft of this piece may have rested in the old Box C, document 16. Autograph A, notebook B.12(II).

Royce bases this essay on Hans Vaihinger’s “Hartmann, Duhring and Lange, On the History of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century: A Critical Essay.” (1876) Royce admires Lange’s limitation of philosophy to the theory knowledge unlike the dogmatic Hartmann basing it all on the unconscious, and Duhring, the materialist who limits all to facts only. Lange’s history of materialism had just at that point been translated into English.

Royce shows himself (page 7) opposed to dogmatists at the start of what is supposed to be an investigation.

“For the secrets of experience are inexhaustible in number and variety, as inexhaustible in fact as life itself, and there will always be new problems enough at any rate, even if the old problems do not, as has been so often the case in the past, arise anew from the tombs in which we thought they had been finally laid, to trouble our security by their questions. Synthesis, therefore, scientific synthesis of observed phenomena, explanation on the basis of experience, systems, if you will, also that seek to give as good an account as is possible of what has thus far been done, all these things let us have; but dogmas about the innermost constitution of the universe, claims of knowledge of the essence of things, whether as matter or as spirit, all such things as these must be definitively excluded. Such then, in brief, is the position of Lange.” (7)

Notice Royce’s insistence on starting hypothetically, and his resistance to at least certain ontological statements. He remains largely neo-Kantian.

Evaluation: An important early writing, as a report on German thought in 1879.

66. **Untitled (1877?)**
Unpublished
Box 79

A 9-page MS, with page 1 missing. A fragment concerning the difficulty of keeping practical and speculative thinking distinct and clear. Royce explains how our irrational elements (emotion, instincts, etc.) are involved in our rational enterprising. It shows Royce’s efforts to adhere rigorously to the scientific method of founding his basic world view. “It is certain that our views as to the world in general, as to the relation of our ideals to reality, as to our place among other beings, will have a very considerable practical effect upon ourselves, in our characters and lives.” (5)

Royce states that “[t]o be too absolute at our very starting point, to affirm our adhesion to one method of solving our problem, or to the other, to place ourselves in positive opposition to the spirit we have defined to be that of our age as distinguished from others, or to declare a full adhesion to it, anything of this kind would be, as we conceive, improper, because too hasty. Is one wholly given over to the scientific method?” (8-9)(at this point the manuscript breaks off.)

[Might this be one of many writings composed with his dissertation in mind? It is carefully thought out.]

Royce says, interestingly, that he intends to follow the “train of thought” of this. The MS ends, however, soon after he declares this intention.

An estimate for the place and date: Boston, summer 1877.

67. Lectures to Berkeley Classes (fall 1878)
Unpublished
Box 58

Box 58 begins with a page of explanatory notes by Wells.

Next, a 1-page printed program of the lectures is included. The “Lectures” that follow in this box are fragmentary and overlapping.

The HARP draft list of Box 58 contents are noted where it gives contradictory information to the MS itself.

Introductory Note:

On a 1-page MS note (on a 3 by 8 inch piece of paper) Royce writes a note to introduce the lectures as follows:

“Lectures Introductory to Philosophy, Berkeley, 1878. Delivered during the first term of the yr. The course was planned at twelve lectures. Programs distribute at the opening. Examinations cut of the last two lectures. Lecture VIII was made up mainly from Lecture II of the Baltimore Kant course. Lectures IX & X were entirely *Extempore*. - In substance they were an extension of the conclusions of the degree essay. The course was dialectically a tolerable success & pedagogically a monstrous failure.”

Lecture I: No Title

A 40-page MS, dated October 29, 1878. He outlines where he is going to with the lecture series. He raises issues dealt with in his dissertation, confirming his note in his introductory note , above “an extension of the conclusions of the degree essay.” The MS is written on three different kinds of paper: one embossed (in upper left corner) with a small star within a shield, the second with an embossed circle with the word “Congress,” and the third a scroll with “Golden Gate.”

Royce breaks this lecture down into ten sections which may or may not correspond to sections in manuscripts below.

Note: Royce makes the following points in this lecture:

- (a) All thought is in Time, and parts of a train of thought are successive.
- (b) Judgment is the fundamental element of thought, since subject and predicate “exist only in their mutual relations in consciousness [in judgment].” (page 12)
- (c) “Philosophy always treats of Thought as Thought. That is, it abstracts from the subject-matter, and treats of Thought about any and all subject-matter.” (page 17)
- (d) “If I think about things, I may not think as I will, even if I keep within the bounds of logical method; but I must conform my thought to the nature of things.” (pages 20-21) [**NB: the**

realism involved.]

(e) After Kant's critique appeared, "the most notable monograph treating this subject alone is the work of Schopenhauer: *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*." (page 25)

(f) Royce notes "the philosophic method" to be an analysis going to ultimate elements which finally need to be interpreted and then synthetic movement into organized whole. Notice the presence of the word "interpretation" as the act of introspection which links these two movements (analysis and synthesis).

Second Paper (Lecture I): "An Elementary Analysis of the Thinking Process"

Headed in red by Royce at the top of the page "Lectures on Logic" 80/Lectures on Philosophy and Lectures on Modern Thought" (indication Royce re-used this paper in later lectures in 1880). Royce heavily underlines the MS in places.

A 24-page MS cover 6 sections (although there is no "section 1" heading), apparently fragmentary. Outside of Royce's notes in red ink, no specific date for this version, which appears in the 1878 sequence of lectures. Indeed, this "Lecture I" appears to introduce an entirely different series of talks more concerned with logic.

Royce has three senses of analysis: of grammar, of rhetoric, and of language and propositions. Re: Realism, Royce distinguishes between "formal truth" and "material truth."

Formal truth does not necessarily represent a meaningful statement by the truth-speaker. Rather, it is a meaningful proposition. That which is "more" than meaningfulness is that which is required before material truth is had.

Lecture 2: "The Nature of the Judgment" [HARP lists as "untitled"]

A 12-page MS, delivered October 31, 1878. Royce continues with "section 6" from the above "second paper, Lecture 1," and picks up with section 7 on page 9, continuing through section 9. In this lecture, he focuses on the central act of truth seeking. But this lecture seems to pick up on points made in the previous MS, "second paper" Lecture 1.

Section numbers used here and in the next MS do not correspond with Royce's *Primer of Logical Analysis*.

Fragment:

This next 3-page MS, headed "Lecture III," continues with section 10.

Untitled Fragment

This MS, the fifth MS in this box, written on full pages, begins with a page 26 and continues to 43. This MS is dated October 31, 1878.

Untitled Fragment [HARP lists this as Lecture IV: Of the Nature of Judgment]

This 49-page MS, the sixth MS in this box, written on half-sheets, with pages 1 and 2 missing. (No date or title, therefore.) FMO, however, in his earlier notes says this was delivered on Nov. 7, 1878, and that it is titled “Lecture IV: Of the Nature of the Judgment; Second Study.” Not clear now where this information was obtained. It is not marked on the MS.

Royce ideas here: Any synthesis by the mind is formed through will activity. **Note:** Royce using modes of “will activity.” See page 5 of the MS. On pages 45-46, note that the desire for the conclusion leads one to find the appropriate premises.

Lecture 6: “The Knowledge of Nature: First Discussion: Preliminaries and Discussion”

A 47-page MS on half-sheets, this lecture was delivered on November 19, 1878. He summarizes this lecture on pages 42-45 of the MS.

Lecture 7: “The Knowledge of Nature: Second Discussion: Historical”

[There is a typo in the HARP list, calling this a second lecture “VI”]

A 45-page MS on half pages. FMO has sketched out the substance as follows:

- A. Various views of the knowledge of nature: On relation of Thought to the External World. Positions are divided into two following classes:
 - I. Do we or do we not have knowledge of a world independent of our Thought?
 - (a) Yes, these are realistic views, pages 3-12. Four versions: naïve, critical, transfigured realism, Spinozism.
 - (b) No: Idealistic: Four versions: Solipsistic, Berkeleyan idealism, absolute idealism.
 - (c) Neither yes nor no: We don’t know. Skeptical theories: ancient, Hume.
 - II. How do you explain your belief that we do have this knowledge?
 - (a) Innate tendencies to believe
 - (b) Inner prejudices that are irresistible, but not necessarily giving us truth.
 - (c) Product of simple experience (see British empiricists)
- B. (pages 25-45) An Historical Sketch. This is a foreshadowing of *SMP*.

Descartes (26-33) His analysis of doubt leads him to a point of constructive synthesis, bringing back many truth of traditional understandings, as if self-evident.

Royce’s evaluation of Descartes is important: Royce points out that Descartes accepted as given and certain the results of the exact sciences of his day and that all he did was try and show that if these sciences were already certain, their philosophical basis of certainty must be a basis of any ideas in the human mind.

Royce says Descartes “in vain endeavors to answer how clear and distinct ideas enable us to pass to an objective certainty of the existence of real external things.” (33) **NB:** Royce

says nothing of Descartes's method or of his provisional rules of moral activity.

Spinoza (33-38) Spinoza denies the sharp distinction between mind and external object. "They really are one. What is actual and substantial is at once thought and the being external to thought. True and substantial Being has two attributes."

Royce has a very high appraisal of Spinoza. Royce admires hidden and recently discovered Spinoza as hero of humanity. Spinoza's "solution to the problem is one of the profoundest of the products of the human intellect." (37)

The best philosophical work since Spinoza's work, says Royce, seems to be a rewriting of Spinoza. (58)

Leibniz (39-40) Royce sees that Leibniz has contributed to the problem of individualism, without which we would lack clarity.

British Experience School (41-45) Royce only sketches here, but grasps clearly how all knowledge is proportioned to experience, without escape.

68. "A Monkish Chronicle,"
***The Berkeleyan*, vol. VI (Dec. 1878): 265-80.**

Published in *The Berkeleyan* vol. VI (Dec. 1878): 265-80. Royce did not sign this piece as its author. FMO recalls no letter by Royce in which he refers to this article. Yet, Berkeley archivist Joseph C. Rowell, who knew Royce well, attributes this article to him, as does Loewenberg in his "List." (It is very telling that, in Box 142, folder 2 in "Loewenberg's Check List," [the smaller notebook], Loewenberg lists "The Monkish Chronicle" on the third to last page in the list he compiles of Royce's writings (e.g., on the same page as, "The Life Harmony" and "Mind and Reality.")

A quasi-imaginative piece that brings out the character of Royce's thought and his longing for community. No manuscript of this published article appears to be available in HARP. But, a copy of this issue of the *Berkeleyan* may be found in Box 116, folder 23.

Ethically, it is a remarkable piece. Even without the Rowell and Loewenberg attributions, internal evidence certifies that no other contributor to the *Berkeleyan* in this period could have written this article, given the following elements:

- (1) Love of philosophy, literature and dialectical discussion predominant.
- (2) Individual human life is transient and sympathy for all men is required.
- (3) The author imagines Christian monastic life, alludes to the Bible, and refers to a Roycean favorite, *The Imitation of Christ*.
- (4) The characters in the "brotherhood" (Monastery) are just Royce's heroes: Augustine, Paul, Spinoza, Bruno, Schopenhauer, Gautama, Lucretius, Epicurus, Prometheus, Jacques, and Hamlet (269).
- (5) The author assigns the main role to "Br. Hamlet" rather than to the "injured and

glorified Titan” (Prometheus), because, the author says, Hamlet is “born to be a dreamer” and worthiest among men to be followed, since his life was either silent or “full of great words” and “little defaced by purposeless deeds.” This fits the Royce of 1878 very closely.

- (6) The author emphasizes Spinoza, whom he calls “Benedict,” and uses Platonic dialectic with reference to the Cave.
- (7) The author describes a community which closely reflects the German Club in which Royce took part during its weekly gatherings at Johns Hopkins. Royce had recently left the interactions of this club which contributed mightily to Royce’s feeling that it was “bliss to be alive” with those people.
- (8) Royce’s “culture shock” after leaving JHU’s intense intellectual milieu and encountering the “slow speed” pace of Berkeley students uninterested in philosophy would have triggered his memories of that “bliss to be alive” in community at JHU he had experienced so recently. [Cf. *Letters* 60, 66.]

Evaluation: Relying on both the internal and external evidence (including the Rowell and Loewenberg verdicts), FMO believes this piece to be by Royce. FMO thinks the piece is an important one, an expression of Royce’s longing for a male community life after 20 years largely without it. Finally, this article appears to be an early articulation of the idea of the “Beloved Community” long in advance of its explicit formulation in *PC*.

69. “Schiller’s Ethical Studies,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 12 (1878): 373-92.

Critical Edition Consideration: The *Critical Edition* board needs to determine whether it simply accepts Loewenberg’s judgment, and in effect republishes *Fugitive Essays* (with perhaps the omission of a final essay or two), or whether it will range wider and critically reproduce more of Royce’s work, written while an instructor at UCB.

70. Berkeley Lectures (1879) Box 59

This course of lectures proceeds from Descartes to Kant. The purpose is to see the purpose of human thought. Royce announces that he will show the significance, but that is not reflected in the text. Perhaps he makes an *extempore* conclusion at the final lecture on February 25

Lecture I: “Introductory”

Delivered January 21, 1879. A 36-page MS.

Lecture II: “DesCartes and Spinoza”

A 7-page outline MS more than a continuous text. Given January 28, 1879. **Note** that Royce is using Toland’s criticism of Spinoza and Bayle’s Dictionary article on Spinoza, as

his sources of modern interpretation.

Lecture III: “Cartesianism (concluded) and English Empiricism from Locke to Hume”

A 28-page MS, delivered on February 4, 1879. The more accurate title of this lecture would be “Spinoza.”

Lecture IV: “The English Philosophy, the Eighteenth Century”

A 19-page MS, delivered on February 11, 1879, on Berkeley and Hume. Although Hume is omitted in the text, Royce may have treated him *ex tempore*.

Lecture V: “The Continental Philosophy of the 18th Century”
[HARP lists this as “Leibniz’s Life.”]

This MS is a bit scrambled. First comes the sub-topic “Leibniz’s Life” (without a description of the general topic), a 3-page MS. Then comes a 25-page MS of “The Philosophy of Leibniz. They are dated February 18, 1879. The first 3-page MS is to be inserted on page 2 of the 25-page MS.

Lecture VI: “Kant and the Significance of Modern Thought”
[HARP splits this MS into two, calling the first “Introductory to Kant”]

A 1-page MS, this begins as an introduction on the Wolffian school (headed “An Introductory to Kant”). Royce then begins the main lecture, a 26-page MS delivered on February 25, 1879.

This lecture is all on what Kant taught, and *not* on the significance of his thought.

Evaluation: For both boxes 58 and 59, some indication of certain seminal ideas would be well to mention in an introductory notice of these lectures.

Key ideas The rule of philosophical method requires both the analysis and synthesis united by an act of interpretation. Royce centers on Judgment as the fundamental element of human thought. He shows a considerable realistic emphasis at this point of his thought. His high regard of Schopenhauer comes through, especially for Spinoza. The attention to the exercises of will foreshadows his later emphasis on voluntary modes of action.

Royce’s recognizes the vanity of doing philosophy without also doing the history of philosophy. The work above provides a strong prelude to his first appointment at Harvard as Professor of the History of Philosophy.

**71. “The Practical Significance of Pessimism” (April 1879)
Box 51**

Given to the Berkeley Club. A 35-page MS, apparently complete. In comparison with the printed text in *Fugitive Essays*, section numbers and titles are dropped in the printed text. Otherwise this MS and the printed text in *Fugitive Essays* run in parallel.

**72. “On the Will as the Principle of Philosophy” (1879?)
Box 79**

A 67-page manuscript, slightly edited, on neat, fresh sheets. Clendenning describes this manuscript as “unnecessarily long and overly elaborate ... and labored at every point.” *Life* 82. Clendenning summarizes Royce’s basic argument in a few lines. In a Jan. 26 1879 letter to Gilman, Royce doubts whether Harris “will be long suffering enough to print it.” Two months later, Royce sends this MS to the *Princeton Review* “for a trial.” Since it was never published, the inference is that it was rejected.

In this text, Royce examines the notions of Self and Experience, rejecting both as Principles of Philosophy. He also carefully looks at the concepts of “external world” and “internal world,” and analyzes Time and Space (although not yet with a social dimension). He is clearly influenced here by Hodgson’s *Time and Space* and *The Philosophy of Reflection*.

In 1968, FMO found more positive themes in his *precis*.

Evaluation: The will continues as a radical element in Royce’s philosophy to the end, one of Schopenhauer’s influences.

**73. “Meditations before the Gate” (1879)
Box 126, folder 1**

As per page 113, Royce sits looking out over the bay on Feb. 12, 1879. The dream of twelve “Meditations before the Gate” arises before him. And he creates a 3 ½ -page Introductory Tableau for his proposed book. He then heavily edits these 3 ½ pages (Loewenberg entitles these 3 ½ pages “Meditation before the Gate” in *Fugitive Essays vii*. Royce, however, used the plural (“Meditations Before the Gate”) seemingly for the title of his proposed book. These 3 ½ pages seem the dynamic interactive tableau introducing his reader to yet another book not completed. See below for its outline. Certainly **this Introduction deserves entry into the *Critical Edition*.**

Loewenberg, in the printed version, omits the following phrases with ellipses:

“... and the thoughts that are given to me upon the problems of our human life are such as I shall seek to write down in what follows.” (page 6 of editor’s introduction in *FE*, page 113 of notebook)

Loewenberg: “But I have here... to speak not so much of Nature ...” (7, *FE*)

Royce: “But I have in this book to speak not so much of Nature ...” (115)

At page 116, he gives the outline for his proposed 3-part Book:

Book I.

Of the Nature of Philosophy, of its Ends & Methods.

Med. I: Of the Nature and End of Philosophy.

Med. II: Of the Method of Philosophy as a Product of Character.

Med. III: Of the Rationalistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. IV: Of the Romantic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. V: Of the Positivistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. VI: Conclusion on the Spirit and Method of Philosophy.*

Book II: Of Truth.

Med. VII: Of Knowledge in its Claims.

Med. VIII: Of Knowledge in its Analysis.

Med. IX: Of The World or of the Ideals of Knowledge.

Book III: Of Right.

Med. X: Of Self and non-Self in Ethics.

Med. XI: Of the World in Action.

Med. XII: Of the World in Contemplation.

[*Ten months before he died, Royce summarized the effort of the Doctrine of Life and the Nature of Truth and of Reality by connecting logical and metaphysical issues. He describes this effort as “it now seems to me not so much romanticism, as a fondness for defining, for articulating, and for expounding the perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the ‘spirit,’ in a sense which is indeed Pauline, but not merely mystical, superindividual; not merely romantic, difficult to understand, but perfectly capable of exact and logical statement.” (*The Hope of the Great Community*, 131)]

**74. “The Nature of Voluntary Progress,”
The Berkeley Quarterly vol. 1 (July 1880): 161-89.
Box 40**

The manuscript with this title contained in HARP (Box 40) is 51 pages long but has no page numbers (except for an added “(1)” on the first page). There are few paragraph indentations. The subject-matter tracks the published *Berkeley Quarterly*’s version, but the texts do not run in parallel. Although not paginated at the top of the page, it is divided at the bottom into five fascicles at about every dozen pages.

The manuscript is written in a light ink, not in Royce’s hand, with only occasional edits. After comparison with Katharine Head’s handwriting, FMO is almost certain from internal evidence that young Katharine Royce copied this draft which stands as the first paper in Box 40. (Katharine Royce’s distinctively characteristic initial capitals: “T’s,” “D’s and “P’s,” along with

her “the’s” and “that’s” supply the internal evidence which links even young Katharine’s handwriting of 1879 to that of hers in 1915 when she served as Royce’s amanuensis for drafting the close of Lecture 1 of his Extension Course in Ethics (currently found in Box 105, folder 4, Document 14).

An essay with the same title is printed in *Fugitive Essays* pages 96-132, yet (beyond an edited version of the first sentence) the texts do *not* appear to match.

Until we find the text of the *Berkeley Quarterly*, we don’t know if the *FE* text tracks that language.

Evaluation: Given how central voluntarism is in Royce’s thought throughout his corpus, this early witness (in addition to Loewenberg’s selection of the piece for *FE*) is very significant.

75. “Some Illustrations of the Structure and Growth of Human Thought” (1880) Box 80

A 62-page MS.

FMO sees this as almost certainly an address given to the Berkeley Club, January 8, 1880. (*See Letters* 74: “I have just come home, after reading a terribly dry and long-winded discourse ... to the Berkeley Club.”) For a description of the club, and Royce’s involvement, *see* W.C. Bartlett’s *Historical Sketch of the Berkeley Club*.

Royce’s key question in this address: how much and what part of all science is and must be either based wholly on experience, or based on pure assumptions? (3) Royce regards the question as both highly theoretical and extremely practical. (9)

Section I: Definitions and Explanations. (10-20)

Section II: The Evolution Theory of Thought. (20-34)

Section III: concerns The Structure of Science Illustrated (34-57) Royce inserts several diagrams in this part of the essay.

At page 45 “... wherever we have in science universal judgments, there we have ampliative thoughts. May we not now add that wherever we have prediction of experience determination beforehand of what we are to see, we also have a transcending of actual experience, and so truly ampliative thought?” *See also* pages 47-48. The importance of ampliative judgments: this is a strong critique of Spencer’s position that all of our thinking is reducible to experienced facts. Royce counters that, no, this is not the case. Our thinking itself adds something to our judgments. For example, the “all” in scientific propositions is ampliative. The assumption of a uniformity of nature is foundational to both Maxwell’s theory of heat and Venn’s logic. (57)

Section IV: A Few Practical Consequences (57-62)

Evaluation: Although Royce describes this as “terribly dry and long-winded,” his critical expression of science’s assumptions to use universal concepts and to transcend present experience marks a lifelong suspicion in Royce’s skeptical approach to knowledge. It is very interesting that, even at this point, Royce is drawing on the importance of specific illustrations.

76. “The Possibility of Experience” (1880?)

Box 80

An 11-page manuscript. Its date and topic fit Royce’s message to WJ on September 19, 1880. The central issue in the question here “what is experience?” is whether a series of states within experience can be known as a series. Without this, only a half philosophy.

From extrinsic notes by Royce, he was working on memory and the nature of experience at that time in Berkeley.

This essay basically states that there are two conditions in a series of conscious states (intelligible experience) that are required. “1. In one state there shall be possible a memory of previous states. 2. In the whole series of states there shall be found certain regularities or uniformities of sequence. The first of these conditions is necessary to make possible in any moment the transcending of that moment and of its data. The second condition makes possible any activity of classification and generalization, any notion of permanency in things or of fixity in the laws of phenomena.” (5-6)

Evaluation: This paper seems part of the Berkeley instructor’s search for the foundations of his thought. Here he includes the questioning of the possibility of memory (6-8).

77. “Unfinished Rewriting of an Essay in the Californian”

“Unfinished Rewriting of an essay in the *Californian*, on ‘The Decay of Earnestness’” (1881-84?) Published in 1881.

Later in a letter to WJ, 1891, Royce calls this first version too “effeminate.”

A 34-page MS with many sections from the published edition inserted on pages 2-5, 9, and 11-18. (Columns from the *Berkeleyan* are interspersed with Royce’s editing.) Pages 19-34 are all freshly drafted material. Page 1 is missing.

78. “Test of Right and Wrong” (1880)

Box 40

Published for the first time in *Fugitive Essays* pages 187-218. Delivered to the Fortnightly Club, July-September 1880. A 73-page MS.

The MS in Box 40 and the *FE* text run in parallel.

Evaluation: This is one of Royce's most important early essays.

**79. "On Purpose in Thought" (1880)
Box 40**

Read to the Baltimore Metaphysical Club, at whose meeting C. S. Peirce was elected its President. This document came from JHU. It is first published by Loewenberg in *Fugitive Essays* pages 219-260.

The MS in Box 40 is unpaginated, but is approximately 70 pages long. On page 237 of *FE* (the paragraph beginning "Whether omitted or not ..." the MS reads "Whether admitted or not ..." This appears to be an error.

Other than this one error, the manuscript and printed text run in parallel.

Evaluation: Another of Royce's most important early essays.

**80. "Shelley and the Revolution,"
The Californian, 1 (1880): 543-53.
Cf. Box 40**

Fugitive Essays reprints an essay with this same title but in an extended version, which includes 23 manuscript pages found in HARP Box 40.

**81. "Pessimism and Modern Thought,"
The Berkeley Quarterly, 2 (1881): 292-316 .
Box 126, folder 6**

Reprinted in *Fugitive Essays*. Skrupskelis notes that most of this essay was incorporated into *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. (BWJR:2 1176)

A fragment of this manuscript may be found in Box 126, folder 2. There are some markings on the first page of the MS: "pica cap" and "proof to Prof. Moses" - Moses was the editor of the *Berkeley Quarterly* - and "reverse final. M. Fell." Fell was most likely the typesetter.

The manuscript breaks at page 47. Then it adds pages 54-58 for the old, crossed-out 47-51. The MS pages 1-50 seem to be in Royce's hand, all in "fresh copy." The MS shows two breaks vis-à-vis the *FE* version and seems to have lost its three final sheets, 59-61. Four pages of the MS have been lost.

Except for these two “breaks,” the manuscript and published version run in parallel.

A partial MS for this paper may be found in Box 105, folder 5. Along with the essay “Tennyson and Pessimism” (1886, *see below*), this piece bears witness to Royce’s grappling with the issue of pessimism during his instructorship period at Berkeley.

Note to Scholars:

Royce’s evaluation of pessimism may be found in several places, including this piece: “The Practical Significance of Pessimism,” “Tennyson and Pessimism,” “The Problem of Job,” and Royce’s posthumous article “Nietzsche.” He treats pessimism in all of these. The choice of one seems adequate. FMO has been impressed by the Nietzsche article because it represents his most mature thought on pessimism.

In the later Nietzsche article, Katharine Royce was concerned that readers might get an erroneous impression of the mature Royce. This concern is evident in a letter she wrote it on December 8, 1916 to Ellery Sedgwick, editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, recommending that Kernan’s “Note” (which explains how Royce came to write the Nietzsche article) be given prominence in order to forestall readers from thinking that Royce had changed his mind in the last couple of years.

Kernan’s note read as follows:

“This essay on Nietzsche was recently found among the posthumous papers of Professor Royce. It will perhaps appear strange to man that the author of *The Duties of American in the Present War* and of *The Hope of the Great Community* should have found so much, not merely of interest, but of sound doctrine – ‘matter for the strengthening of hearts’ – in the philosopher now claimed by modern Germany as its prophet and oracle. In reply it can only be said that modern Germany, and not Nietzsche, is at fault. Professor Royce’s thesis is that only as a prophet of the soul, the portrayer of an ideal, is Nietzsche to be understood. The revolt which he preaches is not so much a revolt against others as against the self, against the narrow or commonplace or merely habitual self in the interests of ideal selfhood. And in a sense it may be said that the rigid *Weltpolitik* of modern Germany is the antithesis of the philosophy of Nietzsche. For all politics or statecraft is relative to a stereotyped world, and with such a world Nietzsche has nothing in common, - ‘All this is poverty and a miserable ease,’ - and the hour that he exalts is the hour ‘in which not only your happiness but your reason and virtue as well become your loathing.’ – W. Fergus Kernan.

82. Essays and Fragments (1879-81) Box 60

This box contains a collection of essays organized around several themes. A key theme is the “Purpose of Thought.” Indeed, “On Purpose in Thought” was published for the first time in *FE* (*see Loewenberg’s introduction at page 3*). Nevertheless, in Box 60, we find several MS essays on the topic, at the date that Loewenberg gives for the *FE* essay, as well as essays relating to other topics.

These Box 60 documents are organized as follows.

a. The Purpose of Thought (1879-80)

An 8-page MS. Wells calls this a “[f]ragment of an essay finished in another form namely the ‘On Purpose in Thought’ from *Fugitive Essays*.” Thus, these notes are only an early attempt at the subject-matter tackled in the *FE* printed text version, a 41-page essay. (*See Life* 86.)

Evaluation: A published version of this fragment appears in *Fugitive Essays* at page 219 (a paper read to the Metaphysical Club at JHU) and is seminal to Royce’s teleological method, his constant stress on the purpose of an idea.

b. Sketch of the Infinitesimal Calculus

An 11-page MS, with no given date. The MS is divided into 19 small sections or propositions. The fragment begins with “I. Introductory.” This essay concerns an analysis of “psycho-consciousness.” “Only by Reflection, therefore, do we get the notion of an Unit.” This piece appears to deal with Hodgson, who calls his own work “The Philosophy of Reflection.”

Royce shows himself to be much influenced by James, even at this early point.

The second section is titled “II. The Measurement of Continuous Quantity.”

This is a very interesting effort to describe Royce’s beginning analysis of present consciousness through interests plus attention plus reflection, and thence projection of past, future, and possible. This leads to his focus on the unit, and building blocks of mathematics.

Evaluation: Perhaps his letters to James from this period are more descriptive of this important starting point in Royce.

c. Outlines of Critical Philosophy

A 20-page MS, beginning with “Chap. I Introductory,” but no other subdivision appears to be included in this fragment. (Although there is a “-” mark later.)

Because “critical philosophy” is always associated with Kant, this may have been prepared in contemplation of a Kant presentation.

In this introductory section, Royce emphasizes the radical question of “why,” that is, the purpose of thought, the aim of our thinking. Using the instance of a hungry person finding food, he describes an inquiring process that perhaps pre-dates John Dewey’s famous “Logic of Inquiry,” very practical, purposeful and filled with critical attention to whether the evidence is adequate to making a clear statement as to which statement is truly food.

Evaluation: This is full of foreshadowing of things to come.

d. The Work of Thought: The Thought of the Truth of Propositions

A 13-page MS, this is a study of assertions which contain propositions. We need to discover whether the proposition is true or false. Royce analyzes the truth of propositions about the future, then the truth of assertions about the past, then as to propositions about the present. As to the present, the truth probably most properly consists in their sincerity, whereas truth about the past and future are judged differently.

Royce then goes into conditional types of assertion. People make assertions about a world of reality beyond possible experience. To be meaningful, the assertions must be true or false. How do you classify that kind (the possible kind) of assertion?

Royce then goes into the four types of assertions - past, present, future, possible.

e. “Thought = Purposes”

Royce begins this MS with a definition of the psychologist: “The psychologist studies human thought, as he studies all other mental facts, for the sake of discovering the mechanical laws according to which thought-processes take place.” Then Royce goes on to deal with the job of logician, who, he says, “treats thought as an instrument useful for the discovery of truth, and investigates the conditions whose observance makes the instrument useful and trustworthy for getting truth.” (pages 1-2 of the MS) [Royce does not divorce the concept of “searching for truth” from “searching for consistency.”]

Royce digs down to the critical level in this piece, beyond the aims of the psychologist and the logician to ask the critical question: “Is the goal of human thought identifiable or attainable?”

NB: at page 8 of this MS, Royce writes “I. The Purpose of Thought as the Attainment of Truth.” This directly parallels the heading on page 221 in *FE*’s “On Purpose in Thought.” Indeed, much of the MS language is similar to this part of the *FE* essay. Thus, this MS appears to be an early draft of the “On Purpose and Thought” essay.

f. The Interpretation of Consciousness [?]

There is in fact no title to this MS, merely a 1-page MS, nor any Wells note. This title appears, however, in the handwritten index to the Royce papers. It is unclear therefore where this title came from. Indeed, the subject matter is the problem of synthetic judgments *a priori*.

g. The Scope and Purpose of Psychology

Royce dates this in his own hand November 1880, adding “Read to the Psychology Club at its first meeting at Berkeley.”

A 33-page MS. “Definitions are always arbitrary.” Royce goes on to show the shortcomings of definitions. Nevertheless, he spends his first section coming to a working definition of psychology. “Psychology seeks to be a science of experience ...” (page 8).

Section II (starting on page 11), having defined psychology, under what conditions does it work? What axioms govern its operation.

At page 15, Royce uses the example of testing the “hardness of iron.” This is almost certainly an echo of Peirce’s article “How to Make Ideas Clear.” The test is going to be Mills’ “permanent possibilities of sensation.” If at anytime, anywhere, something can be perceived as hard, we call it hard. It doesn’t depend on a particular human state.

As far as psychology goes, we have to use a direct method.

Then Royce goes on to how psychology is developed. Descartes left much unexplained. (The pineal gland, where the body and soul came together, e.g.)

Mind as substance was the basic premise of the ontological roots of psychology. Familiar with the British School of Empiricism. Royce addresses Herbart, the father of physiological psychology. Royce mentions Fechner’s Psycho-Physical Law.

The minimum of time required to distinguish two sensations: Royce has his own theory of the time-span of a hummingbird.

Royce closes with a mere outline of the importance of psychology and its significance in estimating the trustworthiness of testimony.

Evaluation: On a scale of 1-10. This is about a 4 or 5.

**h. Reality and Consciousness (June [?] 1881)
Box 60**

Royce’s hand in red ink at top: “Vorarbeit to the Essay on ‘Mind & Reality’”
A 45-page MS, with page 7 missing.

Cf. Box 79, document 3, an unfinished MS after his “Mind Stuff” article of 1891.

This appears to be an incomplete MS (page 45 ends with an unfinished sentence).

This MS is preparatory to “Mind and the Reality.” He talks about judgments, nature and claims. Every judgment supposes there has been a past. Royce begins to criticize the assumptions that try to justify the claim of the existence of the external object.

Pages 21-22, Royce criticizes Spencer for putting forth obscure arguments. He quotes Spencer’s theories of psychology. He criticizes Spencer for generalizing too quickly, going from the present moment to a universal statement that “the object is invariably extended, but presently felt

extension does not give absolute invariability.” “No universal postulate can ever reach external reality as such. But examination may lead us to more definite and consistent fashions of making assumptions about external reality.” (MS pages 36-37)

Royce states that “In so far as they [judgments] conceive their subject-matter to be out of themselves, judgments always cut off their own way to the absolute justification of their claims through any process of direct comparison.” (37-38)

Royce closes with an interesting critique of people who make light of the Absolute. He critiques people who vacillate back and forth without any truth because they do not have an Absolute. (45)

83. “The Interpretation of Consciousness” (1880?) ***Unpublished*** **Box 79**

An incomplete 33-page MS. *See Letters*, 74, Royce to WJ Jan. 8, 1880, in which Royce describes the context in which it was written. This may belong along with one of the fragments in Box 60.

Royce regrets the superficiality of the thinkers of his day. “We live on the surface of things,” not grappling with issues of the deepest and highest import. (1) His call: We must go deeper. (3-4). On page 4, he turns to Shadworth Hodgson. (Royce was commissioned to write a review of Hodgson’s work for Harris’ *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, but never did. Perhaps this is a preparatory work for the never-written work).

“When reading him we feel we are in the presence of man who is fitted to be a true leader of thought.” (5) Royce bases this particular text on three of Hodgson’s works: 1. *Time and Space*, 2. *The Theory of Practice*, and 3. *The Philosophy of Reflection*. Yet, Royce focuses on the topic of the interpretation of consciousness, plus the immediate consequences of that theory.

Royce exposes Hodgson’s meaning of philosophy as an analysis of the ultimate terms in the sciences: mass, energy, potential and kinetic. He asks: what are their objects? (10) At page 11, he quotes “We find that we can ‘analyze the ultimate notions of science still farther, by looking upon them as phenomena relative to the percipients, and asking ourselves what features they possess in this their subjective character, in their character of states of consciousness as contradistinguished from their character of objects, or portions of an objective world.” (11-12) (*quoting* Hodgson.)

Royce asks if the interpretation of consciousness is to be a principal task of philosophy, to what does consciousness bear witness? (13) Royce answers “Upon the answer to this question, all philosophy will depend.” (13) Royce counters the idea of mind as an immaterial substance containing things. (15) He speaks of Hodgson’s three ingredients in consciousness: 1. The person having the feelings, 2. The objects around him, and 3. The activity of consciousness, or psychic activities.

Is one content of consciousness impossible without the other? By no means, says Royce. “Now it is plain that neither objects nor are ever given ‘*per se*, but always in connection with feelings and thoughts.’” (19) (*quoting* Hodgson.)

Royce wrestles with Hodgson, asking whether subject and object are modifications of consciousness. Royce carefully examines Hodgson’s basic distinction between primary consciousness and supervening consciousness (sometimes called “direct” and “reflective” consciousness). (24-25)

“Direct or separative consciousness springs from and depends upon primary consciousness, wherein is given only the flow of conscious states.” [NB: Notice this circa 1880 reflection on “the stream of consciousness” which James will discuss in his 1890 book *The Principles of Psychology*.]

Royce begins his conclusion by listing five consequences of this interpretation of consciousness. (30-31) Royce points to Hodgson as saying that philosophy, in its metaphysical branch, must consist of applying the reflective method to direct consciousness. (31) Only by applying the method of reflection to understand these direct objects that can we have a philosophy. (32) “In reflection in asking and testing the meaning of every notion or class of notions is the only final means of verification. Philosophy must be throughout a philosophy of reflection. The failures of metaphysics have been failures to apply the reflective method consistently and thoroughly. Our interpretation of consciousness has thus led us to see that if all objects of science and belief, all theories and speculations are founded in the last analysis upon a comparison and grouping of the phenomena of primary consciousness, then all testing and philosophical understanding of the products of thought must consist in reflection upon the process by which our notions have been formed.” The text breaks off after an incomplete question: “The question What? Must...”

Evaluation: Given Royce’s nearly simultaneous analysis of the actuality of the present moment, and its extensions to past and future, to social objects and possibilities, this hidden, unpublished response to and critique to Hodgson takes on a vast importance. Royce had dreamed of a new phenomenology (*see Royce’s* Diary entry, April 3, 1879 in *Fugitive Essays* 31). Here in this unfinished essay, he seems to have concurred with at least this much of Hodgson, that until we ask about meaning, and what the primary consciousness or stream of consciousness is offering, we are always dealing with phenomena. Notice that Kant had talked about a phenomenology, as had Hegel. Here is Royce talking about a phenomenology. About 20 years before Royce wrote his marginalia on Husserl’s *Ideen*.

**84. “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty,”
The Berkeley Quarterly, vol. 1 (October 1880): 311-16.**

A comparison of the *FE* and *BQ* versions needs to be done.

85. Three Essays (1881) Boxes 60-61

Wells note states that following three essays were originally bound together. Yet they have somehow been separated in the archives. The essay titles appear in red ink on one page (dated 1881). The first essay appears in this box. The last two essays are in the next box, 61.

a. “The Theory Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy” (1881) Box 60

Originally, a 96-page MS, although pages 6-39 are missing. The first page is numbered “1, 2, 3.”

After the 6-39 page gap, it jumps to section II, which is titled “Evolution as a Philosophical Doctrine.”

In this section, Royce acknowledges that some thinkers wish to make evolutionary theory into a basic philosophical position. He wants to test whether it deserves that rank. (1-5) Pages 6-39 are missing. At page 40, Section II of the MS begins with the heading “Evolution as a Philosophical Doctrine.”

He offers this definition: “Evolution, then, is for the present age, a philosophical doctrine whenever it is a doctrine about the universe as a whole. ... Any assertion about the world as a whole, must be tested by philosophy and cannot otherwise be tested.” (44) “Evolution is defined as the growth from the homogeneous and indefinite to the heterogeneous and definite. Can such progress be universal in a world subject to the conditions imposed upon all knowable reality by the thought that knows it?” (46)

Royce reasons as follows: “Science is very far from universality.” (42) “Any assertion about the world as a whole must be tested by philosophy, and cannot otherwise be tested.” (44) Royce offers two possibilities of evolution: endless growth or endless retrogression. If the latter is true, evolution is not a cheerful doctrine. (51) “Evolution is not an ethically important doctrine” since it lacks the presence of the eternal. (53) From a philosophical viewpoint, difficulties in evolution as a doctrine arise from “infinite time, infinite space, and infinite series of causes.” (54)

Royce next refers to Spencer’s principles. Spencer counters Wundt’s hypothesis. (65-66) In light of issues of infiniteness, Royce comes to the conclusion that “[t]he world cannot be a theatre of endless evolution,” and therefore evolution is not tenable as a philosophical doctrine. For if we suppose infinite space, mass, time, “then the evidence in favor of the law of universal evolution breaks down. This evidence is founded upon these physical laws, and amounts to nothing of [illegible] are not accurate.” (75)

According to Royce, this leaves us with the following possible evolutionary doctrines. “(1) The history of the universe is a series of rhythmic alternations of evolution and retrogression; (2) The universe tends toward some stationary condition of stable moving equilibrium ... (3) The universe, as the result of a creative fiat, has no infinite duration, and

develops or retrogrades just as its creator may desire.” (76-77) (On page 80, Royce inserts a German excerpt from his own notebook into this MS.) Then, calling his 1881 MS a “fragmentary sketch.” (86), he notes that, from a philosophic light, the creation hypothesis, “solves difficulties only by creating new and simply tremendous difficulties.” (87)

Near the close of the MS, Royce states, “the greatest weakness of evolution as a philosophical doctrine is first in this, that it is a doctrine using a very few meager conceptions as materials for building a philosophic scheme of reality,” and they are ill-handled. “After all the question, What is the world? will always be more important than the question “Whence comes and whether goes the world?” The evolutionary philosophy, in Royce’s view, has nothing to say about What is the world. (92)

“There is in fact very little connection between the *Origin of Species* and the meaning of life. My conclusion is that evolution has very little importance for general philosophy.” (94) Royce objects to making science into philosophy, and also to the “inquisitorial intolerance” which, in his opinion, the disciples of Spencer promote. Royce rebels against responses to evolution which grow out of Calvinism and the Athanasian Creed, and strongly asserts his desire for “freedom of thought.”

Royce summarizes the philosophical problems related to evolution as related to (1) conceptions of infinite time, (2) infinite space, (3) infinite series of causes and effects. Though these three conceptions, Royce claims, are necessary whenever we construct the notion of a world, still, to make these three conceptions consistent with a notion of eternal evolution is a difficult task. (54) Royce concludes that these three dimensions would require that the world cannot be a theater of endless evolution.

Royce gives different alternatives to infinite progress. One would be a rhythm of expansion and contraction (he does not find this an optimistic possibility). Or the world’s “history would be summed up in the words of [Mephistopheles?],” at which point Royce quotes a German passage [a loose translation - it is as good as it never happened], an eternal alternation between good and evil. Royce goes on to refer to Sisyphus.

“I must remark that the this hypothesis [of evolution] viewed solely in a philosophic light, solves previous difficulties only by creating new and simply tremendous difficulties.” (87) Royce quotes “Principal Caird, a theologian of undoubted piety and orthodoxy.”

Evaluation: The conclusion of Royce’s dedication to freedom of thought, against inquisitorial intolerance of thought deserves note.

b. “Matter & Consciousness (Fragment of this Essay)”
Box 61

A frontal attack on Grant Allen. But look at Volume 90’s document 4, “The Philosophical Interpretation of Evolution.” Even though this is written much later, in 1897. (The 1897 date comes from Loewenberg’s list.)

c. “Logic as an English Study”
Box 61

This manuscript seems *Vorarbeit* toward especially the preface to Royce’s *Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students*. But no parallel texts are easily discoverable between the MS and the published book. His references to Jevons and Boole are repeated in the *Primer’s* preface, but this MS is primarily concerned with the psychological difficulties of teaching college freshmen the study of logic. Royce was convinced the students needed this knowledge to compose sentences correctly.

Loewenberg lists this essay as unpublished. This essay is dated the same year that Royce published his first book, *Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students* (San Francisco: Bancroft 1881). See Skrupskelis *BWJR* 2:1176.

We may not have the full text here. The 44-page MS has a short introduction, three sections, a *Syllabus* and some concluding pages.

Royce states he wants to consider logic not in relation to mathematics but to English study. He aims at helping the scientific student at UCB, and wants to show the worth of elementary formal logic for them.

Section I (page 2): Royce notes that he designs this work for freshmen. The relations, the combinations, the assertions that the student must come to recognize.

Section II (page 10): Royce counters the objection that “logic is too abstract for us.” Royce states that it’s not as hard as Cartesian coordinates.

Section III (page 13): Royce states that the practice is good to counter instances of freshman “indefiniteness of expression.” He gives specific writing examples.

Forms of obscurity and ambiguity. Logic remedies this obscurity and ambiguity.

Royce quotes Professor Jevons’s *Studies in Reflective Logic*, and also refers to post-Boolean English logic.

Royce uses Jevons’s text almost throughout his entire life as a basic manual for logic. Here (33-36) Royce cites Jevons’s exercises for the students to work on.

Syllabus for a Course in Logic for the Use of Freshman Classes in Composition:

Eight numbered paragraphs (pages 38-40).

This “syllabus” seems to be more of a guide to his course than to the *Primer* itself.

Then, in four concluding pages, Royce admits defects in his previous teaching of logic that he had not used illustrations and examples sufficiently. He tells of a student in geology that he knew (about 74-75), for whom the illustrations made more of an impact than any other aspect of the class. This is probably an autobiographical reference to his own experience in LeConte’s geology class (where LeConte’s reflections on “the philosophy of human thought-growth” in the

context of evolution made a serious impact on Royce) (page 43).

Royce concludes with a factual description of his difficulty in teaching English composition to 60 practically illiterate students.

86. Manuscripts (circa 1880-81) regarding “Truth-Seeking”

Box 79

Box 125, folder 6

The essay “Doubting and Working” in *Fugitive Essays* (322-44) was, according to Loewenberg’s footnote, a “[r]evision of an earlier essay ‘The Work of the Truth-Seeker,’ read before the Literary Society.” (*FE* 322, n.1) Box 125, folder 6, folios 1 & 2, however, contain Royce’s lecture, “The Work of the Truth-Seeker,” written while an instructor at UCB. Its context and an extract seem noteworthy indeed.

a. “The Work of the Truth Seeker ca. 1878-1882” [FMO dates at 1880]

Box 125, folder 6

Two folios, of 24 and 28 manuscript pages respectively, (12 and 14 sheets written front and back), without page numbers. The manuscript is originally written in blue ink, and edited in black. In the first “folio,” Royce eventually leads into the problem “why should we be truth-seekers?” stating:

“To this problem we are led thus irresistibly. Here is a chaos of various minds, whose simpler ideas seem to vary very greatly, whose feelings grow so far asunder that each man becomes a mystery to his neighbor, whose conflicting opinions in consequence are all the results largely of accident, and certainly of narrowness of view. Yet it seems to be thought an excellent thing for each one of them to form fixed opinions about at least some matters, a sane undertaking of them to look for some sort of abiding truth, and a grand act to suffer loss or even death for the sake of the strongest and highest at least among one’s beliefs. Why should this be the case? What is the use of truth-seeking, when so little truth will ever be found on this planet? What is the worth of remaining true to one’s opinions, when everything tends to make them fleeting? These questions must, I think, come into the mind of every active person at some time during his life. I have not in the foregoing stated the sceptic’s [*sic*] case nearly as strongly as I could state it. The more you consider human knowledge the more you will see that some of the dearest pretenses are found upon examination to be only pretenses. And when you see this you are, if of vigorous mental constitution, once for all aroused from what a great philosopher called the ‘dogmatic slumber’ and sent out upon a new search. The questions you then propose to yourself can thus be stated: What kind of truth may I hope to discover? In what spirit ought I to search for truth? Am I to hope for much success? And to bear myself as one to whom truth will certainly be revealed if he but work for it? Or shall I in a humbler spirit say that I am probably to remain in doubt so long as I live? Or finally shall I, neither confident of success, nor resigned to defeat, rise with all my strength and declare that whether finding or baffled, whether a wanderer forever or one who at last is to reach secure harbor of faith, I will through confidence and through doubt, through good and through evil report, search earnestly for truth though I never find anything that

it is worth my while to call abiding? Some suggestions about the answer to this whole series of questions forms my subject in the rest of this lecture. And for the first, what is the spirit in which we should search for the truth that now, from this skeptical point of view, seems so far away from us.” (13-14)

At this point, Royce deletes several paragraphs.

Moreover, three manuscripts related to Truth-Seeking appear in Box 79, apparently related parts of a book (or three books) planned by Royce. None of these manuscripts appear to track the language of the “Doubt” essay in *FE*.

b. “The Truth-Seeking Instinct: A Study in Philosophical Analysis: In Three Books”

A 4-page MS outline that describes in some detail these planned books. Because of its Berkeley period view of Kant, it is reproduced in full as follows:

“Book I. Truth and Reality.

Chap. I. All investigators profess to be seeking truth, for the sake of truth. This search and the search after the purely advantageous as such contrasted. - Truth and assumptions concerning existence. - The postulates of the truth-seeking instinct. - The need of a critical philosophy.

Chap. II. The Case for Idealism. - Assumption as to the nature of existence ordinarily made. - Objections to such assumptions. Berkeleyan Idealism. - Re-analysis. - Idealism on the basis of the *cogito ergo sum* as ordinarily understood. - Sketch of the world of truth as conceived on this basis.

Chap. III. - Sceptical [*sic*] Analysis of Idealism. - The solipsistic consequence only avoided by an effort to maintain the doctrine of Cause. - Analysis of the self-consciousness, on which all depends, as a mere succession of experiences. - Experience philosophy pure and simple. - Positivism? - The misfortunes of the truth-seeking instinct illustrated. Examples of the results of the failure of the truth-seeking instinct as thus far criticized. - The skeptical side of Kantism and its results. - The various modes of escape. - The dispersion and scattering-abroad of philosophic thinkers from this point on.

Chap. IV. Essay of a building of the Notion of Reality. - The fundamental fallacies of the egoistic Idealism. - Analysis of the notion of Self. - The field of Knowledge as consisting of units of conscious activity. - Rejection of the idealistic formula. - Analysis of the notions of Succession and Experience. - The Present Moment. - Its character as excluding Past and Future. - The forms of assertion. - The Hypothetical relation. - The Symbolic Relation. - The Real as the whole sum of conscious moments. - Succession as an unreality. - The world of truth as the world of the eternally Real.

Chap. V. The enlightened [*sic*] Truth-Seeking Instinct.

Book II. The Logical Problems.

- Chap. I. The work of science, the ends of science, the divisions of science according to method.
 - Chap. II. The Reasoning process in general.
 - Chap. III. Synthesis of the constitutive principles. - Princ. Of [*sic*] Least Effort. -
 - Chap. IV. The Ideas in themselves.
 - Chap. V. Number and Substance.
 - Chap. VI. Space
 - Chap. VII. Cause and Uniformity.
 - Chap. VIII. Of Laws, Methods, and Postulates, as non-critically defined. - Definitions of a Law. Induction and its basis. - Probability. - Hypothesis and theory. - Conditions of every Cosmology.
-

Book. III. - The Practical Problems.

- Chap. I. - Worth and Right and the nature of ethical and of aesthetic truth.
- Chap. II. Analysis of the notion of the Individual.
- Chap. III. Work for Self, and work for Not-Self.
- Chap. IV. - Analysis of the notion of Progress.
- Chap. V. - Pessimism, Optimism, and the Worth of the World.
- Chap. VI. Recapitulation of the analysis of the Truth-Seeking Instinct.

c. “Book I: Truth and Reality, Chap. I: Of Wonder as even yet the Beginning of Philosophy.”

A 9-page MS, apparently reflecting Book I Chapter I of the above outline. “Wonder” as a word doesn’t appear until page 8 (“the fruitful and skeptical wonder which is ever the beginning of philosophy.” (8) However, Royce implies a particular sense of wonder insofar as he suggests the contrast of the progress of science and the many fulsome pseudo-philosophers, who vent systems complete, who dogmatize that they have found the wisdom of life.

“We have then to show how the first assumptions of scientific research are themselves unproved, while they are necessary to the proof of the whole body of scientific conclusions, and that these unproved assumptions are really chosen because they are agreeable to a certain non-rational and powerful instinct which itself gives soul and purpose to all our rational processes. Thus the way will be opened to the definition of the truth-seeking instinct itself as distinguished from the truth it seeks and from the consciously defined methods of empirical research.” (7)

“We shall have to develop the strange phenomenon that on the one hand no reasoned truth would be sought or obtained without the presence of the instinct to give strength and earnestness in the search, faith in the principles that must be assumed, and power to choose the postulates that must guide the work; while on the other hand the instinct itself that thus directs the labor of rational investigation is of its nature not rational, doing for the whole body of scientific problems what is forbidden in the investigation of each special problem, viz., assuming the most important truths, begging the great questions, maintaining without reflection doctrines of the vastest import.” (8)

Royce's hoped-for goals in this book: "We shall be prepared once more to traverse the well-known path that leads from the logical outset to the elaborate results of human thought. We shall hope to note by the way some few of the means whereby is rendered so easy that confident acceptance of the first dogmas and that accurate attainment of the resulting beliefs which we find in all who follow the lead of science. The result of our labors, if their [*sic*] is any result, will be a contribution to the Critical Philosophy, to that kind of philosophic research in other words for which human knowledge is less a system of dogmas to be formulated than a product of conscious activity to be made a subject for reflection." (9)

Royce says that this wonder is not rational, it is an instinct. But he certainly agrees with Aristotle that wonder is the beginning of wisdom. Royce's practicality comes out on page 9: "And doubtless we shall be led in the end to study the practical bearing of our conclusions, since no philosophic thinking is worthy of the name which does not ultimately tell for the progress of an enlightened Ethics." (9)

Evaluation: To FMO, this seems a very important beginning of his book on the Truth-Seeking Instinct. Even though he left the book incomplete, and it was never published, these thoughts dominate and guide his own philosophy until his death, "gives soul and purpose to all our rational philosophies." (7) It is tied in with the non-rational factors in consciousness, with the demand for the practical, and especially the ethical.

d. "The Postulates of Truth-Seeking. Chap. I. The Fundamental Postulate of All Truth-Seeking."

A 6-page manuscript. In this last document, he goes on to describe "postulates" relating to truth-seeking, and that they are "the theoretical assumptions that we make either in setting out on every search for truth, or in attempting to find some one definite species of truth." (2) The document is a strange balance of Royce's recognition of theoretical wonder with the need for pragmatic results.

"1. By seeking Truth I mean, trying to widen one's circle of knowledge without having regard to any of the so-called practical benefits that may be expected to result from possessing knowledge." (1)

**87. "George Eliot as a Religious Teacher,"
The Californian, 3 (1881): 300-310.**

Besides revealing how strongly George Eliot impacted him, this essay shows Royce mining for religious nuggets.

Evaluation: This article is a genuine candidate for the *Critical Edition*.

88. “Doubting and Working,”
***The Californian*, 3 (1881): 119-37.**

In *FE*, the essay is described as a revision of an earlier essay, “The Work of the Truth-Seeker.” Several manuscripts on the topic of “truth-seeking” may be found in Box 79 (*see above*; *cf.* Box 125, folder 6, Royce’s UCB lecture “The Work of the Truth-Seeker.”)

Evaluation: Loewenberg, Clendenning and Jacqueline Kegley all emphasize the importance of this article. It combines Royce’s ethical premise that if the action of the human spirit – whether doubting, hypothesizing, choosing or acting, etc. – are all moral actions with Royce’s method in philosophizing that uses wise doubting to discover further truth.

89. “‘Mind-Stuff’ and Reality” (July 1881)

Written in March 1881, this piece was published in July. In Part I, Royce attempts to criticize both Prof. Clifford and F.W. Frankland for their doctrine of mind-stuff. He accuses them of mixing categories, mind and matter, and finds that the mixture doesn’t work. Skrupskelis notes that Royce will make a positive statement of doctrine that will follow in a later paper: “Mind and Reality.”

For Royce’s own view of this article, *see Letters* at 96-97 (a letter to Williams James) in which he talks about this article. Royce and James are tip-toeing around critical possibilities.

90. “Before and Since Kant,”
***The Berkeley Quarterly*, vol. II (August 1881): 134-50.**

There is no evidence of either a manuscript or *Vorarbeit* of this published article in HARP.

The article celebrates the centenary of the publication of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. “The result of the first *Kritik* alone is, that we all now live, philosophically speaking, in a Kantian atmosphere.” (134)

The article focuses on the philosophy of nature (not epistemology or phenomenology as such).

This is not Royce’s most important paper on Kant. Yet it does display his grasp of English and German philosophy. He criticizes Descartes carefully and finds Spinoza’s system its perfect development.

Royce opposes the British empiricist and rationalist German philosophies of nature, then moves to a middle position of harmonizing both tendencies through Kant’s union of sense data with *a priori* forms. Royce ends with Schopenhauer as the greatest philosopher after Kant, and as presaging the return-to-Kant movement.

The turn to recognize the purpose of our thinking – “what is it really” – leads to a central realization of a theory of knowledge. Already, Royce is showing sensitivity to the irreversibility

of past facts and actions. (142) He finds both in sensation and in rational principles the sources of necessary truth.

The nature of the paper excludes a detailed treatment of Hegel's philosophy. But it does show how a once extinct Schopenhauer had his reputation revitalized so that around 1860, Schopenhauer became the rage in Germany. Royce shows familiarity with the authors of the "return to Kant movement" (148) and closes by showing the ethical importance of this fundamental concept of philosophy. Only "through this spontaneous activity from within, and not through any conceivable influence alone from without ... can consciousness develop and grow ..." as vigorously as it did in the philosophy of Kant.

Evaluation: There is better Royce work on Kant.

**91. Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress"
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. XIII (October 1881):
360-81**

This article was read at Saratoga for (not by) Royce. The piece is more significant than the earlier piece on Kant discussed above ("Before and Since Kant"). About eight pages of the present essay were incorporated into *RAP* with heavy changes.

In this piece, Royce furthers the work he had done in his dissertation. This is the piece to which William James will respond. James appreciated the first section, but claimed not to understand the second (on needed reform). See *Life* at 102-05 regarding Royce's thinking at this stage, and the presentation of the paper at Saratoga. Regarding this stage of Royce's reflections, Clendenning's exposition of this paper is sound. He notes this piece as one of three which brought Royce's early philosophical thinking to its climax in "modern phenomenism." (102) WJ appreciated the paper's first part but said he did not understand the second. Royce himself agreed with WJ's appraisal and had his doubts about the Saratoga paper's second part on the "needed reform of the critical philosophy." He too found it obscure.

Extracts toward synthesizing the first part:

- "There is something dramatic or often to be called romantic, in an ontology." (361)
- In efforts at philosophy, a little fragment of ontology often remains. Thus, "to quench some craving, Kant kept the Things-in-themselves." (362)
- Royce tries to bring a critical mentality to the whole problem, pointing out the failure of dogmatic monism in many forms. (365-67)
- "Only against dogmatic metaphysics as such do I war. The critical philosophy holds no theoretical opinion sacred, just as it regards no earnest, practical faith as other than sacred." (369) Royce insists on arguing to a metaphysical position.
- The result is that all monism fails. (370)
- Royce judges inadequate any theory that has not faced the epistemological problem of how the individual human mind grasps the ultimate nature of things. He points out "this is the great mystery that critical philosophy seeks to remove by denying the premises upon which the belief in this mystery rests, viz.: the possibility of an Ontology, and the

supposed nature of the ideal absolute knowledge. Critical philosophy knows, as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson says, nothing of an Ontology, but much of a Metaphysic.” (371)

- He goes on to quote some post-Kantian thinkers.

Then his second part, which James criticized as unclear and weak:

- “Our view (with Kant) would make all the world of reality immediately subject to a unity implied in that present act by which this world is projected from the present into a conceived but not given infinite space and time.” (378)
- This knocks out the *Ding an sich* (by which Royce says even Kant was fooled).

Royce concludes with ten doctrines that he holds. His whole positive suggested reform hangs on his analysis of the Present extending itself into past and future consciousness.

Evaluation: This article is important for seeing the development of Royce’s thought, but still not the best of Royce’s work on Kant. It is *not* adequate to predict where his positive, constructive thought will lead him.

92. “Reality and Consciousness” (1881-82) Box 79

A 30-page MS on fresh pages, slightly edited. He has written his critique of mind-stuff authors, and now prepares to write his own positive piece on the subject.

Written after “Mind-Stuff and Reality,” *Mind*, 6 (1881): 365-77. May be considered as preparatory work for his construction of “a positive doctrine as to the nature of knowable reality.” (9) Ultimately this positive doctrine is published as “Mind and Reality” in *Mind*, 7 (1882): 30-54. (*See* below.)

Royce begins with the common objection that the only thing we can know about A and B is that we are knowing it now. We don’t know it for other people. It is only in the here and now in which a subject can make an assertion. Can we grasp something other than the present moment? The psychological fact that we can have a thought?

Royce calls a not-carefully-handled distinction between external and internal consciousness “the first metaphysical sin.” (14) He goes to the questions “what is the conscious state? How long does it endure? How many ticks of a watch make up one state of consciousness?” He analogizes a melody. (19-20)

Autobiographical Note: “I lately saw an old Mexican farmer driving along a steep dry hillside...” (21-22)

Of this analysis of the Mexican farmer, Royce says “the mental picture of the scene is an internal fact, the conscious attribution of a peculiar significance to this picture as the representative of a past fact is also an internal reality, but that past fact itself, as past, is an external fact, only mediately known in the present judgment, and not immediately knowable at all.” (23-24)

The action of the present moment becomes his reality. Everything else, including all possible worlds, is all external.

Royce concludes by noting that the problem of knowledge then becomes: What is meant by external reality? We make assertions about something other than the present moment, pretended to be knowledge if they are not direct knowledge in the present moment. Since no conscious moment is directly accessible to another “[I]n what sense and by what right are they knowledge at all?” (30)

Evaluation: Important for Royce’s intellectual development in 1881. Not as important as “Mind and Reality,” directly below.

93. “Mind and Reality” ***Mind* 7 (Jan 1882): 30-54.**

Published in 1882, this is a very important work.

From this article Royce pulled several excerpts to be included in *RAP*; specifically:

- The first is from page 30-31 of this article (inserted into *RAP* 338-40).
- The second is from pages 34-41 in the article (inserted into *RAP* at 340-53).
- The third is from pages 42-44 of the article (inserted into *RAP* at 300-304).
- The fourth and largest is from pages 46-53 of the article (inserted into *RAP* at 355-70).

Clearly, this is one of the most penetrating analyses created by a young philosophical genius of around 25 years of age. This sustained effort at Critical Analysis, and the succession of its logical steps mark, on the intellectual level, the work of a skilled miner of gold nuggets (to repeat his own self-image). Royce’s logic in this argument seems to be able to be put in a continuing *sorites*.

[What Royce will allow his later analyses to do to this 1881 position of phenomenism remains a central question about Royce’s intellectual development. It may be sounder to talk about Royce’s “overall mental growth.” That would include his logical, volitional, affective, and social sensitivity which characterize his overall maturation. Specifically, how did Royce’s “religious insight” of 1883, his “new tracks of thought” of 1898, and most especially his “Peircean Insight” of 1912 affect his phenomenism of 1881?]

Part I:

Key emphases in Part I:

- “a Universal Consciousness” (37 & 39),
- “this perfect untrammelled thought”,
- “World Consciousness” (37-38).

This echoes, even through his later critiques, the World-Spirit of his “meditation before the gate”

(FE vii). About the “World Consciousness” he says it is [the only?] external reality. (39) But not a creator since it is a “seer.” As yet it is not a World-Spirit with a will and power.

Part II:

Key emphases in Part II:

“Every belief about an external world is an active assumption or acknowledgment of something more than the data of our consciousness.” Therefore “an addition to the data of consciousness, a more earnest, clearly voluntary reaction, is necessary to the idea of external reality.” Royce speaks of “my own beliefs’ active addition to the meager data of sense.” Through practical action, the baby feels the cold. (42)

Note the shift to the deeper practical level of life, attentive to doing, not theorizing. He appeals to the Will. (43)

Present consciousness actually accepts the external world as being symbolized or indicated, not as being given in the present consciousness. (43)

“The ultimate motive is the will to have an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will persist in spontaneously adding the thought: but there shall be something beyond this.” (44) This beyond can never be proven, because it is never verified. Yet the very nature of the postulate of external reality both forbids and renders needless the actual verification.

Through words of “suggestion” and “indication” (44), Royce already engages in what may be called “semiotic dialoguing.”

“How otherwise shall I form the idea of a cause at all unless I have already assumed the reality of time?” (46) [NB: the radical priority of time’s reality.]

If the causal principle is made more universal than the likeness principle, you end up in “disfigured realism” in which external reality becomes totally unknowable. (47)

Opposite the notion of an utterly unknowable external cause of my sensations is the postulate of my reality conceived as the counterpart of consciousness. Royce adds:

“The whole of external reality, past, present, future, all that is outside of what one now sees and feels, all space, time, matter, motion, life beyond this immediate experience, – all that is for each one a postulate, a demand, an assertion, never a datum, never as a whole verifiable.”(47)

“Now this position of modern phenomenism is that by these two postulates, or forms of the one postulate of Likeness, the whole notion of external reality is exhausted.” (49) Shifting to meaning, he says “the external world means, according to this position the possible and actual present, past, and future content of consciousness for all beings. And this result of modern phenomenism we accept.” (49)

Royce is convinced of the importance of J. S. Mill’s position that “matter is the permanent possibility of sensation.” (50-51)

“I know of it only what I conceive of it, yet I postulate that it has some reality beyond my representation. This postulate is for us in this discussion an ultimate fact of which we want to know, not the justification (for there is none higher than the fact itself of the postulate), but the meaning.” (52)

A very important summary of his whole argument occurs at pages 52-53. Then he adds the hypothetical subject of this possible experience, namely the hypothesis of a consciousness, a knower of all truths.

This has no causal activity. It is simply a pure knower. “It has truth but not deeds.” (54)

**94. “Two Days in Life’s Woods” (a poem)
Overland Monthly (June 1883): 594-95.**

This published poem evinces a sort of skepticism in the midst of nature. “I am going to be proof against idle fancies?”

Although it is published in 1883 (after he is at Harvard), it is obviously set in California. It is therefore hard to say when he wrote the poem. He struggles with a view that makes all philosophical work of the past “soap bubbles” and dreams. (Soap bubbles are a recurring theme around this time.) He may be tempted to feel that all philosophy means little.

A reflection by FMO: Not being a poet, I cannot fully grasp this. The first and last stanzas of Section II (both stanzas are in quotation marks) may represent his mother’s voice, calling him to put off gloomy thoughts and sense of life’s meaninglessness that mark Royce’s positivist skepticism that mark these years of his thinking after leaving UCB. He has probably written better poems. Nevertheless, in terms of showing another dimension of Royce’s personality and thought development, this may well be used to illustrate his affective side, as well as used to give insight into his intellectual development.

**95. “Lectures on Ethical Ideals in Relation to Society” (1883?)
Box 127, folder s 1 & 2 (?)**

In Box 127, folders 1 and possibly 2, there are small (3” by 5”) notebooks containing lectures that may reflect early lectures Royce gave at Harvard. The notebooks themselves are undated. folder 2 (titled “Lecture IV”) contains themes similar to those encompassed by Royce’s “religious insight” of around 1883. (Royce reflects back on this insight in 1916 in *Metaphysics*). See Part VIII of this Index; *Life* 115.

See also Box 129, folder 4: Lecture III on Religious Philosophy.

- 96. “The Freedom of Teaching,”**
***The Overland Monthly*, n.s. 2 (1883): 235-40.**

Evaluation: This reveals Royce’s passionate quest for academic freedom, and his opposition (like Peirce’s) not to block the path of free research. Of important autobiographical significance.

- 97. Review**
Elliott Coues, *Biogen: A Speculation on the Origin and Nature of Life* (1884)
***Science*, 3 (1884): 661-62**

- 98. *Bancroft’s First - Fifth Readers*,**
by Charles H. Allen, John Swett, Josiah Royce (San Francisco:
A.L. Bancroft & Co., 1884)

Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1177: “Since the readers are compilations, Royce’s contribution must have been in the form of editorial advice. In the letter [to George Brett dated February 14, 1904], he observes that his suggestions often were rejected.”

- 99. “The Squatter Riot of ’50 in Sacramento: Its Causes and Its Significance,”**
***The Overland Monthly*, n.s. 6 (1885): 125-46.**

HARP does not appear to possess the original manuscript for this essay.

The article is reprinted with significant changes in *Studies of Good and Evil* as “An Episode of Early California Life: The Squatter Riot of 1850 in Sacramento.”

Royce relied on his California documents [formerly found in Box 107, folders 3 and 4] as background for this address. He originally sent the original manuscript to the *Overland Monthly*, vol. VI September 1885 (second series) no. 53, pages 225-46.

In the *Overland Monthly* article, there is a relatively brief introduction crediting his sources and giving tribute to H.H. Bancroft. Because Royce assumed that his reader audience for the *Overland Monthly* was generally quite familiar with the history of the early California settlers, he had no need to set the historical context for them. However, when Royce republished the article in *SGE*, almost fifteen years later, he recognized he had a very different audience. Hence, in a 5-page orientation to the chapter (*SGE* pages 298 through 302), he introduced his audience to the historical and political background to set the scene. He concluded this Preliminary Note, however, with the very first paragraph of his *Overland Monthly* article, substantially as it had originally appeared.

SGE adds a paragraph at 337 before Section V that is not included in the *Overland* article, beginning with “What other squatters thought ...” and ending with “He was himself present at

the fight and speaks authoritatively.”

SGE adds two sentences at the end of first incomplete paragraph, top of 341: “But the armed men displayed their weapons freely, and were ready for whatever might result. Thus everything was done to tempt disaster.”

SGE keeps yet completely revises the first full paragraph at 341 which tells of the confrontation with the Mayor. At the bottom of this page, Royce revises details about those killed, from “three squatters” in *Overland* article to “two squatters and one of the citizens’ party” in *SGE*.

At 342 in *SGE*, Royce inserts four sentences after the first sentence of the second complete paragraph. On page 343, at the paragraph beginning “As a fact,” Royce has made deep cuts in the *Overland* article. It picks up again with “Their late attorney ...”

At 346, Royce cuts a sentence from the *Overland* article: “And soon the cholera and then the winter, closed the autumn scene” at the end of the first full paragraph.

In sum, significant editing has occurred in the *SGE* text.

100. “The Opening of the Great West, Oregon and California”

(date?)

Box 92

A 77-page MS (the final page is numbered “71,” but there is a 6-page insertion after page 7, labeled pages 7a-7f), in six sections. The essay is apparently addressed to a New England audience seeking both entertainment and food for the mind, probably in the 1880s, perhaps at a place like Old Saybrook (*sic* Clendenning). The MS consists of principally fresh pages, except for the 6-page insertion, 7a-7e, which consists of previously drafted pages. Page 7f is a fresh page.

In **Box 107**, folders 3-7, are several of Royce’s notebooks and cards, full of notes regarding his California research. They have not been reviewed in depth, but may be of interest to researchers on these topics. These notes on early California history, vigilantism and the Squatter’s riots, etc. do not seem to offer any immediate background or basis for this opening to the Great West article.

Cf. **Box 127**, folder 4: a notebook with many “data” notes on California, including emigration figures, etc.

Dating: As yet [October 3, 2008], we don’t know whether Royce drafted (apparently continuously) this paper in his preparation for *California*, therefore 1884-85, or after the publication of *California*, i.e. 1886-87. Even if we accept an 1888 date, then this writing preceded Royce’s “Pacific Coast” article by a decade. The present article was probably written 15 years earlier.

Introduction: The difference between the New England founders – led by the explicit “purposes of social organization, of freedom of conscience, of divine service” – versus the non-explicit form of these ideals in the 49-ers and other pioneers who were often trying to escape from debt chasers and mortgage holders. Royce focuses on this contrast on page 7.

Section I: After page 7, Royce inserts six pages, 7(a) through 7(f). Royce debunks the dreamlike origin of the names of “California” and “Oregon,” tracing them to random associations including Bryant’s *Thanatopsis* (1817) (page 7c).

Section II:

Question: Any parallel with *Frontier Lady*, pages 8-9 *et seq*?

Very detailed descriptions of the geo-physical and climate conditions in various regions of California and Oregon.

Section III: (starts on page 23)

How California and Oregon were settled.

Section IV: (starts on page 30)

After a scathing indictment of U.S. take-over of California, Royce moves to discuss Oregon. [If this paper was written at the time of Royce’s composition of *California*, i.e. 1884-85, this essay gives bolder expression to his view.]

Section V: (starts on page 45)

Royce discusses California history from the time of the Republic (1830) up to the arrival Fremont and his group of men (1844). It ends with the misfortunes of the famous Donner party (1848).

Section VI: (starts on page 59)

The Mexican War (1846-48): “One of our main purposes in forcing this war upon Mexico was to acquire California. The seizure of California took place in 1846. It was accomplished under orders from Washington by a fleet under the command of our own commodore Sloat” (pages 59-60).

Royce goes on to describe the U.S. seizure in detail, including his indictment of Fremont’s actions.

At pages 67/68 to 69, Royce repeats his scathing indictment on the U.S. acquisition of California, of the need to accept this misdeed, and to avoid it in the future. “The seizure of California as it was carried out, is no deed in which we Americans may justly glory. That act, as the event proved, was a deceitful and cruel spoliation of the weak by the strong. And it is the true part of true humanity as it also the part of true patriotism honestly to confess this fact, and see to it that our nation avoids such deeds in the future. But it was the use made of California, when once it was won, that is indeed our real glory.”

Royce goes on to deal with the gold rush of 1848, and the “more than 100,000 wanderers” coming to California, on whose backs the new civilization will be built.

Tentative questions:

1. Did Royce use this text as a basis for his published article “The Pacific Coast: A Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilization”? This was an address given to the National Geographical Society in Washington D.C. in 1898. Tentatively, it seems less likely.
2. Is Royce’s forthright, evangelical, and even prophetic style here the result of having published *California* and encountered many rebukes for his judgment of American heroism and courage, e.g. Fremont?

Evaluation: A close textual comparison of this 77-page address with Royce’s printed version of the Fremont affair, both in his book *California* and in his later articles, is needed. I suspect that he is more reserved in published writing than in this address. This manuscript article might well furnish an entertaining article in a journal for the history of California, or the history of the great West.

101. Review

**Daniel Greenleaf Thompson, *A System of Psychology*
The Nation, 40 (1885): 343-44**

**102. Letter to the Editor of the *Overland Monthly* (1886)
Review**

**Francis E. Abbot, *Scientific Theism*
Science, 7 (1886): 335-38**

Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1179: “Abbot’s strongly worded reply to this review can be found in the preface to the third edition of *Scientific Theism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888).”

Evaluation: A sound historical context of the later Royce/Abbott affair.

103. Review

**“Bancroft and Hittell on California,”
The Nation, 43 (1886): 99-101**

Review of Theodore H. Hittell’s *History of California*, vol. 2, and Hubert Howe Bancroft’s *History of California*, vol. 4 (vol. 16 in Bancroft’s *History of the Pacific states of North America*; vol. 21 in Bancroft’s *Works*. See Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1179.

104. Review

**James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*
The Nation, 41 (1886): 304-306**

105. Review

“Two Recent Books upon California History,” *The Nation*, 42 (1886): 220-22

A review of Hittell’s *History of California* vol. 1, and Bancroft’s *History of California*, vols. 2 and 3. See Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1182.

106. “Tennyson and Pessimism,”

***Harvard Monthly*, 3 (1886-87): 127-37.**

Skrupskelis says that this essay is reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*. There is no indication in *SGE*, however, where Royce originally published this essay, nor does there appear to be a copy of the manuscript in HARP.

Compare Royce’s essay “Pessimism and Modern Thought” in the *Berkeley Quarterly* in 1881 (see supra, and *BWJR*2:1176). A partial manuscript for this second essay is in folder 5, Box 105. Although section II of this article is titled “Pessimism and Modern Poetry,” there is no mention of Tennyson, nor any other detectable similarity to this third essay. Both essays witness to Royce’s grappling with the issue of pessimism during his instructor period at Berkeley.

Evaluation: As noted more extensively above (in consideration of “Pessimism and Modern Thought,” page [40], this is an example of Royce’s evaluation of pessimism. This article is one of several: “The Practical Significance of Pessimism,” “Tennyson and Pessimism,” “The Problem of Job,” and Royce’s posthumous article “Nietzsche.”

107. Work for the American Society for Psychological Research (1886-89)

1. “Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses: Request for Information” (1886)
2. “Preliminary Report of the Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses” (1886)
3. “Recent Psychological Research” (1887)
4. “Report of the Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses” (1887)
5. Request for cooperation, *Proceedings of the American Society for Psychological Research* (1887)
6. “Hallucination of Memory and ‘Telepathy’” (1888)
7. “Addenda to Cases,” *Psychical Research* (1889)
8. “Appendix to the Report on Phantasms and Presentiments” (1889)

9. "Comments on Cases," *Psychical Research* (1889)
10. "Note on two Recently Reported Cases," *Psychical Research* (1889)
11. Report Committee on Phantasms, *Psychical Research* (1889)

Evaluation: Reflective of Royce's work and interest in psychical research.

108. "Letter on Edward Rowland Sill" in *A Memorial of Edward Rowland Sill* (1887)

**109. Review
Bancroft's *Conquest of California* (1887)
The Nation, 44 (1887): 39-40**

Review of Bancroft's *History of California*, vol. 5. See Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1182.

**110. Review
Henry Madsley's *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings*
(1887)
The Nation, 44 (1887): 253-54**

Skrupskelis: "Unsigned. Attributed to Royce by Haskell." *BWJR*:2 1183

**111. Biographical Articles on California Pioneers
Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (1887-89)**

**112. Review
"Bancroft's California,"
The Nation, 48 (1889): 140-42; 164-65**

Review of Bancroft's *History of California*, vol. 6. See Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1184.

**113. "Courses in Ethics in Harvard College,"
Ethical Record, 2 (1889): 138-43.**

Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1184: One of a number of papers on the teaching of ethics at Harvard.

**114. "Is there a Philosophy of Evolution?"
Unitarian Review, 32 (1889): 1-29, 97-113.**

This double-issue reflection shows Royce searching for a common structure in evolution.

Evaluation: Isn't this piece too unrefined for the *Critical Edition*?

**115. “Reflections after a Wandering Life in Australasia” (two parts)
Atlantic Monthly, 63 (1889): 675-86 and 813-28.**

Somewhat autobiographical.

Evaluation: Most helpful for understanding Royce, as to autobiographical detail.

**116. Review
William MacKintire Salter, *Ethical Religion* (1890)
The Nation, 50 (1890): 95-96.**

**117. “Fremont,”
Atlantic Monthly, 66 (1890): 548-57.**

Skrupskelis: “An attempt to estimate Fremont’s public character, written shortly after Fremont’s death.” *BWJR*:2 1186.

Evaluation: Good for an understanding of the “Fremont “affair.”

**118. “Notes on Current Periodical Literature,”
International Journal of Ethics, 1 (1890-91): 499-501.**

Skrupskelis: “Comments on current issues of the *Monist*, *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie*, and *Philosophische Studien*.” *BWJR*:2 1189.

Royce was a member of the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Ethics*.
Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1190.

**119. “Dr. Abbot’s ‘Way Out of Agnosticism’”
International Journal of Ethics, 1 (1890-91): 98-113**

A review of F. E. Abbot’s *The Way Out of Agnosticism*. Skrupskelis: “This review gave rise to the controversy between Abbot and Royce. The Abbot Papers in the Harvard University Archives contain some materials relating to this affair.” *BWJR*:2 1185.

120. “Correction from Professor Royce” [the Abbott Affair] (1891)

**121. “Memorandum of April 13, 1891”
In Abbott’s *Professor Royce’s Libel* (1891)**

Evaluation: A hint of the problem involved in the “Abbot Affair.”

**122. Review
“A New Study of Psychology”
International Journal of Ethics, 1 (1890-91): 143-69**

A review of William James’s *Principles of Psychology*.

**123. Review
John Dewey, *Outlines of a Critical Theory*
International Journal of Ethics, 1 (1890-91): 503-505**

Evaluation: Royce’s review contains significant responses to Dewey. Three sections are particularly important:

- (a) from the beginning of the article (“The author, one of the most brilliant ...) down to (“... attempting to realize them.”), all on page 503.
- (b) On page 504, beginning “The philosophical basis of his [Dewey’s] system ...” Ending with “... ingeniously expound here.”
- (c) Concluding as the article itself concludes, on page 505, the final paragraph: “The present reviewer’s strongest objection...” through the final sentence: “Herein lies also its limitation.”

**124. Review
Robert B. Fairbrain, *On the Doctrine of Morality in its Relation to the Grace of Redemption* (1891)
International Journal of Ethics 1 (1890-91): 502-503**

**125. “Impressions of Australia,”
Scribner’s Magazine, 9 (1891): 75-87.**

Evaluation: See evaluation of “Reflections of a Wandering Life in Australia” above.

**126. “Is There a Science of Education?”
Educational Review, 1 (1891): 15-25, 121-32.**

- 127. “Montgomery and Fremont: New Documents on the Bear Flag Affair,”**
Century, n.s., 19 (1891): 780-83 .

Evaluation: The entire Fremont “affair” (like the F. E. Abbott “affair”) was significant in Royce’s biography.

- 128. “The Fremont Legend” (1891)**
The Nation, 52 (1891):423-25

A letter to the editor, which constitutes “Royce’s reply to Fremont’s own account, published in the *Century, n.s., 19 (1891): 917-28.*” Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1188.

Evaluation: Perhaps this could serve in the *Critical Edition* as an “entrance” into Royce’s affair with Fremont.

- 129. “Present Ideals of American University Life,”**
Scribner’s Magazine, 10 (1891): 367-88.

Reprinted with the additional title “Certain Tendencies in the Development of the American University. *American Institute of Instruction, Proceedings of the 62nd Meeting* (Boston: American Institute of Instruction, 1891): 80-111.

This piece reflects an address “delivered to the annual meeting of the Institute, in Bethlehem, New Hampshire, on July 6-9, 1891.” Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1189.

- 130. “Two Philosophers of the Paradoxical,”**
Atlantic Monthly, 67 (1891): 45-60 (“Hegel”) and 161-73 (“Schopenhauer”).

- 131. “Notes on Current Periodical Literature”**
International Journal of Ethics, 1 (July 1891), 499-501.

- 132. Editorial Contributions**
“The Official Policy for the Acquisition of California” (1891)

- 133. Editorial Contributions**
“Sherman and the San Francisco Vigilantes” (1891-92)

- 134. Editorial contributions**
William T. Coleman's "San Francisco Vigilance Committees"
(1891-92)
- 135. Review**
Herbert Spencer, *Justice: Being Part IV of the Principles of Ethics*
***International Journal of Ethics*, 2 (1891-92): 117-23**

Here, Royce distances himself from his early enthusiasm for Spencer.

Evaluation: The last paragraph of this review is a good summary of this more than 6-page review. "To sum up ..." the end of the review.

- 136. "The Outlook in Ethics,"**
***International Journal of Ethics*, 2 (1891-92): 106-11.**

Skrupskelis: "Comments on the more dominant features of current ethical discussion." *BWJR*:2 1189.

Royce was a member of the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Ethics*.
Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1190.

- 137. "Report on the Recent Literature of Ethics and Related Topics in America" (2 parts)**
***International Journal of Ethics*, 2 (1891-92): 378-85, 514-18.**

Royce was a member of the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Ethics*.
Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1190.

- 138. Review**
Benno Erdmann, *Logische Elementarlehre* (1892)
***Philosophical Review*, 1 (1892): 547-52.**

- 139. Review**
Johann Friedrich Herbert, *A Text-Book in Psychology* (1892)
***Educational Review*, 4 (1892): 185-91.**

140. “Report on Recent Philosophical Discussions” (1892) Box 62

A 25-page MS, on all fresh pages. Although apparently written for publication in a journal, it does appear to have made it to print. Royce briefly comments on the existence of three new philosophical journals, appearing for the first time around 1892, in addition to the now resurrected *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. These three journals are the *International Journal of Ethics*, *The Monist*, and *The Philosophical Review* (from Cornell).

Looking to Sherman’s *Philosophical Review*, Royce points to a psychological study by a Dr. Nichols [a possible relative of Katharine Royce] of the Harvard Psychological lab. He then turns to *The Monist* to draw attention to C. S. Peirce’s series there, especially his article “The Doctrine of Necessity.” (13) Royce recognizes past differences with Peirce, but states his “warm and genuine admiration for his philosophical genius.” (16)

At the close, Royce turns to Prof. Avenarius of Zurich, and his recent lengthy book *Die Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung*, or *Critique of Pure Experience* (his conscious opposition to Kant). Royce points out that Avenarius apparently doesn’t know what he’s doing, by cutting out what Kant recognized as “the negation of the negation.” (24) He calls Avenarius ingenious and unconsciously profound (24-25).

141. “The Implications of Self-Consciousness,” *The New World*, 1 (1892): 289-310.

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil* with small changes.

Royce refers to the topic of this essay as “[t]he grounds upon which the idealistic interpretation of the world depends” (*SGE* iv) and as “An effort to set forth in brief some of the evidence for an idealistic interpretation of the nature of reality.” (140)

Royce claims the essential features of this article are identical with chapter 7 of *RAP* and with pages 368-380 of *SMP*. [*SGE*, 140, and see also *BWJR* 2:1189] He calls the argument in this essay “merely a suggestion,” or “an effort to make a beginning” and “I’m attracted by a train of thought to which the whole of modern philosophy seems to me to lead.” (*SGE* 166) Royce also says he offered this doctrine in a more extended form in *The Conception of God* in 1897. This last assertion must refer to the original text of *CG*, since, as regards textual content, no identification appears between this 1892 text and that of Royce’s 1897 “Supplementary Essay” for *CG*.

[Questions:

1. If Royce had already gotten his arguments as clear as he had in the first *Implications* article of 1892, why in 1895 did he present such a loosely organized argument which Howison promptly punctured?
2. Why did Royce not stress his “Implications” article more in his full *CG* of 1897?]

**142. “The Parallel Series” (1892)
Box 114, folder 6**

One 5" by 8" sheet on Consciousness as for itself, dated Oct. 30, 1892. The height of his Hegelian period. Possibly a ten-point outline for a lecture.

One 8 ½" x 11" sheet, manuscript chart on one side on “The Parallel Series.” The seven columns are titled.

The strictly descriptive sense of consciousness, leading to an appreciative sense – Royce works out the distinction of description and appreciation.

**143. “Report on the Recent Literature of Ethics and Related Topics in America” (2 parts)
International Journal of Ethics, 3 (1892-93): 274-79, 527-41.**

Royce was a member of the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Ethics*. Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1190.

**144. “Philosophy,”
Harvard Graduates’ Magazine, 1 (1892-93): 115-16.**

Report on the work of the Harvard philosophy department.

**145. “Mental Defect and Disorder from the Teacher’s Point of View,”
Educational Review, 6 (1893): 209-22, 322-31, 449-63.**

This is the Tenth Lecture in a lecture series delivered to teachers at Harvard (*see* below at item 147) – a series entitled “Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers.” In the *Educational Review*, it was printed in a plan for four units. But the part on Anomalies and Abnormalities was printed in the *Psychological Review*.

While the manuscripts for other lectures in the series may be found in HARP (Boxes 63-66), this particular manuscript appears to be missing.

**146. “On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training,”
International Journal of Ethics, 3 (1892-93): 413-36.**

The Twelfth Lecture in a series delivered to teachers at Harvard entitled “Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers” (*see* item 147, directly below). Galley proofs for this lecture may be found in HARP Box 66.

Lectures Ten and Twelve are apparently the only published lectures in this series: The galley proofs for this lecture are mounted out of order in Box 66. But comparison with the published text of the article in *IJE* shows that they are in fact complete. (Pencil notes inserted into the mounted Wells pages show the order of the galleys.)

[NB: Royce wrote this article before Freud wrote on the superego as a psychological mechanism of self-control. “Superego” is a very different notion than “conscience.”]

For a full discussion of Lecture XII, see page [\[235\]](#) below.

Evaluation: For FMO, it is surprising that the word “loyalty” does not appear in this lecture. In fourteen more years, the tension between love and justice -- and its subordination to the integrating life of loyalty -- will move towards center in his work. As a mid-period expression of his view in 1893 of conscience and training youthful conscience, this is an admirable paper. It deserves careful musing before it should be excluded from a critical edition.

The absence of encouragement seems to echo the strict evangelism of his upbringing in Grass Valley, in which one lives almost solely for duty.

147. Lectures to Teachers (1893) **Boxes 63-66**

The full title of this public lecture series – twelve lectures delivered to teachers at Harvard University from February to May 1893 – is “Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers.” Box 63 contains the first three lectures. Perhaps only one of these is printed. Box 64 contains the next three.

No mention is made of the lectures in the *Letters*. They appear to be some of Royce’s “bread and butter” work, full of anecdotes and humor.

Skrupskelis deals with these lectures at *BWJR* vol. 2: 1192. The lectures were reported extensively in the *Journal of Education* (Boston) (37 [1893] [issue of June 15, 1893]). Royce used at least the same lecture titles on several other occasions. On February 20, 1893, he lectured at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences on ‘The Psychology of General Ideas from the Teacher’s Point of View.’ From October 14 to November 11, 1893, he gave a series of five lectures at the Brooklyn Institute with the general title ‘Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers.’”

The lectures are illustrative of Royce’s skills and sophistication in psychology, above and beyond philosophy.

The lectures were given on Thursday afternoons from February to May of 1893. The footnote to the published version of Lecture XII calls the series title “Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers,” and notes that it deals with the theory of General Ideas, with the functions of the Imitative Type, with the Psychology of Self-Consciousness, and with connected topics.

Lecture I: **What is a General Idea?**

Box 63. There are 71 numbered pages plus two unnumbered (and loose!) page fragments to this MS. There are five sections, with the last misnumbered as a second section “IV.” There is a long 6-page introduction before the first section begins on page 6. Beginning at page 23, Royce begins to use previously drafted pages.

Royce presents a personal confession of his own struggles to be a teacher. “But my immediate and main concern of these lectures will be theoretical.” (4) He abstains from the attempt to teach any man to be a good teacher. “But I can try to help my hearers to see for themselves in a theoretical way why a good method of teaching, which they have otherwise practically learned or are learning, is in truth a good way.” (5-6).

He gives a definition of psychology in the (then) modern sense; indeed, this is the burden of the first section. Royce focuses on “a decidedly limited group of topics ... topics connected with every teacher’s work and experience.”

Royce will group the entire lecture series around the topic of this first lecture (“What is a General Idea?”). Royce notes that as the lecture titles move on, they may seem less obviously connected to this theme.

“What goes on in the mind when we have or recall or think we use a general idea?” (16) (Royce does not answer the question directly.)

In section III, he suggests looking at the outer marks by which we distinguish intelligent from non-intelligent activity. “The primal data of the psychologist [to make this distinction] is that an animal organism adapts its responses” **NB:** James’s *Principles* have just come out, and the “reflex arc” is an important concept.

Are animals (dogs, etc.) if they show signs of consciousness capable of ideas?

Royce draws the distinction between the primitive and unconsciously general ideas in which all intelligence, indeed all sentience, must begin, versus the conscious and rational general ideas that result from generalization, “to which the highest intelligence always tries to devote itself.”

Royce compares the moth (drawn to the candle) to the physicist. The physicist responds to the candle in a vastly different way than the moth. Sub-human animals guided by primitive ideas. The higher type results from generalization. You can only have a general idea when the particular knower *knows* he is generalizing, intentionally picking out from the concrete perceived world to dwell on that aspect.

Royce tries to make the lecture entertaining with the example of the cow and hay-calf. He implicitly compares the cow’s behavior with the behavior of Harvard freshmen.

Marks of rudimentary generalization: adapt to new conditions (with reference to old), insofar as an animal approximates toward higher intelligence, that is a sign of general intelligence. (Royce notes the “watching of oneself” as a sign, self-consciousness v. self-awareness.) Estimate of the usefulness of the novel experience. We say “the animal knows what it is about.” It’s not a pure

reflex arc.

Royce cites Lloyd Morgan, Wundt and Romanes in support of his animal behavior examples. At page 50, he is still dealing with animal examples (captured elephants). Back to dogs. Wundt trains his dog to jump over his cane at the word “jump.” Then Wundt says (not showing his cane), “jump.” The dog hesitates. After several commands, the dog does jump, complainingly. The dog has generalized by jumping without the cane.

In the last section: Royce goes “beyond the higher brutes” to talk about human beings. How to tell if a pupil has got a true general idea.

- First class: perception
- Second class: abstractions – sweetness, blueness
- Third class: the relation of things (father of, brother of)
- Fourth class: more complex ... logarithm, sine, tangent, life

Royce concludes that all the creatures are imitative animals, and that man is the most imitative. The psychology of imitation becomes fundamental. Yet, our knowledge of habits of motor response are habits of imitation.

Evaluation: A rich mélange. The British Empiricism of any psychic awareness as an idea is not contrasted with the general intellectual concept until the fourth last type. His entire series, *Lectures to Teachers*, represents Royce at a second level of his intellectual acumen, i.e., as more psychologist than philosopher and addressing teachers, not philosophical colleagues.

Lecture II: General Ideas and the Theory of Habits

Box 63. The MS consists of 70 pages (a 53a added to 69 numbered pages) with pages 4-48, as well as 53, previously used. There is some heavy editing, deletions and additions on the previously used pages, the bulk of the manuscript. Royce divides the lecture into 4 sections.

NB: Regarding the “Habits” in the title, Royce gives this lecture three years after William James’s *Principles of Psychology* with its famous chapter on “Habits.”

Royce states that it is not his purpose “to supply in any sense the place which tact and experience occupy in the life of the wise teacher.” (2) He returns to the notion of unconscious and conscious general ideas, and divides the “general ideas” into different classes.

At page 19, the “pragmatic” Royce speaks: “A man knows nothing of things until he has done something with them and has learned to observe what he has done.” He leaves the non-human animal world to focus on our own human processes. (21)

Connected with the general idea is the notion of how you respond to the idea in the world. (The “tiger” example, contrasting the “Tiger, tiger burning bright” of Blake’s poem to a tiger hypothetically roaming about Harvard Square.) Instances of the idea of a sharp-edged tool to explain one source of habit, the sharp-edge requiring a habit of “wisely to be treated.” “General ideas as dependent at least in part, upon the formation of definite habits of response.” (33)

The habit of response is the second half of the reflex arc. “In general you may say that we get scientific general ideas of things precisely in so far as we learn the processes by which the nature and structure of things can be imitated.” (46) In this way, through our own imitating, the exact sciences become more and more accurate. Royce turns for a moment to higher math to support his points.

The object of which we have a general idea is either present or we have a memory of a previous experience of it. This guides our response.

“Rational general ideas are Habits, habits of action, conscious habits, and habits formed under the influence of our social intercourse.” **NB: Royce brings in the role of the community.**

Regarding invisible and internal things of the world:

“The very essence of a sound philosophy is the recognition that the invisible world, the spiritual order of the eternal truths which the theologian philosophers, and the mathematicians, in their several ways tell us, do not constitute an order of things far off, behind the world of sense, and separate from it, but that on the contrary these deeper truths are at the very heart of the visible order, and are recognized by us because the visible things bear witness to the indivisible and deeper truths that both religion and science discover as their essence.” (55-56) Royce denies Plato’s separation of the material world from the world of forms.

In sum, Royce states “The consciousness of your own habitual and adaptable fashion of response that gives you rational light as to the nature and aspects of the object to which you respond.” (68)

The final sentence: Royce with a lot of William James in him: “Hear then, for the present, the conclusion of the whole matter. Thought is life, is action, yet is conduct. There are no abstractions, however recondite, that do not tend towards movements. Let the teacher remember this. When he trains the intellect, he trains the power of conscious deeds.” (69)

*FMO note in Index regarding this lecture: *see* [former] HARP Box H “Life and Ideas.”

Lecture III: The Constituents of a General Idea: – The Relations of Intellect, Feeling and Will.

Box 63. This MS consists of 67 pages in five sections, with 7-9, 39-50 previously used. His introduction ends by cautioning hearers against thinking that psychologists are leading to materialism. (5-6)

Royce again implicitly takes up James’s issue of the reflex arc (even highest thoughts must be grounded in action). Distinguishes reflex reactions of which we are not aware, from conscious response. “[T]he highest as well as the lowest mental processes are in us dependent upon the constant occurrence of appropriate sense impressions.” (11) Royce distinguishes between writing and speaking as regards the reflex arc... there are different sensations involved when one either hears or doesn’t hear one’s own voice. He also points out “[t]he current conversational impressions that we get from our whole social environment.”

“Thus at every moment our brains are magazines of energy, waiting to be stimulated to discharge by the appropriate sensation.” (22)

Sensations guide our restraint as well as our actions. “Inhibition, as I have called it, this tendency of our brains to hold us back from countless temptations to useless or dangerous movements, is one of the most complicated and important aspects of our motor life.” (36) At page 38, he finally begins to talk a bit about the intellect. “My intellectual and my voluntary life thus appear to us once more not as two sorts of life but through and through one life.” “[I]nsofar as I am actively thinking I am engaged in constructive processes.”

At page 42, he goes into the formation of character and habits, and stresses the uniqueness of each individual.

“For the modern psychologist as for the Gospel, the will is already in miniature the very deed itself. The basis of our Will is thus the memory of our past acts or the epitomized memory of past systems and plans of action.... The whole life of the will to come , ... the same consideration determines the nature of my consciousness of myself as an individual.” (46-47)

Royce stresses that “individual” here refers to his empirical self, not his philosophical self. As to the empirical self, Royce states: “I say such an I, for so I mean to live.”

In section V, Royce describes the broader project as “describing the character of our mental mechanism in its wholeness.” (57) In particular, now, he tries to apply his theory to our motor processes of the special case of the psychology of language. Royce notes that imitation occupies a large place in the development of language.

Royce states that he has dealt “throughout the lecture” with the issue of the “intimate union that exists between the intellect and the will.” But that discussion has not been obvious (at least in terms of intellect) in the lecture. Not clear what Royce means by intellect up to this point. Here, he says that intellect gives us information about outer objects, and will tells us how we should behave in response to them. Feeling gives us the tone of the response. (59)

Royce states that only together do these three elements of consciousness – intellect, will, feeling – form the organic whole of consciousness.

At page 61, Royce gives his interpretation of what he thinks William James means by “fringe.” This section, to the end, is significant enough as an insight into how Royce conceives mental life and language, and given the importance of current linguistic studies, this deserves to be transcribed here as a whole:

“But further, whenever a conscious act is merely nascent in us, whenever there is no time to let a thought develop, whenever a reflex at the moment of its initiation has to be inhibited, and is present only in germ in our minds, there what is left most prominent in consciousness is the mere “fringe,” as Professor James has so successfully called it, the

feeling, the color of mind, that is a signal to us of what the act would be if we let it develop. I know, in the most rapid survey of my general ideas, that the idea hippopotamus is totally different from the idea cube root. I have, let us say, no time to develop, through elaborate motor reflexes, the meaning of either idea. My motor response to each of the words begins, but has to be checked. What remains of it? I answer, once more, the mere feeling of a nascent motor reaction. The mere color of mind that I express by the words: I could if I would think out that meaning. In this way the element of Feeling, which is an inseparable constituent of all mental life, and so of all general ideas, becomes in case of nascent ideas, seized in passing, the principal constituent of our fragmentary consciousness of their meaning.

“I have no time to develop at length the experimental evidence for the view of the psychology of language and of our suppressed or inhibited general ideas which is thus indicated. It will be plain to you that in so far as we can thus substitute nascent feelings for developed ideas, and a sense of our power for more elaborately embodied habits of conduct, we may not only recognize the meanings of words without pausing to dwell on meanings, but may even learn to do our thinking in a partially wordless way, substituting our feelings themselves for the words.

“Wordless thought, in fact, goes on at the highest as well at the lowest level of the thinking process. When you act consciously, and intelligently, and so in a way that involves rational General Ideas, but embody your thoughts in significant but unspoken deeds, for example, in moral sacrifices in a good cause, in works of art, in wise choices expressed in the conduct of your profession, – in any such outwardly visible processes of life, – you may work, and at the same time think, without using language to guide you. The thought that crystallizes itself in noble deeds, is often a wordless thought. On the other hand when you think very rapidly and only half-consciously, you may run from place to place in thought without having time to find your words, and being guided in your acts mainly by your rationally directed and habitual shades of thoughtful feeling.

“My sketch of the mechanism of mental life, now before you, will seem to some of you, perhaps, of little direct practical moment for the teacher. And, as a fact, much more practical appreciations will follow at the next time. Is it however not already something to have felt this complexity of interwoven threads in our mental life, and to have seen why that teacher does the best work who appeals through a skillful personal bearing; to the whole nature of his charge at once? It isn't subtlety of special methods, after all, that wins in the battle of education. It is the appeal of an earnest and wholesome soul, of a complete personality, to the growing mind of the child or of the youth. It is humanity that awakens humanity. It is the charm of character that builds up character. Our habits are formed all, as it were, together. You cannot train the wits unless you train the conduct and the feelings. And whatever you aim to train, you must from the first surround your charge with a wealth of stimulating sensations, which may arouse in him fitting reflexes and train him to wise habits. Do you ask, How shall the proper choice of the guiding sensations be made where school-rooms and lecture-rooms are often such dreary places? How shall the teacher awaken this complicated organism to the desired reactions when, alas! Our educational world often has outwardly to seem to the young mind, so dull a region? Then the answer is: There is one set of stimulating sensations that you can furnish which will never fail to be serviceable to this mechanism. And these sensations, – they are those which he may get from intercourse with a cheerful, kindly, enthusiastic, and devoted personality, that of his teacher.”

Lecture IV: General Ideas on Products of Imitation: The Psychology of Suggestion, and the Lessons of Hypnotic Research

Box 64. A MS of at least 51 pages (ending with 49b) in three sections. All fresh pages.

Royce states that whatever else learning is, it is acquisition through imitation. Social life is a matter of imitation. Art an explicit imitation of beauty.

As one of the ways of studying the seemingly familiar is to make it extraordinary, Royce decides to talk about hypnotism *qua* illustrating psychological imitation. In hypnosis, man shows himself to be a highly imitative animal. [**NB:** Royce is participating in the American Society of Psychical Research at this time.]

How imitation promotes development of the intelligence.

Royce talks about hypnosis itself for a while. It depends on suggestibility. A special suggestibility seems to occur in some perfectly healthy people. (He goes on to talk of the mechanical aspects of putting someone into a hypnotic state.)

The subliminal consciousness can sometimes be brought to a conscious level. Royce reveals more and more of the plasticity of the mind during this state. A person who thinks he has a mind of his own wakes up to see that this is not the full story. (25) He thought he was a self-directed person, but now he becomes just the opposite. How does all this apply as to human nature? (27) The real psychologist knows that this is not magic. A person does not have as deep an individuality as he tends to think he has.

“For my own part, I rejoice to know that in all noteworthy respects, I am a tool in the hands of society, whatever may be my failures.” (32) The dependence of our beliefs on authority as we grow up. Society makes continual suggestions that shape our beliefs. The role of language in shaping socially formed beliefs. (38). Royce goes on at length about social suggestion, even talks about society “hypnotizing” us. (41) “Language is the first instance of the normal effects of suggestion. The second instance, that of social convention, is not less instructive.” (42) What is decent, what is decorous, what is socially tolerable. (48)

Royce then moves beyond ordinary susceptibility.

Lecture V: The Psychology of Imitation (continued): The Place of Authority in Education; The Psychology of our Belief in the External World, and the Educational Significance of this Portion of Psychology

Box 64. An 81-page MS in five sections, but heavily worked over (deletions, edits, etc.) even on the fresh pages. Pages 27-48, 56-58 are on used pages.

There is no introduction to this lecture as he is continuing the last one. Section I begins on page 1. “We have unmasked the native suggestibility of mankind” with hypnosis. (2)

“Imitation is not merely a third function over above the ordinary functions of the will and of the intellect. I insist that our human intelligence has no existence apart from some sort of intelligent imitative activities. I insist that the most original of normal men is chiefly original (2) in the

selection of things and what people he has chosen to imitate, and (2) in the peculiar and individual coloring that he has been moved to give to his imitations.” (5-6) There is a very wide scope within which the human individual can choose the direction of his will.

NB: Royce seems to interchange the words “intelligence” and “intellect” here.

The imitative function is omnipresent. (Royce doesn’t quite put it that way, but that seems to be what he means.)

Finally at page 12, Royce gets to “the place of authority in education.” Should you impart authoritative opinions to the child? To what extent should a teacher keep mere authority in the background and teach the child to think for himself? Where does the *via media* between these two poles lie? Social suggestiveness is the more fundamental concept.

“Freedom prospers on the soil of healthy social conformity.”

Royce goes on throughout the lecture to document his thesis, citing many examples and the work of Tarde, in the *Revue Philosophique*, on hypnotism and somnambulism. Goes on to quote Darwin and Romanes (the dog examples).

In section III (40), Royce tackles the issue of what psychological mechanism imitation uses. (A difficult problem, and the answer is not clear.) He returns to animals – monkeys, mockingbirds – and gives three hypotheses about how they imitate. The first one: ideo-motor theory of imitation.

In section IV (56) he moves into Hamlet – more illustrations – and gives the second hypothesis.

In section V, he gives the third theory.

Makes reference to his doctrine of the World of Description, which is imitating the structure of the external world.

Lecture VI: Apperception, Attention and the Theory of an Orderly Acquisition of General Ideas

Box 64. An 81-page MS in four sections all on fresh pages. A very brief introduction before section I. (Section II is almost 22 pages.)

“Apperception” – the quality of knowing that one knows. (FMO)

Royce begins with (and all section I is taken up with) a major summary of the lecture course to this point. Royce summarizes all the activities that have arisen through imitation. He has at least nine theses that summarize the course.

At page 28 (section II). He deals with physical phenomenon (e.g. the blind spot at the center of

one's retina) (32). It is extremely obvious that attention is important in acquiring general ideas. Not the spontaneously spotted characteristics of an object, but those that we are led to choose through attention are what helps to form general ideas. (36-37) He cites Herbart again, and comes again to William James.

According to Herbart, involuntary attention is distinguished between primitive and apperceptive. (43) James calls this "immediate and derived." Royce goes to the example of music: the more we listen to music, the better listeners we are. Herbart says this is an example of us moving from a primitive to an apperceptive. "How a bit of bad grammar wounds the purist."

Royce runs through the whole history of modern philosophy's (Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, etc.) meaning of apperception. But he notes Herbart's meaning this way: "Becoming aware of a relatively new idea by virtue of the fact that we assimilate this idea to an old group of ideas." "We observe well the new only when we can assimilate it to the old."

A very clever trope on climate and apperception at pages 62-63. He is a Californian, and sometimes it bubbles up.

He turns to Karl Lange's book based on Herbart at section IV. The apperceptive process determines of necessity all practical decisions about which general ideas should be presented to the learner. From what's known to the unknown. Also, the movement from the concrete to the abstract, from what is known to what is unknown. (65-66)

Royce's caution as to the apperceptive mass of the recipient, at page 71. Avoid a one-sided emphasis on Herbart. "As for the inadequacy of this apperceptive theory ..." (72) Herbart used all sorts of mythical entities in his explanation (73). The utterly new attracts no derived attention because it excited no well prepared centers, and so calls forth no definite and habitual responses." Therefore "[t]he real apperceptive masses are ... the acquired habits of my nervous centers, the habits that have often led to definite activity."

Think also if you want a child to love an idea, he has to first love you.

Royce moves to a **very interesting autobiographical reflection** from childhood, his boyhood in the Sierra Nevada mountains, with a bit of a reflection on gold mining. He says the main person to influence him was his mother, and the "generally theological turn" of her influence. He talks of the "literary" influence of *Revelation*. (76-77) (One aspect of this reflection is the fact that he was raised away from any knowledge of the ocean, or open water.) (79) "The law of nervous habit is the true law of apperception." All of this he mentions as a counterbalance to Herbart's one-sided theory of apperception. An excerpt from pages 76-79 is appropriate here:

"In my own childhood I lived in the Sierra Nevada mountains far from any large body of water. I was familiar from the outset with gold-mining, both quartz mining and placer mining. As I happened to dislike nearly all the miners whom I saw, my imitativeness was never excited by them. I accordingly formed almost no apperceptive masses of ideas about gold or about mining, and always heartily despised the whole enterprise. The one person whom I most imitated was, I suppose, my mother. She determined my ideas to take a generally theological turn. Accordingly, as it happened, the first book that ever I

read with true and appreciably independent delight, was the Revelation of St. John. Here was to me, for the moment the most thrilling of literary interests. I read it as Eva and Tom read it in Uncle tom's Cabin. I could apperceive but vaguely anything in it. I loved it all. As for the rest of my thoughts, the civil War was then under way. I lived as it were on the news about the war. I commanded imaginary armies whenever I played and often defeated in pitched battles the chickens. For picturing the true pomp and glory of war I had in that remote place absolutely no apperceptive masses; yet half my early ideas of things were based on what I passionately thought concerning the war. I heard people talk too of the ocean. The ocean was accordingly a daily dream with me. I tormented my mother with endless apperceptive questions about ships. Yet I had not as yet the faintest respectable mental image either of an expanse of water or of the ships themselves.

"Now these things were accidents, but, such as they were, they determined the whole future of my education. I do not imagine them in the least uncommon. On such thrilling interests in the wonderful unknown, many childish minds thrive. And if you ask why these interest, I reply that every child is like Tennyson's boy in Locksley Hall, who sees the lights of London flaring like a dreary dawn. The child wants to be in with men, and to share their life. He is imitative."

(Again, FMO reference to former Box H)

Royce's conclusion: "The highest knowledge, the perfect insight is to be sure never of mere abstractions but of concrete real things."

Lecture VII: Some Imperfections of General Ideas: "Unconscious" and "Segmented" Processes and Ideas.

Box 65. An 82-page MS in five sections (numbered 78, with the additions of 5a, 12a, 12b, 43a). All fresh pages. The introduction "The purpose of our rational general ideas is to give us, in the end, knowledge of concrete truth, of the truth about the individual and real things with which we have to do." (2) **Significance:** this reflects the theme of *The World and the Individual*, the movement from internal to external meaning, leading us to the "individual real."

Royce takes the case of a Harvard student, from the initial chaos of his freshman year, through meeting with an adviser, sifting through choices, gradually seeing contact with professors, students, etc., leading to the time of his junior year, understanding what the process of Harvard is all about. Then, the reflective senior year, which understands scholarly reflection. Royce describes this process in three stages:

- (1) unconsciously general ideas and of a chaotic total impression;
- (2) a stage where ideas get conscious, and multiply by accretion with differentiation;
- (3) a stage where ideas systematize into a notion of an organic whole. (12)

The example of growing insight is an obvious one, reminding us afresh of what knowledge is, and the growth of human knowledge. (Royce says he presented this idea in the last lecture.) (12-12a)

Royce adds: "We may experience the individual things of the world, without being able as yet to

classify them. But so long as we cannot classify things, we do not really know them as individuals at all.” (12b) Yet, classifying isn’t enough. It is merely one of the steps.

An insight which Royce sees as a goal of education:

“Since no single thing is ever understood until we know it in its relation to other things, and since all things in our world belong together, and have bearings upon one another, we may unquestionably say that there from the point of view of a philosophy, there is but one absolutely concrete reality in existence and that reality is the Universe itself, which all our knowledge is aiming to understand.” (16-17)

This is a rather dogmatic statement, to the public Boston group of lecture attendees.

Repeating the three stages from above, he mentions Hegel’s notion of the man of understanding. The contrast of the man of the world and the man of science or a scholar. To this man of the world “who is by vocation a thinker, the universe is great and the goal of theory infinitely remote. Accuracy of conception is the great thing.” (24)

“We must move to the stage [third stage] that Hegel called that of the Reason.” [25]
Another good passage on the life of language on page 26. At page 28, almost a description of his own mind in his description of Bishop Brooks. A weaving of attention to detail that at the same time moves toward a universal view. Newton and Darwin. This is all part of the picture of the man of reason, not of understanding.

The man of understanding has gotten to be where he is by segmentation.

Now Royce details what he means by segmentation, in its physical aspect. With certain physical ailments (Hodgson’s Chorea, St. Vitas Dance) that person has his or her physical function segmented. That behavior harbors a kind of “independent life.” (33) There are also mental aspects.

Royce mentions the case of the middle-aged intelligent woman under stress exhibiting hysterical type behavior. (“An experienced invalid.”) (34-35) At page 39, Royce admits the description of these symptoms is not necessarily gender-based. He then takes up the case of a male example. With these examples, Royce attempts to display what he means by segmentation of functions. Segmented people.

Changing focus from these individual neurotic cases, Royce comes to focus on us in general, saying “We are all in our moods and in our measure, discontinuous and capricious,” (45) despite our hope for ideal behavior. “Some people will do their thinking only in staccato.” (46)

“Segmentation is the result of abiding in differentiation without striving back to unity.” (52) He talks of the Harvard prig and the capricious woman, how they are both victims of this phenomenon of segmentation. (58) The woman “differentiating her activities without getting her life in order.”

He sees the effect of this differentiation on our moral ideas as well as our intellectual consciousness. (66) He goes back to recent experience in Australia, and uses the eucalyptus tree as a metaphor.

“Segmentation, used as a means to an end, is a two-edged sword.” (75) Finally, Royce gets to the issue of “that precious possession of the young, namely a healthy naïveté and innocence of life,” and a teacher’s responsibility to that pre-segmentation. (76)

“There is seed time and there is harvest. We have to leave the seeds long to grow in the dark. Naïveté, in its healthy form, means the slow growth of reflective insight, the slow formation of the rational unities of life. But in the name of wisdom let us respect the innocent beauty of the growth, and beware of over hasty artificial organization.” (78)

Lecture VIII: The Psychological Theory of Self-Consciousness from the Teacher’s Point of View

Box 65. A MS of 68 pages in six sections. All fresh pages.

Royce begins the lecture by attempting a summary of the series to this point. He brings up segmentation again, and grants that the current topic of this lecture may seem to be different from the previous lecture topics. Royce refers to his article on the implications of self-consciousness as illustrative of the philosophical aspects of the problem. But here, he says, we take it psychologically. (6-7)

Puzzle: Royce usually capitalizes Self (see e.g. page 7). Why? With self-consciousness, he uses a lower-case “s.”

Look at the various counsels, how seemingly contradictory they are in a young person’s training to become a “self.” Counsels of the ages concerning the training of youth, the perils of self-consciousness. (9)

An instance of Royce sifting traditional wisdom and its perils. Polonius re-emerges at 12. Royce contrasts the common sense wisdom of “know thyself” and “if only you could forget yourself,” “don’t pay attention to yourself,” etc. George Eliot pops up ... she “sings of the choir invisible, and her words meet in this age with considerable popular approval.” (15) Then Pauline Charity.

The waywardness of common sense in estimating the value of self-consciousness. (20) We say “forget yourself” and “you have forgotten yourself.” Something of an answer – the famous principle of a *via media*. For Aristotle, the ethical character is the man who has great merits and who knows that he has them. (22) But Aristotle fails to direct those men who are not great. (The tall and short man example. Royce is clearly not the Greek model of physical perfection, and he plays on this.)

Royce tackles the many possible and tangled meanings of the word “Self.” (23-24) He then

moves to consideration of two types of knowledge (to get to idea of Self-Knowledge). He begins with the immediate kind of knowledge, directly given. He contrasts this with derived knowledge. Royce uses the example of the eclipsed moon, and different understandings of this. Mere perception of color change (immediate knowledge), and what the scientist knows (derived knowledge). The two sorts of knowledge go hand in hand.

Significant passage: “By the aid of this question [what do I mean by this that I have done or said?] we constantly turn relatively immediate into relatively articulate or derived knowledge. And this process of getting derived knowledge is called Reflection. The sort of derived knowledge that thus results I call Reflective Knowledge.” (36) This notion will come to be quite important in his work.

He then goes on to the process of description, and its nature (36-38). He contrasts this Reflective Knowledge (what does “I” mean?) with Descriptive Knowledge (what is the structure of these facts before me?). (38) These two types never occur “sundered from one another, but only as distinguished processes that constantly go hand in hand.” (39)

Now the importance of insight in these distinctions (as opposed to “knowledge”). Descriptive insight is not reflective insight. “Self-contradictions are exposed through reflection.” (40)

By page 57, Royce has moved up to Self, the meaning-seeking Self, as rational Ego. The Self as Knower “exists only as a Subject related to Objects.” (57-58)

“Insofar as I am Subject, nobody can describe me.” (58) “I am permanent, but only as to truth that I know is permanent. I am significant, but only in so far as the conscious life that I live is significant.” (59) Confusion if the Self-as-Subject is made into a thing.

At section V, Royce comes to “that kind of Self-Consciousness which at once combines great psychological interest with vast intrinsic importance.” (61-62). Royce refers to this as the “Empirical Self,” or the actor in the real world. (62) It might sometimes include the Self’s possessions. Or a mother feeling her child as being one with her. The Empirical Self is social as well as individual. The Empirical Self grows as our activities grow.

“The true Empirical Ego is the whole man, – mind and body, and Both are as in action, together with all objects in our world.” (66) The whole man in action.

Section VI: “So much for a sketch of the types of self-consciousness.” (67) Royce pulls the topic back around to the implications for teachers.

“The Self is not all bad.” This is important to Royce, standing against Calvin (who said the Self *was* all bad).

The lecture breaks off with a comma on page 68, apparently near the finish, but no final page is shown. Also, emphasis on being rendered “docile” is a note one does not find in James’s *Psychology* or in Dewey. To be docile, rather, one must be somewhat reflective about your environment.

Tentative Evaluation: Royce shows the keenest of his psychological knowledge in these three (VI-VIII) lectures. He admits apparently changing the course of the lectures by shifting directly to self-consciousness in Lecture VIII. The feature of balancing his remarks with counterpoised propositions creates a triadic development of his thought. His description of the segmented consciousness, divided Self, at the bodily level first, and then at the psychic level, is pointed in his illustrations.

At least two vignettes from his life as a Californian mark these lectures. As for the self-consciousness, Royce seems to follow James's three-fold division of bodily self-consciousness, the Ego as Subject consciousness (as Knower), and the Empirical Self as actor in the real world.

Lecture IX: On a Due Regard for the Varieties of Individual Temperament

Box 66. A manuscript of 68 pages in four sections (section IV constitutes a brief conclusion). Section II is by far the largest. The MS is written on all fresh pages (no re-incorporated pages from previous works).

The sense of this lecture – to keep looking for the individual, without being swept up in the general. Royce, in Section I, counters the criticism that he has not focused enough on the individual, that he has given the impression of drowning the individual in the social order. Royce focuses on the need to be creative enough to take originality and imitativeness into account. He looks to Antigone as an example, obeying the law of the king *and* a higher law. The creativity shown in that rebellion. Royce then points to Shakespeare to illustrate the use of borrowing and originality in one movement.

Three basic ways in which originality appears in the individual:

(1) In his imitative response, he exercises something different from what is imitated. (Royce gives many examples). This unique way of imitation is found most especially in the process of falling in love. “The lover is a very imitative being”

Royce's description of “falling in love”: “The lover as such is a very imitative being. He is not only disposed to a considerable extent to conform to the tastes and ideals of his beloved; but he is also an imitator even in the very act itself of falling in love. Nobody falls in love until he has first often heard that one can fall in love. Think how many lovers have been educated to their nobler passions by Dante's *Vita Nuova* or by the other classic love poetry. Love is then essentially catching. It is notorious that good lovers are much dependent for the whole drift of their sentiments on the social training that their sentiments have received. The romantic love prevalent in modern times had apparently no great place in the life of antiquity. For today from the fairy tales of the nursery to the romances and poems that mould our sensitive youth, all our sentimental reading and speech are full of social suggestions as to the art of falling in love. In due time, these suggestions may work and so far there is no originality in falling in love. The process is in this aspect mainly imitative. But on the other hand, a great social inconvenience would result if too many people fall in love with the same person. Hence the social importance of a very great variety and consequently of a very great range of originality, in the mutual choices of individual lovers. Love in general is imitated; but the particular beloved is chosen for the

individual lover by an inexplicable social rapport. Nobody understands just why another should fall in love in precisely this way with precisely this person. Here them, is originality, temperament, independence. This factor here appears in the form of a personal selection of the particular object of one's predestined type of imitation. And within these limits, the temperamental caprices of love are simply limitless." Therefore "imitation does not in the least exclude originality, but rather, as in the case of the lover, encourages a certain marked sort of originality." (14-15)

(2) "[T]he original shading that we give to the details of all our imitative acts." Handwriting, for example. The theme of the nativity, an imitation of theme, and yet the artist shows originality in detail.

(3) The genius who is able to take over an idea (imitative) and produce something that has not been seen before. The real progressive idea will be a rarity in the person's life. "Intuitions are indispensable to genius, but they are no substitute for acquired wisdom." "An imitation is power developed." (19) Only by imitation does the real master show himself.

In an (a) section, Royce moves to the study of individual types. He delves into physiognomy (phrenology), and states that more attention should be paid to expressive movement than to mere physical form. (Big and small heads, e.g.) He makes comparisons of organ pipes with congenital features of a man's body, with the sense of someone "playing upon it," the importance again of expressive movement, as opposed to static form ("resting features") (28).

[FMO caught by Royce's dictum: "Trust not resting features, but the moving features of eyes and mouth."]

To the teachers, Royce says: (29) Watch your pupil at play. What easily hold him at attention. At what does he laugh. He goes back to his organ metaphor, the child is the organ, the environment plays upon him. This playing needs to be understood. This is a very different assessment than, for instance, judgments based on phrenology. "Both native curiosity and native humor, from their very nature as functions involving an organized response of the highest brain centres, are sure to color the whole intellectual life, entering into many rational processes." (32)

(39) Part of Royce's summary, he gives a personal insight: "For my own part, I love the natural history of minds too much to give myself over to those fearful first impressions with which some people block their way into a real insight into character."

Summary of this section: "Be a naturalist [a hunter image]... Despise crude physiognomic formulas. Cling to the live facts of human character. Study psychology. But apply it cautiously to the individual case." (40)

He then gets to a (b) section (at 41): dealing with the notion that a poet is born. But it is only a predisposition. There are circumstances which allow a poet to develop. Royce returns to the organ metaphor. Beyond our predispositions, we are played as a musician "touches the keys and the pipes respond." (44)

Royce admits that there are innate dispositions toward something, and that these connect with individuality. He uses the handwriting example that, even after training for particular form, even when recognizable as to family handwriting, it is still unique. [NB: Royce was born left-handed, but was forced to write with his right hand.]

In section (c), Royce gets into heredity. Quotes Galton's research on the heredity of temperament. The response to a rose or to sugar has its own individual quality of predisposition. An individual's nerve centers have their own predispositions to certain stimuli. (A poet is predisposed to paying attention to verse form.) The predispositions work into habitual states. Roughly half of our hereditary comes from parents, but how much comes from other progenitors (grandmother, etc.) is open to research. He deals with predisposition to nervous disease as well as music. Hereditary predispositions are also connected to the unique personality.

It is doubtful that we inherit our ancestors' experience, "as some are holding." (50) Royce adds that his doubt in no way cancels his sense of the importance of heredity.

Then section (d): "We inherit from our ancestry an enormous collection of traits, of predispositions and tendencies to love or to hate given sorts of experience." (53) A question of trying to get scientific determination of "rules" of how much you get from your mother or father. Both Galton, he says, and Weissman have studied this problem. (The face of your father, the eyes of your mother.) But the remarkable amalgamation, a chance sorting out of heredity, is hard to predict. Royce quotes Galton who "consider[s] it certain that the brain rarely resembles that of one parent only in all its parts, and as regards the most minute details of its structure; it usually, on the contrary, exhibits a combination or alternation between that of the two parents, and this combination is of the most varied kind." *Both* parents seem to influence the structure of the brain. (57) Royce goes on to refer to the "enormous rubbish heap of ancestral traits." (58) Royce challenges them (Galton and Weissman) to organize these predispositions as part of their work.

Pages 59-60 give a summary of this whole a through d process. In the child is no "sheet of white paper." Yet, on the other hand, neither is there a creature of predetermined character. (60) Royce uses "building the cathedral" image.

In a brief (less than three pages) section III, "a man is educated when he most strongly feels and knows that universal truths and universal springs of conduct have become his own, so that he possesses them in a peculiar way as nobody else does, so that the world needs him in just this place, to reflect just this truth, and engage in his peculiar way in just this office." [Does he allude here to Ruskin?]

Section IV (brief conclusion): "Such are the principles that govern the study and the training of the individual temperament." (68)

Royce's final exhortation: "Individualize your scrutiny. Each individual is actually unlike every other. You will never exhaustively understand any one temperament, even your own. But you will find the natural history of individual temperaments, properly pursued, a source of endless

charm and inspiration.”

Lecture X: Mental Defect and Disorder from the Teacher’s Point of View

This lecture is apparently missing from HARP. However, at Skrupskelis *BWJR* 2:1192, he notes this article as being Lecture X of this series: “Mental Defect and Disorder from the Teacher’s Point of View,” *Educational Review*, 6 (1893): 209-22, 322-31, 449-63. Skrupskelis lists the titles of the other lectures. (*cf.* item 148, above, at page [216])

Lecture XI: On Some Special Devices for Mental Training

Box 66. A MS of 68 pages, in 4 sections, pages 14-29 are from previous drafts. All the rest of the pages are freshly drafted. Royce’s aim in this lecture is to indicate through psychology what educational devices are valuable.

No partisan of any one educational device.

Section I: People of his own age had to quarrel between classical and scientific studies and also scientific and technical studies. But the next generation is brought up with the first wave of the religion v. Darwin controversy. Of late, we have run into the second stage of the Darwinian/religious controversy, but the basis of Darwin is pretty well accepted.

A current controversy in education as to the role of manual training. In one sense physical training, and the growth of a student’s industrial art, is a given on many levels. The Greeks, e.g., integrated the gymnasium as important to improvement of social life.

Many sorts of training are important to meet the particular needs of individual minds. (14-15)

Arguing dialectically, Royce concludes that there is no such thing as an education panacea. (17) Given how many different vocations people have, one would expect certain things to be more important to diverse requirements. In general, Royce says, however, whatever device I use, whether military marching to a drill, or training my hands to specific carpentry skills, I form certain habits. That will always be there. “Even in the most abstract thinking, my thoughts, if definite, could be translated into definite modes of muscular activity.” (20) I must, therefore, learn certain habits of muscular movement. (Writing, speech, social behavior, etc.) A typical Hegelian line: “The Spirit manifest itself in this world only as the life expressed in the well organized movements of intelligent human beings.” (21)

So far, no advance toward an answer, but at this point Royce asks: “Disregarding immediate practical uses of a given habit of conduct, what source of muscular habits are most worthwhile to form for the sake of our general mental training?” (22) Music? Learning to speak Spanish or French?

What is the habit that most helps organize all your other habits? (23) Some habits we only use once (e.g. nursery rhymes). This is a muscular habit, according to Royce. But on experiencing an outstanding teacher, Royce acknowledges forming habits trying to imitate that person’s habits and bearing and ideals. Such habits are peculiarly infectious. Nothing is more valuable to you

than the education device that calls out your teacher's enthusiasm, and so arouses your own enthusiasm. (paraphrase/quote) (24) "I once heard a full year's course on Geology, – a subject that I have never since seriously pursued. The personality of my teacher, Prof. Jos. LeConte, deeply impressed itself on me as he told us about his science. The result is that the habits of mental work then formed proved for me profoundly infectious. They seemed in many ways to transform me. I have never since thought upon any subject without being more or less under the spell of the personal influence of LeConte. Of Geology, as a special science, I have thought hardly at all since that time. Of LeConte's method of work I am today consciously or unconsciously a creature." (24-25) "The infectious habit of thought and of action, where it is a healthy habit, is a truly important one from the point of view of the teacher, and that habit is infectious which, while concentrating the energy of the pupil with the maximum of interest and enthusiasms upon some specific task, as he learns or applies the habit, still at the same time engages in this specific task the most of the energies of his brain. The infectious habit is one, for instance, that is accompanied by any easy and sustained attention. It isn't at all the extent of the muscular contractions that are made when you do a given piece of work. It is the manifold appeal to your whole personality that the acquired habit makes which determines its education value. You aren't educated by your much moving, but by the ingenuity, the attentiveness, the plasticity, the organization, that you cultivate as you work." Royce then moves to the metaphor of a captain navigating a ship, forcing him to adapt to new conditions to handle the unexpected. (26-27)

Section II: (back to fresh pages) Royce will deal in this section with character formation and the role of the disciplinary value of a given study. Royce shows himself opposed to universalizing any particular device. But as individual human brains are immensely complex and varied, don't taut the latest fad. (33-34) As to group activity in class ... it's fine in so far as it keeps students from "robbing orchards or ... teasing cats." (36) But as to teaching individual minds, not very valuable.

Royce sees as of limited value the lessons implied in the fairly well-known story of Houdini's son who is asked to run by the store window, and then in retrospect identify the objects in the window. (39-40) Rather, he expects such exercises to produce a segmented type of mental habit. (42) Royce puzzles on the extent to which such devices may be adapted to the varieties of temperament. (45)

Section III: What is the disciplinary value of certain studies in mental discipline insofar as it forms good mental habits that infect the rest of the mental life? How Shakespeare's mind has infected the whole English speaking race. The influence of true personal example is on the whole something far more than accidental character. (46-47) Another reference to Joe LeConte. But LeConte's "general literary style, his method of taking up a problem, his deep assurance of the unity and harmony of all truth, his ardent persuasion as to the significance of science, and his singular combination of a deep and swift instinctive grasp of things with an admirable exactness of procedure. These characteristics we couldn't indeed fully acquire, but they were the potent suggestions of this powerful personality. These were the things that will remain with me for my lifetime." (48)

"The habits of investigation, of patience, of self-sacrificing industry, of deeper ingenuity, these

will, when once formed, accompany us from an old study to a new one.” (The transformative value of these more generalized functions.) (48-49) “Any activity which I feel to be carried out wholeheartedly, so that, as I say, my whole soul is in it, is an activity that involves generalized functions.” (49) Highly generalized function: the syntax of our mother tongue. Therefore, we should scrutinize carefully which sort of discipline may be expected to result from its pursuit. (51) Don’t assume that your generalized habit (as a teacher) will work for every student. (53) Royce uses the example of a gifted classical teacher teaching Caesar’s Gallic Wars.

A negative example of a teacher’s incomprehensible ranting on matters of no import. Royce deals with Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy. Strained and false personification in nature. Instead of pathetic fallacy, the “highest art shows us things as they are to the sensitive but outward looking and contemplative soul of the lover of artistic truth.” (55)

Then to Odysseus. As to classical teachers, a teacher genuinely interested in the life of Greece and Rome will better teach declensions to the students. A similarly infectious teaching is required for manual training. Royce does not judge this special device. Only points out how the device may be made significant.

But Royce recalls the segmentation of functions. It is harder to organize the skills than to merely employ them. (59) Don’t tell them that this is worth their attention – show it. (60)

Section IV: Finally, it remains true that “the imitative functions, those devices which arouse pupils to imitative and constructive concerted activities are despite all their dangers and limitations ... the true future of education.” (61) “The true maxim is: By training, through imitation, highly generalized types of functioning, lead your pupil to some sort of organized reaction upon his world, and thus train him for his social office. All special maxims of method are subordinate to this.” (63)

On page 64, Royce criticizes some current educational maxims. Then, he states: “The main point is to keep this pupil active and to prevent his newly learned activities from ever degenerating into merely segmented habits that have no relation to the rest of his life.” (65) But don’t universalize any of the maxims.

“Routine kills; intelligent and plastic activity is alone instinct with abounding life.” (68)

Lecture XII: On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training

Box 66. This lecture, along with lecture X, are apparently the only published lectures in this series: *International Journal of Ethics* vol. 3 (1892-93): 413-36. Yet *cf.* Skrupskelis’ notes at *BWJR* 2: 1192. The galley proofs for this lecture are mounted out of order in this box. But comparison with the published text of the article in *IJE* shows that they are in fact complete. (Pencil notes inserted into the mounted Wells pages show the order of the galleys.) Comments on the published article are made separately above.

[As noted above at item 146, this article was written before Freud wrote of the superego as a psychological mechanism of self-control. The superego is a very different notion than

conscience.]

Introduction:

The topic of this lecture concerns neither the philosophy of moral consciousness nor practical questions of “how do I teach a child to be morally better.” Rather Royce deals with “some aspects of the natural history of the moral consciousness in man, and especially in the childish and youthful stages of the human mind. I propose, then, to consider in your company, (1) What principal mental factors go together to make up what you and I call the human conscience; (2) How these factors, on the whole, develop as the mind grows from infancy to manhood; and (3) What difficulties and undertakings consequently lie in the way of any one who desires to train, or to aid in training, the moral consciousness of children and youth.” (414)

Section I:

Royce offers a tentative definition of “conscience.” (414)

At page 415, a very good description of the process of moral consciousness. Popularly known as an intuition supposedly ultimate and irreducible, our moral consciousness distinguishes between right and wrong, and in the individual case notes *this* is right, *that* is wrong. But also determines what should happen to us when we do right or wrong. Gives sense of guilt and of worth. Not only lays down moral law, but acts as judge of past deeds.

This activity and habit of conscience needs moral training. There is tension between being conscious of the immutability of conscience, and the recognition that well-informed persons may judge the same “moral” facts differently. (Conscientious differences of opinion on moral matters familiar and lamentable. This is augmented by serious religious differences.)

Some of the paradoxes of the popular conception of human conscience. Royce aims to show why each person’s conscience is a product of training, using groups of general ideas and why there exists a sense of the authority and immutableness of a true conscience. Why this is consistent with a person’s varied and fallible actual judgments of conscience.

Royce declares that he will “have to proceed dogmatically.”

Section II:

Our conscientious opinions subdivide into opinions concerning selfish deeds and dispositions versus kindly or loving deeds. But conscientious opinions are also about matters of justice in a more general sense, judgments *not* being capricious or anarchical. In all its activities, conscience is engaged in some aspect of a two-fold business. It always says be humane and self-sacrificing. It also says be lawful, have a plan, be consistent. The two must be balanced. (Acts of kindness and largesse may be anarchical.)

These, therefore, are the two universal motives of conscience: love and justice. In practice, they are hard to combine. Virtue is both benevolence *and* conformity to universal rules. Kindliness and love is based on moral sympathy. The other side, virtue appears as a disposition to live according to reason, to attain moral wisdom and live in its light.

“The first motive says, *Live for the general good*. The second motive says, *Always be true to your own rational higher self*.” (419)

Royce goes through the Sermon on the Mount for moral maxims, Pauline charity, then to Kant on the categorical imperative. Schopenhauer tackles these issues via the concept of pity, subordinating the rational to benevolent element in consciousness. (421)

“In brief, to sum up the whole moral consciousness in a moment’s insight, the case stands thus: If I am acting morally, I must be acting reasonably.”

Imitateness or suggestibility are critical to the formation of conscience. (Not that all imitateness or suggestibility have moral implications.) “The moral life is essentially a life of conflict, – of the conflict between human and narrowly selfish impulses, of the conflict between reason and caprice, between order and chaos, yes, and of the conflict between these two moral motives themselves.” (423)

“The moral man is an obstinate person; for justice and legality are essentially forms of obstinacy.” Royce goes back to the union of how to live according to rules and be kind and considerate.

Section III:

One result of conflict is our difficulties of conscience (“the great problem of life”). (426)

Royce looks at childhood to get a sense of how the conscience is gradually formed. Imitations previously dealt with were imitations with intellectual value for the child. Being imitative in moral matters helps only if it helps the child actually to control or modify some private impulse of its own. Without the child’s experience of inner conflict, her wits, not her conscience, are being trained.

Only when a child submits, and abandons his own impulses, do we have the beginnings of moral conscience. Royce calls for “successful feats of self-sacrifice” as part of moral training. The word “sin” pops up at page 430. (Royce says he is only doing psychology, but with “sin,” and biblical quotes, this is problematic.)

Royce criticizes a regime of strict discipline that would not cultivate a rich social experience in the child. He notes that children love routine. But mere organized habits is not enough “to insure the growth of an enlightened moral consciousness.” (431)

At page 433, there is almost a picture of the young Royce preaching down to other boys, and being disciplined by the majesty of the community. (*See* “Hope of the Great Community.”) **At page 434, there are even more explicit autobiographical reflections.**

Royce closes with a recognition of reverence and waiting. But the problem: “to recognize the mystery of conduct and still not to lose heart. But that is the problem of life. Do not fear early to let the child feel what he cannot hope to understand, that life is a problem, and still, for that, is sacred.” (436)

Evaluation: For FMO, it is surprising that the word “loyalty” does not appear in this lecture. In fourteen more years, the tension between love and justice – and its subordination to the one life

of loyalty – will dominate his work. As a mid-period expression of his then view of conscience and training youthful conscience, this is an admirable paper.

The absence of encouragement seems to echo the strict evangelicalism of his upbringing in Grass Valley. One lives purely for duty.

**148. “The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective”
(1893?)
Box 62**

A disjointed manuscript with well over 100 pages, it is the result of Royce’s “mutilation” of a previous manuscript. (see below). The paginations are, therefore, confusing. They unfold as follows:

The first chunk of material runs in consecutive pages 1-52. (Of these, pages 4-5 and 23-32 are renumbered.) A second chunk of material begins after this page 52 with pages running from 36 to 90. Of this group, pages 50-69, and pages 71-73 are missing. Pages 44-49 are renumbered (on previously drafted pages). Royce skips pages 78-79, which Wells combines as page 78/79/80.

Query: Are these two chunks in fact part of the same manuscript? The question turns on the crudeness or compatibility of the nexus of the two groups of the MS – pages 1-52 and 36-92. Do these two groups fit together? FMO must say that there is evidence in support of the possibility that the second grouping is a distinct and new MS. There is a seeming reference (at the bottom of page 70) to his Teacher’s Lectures topic (see above) on the role of imitation in the development of social consciousness: “Organized Self-Consciousness, as embodied in the describable coherent life of a worthily working man, is the kind of Self-Consciousness that the teacher wants to encourage and, in encouraging, to ennoble and spiritualize. To the wise, the word suffices.” (page 70, in the second MS group. A succinct and important summary of Royce’s purpose may be found on this page.)

On the other hand, in the second group, Royce has marked “omits” as a part of his reading script. There are references to reflection. There are also inserted lines to help this other text fit with the apparently older MS. What can be said is that the second group clearly constitutes a previously drafted MS that Royce in some way incorporated into this present text: “The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective.”

When judging whether or not these two manuscripts once were bridged together, Royce’s connective lines, at the close of section III, just before entering section IV on page 37 of the MS second group, are good evidence. Even more important are the inserted lines by Royce in the second group, i.e. to his insertions make connection with the first group of pages to which they seem not originally attached.

NB: This complicated text has perplexed and been tackled by at least two serious Royce scholars. Skrupskelis notes of the text at *BWJR*:2 1195, 3 (following his entry of the article “The

External World and the Social Consciousness,” *Philosophical Review*, 3 (1894): 513-45):

“Lecture to the Philosophical Club of Princeton College given on February 2, 1874. Vol. 62 of the Royce Papers contains the manuscript of “The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective.” It is said to be an altered version of the paper read on August 24, 1893, at the Philosophical Congress at the World’s Columbian Exposition. The manuscript has the following note: “MS later mutilated for the paper in the Philos’l Rev. on ‘External World & Soc’ Consc.” This is confirmed by numerous missing pages. It is possible that these missing pages appear in the *Philosophical Review* text. This manuscript, except for the sections with missing pages, was published by Peter Fuss, ‘The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective, An Unpublished Manuscript of Josiah Royce,’ P-9.”

Peter Fuss, when he republished this essay, ended the text *two pages into the second group*, on page 37, up to the beginning of section IV (of this second group). The text from section IV (page 37) to the end of the second group at page 90 is *not* included in the published paper. (Another section IV appears on page 74 of this second group -- further evidence that Royce “bundled” several MSS into this text.)

The note to which Skrupskelis refers, which precedes the MS, reads as follows in its entirety: “This paper read in 1893 Phi.’l Congress in Chicago – MS later mutilated for the paper in the Philos’l Rev. on “External World & Soc’l Consc.” – Present MS has interest as to the Reflection prob.”

Essay VIII in *SGE* – “Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature” – is related to this paper “External World and Social Consciousness.” (Indeed, that scribbled reference may be Royce’s short-hand for the longer essay VIII title). The empirical and logical themes run in close parallel. Significantly, when referring to Essay VIII in the introduction to *SGE* (x-xi), Royce indicates the bridge building between empirical psychology and idealistic philosophy, a topic precisely at issue in the latter part of the present manuscript:

“As a fact, I myself can find no hostility between the psychological interpretation of consciousness and the philosophical interpretation of reality in terms of consciousness. The differences between the two are founded, in part, upon the empirical nature of the psychological material as contrasted with the general logical nature of the arguments for idealism; and, in part, upon the difference in the point of view between a psychological and a philosophical study. But a difference in point of view certainly does mean hostility in doctrine. And every interpretation of experience involves at once a recognition of the facts of experience, and a consideration of their general logical meaning. Sooner or later psychology and philosophy must join hands afresh.” (*SGE*, x-xi.)

Royce notes in his own hand on the first page that the original draft of this address was delivered at the Philosophical Conference at the World’s Fair in Chicago. But the present MS entails several revisions to that original draft. The original version was presented in August 1893. This MS must be dated at some later point.

This paper is *not* to be confused with “The Imitative Functions, and Their Place in Human Nature.” *Century*, n.s. 26 (1894) 137-45. *see BWJR*:2 1195, 4. (Listed at item 162 below.)

Analysis:

FMO notes from 1968:

“As I read this in context, Fuss seems to find evidence of some aspect of REALISM via intelligence’s “imitative” function coming through the early paragraphs of this MS (pages 2-3). Important, too, for development in his theory of knowing – with him speaking of immediate knowledge (including the pure quality of the present moment of knowing (impression & ideas of Hume), secondly, the Reflective Insights, and 3rdly, the Imitative insights.”

FMO notes and quotes December 2008:

Royce uses the theme of imitation and reflection as two types of knowing. The background and context of this essay deserves note, mainly, the 1890 publication of William James’s *Principles of Psychology*, especially the famous chapter on “The Stream of Consciousness” upon which Royce here reflects and describes.

- On pages 7-11, there is a description of immediate experience as only a part of complete knowing. On page 11, Royce speaks of two types of articulate insights (a key word for Royce). He speaks of the empirical ego, the object of “the Self whose exalted identity, as the knower of the identity of meanings amidst the flux of experiences, reflective knowledge is to recognize. The question is, Who is this true, this identical and knowing Self, and in what form is he known to exist?” (22)
- Yajnavalkya and Hume start from the same sense experience, but read it differently, even contradictorily: Yajnavalkya infers an actually existing “true Self” who “cannot avoid saying ‘I see, I know, I am’”; Hume, after entering within himself, finds “only the flitting impressions and ideas” and infers “there is no identity in consciousness, no proper sameness, but only the illusion of sameness. Whatever is no possible object of experience is not. The Self as identical subject of experience is no object. Hence there simply is no such Self at all. It is a dream , an illusion.” (35)

[Notice that, already in 1893, Royce is both referring to and quoting the Hindu Yajnavalkya as an early Hume. Page 28 and 35 of the first MS group, and page 87 of the second MS group.]

- There are two kinds of opponents to Hume.
 - First, there are those who, unlike a wiser Kant, interpret the Subject-Self as a “substance,” or “nature,” or “principle.” Of the personal Subject-Self, Kant cautiously says he knows its *that* (“*dass Ich bin*”) but not its *what* (since despite all his experience, he cannot answer the question: “*wass Ich bin.*” (41)
 - Second, there are opponents who emphasize the *activity* felt or experienced and who find it to be the Subject-Self – whether the activity emphasized be more psychic (I the thinker, I the decider, etc.) or the more bodily activity (muscular feelings of effort, of initiation) (43). Royce comments that *au contraire* there’s “no immediate intuition” of the Subject-Self, and adduces Munsterberg and the later Wundt as concurring. (45)

- [When Royce here critiques this theory of the Subject-Self as “activity,” specifically as merely “a collection feeling primarily muscular in type, is he implicitly criticizing William James, who says he feels his inmost self to be “a tightening in the throat” in his famous letter to his fiancée, Alice Gibbens.?)]
- [In Aristotle’s eventual insight of the Unmoved Mover, Royce finds a “hint” to his way of avoiding both Hume and these two anti-Humean positions. The “Unmoved Mover,” insofar as it teleologically moves all else, is perhaps the best analogue of the Subject-Self. Royce cautions against interpreting Aristotle’s view into the static lifeless connotations that have traditionally become attached to this breakthrough of Aristotelian insight.]
- [From the viewpoint of a person doing an empirical psychological analysis of human consciousness, does Royce here come almost to the peak of his experiential psychological analysis? Until 1916? Until World War I?]
- On page 23, Royce begins to use old pages, numbers 36-45 (renumbering them to 23-32). [Keep eye out for old MS pages ending on page 22; indeed keep eye out for all of these chunks in other manuscripts on similar topics.]

Some significant quotes:

“Human Thinking is in every individual case an effort, made by an intelligent being, to imitate in his own way the form and structure of the Truth that exists beyond this particular thinking. Consequently the business of knowing is essentially an Imitative business.” (2)

“On the other hand, so it would very obviously seem, I reflect when I retire into my own inner world, and there, with a certain relative independence, endeavor, not merely to re[-]embody what an external authority suggests, but to construct for myself what shall, in the outcome, seem good in my own eyes.” (3)

“...[W]hen I know this content as immediate, my knowing itself is not the content known, but is just precisely the knowing thereof.” (26)

The Self is irreducible to a series of known psychic states. Royce says “I am thus far indeed known only as knower, but that is precisely what, by definition, I ought to be.” (27)

Royce highlights the importance of the conflict between Yajnavalkya and Hume, saying “the problem of the Upanishads and of Hume has been a favorite one both with the psychologists and with the pure philosophers. (36)

Notice the way Royce starts the first section IV in the second group (page 37), calling us to attend *not* to the existence or Being, but rather to the *meaning* in our self-consciousness: “Let us then turn our attention for a little from the reflective problem of how we are able through the unity of Self-Consciousness, to recognize the identity of our own meaning in the midst of the flood of fleeting immediate experience.” (37-38 of the second group) (emphasis added by FMO)

Royce significantly cites Wundt’s “Gesamtwille” from his *Ethick*, foreshadowing his doctrine of community in *The Problem of Christianity*. (46, second group)

Evaluation: Fortunately, we possess Peter Fuss’s publication through section III of this paper. The second group marks Royce’s movement from empirical analysis to a philosophical analysis of the logic of meaning involved in the Subject-Self. Moreover, this second group closes with Royce’s approach to showing the truth that there is a higher than human Guide to Thinking and leading us in the search for truth. This argument and all the matter of the second group clamors for recognition by Royce scholars. (*See also* item 161 below.)

149. “Tolstoi and the Unseen Moral Order,”
***The First Book of the Author’s Club: Liber Scriptorum* (New York: Author’s Club, 1893) 488-97.**

All contributions to this volume were written for the express purpose of publication in the Author’s Club volume. The book was published to raise funds for the clubhouse. Each essay of each copy is signed by the author. Only 251 copies were printed. Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1194.

This article reveals Royce’s clear focus on the invisible moral order binding and moving all human minded beings, and any other such minded beings. In some sense, Royce reviews the ethics of Fichte, Kant and Schopenhauer. He also gives the life of “Count” Tolstoy in his later period. Royce puts Tolstoy in the rank of the prophets, and shows Tolstoy’s psychological development through the years.

Among the “we” who have read his books, Royce includes himself. When he writes, “But next after this renunciation follows the positive side of the new doctrine, – namely, love for all beings, with the consequences as to non-resistance and the rest ...” (496)

Royce thanks and honors Tolstoy as “a teacher much more than I follow him.... We need someone to keep us alive to the absolute moral ideas. Who has done so better than Tolstoi? ... Those who teach the service of the Invisible Order remind us, that unless there is something eternal beneath and beyond all this phenomenal life of ours in the world of space and of time, our labor is indeed in vain, however honestly we serve the social order which can be seen with the outward eye.” (497)

Evaluation: This article not only reveals Royce’s wide reading, but also his openness to a non-Western yet Christian mind. It also speaks to the necessity of an eternal moral order. The article counters misunderstandings of Royce.

150. Review
R. Brisbane, *Albert Brisbane: A Mental Biography* (1893)
***International Journal of Ethics*, 4 (1893-94): 536-39**

- 151. Review**
“Two Studies of Philosophical Idealism,”
***The Nation*, 57 (1893): 231-33.**

A review of Edward Caird’s *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* and *The Evolution of Religion*. The review is unsigned, but attributed to Royce by Haskell. *BWJR*:2 1194.

- 152. Review**
“Phases of Thought and Criticism,”
***Atlantic Monthly*, 71 (1893): 126-29.**

Review of Brother Azarias’s *Phases of Thought and Criticism*. Skrupskelis notes that, while the review is unsigned, it is attributed to Royce on stylistic grounds. *BWJR*:2 1193.

- 153. Review**
Bernard Bosanquet’s *A History of Aesthetic*
***The New World*, 2 (1893): 338-42**

- 154. Review**
Theodore F. Wright’s *The Human and Its Relations to the Divine*
***International Journal of Ethics*, 4 (1893-94): 129-30**

- 155. Review**
Frank Chapman Sharp, *The Aesthetic Element in Morality and Its*
Place in a Utilitarian Theory of Morals
***International Journal of Ethics*, 4 (1893-94): 295-9**

- 156. “Philosophy”**
***Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 2 ((1893-94): 238-39**

Report on the work of the Harvard philosophy department for this year.

- 157. “The Knowledge of Good and Evil,”**
***International Journal of Ethics*, 4 (1893-94): 48-80**

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*.

Of this essay, Royce writes: “The idealistic theory of the meaning of evil, here gets again presented, but this time in reference to the delicate ethical question as to how far ‘the knowledge of evil’ contributes to moral perfection.” [*SGE* viii] Royce sees this question as leading to a study of the metaphysical issue, “namely, that of the ethical interpretation of reality, both human and extra-human ... an interpretation hindered... by the general presuppositions of modern

naturalism ... and the essential limitations of the human type of consciousness [e.g. our human time span].” (*ibid.* ix)

Royce attempts here “to explain some of the relations between moral and intellectual development,” trying to avoid controversy with Professor Georg Simmel. The problem is “to what extent does our experience of evil add to our intellectual ability?” Royce notes as a complex question, but offers only a tentative response. Moral goodness as an attainment “is only won through a conflict with the forces of evil, which involves a pretty deep knowledge of evil.”

HARP does not appear to include this manuscript.

158. Review

Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*

***Philosophical Review*, 3 (1894): 212-18**

159. “Can Psychology be Founded upon the Study of Consciousness Alone, or is Physiology Needed for the Purpose?”

***Proceedings of the International Congress of Education of the World’s Columbian Exposition* (New York: NEA, 1894): 687-92**

Read for Royce by William T. Harris on July 26, 1893 to the Department of Rational Psychology of the Congress. *BWJR*:2 1194.

160. “The Case of John Bunyan”

***Psychological Review*, 1 (1894): 22-33, 134-51, 230-40**

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*. HARP does not appear to contain the manuscript for an article on Bunyan as it appears in *SGE*.

Although the Archives lacks a MS for this work, Box 101, folder 7 contains a small notebook, “Notes on Bunyan,” Royce’s previous research for this essay. The notebook’s opening page shows Royce is familiar with eleven sources on Bunyan’s life, starting with Allebone. Royce makes a note that Offer’s edition of Bunyan’s work is the best. Royce notes that, in Venable’s opinion, Brown’s biography is the most painstaking Bunyan biography.

Royce finds both McCauley’s and Tane’s accounts of Bunyan’s visionary experiences (e.g. with “hobgoblins”) insufficient. Tane sees *Pilgrim’s Progress* as a result of an “inflamed brain” and his early and other work is not recognized. The notebook reveals that Royce has done a prodigious amount of reading and research.

161. “The External World and the Social Consciousness”
***Philosophical Review*, 3 (1894): 513-45**

An earlier version of this essay may perhaps be found in “The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective,” contained in a disjointed form in HARP Box 62. See item 148 for an analysis of that essay.

Evaluation: This article is quite important because it counters the popular view that the individual knows external reality by himself, without being influenced by his community to recognize the reality of the external world. The Ego/Alter doctrine in Royce needs to be set before the reader. Consideration of the entire *The Philosophical Review*’s version of this piece, as opposed to Fuss’s edited version, allows the reader access to Royce’s full thought.

162. “The Imitative Functions, and Their Place in Human Nature”
***Century*, n.s. 26 (1894): 137-45**

Skrupskelis: “In part, a request for information. Included is a series of questions and an invitation to the public to send their replies to Royce.” *BWJR*:2 1195.

163. “The Problem of Paracelsus”
***The New World*, 3 (1894): 89-110**

Reprinted in *Fugitive Essays*. An essay on Robert Browning’s “Paracelsus” before the Boston Browning Society on November 26, 1893.

164. “The Student of Philosophy”
***Harvard Monthly*, 18 (1894): 87-99**

Royce is cautionary about the self-centered egoist, who will be led nowhere by philosophizing. Royce says this almost 20 years before he describes his Three Attitudes of Will in *PC* (351-56). Only the third attitude can support genuine philosophy, the other two being egoistic positions. Royce’s aim here is not to talk about philosophy’s ends, methods and values, but the often omitted question: What conditions make it wise for any individual to become, in an extended sense, a Student of Philosophy – especially since philosophy is distinctly a specialty? Royce moves back and forth on the values and disvalues on specializing in philosophy.

Royce’s concluding lines catch in a short span Royce’s spirit of philosophizing:

“You may honestly doubt what you will when you study philosophy; but unless you doubt in the spirit of one essentially devoted to loyal living, philosophy can do nothing for you. For one of philosophy’s deepest discoveries is that wise doubt, when thoroughly carried to its reflective extreme, is full of positive implications. For that very reason, however, the doubts of the self-centered egoist, because they have no deeper implications, lead nowhere. The truth only comes to those who are ready to surrender their caprices to the law.” (99)

Evaluation: The concluding part of Royce's last paragraph (quoted above) catches the spirit of Royce.

165. Review

**Brothers of the Christian Schools, *Elementary Course of Christian Philosophy*
International Journal of Ethics, 5 (1894-95): 398-99**

166. "Natural Law, Ethics, and Evolution,"

***International Journal of Ethics*, 5 (1894-95): 489-500.**

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil* with "slight changes" (according to Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1196).

Royce's contribution to a discussion in response to the "well-known address of Prof. Huxley." (footnote at *SGE* 125) [*cf.* *The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy* (1881)]

[Royce wrote various studies of evolution, listed here in chronological order:

- "The Evolution Theory of Thought," Section II of Royce's "Some Illustrations of the Structure and Growth of Human Thought" (1880) [Box 80] (*See* item 75, page ____.)
- "Evolution as a Philosophical Doctrine" [Box 105, folder, 4, Document 8] (Perhaps a draft or different version of section II of "The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy." *See* item 85(a), page 191.)
- "The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy" (1881) [Box 60] (*See* item 85(a), page 191.)
- "Is there a Philosophy of Evolution?" (*See* item 114, page ____.)
- "The Rise of the Doctrine of Evolution" and "Nature and Evolution: The Outer World and Its Paradox," Lectures 9 and 10 in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892).
- "Natural Law Ethics and Evolution" (1894)
- Augustus Graham Lectures, Lecture IV: "God and Nature; Evolution and Ethics" (1898) [Box 68] (*See* item 181 below.)
- Royce's Introduction and Notes to John Fiske's *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*. (*see* item 244, below; *BWJR* 2: 1205-06)
- "Herbert Spencer and His Contribution to the Concept of Evolution," *International Quarterly*, 9 (1904): 333-65.
- *Problem of Christianity* 63-64 with Chapter IX, "The Community and the Time-Process" 1913

Royce wrote the core of his 1881 article, "The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy" as a young man and novice teacher. (*See* item 85(a) above.) Without precisely paralleling this early essay, *SGE*'s Fifth essay, "Natural Law, Ethics, and Evolution" (1895) clearly echoes that 1881 work. Yet, being written more than a decade later, the 1895 essay

shows considerable development and refinement.¹⁷ . A final stage is suggested in *PC* 63-64 and its Chapter 9, “The Community and the Time Process.”]

Evaluation: It is important that the scholar pay attention to the full panoply of Royce’s expositions and appraisals of the theory of evolutionary. Royce’s lengthy introduction to Fiske’s *Cosmic Philosophy* (addressed below at item 232) is a book in itself. The two articles on John Fiske, written after Fiske’s death, offer much shorter sketches. From the late period, see *PC* 64-65 and Chapter 9, “The Community and the Time Process.”

- 167. Review**
J. Macbride Sterrett, *The Ethics of Hegel* (1895)
International Journal of Ethics, 5 (1894-95): 257-60
- 168. Review**
Maurice Thompson, *The Ethics of Literary Art* (1895)
International Journal of Ethics, 5 (1894-95): 244-47
- 169. Review**
***Thoughts from the Writings of John C. Learned* (1895)**
International Journal of Ethics, 5 (1894-95): 270
- 170. “Introduction”**
to Anna Boynton Thompson, *The Unity of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895): ix-xx
- 171. “Preliminary Report on Imitation,”**
Psychological Review, 2 (1895): 217-35.
- 172. “Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature,”**
Philosophical Review, 4 (1895): 465-85, 577-602.

Reprinted as Essay 8 in *Studies of Good and Evil*.

This paper was read before the Philosophical Club of Brown University, May 23, 1895, and later considerably enlarged and supplemented. The paper deals with issues of human consciousness and nature.

Royce called a version of this paper “Considerations on the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness (with a few hints on the possibility of immortality,” and regards it as needing the

¹⁷ See *SGE*’s Introduction, ix-x.

previous empirical study [i.e. Royce's second talk after *CG*] "as a preliminary to make comprehensible my position [here]." (Royce to GHH, *Letters*, at page 335. Cf. *Letters*, at page 336.)

The heart of the essay is indicated in Section II, where Royce summarizes his six theses, all of which tend to "a sort of universal sociology" (206) implied by evolutionary doctrine. "[T]he history of the differentiation of one colony [our earth], as it were, of the universal society from the parent social order of the finite world in its wholeness." (207) The rest of the article is a detailed argument and defense of his six theses.

Beyond fragmented references in the "Self-Consciousness Manuscripts" [listed below], HARP does not appear to have the original MS for this Eighth Essay.

**173. "Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness,"
Psychological Review, 2 (1895): 433-57, 574-84**

Reprinted as Essay 7 in *Studies of Good and Evil*.

This originated as a paper read before the Medico-Psychological Association of Boston on March 21, 1894. Royce gave a version of this paper on September 4, 1895 at Berkeley. Royce regards this essay as novel in so far as here he applies his "theoretical consideration to the study of the pathological variations of self-consciousness." (182)

Box 97 contains a 4-page manuscript entitled "Suggestions Concerning the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness," a significant note for the structure of the papers following the Conception of God lecture. Royce writes on this 4-page MS, "I refer here [in this MS] to the psychological paper on the 'Anomalies of Self-Consciousness', – a paper read to the Union immediately after the previous philosophical paper of this series on 'The Conception of Will in its Relation to the Absolute.'" (page 4)

Royce calls this essay "altogether an empirical study ... necessary as a preliminary to make comprehensible my position in the third paper a reflectively philosophical study." By "the third paper," Royce means "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature," the *SGE*'s Eighth Essay. Royce also called this 8th Essay "Consideration on the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness." [See Project Part I, *SGE* 169; *Letters* 336, n.157] [cf. Manuscripts on Self-Consciousness, Box 97.]

Some significant quotes:

"For a man is self-conscious in so far as he has formed habits of regarding, remembering, estimating, and guiding himself.... If a man regards himself, as this individual Ego, he always sets over against his Ego something else, viz. some particular object represented by a portion of his conscious states, and known to him as his then present and interesting non-Ego.... Accordingly, I then exist for myself, as the beheld of all beholders, the model." (180)
"... Conscience is then the colder non-Ego, the voice of humanity, or of God."

Beyond fragmented references in the “Self-Consciousness Manuscripts” [internal cite] HARP does not appear to have the original MS for this Seventh Essay.

Evaluation: Royce selected this article from the planned four articles for *The Educational Review*, evidence of his own appreciation of its importance.

174. “The Study of Philosophy”
Occident (University of California), 29 (1895): 50-53

175. Review
James H. Hyslop, *The Elements of Ethics* (1895)
International Journal of Ethics, 6 (1895-96): 113-17

176. Fragments (undated: 1895?)
Box 91

Two untitled fragments follow the MS of “The Spirit of the Community” in Box 91. A piece of the envelope that formerly contained these pages is included in Box 91. No date is given. However, these MS pages may date to a much earlier time, perhaps 1895. [see FMO notes below. Perhaps they are part of the three talks given *after* the formal public lectures on *The Conception of God*. Royce gave these three minor talks around September 2, 4 and 6, after the main lecture on August 31, 1895.]

Although the subject matter of these two fragments clearly relates to the printed version of the “Supplementary Essay” of *CG*, a quick examination finds no textual parallels between the manuscripts and the printed version of *CG*’s “Supplementary Essay.”

See *Letters* 336, n.157, for Clendenning’s description of how the minor lectures unfolded. Clendenning suggests that these minor lectures grew out of earlier papers “Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness,” and “Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature.”

Fragment 1: **“A General Sketch of the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness” (tentative title drawn from page 44)**

This untitled fragment runs from pages 36 to 53. The title is suggested on page 44, when Royce refers to his subject matter in retrospect. (“I have now completed my general sketch ...”) The coincidence of the fact that this MS fragment begins with page 36 perhaps accounts for its happenstance inclusion at this point in Box 91 (e.g. following “The Spirit of the Community” which ends on page 35).

This Fragment begins abruptly at page 36, in the middle of a sentence with these words “or upon the permanence of any *Ding an Sich*, of any substance, called for instance a soul,” with no hint

of what the previous 35 pages may have dealt with.

The topic is the Ego, “an individual’s experience in its wholeness [which] has a certain unity of meaning, namely as aiming towards the progressive realization of an unique ideal. Leave out that one conscious ideal, and there is no one Ego left.” Royce marks a sharp critique of the substance view of the Self as a Thing. He distinguishes the metaphysical real Ego and the empirical Ego – a “heap of more or less self-conscious moments, involving the contrast of ego and non-ego, viewed just as they chance to come.” (37)

At page 39, Royce refers to “my former paper (of Monday).” Thus this is at least a second paper in a series. He notes the subject matter of the First Paper in the series to be “To define the Absolute as the ultimate Reality.” (44) In it, he had argued for the definition “The Absolute ... is a system of Experience, self-consciously aware that what is present to it is a fulfilment of its own system of Ideas. It is therefore not only a system of experience, but an all-embracing and fulfilled Thought, to which is presented the realization of all genuine or concrete possibilities.”

“The very proof that God exists depends and must depend solely upon proving that no finite reality is or can be absolutely real, and that every finite experience is and must be a fragment of a Whole.” (39)

As Royce approaches the end of his essay, he raises the issue of “arrest,” the idea of the “confinement of abstract or of unreally Infinite possibility in the very presence of real or determinate context.” (49) This arrest, Royce calls “attention” or “volition.” [NB: In this “focused volition” there may be a non-explicated relation to the creativity in Hegel’s *Negativitat*.]

The last page of this MS (page 53) is heavily edited with several lines crossed out, on a re-used draft page. The last paragraph on page 53 appears to conclude the essay.

“Consequently, when we find as we have found, the individual Ego existing, as one individual whose life, by virtue of its relation to one attentively selected and significant ideal, we have a right to say, here is a case, an embodiment, a portion of the divine Freedom. The relative separateness and the actual uniqueness of this individual case give us the right to say, as we have here been saying: God in this Ego is freely expressing an unique portion both of his will and of his life and so this Ego is by his own portion of God’s freedom what in essence he is, as the seeker of just this Ideal.”

Fragment 2 “To Define the Absolute as the Ultimate Reality” (tentative title)

The first section is entitled “The Empirical Aspect of Finite Self-Consciousness.” But the paper ends with great attention to the Absolute itself. Hence this fragment may represent Royce’s first paper in the three days following *CG*, or in other words, the “first article” referred to in the above Untitled Fragment at page 39, delivered on “Monday.” If this is so, the title, offered here tentatively reflects Royce’s aim “to define the Absolute as the ultimate Reality.” (*See* page 39 of prior MS.)

The MS is divided into six sections.

This MS begins with pages 52 and 53 (repeating the pagination of 52 and 53 of the previous MS). The MS is untitled but begins with a Section “I”, continuing through to page 90a, with many inserts (89a-z, e.g.) (all told, the MS contains approximately 65 pages). Again, the coincidence of the page numbers may account for its placement here. There is not, however, any continuity with the previous MS.

There may be previous MS pages leading up to this page. (A note of “14 to” at the top of the page.)

Royce begins this MS in pencil “First then for the empirical aspect of finite self-consciousness.” Then the MS shifts to ink.

FMO suggests that this final MS paper sounds like Royce’s work from 1895, responding to Howison in the *Conception of God* debates in the small lectures that followed the public lecture to the Union. Royce asserts that until an individual comes to a “rational self-consciousness,” that individual cannot be an embodiment of God’s plan. (55)

Royce is working the contrast between the Ego and the non-Ego. “If I really know what, on the whole, I mean to be, the chaotic succession of empirical states of my ego which varying experience brings to me, will not break up my deeper unity.” (64) Royce critiques a superficial self-identity that would be derived from one’s various “roles.”

At page 74, Royce makes a large deletion of 14 lines. Then, at 75: “The reality that in such a case you each time deal with is an absolute reality only in case the contents of experience that you consider are, when taken together, identical with the whole life of God.” [i.e., the union of ethics and religion in a nutshell.]

Royce distinguishes between the ideal life-ideal and the present of something tending to the negative in our self-ideal: “One word more here as to the sort of self that can be defined by reference to a life-ideal. I have spoken as if an individual life-ideal were as such a wholly good, a truly worthy ideal. As a fact any individual life-ideal as such has of necessity a large element of rationality, and so of goodness about it. On the other hand, a relatively although never wholly diabolical individual life-ideal, is perfectly possible; and then the relative unity of an individual self can be, and often is, defined with reference to just such a relatively bad or devilish ideal. In such cases, the goal of life retains ideality, but the individual is an evil doer, a relatively lost soul. There are such lives in plenty in the world. They have their own degree of self-hood, unity, ideality; but a deep-coloring of baseness runs through it all.” (76-77)

Royce begins a section IV at page 77. “[T]he term person in its metaphysical sense, can mean only the moral individual,” aiming toward an Ideal.” (81) This always involves a contrast with other finite selves, and “to the rest of the universe of experience.” “I assert (1) that this individual’s experience is identically a part of God’s experience, i.e., not similar to a portion of God’s experience, but identically the same as such portion; and (2) that this individual’s plan is

identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan. God's consciousness forms in its wholeness one luminously transparent conscious moment, and whatever is has in general such relation to that whole, as in our own consciousness, the partial elements of my one moment of consciousness have to the whole of that moment. On the other hand, I insist that this individual's experience, even by the aid of the very conditions that force psychology to view it is an evanescent and unspeakably delicate product of the most various and unstable factors, is, when viewed in relation to an exclusive ideal, in other words when metaphysically viewed, an Unique experience, and consequently an unique constituent of the divine life, nowhere else capable of being represented in God's universe, and therefore metaphysically necessary to the very fulfilment of God's own life; so that, thus viewing himself, the individual can say to God, in Meister Eckhart's beautiful words: 'Were I not, God himself could not be.'" (82-83)

Royce goes on to insist that the individual is free with the identical freedom of God, whereof his (the individual's) freedom is a portion. (86) Royce cautions not to think of a self first existing and then later freely choosing its ideal. "The Self exists only as the conscious chooser, the attentively free possessor ... of this ideal." (88)

Royce begins Section V on 89a, a section written on entirely fresh pages (previous pages are much re-worked, used at least in two other contexts – i.e. page numbers at the top are often crossed out twice, indicating radically different placements of the text in previous "incarnations.") These new pages in Section V are not much edited. Section V (89a-89z) begins a summary of the previous conclusions. Empirical self-consciousness is formed by a social contrast effect amid an unstable mass of contents in the empirical consciousness. One then chooses a life-ideal which is the base for his chosen plan of life.

Royce shifts then to the metaphysical sense. It is defined both from our own point of view (from below) *and* the absolute point of view (from above). He cautions against our self-consciousness built by contrast with another. In fact, God is one moment of divine life. There is no external other for him, no two-sided absolute moment, nothing not immediate to himself. But he is the whole process which we express in finite mediations. "This fulfilment of all, constitutes what the Absolute as such sees, and save by seeing this, the Absolute is no Absolute, no Experience, no Seeing of truth, at all."

89o: "In this sense one can then say, the Absolute Unity of Consciousness contains, involves, includes, not merely finite types of self-consciousness, not merely finite contrasts of Self and Other, but the contrasts and the consciousness of its own being as Thinker, Experiencer, Seer and as Love or Will, and of all these as essentially interrelated aspects of itself as unity."

In his description of the Absolute, and his attempt to balance interrelating, interpenetrating functions, Royce seems to disclose a strong Hegelian influence.

In section VI, Royce continues with the theme that the Absolute is a logically complete form of self-consciousness. He moves into this objection that if this unique being is free, no other individual can be free. To this he replies: "Why not view the individual Whole as a whole of many related, but not therefore mutually determined individuals? Why is this not possible?" (89y)

Royce ends trying to reconcile the freedom of God with the freedom of the individual. “An individual whole of mutually contingent parts, conforming to law in whole and in part, embodying universals, fulfilling ideas, yet with freedom not only for the whole but also for the parts?” (90-90a)

This address was supposedly offered at Berkeley in September 1895. Soon afterward, in 1896, Royce delivered his Augustus Graham Lectures in Brooklyn. Those lectures had been identified as the first appearance of Royce’s “American Idea of the Individual.” (*See Letters* 347-48) Yet, the present essay seems to articulate this idea of the unique individual one year earlier, in September of 1895. This theory is supported by Royce’s letter to Howison, August 31, 1896.

From FMO’s Index notes: There may be a tie-in of this MS fragment with the 7th MS found in Box 97 (related to the metaphysics of the individual).

Evaluation: These are important essays on the freedom of both the individual finite Ego and of the Absolute.

177. Review

John Dewey, *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus* (Ann Arbor: Inland Press, 1895)

***International Journal of Ethics*, 6 (1895-96): 110-13**

At this point, Royce has already reviewed *The Outlines*.

178. “Philosophy”

***Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 4 (1895-96): 246-47**

A report on the Harvard Philosophy Department for 1895-96.

179. Review

James Mark Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1896)

***Psychological Review*, 3 (1896): 201-11.**

180. “Certitudes and Illusions,”

***Science*, n.s. 3 (1896): 354-55.**

A letter to the editor, with comments on the treatment of Hegel in J. W. Powell’s “Certitudes and Illusions,” *Science*, n.s. 3 (1896): 263-71.

**181. Augustus Graham Lectures:
“On Theism” (1896)
Boxes 67 and 68**

From January 5 to March 1, Royce delivered these lectures to the Brooklyn Institute. These lectures took place five months after Royce’s *Conception of God* lectures. Yet in terms of the detail he offers, the Graham Lectures are very different from Royce’s 1895 *CG* lecture.

The lectures deal with the question: “Whether God exists, and what his nature is, as matters of purely dispassionate consideration, and with the aim of getting as clear an insight as we can.” (page 2, Lecture I)

**Lecture I: “The Present Position of Theism”
Box 67**

Delivered January 5, 1896. A 70-page MS in six sections, with nine pages of introduction. All of it is written on fresh pages.

Introduction: (pages 1-9)

This is a very important introduction, clarifying both the purpose of the lecture series, and Royce’s understanding of God (in philosophical terms).

Royce says this is a philosophical enterprise, he is neither concerned with defending nor attacking faith. Rather, he seeks clear and distinct ideas. The question is what one can see, not what one believes.

Royce defines philosophy as “the thorough going attempt to make truth as manifest as possible, to bring insight into the maximum of unhindered closeness of relation with its accessible objects.” (3) (Royce’s commitment to neither defend nor attack is here long before he makes it explicit in *The Problem of Christianity*.) (6)

Royce does not use “manifestation” in its normal sense. “By a manifestation of God I shall mean such an indication of his presence as our critical thought can estimate, and such an indication, too, as bears the test of this critical estimate.” (8)

[NB: an “indication” puts him into semiotics (sign talk), and “estimation” puts him in value considerations.]

Note the change of tone from, five months earlier, *The Conception of God* text (not the “Supplementary Essay,” but the first text).

Royce will offer considerations about manifestations of God to our *rational* insight, and not appeal to an unphilosophical faith. The first lecture will be concerned with preliminary definitions, and then to pointing out the bearings of certain recent philosophical tendencies. On the theme of a rational Theism. (9)

The lectures will consider not the *nature* of God, but the *manifestation* of God. (10) What we mean by God comes from three-fold tradition. Since earliest time of church, three elements struggled to be brought to unity.

Sections I-III:

Already in 1896, Royce is saying “for certain motives which go very deep in the constitution of the human mind have been working, from the very origin of civilization, to simplify the endless complications and incongruities of primitive religion, to unify men’s views of the world, and to moralize the traditions of earlier faiths.”

Note the theme of a universal tendency under a world spirit, leading to some unified concept of God. Royce regards the primitive man’s puzzling notion of the divine as a pathological stage of development.

In this look at civilization’s growth, Royce intends to point out several special, particularly important tendencies that form our own conception of God. Three sources of theistic tradition.

Source (1) The ethical monotheism of the Old Testament, with the added conception of the universal fatherhood of God, which Christianity has so strongly emphasized. God as the moral sovereign, whose will we are to implement. The God of Israel is righteous. The Jewish fall into exile meant that they transferred into an unseen world of hope, which the visible present refused to confirm.

Source (2) The Greek tendency dependent on Aristotle, backed with the tradition of Plato, Socrates, etc., defined God not by ethical but by theoretical predicates, the “being who is at once self-knowing and absolutely perfect, omniscient and changeless – the being whose knowledge and whose perfection are both alike and rendered logically necessary.” (17) So the philosopher Aristotle “maintains in order that we should be able to explain the order, the intelligibility, the unity, and the processes of the Cosmos.” (18)

“Aristotle’s God was speculatively expounded as the being whose existence explains the world and renders it logically intelligible. By arguments of no little originality, – arguments some of which, in a more or less debased form have now become very familiar, Aristotle reasons that the world of change, full as it is, to his mind, of a ceaseless striving towards ideal ends, needs a changeless being in whom the ideal is realized, to be its First Mover; that the world where facts are to be through and through intelligible, needs an Intelligence as the head of it; and that the order, the live and purposeful unity of the Cosmos, as he conceived it, are comprehensible only in the light of such a view.” (18)

[NOTE: Royce’s attachment to Aristotle, whom he calls (with Aquinas) “The Philosopher” is significant. “Thought thinking thought” is predominant and often repeated in Royce’s later writings.]

This emphasis in this second category is on Divine Reason rather than on Divine Power – “an omniscient rather than an ethical deity, – a God conceived indeed as an eternal Ideal, towards

whose perfection the world endlessly aims, but not at all as the strenuously watchful righteous ruler of the prophets was originally conceived.” (19)

Source (3) Oriental, but one cannot ascribe it to a particular person. A characteristic Hindu conception. “[D]efines God as the Absolute Reality, by contrast with whose fullness of being every finite thing is relatively speaking, unreal.” (21) The divine is above all One. (22) A denial of the reality of the world. “This Monistic view, as it has often been called, received its first classic expression in Hindoo [*sic*] religious philosophy.” (24)

The requirement of the deep union with the Absolute. The Vedanta doctrine of the Hindoos, the Neo-Platonic teachers, the medieval mystics, agree with the more modern Spinoza. What Plotinus said: the world is an emanation of God. “When you find the road Godwards, you forsake this finite realm, to seek the Absolute.” (26) The Church calls this heretical Pantheism. Mere Deism. The denial of the separation of God from the world. (27) God as primarily a Most Real Being.

Royce concludes his historical summary of “the three principal groups of ideas that have influenced modern notions of God.” (35) “[W]e ought to define our problem with due reference to history.” (36)

NOTES: Again, Royce will return to these categories in his later writing on monotheism. He doesn’t question whether a philosophical conception is adequate to the reality of God. It is perhaps a Grace-given notion of God, with God as teacher. Royce does *not* mention the Trinity as the highest experience of Christian mystics. Yet he is working toward a reconciliation of these three tendencies. Royce’s emphases in these sections, written after his *CG* address, reflect that the charge of Monism and Pantheism have been leveled at him.

Except for the Hindu experience, the whole idea of the Western experiences of God seems confined to the rare birds who are called mystics, not the average Christian. A quasi-direct awareness of God. Could this be something that is at least in part beyond rational comprehension? Perhaps hints that Royce is willing to accept the fact that there are elements in this topic beyond one’s full grasp.

Section IV-VI:

Royce now turns to recent work of theistic speculation. The modern mind looks not at God himself but at the cosmos as it appears to the mind of men. Again, three different currents of thought. Royce sees them interestingly related to the three tendencies related above.

(1) Mechanistic View. Scientific idea that tends to view the knowable universe as reasonably definite natural law. Galileo. Mechanical science, Newton e.g. This modern world not Aristotle’s world. Royce is opposed to linking this modern view back to Aristotle. If we’re going to get a modern idea of God, it can’t come from modern science, with its necessity, predeterminism, etc.

(2) Agnosticism - sharply differentiated from the mechanical nature view. We can only know from the perspective of our human experience. We are too limited to know the real laws of the

world. We are unable to get to the reality that is the basis of our experience.

Royce explains “perspectivism” never gets to a final proof. What appears to man is as far as we can go. Royce distinguishes: to be agnostic is not to disbelieve in God’s existence. Kant, e.g., a theoretical agnostic was in fact a theist. Such a position closest to the ethical monotheism of the prophets of Israel (56-57) Righteousness for Kant means Absolute Reasonableness. (57) Kant’s Theism is distinctly ethical. Ethics is higher than theory. (Ethical Monotheism)

(3) Constructive Idealism. (As sort of correction of Kant.) We can attain a positive, if incomplete, knowledge of reality. Further holds that when this knowledge is attained, it is best expressed in the phrase: “Reality is a Spirit,” that is, “behind the show which we see by virtue of the perspective of our human experience. (62) Our own inner life reflects the reality of life in the Absolute. (64) Varieties of constructive idealism: Von Hartman’s Absolute as Unconscious Spirit, e.g. This borrows heavily from the “Oriental” notion of God (see above at section 3).

Royce’s ultimate purpose in these Graham lectures is to show that “the Ethical monotheism of the prophets of Israel, the doctrine which Kant maintained as a matter of faith, is not only reconcilable with Idealism, but is a necessary aspect of it.” (69) “For the natural order, as we men see it, is a show, a hint, an anticipation of a hidden reality...” “[B]ut in the moral world, as we shall see reason to maintain, God and man, as it were, touch hands. Here then we shall reach the manifestations of God in his, and, if we choose, in our works.” Sharing in the unique preference of God’s will. (70)

Evaluation: Lecture I of the Graham lectures seems to FMO one of the most detailed and illuminating exposes by Royce of the problem of theism with its three ancient and three modern types of theism, including his own constructive ethical idealism It is a thought-challenging paper, not light-weight reading.

Lecture II: “The Philosophical Conception of God”

Box 67

Delivered January 19, 1896. The MS is preceded by an 8-point list of topics (typescript). The list reflects a rehearsal of his Four Conceptions of Reality.

This MS is a combination of MS pages, and inserts of some Royce publication. A first insert of printed material (the 1895 *CG* page 12) occurs at page 15, reflecting pages 11-13 of the 1897 *CG*. The second insert begins after MS page 39, and runs from printed pages 19-26. These pages are excerpts of the 1895 printing of *Conception of God*. They reflect pages 21-35 of the 1897 printing. The printed pages are here together inserted as MS “page” 40 (a-g), then the MS resumes from page 41 to 44. Then the lecture MS returns to printed pages numbered 27-34. This third insert reflects pages 36-48 of the 1897 *CG*. Royce ends the lecture inserts, and Lecture II, with the words at the top of the 1897 *CG* page 48: “...assure us of the reality of that fulfilment which is the life of God.” The pagination of the MS also includes a 19a, and a 25a. 8-19 are written on previously drafted MS pages. 19a-39 is all fresh. There are Royce handwriting marks editing the printed pages to fit seamlessly into the lecture.

In brief introduction, Royce announces that he will touch on the “conception of God as the

Highest Reality.”

Section I:

Common sense is not philosophically reliable. “Ordinary man takes on faith what the social tradition reports.” (3) “Tradition is indeed in one sense the source of all our insight, even the highest, insofar as we can only learn to think about what tradition has first suggested to us; but on the other hand, insofar as we learn to think independently, the very contents of tradition are likely to be for ourselves a transformation as we proceed.” (5)

The question is: How shall we conceive reality? Royce reminds the audience that he has previously noted God to be the One ultimately Real Being of the universe. Royce promises to close the lecture with a sketch of a conception of God’s nature that grows out of his analysis of the conception of reality in general. “An idealist, in philosophy, is a man who says: There is nothing real in all the universe except mind, except spirit, except the experience, the thought, in short the inner life, of some being or beings (8-9) who know, and feel, and will.”

But Royce adds to this definition of idealism the tenet that “all the minds that exist, exist only as organic parts of one Divine Mind, which in its wholeness, is absolutely self-possessed, conscious, full of the light of clear insight.” (10) Concerning mysteries, Royce states about his idealism: “There are no essential mysteries in the universe, no dead things that cannot possibly be understood, no fragmentary facts that are without their place in the Divine order, no fair questions that are essentially insoluble, no chaotic realities to whose comprehension mind is essentially inadequate.” (10-11)

A description of the ultimately real on page 11. (a la Eckhart? FMO elsewhere suggests it is.) Royce goes on to contrast his idealism with the common sense view. Royce describes his idealism carefully in page 13-15, plus the brief *CG* insert on page 15.

“This, then, is the thesis that the idealist wants to defend” – God as the one ultimately real being. How to defend? By showing that the ordinary conception of reality involves ambiguities and absurdities. By showing that “reality” is an essentially ambiguous term. The ordinary conception holds present facts of experience as reality. The idealist looks rather to thought, and the world of possible experience. Eventually both these ambiguous views must be seen as partial expressions of the truth.

Reality and the real world distinguished from illusion or appearance. (18) Common sense makes us believe that only the present is in any full sense real, with the past and future not fully real by comparison. (20)

An initial paradox: sometimes reality means the present experienced fact. Yet we also mean the reality of the future, the permanent that forevermore shall be. (22) The first ambiguity to get over.

Another paradox, even as I say the present is real, the present of my reference itself has fled. (24) The real as the current flow of time versus the sense of the real as the abiding and permanent as such.

All these paradoxes and ambiguities lead us to deeper thinking. (25)

Section II: Moves us on to our first close views of reality. “The real is whatever I myself feel to be real for me, so long as the feeling lasts.” (27) “Real are feelings and ideas, real are love and hate, real are joy and grief.” (28) Royce attacks this common sense view of reality. (31) This has to be transcended.

Section III: The possibilities of experience as reality is his next view. A frankly ambiguous account of reality which science has developed. “It is the inevitable and instructive ambiguity of this conception that I want most of all to bring out.” We say the data of present experience are real, and these data indicate reality beyond our senses that science must study. But as science is limited to using our own experience, what does this “beyond” mean. What scientists claim as truth in their system is a world more organized and more inclusive than our own world. (39) Distinction between the verdict of science from the actual experience of any one mortal.

Experience as it comes is a heap of fragments. But science is a system of connections. More of this comparison. “You are ignorant of reality insofar as you desire a knowledge of reality that you cannot now get.” (Page 22 of printed text insert at MS page 40) “And thus the reality that we seek to know, has always to be defined as that which either is or would be present to a sort of experience which we ideally define as an organized – that is an united and transparently reasonable – experience.” (Page 23 of printed text insert)

“Passing to the limit in this direction, we can accordingly say that by the absolute reality we can only mean either that which is present to an absolutely organized experience inclusive of all possible experience, or that which would be presented as the content of such an experience if there were one.” (24 of printed text insert)

Royce then passes to another consideration, the attempt to bring together these two views. He moves into the social relations as necessary to this reconciliation: “genuineness in the life of our fellows” (26) Royce argues that the two views of reality, in social experience, are inseparable. “And our social experience of one another gives us the only suggestion as to how these two contrasting but inseparable aspects of reality can be reconciled.” (MS page 43) Our social bond has connected us. (44)

Our final thought – is there an absolutely organized experience, beyond organization of the social experience. (The proof of God argument.) A mere possibility, yet that implies an actuality. “Every *if* implies an *is*.” (27) Really present to some experience. Royce admits that judgments may be wrong.

There is experience. But then there is also an “**appeal** from this experienced fragment to some more organized whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place.” FMO notes that this appeal is something new after *RAP*. Royce marches through the “proofs” of his steps.

Then you ask: “Where in our human world does God get revealed? – what manifests God’s glory?” (34 second printed insert)

Lecture III: “The Moral World as the Revelation of God”

Box 67

Delivered February 2, 1896. This is an apparently incomplete MS (noted by Wells; FMO agrees). This fragment, however, is exceptional as an example of Royce as a moral philosopher. Royce will be coming to the notion of the individual as object of unique love, choice, preference. It is incomplete at 51 pages. A section IV begins on page 50. "From the conception of God's Will, I turn to the definition of my own self-conscious Will."

This problem of the relationship of the Self-Conscious Will and the Absolute Will is the topic of Part II of *CG*'s "Supplementary Essay." It is possible that this is a pre-draft of the latter two sections in Part II of the "Supplementary Essay," dealing with the relation of the Absolute to the Individual Will. (Indeed, perhaps Royce pulled the missing ten or so pages from the end of this MS to use as redrafted MS pages in the writing of the last two sections of Part II of the "Supplementary Essay.")

Once you move into the conception of God established in Lecture II, you are in the realm of the third "Oriental View" laid out in Lecture I. We are led to reality as the permanent possibility of experience. "Genuinely, finally, satisfactorily real, is only that at which my experience hints, that which a complete, a normal, an organized experience, with which I contrast mine." (8) The One Ultimately Real Being.

Section I:

Royce further reviews Lecture II— if our experience were only fragmentary facts, there would be no unity at all in our understanding. Therefore our experience must be present to somebody's experience ... and the move into the notion of the organizing principle of social experience. "There must be, then, so we must now say, an experience which so comprehends all finite experience as fully to comprehend the truth, the meaning, the nature, of every limitation." (14) This is the all inclusive Absolute Divine experience. There must be, Royce argues, such experience. (15) For that experience, the term reality could have but one meaning.

[FMO note: The only thing that is real is God, and this is very much the view of the Orientals and mystics.]

Section II:

When we make these moral decision, we come into the most immediate and personal relation to God. (17) Rather in that fragment of our experience which is Moral, esp. the Absolute Response of Human Conscience to Responsibility. (34) How one uses one's gifts for good, that freedom to decide.

Section III:

This section takes up our moral self-consciousness and the mind of God: "these are the terms of that relationship to eternal truth which is asserted by our present proposition." (39)

In this section, Royce will (a) sketch our conception of the Absolute. Then (b) he will address the notion of the true nature of our human moral self-consciousness. Royce does say that the only way we can speak of God's experience is to refer to our own human experience, even with the

weaknesses of that analogy.

(a) Sketch of the Absolute

The overall question is “How can we know that the Divine Mind has any clear relation to our moral self-consciousness?” First, we have to try to understand the Divine Mind.

There are possible worlds, and there is knowledge of this particular world. Why should God realize this concrete experience of this universe? We might have been conceived, hypothetically, with three eyes or five arms. But that is not the actual world.

“For every true proposition with an *if* in it is reducible to or dependent upon a proposition with a categorical *is* as its essential form of expression. You can’t really have a conditional sentence without some underlying “is.” Whenever we assert a possibility, God knows the concrete truth that underlies the actuality. The “is.” The “is” of the concrete truth.

How can we understand the fact that God sees this particular world, the actual world, and the truly possible worlds? God’s world is a world of ideally complete experience which renders less perfect knowledge as superfluous. Royce uses the example of listening to a perfect orchestra playing, and then listening to a hand organ playing the same piece.

“God then must be conceived not only as all wise, but also as freely and deliberately attentive to one concrete expression of his wisdom, viz. to this world of facts which now is. There must be, in God, a principle of free choice, which terminally ignores countless abstract possibilities, by virtue of the very realization of an individual and concrete content such as constitutes the present world. But, once present, the world that is must indeed exemplify and express to the full the divine Idea.” (47-48) God determines by his “attentive choice what world shall fulfill his ideal; realizes all genuine possibility by ignoring countless barely abstract possibilities.” (49)

This “attentive choice” is an “eternally present aspect of the divine nature.” (49-50) “[T]his divinely free will, this attentive rationality of God, is to him in his wholeness, precisely what our finite freedom of individual moral intent is to the world of our own self-consciousness. Or in other words, our moral choice is, to my mind, itself a part of the divine Freedom.” (50) [This last answers the first question]

(b) Definition of Self-Conscious Will

Do I know the reality of my own self as a finite being? Royce proposes to sketch what an individual self-consciousness is and means. But the MS breaks off before he does so.

Box 91, fragment 2, and Box 97, document 7, *may* be part of actual conclusion of this lecture.

Evaluation: A very clear sketch of the Absolute’s way of knowing and freely choosing this unique world and in so doing finding universes of barely possible worlds, of which the Absolute is conscious, superfluous.

Lecture IV: “God and Nature: Evolution and Ethics”

Box 68

Delivered February 16, 1896. An 80-page MS (numbered 79, with the addition of a 29a) with an introduction and seven sections. Pages 29a-41, and 50-79 are written on re-drafted (used) pages; the rest are fresh.

Pages 397-400 of *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* and the whole of page 404 are re-employed in their entirety for this lecture at MS pages **internal cite**.

The topic of this lecture (and Lecture V) is the problem of God and Nature. “We come to the study of this problem with a Conception of God in our possession.” (1) “You must find God at home in the very recesses of your inner life. You will not find him by searching in outer nature.” “[R]eflect upon what this experience means, and then you will find that it means something far deeper than you had conceived possible.” (2)

Query: “What is your very essence as a finite being, seeking to know the truth?” (2)

Royce’s summary of Lecture III: “I tried to show how, in the moral world, we have a peculiarly definite realization of our concrete relations to the Absolute, whose personality, as the self-conscious Spirit of the Universe, finds in our own moral personality a particularly definite and unmistakable function and expression, wherein our individual significance as moral beings is in no wise absorbed or annulled, although our unity with God is here of the most inseparable sort.” (4)

Thus far, we are committed to the philosophy of ideas, but have not yet dealt with the special facts and laws of nature. What is nature? What is nature’s relation to God?

Section I: Interpersonal lives.

A provisional definition of Nature: “the finite world beyond th[e] individual Self, but this side of God.” (7) The term “Nature” is unstable and vague. Royce goes into some illustrations to justify the idea that Nature’s meaning is to something beyond itself. Various meanings: Between us and God. A collective name for all the phenomena of the external world. After scientific consideration, perhaps nature may be seen as a “mere fragment of the life of God.”

Section II: “What is the best known and most universal character of the whole region called nature ... where law reigns.” (12) Natural law. “What do we mean by nature [being] subject to law?” (14)

“We mean a precise description of some process that repeatedly occurred in nature.” (15) [Newtonian type laws] These laws may be put into ordinary words or into mathematical formulas. Such laws allow us to predict the future. (These predictions are of course hypothetical.) (17) Unlike external nature, our inner life is in no way similarly describable, despite what an ideal psychologist could do.

Royce applies his appreciation/distinction to cover the inner world and the outer world. “[T]he inner life, in its wholeness, you appreciate, while nature you describe.”

Section III: Back to the question: “How does nature manifest God to us?”

[NOTE: Raising the question of nature’s significance puts us again in the realm of semiotics.] Since God inside is eternal, and nature is temporal, Nature ill manifests the Divine purpose. The rigidity of nature’s laws an imperfect manifestation of God. The uniformity of natural law a human illusion. “It is moral truth, not natural law, that, as revealed in the world of human experience, has a demonstrable universal meaning.” (27)

“What we call the physical or the material world is no doubt the limit of a live reality beyond us, – a reality that from some higher point of view.” (28) “Nature is independent of you and me as individuals.” (28) Nature may hint a lot of things, but it seems to reveal very little that is definite about our relationship with God.

Section IV:

There is no “personal and private” relation with nature. Unique personal and emotional experiences do not represent physical realities. The social criterion is of enormous importance for our whole view of nature. (35) There is a universality of expectation among people, that is the basis of the scientific method. But there is no universality regarding your personal pain. He intersperses this section with extracts from his own writing, from the *Philosophical Review*, Sept. 1894, page 519 (39); a reading from *the Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (pages 397-400 and 404) (Royce writes a direction to this effect at MS page 40.)

Section V:

Do these things really hint “of any wholly extra human reality, such as God knows while man does not know it, – then I at once answer: yes.” (41)

“Apart from all this phenomenal appearance of the realm of law, there are undoubted real facts, known to God, whose presence is limited to us by the stars and by the earth, by living nature and by dead nature.” (42) “There is unquestionably a real basis for our human experiences of natural fact. That real basis is itself a part of God’s life, just as we are a part of God’s life. It belongs to God’s plan just as we do.” (42)

No direct indication of divine wisdom, only hints. (43) “The hints are but fragmentary, their interpretation is very doubtful, their value is determined wholly by our otherwise obtained philosophical or religious view of God’s nature.”

Science doesn’t show how God is related to us. “Hence it is that if you want to know God’s mind you must look within, not without.” (45)

Section VI:

Next Royce shifts into the problem of evil (amid language of finitude and isolation) and relates it to the problem of the externality of the natural world.

At page 38: Royce deals with the gesture theory. The seed-bed, the absolute prerequisite of the gesture theory (Mead has long since read Royce’s *California*, in which Royce talks about the miners’ gestures to each other, and if they don’t catch this, they can’t run the machine).

Then evolution. “The law of evolution is just as true as any other scientific law.” All such truth is phenomenal.

At page 42, Royce advances a kind of realism, without the name, that is theocentric in goal. “[D]oes this [evolutionary] process, taken wholly as a physical process, throw any direct light on the problem of our human relation to the divine plan?”

“[N]ature ... stands in the most insignificant and accidental relations to every conceivable and worthy ideal good.” (50)

The effects of evolution on the human “animal” ... moving from four feet to two, and the downsides as well as the upsides of that process. A bit of racial hierarchy language emerging at page 61 (“the civilized races”, etc.).

At page 66, Royce makes one of his rare references to Satan (a caution against the optimism of material prosperity): “Yet whoever knows man’s heart a little more closely feels disposed, on the contrary, to say that were the economic and industrial problems ever solved, were the burden of want ever removed from the mass of men, were general economic prosperity for while by lucky physical accidents ensured, then indeed Satan would be for the first time fairly let loose upon earth. For then man would have the leisure to define his rebellious desires, to scheme out means to gratify his individual passions, and to misuse the freedom that nature had given him.” (66-67)

Why is this so? “[S]uch loyalty [personal loyalty] only can control from within the boundless caprices of his chaotic physical nature.” (67)

To this point “blind moral accidents” have limited human experience. (67-68)

Evolution is an orderly process physically, but it is a moral chaos, “no sort of orderly relations to the evil aspects.” (69) Royce is not critical of evolution as a natural process, but quite concerned about reading a moral analogue into the process. (Indeed, he sees the possibilities in it of making man “worse.”)

Cites Chauncey Wright (also picked up by Peirce) who made the well-known comment about evolution as being a “sort of cosmic weather.” Royce refers to William James’s reference to this phrase as well. (69)

Section VII:

It is a very dangerous thing to assume we can extrapolate knowledge of the mind of God from a physical law (outer nature) like a Newtonian law. (71-72) “The danger of which I speak lies in the disposition to look in the natural order for what shall principally assist our faith in God. The moral being ought to look upon nature ... as the material of duty, than as the prohibitive embodiment of moral tendencies!” (74)

On pages 76-77, Royce talks at length about death.

FMO: a strange passage in the history of American philosophy. No other has described death as

precisely as this. “Death as a human experience is the very climax of God’s concealment from us in the natural order.” (77) A faith in God based on the goodness of nature is founded on sand. (*cf.* an earlier reference to Job and Satan.) What you need is an insight that can withstand the moral chaos of nature. (78-79)

Find “our way from the chaos of phenomena to the eternal clime of the Spirit.” (79) A call to inner moral self-scrutiny and discovery of moral law as more pressing than nature-reliance. This is Royce’s precise point in his exposition of the Physical Mystic, “Paracelsus” in Browning’s poem of that name. *See Fugitive Essays.*

Summary: The only sure manifestation of God is going to be found in reasonable human moral freedom. If one is not in touch with this, one is building on sand.

Evaluation: Although this is long, the lecture has such high merit that if it could be abbreviated to say 15-20 pages, it certainly deserves inclusion in the *Critical Edition*. Its central thrust points out that if one wants some understanding of God, that person must rely on insight into free human moral agency and human freedom rather than relying on nature.

**Lecture V: “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature”
Box 68 and Box 52**

Delivered on March 1, 1896. Only 34 pages of MS are included in Box 68. However, Box 52 apparently contains the second half of this lecture, much of which constitutes the last half of “The Problem of Job.”

Only page 5 of these 34 pages was previously drafted and re-used here. The rest of the pages are fresh. As noted in item 193 below, “The Problem of Job,” it appears that much of this lecture was pulled and directly inserted into that essay, published first in *The New World*, in 1897, and then in *Studies of Good and Evil*. As recovered in Box 52, “The Problem of Job” manuscript is composed of two distinct manuscripts, one numbered pages 1 to 39, and the other numbered 35 to 87. On page 35 (Box 52), the “Problem of Job” text as published picks up with a “Section IV” (and does not include a half page of text written above). The “Problem of Job” text continues to the end of this Section IV, on page 75. The text of the following “Section V” (pages 75 to 87 of this second manuscript) has never been published.

In Box 68, grouped in sequence with the other Augustus Graham Lectures, only the first 34 pages of Lecture V are found. It now seems clear¹⁸ that the pages 35 to 87 grouped with “The Problem of Job” are in fact pages 35 to 87 of the fifth Graham lecture. Most remarkably, the final and previously unpublished “Section V” noted above summarizes Royce’s themes as articulated in the entire Graham lecture series. Recall that this is Royce’s first attempt to publically grapple with these issues, and articulate his position, since the *Conception of God* controversy in California, and his “Supplementary Essay” written in response. The Graham lectures deal with these same themes. Section V of the fifth Graham lecture trenchantly summarizes these themes. (The entire text of this section as reconstructed, as well as the story

¹⁸ The discovery was made November 20, 2008, and constitutes one of the more remarkable discoveries of the 20008-09 “dig” in the Harvard Archives Royce Papers.

behind its reconstruction, is included below in Appendix B, section III.)

Many clues exist to establish the fact that the manuscript pages numbered 35 to 87 grouped with “The Problem of Job” text in Box 52 are in fact pages 35 to 87 previously missing from the fifth August Graham lecture.

- The sentence fragment ending page 34 of the fifth lecture in Box 68 (“... its own minded bewilderment in their ...”) is picked up with a final word on page 35 in Box 52 (“... presence.”) (The “p” of presence is a lower case “p” in the manuscript.)
- The sentence which follows the sentence ending “presence” on page 35 (Box 52) flows logically from page 34 (Box 68) of the fifth Graham lecture: “And such a spirit, I say, is one that nowadays walks abroad in our literature in form of a certain popular pessimism which now simply requires thoughtfully disposed people to face the problem of evil.”)
- Just as the Box 68 fragment of the fifth Graham lecture are on fresh pages (except page 5), so is the entire manuscript text numbered 35 to 87 in Box 52.
- Neither the half page of text on page 35 (Box 52) before the start of “Section IV,” nor the entire Section V beginning on page 75 (Box 52) are published in “The Problem of Job.” Yet the themes in both unpublished sections exhibit a continuity of thought with the first four Graham lectures, and what we have of the fifth in Box 68.
- At the end of page 34 of the fifth Graham lecture fragment in Box 68, Royce refers to Schopenhauer and pessimism. Near the beginning of the manuscript numbered pages 35 to 87 in Box 52, Royce continues to pursue these themes.
- Royce titles the fifth Graham lecture “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature,” and expressly uses that phrase in the 34 page Box 68 fragment. In section V of the manuscript in Box 52, the manuscript ends with Royce repeating this phrase.
- There is, again, the perfect fit of page numbers.
- The theme of the process of balance is striking in both manuscripts.
- The method of interior reflection on one’s ignorance characterizes both manuscripts.
- The question of the *meaning* of our ignorance as finite selves, rather than the bare fact of our ignorance, is a theme that pervades both manuscripts.

An close analysis of the “full lecture” hypothesis

FMO looked closely to the themes of the first 34 pages (Box 68) to determine whether they did, in fact, fit with the last pages (35 to 87) in Box 52. FMO specifically turned to the introduction of Lecture V to see if the things Royce set out to do in the lecture were actually accomplished in the manuscript as a whole as posited by the hypothesis above.

A transcription of FMO’s thoughts on these points, a process he felt important to establish the possible connection of the Box 68 and the Box 52 manuscripts, follows:

In the first pages of the MS in Box 68, FMO points out Royce’s levels of depth that he brings to his analysis, what we really know, and what we have to doubt, I.e., the certainties, probabilities and possibilities that give us truth about God (as opposed to the opaqueness of nature.) Will Royce follow this track of three levels in this lecture? A query to be investigated.

One thing we look for in Box 52: “a very deep implication at the heart of our life that tells us the meaning of our very ignorance.” We are ignorant, Royce says, of the past, the future, and of social relations. (6-7).

You can’t say “I don’t know something” without knowing there is a truth. This is key. So we showed there was this all knowing reality which exists, but not apart from us in the world of finite beings, but including his own life in our finite unity.

Then he moves over to how our moral ... we didn’t get a whole lot from our natural world, but if we move over into our moral world, we find that we make a moral choice in the present that excludes a lot of other possibilities. Seeking the ideal, and making this choice here and now we do this. FMO quotes pages 18 and 19 (Box 68 MS), ending with “Now such will our philosophical theory attributes to God.” All those other possibilities are made just possibilities by his choice.

FMO thinks Royce would probably say that ... what he is certain of, that if God is knowing of this ideal, then whatever evils that happen in this finite world, in eternity the ideal is fulfilled. Now we come to the issue “does that give us any comfort?” If I answer the first question this way “that you can more or less intelligibility reconcile the existence of perfect world as god sees it with the actual existence of a fragmentary evil in the natural world ...” doesn’t that knock out the basis for a moral order? How can I really, how do moral efforts count? That’s the problem. These two questions constitute the two most serious issues of what a “theistic interpretation of the natural order has to face.”

These two questions are, in FMO’s paraphrase:

- (1) if the whole world fulfills God’s ideal, then should we feel reconciled of our share of the evil in this finite temporal world? Should we find comfort with this?
- (2) If this one is true, then haven’t you knocked out the basis for moral action?

Royce says he will simply be using philosophical reason. He does not claim to use the full power that other things might give him. (Although there are extensive scripture quotes and references.)

Royce confesses that there is a good reason, considerable respect for, the pessimism of Schopenhauer. And he has every sympathy for a man who has learned to doubt. If one has faced the evils of the world, one ought to be lead to deep doubt, facing the ghastly facts, not for the sake of the search for the real, but for the sake of “imparting its own weak-minded bewilderment in their” [end of page 34 of MS]

Now to the MS in page 35. It continues (in the paragraph not printed in the *SGE*):

“...presence. And such a spirit, I say, is one that nowadays walks abroad in our literature in the form of a certain popular pessimism while now imply requires thoughtfully disposed people to face the problem of evil for themselves in order if possible to rescue the consideration of its mystery from the attempts of those who note merely doubt; for every earnest man has a right to

doubt, but who glory in their one philosophical gift, namely in their incapacity to make any matter clear to themselves.” (35)

Not only does this [hypothetically continuous] page deal with pessimisms, comparing the Schopenhauer comments in the first Box 68 half. There is the reference to literature.

The Box 52 MS then continues with a section IV, the text of which (up to the last section) is published in *SGE*'s first essay, “The Problem of Job.”

At pages 36-37 of the Box 52 MS, Royce continues to consider the subject of good and evil. He ponders whether evils are particular in our lives. Or are they mere illusions? Royce stands firm on the point that evil is a fact, not results of just our mind. Royce distinguishes false idealism (for example, the Hindu seer) from genuine idealism or true ideas. [The fact that he mentions Hindu spirituality at this point is a large clue, given that he has dwelt on this at length in the earlier Graham lectures]

Royce won't talk about the human finite spirit, but *any* finite spirit. (55 MS Box 52) The tension of the manifold impulses and interests ... must be the type of the organization of every rational life.” (55) “The only harmony that can exist in the realm of the spirit is the harmony that we possess when we thwart the present, but more elemental impulse for the sake of the higher unity of experience, as when we rejoice in the endurance of the tragedies of life, because they show us the depth of life, or when we know that it is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all, or when we possess a virtue in the moment of victory over the tempter.” (56) The effort to overcome an impulse for a higher good.

Talking about experiences: If God is an infinite knower, he has to know the fact of existing evil. (59 -- with reflection on knowledge of higher good, and the limitations thereon).

“The existence of evil is not only consistent with the perfection of the universe, but is necessary for the very existence of that perfection.” (63) Royce refers back to Job's problem (a continuity of theme with the first lectures). Royce goes into, again, the argument that ignorance necessarily implies truth. The human self is called to see more truth, by awareness of its own ignorance.

As to certainties, probabilities and possibilities: (and whether Royce follows through with this):

Certainty: We can know that God is all knower - we can and do know certainly that God is an all-knower. That is simply logically necessary from the structure of ignorance, and what ignorance demands.

Probabilities: it is probable that both the doubter for the sake of doubting, and even a sophisticated philosopher like Schopenhauer are in some way not being true to their truth-seeking instinct.

Possibility: What is this community of spirit to which we are being called.

Analysis of the first 34 pages of Lecture V:

Before the discovery was made of the connection of the lecture pages 35-87 grouped with the “Problem of Job” texts in Box 52, FMO analyzed the 34 page fragment of Lecture V in Box 68 in its own right. That analysis follows.

The overall theme: the problem of evil.

FMO thinks it significant to point to “the *invisible* members of the city of God,” thanks to Howison. Also significant is the implication of an early hint of what will become Royce’s “cult of the Dead.” For Royce, this serves as a positive aspect of evolution that was described paradoxically (as both good and bad) in the previous Graham Lecture IV.

Looking back to lecture 4, Royce summarizes how nature conceals rather than reveals God. But in this lecture, Royce says he will deal with the subject of “how the very mystery of nature may be reconciled ... with what we otherwise know of God and of the moral order of the universe.” (2) [Yet the incomplete MS that we have doesn’t allow us to find this reconciliation advanced here.]

An important point Royce makes against Dewey (who accused him of using philosophy as an effort to console or edify): “I despise any philosophy which sacrifices cool considerateness to the needs of edification. But, on the other hand, I desire to take advantage as a man, of all the rights of our human reason.” (3) Royce wants to strike a balance between the things we know and those we have to doubt.

Section I: The importance of this section lies in Royce’s synopsis of his argument for God via ignorance. (7-8 and 9-11). The philosophical argument here builds on ignorance which supposes a thirst for truth, which implies a whole realm of truths, which implies an experience of all those truths. (*cf.* *RAP*, and his argument from the possibility of error.)

Royce begins the section with the reasons man for finding a central and rational purpose in the universe. Our first sign of God comes to us through our ignorance, says Royce, and its implications. (4) “[W]e reach God not [via the external world], but by virtue of our considerate retirement into the very isolation and want of our own central being as finite creatures, who hunger for truth.” (5)

However many facts one ignores, every time one defines one’s ignorance, one does so by defining a world of truth to which one is related. This world of truth cannot be defined without being in relation to human ignorance. (All of this presupposes the ignorant person’s “thirst for truth.”) (7)

Section II:

This section deals with Royce’s sense of the **rational will**. [In FMO’s view, this section is Royce’s clearest exposition of the rational will (at page 18 especially, but also up to page 21). Here Royce uses an analogous application from the human mind and will up to

God's wisdom and will. But he is very aware that God's will is "this special and eminent sense of the word will." (19)

[FMO sees Royce stressing the need for a human sense of the intimacy of God prior to sensing his transcendence.]

Royce portrays the all-knowing God, all-perfect and knowing of all possibilities, genuine and bare possibilities. He uses this portrayal as background for two basic objections.

Section III: Royce poses two questions in order to move to the consideration of the problem of evil.

First:

Can we as finite beings take any true comfort in the notion of God's perfection? If you feel separate from God, if you see God as remote, God's perfection will be of no comfort. Rather, it will provoke a Promethean rebellion. Another example is the Job story in its core form (i.e. before later embellishments), which portrays Job's rebellious feelings rather than his submission. His rebelliousness follows from his view of God as "The Distant One."

We have a problematic relationship to the ideal, if we infer that external nature is working for our ideals.

Given that "[t]he presence of finite evil in the world is an evident fact", Royce rephrases his question: "Does a philosophical proof that, from the eternal point of view, [wherein] the world in its wholeness fulfills the divine ideal, [does this proof] give us any reason to feel reconciled with our share of the evil of the finite and temporal world?" (25)

Second:

"Does not any general justification of the presence of finite evil in a perfect world at once do away with the very basis of our moral consciousness?" (27) I.e., if this is an imperfect world, then why should I try to do good?

This reveals the depth of Royce's criticality – he pushes questions very far and doubts deeply. Royce insists the problem of evil is a valid topic of philosophy. "I entirely reject the supposition that a mature man genuinely devoted to the truth has no right to think, as coolly, as sceptically [*sic*], as thoroughly, and curiously as his wit permits, upon the problem of evil. There is truly no serious problem of life from which the philosopher's scrutiny is excluded." (30-31) Or again: "Concerning what should we philosophize if not concerning that problem of evil which forms the most insistent question for every thoughtful person who knows what life is?" (31)

Royce contrasts his vocation to that of certain novelists, that class of writers that claim nothing is or can be known. (Who say neither "lo here" or "lo there," but "lo nowhere" and "lo nothing.") (32) Royce cannot tolerate pretended literary wisdom that is "especially proud of its inability to think." (34) Royce's engagement with the problem of

evil, he says, differs from the pessimism of Schopenhauer. (34)

The MS breaks off at page 34 in the middle of this critique.

Evaluation: Though philosophically challenging to read, Lecture V seems to represent Royce's most penetrating and detailed engagement with the problem of evil thus far in his career. Nine months later, this leads up to his franker depiction of the problem of evil in the unpublished "Introduction" (November 1896) to his paper on "The Problem of Job." But the November paper will not exhibit the philosophical focus on the human person's experiential finding of his own rational, moral consciousness found in this Lecture V.

Particularly now that the full Lecture V has been pieced together, FMO strongly recommends that the scholar pay serious attention to the entire Graham lecture.

182. "Browning's Theism,"
***The New World*, 5 (1896): 401-22.**

Reprinted in the *Boston Browning Society papers, 1886-87* (New York: Macmillan, 1897): 7-34.

Royce deals with the subject of charity in Browning. He points out that "good form is of more value than the content it informs." Here he hints at the three trends in the Christian conception of God: the Greek, the Hebraic and the Hindic.

**183. Ten Fragments at Close of Box 97, Preserving Royce's Titles
Where Found**

(Here we list 10, although the HARP Finding Aid has mentioned 12. "Objective Consciousness" is included above as a manuscript relating to self-consciousness. Fragment 9 below, the outline on the Nature of Reality, involves TWO outlines, the second of which is a sub-outline to Chapters I-III of the first.)

a. "Discussion on the Reality of Time"

Two usual stationery sheets from the New York, New Haven and Hartford RR, with four sides each (numbered one and two by Royce). No date. Royce seems to set forth his thoughts on the temporal aspect of the world. He breaks it down, by orderly reference and logical analysis ("arrays", e.g.), into temporal reference and temporal sequence. There is some emphasis on past time's irrevocability and on time as involving a special mode of interpretation of a realm that, if viewed as it is, would be better interpreted in some other form, viz. a *timeless form*.

b. "Discussion on the Concepts: Equal, Greater, Less, Order, Series, Number, Quantity, Transfinite [?]"

Three usual stationery sheets from the New York-New Haven and Hartford RR ("en

route”), 10 written pages total (in a very large hand). The third folded sheet is mismounted ahead the first and second sheets in the Box book.

Royce outlines his thoughts on these concepts in broad strokes. He sketches a system of ideas in logic, and the basic concepts of mathematical logic.

c. “Principles Relating to Duty to Animals”

One page front and back. An outline (divided into seven major points) of projected talk relating to human duty to animals. Schopenhauer and the oriental view that our will is one with the animal’s will, but this principle doesn’t solve the ethical problem of our duty to animals.

Royce claims that the principle of “do no harm” is analogous to the principle of loyalty. He offers, however, contrast to this principle. He traces the practical results of the principle, finding “Injure no living being” and “do not kill” are self-contradictory. Requires attention to individual detail, rather than reliance on general principles only. Royce claims that all action involves partiality, but inaction involves still more impartiality. Suicide, Royce claims, is the self-surrender of this principle (that all life is equally valuable).

A supplementary principle: man is selective. “He is loyal to the human but also *through* the human to all life. Royce buys into evolution.

Aspects affecting this problem include human struggle for existence in a world with animals, “allies and messmates” with animals, use of their service and lives, bonded with animal life through domestication and reservation of land necessary to their lives.

Royce puts specific limits on actions vis-à-vis animals: no hunting or baiting. But eating animals for food and even their use in vivisection justified by the human “struggle for existence.”

Royce does not take a purely economic view of animals.

Finally, Royce closes his reflections with reference to the “individual relations with the animal world.”

d. “The Concept of Fitness”

Written on Colonial Club stationery (simply a two sided card). No date. Royce’s language in this piece is laden with formal logical terms. Facts are interesting as either exceptional or not exceptional.

Introduction: “Facts seem to us ‘fit’ when for some reason it is to us as if they had been made or devised for some purpose. Why this seeming?” Royce then breaks his ideas down into four sections.

- Section 1: Exceptional Facts
- Section 2: The Interesting Fact
- Section 3: Interest is Subjective
- Section 4: But Value is Objective

Royce closes with a note on “Types of Fitness.” The “Algol type”[?], the Trap type, the trial and error type “with a striving at its back.” Royce references “Elan Vital” (Bergson) as well as Henderson’s type of fitness. This need not mean a date of 1913 (when he uses Henderson and *The Problem of Christianity*), but it may.

Evaluation: The many-sidedness of his approach deserves notice.

e. “Notes for Remarks upon Absolute Truth”

Three-page manuscript, last page misnumbered as “4.” No date. Appears to be notes for a lecture on Absolute Truth. Perhaps circa 1911 in Philadelphia and “The Battle for the Absolute.”

Divided into five notes:

1. Truth is a property of Assertions, or of Propositions. (Royce distinguishes Assertions from Propositions)

2. The value of experience for beings who do not live in the moment. Consists of more than present satisfactoriness. Experience must be taken in its total setting for a valuable experience.

3. Examples of Absolutely True Assertions (he gives three examples).

- a. I do it.
- b. I must do this sort of deed.
- c. Something is right for me to do.

Emphasizes the practical character of the assertion. The transcendental truth in the poet’s lines: “I would have my days to be, bound each to each by mutual piety.”

4. “A certain conclusion does or does not follow from given premises.” Fecundity of Deduction.

5. The uses of absolute truth. (Royce will argue there are many.)

Evaluation: A pregnant set of notes.

f. “Notes for article on Monotheism in Hastings’s *Encycl. Of Rel. & E.*”

One usual stationery sheet, with four pages. No date, but this is probably 1916, when an entry is published. An effort to outline his re-drafting of earlier papers on monotheism for

Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. Royce is careful to distinguish monotheism from polytheism proper. Finds the term pantheism somewhat confusing. Concludes by sketching philosophical monotheism in reverse order:

1. Indian Upanishads, to Plotinus
2. Greeks (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle)
3. Ethical Theism of Kant, moving into Pragmatism
4. (Final form) An Idealism in which "The world contains its own interpretation and its own interpreter."

Note: The absence between the Greeks and Kant. No mention of Christian philosophy.

g. "Preface"

(To his address to the Boston Physical Education Association. See *BWJR* 2:1209, no. 5. The pamphlet is reprinted in *Race Questions*. See *RQP* Ch. 6.) The MS is contained on one page.

h. No title, but begins: "Cartesianism"

Six pages, perhaps prepared for a dictionary entry. The text is rich in references indicating followers of Descartes. He ties Cartesianism fittingly with both Scholastic tradition and with the *new physics* and *new mathematics* following Galileo. Royce sees Descartes as a father of rationalism. This may be a complete dictionary entry, but there is no trace of its having been published. No date is given.

i. Untitled Outlines for a Projected Book

Four MS pages. Pages 3 and 4 appear to be outlines for an early part of the more general outline. No date, but about 1897. The text reads as follows:

Part. I. The Nature of Reality.

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| Chap. I. | Types of Reality. |
| Chap. II. | Reality and Unreality in Language. |
| Chap. III. | The Existential Judgment in Logic. |
| Chap. IV. | The Real as Independent, as Conceivable, and as Immediate. |
| Chap. V. | The Real and the Possible. |
| Chap. VI. | The Four Antithetical Definitions of Reality. |
| Chap. VII. | The Warfare of the Four Conceptions in History. |
| Chap. VIII. | The Real as Transcendent and Rational: The One and the Many; The Individual and the Universal; Substance and Accident, Change and Permanence. |
| Chap. IX. | The Real as Transcendent and Immediate: — The Knowable and the Unknowable. |
| Chap. X. | The Real as Immanent and Rational: — The Possibility of Experience. |
| Chap. XI. | The Real as Immanent and Immediate: — The Mystic and the Positivist. |
| Chap. XII. | Scepticism, and the Truth of the Immediate. |
| Chap. XIII. | The Fifth Conception of Reality. |
| Chap. XIV. | The Concept of Limit: — Idea and Fulfilment; Fact and Worth; Part and Whole; Finite and |

- Absolute.
- Chap. XV. The Factors of Reality.
- Chap. XVI. Monism and Pluralism; World and Individual.
- Chap. XVII. Historical Retrospect.
- Chap. XVIII. Summary of Parts.

Part II. [The Cosmological Problems]
[Nature and Mind]

- Chap. XIX. The Social Consciousness and the Empirical Ego.
- Chap. XX. The Consciousness of Physical Reality.
- Chap. XXI. The Phenomenal Laws of Physical Reality: – Space, Time, Causation, and Material Processes.
- Chap. XXII. The Cosmological Problems.
- Chap. XXIII. The Interior of Nature.
- Chap. XXIV. The Organization of the Finite World.
- Chap. XXV. The Process of Evolution.
- Chap. XXVI. Mind and Body. Freedom and Law.

Part III.
God and the Moral World

- Chap. XXVII. The Conception of God.
- Chap. XXVIII. The Moral Order.
- Chap. XXIX. The Problem of Evil.
- Chap. XXX. The Problem of Immortality.
- Chap. XXXI. The Spirit of the [illegible].
- Chap. XXXII. Reality and Life.

Concept of Being

I. In language: –

- (1) Categories of expression of being in popular speech: –
- a. By perfect tenses of verbs of process.
(especially verbs of living, growth, begetting, etc.)
 - b. By verbs & adjective implying a coming to light or being at hand.
 - c. By animistic expressions as such (?) [*sic*]
 - d. By stress laid on presence in time as against distance in time (or space).
 - e. By verbs of permanence (stand, etc.)
 - f. By Expressions of stubbornness or of intensity of experience (hard fact, – this for unreal, etc.)
 - g. By husk & kernel metaphors in general.
- (2) Preference of language for expressions for unreality (sham, fraud, appearance, show, etc.)
- (3) Negative & privative concepts and their relation to reality.

II. In technical discussions.

- (1). The real as the present (in time).
- (2) The real as the independent (indep. Of thoughts [*sic*])
- (3) The real as the true (Platonic).
- (4) The real as the lasting.
- (5) The real as the worthy.
- (6) The real as the indescribably immediate.

III. The Logic of the Existential.

- (1) Contrast of the That and the What.
- (2) Reality as no Logical Predicate.
- (3) The Relation of Ordinary Judgments to Existence.
No purely ideal or hypothetical judgments.
- (4) Unreality as thus a Logical Predicate.
Logic of the class o.
- (5) Assertion of Reality as always particular.
- (6) The Real and the "None Other".
- (7) Individuality & Reality.
- (8) The Possibility of a Total Univ. of Disc.

j. "Poincaré on Space"

A subtitle in Royce's hand, in pencil, reads "Poincaré: Monist, Vol. IX, page [marked out in ink]" The MS (three pages) shows Royce carefully reading Poincaré's article in *The Monist, Vol. IX*, and making notes with references to specific page numbers.

184. "Outlines of Psychology; Or, a Study of the Human Mind,"
James W. Roosevelt, ed., *In Sickness and in Health*, (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896) 171-233.

Reworked in book of 1903.

185. "Philosophy,"
***Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, 5 (1896-97): 228-32.**

A report on the Harvard Philosophy Department for this year.

186. Review
John Ellis McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (1897)
***Philosophical Review*, 6 (1897): 69-76**

187. Review

George Frederick Stout, *Analytic Psychology* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896)

***Mind*, n.s. 6 (1897): 379-99**

A 20-page review. Here's an American getting into a British review with a 20-page review. This involves a complex problem, which brings Ralph Barton Perry, Royce, James and Peirce together, thanks to Stout's work.

G. T. Stout, in Scotland at the University of Aberdeen until 1903, had preferred to do empirical psychology as precisely as he could rather than philosophy. After publishing his *Analytic Psychology* in 1896, he remained in Aberdeen during Royce's 1899-1900 delivery of the Gifford Lectures.

William James had been asked to review *Analytic Philosophy*, but he declined. He passed the task on to Royce, who then wrote a document (21 printed pages in *Mind*) wherein he often treated Stout philosophically, especially regarding "causation" and also teleology.

Ralph Barton Perry, before he died in 1957, left a note to the Harvard Archives on May 14, 1948 that a particular letter was "To be deposited among the Royce papers." He signed the note (a small 2" x 5" slip) "RB Perry." The letter he had apparently discovered was Stout's thank you to Royce for this long review (of Stout's *Analytic Psychology*). The letter is most interesting in that it includes Stout's assertion that he and Royce differed on the issue of "causation."

The 5-page letter from Aberdeen, Scotland is dated February 17, 1897. The letter reveals Prof. Stout's own deep appreciation for Royce's lengthy review. He differs, however, with Royce's interpretation of Stout. For, according to Royce, Stout had used "causation" to explain certain processes of consciousness.

Notes in Royce's hand outline on the back of the final sheet three points of difference between himself and Stout on causation. Royce ends these notes by asserting that "the issue turns on the definition of causation. I hold that causation so involves in its definition the universal that it can never be felt at all. Kant and Hume both hold this." This is a rare use of authority by Royce. (The letter may be found in Box 125,¹⁹ "Various Correspondence [*sic*] to Josiah Royce")

Without knowledge that the letter was from Stout, and that Royce had reviewed his work, the archivist placed in a folder of miscellaneous correspondence to Royce. (Box 125) However, the importance of Stout's article escaped neither Royce, C. S. Peirce, nor Ralph Barton Perry.

In 1904, William James referred to this review when he told his fellow psychologists that "Royce, in a long review of Stout, hauls him over the coals at great length for defending 'efficacy' in a way which I, for one, never gathered from reading him [Stout], and which I have heard Stout

¹⁹ Please note that at the time these observations were made, the Harvard Archivists were in the process of shifting materials among boxes, but among folders within boxes. In the boxes with numbers higher than 99, materials are contained in file folders within archival file boxes. The comments in this Index refer to the location of a given document at the time it was read and analyzed. In this case, *cf.* both folders 2 and 3 in Box 125.

himself say was quite foreign to the intention of his text.” [Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 158.]

Later, while cordially agreeing with most of Royce’s work in his review of Stout, James added, “I cannot agree with his separating the notion of efficacy from that of activity altogether (this I understand to be one contention of his [Royce’s].” Yet William James added that “the inner nature both of efficacy and of activity are superficial problems, I understand Royce to say.” [Ibid. 187; see also *BWJR2*: 1199] This leads one to wonder whether William James grasped the depth of Royce’s rejection of non-teleological causal efficacy.

Finally, shortly before he died in 1914, C. S. Peirce wrote Royce asking him to send him a copy of this review of *Analytic Psychology*. What made Peirce interested in this review? And who were the “precise thinkers” involved here? [Interestingly, in the 1897 letter to Royce, Stout describes himself as achieving nothing but the following: “I do not pretend to anything [in my book] beyond systematic arrangement & description as precise as I can make it.” (page 2-3 of the manuscript letter). Peirce was fond of precise thinkers.]

Evaluation: Section III of the review, at pages 394 to 99, is particularly significant, and summarizes the piece.

188. New Orleans Lectures (1897): “The Psychology of Intellect”
Box 68
see also **Box 103, folder 2,**
Box 105, folder 4, Document 12

Delivered in New Orleans May to June 1897, a course of five lectures on “The Psychology of Intellect, with special reference to the influence of social factors on the formation of intellectual processes.” (This is the heading of his syllabus.)

While at Berkeley, Royce gave a talk “Intellect and Intelligence” to the Berkeley Club on March 4, 1881.

Cf. Box 142, folder 2: Loewenberg in his notebook reflects on these lectures as “possibly useful as transition stages.”

The text of Royce’s Syllabus for the New Orleans Lectures (a 4-page typescript) reads as follows:

The Social Factors of the Human Intellect [handwritten]

[The rest is typescript, with a few handwritten corrections. Punctuation is as given.]

SYLLABUS
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT.
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL FACTORS ON THE FORMATION OF INTELLECTUAL

PROCESSES.

LECTURE FIRST. – THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT. The signs of Intelligence in general. The relation of intelligence to experience. Intelligence proved by acts that adjust old habits to present experience. The degree of novelty and success in adjustment determines the grade of intelligence. – The relation of intelligence in general to conscious rationality in particular. What constitutes thinking? Thinking as Conscious Imitation. Illustrations. The general nature of ideas. – The foregoing processes more carefully reviewed. Knowledge implies assimilation of new data to former experiences, comparison of present data, and discrimination, by virtue of contrast-effects, amongst present data. – The value of conscious ideas for knowledge. By virtue of their imitative character they set over against an object something which, by means of contrast-effects, brings the characters of the object into clearer relief. By virtue of their controllable character the ideas render easy a more careful scrutiny of the nature of the object, through a study of the features involved in the ideas. – Grades of ideas. Unconscious general ideas of the lower stages of the intelligence. Conscious general ideas such as we possess when we know how to use words, and otherwise to treat objects as conventional usage requires us to treat them. Scientific general ideas. Diagrams, curves used in statistical researches, maps and other imitative expressions of ideal processes. Science as an effort to imitate the world in more or less symbolic terms.

LECTURE SECOND. - THE SOCIAL BASIS FOR THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE. In what way does man become conscious of the existence of his fellows? The relation of imitation to the origin of our social consciousness. – Man is first aware of his fellows, and only secondarily does he become aware of himself as a person. – The primitive stage of our general ideas. General ideas are not general images, but generalized mental attitudes towards objects. Without activity no intellect. – The influence of the social consciousness upon our attitude towards objects. This influence makes us first aware of our own attitudes, as such, by contrast and comparison with the attitudes of our fellows. Secondarily, the results of such social comparison of attitudes is a perception of the nature of things as related to these attitudes. The conscious imitation of things in ideal terms is secondary to our imitation of our fellows.

LECTURE THIRD.- THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF THE REASONING PROCESS. To reason is to observe what is involved in our ideas. Owing to the imitative character of all our conscious ideas, the ideas themselves are products of a constructive process which, when once accomplished, we can read off in new ways, thus observing novel, and often unexpected, results of the ideal processes. Illustrations. – There is no definable limit to the number of types of reasoning processes which can be carried out. Reasoning is not confined to the so-called Syllogism of the logicians. – Reasoning means insight into the structure of the ideal constructions. Reasoning thus implies self-consciousness and is coincident with the process of finding out what we mean and what we have been doing. – The relation of our social consciousness to our reasoning processes. – Self-consciousness in general as a social contrast effect. – The self-consciousness of the reasoning process is due to a critical comparison between our own doings and meanings and those of our fellows. This critical comparison is itself acquired through the criticism of others, through their demand that we should conform in detail to their own constructive processes and meanings, and through our own effort to maintain some degree of independence in response to such criticisms. – Illustrations from the history of science. Dialogue, debates, and controversy as the means of

training the reason. The social acquisition of the intellectual Conscience, of care in the scrutiny of our ideas, and of skill in the rigid criticism of the processes of our own reason. The relations of imitation and originality, of conformity and independence in the growth of the intellect.

LECTURE FOUR. THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS. The question whether man has any innate ideas. The impossibility of deriving fundamental ideas from individual experience. Our fundamental ideas, such as the idea of Causation of the Real Existence of the physical world, etc., are not hereditary. If neither hereditary nor derived from individual experience, nor innate in the older metaphysical of that term, whence are they derived? Answer, from the conditions under which our social consciousness has been formed and transmitted. – Evidences forth this view. The fundamental idea of the Exactness of the whole real world of facts, natural and moral. Social origin of the conception of exactness. The Commercial Relations, and the Industrial Arts, both demand exact conceptions of facts, in advance of the appearance of scientific conceptions. It is man that first requires man to be exact, for the practical purpose of reaching business-agreements, of executing contracts, and of meeting the requirements of artistic and other conventional standards. – Illustrations from primitive customs, from the growth of law, from the nature of magic formulas, sacrificial rites, and other conventional products. – Where exactness of formulation has been obtained, experience tends to become selective of such facts as are definable in terms of exact formula. In consequence, the inexact regions of experience tend to be considered, either as insignificant, or as unreal. On the other hand, since not all social relations demand exactness, tendencies remain which favor emotional, or otherwise inexact, interpretations of the world, in addition to the interpretations that use exact formulas: – Rise of Science out of Industrial Arts, and out of Commercial Interest. Consequent nature of the fundamental scientific ideas. – Development of the general idea of exactness into various forms. The conception of the Real world of exactly definable objects. Atoms. Ether etc. The conception of the world of exactly definable processes. The World of Law. The so-called Axioms of Causation, or the Uniformity of Nature, etc. – The world of Science is thus a world determined by motives of social origin.

LECTURE FIVE. - PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOCIAL THEORY OF THE INTELLECT. PHILOSOPHICAL BEARINGS OF THE THEORY. Pedagogical application. – The training of the intellect as essentially a social training. The appeal to the imitative tendencies as of primary educational importance. Perception must be guided by social motives. Personal inde-

[the typescript is apparently continued on another page, not included at this point in Box 68]

An analysis of the individual New Orleans lectures follows.

Lecture I: “The General Nature of the Human Intellect”

A 15-page typescript text (numbered 14, with an added page 1a). This typescript is incomplete. There are many handwritten corrections and edits to the typescript. (While fragments in Box 105, folder 4 do not appear to connect to this lecture, they do seem to deal with similar topics. They are also typed in similar inks on similar paper. *See* note below for missing Lecture V of the Jacob Sleeper series.)

Royce later refers back to this lecture as a “preliminary survey of the scope and methods of psychology ... the general nature of intelligence and the special nature of the kind of intelligence that we called thinking.” (Lecture II, page 1.)

FMO notes:

Survey of nature, scope and methods of psychology, followed by pragmatic definition of “intellect” (i.e. by the intellectual facts and processes of the mind.” (11) – since “the best way to find out what we mean by intellect is to consider what is the chartered behavior of any intelligent creature in so far as he shows signs of intelligence.” (12) [What he’s talking about is Intelligence as adaptive of behavior to environment.]

Royce sketches his view of the psychologist, and what psychology consists in, in contrast to the methods of the popular mind. (4-7) He also sketches three groups of psychological method, the last of which is more physiological.

In a section II, Royce begins an analysis of intellect and brute behavior. Royce is going to study intellect as not only states of mind (“intellectual states”) but as expressions of intelligence. (11) “The best way to find out what we mean by intellect is to consider what is the characteristic behavior of an intelligent creature insofar as he shows signs of intelligence.” (11) [Notice the implicit use of the pragmatic maxim of Charles Peirce – a thing defined in terms of its results.] The fragment breaks off on page 14, the third paragraph of section II.

Lecture II: “The Social Basis for the Intellectual Life”

A 17-page typescript text. The text appears to be complete, ending with handwritten “I conclude then, thus far, that”

FMO notes:

Royce illustrates how our habits of intellect are affected by our social relations (shown by sampling members of a well-diversified jury, or an interdisciplinary panel of various experts. Proper and improper roles of “controversy” in this – perhaps lawyers do best here because they know that there is some ultimate judge which makes the case go thus or so -- so Royce reports meeting occasionally with a distinguished jurist who is also a philosopher, who told Royce: “In the universe we have to conceive that the ultimate truth is likely to be that which some irresistible umpire of all controversies simply requires you to believe, and to believe because the force behind that verdict is irresistible.” (6) Royce responds to the jurist that this “seemed to me a characteristic instance of a jurist’s metaphysics”, how a discipline of habitual thinking shaped his ultimate views -- rather than Royce fully agreeing with this “backed up by force” idea.

Rest of lecture: “socially speaking we directly communicate ideas rather than feelings or other mental contents, and that the source of our belief in our fellows’ existence lies in the fact that our fellows are sources of new ideas.” (17) [**NB:** Here is a seed of “dynamo of ideas” view of other selves that CSP appreciates much in *WI:2*]

Royce starts off section one (2) with the common awareness of how our behavior and thinking

depend on our social conditions. What some are unaware of is that the indirect influence of a set of mind, the characteristics of your thinking (urban versus country person). Professionals tend to get into controversy – theologians as well as scientists – and points to lawyers with their bitter fights in courtroom, but can be also closest of friends. An illustration of the subtle ways whereby our intellect gets indirectly affected by social conditions.

Section two continues with how and why “social relations mold our whole view of the universe.” (7) To do this he focuses precisely on the real nature of our social ideas themselves. Royce touches the question of whether there is an innate knowledge of our fellow man. We are surrounded by our fellows, but no one has entered the mystery of each one’s self-hood. (8) We need to examine very familiar facts to break through to this question.

Royce goes into the argument of knowing another by analogy. (He despises that argument.) People *do* think by analogy, but that’s not the fundamental reason why I believe in the reality of the other person. He feels that it starts with a feeling, more or less conscious, that refers to what he later believes will be other minds. (11) This is before he feels drawn to act as others act.

Royce makes a second argument against knowing others by analogy. He claims that newness and knowledge by sympathy is a more apt description. (12)

Lecture III: “Social Origin of the Reasoning Processes”

A 15-page typescript, unedited. It breaks off with a final handwritten note, “I learn to....” [See the text of the typeset syllabus above for a description of Lecture III.]

Lecture IV: “The Social Origin of our Fundamental Ideas”

A 31 page text fragment. Up to page 23, it is typescript with handwritten edits. From pages 24-31, it is a handwritten autograph, breaking off with an incomplete sentence.

[See above (ca 3 pp.) for the description of Lecture IV.]

Lecture V: “Practical Consequences of the Social Theory of the Intellect, Philosophical Bearings of the Theory”

No MS given in Box 68.

- 189. “Benedict Spinoza” (1897)**
Warner, ed., *Library of the World’s Best Literature*, 23 (New York: R.S. Peale and J.A. Hill, 1897): 13785-93.

- 190. “Comment by Professor Royce on Hegel’s Social Theory,”**
Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1897) 569-70.

Skrupskelis: “Extract from a private letter. For another extract from the same letter see L-2.
There are no indications that Royce consented to the publication.” *BWJR*:2 1198.

- 191. “Immanuel Kant”**
Warner, ed., *Library of the World’s Best Literature*, 15 (New York:
R.S. Peale and J.A. Hill, 1897): 8477-85.

- 192. “Originality and Consciousness,”**
***Harvard Monthly*, 24 (June 1897): 133-42.**

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*.

The essay entails a “supplementary statement concerning certain general aspects of the nature of human consciousness” (*SGE* xi). Royce focuses on the tragedy of good and evil, as it is connected with the limitation of the span of human consciousness. If this span were to be lifted, Royce feels that we would grasp the whole of what we actually mean from our finite point of view.

“[O]ur own finite meaning does not become perfectly clear to us, and our own conscious processes are not themselves, to their own very depths, presented to our fleeting finite moments of consciousness.” He clarifies that we are thus “hindered by this mere narrowness of the moment’s view of its own sense, and not by any gulf which separates us from real Things in Themselves.” (xii)

There does not appear to be a manuscript for this essay in HARP.

- 193. “The Problem of Job,”**
***The New World*, 6 (1897): 261-81.**

Reprinted in *Studies of Good and Evil*. pages 1-28. See above at Part I, item ___, for discussion of the essay. As noted there, the manuscripts relating to this essay are found in HARP Box 52, and are composed of two manuscripts. The first MS runs from pages 1 to 39, and the second MS runs pages 35 to 87.

Originally, this break in manuscript pages presented a puzzle. However, it was discovered that the second manuscript numbered pages 35 to 87 is in fact that conclusion to the fifth August Graham lecture. (See discussion of Section V of item 181, the Graham Lectures, above.)

Evaluation: Cf. the evaluations for “The Practical Significance of Pessimism,” “Tennyson and Pessimism,” and “Nietzsche.” FMO has been most impressed by the Nietzsche article as it represents his most mature thought on pessimism.

194. “Systematic Philosophy in America in the Years 1893, 1894 and 1895,”
Archiv fur systematic Philosophie, 3 (1897): 245-66.

This shows Royce as an alert observer of contemporary philosophy.

195. “President Andrews Case,”
Boston Evening Transcript (August 18, 1897): 6.

Reprinted in *The Congregationalist*.

A letter to the editor on the firing of president Andrews of Brown University.

Evaluation: An interesting letter.

196. “Some Characteristics of Being” (1897?)
Box 80

This incomplete 54-page manuscript is misplaced in Box 80 (by E. F. Wells). It is most probably preparatory work for the Gifford lectures. J. Harry Cotton (professor from Wabash College) inserts a note into the folio box dated August 19, 1952 that reads as follows:

“The reference to Peirce, page 47, and more especially to the “four historic conceptions of being” (p. 48) would date this paper in the later 1890s. It looks like an early draft of the argument in Vol. I of The World and the Individual.”

The title, “Some Characteristics of Being” points toward a two-fold sense of “Characteristics”:

(a) characteristics of being “in so far as it *is*” (even though he doesn’t here use the phrase “the what of the *that*”, and although Royce speaks of attributes of being as belonging “to its *what* and not to the fact *that* it is.” (49) (Royce’s emphasis).

(b) characteristics of being “in so far as it is *qualitative*” -- e.g., as “independent of ideas”, as “active”, or “effective”) as on pages 52-54 (even though he doesn’t here use the phrase “the *that* of the what” to point to the factualness of mere fictions like the “infant Hercules strangling with the serpents,” or “the ‘beamish boy’ hunting the Jabberwok.”) (53)

Because this text has six carefully numbered sections (not in typical Royce form, with roman numerals, but with section marks), and given a long German quotation from Kant (at pages 28 to 29), it seems intended as an early draft of a book, something more than lecture notes for his Phil. 9 course “The Definition of Reality,” even though the subject matter of the two is similar.

Of interest is how this manuscript may tie into the papers in the next box, Box 81. *How* this MS fits into Royce's preparation of his Giffords (*see* also "Plans for the Giffords" formerly in Box F, folder 2) or the Box 81 materials (particularly in its relation to Royce's "A Critical Study of Reality" in Box 81) remains unclear.

Royce's mention of "the four most fundamental historical conceptions of Being" on page 48 of the present MS is significant. His first "Plan" for the Giffords – written before October 1897 – mentions these conceptions, and his change of his title for Phil.9 in October 1897 to "The Definition of Reality" suggests that the themes of the "Characteristics" essay were on his mind.

The central project of this fragment is to consider the "circles" in ontological thinking that trap Descartes and Kant. He tackles the question of whether trying to "define" being as "being" (i.e., as existential *that* rather than qualitative *what*) involves so much circular reasoning as to render the effort futile. Royce wrestles with this issue: is the attempt to articulate the meaning of being as existential being, in so far as this is humanly possible, a vain endeavor? Royce suggests that perhaps one had best start off on a course of a "third approach" to Natural Religion by simply assuming the meaning of being as an unavoidable ingredient in all our thinking and assertions – even if this assumption leads to consequences like the dogmatic claims, "Being is that which is independent of our thoughts!" or "Being is individual" etc. OR, even granting the kind of circularity unavoidable with most basic concepts and with correlatives, *can* such an endeavor prove worthwhile and so clarifying of thought that it forestalls falling into such ensnaring dogmatic claims about Being (or Reality) as just mentioned?

Royce himself writes at the top of the "Characteristics" MS: "an early sketch carefully worked out." "Early sketch" is not accurate, but "carefully worked out" is.

The MS ends on page 54, trailing off mid-sentence (mid-run-on-sentence): "While independence is an ontological predicate worthy of a more careful separate study, it is still plain, after we have listened to such account as a Kant or a Spencer, or any other realist may give of the precise sense in which he holds being to be independent of our ideas about it, we may still find ourselves ." [There is no period after "ourselves"].

The MS breaks off before Royce comes to a criticism of Peirce's ontology.

197. "Finale of Lecture on Intellect and Will" **Box 105, folder 4**

Box 105, folder 4 contains pages 23-42 of "Finale of Lecture on Intellect and Will." The pages are loose, and unmounted.

Royce writes on a first page: "Read Illustrations from the Imitation Correspondence. Close with practical suggestions adapted to the special audience." After this first page, the MS pages numbered 23-42 follow.

It is unclear to which lecture notes and pages he refers. Perhaps the fifth lecture of the New

Orleans lectures (for which there is no MS)?

To avoid splitting the mental process, Royce prefers not to use the traditional terms “intellect” and “will.” Rather, he stresses the dynamic unity of the process that involves docility, ingenuity, habits, etc.

He says we learn because we are curious. Curiosity is a radical quality, the fountain from which ingenuity and docility arise.

198. “Philosophy IX. 1897-8” Box 71

A 41-page MS on entirely fresh pages.

Royce offers “brief summary of what is meant by philosophy (p. 2) as “an effort to get a reasoned solution of the ultimate problems of human life” – “ultimate” as lying beyond the scope of special sciences.

After scanning various levels of problems of human life, he finally uses as an illustration of an “ultimate problem of human life,” how can human life have evolved from lifeless matter to full human life?

Criteria for a genuinely ultimate problem: 1st, it doesn’t presuppose or imply still deeper questions; 2nd, such problems must lead, as science grows, to constantly new problems of generalization, and of co-ordination of the results of science, and [3rd] these resulting problems of generalized or unified science at once go beyond the more special problems and concern still more significant and central issues.” (p.11) “... every scientific induction rests upon certain presupposed principles of Logic, of the theory of Knowledge, and of the metaphysical theory of Reality.” (12) Royce writes that when a person learns about the law of gravitation, “every study of the law presupposes a certain knowledge of what is meant by space, by matter, by motion, by time, and by quantity in general.” (12; underlining added)

Royce leads students of Phil. 9 to hear what Metaphysics is: “the discussion of the ultimate questions as to what the Real world is” (22) and “more technically, Metaphysics is that doctrine which undertakes to answer, as well as may be, two questions: (1) What is meant by the term Reality, or by the adjective Real, as applied to the whole world, or to any being in the world? and (2) What can be known about the true nature of the world, and of the beings in the world, – in other words what can be known about the objects to which we apply the term Reality, and the adjective Real?” (22-23). The first form of the metaphysical question does not yet directly concern the problems as to the nature of the universe, but the meaning of a very familiar term,” the real and the unreal, e.g., solid earth and objects in a dream, or again, “Was what he reports really as he reports it?” or “Are the circles of a geometer realities, or mere mathematical ideals?” (26)

Note, too, the case where to live authentically in the heroic mood is to identify the real with that

which has been called the ideal.” (33) It’s to seek a city out of sight. [But is the “city” *real* or *only ideal*?]

Here Royce’s witness to history: “Believing in ideals as being somehow more real than the visible facts are, has been a prime factor in human civilization.” (34)

Conclusion: The Royce of 1897 views Metaphysics as a study of those basic terms of common-sense which have the profoundest meaning (39), such as real, reality, ideal, unreal and related words ... being, existence, actuality, and their related terms, truth and falsity, possibility and necessity and actually possible. Royce aims to treat the problems connected with these terms “not as merely verbal problems, but as inquiries into fundamental matters. For all such terms are mere efforts to fix ideas of the profoundest moment for our whole view of our relations to the world.” (41)

Evaluation: A document that quite clearly reveals Royce’s approach to metaphysics about a year and a half before he delivers *WI:1*. This is significant as a window into Royce’s approach to his Giffords.

199. Untitled and Undated Manuscript Examination (?) (Probably Phil. 9: Metaphysics) Box 105, folder 4

An early four-sided sheet (5" x 8") of manuscript, in Royce’s hand, creating an untitled undated “Examination.”

The text reads as follows:

“The two assertions: –

- 1) “Such and such is the fact”
- 2) “The wiser, truer, larger insight that I am trying to get, conceives, sees, knows that such is the fact.”

Compare these two. Are they equivalent assertions? If not, what is the difference between them? If they are equivalent, does not this imply something as to the very nature of facts. What?

State in your own words the thesis of Idealism.

Consider the two assertions: –

- (1) I believe that such is the fact.
- (2) I ought to act as if such is the fact.

Is there any difference in meaning between these two assertions? If there is, what difference? If not, what is implied about truth & the nature of fact.

Discuss Mill’s instance in the review of Hamilton. What light on nature of truth. On our right to make assertions about God.”

200. “New Methods at Hingham,”
***The Nation*, 66 (1898): 459.**

Letter to the editor, dated June 10, 1898. Skrupskelis: “Royce denies that he is in any way connected with the “New School of Methods” at Hingham. He had consented to give one lecture, but withdrew.” *BWJR*:2 1199.

201. “The Social Factors in the Conception of Reality” (1898?)
Box 91

Note at top of page according to Loewenberg (*Phil. Rev.* 1917): 579, this belongs to the “Fragments and Studies for an intended book” possibly to be entitled “Social Consciousness and Reality.” No date is given.

In this 1898 period, Royce is dealing with the issue of social consciousness.

This is a 39-page manuscript fragment, breaking off after the word “moreover” on its last page. It is written on fresh pages. (FMO’s secretary has prepared a typescript of this manuscript.)

The illustration of the umbrella testifies to Royce’s middle-period realism, not in the sense of total independence of subject and object, but of some dependence by subject on object. (For umbrella illustration, *see* page 13 of the manuscript, page 4 of the typescript.) This manuscript has not been published.

Evaluation: This MS deserves careful consideration as it counters the idea that Royce is a pure idealist. It clearly was intended as part of Royce’s projected book “Social Consciousness and Reality.” **NB**: Loewenberg in his “larger notebook” marks this title “important.” (See Box 142, folder 2.)

202. Review
Theodore H. Hittell, *History of California*, vols. 3 and 4 (1898)
***American Historical Review*, 4 (1898-99): 184-86.**

203. Review
Ralph Waldo Trine, *In Tune with the Infinite; Or Fullness of Peace, Power and Plenty* (1898)
***International Journal of Ethics*, 9 (1898-99): 124-26.**

204. The Twentieth Century Club Lectures (1898)
“The Social Factors in the Development of Individual Minds”
Box 69

Sponsored by the Harvard Education Department, these lectures were given at Jacob Sleeper Hall, Boston University on Saturdays at 9 a.m., starting January 15, 1898. Organized by the Education Department of “The Twentieth Century Club,” which had an inaugural meeting one meeting before Royce’s first lecture. (Did the 20th Century Club offer its facilities to a possible consortium of education departments of Boston area universities?)

The series is outlined for 10 lectures, according to a loose document in Box 69 (loose), a typeset, 4-page program. Royce apparently approved the program. Portions of the program relating to each lecture accompany the analysis of the manuscript below.

Lecture I: “Introduction: The General Nature of the Intellect”

1. INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE INTELLECT. –

Experience and skill, habit and instinct, training and sensitiveness, in their relations to the life of the intellect. – Conscious and unconscious intelligence. –Knowing as recognizing, as discriminating, and as comparing. – The problem of the human type of intellect. Dependence of man’s mind upon the social conditions under which man grows up. The plan of the subsequent course outlined. Practical importance of the undertaking.

This appears to be a complete text of the lecture. It is divided between MS and typescript pages, 51 in all (plus a 32a). They are divided into typescript and MS as follows: Pages 21-29 are autograph MS. Beginning at the bottom of 29, a typescript starts, and continues to page 31. (31 is repaginated) Pages 32 - 36 are again MS. The bottom of 36 picks up with typescript again. Page 37 may be missing (according to Wells). Pages 38- 41 are MS pages. One page (42/43) begins the typescript again. The typescript pages run to the end of the text at page 51. The bottom half of this typescript page ends with a long handwritten paragraph. (This appears to be the end of the lecture.)

This lecture is not to be confused with the Lecture I of the New Orleans Lectures in Box 68. While their titles are very similar, the lecture texts do not appear to parallel each other in any way.

Royce grounds the series on the contributions of social psychology. He refers to Professor Baldwin and his work (without naming specific volumes). This lecture is limited to “very general considerations” about what the human intellect is and how it works. He ties all this up with having a skill, skillful habits, skillful behavior. The how of speaking or writing, moving from babble to intelligible speech in children.

The more skillful and accurate a habit becomes, the more our inner intellectual life grows. Royce seeks to show how the interference of social factors must prove the essential importance of the life of the intellect.

Royce notes docility and ingenuity as two characteristics of intelligence. (He will later, in 1903,

speak of sensitivity, docility, and creativity as divisions of consciousness.) “To be docile is to show by your behavior at any moment signs of what has happened to you in the past.” (16) As another description of docility, Royce says “viewed from without [it] means the tendency to form new habits in consequence of new happenings.” (18) It is especially in vertebrate animals that functions of mind are exhibited.

The role of habits in docility (a cow coming back from pasture by the same path, e.g.) allows a basis of influence from a steady past. Royce says and illustrates in what sense man is the most docile of animals.

What is meant by ingenuity is shown in conduct. Docility was “dependence upon past experience, and aptness in making direct use of that experience. Ingenuity means valuable novelty of conduct in presence of novel conditions.” (28) Ingenuity indicates an unpredictability of response (poet, scientific genius, etc.).

We observe that these two sorts of knowing are symptoms of intelligence, and ultimately mean the same thing: sensitivity to training and plasticity in the acquisition of novel forms of skill. (31) “Corresponding to the fact that our acts express our intellectual life is the fact that we ourselves are more or less aware how our inner knowledge and the docility of our outer conduct vary together.” (32)

“Intelligence as docility means capacity to be molded by experience is in no ways to deny that there is an inborn basis or foundation for intelligence, an instinctive aptitude to form habits in all of us. It is just our inherited instincts that are themselves docile.”²⁰ There are no innate ideas, but there is innate aptitude. (36) (A crucial response to Descartes.) Against Locke’s idea of the *tabula rasa*. But also against the idea that we have nothing but sense impressions.

A summary on page 43, starting from experience, and finding that this intelligent life is featured by docility and then by ingenuity and thirdly, in some measure, meaning being conscious of one’s own docility and ingenuity. Therefore, “[h]e knows in what sense he depends upon experience He discriminates and compares things in such wise as to know in what way and what end he is ingenious.” (42/43)

Now we take up the problem of how the social life is related to this intellect. Our first possibility of relating depends upon our inherent instincts that fit us for social life. At present enough to name this a fondness for companionship. “Man is a being that can neither suffer his fellow, nor do without him.” (Kant quote.) Royce: Man is profoundly selfish, but he is also in an equally elemental way far more than selfish.... He is unspeakably wretched and lonesome without his fellows, even when he seems for the most part to hate them, he is normally dependent on their good will.” (45) Lists of initial social instincts.

Royce then makes all the traits listed above social (ingenuity, creativity, etc.). He is leading into the nature of our social instincts.

Evaluation: Tentative. The editorial board is faced with a decision of whether this series of ten

²⁰ Text is apparently missing from this quote.

lectures should be published as a volume itself. I'm not sure that this first lecture qualifies alone for inclusion in the *Critical Edition*. However, as an integral part of the ten-lecture series (or the lectures we have), it deserves consideration.

Lecture II: "The Basis of Our Social Consciousness"

2. THE BASIS OF OUR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS. – The Ego and the Alter. Neither known at the outset of intellectual development. Neither ever a fact of direct experience. Each constantly misjudged. Examples of both sorts of misjudgment. The usual theory of the development of the idea of the Alter, by analogy, from that of the Ego. Inadequacy of this account. –The natural relations of Ego and Alter: rivalry, selfishness, dependence, submissiveness, sympathy, as examples of these natural relations. Selfishness, as a conscious tendency, is no more primitive than social dependence or sympathy. – The variations of our ideas of the Ego: The bodily, the remembered, the social, the customary and the ideal Ego. All of these alike are highly ideal constructions; none of them are bare facts of experience. – The variations of our ideas of the Alter: Literal and idealized social companions; the crowd; the social "authorities," our family, our "set," our community, our nation, mankind, etc. – The purely ideal Alter: Fictitious heroes and their meaning, Conscience, "the Law," "the Truth," "the verdict of good judgment," and similar ideals. All of these forms of the Alter are alike highly ideal constructions, not bare facts of experience. Their importance for our intellect. Need of a closer study.

Besides this printed summary, he offers his own written summary on page 38a in the MS lecture. "The Basis of our Social Consciousness lies in our ideas of Ego and of Alter."

An apparently complete MS of approximately 50 pages (40 numbered pages plus pages 4a-4i), divided between typescript and manuscript pages as follows:

1-4 typescript, with handwritten edits.

4a-4i and 5 are MS

Page 6 is again typescript, with many handwritten edits. The heavily edited typescript continues through page 20.

At page 21, the MS picks up again on fresh pages through page 40.

From FMO's notes:

Some key ideas: (see also syllabus above) On page 3, Royce orients the reader by saying he will use "social consciousness" to describe two modes of consciousness: the mode had when meeting a fellow human being, and the mode had when being alone I am in dialogue with my thoughts.

After tracing the usual Roycean sense of Self (immediate Self of feeling, bodily self, subject, and empirical socially-related self), Royce describes Alter in its various meanings – as ordinary fellow I meet, or as viewable as ideal alter (as I do of a hero in a novel), and then Conscience is a sort of ideal alter (to my present self) as well as an ideal ego (so see how these two tend to come together here). (4)

He then restates his thesis that the Alter (of my own Ego and of my neighbor) -- as the individual mind proper to each eludes “direct experience” – unlike the way sounds, scents, and his facial movements do not elude it, but enter into my direct experience. (7)

He argues vs. analogy-reasoning and for social-contrast effect as main (not exclusive) original or our ideas of ego & alter. (19-20) He also argues vs. primacy of egoistic tendency in the ego – hold that its tendencies are at the first neutral – neither altruistic nor egoistic, but that there are as many factors within favoring either priority – the habitual training derived from imitating one’s neighbors (usual father and mother) being the very relevant influence. (31e)²¹

Royce shows his keen observance of Baby’s growth on pages 13 and 34-35.

Evaluation: The balance of Ego and Alter seems radically important, both for social psychology and the role of balance in the philosophical method of Royce. Royce shows himself a keen, careful analyzer (phenomenologist) of this key relationship – in all its varieties – within our consciousness. I would say this is quite important for social psychology.

Lecture III: “The Beginnings of Social Life in the Individual”

Thirty-two pages of a 37-page typescript, with some handwritten edits and MS insertions. Pages 17 to 21 are missing.

3. THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL LIFE IN THE INDIVIDUAL. Imitativeness. Its early forms. Relations of imitation to the early growth of intelligence. – The love of the Social Contrast-Effect. Relation of this tendency to Imitativeness. – Play and the social tendencies. Sociality and selfishness. The Ego of the child as a social contrast-effect. – Ideal comrades. Imitative originality. Continued games and continued stories. – The growth and systematization of ideals. Examples.

FMO notes:

The lecture’s importance lies in tracing the beginning of the social life to a ‘love of imitation of the alter’ as operating when seeded by a social-contrast effect. Many illustrations. Relation between ego and alter is the fundamental social relation.

Royce deals with the issue of how the social life begins in the individual. On page 9, Royce describes certain feelings as sympathetic, going “along with more or less unconsciously imitative acts. And thus, the whole range of what we call sympathy involves a repetition of the emotions of others and a repetition due to imitation although solely occurring without a clear knowledge of how all this repetition of another’s feelings is accomplished.” (9)

In early child formation, children call this social function (relation to the Alter) into play. But beyond this, everything else is capricious interaction. (14-15) Singing or whistling a popular tune. Royce gives many examples.

²¹ The lower case letters following manuscript page numbers reflect page insertions would make to his manuscript, after a given page number, numbering the insertions “31a,” “31b,” etc.

Royce mentions the obstinate child, who may also be an imitative child. The contrariness need not exclude imitativeness. (25) In play, the Social-Contrast Effect is very predominant. Thus it is imitativeness and the social-contrast effect that are working together.

Stuck in the back of Box 69 is a loose photocopy of a page 32, apparently connecting this lecture with the next one (which is missing from HARP).

**Lecture IV: “Continuation of the Foregoing”
Box 105, folder 4?**

A complete, identifiable MS of this lecture is apparently missing from HARP. It is not included, in any case, with the other lectures in Boxes 69 and 70. However, a typescript fragment (pages 20-30) in Box 105, folder 4 deals with the growth of consciousness in children, and may be a part of this lecture. It gives many examples of children’s learning experiences, and thus comports with the references to this Lecture’s subject matter. The Box 105, folder 4 fragment is found among other fragments dealing with the topics covered generally in this series (habit, skill, etc.)

4. CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING. -- Illustrations of imitation, of self-consciousness and of social consciousness, at various stages of mental development. Ordinary mature social life as illustrating similar processes.

A manuscript of this lecture does not appear in HARP. However, in the next lecture (V), Royce refers back to Lecture IV, saying it had been “devoted altogether to illustrations of the life of childhood and of the imitative functions which there take place as well as of the functions that have to do with what we call the social contrast effect. “

**Lecture V: “Theory of the Origin of the Ideas of Ego and Alter”
Box 70**

A 29-page typescript text, with handwritten edits and marginalia in pencil. (Royce’s handwriting). The text appears to be complete. From page 25 to 29, however, there are no edits (completely clean). As with lectures six and seven, the paper of the text is punched for inclusion in a three ring binder.

At the beginning of Box 70 is a “More Detailed Statement of the Argument of the Present Lecture,” i.e. Lecture V. [typeset page?] It reads as follows:

The general topic is the Theory of the Origin of our Ideas of Ego and of Alter. The general statement of this Theory is suggested in the Syllabus, and has been indicated in foregoing lectures. But the necessarily difficult detailed account of the theory itself will be aided by bearing in mind the following points, to be illustrated in the present lecture.

1. A theory of Ego and Alter involves a view as to the *general* nature of human consciousness. For the sake of such a view we shall first distinguish between the CONTENTS of Consciousness, and the FORM of Consciousness. Neither Ego nor Alter are mere Contents of Consciousness. For the contents, or raw materials of even the highest conscious life, consist of masses of sensations and of feelings, not of definite knowledge as such. And all *meanings*, all higher insights, of our conscious life, depend upon the *form* which our consciousness comes to assume, and can never be reduced to mere contents.

The Form of consciousness depends always in part upon CONTRAST, or differences, that get at any moment present in the consciousness of that moment.

2. In studying the Evolution of our Consciousness, we also learn that the Form of our consciousness grows more definite in proportion to the definiteness of the *habits of action* which at any time we have acquired through former acts. This principle will help us to understand the way in which the field of consciousness comes to take on the Ego-Alter Form, or, in other words, to involve a knowledge of one's self and of one's neighbor. For, as a result of this principle about the growth of definiteness in consciousness, the lecture will be able to define a very important sort of contrast, namely that between the IDEAS and the PRESENTED FACTS that are at any time in our consciousness. This special sort of contrast grows as our habits grow. It is a contrast of especial importance in determining the form which our whole consciousness takes as we mature. IDEAS are mental states that are viewed as meaning or as leading to states or facts *beyond* themselves. In this sense hopes, wishes, etc., involve *Ideas*. – Ideas depend upon our formed habits and evolve with the latter.

3. Having distinguished *form* from *content* in general, and having further distinguished, by means of their form, our *ideas* from our merely *presented facts* of consciousness, the lecture will proceed to study the special case of Ego and Alter. Ego and Alter come to our consciousness mainly as *Ideas*, whose relation to one another and to presented facts has a certain *Form*.

Here the theses to be proved will be as follows: – The child's conscious imitations, and later his other social acts, involve as their result a peculiar *form* of the conscious field. This is the form common to all the social situations. It is the form of the contrast between alter-contents and ego-contents. The former are states of mind due to other people's presence and deeds. These are relatively "cold." But the ego-contents are due to one's own deeds. They are "warm," by virtue of all sorts of organic interests (such as bashfulness, vanity, obstinacy, etc., involve). The ego-contents involve both bodily acts and states of feeling.

But the form of this conscious field is also characterized, as the social consciousness grows, by the other formal contrast, viz., that between ideas and facts. And the ideas are on the whole first *due to the alter*, while the ego contents appear, by contrast, as bound up with certain experiences of *choice*, whereby one, first receiving his ideas, *attends* to one idea as against another, or accepts one idea, and rejects another. But both the ego and alter part of the field are ere long known to consciousness as consisting largely of *ideas*; while the ideas of which the alter is the source get more and more contrasted, as time goes on, with the ideas that the ego chooses, and proposes. Hence to the primary contrast between ego and alter, is joined the further contrast of ideas and facts.

In consequence, both the ego and the alter contents, always seen in the form of the social contrasts, and more and more interpreted in terms of ideas, rather than of presented facts, gradually get more and more sundered from and contrasted with one another, and with the presented facts of consciousness, until each set is viewed as a set of contents merely hinting of the existence of two sorts of Beings, the ideal Ego and the ideal Alter, neither ever a wholly present fact, and each in its way a mystery to the other.

5. THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS OF EGO AND ALTER. --
General definition of what the Alter is from the point of view of the mind that comes to believe in any such alter. – The alter as a source, or as a reservoir of ideas and meanings. -- Secondary character of the Ego, and of

all self-consciousness. – Ego and Alter as ideas developing together, but with the Alter always a step in advance. – Practical consequences of this view of the growth of the social consciousness. – Defects of current theories.

FMO feels that pages 3 and 4 are most important. Royce speaks there of the reality of the imitative insight and how it depends on all levels of conscious life on receiving a model from without or from above. He explicitly quotes St. Paul saying, “By grace are ye saved, through faith” etc.” as the epitome of our theory of the imitative source of self-consciousness on the higher levels of the life of the self.”

[Might Royce be showing himself as a proto-phenomenologist when he takes great care to show, step by step, how a child’s consciousness grows?]

Lecture VI: “The Social Basis of the Thinking Process”

A 32-page typescript, with *no* edits, beyond small reading directions in the margins (Royce’s handwriting). (e.g. “omit ...”) As with lectures five and seven, the paper of the text is punched for inclusion in a three-ring binder. There is no detailed summary for the sixth lecture as there was for the fifth.

6. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE THINKING PROCESS. -- The nature of abstract ideas. -- Thinking and conscious activity. -- Generalization and self-observation. -- Imitative origin of abstract ideas. -- Thinking as a social process. -- The relations of thought and language.

“[I]f I think, I am not merely accepting the traditions or the signs or the habits of other people. Thinking is ... peculiarly characteristic of the circle of my own consciousness.” (2) Royce quotes a gentleman (a correspondent) to tell the story of the imitative life of a child. (4) He uses tree climbing as an example.

Royce has grave objections to the vagueness of general ideas. (10) But the older writers distinguish between ideas that carried mental images and more general ideas. (13) Composite images aren’t enough for a general idea. (15) His example of a tiger, which he takes from William James, and uses elsewhere. From the tiger, he goes to a triangle.

“When we think we act – and here is a distinction between thinking and other intelligent activities – we observe our own action. Thinking is then a case of self-consciousness.” (21)

There is some initiative in our thinking.

On page 30, he begins to sum up the discussion. The thoughtful person acts carefully. The social dimension is involved “by virtue of the way in which we become aware of what is done, and when later in our development we learn to think while we are alone.” (32)

Royce points ahead to the next lecture, in which he will consider reasoning – not mere self-consciousness, but self-criticism.

FMO notes: Royce uses the word imitation in a very wide sense, including the conductor's thinking through his baton-movements, or the artist's discerning what is apt or inapt through his brush-strokes a "language." The meaning of such an idea as "justice" can only be expressed in terms of a plan of action – and this will involve our social relations.

Lecture VII: "The Social Basis of the Reasoning Process"

A 26-page typescript, with extensive edits on some pages in both ink and pencil. As with lectures five and six, the paper of the text is punched for inclusion in a three ring binder. If it is not a complete text, there is only a paragraph or so missing.

7. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE REASONING PROCESS. -- Definition of reasoning. -- Inference and self-consciousness. -- Inference and argument. -- Argument as a social contrast-effect. -- Criticism as the source of conscious reasonableness. -- The sense of rationality as a social product. -- Reflective thinking as an inner conversation.

Talking now about reasoning, not thinking, the essential notion here is self-criticism. Children have to learn to reason. Royce shows (14 ff.) "Reasoning then, is so far a passing from a lower to a higher stage in your consciousness of your plans action." (15)

The social factors enter in with the questions of children, and the contributions of those questions to their growth. "Why?"

Lecture VIII: "The Social Basis of Conscience"

Loewenberg lists this lecture (with lectures 9 and 10) as missing.

8. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CONSCIENCE. – Imitativeness in its moral aspects. – Sympathy and suggestibility. – The social emotions: bashfulness, shame, vanity, good fellowship, social curiosity. – The moral aspects of the social contrast-effect. Obstnacy; independence; judgments passed upon others. Reaction of these tendencies upon our social suggestibility; they normally do not diminish, but rather heighten the later, while they complicate its expression. – Social conflicts and the practical reason. - Self-respect, the sense of honor, and the love of consistency. – The ideal Ego and the ideal society. – Conscience as the mediator.

Skrupskelis notes that an address with the same title ("The Social Basis of Conscience") was given at the 37th Annual NEA Meeting in 1898, and published in *The National Education Association, Journal of Proceedings and Addresses of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting* (1898): 196-99. He states that this may be the missing 8th lecture. *BWJR*:2 1200.

Lecture IX: "The Social Basis of Our View of Nature"

Loewenberg lists this lecture (along with lectures 8 and 10) as missing. In Box 105, folder 3, however, the second MS in the box, an unedited typescript numbered 14-32, covering sections III and IV, may be a draft of this lecture. The contents of the fragment match the series program

description below.

However, in Box 103, folder 2, an untitled “Lecture IX,” a 23-page typescript with many edits in Royce’s hand, fits the program description of this Lecture. The typescript is on paper with three-hole punches, identical to the paper used by the typist of the Cambridge Conference Lectures in Box 70. (The 20th Century Club lectures and the Cambridge Conference Lectures were typed around the same time.)

9. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF OUR VIEW OF NATURE. – The external world as the social object. – The social Alter as the originally “independent Being.” The “physical reality” as his, and our, correlate. – The determinateness of natural facts as a socially acquired idea. – It is man who teaches man to be exact. -- Application of the idea of exactness to the world independent of man. – The idea of law in nature as a socially acquired idea.

Lecture X: “Review of Results”

Loewenberg lists this lecture (along with lectures 8 and 9) as missing.

10. REVIEW OF RESULTS. – Recapitulation and applications: (1.) To the work of the teacher; (2.) To the study of social problems; (3.) To the general problem as to man’s relation to the universe.

EVALUATION OF WHOLE SERIES:

(1) These lectures reveal:

- Royce at his psychological best, like a phenomenologist. They certainly show Royce in a balancing act: on the one hand this, on the other hand, that. The series offers experiential evidence for the social dimension of his metaphysics.
- On the negative side, this series currently lacks four of the ten original lectures. Royce himself did not choose to publish them. The editing job would be intense to eliminate some of his repetitions (both within the series and in comparison to earlier series).

(2) Is any of these lectures so good that it should be published on its own? Lectures 2 and 3 present some highly important parts of Royce’s thinking that perhaps should be called to people’s attention by inclusion. (e.g. the question of the primacy of egotism over altruism)

- 205. “The New Psychology and the Consulting Psychologist,”**
National Educational Association, Journal of Proceedings and Addresses of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting (1898): 554-70;
Reprinted: *Forum* 26 (1898): 80-96.

Skrupskelis: “In the minutes of the meeting this paper is titled ‘The Relation of Psychology in its Various Aspects to Education.’” *BWJR*:2 1200.

- 206. “The Psychology of Invention,”**
Psychological Review, 5 (1898): 113-44.
Scientific American Supplements, 45 (1898): 18602-3, 18682-83.

- 207. “The Social Basis of Conscience”**
National Educational Association, Journal of Proceedings and Addresses of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting (1898): 196-99

It is possible that this was originally the eighth lecture of a series of ten entitled “Social Factors in the Development of the Individual Mind.” (See “The Twentieth Century Lectures” above at item 204.) HARP Boxes 69-70 contain the manuscripts for these lectures. Lecture 8 is missing.

- 208. Untitled and Undated Manuscript (1898?)**
Box 105, folder 3, document 10

A MS fragment running from pages 78 to 102, the text lacks any Section indicators yet appears to conclude at page 102.

This MS seems an early draft of an early Lecture of WI:1, BUT later reading makes FMO wonder whether this might be part of a draft of Royce’s “A Critical Study of Reality” [Comparison with *Transactions*’ published version of “ACSOR” is needed.]

Some FMO notes:

At page 79, Royce writes “... to which I earlier referred in my discussion of the popular metaphysical notions” and later [p. 101] to “the popular metaphysics of language.”

At page 80, Royce states that according to Kant,

“... science deals, not with things-in-themselves, but with objects and ... with real objects also. Only the reality of these objects of science is of a special type. It is objective but it is not independent of knowledge. What it depends upon is the general constitution of the process of knowledge which is a process that predetermines the form, but not /81/ the matter, of a realm of possible experience. Now a possible experience, when not present, is still an object of search... They have truth, but not metempirical substantiality, form, but not the present immediacy of feeling. They appear to science

as given, but as indirectly given. They appear as substantial, but because they get their substantial categorization from our understanding.

“The novelty of Kant’s formulation of this third conception of reality lies in the fact that earlier metaphysic, in trying to define the realm of truth as truth, the realm of the *nous* of Plotinus, or of the possible being of the scholastics, had almost always sooner or later returned either to the realistic or to the conception of the real as the basis of truth. But Kant, himself a realist, /85/ deliberately gave up the knowledge of the independent reals, and himself, a partisan of knowledge within experience, deliberately refused to be a mystic. He was therefore responsible for a third view as to a realm of truth, since he had to show that we can know realities, that these realities are to us objective, and that the realities which we can know are not the independent reals. The result of this situation was Kant’s wonderfully skillful compromise presented in the Deduction of the Categories, in the idea of the world of *mögliche Erfahrung*.” ...

/89a/ “... In fact, this third conception, in the various stages of its growth, may be called the characteristic conception of the critical rationalists of the world,--the conception of the jurists, of the moderate liberals, of the men who viewed conventions as conventions, and who yet meant to maintain them for consciously practical purposes. The world of prices, of commercial values, of the stock market and of the law courts, deals with the realities of this third type. Practical allies of the / 90/ realists, the partisans of this third conception have lacked the realistic dogmatism. The English Constitution has a form of reality that is a classic instance of this type.

“Viewed however as a final and universal conception of reality, this third conception is a compromise between the various motives which have led on the one side to the realistic and mystical conceptions, and on the other side to a criticism of their inner contradictions. For what after all, is a real possibility which makes a thought true, but which itself is a bare universal conception, devoid of individuality, of concreteness, and of immediacy.

“In place of this compromise, the fourth conception of what it is to be real, the modern conception of constructive, or, if you like, of absolute idealism, has at last /91/ undertaken not to destroy, but to fulfil [*sic*], the work too abstractly begun by realism and by mysticism, and too negatively set aside by the critical philosophy.

“For idealism, all of the other conceptions of reality are equally momental [? reading unsure] aspects, of the true conception. They are wrong only in their /92/ abstraction. To be real is to be independent; – yes precisely, to be independent of the unfinished, of the fragmentary, of the abstract character which makes any of our single human thoughts or experiences in so far as it looks beyond itself. To be completely real then, is to be merely a whole object of knowledge, or of meaning, instead of being a shred or patch of an object, such as you and I now face. To be real is to be /93/ immediate. Yes, but immediate as a clear vision of the whole of a meaning is immediate, – not as of mere feeling is immediate. To be real is to be individual. That realism had already implied. And modern idealism accepts the implication. But the true individuality of a meaning, of a life, of /94/ self, yes, I should add, of a self possessed of love or will which, loving what it has as [?] fact within the range of its purpose, of its meaning, of its life ill, have no other object than its own. In this sense, Plato’s Idea of the Good, and Aristotle’s God already showed signs of attaining the sort of self-possessed individuality which idealism demands from its type of realities. Real then is any whose meaning,

precisely in so far as it is /95/ explicit in thought, in life, in character, in experience. Real, for instance, are you, precisely in so far as having a life purpose, you know what you mean, and have your meaning present in your life.

“To be, once more, in this sense, is simply to be a whole object presented as fulfilling a conscious meaning. Now from the /96/ nature of this conception, idealism knows of no unconscious beings. In its world there are none. For it to be is to present the fulfilment of a conscious meaning, then where the object is, there the conscious meaning must be also. A reality, in this idealistic world, includes within its own being a thinking process, for a thinking process is needed to define the meaning. It /97/ includes immediacy, for a meaning can only be expressed in a life. It includes the determination of the life, in accordance with the meaning, by a process that gives the expression individuality and wholeness. Hence it includes Will. But these are consequences of synthetic idealism. I cannot describe them here. I desire only to sug- /98/ gest the general historical place which idealism occupies.

“It is peculiar to this idealism that its type of reality can be possessed in various degrees by various subjects, so that, in this system, one real object can be more real than another. I said a moment ago that you are real, in so far as your life expresses to you, consciously, the fulfilment of a meaning, /98/ of a purpose. Well now, that may happen in various degrees. You may grow in reality. The man may become far more real a being than the child was. And so, when idealism declared God to be the only absolutely real being, it does not thereby destroy the subordinate reality of the lesser beings, each in his own grade.

/100/ “In this sense, of course, the least or most fragmentary fact, in so far as it is made or formed to be the object of a definable meaning, has its own relative wholeness about it, and so has its little grade of reality. We cannot speak merely of two worlds, one apparent, or merely existent, the other a world of reality. We have as many grades of reality as there are grades of wholeness in our meanings. And these grades are simply countless. What is mere appearance from a higher point of view is practically [? reading unclear] real from a lower one. The least of our meanings has some wholeness. Hence the least of objects has some grade of reality. The only absolutely whole meaning is the absolute meaning itself. So the only absolutely Real Being is the Universe.”

[/100a – via Wells’s emendation/] In its origins, this synthetic idealism is a very old conception. It is implicit in much of the world’s most serious religious thinking. Long eclipsed by the fervor and the abstract skill of mysticism, it has gradually won its place in modern thinking as a conception of the first importance. As for its mission in civilization, I take that to be nothing less than the preservation for humanity of a faith in the meaning of life, – a faith which realistic conservatism has failed to ensure, and which mysticism /101/ has been unable to make concrete, – so that now a deep scepticism [*sic*] has assailed it, and only a[n] enlargement of our whole point of view can rescue us.

My sketch of the four conceptions of reality is before you. I have tried to show you, by a comparison with the popular metaphysics of language, that all these conceptions are

efforts to be just to the same three fundamental and closely related motives. I have tried to show you that the four conceptions are themselves not mere theories, but general, /102/ and in one sense intensely practical attitudes towards life. I have meant to remind you that a metaphysical theory is also an ethical resolution, – a resolution to deal with the whole of life so or so, and that in consequence the metaphysical conceptions have also been contributions and elements in the whole spirit of civilization. And finally I have wanted as a mere matter of technical study, to remind you that you cannot understand a philosopher if you merely ask what object he supposes to be real, but that in addition you must know what he means by Reality.” [END of document 10 in folder 3 of Box 105]

At pages 100-102, near the close, Royce seems to be making an important “confessional statement,” since he speaks of “the preservation for humanity of a faith in the meaning of life.” (100) In it, he calls his four Conceptions of Being “not mere theories, but general, and in one sense intensely practical attitudes towards life.” – “resolutions to deal with the whole of life in a definite way, which have ‘consequences’ for the development or hindrance of ‘the spirit of civilization’.” [102]

Evaluation: Royce’s “A Critical Study of Reality” has already been published in *Transactions*. Nevertheless, some of the most striking passages from this present MS are significant, e.g., (89) Kant’s 3rd conception of Being; (98) on various degrees of reality possessed by various minds; (100) pragmatic element in each of the four conceptions of Being; (100a) Royce’s view of the long-range civilizing mission of his “synthetic idealism” founded on his 4th Conception of Being; and (101) Royce’s own summary of this valuable MS (Box 105, folder 3, document 10).

209. Cambridge Conferences: “Aspects of Social Psychology” (1898) Box 70

Regarding these lectures in Box 70, Royce writes on a scrap of paper between the first and sixth lectures:

“Cambridge Conferences. ’98. Sixth Lecture. Other lectures except the first of this series of Cambridge Conf. adapted from the 97-8 course of lectures to teachers.”

Interestingly, while Royce delivered these lectures (from February 6 to March 4, 1898), C. S. Peirce was delivering his famous Cambridge lectures, “Reasoning and the Logic of Things,” February 16 – March 7, 1898. Royce would have attended the Peirce lectures, as well as giving his own.

Pages 1 to 8 of Lecture VI form a good summary of Royce’s entire Cambridge Conference series, lectures that are “largely addressed to teachers.” (page 1, Lecture 1)

Lecture I:

In HARP, we have a text of 51 pages (pages numbered up to 45, with the addition of 21a-e), a mixture of manuscript and typescript.

Typescript: 1-21

MS: 21a-e

Typescript: 22-29

MS: 29 (at bottom) to 45.

Again, a distinctive three-hole punched paper characterizes these pages.

This lecture was delivered February 6, 1898. (Pencil note at the top of page one.)

FMO notes from 1968, expurgated:

In this lecture, Royce rises to a new clarity when expressing his view of the ethical individual – not considered atomistically, but as he is, in the moral fate of unity with the world life in its universality (35) and in the divine order as intelligible only in ethical unity with the divine life (44). Here Royce also seems to reveal the poverty of his potentially rich ethical view. For, as regards the universal flood of human misery (whose members we as men are or may be called to serve), he hardly hints that “the Most Intimate Ethical Individual” may be offering humans both repentance towards a salvific return to ethical unity with the divine life and also living charity towards all Selves – human and divine. [An “ethical hymn,” potentially rich and dynamic.]

[FMO Notes:

- Royce here speaks for the first time, to my knowledge, of the ethical individual *as an ideal*, using the term “ideal” in the most concrete of senses, in a very uncommon usage. *See e.g.* page 22: “the [finite] spirit is to be an ideal.” This theme occurs at least one or two other times here. **NB:** An individual’s freedom lies in his “independence to initiate values.” (24, end)
- Royce concludes facing the key problem of this period in his thought: What is the true relation of the Individual to the Universe? (45)
- Clearest expression FMO has encountered of Royce’s giving primacy to ethics over metaphysics. (23, bottom)
- Superb focusing on the concrete ways of building community via loyalty, with an emphasis that shows how central discernment is to this loyalty. (28-29) To be taken with page 12 on union of sacral-secular.
- How “socially-saturated” man is – wombed by various kinds of community (6) **(Is this parallel to the mother-child cameo of the Fiske MS in Box 72, document 1, page 38?)**
- Royce voices (doesn’t necessarily adopt) the 18th century enlightenment position: “The development of free ethical individuality is all the freer, so say such minds, when we no longer look to the ghosts or to the gods, to nature or even to the absolute, to help you out.” (20) **NB:** Royce only inserted “even” in ink before “to the absolute” *after* the text was typed. He perhaps gives a clue of seeing the Absolute as itself a Form that he is already starting to transcend in 1898.
- Royce’s summary of Kant’s ethical individual: “Nothing determines for him good or evil save his own will.” (21, bottom) This will makes him a denizen of an eternal world. In this article Royce surely shows many of Howison’s ideas.
- Where lies the “deepest problem of this modern culture”? Not in deciding “about the truth of this or that religious or scientific creed. It lies in the definition of the fundamental ethical conceptions themselves upon which this modern culture is based.” (21) Royce’s big point is that dangers come from so focusing on this ethical individual as

to detach him from community with all men, based on his ethical unity with the divine.]

The following notes reflect FMO's 12/2/08 "precis-making" project for these lectures (in contrast to his 1968 hunt for striking quotes):

Royce offers lectures to teachers here and so turns from philosophy to psychology. (1) But he wants to present these ideas to such people as are somewhat more than ordinarily interested in mental cultivation and in the search for the meaning of ethical and metaphysical study. (2-4) He distinguishes the question of the origin of an idea from the question of its meaning and value. The first question is psychological and can influence a philosopher's quest of the second question. Royce will start seeking the origin of such ideas as Self, Neighbor, Nature, Spirit, Conscience, Duty, and Good. Later he will search for the meaning and value of these ideas. But notice that all of these ideas are products of the social conditions in which we were trained. (6)

Referring to Ibsen, Royce contrasts the primitive man from the present-day citizen. We think that because of his unpredictable situation the primitive savage found nature having its ghosts. But we have our own "ghosts of modern civilization," i.e. our inner realm. (8) Most of all we need clarity regarding the life of the spirit, what its constitution is and what it means.

Autobiographical sketch of Royce in 1898, on the reading of Vierkandt, a student of Wilhelm Wundt, on the difference between nature people and culture people. Royce uses the contrast between primitive and modern man to stress the concept of purpose-seeking as the mark of the modern man; i.e., his continuity in conscious seeking. That's why the modern man is "at heart and above all, a teleologist." (10-11) Royce then introduces the contrast of the Western modern individual with the Oriental Muslim and Vedantist. In brief, only by abolishing the individual do typical oriental individualists "save" the individual. The Muslim is totally subject to the infinite ruler. The Vedantist is subject to the world as illusion. By contrast, modern Western man has by some ethical doctrine something that makes the moral individual central as regards finding value in the universe. (11)

Royce marks his presentation of oriental civilization as unfair to the special complexities of the life in question. (13)

Three stages in human evolution: 1) the wandering stage of the primitive (a stage which moves into the agricultural), 2) the stage in which some idea of humanity develops, commerce and industrial arts as well as science, and 3) the stage of the growth of the moral individual.

Example: the people of Israel didn't have an *individual* goal. The relation to the ethical culture is what marks the European mind. Righteousness becomes extremely social in its ideals. All these things form the ideal of our modern, Western culture. However, modern civilization has created a peculiarly pathetic sense, namely, the despairing individual not at home in his own universe.

“[M]odern civilization, in creating the ideal of the ethical individual, often seems to those who feel its problems as if it had merely created the individual as a spoke out of a wheel, or as a dew-drop in a desert, with no shining sea to slip into, for in precisely this way there comes home to us the peculiar modern problem of the genuine meaning of individuality.” (16) Royce questions whether a background in ethical individualism is truly adequate. (17) He asks about five questions to show the inadequacy. Royce credits Christianity with interest in the individual’s own growth, the need of righteousness as the product of active organization and social interaction, as well as the relation of an individual to an unseen world.

But the 18th century enlightenment creates skepticism about the supernatural dimension of faith. The gods had disappeared from the scene in contemporary times, especially as regards immortality of the soul. The very truth of traditional faith was questioned in the aftermath of the enlightenment.

Royce runs through the effects of Kant and Fichte regarding the concept of ethical life being primary. “[T]he freely reasonable ethical individual of the Kantian type knows no fatal necessity and no abiding law but the self-made law of his reason.” (21)

The objection from post-enlightenment is answered this Kantian way: “the moral will makes the common man, taken just as he is, the denizen of an eternal world, of which his physical life is a mere shadow.” 21b-21c) “[T]he ethical aspect is morally free.” (21c)

Royce finds the essence of “modern culture declines to take the usual Oriental attitude. The ethical individual remains central, sacred, defiant of fate, strenuous, infinitely valuable.” (21e) But all of this evokes the deepest problem of modern culture. (21f) The question of conscious aim (of choosing a goal) comprises the whole significance of life.

For the modern western mind, we must assert the primacy of the ethical somewhere against the theoretical, and declare that the value of the individual would remain what it is even if there were no certainty as to the relation between nature and the moral world. “Or better, it must be possible in the end rather to deduce your theory of the world from your ethics, rather than to make your ethics depend upon your pre-conceived view of fate, of Karma, or God.” (23) **NB:** note the utterly radical nature of the ethical in Royce.

Royce shows himself to be heavily influenced by Vierkandt in this period. The key question is: what makes the ethical individual? With the external law so subject to natural law (determinism, etc.). He points to Browning as an example of extreme ethical individualism. Royce points to the objection that this is too extreme a view. Royce says this leads into the need for a social approach. What value you have must take into consideration your relation to others. (26) “Try as you will to realize individuality; you can only do so when first you have conquered what now proves to be, in view of your human relations, your ethical fate!” (27) Key line: “As an ethical being your fate lies in the fact that you are a man amongst men, and that these other men need you.”

Royce addresses the problem of how many lives are meaningless. In misery-filled humanity, what is your task? Royce wants to make life more unified, clear, connected and organized. The goal lies “in faithfulness, simply in finding any tie, any relationship, any office, however humble, such as brings light, makes definite, the life of your fellows, gives harmony and organization, increases instead of decreasing the tie that binds men together.” (28) The question is how the ethical individualist should take into account and respond to the social dimension. He must relate to the unity of life. For we are all products of our social conditions. (31-32)

Ethical fate: the individual has no value save in service. (35)

Royce draws to a close with this question: “It is the problem: who and what is the individual man, viewed as a conscious and an ethical being and how is he related to the life of society?” (39-40) “I regard the ethical individual as, in the natural order, a product of social conditions, and as, in the divine order, a being unintelligible apart from his ethical unity with the divine life.” (43-44)

At the end, Royce leads into using the social factor lectures.

Evaluation: The lecture style forces Royce to be redundant and almost boring. Yet this lecture is of great importance as Royce portrays the evolutionary development of humanity. He shows more receptivity to Vierkandt, the student of the role of culture in shaping of humanity, than any Royce scholar has yet pointed out. Toward the end, Royce lets the problem of evil enter the scene. But for the time being, he confronts the problem with the faith that has made European culture what it is. Royce raises the key problem: can an ethical individual be moral without living moral relations to the whole of the universe, including the whole of humanity.

This lecture is significant, *qua* philosophical content, several points higher than do most of the Social Factors lectures. Yet it requires severe pruning to make it an attractive read.

Lectures II-V:

Per Royce’s own note (located between lectures one and six), Lectures II-V of this series were derived from his 20th Century Club Lectures to Teachers (1898). (*See supra*)

Lecture VI:

The 40-page text is a combination of typescript and manuscript (1-27 are typescript; 28-40 are manuscript). This seems to be the *final* lecture, given Royce’s presentation (9). Both the typescript and manuscript pages are heavily edited.

FMO notes from 1968:

- Pages 1-2: Royce is basically accepting the main thrust of Comte in his law of the 3 stages of the development of consciousness – from primitive, through a religion of universal law, to rational explanation of philosophy (ethical idealism). (??)
- Pages 1-8: The first pages are a good summary of the entire Cambridge Conference

- series.
- Page 3: The role of “Christian conceptions” heavily stressed in 1898 upon European development to an ageric (moral) self in service to community. This is 15 years before his *Problems of Christianity* study of the three central Christian ideas.
 - Pages 12-13. How Royce handles the objection “Does the Self cease when we are asleep” -- treats it with a certain disdain for missing the question and overemphasizing a condition – bodily energies – into a permanent essential part of the Self; and while granting very great limitations of our conscious-”seeing” of what our selves are in contrast to what they are aiming to become, he rejects the idea of the true self as extending to any wholly unconscious realm – or as involving the existence of any mere dead thing called a soul. (paraphrase of page 13)
 - Pages 17-18: Royce speaks of the whole universe as one’s “ideal comrade.”
 - Page 20 (bottom): Here Royce strikes an important element in what late Teilhard will call the “law of union”: the more contrast you establish between selves, the more meaningful is the life had. – The “*them*” is repeated at least on pages 29 and 40.
 - Page 23: **NB:** Royce building-in of Community into **Individuality**.
 - “Individuality is indeed sacred; but if you need at least two individuals, real or ideal, in order to get a consciousness of individuality, then the sacredness belongs to the situation in question, and consequently to both the individuals in common, and not to either of them alone. Here lies the fundamental basis, not only for a general objection to every form of anarchism, but also for a specific criticism of countless modern ethical attempts which depend upon taking an individual alone by himself and then considering him as an isolated but still sacred ethical being.”

Description from 2008:

Pages 1-9 are a careful and important summary of the three stages of evolving consciousness and of human civilization: (1) a savage stage, (2) Oriental civilization, with its “absorption of the individual into the infinite,” and (3) the mediation of Christian ideas with the emphasis on individual dignity, the rise of the concept of the moral individual as leading into the modern age. Royce states that today we suffer a chaotic understanding of the individual because it often leads to pessimism, anarchy and sentimentalism. Thus, our problem is: “what is the true nature and meaning of moral individuality.”

Royce refers to the previous Lecture V (of which we do not have a MS) and notes that he ended by arriving at “the moral meaning of individuality,” which involved the Self’s relation to others, the social dimension. He lists a handful of social motives relating to this.

But these stages of “human consciousness” are currently confronted with the problem of determinism in the natural sciences and the role of freedom in the moral individual.

Royce again refers back to Lecture V, recalling his description of the conscience as either “a certain ideal comrade” or “an impersonal alter who sets before one a plan of harmonizing” all of his various interests. (8) By doing so, Royce begins to describe an ideal community: “[A]lso infinitely winning ideal of an organized, complete and thoroughly human existence, – an existence supremely social, and supremely individual. With the conception of conscious

conscience the idea of the moral ego, of the ethical individual is at last formed.” (8)

[NB: Royce’s interest in “windows to the East” here in 1898, at least in his awareness of the “Oriental mind” taken largely in its Hindu version.]

At page 9, Royce focuses on the Lecture VI material by applying the whole course up to that point to the problems posed at the start of Lecture I. He notes the vague understanding that most people have of the Self and its meaning. He says of himself “I am only my actual or possible, my present, past, or future, or otherwise genuine conscious states, ideas, deeds, and life.” (9) There is nothing like a “soul-substance,” only the Self of Royce is found in his past, present, future, or his ideal Self, when “I manage to fulfill the purpose of my life.” (10) He contrasts himself with a cobblestone, since the moral individual differs from the cobblestone by his *esse* which is explicitly his *percipi* [echo of Bishop Berkeley], “namely his presence as a conscious fact, from the point of view of some higher or lower consciousness, human or divine.” (10)

This means that there is no soul substance or soul thing, and that an infant child has as yet no Self. It’s just a “chance ego” having some contrast effects, but not yet a moral self. “For my part I care nothing for the question often raised as to whether the Self exists when one is asleep, or is deranged.” (12)

Having given a psychological view, Royce moves to emphasize the meaning of our ethical individuality. The whole notion of individuality is based on social contrast. And contrast implies not mere difference, but in general organic relationship. “You can only contrast objects when you see that they are much alike.” (17/18) Too many views of the individual have forgotten the fact that the individual exists only by virtue of contrast. “And is not contrast the very basis of insight, and so of wisdom?” (19/20) Thus, moral selfhood and moral individualism get their meaning by virtue of contrast effects. (This leads to consideration of one’s uniqueness in contrast with other human selves.)

On page 22 ff., Royce delves deeper into the concept of moral individuality. At page 28, he goes into the question “what is this individuality?” – it has to do with a contrast with a social or with an ideal environment. He talks about one’s individuality with the metaphor of sunlight and a diamond (reflections) but recognizes that this is a misleading metaphor, as the individual is in fact a small sun, not only reflects with his own light, but beams with his own glow, given the divine light within him. “The life of the absolute, I take it, is not merely a monotonous series of illustrations of formal laws, but is a significant expression of an Absolute Will. Universal laws are expressed in the word, but are expressed by and for the sake of this Will.” (30-31)

At pages 31-32: “But the unique life of the absolute, which is this and no other, which wills, in its wholeness, this and no other world, is a whole of many aspects of many consciously contrasting regions of life, and for that very reason of many individual lives, and each of these individual selves is as just this part or region of just this whole life, itself unique as the whole is unique, itself this case of free choice as the whole world is an expression of a divinely free choice.” (31-32)

At page 32: Law is in the world, but the world is not a mere case of the law. For the world is an instance of artistically free expression of the divine will in accordance with law.

Evaluation: Royce's description of the **ethical self achieved through a consciousness of an ideal freely chosen and pursued**, and thus in some kind of community, and in increasing individuality, is very clearly portrayed here. However, Royce seems more than usually prolix.

210. "The Growth of the Social Mind" (1899) Box 91

A 29-page typescript, concluding with pages 30 to 38 in manuscript. In one sense, the MS is incomplete, ending with an outline for the completion of the lecture. The Outline: "Remedies."

A lecture to the Twentieth Century Club given in its 1899-1900 season. *Twentieth Century Club Bulletin*, Widener Library, U.S. 13186.20.62.

Not to be confused with the 10 lectures of 1898-99 to the same club on same topic the previous year. The topic of this lecture was suggested to him after he gave the lecture series the previous year.

Royce deals with the notion of "public mind" or public opinion. (page 3) "It is precisely the socially significant sources, laws, and results of these phenomena, precisely that interest the student of social psychology." (4)

"There is a mental life, that is not merely common to various men, but that is both due to their interaction, and significant especially in so far as it produces social results." (5) Royce cites language as another example of this phenomenon. The social mind means what is of interest to the social psychologist.

Section II: How does the social mind grow? Royce cautions that it is misleading to speak without qualification of the social mind as possessing inherited instincts. He does grant that a group has initial tendencies that are somewhat analogous to the instincts of the individual mind. But it is better to avoid the term "instinct." (12) Example: A club. Every member brings his tendencies, and this will affect the life of the club. If they're English, they won't have ignorance about club life.

Here we have the idea of club member *imitating* the tendencies of their previous life. However, the particular club or social group will show spontaneous changes from previous habits and tendencies. The purposes for which the club is founded also determine that social mind. The accidental combination of the members of the club give it a temperament that determine the future social life of the club. Out of this flow the distinctive activities of the club.

The club doesn't have sense. Sense experience is not part of club life. However, memories of things that happen, a club's activities, are remembered. Royce parenthetically says "The social mind of any group is not to be viewed as a metaphysical entity, but as a conveniently definable

unity characterized by the social significance of its processes and of their results.” (18) This is a kind of phenomenology of the club, but without going into the personality of the club, with a mind of its own. He leaves that aside.

The social mind is fed only by the communications made by its members, one individual to another. “No social experience is had apart from the social intercommunication of many individuals.” (19)

He looks to the work of Tarde, who puts imitation as crucial to social functioning in a group. He makes a side reference to Aristotle, and the *sensus communis* of an individual mind.

At page 24: we don’t just imitate, but develop our own sense of our individuality which creates a “gossiping effect,” which contributes to social growth.

Section III: When does this social mind become healthy and when does it become like a mob, irrational and destructive? He points to Le Bon on mob psychology. There is a large section on mob psychology in this essay.

Then he switches to positive and healthy social mind. How to guide such a mind is a critical question for modern democracy. [FMO note: this is perhaps the first time he has seen him talk about democracy.]

The individual should have maximum freedom. The majority ought to govern. Government by the people means by the social mind.

The question becomes, when they govern, will the people govern for the people? Exciting and leveling emotions are the basis of the real danger.

At the end of this essay, Royce merely outlines the remedies to these problems and considerations. In this sense, the essay is incomplete. He notes these four ideas:

- Giddings for a determination of mass action and individual reflection.
- Tarde in terms of the struggle for existence amongst imitations of individuals.
- Small groups do all the work.
- Socialism.

FMO analysis:

- Apparently, one of the rare instances when Royce looks at democracy.
- There is a protracted look at the psychology of the mob mind (caprice, violence, etc.), and an effort to start pointing out the needed remedies.
- Absent any references to the influence of the media in forming the social mind. But Royce hints at the importance of small discussion groups. But these can be just as important as the mob.

Evaluation: One of the more significant among Royce’s lectures on social consciousness.

211. Review
George Frederick Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*
***International Journal of Ethics*, 10 (1899-1900): 258-61.**

212. “The American University Gymnasium: Its Influence on Academic Life,”
***Alma Mater*, 17 (February 7, 1900): 135-38.**

The *Alma Mater* was published by Aberdeen University. Skrupskelis says that the construction of a central athletic facility was being discussed at the time. Royce was invited to speak on the role of gyms in American universities.

213. “The Pacific Coast, a Psychological Study of Influence,”
***International Monthly*, 2 (1900): 555-83.**

Reprinted in *Race Questions* as “The Pacific Coast: A Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilization.”

214. “Professor Everett as a Metaphysician,”
***The New World*, 9 (1900): 726-41.**

215. “The Recent University Movement in America,”
***Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society*, 3 (1900): 131-49.**

A speech given at Aberdeen on January 31, 1899 to the Society when Royce was in Aberdeen for the Gifford Lectures.

216. “Some Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization,”
***Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society*, 3 (1900): 194-217.**
Box 92

This address was delivered to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society in January 1900, then later published. Royce had addressed the Society the previous year on the topic “The Recent University Movement in America.” This address shows Royce’s practical doctrine on the factors and forces that build the common ideal past event or deed which is necessary for the development of community consciousness. Cf. *The Problem of Christianity* 253-71.

In Box 92, this 90 page MS has six sections marked, although Royce appears to have omitted a

section IV. The MS between Royce's handwriting, and the handwriting of a secretary or assistant (over which he makes edits in his own hand).

25, 26, 27, 28 on the same page. On this page, a section mark (V? II?) is crossed out, and section "III" is added.

55, 56, 57, 58 on the same page.

Royce also refers to the Second Boer War, which occurred between 1899 and 1902.

This address is *toto caelo* different from "Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America".

Introduction:

[Royce addresses a philosophical society at night in what seems to be Scotland, perhaps St. Andrews or, less probably, Aberdeen. There is a possibility this might be given at Oxford. *Cf.* the frequent references to Empire.] Royce refers to a crisis that is later identified (on page 24) as the Boer War.

Royce sees himself and his audience as "servants of human civilization." (4a) Royce speaks of himself and his audience "as near to each other, not only in blood, but in their whole spiritual kinship as are America and Great Britain. (3-4)

Section I:

Royce feels as if he is at home among his true brethren. Addresses his topic, namely, the characteristic tendencies of British civilization in the 19th century in contrast with American tendencies. Royce views the "American tendency" as one of assimilation of "our foreigners" and "strangers upon our shores." Royce viewed this assimilation as linguistic, political and moral.

Section II:

Royce discusses the Civil War. At page 18, he recounts his own visit:

"A few years ago, during a vacation, I made a visit to some of the best known, and tragically remembered, of our Southern battlefields. In many places, even where little local attention has been devoted to preserving the traces of the old conflicts, or to setting up monuments to mark historic spots, one still finds the original lines of earthen works, about which, in some cases, young forests of pines have now sprung up, half hiding the signs of the days of bloodshed and of patriotic devotion. Here brave men and true fought, sometimes for days in succession, and often apparently useless struggles, which for the time decided nothing, but led to new and equally stubborn conflict elsewhere concerning dangers and defense of all that their hearts held dearest, and in the furious hatred that only brethren can know when they war together. Yet now, when one wanders in the solitude under the warm Southern sky, and amongst the young pines, whose roots grow through the banks of the old entrenchments or whose branches overshadow, in the cemetery nearby, the graves of the dead, it is indeed a comforting thought to remember, with reverence for all those who died there, that they died not in vain, that their devotion has led to the solving of the old problems, and to the coming of a new life which none of them could have foreseen, This address shows Royce's practical doctrine on the factors and forces that build the common ideal past event or deed which is necessary for the development of community consciousness. *Cf. The Problem of Christianity* 253-71.

to the passing away of much that was narrower, and to the higher consciousness of a more united civilization. The descendants of those foemen will not retain the old hatreds. They will honor each other the more because the fathers knew so well how to die for ideals. Had not both sides been so much in earnest, there would be today far less hope for our common country, for our race, and for our type of civilization.

“And so, when the frivolities and the frequent social ills that are indeed present in some aspects of our national life sometimes sadden us Americans, the memory of the Civil War always helps us to look deeper, to know that the most formidable appearances of weakness of character which we can observe, are but superficial symptoms, and that at bottom our people are the inheritors of the blood and of the traditions of the men of ’61. In brief, our war, just because it had to be fought out to a finality, resulted in attainments which our civilization could never have won without it. No desire for a renewal of any of its most essential issues survives amongst us in the mind of people whose feelings are of any serious social or national significance. The future of the American Negro is still a great problem; but nobody desires to see him again a slave, or seriously wishes the old slavery days back again. The Southerner, as I have said, is still as proud of his history, including that of the Civil War, as ever he was. But nobody genuinely desires any form of revenge, or keeps alive the sentiments that inspired the conflict. The South has still a keen and common political consciousness, and votes, where national issues are concerned, in a decidedly sectional fashion; but the honor and the deeper unity of the nation are today as clear to the former Confederate, as to his New England brother. In brief, the outcome of our greatest national crisis, and of one of the bitterest and most stubbornly contested of all modern conflicts, has been, not separation, not yet mere conquest, nor even prolonged hatreds, but national unity, a satisfied sense of historic honor in the minds of all those most concerned on both sides, a deep lesson in the seriousness of national life, – a record of devotion, – And, above all, the outcome has been a measure of true assimilation of North and of South without any merely destructive confusion or simple mingling of their types of civilization. For these types still preserve a certain wholesome individuality at the same time when they contribute to the life of one nation.” (18-22)

Royce goes on to compare the dedication and the sufferings of American Civil War people with the British losses sustained in the Boer War. “Your Empire might become not only the protector of alien subjects, but the assimilator of men of kindred blood, and the object of a common loyalty even to those who now perhaps fail to comprehend their true share in your destiny. You have often carried power, protection, and order, into remote regions. May you in future more and more fully knit together your Empire by the ties of a conscious community of ideas, of interests, and of civilization. May your wars end in liberty and in future brotherhood.” (24)

Contrast this Roycean way of speaking to his Tremont Temple addresses against the “Huns,” and how Anglo-Americans are assumed to have a destiny then which he then (WWI) expands to include the Teutonic forces. Also, the “hatred that only bretheren can know” finds a parallel with Royce’s later tension with German people. Through tremendous sufferings, unity can be born.

Section III:

Royce continues with examples of how the “assimilating tendencies of our American civilization” have manifested themselves.” (28) Royce addresses issues of linguistic assimilation, the issue of the Catholic Church and specific immigrant populations (Irish, German, Polish, Italian, etc.) In the discussion, Royce maintains the balance between unique individuality and community. Royce shows himself knowledgeable of the inner tensions of the Catholic

community, particularly its leaders, on questions of public versus parochial schools, the issue of language in assimilation, and the issue of overcoming ethnic churches. Royce contrasts the U.S. Catholic Church with the French Canadian Church, e.g. the latter's use of excommunication. (33-37)

The issue of provincialism, the uniqueness of communal regional identity, was taken up earlier in *RQP*.

[The section "IV" mark is missing, therefore we cannot tell whether the above material was intended for Section IV, or if there is merely a mistake in numeration.]

Section V:

[This section begins in the handwriting of an assistant or secretary. The MS is not, at this point, in Royce's handwriting. Pages 40 to 53 in the non-Roycean hand. Royce's handwriting picks up again for two pages 54-55(58). Then Section VI returns to the Secretary's hand, 59 to 69. Royce's hand begins again at this point, page 70, to the end of the manuscript.]

In Section V, Royce now turns to more general issues of assimilation, and the means by which assimilation may be accomplished. He first addresses physical causes and then ideal causes. He points out that they come, to a large extent, from English origin, especially in political and social life. [Royce edits the secretary's text with notes in his own handwriting.] Some specific influences: the English system of the colonies, the Anglo-Saxon language.

Royce compares Brett Harte's account to the shepherd/shepherdess theme in romantic poetry.

Royce describes the social and economic conditions of a variety of miners (including South American and Chinese immigrants) coming to California in 1849 (45-47). He describes the effort to have California admitted to the Union, and the drafting of its Constitution. The general traits of California culture become predominantly. Royce states that Mexican culture became a "romantic memory." "[T]he great masses of foreign newcomers had wholly been subordinated to the American way."

Then, at page 51, Royce shifts to personal memories to illustrate the social condition of California. The mining community he describes as being five years older than himself. Royce expands his references in his autobiographical sketch, viewing Grass Valley as simultaneously old community and a new community. On page 52, especially, Royce elaborates on the sense of tradition (the "old") in a new community, via teaching of Anglo history, and the institutions of schools and families and churches. His mind as a child is structured as well by non-local, national current events, e.g. the Civil War. Royce uses Grass Valley as an example of the dynamics that underlie assimilation.

Section VI:

In conclusion, Royce focuses on precisely how Americans have so successfully assimilated into a strong national consciousness. This force of assimilation has become irresistible because (1) America hasn't to grow in separated parts, like the British colonies, and (2) Americans haven't been greatly concerned about the influence of foreigners, assuming foreigners respected

American customs.

Royce talks about Chicago as being an almost too diverse melting pot (noting that there needs to be a balance between divisive political controversies, and unifying cultural elements).

Royce stresses the power and important role of English ideas to unify the American civilization. The determination to keep tolerance alive is crucial.

Royce notes the most important institutions in extending the American civilization have been churches, law courts and schools. (63) Also, Royce cites “journals” (*The Atlantic*, e.g.) for promoting public sentiment in response to political questions. (64) Royce strikes out the following line regarding the press: “the popular newspapers and our worst type are not great political powers and even they” on page 65.

Royce by looking ahead to what the 20th century might bring, and wonders as to revolutionary rumblings (Russia). But whether revolution comes or not, the “past unifications of industries leads to both direct and indirect results which certainly tend to the absorption of the foreign peoples, to making them part of our system.” Citing his own talk to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society the year before, Royce again points out that “without organized learning our national ideal could not prosper.”

Royce notes the consciousness of humanity through the prospering of science and the liberal arts is a key to the English tradition (69-71). Royce goes on to contrast political ties with the “invisible ties of the Spirit” as the basis of Empire. Royce proposed that his audience consider two propositions: (1) Have you seen how your educational system affects the social consciousness of the Empire? and (2) Imperial unity demands unity of educational systems, and not mere legislative enactment. Royce implies a system of secular cultural missionaries, in which teachers go out in the Empire to effect this unity.

Royce asks whether their public understands political unity as depending more on assimilation than political power. Royce takes this position: “Where the ideas are, there, in the long run, is the power also.” (79) Royce closes with an un-cited Sienkiewicz reference, noting philosophy’s purpose to be “the strengthening of hearts,” and not mere intellectual endeavor. (*cf.* his “Author’s Preface” in *The Problem of Christianity*.)

Evaluation: Certain sections reveal Royce’s practical dynamics for building community, his appreciation of Anglo-Saxon culture in American life, despite his recognition of the German University’s work, and his recognition of the importance of the power of ideas over the material factors of civilization.

217. “Activity”

Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)

218. “Agreement”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
219. “All”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
220. “Analogy”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
221. “Analogy of Experience”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
222. “Apprehension”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)

Page proof may be found in Box 103, folder 12.

223. “Autonomy”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
224. “Category”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
225. “Greek Terminology (considered in relation to Greek philosophy)”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)

226. “History of Philosophy” (with John Dewey)
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
227. “Individual”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
228. “Individuality”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
229. “Kant’s Terminology”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
230. “Latin and Scholastic Terminology: with reference principally to the *Patristic* and *Scholastic* philosophy and to *Thomism*.”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901)
231. “Hegel’s Terminology”
Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901) 1:454-65.
Box 52 (*cf.* Box 101, folder 6)

Published in Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901) 1:454-65. See *Letters* 358-60, Royce to Baldwin, June 20, 1897. Royce contributed about a dozen articles for the dictionary. (See *Letters* 360 n.185; *BWJR* 2:1204 at 1.) This letter indicates he is working on those contributions at this time.

Note: *Cf.* Box 101 folder 6, which contains a small notebook titled in Royce’s hand: “Notes on the Vocabulary of Hegel.” This notebook, of approximately 30 unnumbered pages, may well parallel some of the language of the eventual *DPP* dictionary entry. Certainly the same subject matter is considered. The notebook is not dated. Uncertain of the basis for the archivist’s date estimate of 1892-95.

The archivist estimated the date of this MS in Box 52 as 1892-95. This seems uncertain without further evidence.

The *DPP* version ends with a glossary of terms. No evidence of a glossary in Royce’s text. Royce’s initials appear at the end of the article *before* the glossary, not after.

In the *DPP* version of this article, the word count is approximately 8,800 words. The Box 52 Royce MS (178 pages) the word count is approximately 18,700 words. Great reduction was achieved.

In Box 52, MS originally of 178 pages, the following pages are missing: 1, 4-6, 8-31, 36-38, 44-46, 54, 56, 57, 60-77, 79-89, 146-160. As it is found in HARP this is, therefore, a highly fragmented MS. There are notably few extensively continuous sections.

The first lengthy continuous section occurs at pages 90 to 145. This lengthy fragment includes the end of section VI, and the whole of sections VII and VIII. Section IX begins, but breaks off incomplete at 145. The second lengthy section begins at 161 and continues to the end of the MS (178). It begins with Section X.

A comparison of the HARP MS with *DPP*'s text of "Hegel's Terminology" article follows:

On page 2 of the HARP MS, we have one phrase that parallels the published text. But then the versions diverge. This suggests a severe reduction of the MS before printing. A search for further parallels between the HARP MS and *DPP* version proved fruitless. No further exact parallels were found. The *DPP* version often contains the same material discussed in the HARP MS, but not in Royce's detail and style.

Hypothesis about reconstructing Royce's 178 page MS. Since the two longest continuous sections of the HARP MS in Box 52 are both dedicated to the terminology of Hegel's *Logik*, it seems that the earlier parts of this MS that were heavily excerpted concerned Hegel's terminology in *The Phenomenology*. For Royce judged *The Phenomenology* as more important than *The Logik* to grasp the "genuine mind and heart" of Hegel.

[Section I HARP MS: section marking missing; probably on page 1.]

Page one is missing in the HARP MS. In Baldwin's *Encyclopedia*, 1:254, col. B, the text up to page 2 of the HARP MS reads as follows:

"I. GENERAL NATURE AND ORIGIN OF HEGEL'S TERMINOLOGY.

Amongst the thinkers who, since Aristotle, have undertaken to work out a relatively independent terminology adequate to the complexity and to the organization of a complete philosophical system, Hegel occupies a very prominent place. His terms are chosen on the whole, with a very careful regard to his own central theories. They are in a number **of instances, decidedly novel.**" [bolding added; these bolded words begin page 2 of the HARP MS.]

The only other remaining pages of Section 1 in the HARP MS are pages 3 and 7.

[Sections II-VI HARP MS: section markings are missing in the HARP MS]

[Section III: section marking missing in MS]

On page 40 of the HARP MS, Royce refers to section III, saying, "(see above, in III, what has been said as to the second form of the dialectic method)."

Thus, section IV has occurred before page 40 of the HARP MS.

Section VII (pages 98-115) “The Categories of Mediation in the First Section of the Logic.”

Section VIII: (115-137) “The Categories of Mediation in the Second Section of the Logic.”

Section IX (137- 145) “The Categories of Mediation in the Third Division of the Logic.”
This section breaks off incomplete at 145.

Section X (161-178) “The Terminology of the Divisions of the System Subsequent to the Logic. [subtitle:] A. The Psychological Terminology.”

At 161, the final section, section X begins. The text begins “To follow Hegel’s system into the details of its special doctrines outside [on to 162] of the Logic, is here impossible. The principal terminology of the system and also its total impression of the universe have now been expounded. It remains here to state only a few characteristic usages of terms in Hegel’s other works.”

[At this point, Royce continues his overall study of the usages of Hegel’s psychological terminology, which had started in *The Phenomenology*, and then continued in *The Philosophy of Spirit*, and *The Encyclopedia* to Hegel’s other works.]

General First Impressions:

The editor of the published article in *DPP* seems to have focused readers’ attention on Hegel’s usage of terms in the *Logik* rather than following Royce’s lead of emphasizing the usages of terms in Hegel’s first work *The Phenomenology*. For even the *DPP* article describes Royce’s preference of terminology in *The Phenomenology* as follows:

“At the point where we first meet with Hegel’s technical vocabulary in any really free expression, viz. in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), it appears very fully developed, although not as rich as later in the *Logik*. In the former work, some of the categories (e.g. *Wirklichkeit*, as opposed to *Dasein*, *Sein*, &c.) are not uniformly used in the pregnant sense later obtaining, and a certain number of vaguer or of more poetically formed terms or phrases do not later reappear; while, on the other hand, the relative poverty of the categories of the *Phänomenologie* has been a frequent topic of complaint, especially amongst the Hegelian critics of that work.” [*DPP* 1:455 col. A]

Who is the editor of the *DPP* article? Cf. William James letter to John Mark Baldwin.

Tentative Conclusion:

- (1) The fact that the published article does not distinguish Hegel’s terminology as used in *The Phenomenology* and as used in *The Logik* -- something Royce does in this HARP MS -- suggests a radical rewrite and abbreviation by some editor for the *DPP* version of “Hegel’s Terminology.”

- (2) The fact that although the same Hegelian ideas and terms are discussed in both the HARP MS and the *DPP* article, but rarely in the same language, again suggests two different writers, Royce and an editor skilled at condensing a vast manuscript.

Evaluation: Even though this particular MS (Box 52) is highly fragmented because of the many missing pages (apparently extracted by Royce), the existing major fragments in Royce's version of "Hegel's Terminology" on *The Logic* are significant, especially HARP MS pages 98-178.

**232. "John Fiske: His Work as a Philosophical Writer and Teacher,"
Boston Evening Transcript, July 13, 1901;
Harvard Graduate's Magazine 10 (1901-02): 23-33.
Box 72**

The *Harvard Graduate's Magazine* article revises the *Transcript* article. This printed text precedes two addresses he gave concerning Fiske listed below. It is not clear where he gave the address reprinted in the *Transcript*. We have not been able to locate the MS for this piece in HARP.

After these publications, Royce drafted an address given to two groups: the Ethical Society in Philadelphia, November 10, 1901. He then presented it (with revisions) as a Memorial Address before the Brooklyn Institute December 11, 1901. The MS for these addresses is found in Box 72, and is titled simply "John Fiske." This MS does not seem to have been published. It is much longer than the article in the *Harvard Graduate's Magazine*.

The Box 72 MS and the printed articles do not resemble each other. While this manuscript does not correspond to the introduction Royce wrote to the four-volume Fiske work *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, he does use parts of this manuscript in the introduction. The autobiographical information at page 6a, for instance, corresponds precisely to his *Outlines* introduction (page xxxii and following of the Introduction), with minor edits, and some paragraphs from the manuscript not appearing in the printed introduction. Unfortunately, pages 6d-f, in which the manuscript parallels the introduction, are missing.

In the manuscript, Royce gives autobiographical information (at pages 6h-6i) about his relationship with Fiske that does not appear to be found in the printed Introduction.

I remember that, upon my own first meeting with him in the summer of 1877, when as a student I visited Cambridge in order to carry on some research work in the library, Fiske, to whom I had a letter of introduction said, as he welcomed me to the Library, and granted me every possible privilege, that he felt himself already growing rusty regarding philosophical studies. His work as Librarian, he said, was absorbing. He could not foresee when the time would come to return to his former plans of work. As a fact, he was destined never to return to them in the sense that he himself desired.

The 65 pages includes 6a-6o; Royce numbers his last page "50." The 15 page insertion (6a-6o) deals with Fiske's life. Manuscript pages 6d-f are missing.

Royce closes, in the last 14 pages of the MS, with “the four ethical lessons that Fiske most frequently draws from his study and interpretation of the evolutionary process.” Fiske’s work attempts to apply Darwin’s theory of evolution to the development of man’s spiritual consciousness. (*Life* 258).

1. The first of those lessons deals with the question of how maternal love and paternal love of parents for children came about in evolution, and sees this as a central concern for Fiske (pages 36-39 of the MS). **This topic is worthy of inclusion in the *Critical Edition*.** It is not included in the printed piece in *Harvard Graduate’s Magazine*.

2. The second lesson deals with the sterner aspects of loyalty, courage on behalf of the greater good of the clan.

3. The third lesson deals with how the development of reasonableness leads to the rise of religion, philosophy and science and a concern for the whole cosmos.

4. The fourth lesson is that progress toward the ideal is only made step by step: “The Ideal can win its way only by continuous and deliberate processes.” (page 48, MS)

Evaluation: The *Critical Edition* board should consider including this article, given Royce’s relationship with Fiske, and his commitment to Fiske’s work (*see* “Introduction” to Fiske’s 4 volume *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy* below).

233. “Joseph LeConte,”
***International Monthly*, 4 (1901): 324-34.**

Contains many autobiographical notes of Royce’s days as an undergraduate in LeConte’s classes.

234. “Recent Discussions of the Concept of the Infinite” (1902?)
Box 72

At one point, a 94-page MS, on almost all “fresh” (previously unused) sheets. This manuscript was apparently never published as written, but its contents were almost certainly employed to create the published article “The Concept of the Infinite” *Hibbert Journal* vol. 1 (1902): 21-45. (*See* below.) Of the original 94 pages, only 50 pages remain here. Pages 29-50, 52-56, and 75-91 have been removed, no doubt in the service of the apparently non-extant MS of “The Concept of the Infinite.”

Given its apparent relation to the published *Hibbert Journal* piece, the date of “Recent Discussions of the Concept of the Infinite” is estimated at 1902. Several important notes may be made regarding the pages that remain in Box 72:

- At pages 1-8, Royce relates an autobiographical reference, writing of “one of the earliest

metaphysical experiences” of his life, when he was 9 or 10 years old. He reports his early dread and loneliness when confronted with thoughts of infinite space and time.

- The Question of the Infinite, he argues, is one concerning which philosophers need to listen to recent mathematicians.
- At pages 25-28, Royce gives a history of his study of the mathematics of the infinite, starting with Bolzano (1851), then Dedekind and Cantor, plus C. S. Peirce and more recently Schönfliess.

235. “The Concept of the Infinite” ***Hibbert Journal, 1 (1902): 21-45***

This is important for the **logic** people. The article is *not* included in *RLE*.

When he wrote this piece, Royce had recently completed his “Supplementary Essay” to *WI*:1, using his “new concept of the Infinite” for metaphysical purposes. In the present article, however, Royce states, “It is the logic and not the metaphysic of the problem of the Infinite that will here form my main topic.” (23)

The manuscript for this published piece does not seem to appear as such in HARP. As published, the piece has seven sections. The first footnote refers to *World and the Individual*: 1 & 2, and especially to the “Supplementary Essay” of volume 1. In that volume, he had used the concept of the Infinite as a core idea in his argument against F. H. Bradley.

Royce distinguishes two questions:

- a) What is our meaning of the infinite? He identifies this as a purely logical question.
- b) What grounds do we have for asserting that any thing is “infinite.” (23)

Royce treats only the first (“purely logical”) question in this article.

Royce says he writes this piece for an audience of students of “deeper theological problems.” (45)

Whereas in *WI* Royce had used the image of a map of England lying within a map, here he illustrates his idea of an infinite image with the example of a trademark advertisement that includes within itself the image of the trademark product. (27) He refers to such an image as a Self-Representative System *ad infinitum*. He then exposes the simple logic of the two features (the image and its representation) plus the executive order that carries out the representation. (28-29). Royce applies this Self-Representative System to the concept of the Self and to the concept of Divine Process in order to explore the concept of infinity.

236. “The Old and the New: A Lesson,”
University of California Chronicle, 2 (1902): 92-103

Rich autobiographical material.

Evaluation: Too lengthy for full inclusion in the *Critical Edition*. The autobiographical section(s), however, should be extracted and included in the *Critical Edition*.

237. “Provincialism: A Plea for Stronger Local Sentiment to Restrain National Heedlessness,”
Boston Evening Transcript (June 14, 1902): 32.
Provincialism: An Address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society of the State University of Iowa (Iowa City: State University of Iowa Press)

Reprinted with extensive additions as “Provincialism” in *Race Questions*.

Royce delivered this address at the commencement of the Iowa Alpha chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa in Iowa City on June 10, 1902. It was published in the *Boston Evening Transcript*, June 30, 1902 page 32. It was reprinted with extensive additions as “Provincialism” in *RQP*.

Royce’s additions to the *Transcript* text – some a sentence, some a paragraph, some two pages or more – suggest how much he has read and learned in the six years between 1902 and 1908 (the publication date of *RQP*). The additions occur as follows:

In 1909, Royce published another study entitled “Provincialism Based on Early Conditions in California,” *Putnam’s Magazine*, 7 (1909).

The *Transcript* article is titled: “Provincialism: A Plea for Stronger Local Sentiment to Restrain National Heedlessness.” It does not have numbered sections marked, as does the book. Small changes in diction and connectives are not indicated. The *RQP* edition has an introductory sentence lacking in the *Transcript* article: “I propose, in this address, to define certain issues ... Make both prominent and critical.” (57)

On page 58 of *RQP* the sentence “Thus the ‘provincialism’ applies ... maintains these habits” is added. Then, Royce inserts from “This word, however ... “ at the bottom of 58 to the top of 61 “... organized politically a province must be ...” as new material in *RQP*. Then the rest of *RQP* section 1 follows the *Transcript*.

The second paragraph of *Transcript* begins section II of the *RQP* chapter, without the *RQP* introductory sentences: “I have defined the term used as my title. But now in what sense do I propose to make provincialism our topic?”

In the *Transcript*, after the sentence ending “... able to fulfill (64 *RQP*), Royce deletes from *Transcript* the sentence: “For the great modern nation has developed new social dangers.” Several lines down, Royce deletes the clause “... in order to contend against these new social dangers” after the words “highly organized provincial life.” (64 *RQP*)

On page 65 *RQP*, Royce adds several sentences to *Transcript* text, after "... following discussion." These lines begin with "My main intention is ... in the wholesome sense provincial."

At the end of section II (page 66 *RQP*), after sentence ending "... henceforth grow together," Royce adds about 20 lines, to the end of section II (page 67 *RQP*).

Section III (sections are marked in the *Transcript* article with slash marks, but no numbers), begins with an extra phrase in *RQP*: "With this programme in mind ..."

On page 69 bottom, after "... for his community." Royce inserts one long sentence in *RQP* beginning "A sound instinct, therefore, ... The advantages of his community." to the *Transcript* text.

On page 70 top, after "... in my own state," Royce adds three sentences, beginning with "How swiftly.... History of our own." to the *Transcript* text.

On the bottom of 70, Royce adds "Such a foundation ... object of pride" (71) to the *Transcript* text.

On page 71, Royce adds sentence "In fact, that we all do thus glorify ... for ourselves."

At the bottom of 72, the *Transcript* article ends its section with "... the Australasian colonies." Royce adds to *RQP* a page and a half of text to finish the book's section III.

On page 75, Royce deletes from the *Transcript* text the sentence "The great modern nation expresses today far too much the results of such a process." To the *Transcript* text, Royce adds in *RQP* several sentences ("The independence of the small trader ... moral destiny as an individual." (76)

On page 78, at end of first paragraph (continued from previous page), Royce adds the sentence "Hence he tends to lose independence of spirit."

Royce ends section differently in *Transcript* and *RQP*. The differences occur at the bottom of page 79 in *RQP* after the sentence ending "... besetting his life at every turn."

Section V (page 80 *RQP*) adds text to *Transcript* article after "... may accomplish," through to "... Le Bon characterizes" on page 81.

Royce adds to the beginning of the first full paragraph on page 81 several sentences to the *Transcript* text, from "I use the term 'mob-spirit'..." to "... more strictly normal social activities." (82)

At the top of 84, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "... a helpless member," and up to "... or even of ignorant persons" on 85.

On page 86, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "... of the mob-spirit" and up to "They cannot be safe rulers." on page 87.

On page 89, Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text, after "... may get embodied," through page 90 and most of 91, up through "... suggestions of the moment," returning to the *Transcript* text with "If follows that ..."
This is a significant addition as it pertains to Royce's recognition of the power of language, and its usage.

On page 93, Royce adds one sentence in the *RQP* text regarding literature: "Consider modern literature with its disposition to portray any form of human life ..."

On page 94, Royce inserts a large addition, beginning with "The result is that modern mobs ..." and up to (on page 95) to paragraph beginning "Yet, as we have seen ..."

On page 96, at the end of section V, Royce closes with an addition sentence: "The lesson would then be: Keep the province awake, that the nation may be saved from the disastrous hypnotic slumber so characteristic of excited masses of mankind."

On page 96, after the first sentence of the section, Royce inserts about 25 lines to the *Transcript* text, from "As I review ..." up through "... in common with Schiller's words" on page 97.

At the top of page 98, Royce adds to sentences to the end of the *Transcript* paragraph ending "... in the provincial life," with "The national by itself ... save the individual."

On page 99, Royce adds one sentence after "worthless abstraction." ("We love the world better when we cherish our own friends the more faithfully. We do not grow in grace by forgetting individual duties in behalf of remote social enterprises.")

At the bottom of 99, Royce adds several sentences and a new paragraph to the *Transcript* text, from "... own unique wisdom" through "... of which I have spoken."

From mid- page 101 ("... in our hands") to mid-page 102 ("... our human weakness"), Royce inserts a large addition to the *Transcript* text.

At the top of 103, after "... you the learner," Royce inserts several sentences before the next paragraph.

On bottom of page 103, Royce inserts one sentence "They seemed to be adopting...", then after "... independence of spirit" inserts a couple more sentences through page 104, up through "... to remain themselves."

On page 106, after "... in the service of their home," to page 107 "... and most active of their young men," Royce adds a page and a half of material to the *Transcript* text.

On page 107, after "... nobility, dignity and beauty," Royce writes a completely different ending

for *RQP* from the concluding paragraph in the *Transcript* text.

Royce says of this essay that in it he discusses “in general terms the need and uses of that spirit [of provincialism] in our American life.” (vi)

In the article published in *RQP* Royce says “My thesis is that, in the present state of the world’s civilization, and of the life of our own country, the time has come to emphasize, with a new meaning and intensity, the positive value, the absolute necessity for our welfare, of a wholesome provincialism, as a saving power to which the world in the near future will need more and more to appeal.” (*RQP* 62) In his Preface to *RPQ*, Royce says that while he could only sketch provincialism in *PL*, in this essay, he continued “the study which first took form in my volume on the history of California ... in 1886.”

He mentions our having to deal with “very grave evils due to false forms of provincialism.” (63) But he also discusses “an enlightened provincialism.” (*see e.g. RQP* Preface vii)

Evaluation: A more refined and detailed version of this article appears in *RQP*.

238. “Recent Logical Inquiries and their Psychological Bearings,” *Psychological Review*, 9 (1902): 105-33.

This is the text of a presidential address to the American Psychological Association on January 1, 1902. It is reprinted in *RLE*, at pages 3-34. A copy of the *Psychological Review* reprint may be found in Box 103, folder 13.

[**Caution:** Because of certain parallels in titles and links between logic and psychology, a reader *might* confuse this address with Royce’s other, later paper “Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism,” *Popular Science Monthly*, 83 (October 1913): 394-411.]

This address belongs more properly in the Logical Section of the *Critical Edition*, following Robinson’s classification in his *RLE*. Undoubtedly, however, this paper reveals Royce keeping quite abreast of psychological research. Royce reports on his readings of Husserl and offers his response to Husserl’s phenomenology. [Royce’s view of Husserl will influence Peirce’s view.] Royce also reports on Wundt’s recent work in empirical psychology, the analysis of language and the psychological processes needed for language usage.

For logicians, this paper is a highway map of the almost countless number of Royce’s readings and studies in logic up to 1901. [Hence, this address provides a helpful introduction to Royce’s labors in logic up until *WI*.]

For his psychological audience, Royce stresses his call that they study “the psychology of the intellectual life,” the “intellect” itself (getting beyond simply associations and memories), and the psychological underpinnings of conception, judgment, and reasoning. After sketching a half-dozen inadequate psychological hypotheses about judgment, he invites them to an up-to-date psychological analysis of all the aspects of judgment. Yet, in speaking of judgment he here

never once mentions “truth,” even though, as a philosopher, truth has been and will be his central focus when treating of judgment philosophically.

Near the close, Royce touches upon the psychological study that compares the methodologies of the various sciences – its contribution to the “logic of science.” And near closing, he points up the radical importance of the “‘yes and no’ consciousness.” In this he foreshadows his late article on the role of the primitive taboo.

Evaluation: Certainly helpful as a general explanation of Royce’s logic work.

239. Speech at Alumni Banquet, Johns Hopkins
Johns Hopkins University Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the University and Inauguration of Ira Remsen L.L.D. as President of the University (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1902): 112-18

240. “What Should Be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?”
International Journal of Ethics, 13 (1902-03): 280-85.

241. “Introduction”
To Fiske, vol. 1 *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1903): xxi-cxlix

Perhaps the manuscript in Box 72 is a draft of this introduction? The introduction is a lengthy one. As editor, Royce wrote notes that are scattered throughout the text in enclosed brackets. Skrupskelis: “The major ones are listed in the index (4: 387), where they are given the title “Notes mainly relative to advance in science since the writing of *Cosmic Philosophy*.” *BWJR*:2 1206.

This 128-page “Introduction,” not including Royce’s “major notes,” represents at least Royce’s tribute to Fiske, recently deceased in 1901. This introduction was dated April 19, 1902. Fiske had personally introduced the young Royce to libraries in Boston and Harvard in 1877 and Royce had kept reading Fiske’s works.

Evaluation: Cf. Royce’s “John Fiske as Thinker,” an article that appeared in *Harvard Graduates’ Magazine* in 1901 (see item 232 above).

242. Letter to Munsterberg (published excerpts) (1903)

243. “Pope Leo’s Philosophical Movement, and Its Relations to Modern Thought,”
Boston Evening Transcript (July 29, 1903): 14.

Evaluation: Loewenberg favored this article, as evidenced by his inclusion of the piece in his collection of mostly early Royce writings. FMO concurs strongly: Royce grasps Thomism’s strong point and incisively points to its three weaknesses.

244. “The Problem of Natural Religion: The Present Position,”
International Quarterly, 7 (1903): 85-107.

This magazine was formerly *The International Monthly*. HARP has no manuscript of this Dudleian lecture, which Royce (as the Dudleian Lecturer for 1901-02) delivered on March 10, 1902. Royce had finally freed himself of his work on the Gifford Lecture in mid-October, 1901. Because he had fulfilled the stipulated aim of any Gifford Lecture series – namely, in some way to treat of “natural religion,” Royce was at this time well primed “to define,” as he told his audience, “my own view of the present state of inquiry concerning the principles of natural religion.” (84) He did so by focusing on “a certain apparent opposition between . . . two sorts of objects, ideals and facts, [upon which] all religious problems depend.” (85)

Concerning facts, Royce asked whether external nature, of which we so limited men know so small a part, allows us enough evidence to prove some overall Orderer is real? (90-91) About ideals, Royce noted both their abstractness and their exigency to be made real (their Ought), and their fluidity – witness their being transformed throughout centuries. He surmised that if at bottom our natural world is only energy (with matter as frozen energy) then the outer world seems closer to ideals and mind.

Scanning the history of philosophy, especially its modern period up to Kant, Royce examined from both sides of the question whether a basis for natural religion can be discovered in empirical nature. (102) He then relied heavily on the “ideal of the truth-seeker,” (103-04), and the transformation of “failed ideals” (or “lost causes”) to find that the internal meanings of ideals (their “immortal souls,” he calls them) bring the truth-seeker to their fulfillment “in the determinate absolute.”

Along the way of this argument, Royce provided (106) two cases of “failed ideals” – to square the circle and make a perpetual-motion machine. Through prolonged frustrations, these cases later became transformed at a higher level into wider vistas that led to discovery of more truth. He thus clarified his meaning of the role of “lost causes.”

[A comparison-contrast of Royce’s argument here with CSP’s “Neglected Argument” seems promising. Royce’s repeated use of the term “interpretation” (95) deserves notice, as does his characteristic tactic of “alternating perspectives.”]

Evaluation: As a largely unnoticed and non-typical approach to the absolute, this article is neither A-prime in quality nor brief. Nevertheless, it is packed with enough insights and a sense of the frontiers of science in 1902 as to be graded A, for scholarly purposes.

245. Logical Essays
Unpublished
Box 73

Except for the MS “The Hero Burk,” a literary piece drawn from Turkestan literature, all the manuscripts in Box 73 relate to Royce’s logic work.

a. “Mr. Bertrand Russell’s Problem of ‘The Contradiction’” (1903)
Box 73

A 55-page MS, in six sections.

Royce deals with some of the more serious logical questions “relating to the nature of reflective thought.” (2) It takes on the apparent triviality of the statement “I’m a cretin, and you know all cretins lie.”

Russell’s *Principles of Mathematics* came out in 1903.

Three Papers relating to the Philosophical Conference of October 19, 1903
Box 73

b. “Introductory Statement at the Philosophical Conference of Oct. 19, 1903”

A 29-page MS

c. “Closing Words Addressed to the Philosophical Conference 1903-04

A two-page MS response to Dr. Cabot.

d. “Concluding Summary of the Philosophical Conference”

Begins with a 17-page typescript that leads into the next MS.

e. “The Hero Burk”
Box 73

A Turkestan story, from Vambéry, used by Royce in the “Concluding Summary.” This is an 18-page MS that transcribes 120 lines of poetry. (A deeply Islamic text.)

f. “Concluding Summary” end
Box 73

The “Concluding Summary” then ends with a 2-page typescript.

Evaluation: Except for “The Hero Burk,” these manuscripts belong to Royce’s logical works

**246. “Notes on Logic” (1903)
Box 73**

The group of texts is introduced by Royce on an envelope fragment as follows:

“Notes on Logic. 1903

1. Note on Transitive Relations.
2. Note on Complex Relative Numbers.
3. Points Viewed as Products of Points.
4. Relative Products in three dimensions and the tridimensional representation of binary relatives.
5. Note on Rules for representing dyadic relations in terms of triads.
6. Definitions of the Logical Universe of Disc[ourse].”

The manuscripts that follow in Box 73 are titled by Royce as follows:

Note 1: “Transitive Relations. [A restatement of Schroeder’s statement).” [sic]
A 15-page MS, plus an added page “6a.”

Note 2: “Complex Relative Numbers, or Relative Complex Numbers.”
A 4-page MS.

Note 3: “Points viewed as products of points.”
A 1-page MS.

Note 4: “Relative Products in three dimensions; and the tridimensional representation of binary relatives.”
A 4-page MS.

Note 5: “Notes on Rules for representing trans. rel’s.”
A 2-page MS.

Note 6: “Definition of Logical U. of Discourse.”
A 2-page MS.

**247. “Plan of Course: Notes for Phil. 15 1903-04”
Box 72**

[This material is taken from the cover envelope used to house Royce’s Outlines of Elementary Logic, i.e. written on brown paper. The following approximates the handwritten chart.]

- I. 1. Introduction on Scope of Theory of Knowledge.

- Logic Its Relation to Logic. Plan of General Logic
2. Outline of Elementary Logic (I.) The Operations of Thought: (1)(a) Distinguishing of Elements, (b) Combination of Elements, © Comparison to Equivalence of Elements; (2)(a) Judgment, (b) Inference; (3)(a) Classification, (b) Combination of Classes; (4) The study of Relations.
(II). The Logical Calculus as a development [*sic*] of the fundamental Relations of these Operations: (1) the Elementary calculus of Propositions & Classes; (2) The Logic of Relations.
 3. The Fundamental concepts: (1) Number, (2) Time, (3) Space, (4) Systems of Concrete Facts
-

- II. Epistemology
4. The Relations of Thought and Reality.
 5. Cosmological Applications.

248. “Introduction”

to L. van Becelaere, O.P.’s *La Philosophie en Amérique, depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours, 1607-1900* (New York: Eclectic Publishing Co., 1904): ix-xvii

249. “The Eternal and the Practical,”

***Philosophical Review* 13 (March 1904): 113-42.**

This lecture was delivered as the presidential address to the American Philosophical meeting at Princeton on December 30, 1903, and later published in the *Philosophical Review*. Royce presents “the central problem of balancing two current investigations: 1st, What place ought empirical tendencies occupy in our philosophical opinions, and 2nd What place ought our practical postulates, our ethical understandings, our doctrine of conduct to have in determining our entire view of the universe.” (114). Royce is not framing the question in an “empiricism vs. idealism” way, but instead as a uniting of “empirical and pragmatic tendencies.”

Up to Section IV Royce develops the case of “pure pragmatism.”

In the controversy regarding the “battle of/for the Absolute,” this paper marks a watershed in Royce’s response to James, Dewey and Schiller. How much time he had to compose it is as yet not known.

As a biographer, Clendenning says (*Life* 286-87) that Royce caught by the limits of space, and feeling the rising tide of pragmatism, quotes this 1904 presidential address on pure pragmatism’s inability to supply a coherent theory of knowledge. Clendenning concludes with Royce’s own seven final points summarizing his address. He views the address as largely paralleling Royce’s 1885 argument to the Absolute power in *RAP*.

FMO finds in this address some very significant new developments in Royce’s more carefully considered new argument.

He poses “a central problem of modern investigation” (114) and goes into his statement of the problem of balancing the investigations of, first, what place “empiricist tendencies ought to occupy in our philosophical opinions, and second, what place ought our practical postulates, our ethical understandings, our doctrine of conduct, to have in determining our entire view of the universe.” (114)

Royce summarizes his purpose “this question is how far is our knowledge identical with an expression of our practical needs.” He points out that it is not a question of empiricism versus idealism, but empiricism and pragmatic tendencies.

Autobiographical Entry: At the bottom of 116, Royce tells a funny (self-ironical) story of being in “the bondage of Absolutism.” He also goes back to a story about the 21 year old Royce (when he was a “pure pragmatist”) as opposed to the 48-year-old Royce (who has something to say about the eternal as well as the practical). The story ends on 118.

In section II, he outlines his program for the address: What motives give rise to pragmatism, and for what reasons does the pragmatist think that pragmatism is a partial statement (and thus inadequate) and needs a supplement? Sections II and III are a summary of the pure pragmatic position.

- Page 118-19: An important point that Royce makes: any thinking (like talking and pushing) is an activity, and all activity is a mode of action. Even when thinking, a person has present to his mind something determined by a series of acts of attention.
- Page 122: “Our thinking is indeed from moment to moment a consciousness of our adjustment to our present experience.” “For what is directly given to us at any moment (that is, what is immediately and *merely* given to us) is simply the fact of our special momentary need for further insight and further action.”
- Page 123: “If you have no interest in the object, its supposed independence of the will can impose upon your will no recognition of this” its barely external nature.
- Page 124: “For you are bound fast by your own need. The object is therefore yours to construct, but not yours to create; and this again is what Kant said. And this is the aspect of the object which realism falsely emphasizes.” Royce points out that popular realism rests logically on the social need of companionship.

Some important items in section IV and following:

- The appeal function in judgment is unavoidable and clearly social.
- “My need of appealing to somebody else ... constitutes me a rational being [interpretive self].” (135)
- When different persons judge the same assertion as true, they do so from their various viewpoints.
- The self expresses a “‘purpose,’ which reveals they thus share in one selfhood.” They are unified in the selfhood of one purpose. (137)
- My genuine judgment of “x” within this socially expressed environment also makes the claim that about “x” there ought not be any disagreement.
- Royce asks what then does this “ought” mean? He replies, this “ought” means that my

present action of judging “x” has a purpose which goes beyond my present partial expression ... “ (137) “In other words my present judging activity has a place in a process of experience such that if my judgment, despite its present success, still on the whole and in the end fails, this process of which the judgment itself is a part, contains somewhere conscious contents which will show my partial failure. But since no self whose purposes are foreign to mine, or are in any way such as not to include mine, can possibly observe my failure in judgment, or can be conscious of what I mean and how and where I fail of my own purpose, it follows that to say: ‘I *ought* to judge thus or thus’ is to say: ‘I myself, in a more fully enlightened expression of myself, am so constituted as to detect whether my judgment wholly fulfills or only partially fulfills my purpose.’ But to say: ‘We companions, who judge together the same object, we are all subject to the same ought,’ is therefore to say: ‘All our various selves are functions not only one of another, but of one conscious Self that somewhere and somehow pragmatically constructs an expression of itself in the light of which our various partial expressions are judged.’ Such a self I need just in so far as I need my judgment to be true. Such a self is real if my judgment has either truth or falsity.” (138) (underlining added.)

At page 140, he adds,

“For the ought is either a real ought or it is nothing. A judgment has its place in a complete system of truth, or else it is not true.

“Now when we declare that our judgments are true, we appeal to such a self to confirm them. Of such an appeal our desire for social support and comradeship is merely a special instance, a fragmentary example.... When we need to call our judgments true or false, we need to conceive, to define, to address, such a self. If there is such a self, then there is truth. If there is no such self, pragmatism can truly assert nothing, can truly deny nothings, stands in the presence of no genuine reality, and can only continue to be conscious of how it wrinkles its unreal countenance in the echoless void, where its assertions meet no genuine response, have not even any real spectators, and are meaningless both to God and to man, since then neither man nor God exists to fill the void.”

“But if there is such a self, then for every finite instance of life pragmatism remains a perfectly genuine truth, – genuine as our ceaseless longing for the eternal is genuine, – genuine as love and aspiration are genuine ... Everything is practical; and everything seeks nothing whatever but its own true self, which is the Eternal.”

“For the Eternal is not that which merely lasts all the time. Only abstractions temporally endure. And they are not the life; they are either only a dead image, or again, they are only an aspect of the life. That alone is eternal which includes all the varying points of view in the unity of a single insight, and which knows that it includes them, because every possible additional point of view would necessarily leave this insight invariant.

“The possibility of such an eternal is, of course, the possibility of the existence, in a genuine sense together, as a *totum, simul*, of the contents of an infinite series of practical and evolutionary processes ... I have desired merely to indicate what we need when we attempt to make true assertions.” (140-41)

Royce concludes with seven propositions (well-summarized by Clendenning), but of which the

sixth and seventh deserve mention also here:

“Accordingly, in the sixth place, in order to conceive our judgments as true, we need to conceive them as partial functions of a self which is so inclusive of all possible points of view regarding our object as to remain invariant in the presence of all conceivable additional points of view, and so conscious of its own finished and invariable purpose as to define an ought that determines the truth or falsity of every possible judgment about this object.”

“Seventhly, and lastly: If there is such an inclusive and invariant self, it is of course complete at no moment of time. It is inclusive of all temporal processes of evolution that could alter our view or any view of our object. Such a self is invariant and eternal, without thereby ceasing at any and every point of time to be expressed in finite and practical activities, such as appear in our own judgments. If there is such a self, our need to make judgments that can be true or false is satisfied. If there is no such self, no judgment is either true or false. The need for the Eternal is consequently one of the deepest of all our practical needs. Herein lies at once the justification of pragmatism, and the logical impossibility of pure pragmatism. Everything finite and temporal is practical. All that is practical borrows its truth from the Eternal.” (142)

Evaluation: This article rates 9 on a 10 point rating scale. It beautifully illustrates Royce’s viewpoint amid the heightening conflict between his “constructive absolutism” and James’s “Pragmatism.”

250. “The Present Significance of Kant,”
***The Nation*, 78 (Feb 18, 1904): 125-26.**

The article is unsigned in *The Nation*, but is attributed to Royce by Haskell. Written to commemorate the centenary of Kant’s death. A survey of Kant’s present and future significance. This brief piece was written after both Royce’s “Kant’s Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress” for the Centennial of *KRV* and his treatment of Kant in his 1892 *SMP*, but before his 1906 Baltimore lectures on Kant in *LMI*.

Royce here aims to highlight Kant’s still living influence and to show why the new century is likely to face the task of defining its positions in relation to Kant’s doctrine.

Even Pope Leo IX acknowledges Kant’s influence by cautioning Roman Catholics against Kantianism and neo-Kantianism.

Royce indicates that Kant has pointed out the limits of possible knowledge in phenomena, and in the practical order those assumptions we must make, not as true, but as objects of rational faith. Royce proposes Kant as the model for anyone who wants to go beyond anarchy and fear and become “the spiritual master of his own world.”

Evaluation: For Royce’s revised view of Kant, this brief article is important. It is only 3 1/4 columns long in *The Nation*.

**251. The Columbia-Richmond Lectures (1904):
The Relation of the Columbia, St. Louis, and Richmond
Lectures²²
Boxes 50, 74, 88**

Royce gave a series of lectures in 1904 as follows:

- The Columbia lectures (February 1904): “Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process”;
- A St. Louis Lecture (October 1904): “Science of the Ideals”; and
- The Richmond Lectures (November 1904).

The manuscripts for the Columbia lectures do not run in sequence in the HARP boxes. **How are the manuscripts connected in the HARP? At issue are Boxes 50, 74 and 88.**

An investigation of the “Mystery of the Boxes” on October 8-10, 2008 led to the following hypothetical description of how the manuscript pages seem to unfold in HARP for the Columbia Lectures, and how the Columbia Lectures may relate to the Richmond Lectures.

Lecture One: Straightforward MS of 68 pages first MS in Box 74. [Royce slips on page 68, numbering it “(69).”]

Lecture Two: seemingly ends incomplete at page 40. But, two-thirds through Box **50** [after the 2nd typescript of Royce’s “Order” article], Section IV picks up (but now on renumbered pages “(41-60)”) so that on this page 60 Royce concludes his “General Survey of fundamental concepts in the sciences” and promises next time to apply them “in more detail.” After page 60, the reader encounters a page entitled simply ...

“LECTURE Three,” followed by pages 21 and 22, (with a missing pages 23-24). If the reader now returns to Box **74**, (to just beyond page 40 of the MS for Lecture II), he or she will continue with a typescript document starting on page 25 and running to page 42, where Lecture 4 begins and ends at page 70. On page 66, Royce views it at his concluding “summary sketch of the logical theory of extensive and intensive quantities and magnitudes.” Thereafter, Royce starts his Fifth Lecture on freshly numbered pages running from 1 to 58, and fulfilling his title indicated for Lecture V in his Programme :“Philosophical Considerations suggested by the foregoing survey: The problem of the Categories.”

In sum,

- Lecture Three: Begins in Box 50 with pages 21-22. Pages 23-24 missing, and continues in Box 74, just beyond page 40 of the MS of Lecture II.
- Lecture Four: Entitled “Quantity” in Box 74
- Lecture Five: Box 74 Deriving title from Royce’s Programme: “Philosophical Considerations suggested by the foregoing survey: The problem of the Categories.”

²² In working with these materials in 2008-09, FMO referred to this problem as “the mystery of the boxes.”

Evidence for above.

Lecture II, section III, ends at page 40, Box 74. In Box 50, there is a typescript, which Royce repaginates from “1-20” to “41-60”, and marks page “21” as starting section IV. Lecture II appears to end at page “60.”

Immediately following this is a sheet labeled “Lecture III.”

This lecture appears to begin with the same typescript as the previous (renumbered) Lecture II. Only here, Lecture Three continues with the original pagination: 21. Only pages 21 and 22 remain. These lectures end Box 50.

Back in Box 74, the typescript, on similar paper and in similar ink, picks up with typescript page 25. (This would indicate pages 23 and 24 of Lecture are missing from this collection of typescript pages.) This follows directly (in Box 74) the point in which the jump to Box 50 was made. Substantively, the first two pages of Lecture III (found in Box 50) correspond to page 25 of the typescript (and following) in Box 74). This typescript page numbering continues unbroken through the end of the Lecture IV.

Lecture V follows (in Box 74) in Royce’s hand, a MS on 58 fresh pages. In Lecture V, Royce gets to the question of the spatial experiences of reversibility to discover co-existence. But then at section IV of this lecture, he raises “a decisive issue”: the irreversibility of the time series. By moving to accentuate the irreversible nature of time, Royce points toward his eventual doctrine of the Will’s role in “Modes of Action.”

Relationship of the Columbia and Richmond Lectures

Located at the start of Box 88 is a 1-page note from Wabash College, dated September 4, 1953 and signed by [Professor] J. Harry Cotton. He transmits the Records of the University of Richmond, Richmond VA, stating that at this University in 1904 on the Thomas Museum Lecture Endowment, “Professor Royce gave three lectures as follows:

- I. Thursday, November 3 “The Orderly Arrangement of Facts and Ideas: ‘Series’ and ‘Levels’”
- II. Friday, November 4 “Transformations and Their Laws”
- III. Saturday, November 5 “The World and the Will”

The First Richmond Lecture (MS in Box 88) is clearly entitled in Royce’s hand: “The Orderly Arrangement of Facts and Ideas: ‘Series’ and ‘Levels’” This concurs with the title of the First Lecture as witnessed by Cotton, and concurs with Royce’s First Columbia Lecture entitled: “Introduction: The Comparative Study of the Concepts of Science” as well as with its purpose to study “The Morphology of Concepts” [See Box 74, item 1, pages 11-15]. The first lecture at both Columbia and Richmond introduced Royce’s auditors with the overall theme of both lecture series as expressed by Royce: “Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process.” [See start of Box 74, “Program of Lectures” (3 pp.) before page 1 of First Columbia Lecture.]

The Second Richmond Lecture, entitled “Transformations and Their Laws,” seems to parallel the Third Columbia Lecture in theme, content, and ordered placement in Royce’s way of serially

offering this pair of lecture series on logical scientific concepts, or as Royce put it, “on the Morphology of Concepts.”

The Third Richmond Lecture was titled “The World and the Will.” This lecture’s content and theme resonate with the Fifth Columbia Lecture because the Will became a major theme in the Fifth Columbia Lecture. Moreover, [see Box 88, near end, (and just before Royce’s starts the MSS of his “6 logical exercises” which close Box 88)], there appears a one-page MS “Topics of Final [Richmond] Lecture.” On this page Royce states as his 4th and 5th topics in this Final [Richmond] Lecture: “4. World as Will” and “5. World as My Will developed *ad inf.* [into infinity].”

This may indicate that Royce used at least part of the MS of his Fifth Columbia lecture as his Third Richmond Lecture because of the shift of theme to Will in the Third Richmond Lecture and Royce’s “Topics of Final [Richmond] Lecture” in all announced titles (of Sections IV & V of that lecture in his MS “Topics of Final [Richmond] Lecture.”

According to Harry Cotton’s testamentary document of Sept. 4th 1953, situated at start of Box 88, Royce’s Third Columbia lecture on Transformations seems to fit this picture because these Records of the University of Richmond state that Royce’s 2nd Lecture on Nov. 4th was entitled “Transformations and Their Laws,” a fit description of the Second Richmond Lecture.

That Royce would take sections of his Columbia lectures and use them in his Richmond lectures makes eminent sense given the time frame and flurry of activities Royce was then engaged in.

What about the second document in Box 88, situated as if it were the Second Richmond Lecture? It is a 26-page typescript without a title. This raises the question whether it is, in fact, the Second Richmond Lecture. The typescript is lightly edited by Royce, and has marks in his hand to “Read.” E. F. Wells heads this typescript with the note “Lecture II: Instances of Order (Number, Time, Relation.)” This does not correspond with Cotton’s title for Lecture II.

Wells identifies the third document in Box 88, situated as if it were the Third Richmond Lecture, “Instances of law, series, levels.” But there is no indication on the typescript (23 pages) that this is the case. Yet, there is a single page MS titled by Royce: “Topics of Final Lecture.” (This follows a 3-page MS titled by Royce “Advantages of Serial Order,” and identified by Wells as “Sketches of Final Lecture.) On this single page, Royce moves to the issue of World as Will, which corresponds to Cotton’s identification of the Third Richmond Lecture.

A concluding question about Royce’s later writing:

Ten to twelve years after the Columbia and Richmond lectures, when Royce had to finish the article “Order” for the Hastings *Encyclopedia*, did he or did he not pull out of his Columbia Lectures or Richmond Lectures one or two sections to complete the “Order” article? The redrafted pages, the pages out of order (and included among much later dated drafts) might indicate such a conclusion. Still to be investigated.

**252. The Columbia Lectures: “Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process” (1904)
Boxes 74 and 50**

In contemplation of giving these five lectures, Royce wrote on July 11, 1903, in a letter to Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, that “[o]f course, five lectures could doubtless be prepared; and I should find the idea attractive if you wished them. But they would contain decidedly less than half of what one could give in ten lectures, owing to the difficulty of presenting the introduction to such a course, since it takes so much time to get started, in metaphysics, on the lines of any particular discussion. . . . I mentioned ten lectures only because you suggested that as the advisable number.” (*Letters* at 456-57).

Columbia Lectures at Columbia U., NYC, Feb. 1, 2, 8, 9, and 15, 1904 (which predates our use of MS).

Between them, the boxes contain five lectures, in MS and typescript. (*See* notes for the individual lectures to understand how the typescripts, manuscripts and boxes interface in this series.) Originally, the typescript version ran consecutively from page 1-70. Royce, however, broke up this original typescript among three of the lectures. He changed the typescript pages 1-20 in his own handwriting to read “41-60” of the Lecture II. Hence, the original typescript now breaks down as follows: pages 1-20 are the last third of Lecture II. Pages 21-42 are Lecture III. And pages 43-70 are Lecture IV. Lecture V, like Lecture 1 and the first 2/3 of Lecture II, are MS.

“Programme of Lectures”

A 3-page MS in Royce’s hand opens Box 74. It reads as follows:

Program of Lectures

(Columbian Course)

Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process.

First Lecture: – Introduction: The comparative Study of the Concepts of Science. Examples of Concepts useful in widely sundered regions of Inquiry. Problem as to the reason for this usefulness: Is this reason to be found in the nature of things, or in the nature of the thinking process? Arguments for both views.

Second Lecture: – General survey of certain concepts that are of fundamental importance in science: –

- (1) Classes and the process of Classification.**
- (2) Relations and their types.**
- (3) Ordinal Concepts and ordered Series.**

Third Lecture: The same topic continued.

- (4) Concepts of Transformation: –**
 - (a) Concepts of External or Actual [Mental] Transformation.**

(b) Concepts of Ideal Transformations: – the “Operations” of the Exact Sciences.

(5) Concepts of Levels: –

(a) Types of equality and Equivalence.

(b) Concepts of Invariants or Laws.

Fourth Lecture: - Applications of the foregoing survey to various special problems : – Intensive and Extensive Magnitudes; the problem of Descriptive Science as the definition of Manifolds, and their adjustment to the varieties of facts; the search for an universally applicable Manifold.

Fifth Lecture: – Philosophical Considerations suggested by the foregoing survey. The problem of the Categories. Three views of the work of thought: Realism, Pragmatism, and Idealist Absolutism.

Lecture I: “Introduction”

In this lecture, Royce describes the scope and limits of the series. In the program above, he subtitles this particular lecture “The Comparative Study of the Concepts of Science.” A heavily edited 68-page MS (with 68/69 on one page) in three sections, it is written on fresh pages. Page 3 is slightly torn (text missing) on the upper left side.

This lecture series concerns empirical logical thinking as used creatively to make applications by genuinely reflective scientific workers (page 2), not the dreary and dead formal logic of most textbooks.

“It is my purpose, in the following brief course of lectures, to give a few illustrations of certain problems of recent logical inquiry. I speak as one who am myself only a very imperfect inquirer in this branch of research. I have no very highly finished results to report. I chiefly want to win for this field of study new devotees. As I am to address a company of students, to whom the rather widely scattered literature of the subject of recent logical investigation has probably not been very accessible, I shall make little attempt to be original. I shall be content, during most of these brief studies simply to report some of the less popularly known recent investigations into certain topics of logical interest.” (page 5)

Royce, coming to empirical Columbia University, puts emphasis on EXPERIENCE. Though he finds faults with considering logic by way of tradition order – 1st concept, 2nd judgment, 3rd reasoning – and by way of 1st judgments, 2nd reasoning process, and 3rd process of conception, Royce says:

“For if any one of the three [operations] is to be regarded as the primary and fundamental / [7] operation upon which thinking is based, then Judgment, rather than Conception is to be entitled to the first place. It is true that whoever judges, inevitably possesses, at the moment when he judges, conceptions of some grade or value. But, on the other hand, every new conception is reached either as the outcome or as the accompaniment of processes of judgment. Our earliest conceptions, as I think I may say, first came to our consciousness, became our actual possessions, at the moment when first we judged. Our later conceptions receive, at each stage of our advancing thought, their first formulations

by means of judgments.” (pages 6-7)

As to the purpose of his lectures, he writes:

“I propose to devote myself, for the greater part of these lectures, to a comparative study of some of the most remarkable conceptual structures to which the processes of judgment and reasoning, as they have been applied in various / [12] regions of human ingenuity, have led thinkers. I intend to discuss certain common features which appear in the concepts of different sciences, and which are common to the outcomes of otherwise very different thoughtful inquiries.” (pages 11-12)

Regarding the definition of judgment, he writes:

“The traditional doctrine of the text-books defines a judgment as a synthesis of previously existing concepts. It would be nearer the truth to say that a **judgment** is / [8] a process that is busied either in the building of new concepts or in the modification of older concepts for the sake of **adjusting** them to new experiences. Neither account is an adequate statement of what happens when we judge. And we are aided in understanding the matter by adding that an already formed concept, when it comes to our consciousness constitutes a **sort of plan of action, an epitome of a series of processes** whereby, as we believe, we may, if we choose, portray or construct objects; while a **judgment is an actual deed**, a construction or portrayal of an object, joined with a consciousness that this construction or portrayal is what it ought to be. **But we learn to form plans of action by first acting.** Hence judgment is a necessary means for forming new concepts.

“However one defines the relations between conception and judgment, the fact remains that any scientific conception of importance and of any high degree of elaboration, is a **result of a great number of previous processes of judgment, and also of acts of reasoning.** As for reasoning, it is a process of judging about judgments, and about their relations and their meanings. And so both simple judgments, and inferences (i.e., judgments about judgments), enter into the processes whereby all our more elaborate conceptions are formed, there would be much to say for an order of logical exposition that followed the plan of discussing, first the judgment, then the process of reasoning, and thirdly, the process of conception.” (Pages 7-9; *emphasis added* by FMO.)

But Royce here does *not* follow Kant’s or Hegel’s movement from

“a priori philosophical considerations. On the contrary, I shall first try to consult the experiences which have accumulated in the course of scientific inquiry, - experiences regarding what types of conception most naturally result from the work of thinkers. These types of conception, so far as we shall consider them, will thus first appear to be of fundamental importance, not because any system of philosophy here presupposed makes them seem so, but because the experience of thinkers in very various branches of science has resulted in showing that, [/ 14] if you judge and infer very extensively concerning any one of a very great variety of types of facts, you come to form and to use these fashions of conception. That the forms of concepts which may thus be empirically shown to be so important, as the outcome of the thinking process, must borrow their importance from something that lies very deep in the nature of thought itself, will of course seem to us probably from the very outset. We shall be led, therefore, in our closing lectures, back to the philosophical problem of the Categories. We shall try to see,

as we close, whether these important [/15] types of scientific conception are so because of something in the nature of things -- of something which, apart from the interest of our thought, forces upon us these ways of conceiving things; or, on the other hand, whether it is rather due to our nature and interests as thinkers that we find ourselves disposed to view things through these somewhat monotonous conceptual forms. Hence we shall, in the end, raise the question which, at the outset, we ignore, -- the question whether there are any fundamental Categories of thought, deducible from an analysis of the very nature of thought itself. Thus by way of an empirical [/16] examination, we shall approach a philosophical issue, -- the issue about the fundamental nature of the thinking process, and about the relation of Thought and Reality. To that issue the concluding discussion of this series will be devoted.” (Pages 13-16)

Royce promises in early part of these lectures

“a very modest and imperfect **report of some of the inductions of a new empirical science**. This is the science of what I am accustomed to call the **Comparative Morphology of Concepts**, -- a science in which I should like to interest you, and a science which, in the courses of [/17] the next generation, may be expected to make great strides. It will be the business of this new science, as it develops, to study the conceptual forms to which the experience of the various special sciences leads thinkers, as they study their different regions of human experience.” (Pages 16-17; *emphasis added* by FMO.)

Royce goes on from the Concept of NUMBER – used in such wide fields studying facts of inorganic or organic nature, or business, or theology – hence, it clearly belongs to our study of the **Comparative Morphology of concepts**. Then he moves to the Concepts of STATISTICS, and the to the Concepts of RHYTHMIC PROCESSES so widely applied, and hence again an illustration of “what I mean by the **Comparative Morphology of Concepts**. My early lectures will be devoted to illustration of this sort of study.” (Page 19; *emphasis added* by FMO)

Royce’s example of the NUMBER concept shows him using common sense and then criticizing it (pages 22-24): If one asks *why* the whole numbers are very widely applicable,

“common sense is tempted to say, – ‘because the real external world consists of diverse entities which can be numbered. The discrete structure of the world is a universal fact of experience. The world consists of units and of collections. The whole-number-concept expresses a mere recognition of this fact on the part of the thinker.’ But, on second thought, we see reason to question whether this common sense account is complete. For one thing, the concept of the whole numbers, as this concept now exists in our minds, bears many [/23] marks of its dependence upon purely logical considerations, such as arise out of the inner interests of thought. Number has properties that cannot be wholly derived from a mere description of observed external phenomena. What some of these are properties are, we shall later see. In order to define the series of the whole numbers, you are obliged, as Dedekind and several other writers on mathematical logic have recently shown, to take account of no ideas that involve any perception of external physical objects. The whole numbers may indeed be called, in a logical sense, the free creation of the human mind, as Dedekind himself declares them to be. But still further, even in applying the whole-number-concept to [/24] external things, we are not obliged to wait for the world to furnish us from without with any particular degree or type of discreteness of structure. Our attention fixes, often in highly arbitrary fashion upon the

outer facts that we first distinguish, treat as units or as definite collections of units, and then count. It is not that we find units in the world, – it is not this alone which makes our number-concept so useful. For constantly by our attentive fixation, now of this object and now of that, we make units for ourselves. The human mind, then, at the very least cooperates with the real world in making our own number-concept so widely applicable. Exactly in how far the success of our numerical conceptions in our dealing with various types of things is due to us, and in how far it is forced upon us by some external nature of things, – this is a matter which, despite the familiarity of the number-concept, is not easy to answer. Such questions then, lead us back from the empirical study of the wide range of usefulness of numbers, to the problem of the philosophy of number.” (Pages 22-25)

Though **STATISTICAL CONCEPTS** – such as the “death-rate” or “expectation of life” – involve much from the mind, they still cast indirect light, via averages, upon individuals’ real deaths, and their real continuity in life. (Page 26) Use of statistical concepts presupposes that we have used number to gather individuals into “lumps” so that we can treat of a certain man-made class. Statistics “do not give us rigid laws; but they help us to a study of variations.” (Page 29) The range of applicability of statistical concepts “is thus determined not so much by the nature of external things, [31] a by a certain often transient state or stage of our own imperfect knowledge regarding the nature of things.” (Pages 30-31)

Moving to his third instance, “**the concepts of rhythmic processes,**” in order to test their applicability and especially their *why*, Royce opposes Spencer’s almost universal yet non-mathematic zed concept of “rhythm.” (Pages 33-36) Yet Royce as mathematician sees the role of mathematics in rendering precise the concept of rhythm:

“This concept [rhythm] is at once extremely exact, and marvelously plastic. It is exact, because harmonic movements are defined by means of certain functions based upon the simple circular functions of trigonometry. It is plastic, because purely mathematical considerations show that by properly combining sets of suitably chosen functions dependent upon circular functions, you can [41] produce conceptual structures which will approximate, as nearly as you please, to the vicissitudes of any chosen physical process of finite length whose character is such as to permit curves to be drawn which will represent any definite aspect of what takes place in the course of this process. Draw at random any line of limited length on paper. Then to say that, because that line is broken or is crooked, it has a rhythmic structure, seems, and is, at first sight, quite unenlightening. But a certain mathematical theorem, – Fourier’s theorem – shows that a series can be constructed whose terms depend, for their values, upon trigonometric functions, and whose nature [42] is therefore such that it can express the result of superposing one set of definitely rhythmic – that is, of wave-like ‘harmonic’ – movements upon another, while this series can be so built up that the resultant movement to which it corresponds will describe a curve such as will approximate, as nearly as you wish, to the given arbitrary line with which you started. In the same way, let a physical process involve any changes that you please in a limited number of measurable variable quantities ... etc.” (Pages 40-42)²³

“The result of these considerations, however, is a law somewhat different from Spencer’s

²³ FMO query: Is Royce’s love of music tied in with his love of the “harmonic movement”?

generalization.” (Page 43)

“... that, in this complicated world, where nothing [/46] moves in perfectly straight lines, all things more or less waggle. **Now such a law is not enlightening.**” (Pages 45-46; *emphasis added* by FMO)

“But on the other hand, the more exact applications of the concept of rhythm in science are due [to] a wholly different logical process. Of this process in its highest complication Fourier’s theorem give the definite statement. The success of the concept of rhythm is thus at all events very largely due to the remarkable union of exactness with plasticity of which that concept, like the concept of number itself, is capable. We are not obliged to say that, by a mere process of abstraction we can first render our popular notion of rhythm so vague as to enable us to call anything that happens to occur more or less rhythmic. But we are able to show that, without [/47] sacrificing any of the logical exactness of our conception of a harmonic function, we are able to define a combination of harmonic functions, of various periods, – a combination so complex, and yet so definite, that the result of this combination serves to express any limited series of physical changes whose phenomena are subject to exact quantitative measurement, and are so correspondent in their characters to waves drawn on paper.

“In consequence, the success of the concept of rhythm, for the purposes of descriptive science, appears to be due at least quire as much to our own methods of forming and of combining our conceptions, as to the rhythmic character of the processes of any world external to the thinker... A comprehensive philosophy of rhythm is therefore a task dependent upon numerous considerations; some of which are logical, while some are empirical.” (Page 49)

[Royce asks us to recognize the philosophical interest in such problems in the science of the **morphology of concepts**. Here is a clear embodiment of his December 1915 way of characterizing his philosophy as a keenness for the logical working out of our thinking so that such problems “get a concreteness and fairness of definition such as it is hard to attain in any other way” (Page 53; *see also Hope for the Great Community*). FMO sees here a Peircean kind of pragmatism – a working out logically conceivable consequences of e.g. using Fourier’s theorem to “catch” the crooks and curves of a roughly drawn limited line, as an example. Keep in mind, however, that Royce is talking about our **possible development of scientific concepts**, and not our leaving them at their nascent, vague, and not as yet very fruitful level of common sense.]

When concluding this long lecture, Royce critiques the common sense effort to identify the basic concepts which science must use – for common sense replies: “class,” “cause,” and “law” – by showing the “notorious vagueness” of such concepts and their need to be sharpened up. (Page 56) For example, as to “classes,” Royce writes, “Classes then are sometimes mere random collections – [e.g. objects that caught my attention on a walk] sometimes what are called natural classes, and sometimes systems of various degrees and types of orderly complexity...” where some order or ordering is indispensable for the formation of the class, e.g., in a **series of whole numbers**. (Page 59)

NOTICE how the FORM (*morphe*) of the concept “class” or of “rhythm” develops in this Roycean movement from the “notoriously vague” to the “logically precise yet plastic” concept that science needs. Royce, too, shows a Peircean-like recognition of starting from the vague

concept with its own latent richness. **Query:** Am I actually finding Peirce's 1903 Pragmatism lectures giving a tone of emphasis on the empirical, on the pragmatic usefulness, and on the vague starting points. (NB: this "vagueness" notion permeates pages 59-61.) **Did these characterize Peirce's 1903 Pragmatism lectures?**

"The three terms Class, Cause, and Law, are therefore, for our purpose, very imperfect expressions for the types of scientific concepts which we shall [63] have to consider in our general sketch of the Morphology of Concepts." (Pages 62-63)

Royce goes on to introduce science's most elementary concepts, starting with **element "as what my attention first finds"** (page 67; note WJ influence; *emphasis added* by FMO), and building up to a group of elements into a **complex** that is unordered or ordered (Royce prefers concept of a complex to that of a class), and so Royce leads his hearers to expect the next lecture to

"be concerned with studying certain very widely useful types of complexes. In particular **we shall deal with complexes** which I shall call by the following names: – 1. Simple Series. 2. Domains. 3. Transformations. 4. Levels. I shall try to show you what a wide range of scientific concepts can be reduced to these four types. I shall also try to show you how these four types are related to one another, and to the interest of our thinking." (end of Lecture I; *emphasis added* by FMO)

Lecture II: "General Survey of the Concepts useful in Various Sciences"

In the program, Royce refers to this lecture as "General survey of certain concepts that are of fundamental importance in science," giving three subtopics: "(1) Classes and the process of Classification, (2) Relations and their types, and (3) Ordinal Concepts and ordered Series."

A 60-page text, with pages 1-40 in MS in Box 74, and pages 41-60 in typescript in Box 50. (*See "Mystery of the Boxes" above.*) The second part of this text has been repaginated and heavily edited by Royce in his own hand. Royce appears to have redistributed the contents of his original Lecture III-IV with this repagination.

Royce starts by focusing on our use of the "apparently simple abstractions" of "class" and "relation" (pages 1-13), and promises to return to them, at which point we will find "what we mean by classes and relations is at once a very important and a very complex undertaking." (Page 13) He includes in this reflection "conceptual form": "By the term 'conceptual form,' I shall hereafter mean, as I may say, any concept of very wide application in the work of thought in various departments of research." (Page 4) Royce does *not* say this is the same as what he means by a "leading idea."

Still by way of introduction, Royce points out that you can't have classes or relations without single facts, or individuals or what he terms "AN ELEMENT". (Page 16) Note the psychological dependence involved here, since we can consider an atom as an element and also the earth or Jupiter as elements which are members of the solar system, depending psychologically on the "purposes of our thought, as for the time the constituents of the group." (Page 19)

Although we say class and relational groups consist either of literal or of ideal individuals, Royce says:

“I prefer the term element to the term individual, as the name for what thought at any time distinguishes as the single constituent of any class or collection of objects of thought. And I do so because the name individual seems to imply, and in fact generally does imply, a metaphysical theory as to what an individual object is in itself, apart [20] from our own present thoughtful interest in it. But, as a fact, it is our present thoughtful interest which mainly determines, with respect to the objects once presented to our mental view, what we shall regard as, for the moment, our elementary objects. What is an element for one of our thoughtful attitudes, may appear as a collection from some point of view A single man may be an element to the employer of labor, or to the statistician, but a prodigiously vast complex to the physiologist or to the psychologist.” (Pages 20-21)

“What is essential to the notion of an element is that an element is seized upon by our attention, is then, for the moment, treated as one, is distinguished from other elements, and is also grouped with them for purposes of further study.”

Royce wraps up this introduction by indicating that “our whole thinking process makes us of these three conceptual forms: element, relation, class, whatever concepts we may be employing.” (Page 23) **NOTE** this basic triad, even if Royce doesn’t use the term “triad” here.

Royce next focuses on “more complex conceptual forms” and how “in the most diverse sciences, and also in the most extra-scientific thinking processes, we make use of **rows, i.e., of ordered series of facts.**” (Page 23)

“The concept of series is thus more inclusive than that of either number or “rhythm.” Series can be simple or complex; they can be forced upon us by nature (page 26) or be constructed by our own purposes, e.g., when we deliberately create a “list.” (page 27) The concept of series has been generally overlooked until recent mathematical logicians attended to it:

“The best summary of the modern discussions of the whole question [of series] in English is to be found in Mr. Bertrand Russell’s recent work on the Principles of Mathematics.” (Page 31)

“The concept of a row or series of objects is therefore a concept of simply universal significance for every coherent thinking-process.” (Page 32)

Next Royce exemplifies what contrasts with our ordering elements into series, by looking at our operation of “taking levels” in many fields of investigation (and ordinary life). He concludes in balance by noting:

“Equality [from taking levels] and precedence [from ordered series] are the two correlated [38] practical problems of all our social relations . . . [and] . . . to know that many objects are of equal weight, is not to set them into any series. But the process of taking levels serves to correlate many series, and is itself an indispensable correlate of the series-building process.” (Pages 37-38)

[At this point, the Lecture II text shifts to Box 50, and the renumbered typescript, for

sections IV-VIII.]

Royce begins section IV:

“But in addition to the conceptual forms so far discussed, we find in the field of science still another and very important group of concepts. . . . These are the concepts we may call in general ‘Transformations.’ They are of three classes, which I shall at once exemplify.” (Page 41)

Royce then proceeds to describe the three classes as:

- (1) Types of Change in our mental world, and in the physical world where “change does not appear to be so pervasive,” (41)
- (2) Transformations – whether occurring through our intervention, or without it, and
- (3) Ideal Types of change “which either may under certain circumstances occur in the outer world, or which in some cases may be intended to remain wholly ideal. Thus, for instance, at a given stage in an investigation, we may substitute one idea for another. Or we may combine certain ideas, and, for the sake of defining the result of this combination, we may then substitute for the combination some new idea.” (42)

These changes among ideas may be called “Ideal Operations.”

A classic instance of transformations of this kind is furnished by the well-known mathematical operations – addition, multiplication, division, subtraction. “Operations of this sort are transformations occurring wholly in the realm of our ideas.” (42)

Any process of reasoning, by which we proceed from the premises of an argument to the conclusions of this argument is a process of ideal transformation and all operations which consist in substituting a group of ideas (e.g. sums and products for certain other groups of ideas) are transformations governed by the rules of logic. And these transformations are intimately tied up with the previous concepts mentioned: series, levels, class, relation and element.

Section V:

Royce focuses on the **characteristic structure of each of these various types of conceptual forms.** (page 44) Using the idea of “class,” Royce points out the common-sense notion of a group is very vague, using “unlike” and “like” whereas science requires a more specific term to the mere idea of “unlike,” or vague others. And this requires making judgments. “The essential thing to remember is that classification depends not merely upon the perception of likeness or unlikeness, but upon the acceptance or rejection of a certain judgment, as applying or as not applying to any one of a group of objects.” (Page 46)

Section VI:

Royce moves from classes to Relations, and to “the fundamentally distinct types of relations,” writing that “[a] relation is a characteristic that belongs to an object not when you take it alone by itself, but when you take it as a member of a group of objects.” (Page 50) Some relations one

has in so far as one belongs to a pair; but other relations are found in so far as one belongs to a group of three, four, or more objects. (page 52) For example, John gives an apple to James (triadic), or “[h]e is a pitcher of nine baseball players,” where we have “a many-cornered, or polygonal system of relations.” (Page53)

Comparing dyadic and triadic relations, Royce observes,

“A very important and fundamental logical question is that as to whether dyadic relations are any more fundamental, than more complex types of relations.... But considerations ... tend to suggest that the triadic relations are really more important for our thought than dyadic relations, and that they are logically relations of the more fundamental type, at least so long as we consider certain of the most important interests of our thought.” (Page 54)

[Yet Royce for the time being stays mainly with dyadic relations in his philosophizing, until his 1912 “Peircean insight.”]

Section VII:

While we can relate “a” and “b,” it’s important to recognize the sequence in which we read that relation, since if “a” is father and “b” is son, it’s important not to treat “a-to-b” as if equaled “b-to-a.” IF “a” stands in relation “R” to “b”, and “b” stands in the same relation “R” to “a,” then we have a **symmetrical** relation. For example, “a” is brother to “b,” and “b” is brother to “a.” BUT such relations as “greater and less,” “father and son,” debtor and creditor” are properly called “**non-symmetrical**” or “**asymmetrical**” relations. (55) Here the relation of “b” to “a” is the converse of the relation “a” to “b.” Note that the relation “brother” is often symmetrical, but it may be brother of a sister and then it is asymmetrical. As for the “illative” relation, if I know “a” implies “b,” I may not conclude that “b” implies “a.” (56)

Section VIII:

Regarding the relation of two pairs of objects, Royce writes:

“We consequently distinguish two classes of relations in the world of dyadic relations. We say, first, that a dyadic relation “R” may be transitive. And by a transitive relation “R” we mean a relation such that if “a” stands in the relation “R” to “b” and “b” stands in the relation “R” to “c,” then “a” stands in relation “R” to “c.” Then this “R” is a relation of a quality.

On the other hand, if the relation “Q” is such that if “a” stands in the relation “Q” to “b” and “b” stands in the relation “Q” to “c,” “a” cannot stand in relation “Q” to “c” since “Q” is a wholly intransitive relation, e.g. the Father-son-grandson relation. Nevertheless, sometimes certain relations are transitive at times and intransitive at other times, for example, “different from” relations. “Thus if ‘a’ is different from ‘b’ and ‘b’ is different from ‘c,’ ‘a’ may or may not be different from ‘c’ according to ‘a’” [FMO thinks this last “a” should be “b.”] (Page 56)

Notice that “a relation may be symmetrical and transitive, or it may be non-symmetrical and transitive, and if intransitive, it may be either of the symmetrical or non-symmetrical type.” (Page 59)

“I assert, then, as I close, that those conceptual forms which we have called ‘ordered series’ depend altogether for their existence and for their significance upon the presence of transitive, non-symmetrical relations, which obtain between members of pairs of objects that you find belonging to a series. That is, I assert that those conceptual forms which we have called ordered series depend upon the presence of some such relation as “before and after,” and this relation may be in general defined as a non-symmetrical, but transitive relation. On the other hand, what we have called a ‘level’ is characterized by the presence of a certain relation such as ‘equality,’ which obtains between the members of any pair of objects belonging to the same level. Equality, however, is a transitive symmetrical relation. Therefore, as we shall see, upon the distinction between the symmetrical transitive relations and the non-symmetrical transitive relations, the most fundamental distinctions between the concepts of the various sciences depend. The entire business of thought may be defined as a process which everywhere includes establishing systems of relations and then distinguishing transitive symmetrical relations from transitive non-symmetrical relations.... At the next time I shall show, then, in more detail how these distinctions may be applied to the conceptual types that we have already distinguished.” (Page 60)

Lecture III:

In the program, Royce refers to this lecture as a continuation of Lecture II, with the following continued subsections:

- 4) Concepts of Transformation
 - (a) Concepts of External or Actual [Mental] Transformation,
 - (b) Concepts of Ideal Transformations: - the “Operations” of the Exact Sciences, and
- (5) Concepts of Levels:
 - (a) Types of equality and Equivalence, and
 - (b) Concepts of Invariants or Laws.

An incomplete text, the lecture begins with a typescript – the last two pages in **Box 50** – and a typed notation “Lecture 3” on a separate page (without explicit reference to the Columbia Lectures). Back in **Box 74**, this Lecture appears to continue with typescript page 25 to page 42. Pages 23 and 24 are not included in either box. As explained above, the typescript page 21 appears to follow directly on the typescript pages “1-20” that Royce renumbered “41-60.”

The remainder of Lecture III, as well as the typescript of Lecture IV, and the MS of Lecture V, finish **Box 74**.

While the first two typescript pages 21 and 22 are included in **Box 50**, they are reproduced here as follows:

“The somewhat abstract considerations with which the last lecture closed must be considered for a moment in a more practical light before we go on to apply them to the study of the more complicated scientific concepts. When I speak of symmetrical and non-symmetrical, of transitive and intransitive, relations, I make use of terms that may

seem painfully or uselessly abstract, but which are nevertheless necessary for the process of definition. But on the other hand I do not wish to neglect the fact that the distinctions amongst the relationships which are thus defined have a very decided concrete and practical significance. We all recognize in daily life that our symmetrical relations have a peculiar value, and also lack certain values which are possessed by our non-symmetrical relations. I stand in a symmetrical relation with my fellow when I am his brother, his friend, his equal, his fellow-traveler, when co-workers in an activity we are both symmetrically related. On the other hand, I stand in a non-symmetrical relation to my creditor or debtor, to my ancestors and to my children, to whoever [*sic*] is better than I am or whoever [*sic*] I regard as worse than I am. The symmetrical relations have in many cases a pleasing and simple and satisfactory aspect. They do not arouse hostilities, they do not of themselves invite change. They have, on the other hand, very distinctly what may be called from a practical point of view the leveling character. And what brings life to a level is not the most interesting aspect of life. In so far as I stand on the same level there may be, indeed, many observable differences amongst us, for difference is itself a symmetrical relation, but on the other hand these differences are not viewed as exciting us to definite and serial forms of activity. To attain or to establish equality [22] amongst men has often been an object of the most vehement conflict, so long as the equality was not attained; but when equality is attained, it gives us merely the opportunity for some type of action, it does not of itself put us into significant courses of activity. The fact that I am equal to my fellow does not determine why I should select one profession and he another. It does not tell me which of us ought to write a letter to the other, or which ought to greet the other first. Hence mere equality is always unsatisfactory. And I no sooner make men equal than they begin to discover new devices for establishing inequality among them.

“On the other hand, the unsymmetrical relations are precisely those which most have to do with inciting changes, with leading to coherent activities, and as we shall soon see, with establishing precise serial order amongst men and amongst activities. It takes but a glance at the facts to show you that in terms of before and after, of right and left, of up and down, of to and fro, of advance and retreat, of ascent and descent, – in terms of such relation you set in order your house, arrange your business, and establish your plan of life. In nature the non-symmetrical relations appear to us even the sole ones upon which life, change, growth, decay, and the course of nature generally, depend. The relation, a greater temperature and the less, is a non-symmetrical relation. But heat passes from the body at the higher temperature to the body at the lower temperature, and does so of itself. And the relation between a high level and low level is a non-symmetrical relation. Water flows from the high level to the low level. The relation between infancy and maturity is a non-symmetrical relation. The infant tends to mature. Thus the distinction between symmetrical and” (Page 22 breaks off at this point.)

Royce sets for a **plan of action** by using these logical ideas in order to reach a definition which will give the scientist the clarity beyond an initial vagueness whereby he can take his next steps. [Does this echo C. S. Peirce’s 1903 Pragmatism Lectures? See the resume of Peirce’s 1903 Pragmatism Lectures, edited by Turrisi. Royce had access via colleagues in Cambridge to this resume after his return from California.]

“In order to classify you must [go beyond merely perceived ‘likes’ and ‘unlikes’ and] use so deliberately chosen judgment as the test whether or no this or this object does or does not belong to a given class.” (Page 49)

Royce then turns to Relations, with the help of modern logic and its “logic of relations” in which “a certain few and simple types of relations are of such enormous and universal importance in the whole field of definite thinking.” (Page 50)

Royce next moves into Kind of Relations: dyadic (transitive, non-transitive, symmetrical and non-symmetrical), triadic, and multi-parted relations. Then he addresses the issue of series: ordered, one or multi-dimensional series, and the practical series of means-to-an-end. He concludes the lecture by considering “levels,” and then “transformations” (or “changes” of the three basic types).

Lecture IV:

In Box 74, a page with a typed note “Lecture IV” on one side, and a MS list under the heading “Quantity” on the other, leads into what Wells determined was Lecture IV of this series. Wells makes a note in red pencil under the “Lecture IV” typescript noting that typescript pages 43-70 are included in this box.

Royce’s preliminary handwritten note on “Quantity” on the back of the “Lecture IV” title page does not include the terms “magnitudes” or “manifolds,” as mentioned in Royce’s program notes for this lecture [“Applications of the foregoing survey to various special problems : – Intensive and Extensive Magnitudes; the problem of Descriptive Science as the definition of Manifolds, and their adjustment to the varieties of facts; the search for an universally applicable Manifold.”]. Yet, it is possible that Royce views quantity as a subset of magnitude. The typescript here has neither a title, nor a heading that makes reference to the Columbia Lectures. But its text does refer to magnitudes.

In this Lecture, Royce goes beyond the traditional association of mathematics with “quantity” and follows the expansion of modern mathematics to also include non-quantifiable objects as in “projective geometry” and “algebra of logic.” He does not fully follow Bertrand Russell in this presentation.

Then turning to quantity, Royce substitutes a wider term “Magnitudes” -- intensive and extensive. He states that the importance of magnitudes to exact sciences lies in the fact that they “admit of a strictly orderly distribution.” (Page 50) Hence they include all series, transformations, and levels.

Royce then turns to the concept of Number (page 51) with its key lying in the next successor. Lastly, Royce moves into the concept of “manifold.” (Pages 67-68)

Royce predicts that logic of the future will “prefer to begin defining properties not of pairs of objects but of triads of objects.” (Page 70)

Lecture V: [Titled Only as “Columbia Lectures: V” in the MS] Box 74

In the program, Royce describes/titles this lecture as “Philosophical Considerations suggested by the foregoing survey. The problem of the Categories. Three views of the work of thought: Realism, Pragmatism, and Idealist Absolutism.” He gives no title at the top of page 1 of the MS, beyond the “Columbia Lectures: V” note.

A heavily edited 58 page MS in five sections, on fresh pages, which is the last document in Box 74.

FMO further additions:

Royce returns to the underlying “problem: why are just these conceptual forms so widely applicable [especially in exact scientific thinking]?” (Page 1)

“The two Categories [of exact sciences], viz. the Series and the Level, are universally present wherever exact science is present, and they aid to make such science possible.” (Page 13)

Royce tests two theses on why these two Categories are so widely applicable:

- (1) The time-series is the prototype of all series.
- (2) The space-world is a sort of primal locus of levels. (Page 20)

When we enter our real world of Space and Time, we enter into what “appears to us to be a realm of series and levels.”

Evidences:

- the energies of the world (e.g. heat and water) flow toward equality of distribution (never actively attained within the range of our experience). (*cf.* the tendency of oceans to reach “sea-level.”)
- Evolution has series and levels of its processes
- The economic law of supply and demand tends to a certain level that determines a series of economic events.

Section III:

Royce swings back to Kant’s thesis of “forms from the understanding.” He allows that thinking of the “real world” uses the conception that the real world consists of an order of things and events in space and time. (Page 29) But his concept does not come from our present moment to moment experience. We seem directed *a priori* to think this way.

Royce emphasizes our present experience with its “character of co-existence.” Your formation of a concept of “The World” (of space and time) with its structure of “levels” would appear to be forced upon you... because of our character as the intelligent interpreter of your experience. While Realist thesis emphasizes spatial world and our capacity of “reversibility” of forward and backward.

Royce replies starting with Section IV by pointing to time’s irreversibility and thus induces the primacy of the idealist position.

“Our conception of the events [of the past and future] is obviously an

interpretation of certain given memories, images, names, suggestions, interests, hopes, demands. The present time does indeed involved an experience of a relation between the earlier and the later content of our present passing consciousness. We conceive this relation as extending indefinitely into both the past and future, and as being universally, both unsymmetrical and transitive. That is, a character of this relation which our present consciousness suggests, we universalize, we define as holding for all earlier and later temporal events, and so we conceive that all whichever has happened to us, or whichever will happen to us, forms a single series of experiences.” (Pages 49-50)

“At any instant, namely, we have something given to us, and we need to something with this which is given. That is, the present datum means something to us, implies something, leads over to a deed of some sort, arouses a response, sets us at the business of idealizing its contents, and we proceed to idealize these contents by giving them a place in a system; and so any present datum can get a place in our attention only in case it somewhere cooperates in our business of defining our own purposes as thinkers who conceive our world as a system.... And the conceived reality therefore contains for us series, because we need to conceive that it does so.” (Pages 52-53)

[Notice a turn to a pragmatism which balances the position of the realist and emphasizes idealism.]

Royce addresses:

“the present requirements of our thoughtful activity. One of these present requirements, however, involves the conception of series of past and future experience, and of endlessly numerous ranges of possible experience. Hence we conceive the real world as a system of serial orders of data. We conceived some of these serial orders as essentially reversible, and some as not reversible.” (54-55)

NB: Royce concludes this lecture by asking “In fact, how can you undertake to conceive your present experience as a stage or as a transitional phase in a system of experience. Only, of course, by conceiving, as you always do, that your present experience is a sign or symbol of contents of experience not now present to you.” [FMO: The echo of C.S. Peirce is evident here.]

[Notice the use of Royce’s insight into the present moment and our necessary extensions of that, as interpreters of experience, and of past and future dimensions -- early Berkeley experiences.

Evaluation: These Columbia Lectures represent the middle stage of Royce’s turn to logic immediately following his publication of *WI*, and in accord with his “logical correspondence course” with Peirce. These lectures are most significant because of their focus on the **usefulness** of certain concepts, logical thinking required by the sciences. This shows a pragmatic emphasis. Here Royce employs his empirical method of comparison of logical concepts and focuses primarily on judgment, taken not traditionally as “a synthesis of concepts,” but as a process busied with experience and levels of thought. Because of the stress on usefulness, all these ideas which Royce calls “plans of action,” or “epitomes of a series of processes” (Lecture I: 7-9) lead to his effort in Lecture V to create his distinctive *IND*duction of the Categories (especially of

space and time), contrary to Kant's Schematism of them as *a priori* forms of the imagination.

While Royce's April 29, 1905 logical article "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry" is clearly more significant, these Columbia Lectures are certainly to be raised in the importance of Royce Readings. (Even he used them again in the Richmond Lectures.) **NB:** The connection between Royce's predicted goal in these lectures (*see* Lecture I, and his attempt to decide between Realism, Idealism and Pragmatism), and his actual carrying this out towards the end of Lecture V. The in between lectures can distract a reader from Royce's careful laying of grounds for this induction.

Particularly insightful portions of these lectures may be found in lectures I and IV.

**253. The Andover Address: "The Clergyman's Relation to Philosophical Inquiry" (June 1904)
Box 75**

A 75 page MS, extensively edited, on all fresh pages. The above title is marked on the first page. It is immediately preceded in Box 75 by a cutting from a manila envelope which titles the MS somewhat differently, i.e., "The Andover Address on Relation of Philosophy to Clergyman's Profession" June 7, 1904. Sections II and III are marked, but no others.

Royce also delivered an address on a similar subject to the Harvard Divinity School on February 20, 1908 (HUG 3, page 96)

This is an unpublished text. There is an article on a similar topic which was published at around the same time, and may be useful for comparison: "What Should Be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?" *International Journal on Education* 13 (1902-03):280-85. *See BWJR*:2, 1206.

Royce begins the address by dealing with the ideals of the clergyman's profession, first, the need to assess, as in any profession, the distinctive work to which your inclination calls you, and second what instruments are needed for that profession. Royce draws analogies to other professions (e.g. law and medicine).

With temerity, Royce offers to be a mid-wife toward their ideal (9-10). Recognizing confusion in the "age of transition" that they live in, Royce ventures with sympathy reflections on a matter of difficulty -- the definition of their profession's requirements.

Given the wide range of interpreting the bible, the clergyman is confronted with a further vagueness and diversity of path. This is made more vague by the need to do so in the context of the varying needs of many different people.

Royce's reflection on the job of the protestant minister at pages 17-18 is interesting: dealing with the conviction of an individual calling in light of scientific advances: "But this very conviction also must be kept in line with the advance of human knowledge." (18) The minister must be up on sociology, and this may sometimes conflict with traditional clergy function. (Royce makes a

reference to *Romans*.) The minister must also be up on the higher criticism of the scriptures. Little wonder that it is hard for him to define his central ideals.

“[F]or my part, I do not like the clerical doubter in the pulpit. ... I do not like to see a ship navigated by a captain who stands on the bridge explaining to the passengers” that he is uncertain how to steer a ship. (23)

[NB: In his two page list of “Topics” for a lecture to the Yale Theological Club on the “Sources for Religious Insight” (found in **Box 78**), Royce refers to pages 20-32 of this Andover address.]

After the “doubter,” Royce assails the “dogmatist.”

Royce turns to the question of how the study of philosophy can help the minister define for himself the central ideas of his profession. Having seen “too many theological students injured by an excessive or by a misdirected interest in philosophy,” Royce suggests a comparatively narrow limit for relating to philosophy.

NB: A significant autobiographical passage:

“I remember clearly the ministrations of such men as I heard them more than once in my boyhood, and in my early youth. They used to quicken my wits by the hostility which they awakened in my mind, and to arouse my boyish fury by their dogmatism. They probably helped to turn me in the direction of philosophical study. They therefore may have aided me to find my own calling in life. But they certainly drove me away from their own form of religious life.” (26) [This is the first time FMO has heard Royce state why he did not become a clergyman.]

“They did so by ostentatiously pretending to reason about philosophical problems under conditions which all the while made the spirit of leisurely and dispassionate inquiry simply impossible. They undertook to investigate; but theirs were forgone conclusions. They said, ‘come let us reason together’; and then they hurled their dogmas at me, and denounced more or less ingenuously all possible opponents. They in any case taught me one thing, which I have never forgotten, and which I hope that all of you recognize; namely, they taught me the pulpit is no place for philosophical investigation. Whatever the clergyman is, he is, as clergyman, no teacher of philosophy. If he tries to unite the two offices, that of philosophical and that of religious teacher in the pulpit, he sins doubly against the truth.” (26-27)

The double sin: (1) the sin against “the philosophical business of truth-seeking.” [emphasis added by FMO], and (2) the sin of confusing the hearer with technical formulations (thus breaching his duty to present religious and moral truth.) (28).

The minister’s philosophy will, as such, not determine the content of his preaching. (32) Only the religious experience which he has will nourish his people, and indirectly the social question, new testament problems, and higher criticism.

Query: what is the role of philosophy for the minister? “I reply it can make him reflectively conscious, in a technical way, of the meaning and of the problems, both of life in general, and of duty and religion in particular.” (33)

“[Philosophy is a criticism of the leading ideas and ideals of science and of life.” (35)

“But philosophy may help you to gain possession of your own spiritual freedom, and so of your own ideals.” (36)

Royce enters into the question of how to nourish this life and religious experience. References hint at prayer form.

Royce’s aim in this address, he states, as

“to exemplify how to my mind, a certain way of viewing philosophical problems might be useful in helping some of you, if you agreed with me, to define the ideals of your chosen calling.

“I conceive then, the ultimate truth which lies behind any man’s religious consciousness to be of the following nature :” Any man has two instruments in dealing with the world around him: (1) experience and (2) thought. (42-42)

There follows an exposition of these two elements, from page 42 up to page 45: “To get an intellectual mastery of our world The logic of the sciences, proceeds to define a certain well know limitation of all human knowledge”, namely the tension of thought as powerless and experience as transient. (46-53)

The nub of this tension: “The rationality that we demand of our empirical world is thus merely illustrated with wavering definiteness, by our flickering human experience. And in this way is the pride of human intelligence baffled by a nature of things which appears, to our quickened critical and scientific insight, far more mysterious today than the brilliant half-mythical imagery of the author of the Jahweh-speeches in the book of Job could possibly make it appear to his own age. ‘Where was thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?’ says the Jahweh of the whirlwind in the poem. ‘Where are the facts which can prove to our human sense that the universe has any rational foundations whosoever?’ Such is the question which the logic of science seems today to force upon us as the whirlwind of human experience passes before our eyes.” (53-54)

This “whirlwind” and question reveals the limitations of our human knowledge provided “we view the relations of thought and of experience this essentially dualistic way.” (55) “As a result all our knowledge of nature is limited to probabilities; and all our sciences are but present efforts to adjust ourselves to a realm of truth whose inmost meaning still baffles us, even while it inspires us.” (56)

“But, on the other hand. . . what interests me . . . is a point of view which seems to me to make clear that right at the very heart of this so baffling mystery of our present existence a truth stands revealed which is as simple as it is absolute, as exact as it is inspiring, as significant for logic as it is for religion. Shall I try to indicate what this truth is.” (56-57)

Royce asks how can he say “mine, here, now” . . . he goes into the conditions of the truth statement. There are echoes of the logician talking. To whom am I appealing, both as a system of experience, when the system of experience is itself a manifestation of a greater mind?

These two aspects of intellectual life and experience are kept separate in our mortal condition, yet they are hints of the truth of a certain rational system of experience which is not merely the

system of human experience. “Rather in the end, they are hints of the system of the divine experience viewed as the expression of the divine thought, and so the embodiment of the divine will.” (66)

He then expends this approach to God in the following pages.

Hence,

“I hold that both philosophy and religions can say, each in its own way, - to every son of man, however, wretched or rebellious, ‘Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you’, or again: ‘What you in truth aim to be, that I declare you eternally to be, namely this expression of the divine Will, this form of the divine life.’” (68)

Royce then sketches the life of the philosopher who agrees with him (really a self-portrait) (69). He contrasts this with a portrait of the clergyman. (71) He ventures to define a clergyman’s ideals:

“to make people practically and effectively aware, in whatever they do, of how near they are to God, and of how near God is to them. It is [the clergyman’s] business to get people to live in accord with this insight.” (72)

“-- In any case, gentlemen, it is your ideal to make people feel and live as if they knew that God is in them. It is the philosopher’s business to inquire whether this is true that God is in them. As you well know, I have long since publicly asserted that there is room here for much division of labor, and that, for my own part, I prefer to see at least some philosophers at work upon this task in entire freedom from personal connection with any branch of the visible church. I myself deliberately avoid such connection. It is as such an outsider that you have called me here. I am able to speak frankly. You see that I do not want our respectively [*sic*] callings confounded. But I am glad to feel that, with very different means at our disposal, with means that in my own case I feel to be indeed poor, we are still, in the intimacies of a common divine task, -- coworkers.” (75)

[NB: The **autobiographical nature** of this conclusion.]

Evaluation: FMO’s identity as priest and a Roman Catholic undoubtedly influences this evaluation. Nevertheless, Royce here shows for us of the 21st century a way to deal with the critical problem today of the relation of reason and faith. Royce’s emphasis in his so-called “argument to God” grapples (with Thomas Aquinas) **about the truth** of the assertion that God is actual. It is not a proof that God is experienced, in terms of quasi-mystical experience. It is a proof of the indispensable logical conditions of an ordinary human factual assertion. Royce’s approach implies a whole system which embraces our human experience and all rational thought, and this implies an insight into the divine system of experience and of rationality which arises from the divine will.

254. “Herbert Spencer and His Contribution to the Concept of Evolution”
International Quarterly, 9 (1904): 333-65

Reprinted in *Herbert Spencer: An Estimate and Review* (New York: Fox, Duffield & Co., 1904). On page 53 of the book, there is a footnote not found in the *International Quarterly* article.

Evaluation: A more concise Royce writing on his view of evolution can probably be found.

255. Covers from Manila Envelopes, and a “Mem. On the Chapter on Grades” (1904)
Box 75

The envelope covers read as follows:

“Memorandum for a ‘Chapter XII’ on the “Grades of Influence” exercised by the ‘Great Man’”

“Chapter XII: Grades of Influence, Royce Notes, 1904, Second Envelope”

“Grades Notes for rewriting Linkages. 20 ½ [min]

1. Propinquity
2. Cooperation in work
3. Trade
4. Science
5. Philanthropy
6. Social Control
7. Religion

-
1. Grades of influ. As related to the ‘spheres’, I.e. the ‘forms of linkage’
 2. Grades as related to types of Initiative
Grades of influence as related to the method used.
40 min.”

Then, a single sheet MS, front and back, in Royce’s hand. In it, he outlines the topics for this Chapter. This MS appears to relate to the envelope covers listed above.

FMO notes from 1968:

Royce is evidently working on a book, with a chapter 12 that includes material on the “great-man theory” and on “how the modes of influence are related to the individuality of the influence of the genius.” (1) Royce explicitly dates this “JR Notes, 1904 Grades, Chap. XII.”

256. The St. Louis Lecture (October 1904): “The Sciences of the Ideal”
***Science*, n.s. 20 (1904): 449-62**
Box 47

A paper read in September 20, 1904, then published (in *Science* n.s. 20 (1904): 449-62) on October 7, 1904.

Skrupskelis suggests that the paper “Symmetrical and Unsymmetrical Relations in the Exact Sciences” (Box 72, document 4) may be an elaboration of this paper read at the St. Louis exposition “on the ‘fundamental relations involved in the exact sciences.’” *BWJR*:2 1207.

Royce refers to this lecture in his 1906 paper “The Present State of the Question Regarding the First Principles of Theoretical Science” published in *The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 45 (1906): 82-102.

Brief Outline:

Section I: What is the most general community of interest which unites all “normative sciences”? (e.g. the philosophical and mathematical sciences) (449-54).

Section II: What recent work bears upon the task of all of us? (454-58)

Section III: Results and problems raised by this type of scientific work (458-462).

Section I: What is the most general community of interest which unites all “normative sciences”? (e.g. the philosophical and mathematical sciences) (449-54).

Royce does engage in a critique of Kant’s categories as being too formalistic. At page 456, Royce talks about the normative science (aestheticians, ethicists and mathematicians). He foresees real results occurring in the logical foundations of these three disciplines, although the goal of unification is in the far future, “I freely admit that the relatively complete rational analysis and tabulation of the fundamental categories of human thought,” we are approaching.

Section II: What recent work bears upon the task of all of us? (454-58)

Royce includes why he feels Bertrand Russell is inadequate. (A hint regarding Russell’s not taking in “modes of action.”)

Section III: Results and problems raised by this type of scientific work (458-462).

Royce finds Kempe quite helpful. Royce admits that all he is doing here is restating Kempe’s generalization in his own way. Moreover, “the world of ideally possible logical objects interests the logicians,” including “totality of possible acts of will.” 459-60. What Royce is doing is to say the fundamental category is Relations.

At the end, however, he makes the important note that the group and self concepts have very wide application in the ethics of the future. (hinting at the importance of, ultimately, the Great Community in his fault)

**257. The Richmond Lectures (November 1904)
Box 88**

Professor Cotton, in a typed note, inserted into Box 88 and dated September 4, 1953, lists the Richmond lectures as follows:

- I. "Orderly Arrangement of Facts and Ideas: 'Series' and 'Levels'"
- II. "Transformations and their laws"
- III. "The World and the Will"]

Only the first of these lectures, at least under the name Cotton gives, is here in **Box 88**.

Box 88 1904

1st Richmond Lecture MS

Typescript untitled (Wells's conjecture - Lecture II? Wells calls it "Instances of Order (Number, Time, Relation)" FMO thinks it a continuation of Lecture 1)

Typescript untitled (Wells calls it "Instances of Law, Series, Levels)

3 page MS "Advantages of Serial Order"

1 page MS "topics for Final Lecture"

Six logical exercises

[These belong with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as "Logicalia."]

258. "Wie unterscheiden sich gesunde und krankhafte Geisteszustände beim Kind,"
Padagogisches Magazin, 44 (1904): 1-28

259. Introduction
Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*, trans. George Bruce Halsted (New York: Science Press, 1905)

Reprinted with slight omissions as the introduction to *The Foundations of Science* in Royce's *Logical Essays*. Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1207.

260. "Kant's Doctrine of the Bases of Mathematics"
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 2 (1905): 197-207
Box 47

A manuscript of this text may be found in HARP Box 47. The paper was read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia, December 28-30, 1904.

A reprint of this article may be found in Box 103, folder 14.

Evaluation: In 1905, looking at Kant's doctrine of the bases of mathematics, Royce

interestingly offers a critique – both positive and negative – of Kant. Especially on page 206, Royce concurs with the modern logic of mathematics in abandoning Kant’s theory. But Royce holds Kant was right in declaring that constructive synthesis and observation of its ideal results are both necessary for math. **It shows how Royce’s attitude to Kant is developing.**

Overall, the article belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicalia.”

**261. “Symmetrical and Unsymmetrical Relations in the Exact Sciences” (Spring, 1905)
Box 72**

The last paper in Box 72, entitled as above given, is a typescript of 17 pages, with edits and diagrams in Royce’s hand. Here he aims to simplify and extend some of Kempe’s theorems (p 17), writes much on the O-Relation, but does not yet speak of its “generalization.” Royce says he is reading this paper after his 1904 “St. Louis paper,” and around the time of his major presentation to the American Mathematical Society (April 29, 1905). This paper may be one of those “4 MSS” which concerned the overall project that Royce presented to the AMA, calling it a “restatement of Kempe’s Theory of the Relation between Logic and Geometry, . This latter (major) MS Royce sent off to Prof. E. H. Moore at the University of Chicago in early May 1905 for printing. [See cover-page of the MS form of this address to the AMA found in Box 45].

NB in Box 45, 1st MS, “Relations of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry,” Royce writes (p 4) of the axioms of geometry which consist 1) of assertions characterizing the “between” relation... and 2) of existential propositions defining certain entities that shall possess the [“between”] relation.” [underlining added, yet Royce “defining” refers to the logician’s creative act of making some idea be real in logic--something very existential for Royce].

Evaluation: This belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicalia.”

**262. “The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry,”
Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 24 (1905): 353-415**

Reprinted in *Royce Logical Essays*.

A reprint of the article may be found in Box 103, folder 15.

For the logic people and their Section of the *Critical Edition*.

263. Cutting from a manila envelope cover
Box 72

“Proposed Supplement to the Alg. Of Log. Investigation of July 1905 (Am. Math. Soc.).

1. Notes on the T=relation.
2. Note on generalization of O=Relation
3. Also note on conditions of the possession of unique resultants common to two triads, or other collections
4. Also note on corresponding sets of resultants.”

This is followed by a page of logical formulations.

Evaluation: This belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicalia.”

264. “A Study Toward A Generalization of the O=Relation. Being a Supplement to the paper in the Am. Math. Soc. Trans. For July 1905”
Box 75

A 9-page MS, with roman numeral page numbers. Royce titles these pages as “Preliminary Note on the Symmetrical Tetrad Relation.” The lengthy title precedes it on a first non-numbered page. This is a logical paper on tetrads. [See also 49a below.]

See Letters 610. Royce worked this out with the American Mathematical Society.

Evaluation: This belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicalia.”

265. “A Generalization of the O=Relation”
Box 75

A 22-page MS, with page 21 missing. Sheer symbolic logic. The paper contains 14 logical sections.

Evaluation: This belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicalia.”

266. “Race Questions and Prejudices”
***International Journal of Ethics*, 16 (1905-06): 265-88.**

The text of an address delivered to the Chicago Ethical Society in 1905. Reprinted in *Race Questions* and in *SPJR*.

Of this essay, Royce writes in his preface to *RPQ* (vi) that he has tried “to express and justify, in the special case of the race problems, the spirit which I have elsewhere defined as ‘loyalty to

loyalty.””

A 76 page MS (adds 14a-c, combines pages 9&10), in six sections. Some pages fresh, some formerly drafted as follows: 1-14 are fresh pages. 14a-14b are previously drafted pages, 14c-40 are clean pages, 41-62 are previously drafted 62. Starts section six. 63-73 clean. Last page 74 is redrafted.

The published version in *RQP* very faithfully follows this MS.

The text deals with the issue of how illusions play a role in race prejudices.

Page 9/10, Royce confesses that as a student of ethics he has “been a good deal baffled trying to discover just what the results of science are regarding the true psychological and moral meaning of race-differences.

Royce recognizes that the scientists of the *Rassentheoretiker* (race theorists) frequently use science to support their prejudices. “Therefore I cannot use scientific results, but begin with events I have experienced.” (14). He begins with a story about Japan.

He then moves to the “Southern question.” (19) i.e., “The very constant and explicit insistence upon keeping the negro in his proper place, as a social inferior“ (20) But I have experienced a Jamaica.” (21) He then considers how the British dealt differently with the race question on that island. White people may move freely among the black population on the island, e.g. “The negro is on the whole neither painfully obtrusive in his public manners, nor in need of being sharply kept in his place.” (25)

“Yet there is no doubt whatever that English white men are the essential controllers of the essential destiny of the country.” (25-26)

“Administration has done the larger half of solving Jamaica’s race problem.” (29) Royce also cites “reticence” as a productive element: “Superiority is best shown by good deed and by few boasts.” (32)

In the East Indies, Royce notes the British used native peoples as constabularies. (33)

Page 63 of the MS, page 47 of the printed text, the last paragraph on the page begins “Now, the mutual antipathies ...” in the MS, but “Now, the mental antipathies ...” in the book. The MS is pretty clearly “mutual.”

(71)

The effect of social training on the race problem: “Our social training largely consists in the elimination, or in the intensification, or in the systematizing of these original reactions through the influence of suggestion and habit.” (71)

Royce concludes as follows: “- I have said little or nothing, in this paper of human justice. I have spoken mainly of human illusions. We all have illusions, and hug them. Let us not sanctify them by the name of science. For my part then, I am a member of the human race, and that this

is a race which is, as a whole, considerably lower than the angels, so that the whole of it very badly needs race elevation. In this need of my race I personally and very deeply share. And it is in this spirit only that I am able to approach our problem.”

At the end of the MS, page 74, Royce adds in red ink “Harvard University Josiah Royce” (This is not in the book.) Then, having used a previously used page, he deletes the following lines evidently intended for another article: “So much, merely by way of a confession of my personal limitations, at the outset of the discussion. But not for a word as what has led me to undertake in your presence a discussion for which my own learning has rather ill-prepared me. I shall not confine myself merely to general principles. My attention has been attracted to the general problems by the different lessons that experience has taught me regarding [illegible]. II. I have been [illegible] interested, of late year, in the work [text breaks off]”

Evaluation: This work has recently been published, revealing popular interest.

267. Review

**James Hervey Hyslop, *Problems of Philosophy* (1906)
International Journal of Ethics, 16 (1905-06): 236-41**

**268. “The Present State of the Question Regarding the First Principles of Theoretical Science,”
The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 45 (1906): 82-102**

In this piece, Royce considers, from the point of view of the philosopher, “the logical problem regarding the internal structure of theories. What does one mean, for instance, by a quantitative theory?” (86) Noting that “[s]cience depends upon finding facts; it certainly also aims at the controlling of facts,” Royce suggests “that a science ... which I may provisionally call the morphology of theories” is needed. He views this “science as a branch of logic.” (87)

Royce develops the argument that:

“Our study of theoretical science has to be interpreted, then as a kind of science of a thinker’s ways, as an inquiry into what sort of ideal he has, as a study of the meaning of his thoughtful life, of its internal meaning, and of truth, in so far as truth is related to this internal meaning of the thinker.” (98)

He then goes on to ask:

“When we find, as we do, that the forms of thought are not endlessly variable, but are reducible to a certain range of generically different conceptual structures, we are therefore led to this question which now we face. To what are these thought forms due? What is their unity?” (98)

Looking to research being done by mathematicians (Kempe) and symbolic logicians, Royce suggests a non-mathematical philosophical approach to categories of logical relations. Noting

that “these forms of relations are themselves the forms in which our will embodies itself” (102), Royce casts “the modern study of the principles of theoretical science” as part of a broader philosophical endeavor, part of “a long struggle with nature, by means of which ... we attain the end of finding our own will expressed in the order of the controllable facts.” (102)

Evaluation: This belongs with Boxes 86 & 87 to be **labeled clearly** as “Logicialia.”

**269. The Baltimore Lectures: “Lectures on Modern Idealism” (1906)
(Royce’s title: “Aspects of post-Kantian Idealism”)²⁴
Box 41-42**

Lectures 1-3 are contained in Box 41.

Lecture 4, 8, 9 is in Box 42.

Lectures 5,6, 7 and 10 are not in this grouping (Boxes 41-42) The job of trying to find them in the remnants remains on scholars’ hands.

Not directly related to these Baltimore Lectures. Loewenberg’s *Selections from Hegel* (1929) seem to reproduce this MS of Box 41.

Royce apparently left no index for this lecture series, but the index in the published volume comes from Loewenberg.

This book was published posthumously, with Loewenberg as its editor. In his Editor’s Preface (1919), Loewenberg writes:

“The lectures here published were first delivered at the Johns Hopkins University in 1906 under the title ‘Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism.’ They were, in their present form at least, no originally intended for publication, but a note, dated 1907, found among Professor Royce’s manuscripts mentions these “Baltimore Lectures” as material “worth publishing.” This entitles them to head the list of this posthumous works. Written as they were for oral delivery **the lectures required much revision**; the editor hopes he has not used his pen too freely.”

Loewenberg edits the MS with a red pen, used sparingly. Very rarely, some hand makes further edits in pencil. This hand is more probably Royce’s than another’s.

Lecture I:

Box 41. Royce entitled this entire lecture “Introduction.” But Loewenberg changed its title to “Kant’s Conception of the Nature and the Conditions of Knowledge.”

The 70 page MS consists of fresh pages in six sections. The text is heavily edited by Royce himself, and then re-edited in red ink relatively rarely by Loewenberg.

²⁴ According to Loewenberg’s note starting his bibliography of Royce’s unpublished works *Philosophical Review* XXVI 1917 page 578). See Box 41, page 1.

The MS for the first lecture runs parallel to the printed text, , incorporating Loewenberg's edits.

Introduction:

The introduction to the lecture occupies 10 pages.

Section VI:

The MS section closes with these Royce lines deleted Loewenberg: "At the next time we are to begin to see what the Idealists did with this conception of a virtual self, to whose unity all facts must conform."

Lecture II: "The Modification of Kant's Conception of the Self"

Box 41

Royce had originally titled this lecture: "Fundamental Conception of the Early Post-Kantian Idealism: The Modification of Kant's Conceptions [pl.] of the Self"

The 62 page MS is divided into five sections.

Section 1.

On page 7 of the MS, which appears on page 33 of the printed text, Loewenberg deletes "in the sense which Locke had in mind" and "according to those whom Lock opposed."

On page 9 of the MS, before the paragraph beginning "The third thought" (page 34 of the printed text), Loewenberg deletes the following lines: "So far then for two thoughts. We know things only in so far as the nature of our own intelligence determines how phenomena are present to us. But this a priori nature of our intelligence itself we can know."

On page 12 of the MS, before sentence beginning (page 35 of printed text) "To say: This is a fact" Loewenberg deletes these words: "- the presupposed subject to which we attribute our knowledge.:"

Section III:

On page 13 of the MS, after the sentence "the experiences into actually present experiences," Loewenberg deletes "our real dealings with our world are such processes."

Section IV:

Royce himself heavily edits pages 45-48 of the MS, starting with the paragraph "It seems impossible..." (page 47-48 of the printed text).

Lecture III: "The Concept of the Absolute and the Dialectical Method"

Box 41

A 61 page MS, divided into three sections. Royce's title is identical (except he inserts a semi-colon after Absolute.

Section 1:

At page 11 of the MS, after the words "... political reconstructions...." Loewenberg deletes "(since the French came to hold during these years, the 'empire of the land'); were these activities reflected in Germany." Loewenberg leaves in Royce's "but after" in the middle of that ellipsis.

Section 3:

At the bottom of MS page 42, after "of such a tendency, and continuing onto 43, (page 79 of the printed text) Loewenberg deletes "as thus becomes explicit in the dialectical method of the idealist."

On page 52 of the MS, after the words "a closer view shows" Loewenberg transposes Royce's clause "that this dialectical tendency belongs rather to the active will than to the mere emotions." to precede the sentence beginning "Upon this both Hegel and his bitter enemy Schopenhauer, though in very different ways, are agreed, and upon this they insist."

Lecture IV: "The Dialectical Method in Schelling"

Box 42

Royce writes in the manuscript above "Lecture IV" "Post-Kantian Idealism." Loewenberg inserts the lecture title "The Dialectical Method in Schelling."

The 68 page manuscript is divided into five sections. It is moderately edited by Royce, with occasional editing marks in red by Loewenberg. The manuscript consists of fresh pages (no re-numbered ones).

The MS runs in parallel with the printed text, incorporating the edits.

Section II:

On page 10 of the MS (page 91 of the printed text), Loewenberg adds to Royce's sentence: "The self is primarily unconscious of even those most necessary deeds whereby it becomes an informing principle to which is due the form of all objective phenomena" the phrase "and their submission to intelligible laws."

Lecture VIII: "The Dialectical Progress of Hegel's Phaenomenologie"

Box 42

A 72 page MS in eight sections. Royce had titled the lecture "Hegel's Phaenomenologie Complete". The title above (and printed in the book) is inserted in red by Loewenberg.

At MS page 44, printed text page 203, there is reference to loyalty noted by FMO. "In brief, the ideal commonwealth lives through an unconsciousness as to what its own inner doubleness of loyalty means. It is unstable. Its only resource is in exercising its loyalty through active conflict with other states."

Loewenberg inserts sections "VII" and "VIII" in red, dividing Royce's last section into three parts.

On page 49 (section VI) of the MS, page 205 of the printed text, there is an edit in pencil. It is difficult to ascertain whether it is in Royce's hand (later pencil edits do appear to be his handwriting). The edit works as follows: six words are deleted from the ink MS. By pencil. The word "underlies" is inserted. Thus the MS reads: "Whatever principle underlies this world-process is an unknowable Supreme Being."

Prior to this edit, Royce's first editing had read: "Whatever principle there is that lies beneath and behind this world process is an unknowable Supreme Being."

The printed text is very faithful to the MS.

Lecture IX: "Hegel's Mature System"

Royce's original title had been "Hegel's Mature System; Later Problems of Idealism"

A 54 page MS in six sections, only slightly edited by Royce and Loewenberg. It is written on fresh pages.

In the last sentence of the lecture, MS page 54, book page 231, Loewenberg changes the last sentence from "...are eternally at once present" to "... are eternally present together."

Some later pencil edits seem likely to be Royce's hand.

The printed text is very faithful to the MS.

Evaluation: Can we find the other four lectures? Agreeing with John Clendenning, I believe these lectures are considerably more valuable for the history of modern philosophy than are Royce's earlier work *SMP*. FMO recommends publication in the *Critical Edition*.

270. "Immortality," *Hibbert Journal*, 5 (1907): 724-44

An address to an association of clergymen, given in March of 1906.

271. Introduction and "What Sort of Existence Have the Entities of Mathematics" (1907) Box 75

The 86-page MS is immediately preceded in Box 75 by a four page "Introduction" to Vassar students that expressly mentions Phi Beta Kappa. Wells identifies the two MS, in a note above the introduction, as a March 8, 1907 address, and says that this address was likely also given at the University of Illinois at Urbana.

As to the four page introduction that precedes this MS, however, Skrupskelis appears to be correct when he says the introduction relates to a **1909** Vassar lecture, and that the introduction was eventually included in “What is Vital in Christianity” *Harvard Theological Review* 2 (1909) *BWJR*:2 121, 5. (Wells had assumed that this introduction should be grouped with “What Sort of Existence” Given a reference, however, to “vital in Christianity” in the introduction’s body, this is apparently incorrect.)

On page 80 of the present 86 page MS, Royce begins an explanation of a history of his work on the topics to which the present address is concerned. Given the logic and mathematics topics, it does seem to place this as the first 1907 Vassar lecture.

The 86-page MS does not appear to be published. (It is not mentioned in Skrupskelis.)

The 86-page MS is in four sections. Some of the sheets have been formerly used, but most are fresh.

Introduction:

(Not the four page introduction to Vassar students.)

The tone of the introduction deals with the difficulty of talking about a technical problem to a fairly general audience. Royce bemoans a response of “you delighted me” after a an intensely technical presentation. Royce goes into his “dream life” as an “expositor of hard things.”

Section I: page 9

What are mathematical entities? What sort of existence do they have?

Objects have different sorts of existence. Possibilities have their own sort of existence.

Section II: page 30

Royce stresses the importance of his topic. (31) Royce goes into how important learning to count has been in human history, how important doing geometry has been. These instances of mathematics seem dreamlike, but they are pregnant with future implications for science. “Seemingly remote yet intrinsically practical.” (42-43).

Section III: page 46

Talk of the Greeks and “God geometrizes” (Newton?). Royce moves into Spinoza’s geometry, contrasting it to his ethics. The proper realm of mathematics, Royce says, is not ethics or theoretical physics, but pure mathematics.

Possibilities then seem to have some sort of fact character about them. (52)

Royce quotes scholastic authorities: “All genuine and serious possibilities are real.” (56)

On 57, he quotes a Rossetti poem: “The hour which might have been, yet might not be”

Section IV: page 60

The question becomes: what constitutes Pure Mathematics? (61)

First the drawing of conclusions from postulates, which doesn’t look to outer experience. (He repeats that mathematical entities have existence as possibilities.) Such a view of pure math is abstract and therefore superficial. It leaves the actual existence of the kinds of entities as simply defined. But if you look closer, created entities of math can be specifically defined because they

exist as pure possibility. They are connected with modes of action, choosing to think this way rather than that way. (The existential aspect emerges.)

Royce addresses question of what right we have to make these choices in pure math, to set up this or that postulate. Royce says the will has a right to do this defining. (70)

Past experience of past mathematicians' use of numbers doesn't make present use valid.

What other objects do I suppose to make my postulates?

"This notion of something that you must construct and reproduce in your thought whenever you think, may seem strange to you." (75-76)

"What is the system of things that you must view as possible in case you are to think at all, is a system rich enough to contain all the entities that pure mathematics ever defines." (78-79)(loose quote)

Royce concludes: "There are certain entities that you must view as possible if you are actively to think at all. These entities are objects that anybody who intends, who defines, who asserts, who denies, or who otherwise voluntarily and thoughtfully expresses himself about any topic, inevitably, in unconsciously, defines as possible. These objects are the logical objects. They are propositions, relationships, classes, implications, and such like things. The system of them is so wealthy that the whole infinite range of pure mathematics is included in any attempt to describe these systems of ideal objects" (81-82) "But you learn about these beings and about their relations not by merely looking but by acting." (83) I.e. there is a mode of action that these things require of you.

Comes back to theme : "What you thus seem to create, greets you, in this world of free thinking, as if it were your child, whose parent has come to find it.... It is at once your deed, and a necessity of the divine thought." (84-85)

Last sentence of address: "The lesson of mathematics that by rational creative activities we come to participate in the very being of an uncreated world is the great common lesson of art, of morality, of religion, and of philosophy." (86)

Evaluation: Left to the logical experts, a very clear presentation of the necessary link between logic and the bases of mathematics. Royce focuses on "existence" in the mathematical sense and this paper borders between metaphysics and logic. Royce's conclusion on pages 81-86 seems of paramount importance to the foundations of his eternal world of divine thought: "Yet as a valid and eternal possibility, due in its inmost nature to the necessary constitution of a divine and rational will, whereof your will is but a single expression, this which appears to be the creature of your definition has really been waiting for you in the world of truth through all the ages of eternity." (85)

272. The Urbana Lectures (1907) Box 76

An envelope cover identifies these lectures, in Royce notes in his hand, as follows:

“These Lectures to be worked over for a book on ‘Loyalty & Personality’. In this book the annexed three lectures on ‘Race-Questions’ (International Journal of Ethics April 1906), ‘Provincialism’ ‘Limitations of Thoughtful Public’ would find a place.”

FMO Notes from 1968:

This note indicates that this Urbana lecture series seeded *RQP*, of which Royce signed the preface on October 16, 1908, one and ¾ years later than these Urbana lectures were delivered, and less than a half-year prior to the publication of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (the preface of which was dated March 1, 1908).

Skrupskelis points out that Lectures I and II were edited by Peter Fuss and published in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy* 5 (1967). Skrupskelis states that the material of these lectures was used extensively in the *Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908)

Query: FMO questions the direct association with *Philosophy of Loyalty*, and would like further investigation on the topic. Certainly, Lectures III and IV explore Loyalty themes. But because they are incomplete, it is difficult to find direct parallels.

NB: The contrast between how Royce deals with ethics in *RAP* and 21 years later in the Urbana lectures is instructive and significant.] See *BWJR*:2 1223, 6 & 7.

Lecture I: The Problem of Ethics

A text made of pages 1-24 MS, 25-43 typescript (with some extensive edits). Then on page 43, Royce resumes MS to the end (page 59). The text is divided into three sections. Pages 21-22 are on renumbered pages. This lecture was edited by Peter Fuss and published in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy* 5 (1967): 60-78.

FMO 1968 Notes:

“Royce moves generally but without getting out of balance; he gradually uncovers two most general ethical rules (43), and insists on their inadequacy unless men actually proceed towards harmonization of their valuations and towards a discovery of those modes of co-operation which have a higher value than the elementary impulsive valuations which individual men possess (46). So Royce moves into how men form their values -- through an interpretation of how the present act accords with past deeds and with future anticipations, and in this way of coming more and more to discover the true self each one is -- so that the formation of a personal ideal as one’s value to be realized through present acts harmonizing with one’s past and future goal is what needs to be formed; but this Personal Value (Self-Ideal) will not be such unless it harmonizes one’s life with that of other men -- and hence the question rises which Personality-Ideals tend most to harmonize the lives of men mutually? (And this leads to Royce’s 2nd lecture).

“Notanda: Lecture I marks Royce’s shift to an explicit study of Values (with him quite aware of

recent value-researches. He starts off contrasting two ways of studying the world: a) trying to find out what things there are in the world, and b) trying to discover the value of things.(1). In this second way, science too presupposes that the astronomer values the knowledge he gains (for any of many reasons), but doesn't talk about those values. There are, by contrast, inquirers into values -- values of conduct, of art, of straight thinking, etc., about which there can be only a descriptive study (which Royce thinks insufficient. (13). Hence, Royce opts also for a normative study of values using a philosophical logic to tell how one ought to think and reason.” (16) Whereas scientific pursuits tend to unite men, their diverse valuations tend to split them -- wars, strife, etc. (21-22) So the question arises: HOW reach objectively valid reasons for the values of conduct? Remember values are facts (ways will have gone -- and deserve as much close attention and study as external facts! (34)

“LONG ANALYSIS of how Royce, if truce could be obtained, would reason with headhunting tribesman who wants Royce's head off his shoulders, while Royce wants it on his own shoulders. (NB role of rational discourse as a *sine qua non* condition for having people find other ways of getting the values they seek (e.g. prestige in case of this tribesman -- by getting into a civilization which lets him win over Royce in argument, earn more \$ etc... Then Royce moves to show how man forms his own values via an interpretation of a present deed in line with past deeds and future hopes, and normed by Ideal self. (See pages 58-59, for Royce's move to “the most harmonizing personality ideals.”)

FMO December 2008 Notes:

In this lecture, Royce describes a person as “a being with a will of his own... The world of values and the world of wills are logically inseparable.” (9-10)

Section I:

Form 10-13, Royce offers the modern simply subjectivist view of values. On pages 14-15, he argues against this position, saying how a scientific, fact-based psychological study of men's opinions about the values of things is possible, as are our accessible facts regarding what values people place on your behavior and their behavior so a general doctrine and values and valuations is possible according to Royce. Its central question: what valuations ought we to make. (17) For this, we need to discover what are the true standards of value. (17)

Section II:

Royce says his task is to point out the standards for right and wrong conduct. (18) He insists that there is a right and wrong way of conducting oneself. “Our voluntary conduct is right if it possesses the value that it ought to possess. Otherwise it is wrong. I am to tell you what I believe to be the basis of this distinction between right and wrong, and then I am to draw some conclusions which depend upon this my belief about the nature of right and of wrong.” (18)

“By conduct I mean deliberate action, - such action as we carry on voluntarily.” (18)

Dangerous to make statements in ethics, even more than in science. It can lead to quarrelling, fighting and slaying (21). Oughts and shoulds are dangerous things. (22)

Royce moves to try to find the objective basis of moral conduct, of rights and wrongs. His basic

question is, “what do I mean by saying to my fellow that if he rightly views things, he will agree with my opinion about the right and wrong of given conduct.” (25) The important thing is that “there is a perfectly legitimate and obvious basis for a reasoning process, in which may both engage....” (26)

The head-hunter anecdote (page 29): is there an ability to dialogue into agreement? “Why do want to kill me, when I am not trying to kill you?” (30) A starting point for an objective doctrine about values “All sincere valuations of things by whomsoever made, are themselves facts having value. Whoever wills any thing, - that will has its own value. Whoever wants to know the values of things must take account of all values that any will sets upon things.” (32-33) Psychological conditions are not at the center of ethics. “What I am trying to point out to my supposed opponent is the fact that I am just as much alive as he is.” (33)

Royce then deals with the issue of sympathy for several pages, keeping with the head-hunter anecdote. A way of persuading the chief ... it will be in his interest to associate with civilized people if he wants to reign longer as chief. [?!?] “To generalize the case: If A’s will and B’s will give opposed valuations to a certain thing or act, it is frequently conceivable that some plan could be found, whereby, through an introduction of new things, or of new acts, or of supplementary acts, into the situation, the essential will of both A and B can be carried out, in such wise that they now give valuations to the new situation which are no longer essentially opposed.” Royce takes the position that the evolution of civilized life establishes this claim. (38)

Section III:

“Whoever has once conceived of the civilized art of harmonize in the wills of mankind, has discovered what it is to consider objective values. The union of many wills is superior to the conflict of wills.... This is a truth quite independent of the customs of any people, or of the conventional opinions of any man regarding what he privately thinks to be valuable.” (41)

Royce recognizes that his two principles are now too abstract and impractical. They need to be enriched by further steps and principles. (43)

The first principle (“regard every man’s will, whatever it be, as something that in itself is worth carrying out, if only that can be done without conflicting with the interests of any other man”) [A heavily Kantian slant.] (43)

“[T]he second rule of the doctrine of values is: ‘See whether some lawful sort of plan of action can be discovered whereby the conflicting valuation with which men begin can be harmonized.’” [notice the pragmatic maxim in this second rule] (45)

Royce is aware of the hope that there is a law to be found in and beneath things directing conduct. Ethical doctrine, on the other hand, “expresses the resolution that there shall be a law, whereby our chaotic elementary valuations may be harmonized. The two ways of procedure thus contrasted; but they are equally expressions of our interest in the reasonableness of the world and of life.” (45)

“Our answer is indeed to be found in that whole process of evolution by which men have passed from savagery to civilization.” [FMO rephrases this question as: Are we being morally developed by our social life, or turned into savages.] Royce insists that harmony, like charity, begins at home. (46)

“But as a fact, man is reasonable.” (47) Royce promises that the role of time is crucial for ethics (he says he will deliver this in the fifth Urbana lecture). Royce will come to stress the irreversibility of the past, and looking for the future of values that one has not yet attained. Higher expectations. (48)

Humankind’s practical reason is rooted in the consciousness of the past and the expectation of the future as having the possibility to enrich the present. (50-51) The only way a person can do something is to do it in the now, “aligned between my past intention and my future goal.” (53 or 54)

“The task of attaining such harmony involves the whole business of forming, finding, remembering, and anticipating, what a man calls his own personal life, - his true Self.” Ought looks to the future. How will I develop my true self. (54-55)

“If want ten to understand valuations as they exist for reasonable beings, you must become acquainted with the types of personal ideals that are most important amongst men.” (56) Royce concludes by saying that these ideals “have played a great part in the discovery of how to harmonize life.” (59)

Lecture II: “Four Types of Personality”

A 35-page typescript, with some editing, again in three sections.

Introduction:

To judge something right or wrong presupposes a plan of action. One will work and one won’t. Royce develops a teleology, therefore, as underlying ethical considerations. Ethics is never mere dependence on authority, despite the important role of authority in ethical decisions and constructs. (2-3) What of a man who gives evidence of being a rascal? (4) “To call a man a rascal has this rational warrant ... that the man himself possesses such a nature that if he realized his true purpose, he would agree with my judgment.” (5)

Section I:

A sense of men as rational creatures necessarily underlies a system of ethics. Royce returns to the “growing boy” theme and his moral development. What the self is trying to become. For the boy to define his own plan of life, what he wants to be, he has to depend on society. “It is I, then, who as a social being, continually require myself to look for guidance to my social world. My comrades, my teachers, my rivals, even my enemies.” (9) Once this world is consulted, “I have to choose for myself.” (12)

Section II:

Royce then gets to the theme of this lecture: what kind of personality “best expresses the

purposes which are most essential to a human being” for this moral development. (12) Surely there must be a law. But the law is not enough. (13) At page 15, Royce gets to the 4 types of personality:

- The hero - the stately self (18-19)
- The saint - the self-abnegating self (19-21)
- The Titan/Promethean - the defiant self (21-22)
- The loyal servant of a cause - the loyal self (22)

In some sense, all four of these ideals are represented among the prevalent ideals. (16) The hero is the first stage of development of civilization. The saint has an important role in the development of religious sensibility. The Promethean type arises in a “certain phase[] of civilization.” The loyal self, the ideal personality to Royce’s mind, best withstands philosophical, ethical criticism.

Section III:

“What motives have led men to view each of these four types as ethically significant?”

Royce discusses, historically, examples of these four types. Classical literature, e.g., as giving examples of the stately self. Then on to Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*. Royce gives benefits that we can learn from all four types. Royce moves then to an example of the Buddha. (saintly self)

He characterizes the defiant self as a creation new every moment. 31-32. The extreme individualist, in which morality means self-expression. The value of Titanism is the lesson that the self must be its own ethical director.

Royce looks ahead to a fuller consideration of ethical type four, the loyal self, in Lecture III.

Lecture III: “Loyalty as a Personal and as a Social Virtue”

This text that begins with a 17 page typescript (pages 1-17), page 18 is missing, then the text returns, on pages 19-42, to MS. The text is incomplete at page 42, according to Wells.

Introduction:

Royce summarizes the previous lecture on the four ideals, and leads into a concentration of the loyal self.

Section I:

Royce cites the famous incident of Charles I being confronted by the Speaker of the House in the Parliament of England in 1642. (King has been looking for traitors, yet the Speaker states that he can only speak as the house commands me. I express their will, and say nothing more.) What type is the man to be considered. (Royce uses this example again and again.) (2) Royce defines loyalty in terms of dedication to a cause. This word expressly arises on page 8. “What is the cause that a given person ought to choose as his own cause.” [punctuation sic]

“What I mean by the attitude of the Loyal Self.” (8)(FMO emphasis added.) The attitude is important to Royce is these determinations.

Section II:

Royce gets into the definition of loyalty. He is not talking of the fidelity of a dog to its master. (10) Royce adduces the example of Samurai and Japanese culture. (12) Royce does not wish to emphasize blind obedience and war-like service by this example. (14)

Section III:

Royce raises the story of Joseph and his brothers from the Old Testament. There is a reference to the City of God, the ideal community of all rational beings. (The argument breaks off with the missing page 18.) When the MS picks up, Royce is still looking for “what is that ideal”? (19) If you are loyal to your case, it may conflict with my loyalty to my cause. (20) Royce deals with the issue of conflict of loyalties at page 21. Royce notes it is a delicate one. (22) Underneath the conflicting loyalties, Royce quotes a poem: “they are ‘kindred by one holy tie.’”

Because disagreeing loyalties are all loyalty, universal and objective work depends on loyalty harmonizing the lives of individuals and social groups. (23)

FMO note: What underlies these considerations is Royce’s sense that the opposite of the loyal person is the capriciously acting person. Royce ethically detests the capricious person.

“Shall I pretend to prize brotherhood, and yet deliberately sow discord amongst bretheren? Shall I prize fidelity and yet aim to make my fellow unfaithful, by wounding his cause, or by making him suffer for his fidelity?” (27)

“...I can never define my loyalty merely, or largely, or event at all, in terms of my hatred for another man’s loyalty.” To do so would be “blind to what loyalty really means.” (28)

The first command of the moral life is “Be loyal.”

“The second commandment is like unto the first in absoluteness, but is far superior to the first in universality of expression. This second commandment is :Be loyal to loyalty. Or, otherwise stated, So choose your cause, and so serve it, that through your service of your cause there shall come to be more loyalty existent amongst men rather than less loyalty.” (30-31)(emphasis in the original)

“[L]oyalty must be concrete, individually determined, - intimate, personal. I cannot by abandoning personal ties, serve mankind in general.” (32-33) “[I]n general, the detached self is not, as such, effectively loyal. I must indeed narrow my life to this my personal field; otherwise I wander vaguely about on earth.”

“Through my personal task, I serve the universal interest of mankind.” (34)

A “robber-band” displays a pseudo-loyalty. (36)

How to choose object of one’s loyalty: “So choose, and so serve your cause that, so far as in you lies, not your loyalty alone, but the loyalty of all mankind shall be thereby increased rather than decreased.” (37)(emphasis in the original)

Loyalty does *not* mean warfare with other loyalties. (38)

Section IV:

There are only two pages of this incomplete section.

That “most essential principle” (loyalty to loyalty) ... from this all ethical conduct is to be determined. (40) All the virtues, especially charity and justice, flow from this principle.

“In general, no single object of loyalty meets the needs of the individual. A system of objects of loyalty is needed. But one must make a beginning. Let him set out with a few objects of loyalty. More will develop. [*sic*] Such objects of loyalty can be forced upon nobody by a merely external authority.” (41-42)

“The inalienable privilege and duty to choose our objects of loyalty leaves open an endless range for a wise individualism.”

After the phrase “Loyalty is at once the ” It is unknown how this lecture ends. **Be on the lookout for a fragment beginning with a MS page 43.**

Lecture IV: “Loyalty as a Factor in American Life.”

A typescript, with no title, that begins on page 19. The pages then run from 19 to 22, and then after some missing pages, 27 to 33. Wells supplies the title, but it is unclear how he knows that (a) this is lecture four, and (b) that this is the title. The typescript appears to be a purple carbon (different from the typescripts of the other Lectures). Also, the pagination is different (here, the numbers are center top, with a “.”)(The other typescripts are numbered in the upper right hand corner, no “.”)

There are substantive clues, however, that this lecture does tie in with the previous ones. There is another reference to the Speaker of the House story. This lecture could be on the topic of how people might be trained in loyalty, which would develop previous lecture themes. There are similarities here to the printed text, regarding, e.g., the former role of the July 4 holiday in the U.S. as a celebration of loyalty.

FMO believes, however, the Wells is correct in his supposition.

Royce, in this fragment, begins on page 19 by trying to loyal to our practical lives in the changing conditions of our nation. Royce asks in what way is the fourth of July being celebrated. (He gives about 3 pages to this topic.) He makes reference to having spoken of the importance of freedom to loyalty. Memorials are to recall our common ideals, he says.

Royce notes the disparate character of the U.S. given the individualism that is part of its character. Yet, he distinguishes: “The false individualism depends on forgetting what an individual is.” A person who has lost a sense of his life plan. (27)

He then moves into the opportunities for becoming more genuinely loyal: our educational life, for instance by the examples of exemplary loyal lives (concrete examples help rid the country of false individualism).

Royce refers again to the Speaker of the House anecdote as an example of courage, and a uniquely universal example of being loyal to loyalty.

Royce then turns to hints about the next lecture, which is to be about a larger philosophy of personality and its ethical significance concerning the problem of immortality. “In one sense the problem of immortality becomes, in a sense, identical with the problem of what is meaning,

I shall have to speak of some very problematic topics that don't belong to the field of ethics. But I shall make the whole discussion turn, in the end, upon the interpretation of what we mean by an individual human personality. The announced topic is Personality and Immortality. (33)

Lecture V: “Personality and Immortality”

This lecture does not appear to exist, as such, in HARP.

Six page fragment at the end of Box 76

“Lectures on Ethics prepared for delivery at the University of Illinois, Jan Feb 1907”
Lecture I. The Problem of Ethics.”

Evaluation:

First, in FMO's opinion, the assertion that much of these lectures has found its way into the *Philosophy of Loyalty* needs some qualification. The subject matter of Urbana Lecture III is heavily taken up in Chapter III of *Philosophy of Loyalty*. Furthermore, Urbana Lecture IV's critique of false and genuine individualism is repeated in Chapter II of *PL*. Urbana Lecture IV's mention of the July 4 holiday appears in Chapter VI of *PL*. On the other hand, *PL* does not contain any prolonged treatment of the four ideals of personality that Royce describes in Urbana Lecture II.

Lecture I's discussion of the role of the foundations of our dialoguing as necessary to overcome conflicts in loyalty (the head-hunter anecdote)
Some attention to the uniqueness of the Urbana lectures, over and above the material in *PL*, merits the attention of the editors.

Secondly, this period (1906-07) marks a middle stage of Royce's ethical thought, that contrasts with his earlier *RAP* ethics, and his most mature thought in *PC*, “The Christian Doctrine of Life,” and in his final extension course on ethics. The role of mediation in ethics to overcome conflicts of loyalty is at least present in these Urbana Lectures, and will come to full bloom in his 1914 *Spirit of the Community* address.

273. “The Yale Undergraduate Ethics Course” (1907) **Box 77**

Lecture I: “Introductory Statement for The Yale Undergraduate Ethics Course. Sept. 28, 1907”

A 42-page MS.

FMO notes from 1968:

A general effort to define the field of ethics. “Ethics is that branch of philosophy which considers the true standards of the moral life,” (38) but has reservations that such a way of putting it might lead Yale men to think ethics doesn’t have to take account of the facts and the laws of the moral life of mankind.

Royce speaks of ethics as “the study of the art of wise living” (7) and that the “interest of the ethical philosopher in the facts of the moral life is determined by their bearing upon our efforts to give to our whole life some reasonable unity of plan, and to find out what is the true difference between good and evil, between right and wrong.” (33)

He refers to Professor Palmer’s *The Field of Ethics* and his *The Nature of Goodness* (41)

Autobiographical: Royce gives a sketch of the philosopher which approaches a self portrait. (12-13)

Lecture II: “Yale Course in Ethics. Lecture II, Oct. 5, 1907”

A 35-page MS, followed by an exam.

FMO notes from 1968

Royce summarizes Lecture I, and introduces the students to a survey of the standards of moral action.

First, he makes the distinction between Norms for good and evil (e.g. the Beatitudes) and Norms for right and wrong (norms of basic duties). Second, he contrasts common standards (e.g. Christianity’s golden rule versus David Harum’s “Find out what the other fellow wants to do to you, and do it first.” --- why should the first be preferred? What might the consequences be. Why not say “love your friends and whack your enemies”?)

FMO notes December 2008

Royce attempts to offer the Yale students a universally valid plan of life. Toward this end, he surveys many moral standards. Royce gives a rare instance of calling the students into dialogue, with himself and with each other, in the search for this moral standard. He says he is there to discuss the true and false moral standard (9) At pages 16 ff. he gives quotations from Marcus Aurelius, with a concentration on reasonableness being in harmony with universal reasonableness.

Autobiographical Note: Royce talks about a friend whose standard was “love your friends and whack your enemies.” (22)

Royce speaks of the contention that a man must have some satisfaction, some release in life. And innocent pleasures are so expensive that a poor man has to be bad. (28)

How to sort among all these standards? Royce doesn’t use the word “loyalty” yet. To sort through, Royce talks of being clear-headed and not ignorant.

274. Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America (Boston: The Boston Normal School of Gymnastics, 1908)

This pamphlet is reprinted in *Race Questions*, and closes the volume. Of this essay, Royce writes in the preface (v-vi): “The closing essay of the present volume contains in fact a summary of the theses upon which my ‘Philosophy of Loyalty’” is based, as well as a direct application of these theses to a special practical problem of our recent education.”

Royce gave this address before the Boston Physical Education Society in the spring of 1907 (Royce to George Platt Brett, July 14, 1908, *Letters* 524) “The address sketched my views on ‘Loyalty.’ It applied them to the problems of the physical trainer. While the book on *Loyalty* was written months later, this lecture independently sketches my ethical position, & would help out the *Loyalty* book in a way.” (*id.*)

275. Review

**I. Woodbridge Riley’s *American Philosophy: The Early Schools* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908)
Harvard Graduates’ Magazine, 16 (1907-08): 649-51**

Royce writes an extended introductory note for one Hegel excerpt which he translates for this volume.

276. “Football and Ideals,”

***Harvard Illustrated Magazine*, 10 (1908-09): 40-47**

**277. “Introduction” to Vassar Phi Beta Kappa Lecture (1909)
Box 75**

This 4-page MS was previously identified by Wells (in a red pencil note) as being introductory to a 1907 Phi Beta Kappa lecture at Vassar. Skrupskelis, however, seems to identify this MS more accurately as part of a 1909 Vassar lecture, which was eventually included in the essay “What is Vital in Christianity” in the *Harvard Theological Review* 2 (1909): 408-45. The piece is reprinted in *William James (1911-4)* and in Clark S. Northup, William C. Lane, John C. Schwab, eds., *Representative Phi Beta Kappa Orations* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915), pages 404-41. See *BWJR*:2 121, 5.

278. “The American College and Life” (1909)
***Science*, 29 (March 1909): 401-07**
Box 48

The 40 page manuscript of the text may be found in HARP Box 48, document 2. It reflects Royce’s address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Baltimore, and was published in *Science* magazine

Autobiographical Note:

“I consider it a proper part of a philosophical student’s business to keep himself relatively naïve, unreflective and directly practical regarding at least some important portion of his own life’s business. Upon certain problems it is my duty to reflect, in as critical a fashion as I may. I do reflect about those problems with a good deal of persistence, and I discourse upon those topics at wearisome length. They are topics of logic, of metaphysics and of general ethical doctrine. In the rest of my life I try to stick to business without much reflection.” (p. 401 of published text)

With this reservation, and a demurral that he has no “right to speak as a representative of a distinctively Harvard point of view,” Royce proceeds to reflect upon the nature of learning and education at the collegiate level in America. The piece has a strongly pragmatic slant, urging his audience to “beware of those theorists who, in the name of what they call the American college, want to sunder afresh what the whole course of our modern American development has wisely tended to join, namely, teaching and investigation, the more technical training and the more general cultivation of our youth.” (407)(Not surprisingly, Royce also argues for making the “college boy work harder by giving him more work to do.” (406))

Evaluation: Some interesting autobiographical picturing of himself as a fallible older professor. Royce is quite aware of the *evolving* educational forces within the national scene of collegiate undergraduate and professional practice.

279. “The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion”
Bericht uber den III internationalen Kongress fur Philosophie
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1909): 62-
90

Reprinted in *William James and Other Essays*. An address before the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, in September, 1908. The MS for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents.

NB: Note the **outline sketch** of this address in Box 111, folder 4, document 1 (among “Loose notes found with Properties of Circuits,” a group of logic papers).

This is a crucial article.

- 280. “Provincialism Based upon a Study of Early Conditions in California,”**
Putnam’s Magazine, 7 (1909): 232-40

Evaluation: See *RQP*, Part I of this Index.

- 281. “The Recent Psychotherapeutic Movement in America,”**
Parker, ed., *Psychotherapy: A Course of Readings in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine, Sound Religion*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1909)

Evaluation: Royce did not hear Freud speak at Clark University, but he did work with James Putnam.

- 282. “What is Vital in Christianity?”**
Harvard Theological Review, 2 (1909): 408-45
Box 105, folder 4, Document 10
Box 75

Reprinted in *William James and Other Essays*. Prepared for a series of addresses to the Young Men’s Christian Association of Harvard University in 1909. Royce gave the three conferences composing this text on March 18, 25 and April 9, 1909.

The MS for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents, but there may be a fragment of this text at Box 105, folder 4, Document 10.

See Box 75 for a 4 page manuscript as part of the Philipp Brooks House addresses, March-April 1909. See *BWJR* 2:1211.

Evaluation: Royce’s approach here to Christianity is from a very different perspective from his approach in *PC*, covering the fatherhood of God and the incarnation – themes omitted in *PC*.

- 283. “A Word of Greeting to William James”**
Harvard Graduates’ Magazine 18 (1909-10): 630-33

Skrupskelis: “Remarks at a dinner in honor of William James, held on January 18, 1910. Contains some autobiographical remarks on his first contacts with James.” *BWJR*:2 1212.

Evaluation: Significant for both autobiographical and doctrinal reasons, regarding his relation with William James. The timid, usually self-contained Royce opens up and shares his inner soul because, “I love him.”

284. Smith College Lectures on Modern Philosophy (1909-10) Boxes 77 and 78

These Smith Lectures were delivered to F.H. Rousmaniere's class in the History of Philosophy.

a. A manila envelope fragment (perhaps in KR's handwriting) reads as follows:

"Smith College Lectures on Modern Philosophy 1909-1910 (8 Sheets MSS)

1. Introductory Remarks/, and Resume of the Greek contribution, as contained in a paper, here included;

Philosophy and Life (55 Sheets MSS)

2. Nature in Modern Philosophy (25 Sheets MSS)

The Smith College Lectures were delivered to the class in the History of Philosophy"

b. "Introductory Remarks"

An 8-page MS, headed simply "Smith College Lectures. <Notes>" on the first page. Wells makes the assumption that these are Royce's "Introductory Remarks," apparently since this document, along with the following two manuscripts, were included in the envelope from which he took the above wrapper fragment. This first piece is simply an introduction

c. "Philosophy and Life"

A 55-page MS, in six sections, plus a few introductory paragraphs. Pages 25, 20-23, 52 have been renumbered.

FMO 1968 Notes:

Royce's resume of the Greek contribution, how Christianity wouldn't have become what it did without Greek thought (14). He shows the reaction to Pius X's Encyclopedia on Modernism (18) which Royce regards as contrary to the growing enlightenment which was seeded by the Greek philosophers' services to the spirit of free inquiry. All this is suggested by Royce to show the relation of Greek philosophy to life (e.g. idea of God of Plato and Aristotle; the idea of immortality, etc.) Royce closes with a confession of his respect for an "unconsciously wise instinct" in men and the fallibility of philosophers who try to seek wisdom explicitly (48-50)
NB: Elsewhere, Royce refers to himself as a "philosopher of life."

Royce offers a definition of what he means by the philosophy of "today" (i.e. 1909) among more educated people: "The effort to think out for yourself a rational solution of the most fundamental problems of life and of the world." (3) Early Greek philosophy gifts us with a desire to make progress. But generally speaking, men are not naturally disposed to the sort of effort and sacrifice which is an essential element of progress. (6) He compares Greece with Egypt, the Euphrates valley, and China (which go on via established social conventions).

The middle ages show how hard it is to teach the spirit of striving to other people. Tradition has its weights. "Our moral welfare, for instance, has to be the object of new and of uncertain efforts

in every generation.” (9) Progress is risky, and not necessarily “straight-upward.” What distinguished the Greeks, says Royce, was their social restlessness, political rivalry, a keen curiosity and a fondness for individuality. (12)

“In sum ... without the influence of Greek thought, Christianity as a world-religion, could never have forged its most effective spiritual weapons for teaching to the European world the unity of mankind, and for making men feel the need of an universal progress.” (14)

Royce expounds on the way Christianity and science are both very indebted to the Greeks. The relation of philosophy to life was crucial then, and is crucial today. (16) Royce notes three great tasks of the Greek philosophers:

1. “they made conscious and permanent, the spirit of free inquiry.” An individual was called to think for himself.
2. “they made the art of living a topic of earnest and careful consideration.” Living wisely, rather than merely conforming to custom.
3. “they made elaborate inquiries into the methods and the fundamental conceptions” of their embryonic science. (16-17)

Royce criticizes Pius X’s attack on modernity, and its attempt to set strictures on free inquiry. (18) He notes that even those who preach the art of thinking for oneself do not always practice it. (19). “In general, man as a merely social animal dislikes nonconformists; he snubs the independents; he joyously ridicules the philosophers; and he sets the ardent young inquirers back into their places with a sneer, a snub, or a solemn reproof.” (19-20)

Royce compares the fright of parents when they teach their children to swim. “Alas, why do these children think as I do.” The art of thinking for oneself is a great part of the art of progress.

Royce offers signs of his search for balance: “What is best in our civilization depends on [the art of progress]. Conservatism without independence of judgment, conformity without initiative, routine without personal ideals, - what would all this mean for the future of our civilization.” (21)

Royce points out that the heroes who invent things like taming fire (stealing the secrets of heaven) are portrayed in ancient legends as thieves, and for that reason, came to a bad end. (e.g. Prometheus and Maui) Royce says something about witches. If you are inventive, in other words, you may get whacked for it.

Points to teachers of the art of life (point 2 from above). They gave the definition of wisdom special prominence, trying to know and reach the highest good. (26) The Greeks didn’t see the whole truth of the art of life, however. Some aspects of the wisdom about conduct and character have come from the prophets of Israel and the Far East. (27-28) Christianity alone made some men know some features of the art of life “through an insight that was not derived from Greece.” (28)

As to the third contribution, the Greeks’ probe into the idea of theoretical science. They thought out their own conceptions of God, the immortality of the soul, the nature of the universe.

Consider the whole idea of Socrates' death and the idea of immortality. The Greeks "created the early vocabulary of science" --its ideas as well as its methods.

After a discussion of free inquiry: "But the very essence of philosophy is the spirit of earnest toleration, - the reasonable respect for the man that differs from one's own views, - the readiness to treat individuality reverently, even while one contends for one's own view of the truth." (39)

"Democracy [which]... depends upon a toleration of individual varieties, had a large philosophical origin." (39)

At 42, Royce points to Fichte, awakening the German nation to a new courage and its stand against Napoleon. Royce nods to Bentham and others in England.

Royce notes that, in the lecture he speaks of philosophy in general, and not of one particular brand or type. (44) Philosophers have made the spirit of civilization articulate. (47)

Pages 48-50:

Autobiographical note:

"And so, whether the philosophers have correctly solved their own problems or no, we need their spirit and the guidance of this spirit whenever we have practical problems to face and to solve which concern the greater and deeper ideals and mysteries of life, and which, as it chances, our personal instincts are inadequate to solve or to master.

As a teacher, I have indeed often warned people against expecting too much from philosophical study. I know that there is much in life which only an unconsciously wise instinct can undertake to overcome. And I have a deep respect for an unconsciously wise instinct. And I know that philosophy, which is the effort to become conscious of the problems of life, and to solve those problems by rational inquiry, and to find out what we can know about God, and the world, and the soul, and our duty, and the art of life, must always remain imperfect so long as men remain fallible. But I am also sure that we all need to have philosophers at work. I know that the social problems of our modern world, - that for instance your social problems here in this city, - will never be solved unless philosophy is in due time and measure added to common sense, unless theory gets joined to practice, unless somebody, properly called to the task, reasons and criticizes, and faces mysteries with serious methods of thought. And I know to that no pursuit of the special sciences will alone suffice to accomplish the work of reason in this field. I know that the philosopher's love of unity and of connectedness, and of fundamental questions is needed to keep our too much distracted civilization from losing its ideals, from forgetting its mission, from degenerating in its instincts, from failing in its highest undertakings."

Near the close, Royce suggests how a young woman, if she feels called to further studies, might proceed. First get in touch with the classics of philosophy: the dialogues of Plato, Marcus Aurelius, the ethics of Spinoza, Locke, the British moralists, Shaftsbury, Bishop Butler, Adam Smith, the popular works of Fichte. "Don't pursue these classics unless it helps you live your own life better." If problems prove baffling, return at your leisure. Don't hasten to form a system. Let it gradually mature. If you don't care to study philosophy, remember what the Greeks contributed to our civilization.

Evaluation: This piece offers a chance to see Royce who called himself deliberately "a

philosopher of life” trying in brief to show what “the philosophy of life” means for him. It surely shows Royce as perhaps the best historian of all philosophy at that time in America. On a scale of 1-10, I would place this at about 7. It exemplifies the tone of Royce’s teaching at Radcliffe.

e. **“Nature in Modern Philosophy”**

A 25-page MS, Wells again gives it this title from the envelope notes. Royce heads the first page with “Feb. 1910 Notes for the Smith College Course.” This looks to be an incomplete MS (stopping in the middle of the last page, 25)

Interestingly, Royce mentions at the start that he has just given the students some ways in which the idea of God has been formed. He speaks of the three streams of tradition that form the doctrine of God. [A seedling of his “Monotheism” article.] In response to these three traditions about God, in Christianity, one may in response:

1. Ask which is the deeper truer view,
2. Try to unite all three in a synthesis,
3. Be unable to decide which of the divine concepts is right, or
4. Ask whether any of them stand for a demonstrable fact. (p. 3)

Royce says the present talk concerns “ways in which the conception of nature, that is, of the physical world, has been related to the course of modern philosophic thought.” (4)

Some would say modern science is nearly totally beyond the Greek conception of nature. Royce cautions his audience to distinguish where we have gone far beyond the Greeks in the science of nature, but yet acknowledge the aspect of Nature where we are still very little in advance of “some decidedly crude speculations of the ancients.” (5-6)

Royce balances the astounding progress scientists have made in the grasp of the physical world, yet they say science never shows us “the true essence, the interior, the real being of nature, but only finds how nature appears.” (6) We still don’t know, e.g., the physical origin of life. We can’t answer the question “how living matter can be produced only from non-living matter.” (9)

We do not learn from science what the ancients wanted to know: what nature really *is*. Yes, we learn by experience the laws of nature, but we do not learn *why* these laws hold true. “We watch nature’s face, but we do not thus read its inner meaning.” (11-12)

Heraclitus’ question, amidst all the flux of matter, was whether nature’s “manifestation” was that of everlasting reason. (12) Philosophical questions about nature are not being solved by science. Royce’s main contrast between the Greeks and the modern view of philosophy may be stated as follows:

1. “The Greeks began with a crude sort of evolutionary philosophy of nature.” (21) 18th century philosophy of nature didn’t deny evolution, but the emphasis was on infinite time and space, unchanging matter, with entropy affecting energy. (22)
2. The Greek Democritus thought nature was a machine. Plato and Aristotle critiqued this materialistic thought of nature and looked to the moral world as the true world of which nature

was a manifestation or an imitation. (24)

Evaluation: This MS is incomplete. See Clendenning's study of Royce's philosophy of nature.

e. Manila Envelope Fragment
Box 78

This fragment, perhaps in Katharine Royce's handwriting, reads as follows:

"Smith College Lectures, 1910

A second series of four lectures on Recent [over a crossed out "Present"] Problems of Philosophy

1. [A discussion of contemporary and recent forms of world-view, as related to ways of living, -- Khayyam, Nietzsche, Schiller, Eucken, Spencer, ---- leading to a statement of the problem in terms of Loyalty (p.40), as another and philosophically preferable term for the "love of God and man.]

A public lecture
Feb. 25, 1910" (51 sheets MSS)

f. "Smith Lectures on Present Problems in Philosophy"

A 51-page MS on fresh pages, heavily edited in places. The lecture reflects Royce's effort to help the students keep up with recent philosophical movements. This lecture is not, apparently, to the same audience to which the above lectures were given. (See page 16, when he refers back to the smaller audience of the History of Philosophy class.)

Royce states the focus of the lecture will be on the philosophy of life. The questions: "What is it to live wisely?" "Who and what is the wise man?" (3)

Autobiographical note: Royce says that it is natural "for me to remember that whatever else may interest the students of logic, of metaphysics, or of the theory of knowledge, the problem of the wise conduct of life is at present the central issue with which the men of my calling are busy."

Royce takes cases of contemporary interest. First, the enthusiasm which has met Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyam. Also Ecclesiastes. Then Nietzsche ("full of inner conflicts"), whose ark "was full of many strange creatures, including a good many creeping things." (9) He then picks up pragmatism, using Schiller. Another example, Eucken in Jena, with his "view of life" (*Lebensanschauung*)

Royce also talks of Wagner and Santayana, Munsterberg. The ancients, too, were interested in the philosophy of life. "Wisdom that is in no sense practical is not true wisdom at all." (Note the pragmatic bent.) He gives evidence that, while the philosophy of life has pervaded the history of philosophy generally, today it is given a special stress.

He also points out the other emphases of different periods. The Greeks interest in the ultimate nature of reality, nature and metaphysics, e.g. For the Medievals, God was the supreme problem. More recently, evolution was the primary interest. Royce asks why the philosophy of life has become so emphasized today. He looks to two motives:

1. The larger, practical problems of people's lives themselves.
2. Indirectly, we're not disposed to form opinions about the mysteries of the universe outside of man.

Royce points to the Chinese sages, and their concern with how to live a good life. He also points to the imitation of life. It is true that some of the specialization of philosophy takes us away from the philosophy of life. (35)

Royce confesses that he has made this preliminary historical survey quite long (40), but he sees the importance of the historical perspective that he's trying to inform his own students about.

In section IV, he turns to one central "problem of life around which are grouped the various aspects of the philosophy of life...." (40) He gives an outline of the rest of the lectures in this series. [Those lectures are not contained in this Box.] The lectures will take up the issue of the merits of the central problem, and what some applications might be.

Two motives that drive man to his best efforts toward life in its highest values: (41) Love of God and love of man. "My own common name for both these motives to which the higher life of man whatever his religion or his nation has been due is the term loyalty." (42)

The causes that have called out this thorough going devotion have two forms. Two types of loyalty:

Loyalty to the unseen world, the motive of every higher religion. (43)

Loyalty to the visible world of mankind, "to the higher human life viewed just as human life, as the better life that we seek or find in the social world about us." Examples of the second are friendship, the devotion of lovers, family affection, fidelity, filial piety, fraternal good will, patriotism, "and as every large form of practical humanity." Wherever these two have parted company, the higher life of humanity has been deeply endangered. (44-45)

Man's highest, best treasures have been kept in earthen vessels. The two forms of man's noblest devotions have often been embodied in vessels, the preservation of which is made difficult by hostile historical settings. (46) One embodiment of religion are myths that are unfounded, exaggerated beliefs about nature, superstitions.

"It has been one especial office of our modern study of nature to free us from superstition ..."
(46) But, if one is freed from superstition, is there any truth left in religion?

Then the corruption of war ... it has often corrupted the second motive of loyalty to man. While war has encouraged some valuable qualities (love of home, honor, etc.), it is often a source of evil. (49)

Royce concludes this lecture with the "question of questions for a modern philosophy of life. How can we keep our devotions, our loyalties and still part company with superstition, with false conventions, and with war ...?" (51)

[NB: Royce's interest in a practical philosophy of life shows the underlying basic importance of ethics in his thinking, i.e., as more fundamental than metaphysics and the theory of knowledge.]

Evaluation: 1910 is the year Royce completed his *The Principles of Logic*. Interestingly, this address shows him simultaneously trying to emphasize the ethical aspect. This effort at balance seems almost breathtaking. Although this is a popular address, its witness to Royce's grasp of contemporary movements in philosophy is most noteworthy and perhaps, on a scale of 1-10, this MS deserves an 8. It certainly makes "philosophy of life" far more than a catchword.

285. "Introductory Word"

Jessie E. Sampter, *The Seekers* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1910) v-xii.

Evaluation: An indirect reference to his basic truth-seeking instinct.

286. "The Reality of the Temporal" (April 1910)

***The International Journal of Ethics* vol. XX, no. 3 (1910): 257-71**

This is the text of a paper read before the American Philosophical Association in New Haven on December 29, 1909.

Autobiographical Note: Royce opens this piece with the memory of a story he read in his childhood concerning a "bold bad elder boy" who tempted a "too trustful little boy ... to disobey the express commands of the hero's parents" and "play truant." (257) Passing a shop, the older boy bought some nuts.

"[C]racking one of them [he] held up the kernel and said: 'Did anybody ever see that before?' The hero was obliged to respond, 'No.' Thereupon the bad boy, instead of offering this nut or any other of the nuts to his comrade, cruelly ate the kernel and said: 'Will anybody ever see that again?' and the small boy sorrowfully answered with another 'No,' and returned through tribulations to the paths of virtue." (257-58)

Royce compares the "very novel insight into the nature of Time" proposed by the "New Realists" to the lessons of this story. (258) "To be sure, they have told me the truth, but in how disappointingly familiar and commonplace a fashion." (259)

Moving through Bergson, Maxwell, Spaulding and Perry, Royce then proceeds to sketch his own outline of "a theory of the real time order, of its novelties, of its uniqueness, and of its significance." (270) He concludes by addressing the issue of the eternal. "By the eternal I mean not in the least the timeless, but the totality of temporal events viewed precisely as a totality.... The temporal not merely implies the eternal; in its wholeness it constitutes the eternal, -- namely, the total decision of the world will, wherein the loyal will to be rational finds its own fulfillment." (271)

Evaluation: FMO feels this should be included in the *Critical Edition* for at least three reasons: it includes the elderly Royce's critique of the New Realists, it tells the tale of the good and bad boy with its roots in Royce's boyhood reading, and it reveals his striking view of "the eternal" as "the total decision of the world will."

287. "The Sources of Religious Insight" (1910) Box 78

a. envelope clipping:

"1910 Notes For Address before the Yale Theological Club. May 14, 1910.

b. Notes for the Address

2-page MS, it is headed "Topics." Royce paginates these pages "I" and "II". On these two pages, he sketches out six numbered points:

1. Revelation
2. Interior Light, Mystic Insight
3. Modified and Attenuated Mysticism, Values "Religious insight reduced to merely human terms. - Humanism, Pragmatism, - triviality. This is not religious insight.-"
4. Reason
5. Morality and Religious Insight
6. The Loyal Spirit and Life as the Source of Religious Insight.

c. "The Sources of Religious Insight."

A 21-page MS of the first part of the address. These 21 pages do not treat the last 5 topics listed in the above notes. (He only treats the first: revelation.) The manuscript therefore appears to be incomplete.

Royce offers a common view of the general nature of religion, "some sort of genuine and valuable personal intercourse with a real and significant spiritual world, - a world such that to know it sustains us." Notice that Royce adds the pragmatic value of this intercourse. (2)

By religious insight, Royce means "any genuine knowledge of religiously important truths and realities." (4) On pages 6 to 14 Royce gives an extended and significant description of revelation. To accept the external revelation he adds the prerequisite of faith. (14-15) Royce criticizes people who stress merely external revelation. The heart itself has to be touched for revelation to be understood as genuine, as opposed to a false revelation (e.g. the world spirit of Faust) "The witness of the spirit must be, at least in its deepest essence, an internal witness. Religious insight cannot exist unless the spirit itself bears internal witness, "... has first adapted us to know religious truth when we meet it." (21)

[NB: Anyone re-editing *Sources of Religious Insight*, especially its chapter I, should examine this 21-page document for its early hints at some valuable suggestions that didn't make it into the final published work.]

288. “What is Philosophy and Why Study Philosophy” (1910?) Box 78

A 27-page typescript, with pencil edits. It seems not published. The entry (“1910”) added in pencil under the title may be by Royce’s hand. There is a long pencil mark covering the first page, which may be a cross-out, and/or a directive during for a reading [in 1910?] to a later audience.

In this text, Royce appears to be addressing an audience of teachers. Several times he speaks of his lectures to “teachers.” And he makes reference to a busy teacher’s life on page 26. He has an hour to give his talk. Royce writes:

“To Plato’s longing for a sort of supernatural realm of remote and higher truth, Aristotle opposed a certain cheerful confidence that the ideal is constantly realizing itself in the world about us, and that eternal truth is manifest to reason in every fact of nature . . . Aristotle is the man who sees the everyday truth, and is yet able to see that this truth has a divine significance.” (16)

It is impossible to do philosophy without the disposition to inquire into the world spirit. (19)
“Philosophy is characterized not merely by its subject matter but by its spirit.” (21) The spirit of Greek individualism is the spirit upon which all modern liberties depend. (21)

As for the question “why study philosophy,” Royce seeks clarity by pointing out in advance that what follows is meant for lay persons simply interested in philosophical questions, and not meant for a student starting a professional study of philosophy. For the latter, Royce points out three ways:

First, at page 24, he suggests a profitable start might be made by reading an introductory history of philosophy. (Then, as the original typescript hints, Royce mentioned by name several particular histories of philosophy. Later, however, the list seems no longer suitable for his present audience.. So, in pencil he crosses out the long paragraph in which he had recommended particular histories.

As a second step, he suggests reading a few classic texts: Plato, Berkeley, Fichte, Schopenhauer et al.

As a third step, Royce suggests reading the work of some contemporary philosophical discussion in a class or club . Again, he crosses out a paragraph of particular examples of contemporary philosophers to read. Then he adds:

“The philosophers will help you in so far as they make you appreciate your own providential limitation to your judgment, and presenting issues, leave you in the end alone, and yet not alone, with the truth, -- alone, since you only can see the truth in your way, and yet not alone, since the truth is your guide, your protector, your divine possession.”

Evaluation: Royce inserted “1910” in his own hand under the typescript title. Since he refers to

Palmer's *Field of Ethics* (1901) and *Nature of Goodness* (1904), the typescript must be dated at least after those years.

Interesting as background to Royce's idea of philosophy.

289. "Loyalty and Insight,"
***Simmons Quarterly*, 1 (1910): 4-21**

Reprinted in *William James and Other Essays*.

Box 29, a 68 (including 16(a) and (b) page MS, not divided into sections. A typescript of the MS is also included in Box 29. (There are no edits to the typescript.) Except for pages 1-16(a), the MS consists of previously drafted (and renumbered) sheets. (A 33 page typescript, slightly edited, is also found in Box 104, folder 3.)

Pages 1-16(a) - are fresh

Pages 16(b) - 67 he is revising previously written pages.

Royce views this essay as a summary of *PL* (*WJO* Preface at vii.)

A commencement address delivered at Simmons College Boston, in June 1910. Wells notes that Royce also gave this address at Kansas University on June 8, 1910.

Royce delivered the address *after* his near final draft of *SRI* on insight, and his Smith College lectures of 1910, as well as after three years of trying to save Christopher, mentally and physically. The address is given three months before the deaths of William James and Christopher. Royce feels like the Job he quotes here at *WJO* 64.

Pages 1 and 2: Initial penciling adjustments to identification of College.

Pages 6 to 14 in the MS (52-58 in the printed text is one paragraph by Royce. He calls this long paragraph his "bare indication of what I mean by loyalty." 14 of MS, 58 of text.

On page 51-52 of the MS, page 85 of the *WJO* text, Royce adds emphasis (italics) to "that human experience has, or can by the loyal ... through "of any set of detached observers, however large."

On page 23 of the MS, he deletes these words: "But the further pressing question is this of the philosophy of life which result from this situation are well know to you. In my opening lecture I indicated them."

On page 25 of the MS, he deletes: "Such are the problems that at the close of our opening lecture, I emphasized as the central problems of the philosophy of life, as its task is today defined."

On page 26, Royce deletes: "In talking about a purely human and practical ideal I seem then to have been simply avoiding problems about reality. I have said nothing about how this ideal is related to nature's mechanism. I have not founded the doctrine of loyalty upon any express

theory of the ultimate nature of the universe. I have had nothing to say regarding the old conflict between natural science and superstitions.”

On page 27, Royce deletes, in reference to the so-called conflict between science and religion: “[that conflict] It has been presented so far simply as a moral doctrine, as a solution for the personal question: How can I plan my life wisely, if indeed nature gives me any chance to plan and to live at all, [new paragraph] But now in this concluding lecture I have indeed to take a further step. I have ...”

On page 34, Royce deletes: “In order to make plain what I here have in mind, I must call your attention to matters which have been, in part, incidental to my former discussions but which must now for the first time in these lectures appear in their true light.”

Evaluation: These deletions appear not merely for the sake of proper linkage, but hint that originally these sheets were drafted for a concluding lecture in something like the problem of loyalty itself -- the quality of condensation and light in the text.

290. “Axiom,”
Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 2 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1910): 279-82

HARP appears to lack the manuscript for this text, which comprises Chapter V of Robinson’s *Logical Essays* volume.²⁵

291. “Minute on the Life and Service of Professor William James”
***Harvard University Gazette*, 6 (1910-11): 29-30**

292. “In Honor of Professor Palmer”
***Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 19 (1910-11): 575-78**

Speech at a banquet in honor of George Herbert Palmer, February 25, 1911. This is autobiographically significant.

²⁵ The *Royce Logical Essays*, edited by Daniel Robinson, contain the following chapters: I. Recent Logical Inquiries and Their Psychological Bearings, II. The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical, III. The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion, IV Error and Truth, V. Axiom, VI Individual, VII. Mind, VIII Negation, IX Order, X Definitions and Debates, XI Introductory Note to Enriques’ Problems of Science, XII Hypotheses and Leading Ideas, XIII Introduction to Poincare’s Foundations, XIV Benno Erdmann’s Logic Part II, XV An Extension of the Algebra of Logic Box 49, XVI The Principles of Logic, and XVII The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry.

293. A Communication Dealing with the Relations Between the Two Institutions,”
***Yale News*, vol. 34, no. 128 (1911)**

Major portions of this piece were reprinted as “An Intellectual Contest,” *Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 19 (1910-11): 740-41.

294. “James as a Philosopher” (1911)
***Boston Evening Transcript* (June 29, 1911): 13**
***Science*, n.s. 34 (1911): 33-45**
***Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 20 (1911-12)**
Box 29

Reprinted in *William James and Other Essays* as “William James and the Philosophy of Life.”

This was Royce’s Phi Beta Kappa Oration delivered at Harvard University, June 19, 1911.

In Box 29 is the 65 page MS (counting page 53(a)) in four sections, mostly freshly written pages, but few previously drafted pages, as follows:

1-11 fresh pages
12-13 are previously drafted
14-18 are fresh
19 was previously drafted
20-46 are fresh
47-52 are previously drafted
53-64 are fresh

Only slightly edited; no easily detectable major deletions.
Nothing but brief stylistic variations between the MS and the printed text in *WJO*.

The third document in Box 29 consists of a 26 page typescript, slightly edited, of the 65 page MS.

Evaluation: A further account of the WJ-JR relationship.

295. “On Definitions and Debates” (1911-12)
***The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. IX, no. 4 (February 15, 1912): 85-100**
Box 48

The manuscript for the article may be found in Box 48 of HARP. A quick reading comparison of

the MS in Box 48 with the printed copy in Woodbridge's *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. IX, No. 4 (February 15, 1912) 85-100 reveals the printed text parallels the MS faithfully.

The American Philosophical Association had tried to set up rules without discussing these rules with the membership. Royce wrote this essay in response to this attempt. He "cheerfully submits" the criticism.

This MS consists of 65 pages (taking pages with multiple paginations into account) in seven sections, plus an introduction and Royce's proposal for "the planning of our future discussions." This is an article, not a letter, submitted to F.J.E. Woodbridge, Jan 5, 1912 [*Letters* 560-61], editor of the *Journal of Phil & Ethics* following the APA meeting in late December 1911.

On January 20, 1912, after sending his full document to Woodbridge, he writes "I see no way to shorten my article on "Definitions and Debates." I am perfectly willing, however, to have it printed piecemeal, - say in two or three successive numbers. That I leave wholly to you." [*Letters* 562]

Introduction:

Three pages, fresh paper. Written in a very polite style.

Section I:

On fresh paper to 10(a)

Royce summarizes the Committee's description of their procedure.

Section II:

On fresh paper to 16

Members are asked to follow the conditions set down "with scrupulous care." (page 11 MS, page 86 *JP*)

"Members were asked to cooperate under the rules laid down by a body authorized to restrict the field of inquiry for the sake of ensuring cooperation." (pages 13-14 MS, page 87 *JP*)

Royce's present question: "How did the committee accomplish this duty? Whose cooperation did it make possible....?" (page 15 MS, page 87 *JP*)

Royce takes the committee's "formulas" seriously and counteracts them with logic.

Section III:

On fresh paper from 16-20

Royce begins his objections to the procedure, particularly with regard to the word "given" and their predefinition of "object."

Section IV:

On fresh paper from 21-36

Section V:

On previously drafted pages, runs from 37 to 49.

Section VI:

Begins on 50 with a fresh page.

51 -53 are on formerly drafted pages.

Page 54 is fresh page.

Section VII:

Begins with a used page 55.

Pages 56/57/58 - 68

Pages 69-70 are fresh.

Comments:

(Pages 68-69):

Royce recommends that “modern mathematical logicians ...[d]efine your problems as far as possible by designating typical examples.” He recommends taking the Peircean tack of using examples to concretize demonstrations.

Secondly, he recommends that “marshalling the various possible varieties of opinion which you regard as worthy of discussion, it is of course natural to divide some universe of discourse into classes, and then to enumerate the possible views by pointing out the logically possible relations amongst these classes.”

Yet, “do not ignore those most momentous aspects of modern exact theories, namely the ‘existence-theorems,’ or ‘existential postulates’ and their contradictories (the assertion that declare or deny some of your defined classes to be ‘zero-classes’).”

Autobiographical in the sense that it shows Royce’s deep interest in logic.

Evaluation: This article reflects Royce’s deep interest in logic, and amounts to a call to the editor not to overlook the importance of recent logical investigations.

296. “Introduction”

to Eugen Kuhnemann, *Schiller*, trans. Katharine Royce (Boston and London: Ginn & Co. 1912)

297. “Prinzipien der Logik” in *Logik* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1912): 61-136

“The Principles of Logic” in *Logic*, trans. B. Ethel Meyer (London: Macmillan, 1913): 67-135

German version may be found in HARP Box 104, folder 4.

For Logic People.

298. “Error and Truth”

Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 5 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1912): 366-73

HARP appears to lack the manuscript for this text. Chapter IV of Robinson’s *Logical Essays* volume.

299. “Atonement”

***Atlantic Monthly*, 111 (1913): 406-19**

Lecture VI from *The Problem of Christianity*.

In HARP Box 33, there is a 78 page MS (numbered “80,” but with pages 13, 14, 15 combined), in ten sections of this piece. Except for pages 3 and pages 21-34 (sections II-V), all pages are fresh.

Sections 1-10 are parallel in text and MS, except the late insertion of a footnote. At section IX (page 60 MS, page 181 printed text), Royce inserts a footnote not included in the MS. Royce encounters Allen Dinsmore’s book *Atonement in Literature and Life* (Boston, 1906) after the MS was written. The note was inserted in the galley proof.

Will be in *Critical Edition* via PC.

300. “The Christian Doctrine of Life”

***Hibbert Journal*, 11 (1913): 473-96**

Lecture VII from *The Problem of Christianity*.

In HARP Box 34, there is a 75 page MS of this piece (with 6, 7, 8 combined, and an 11a, and numbered “76”) in ten sections, all on fresh pages.

All sections run in parallel, in the MS and printed text, except for the very last line. In that line, Royce adds the words “both labor” to the printed text, so that it reads “...for that coming of the Kingdom, we both labor and wait.” (page 208 of the printed book text)

301. “An Extension of the Algebra of Logic”

***Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 10 (1913): 617-33**

Logic.

Reprinted in *Royce Logical Essays* with corrections. *RLE* omit’s the last paragraph of three

lines.

302. “George Fox as Mystic”

The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 1913): 31-59

Royce delivered this address at Earlham [Quaker] College Chapel, on Friday February 5, 1904. It is certainly a tribute to the founder of the Quakers.

Royce calls this paper “a fragmentary contribution to that study of the ‘Varieties of Religious Experience’” which William James opened up to the American public. (31)

Royce distinguishes carefully between Fox’s “openings” and the “central mystical consciousness” as “decidedly different sorts of mental facts.” (52) Royce finds four kinds of “openings” in Fox’s experiences. (49)

Light, he notes, is the essential feature of Fox’s consciousness of the presence of the divine. (53) The five movements which Fox identifies in the Lord’s “immediate working power” in his “Friends” are as follows:

- a) tastes of the immediate working power of the Lord
- b) finds an alteration in your minds
- c) do see whence virtue doth come, and strength that doth renew the inward man
- d) doth refresh you
- e) draws you in love to forsake the world, and that in it which has form and beauty in it to the eye of the world.

“To you all I say, Wait upon God in that which is pure.” (53).

Two other features of the “Light” besides its being “a direct consciousness of God’s presence”:

- “why Fox finds the consciousness of the Light so convincing and so immediately a **revelation of God,**”
- “the character which the Light revealed as the essentially divine character” (55)

This light is the “source of discernment” (54) provided that one “waits” for the Lord, and keeps close to the Lord. (53)

Royce distinguishes the “classical mystical resting in God, as in a trance, over against Fox’s experience of a “perfectly unifying Light” - pure, absolutely simple, one - which soon stirs him to movement. Fox’s kind of mysticism has its “motor side.”

Work to be clarified by scholars:

- Comparison of Fox’s kind of mysticism with that of Meister Eckhart’s *abhendikheit*.
- Comparison of Fox’s kind of mysticism with that of John Bunyan, and especially evidence for
- Similarities in Royce’s own kind of musings.

Evaluation: This seems to be Royce's most careful description and analysis of at least one American mystic since Royce placed metaphysical mysticism as central to his examination of conceptions of Being.

303. "Primitive Ways of Thinking With Special Reference to Negation and Classification"
***The Open Court*, 27 (1913): 577-98**

Logic.

An "[a]ttempt to show how primitive mental processes, particularly tabu and divination, have contributed to the development of more rigorous thinking." Skrupskelis, *BWJR*:2 1216.

304. "The Second Death"
***Atlantic Monthly*, 111 (1913): 242-54**

An excerpt from *PC*.

305. "Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism"
***Popular Science Monthly*, 83 (1913): 394-411**

Evaluation: Paradoxically, FMO thinks the introductory two pages are Royce's brief summary of philosophical problems emphasized by Pragmatism, hence I would concur with publishing the introductory two pages in *The Critical Edition*.

306. "Some Relations Between Philosophy and Science in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century in Germany"
***Science*, n.s. 38 (1913): 567-84**

Logic.

The fourth section is reprinted in *Royce's Logical Essays* as "Hypotheses and Leading Ideas."

307. "Address for Meeting of American Students at Oxford, Feb. 22, 1913"
Box 78

A 22-page MS, with the last page mostly in pencil and outlining possible topics, especially for Rhodes Scholars. The text seems complete (ending before the pencil notes on the last page). This seems an as yet unpublished address (Dec '08).

NB: The frequency of Royce's use of the word "reverence" in this address, and in the 1910

article above “What is Philosophy and Why Study Philosophy,” as well as in *the Source of Religious Insight* seems significant for FMO. Royce apparently uses the term more frequently in his final years than he did in his middle and early writings; yet here he echoes directly his self-definition as a philosopher in his 1879 “*Meditation Before the Gate*.” [as seen in *FE* vii].

In this address at Oxford, Royce talks as an American speaking largely to Americans on Washington’s birthday. Royce reflects on a boast he used to make during the Boer War that America’s way of dealing with immigrants surpassed that of the British. For the British had bred disruption of their social order through their imperial civilization policy. “So I used to feel, and say.” But Royce sees that this is a pre-20th century remark. More recently, given that American has undergone huge waves of immigration, his boast is no longer true. [On the eve of WWI, Royce hopes that these students don’t have to go to war to save the country from external malevolent forces Yet he challenges them with America’s internal problems, esp., that of integrating immigrants into Americans’ self-identification as Americans. [At that time, the Census Bureau had released statistics indicating that currently males over 21 resident in America were about six foreign born to about seven native born. Hence, Royce’s audience has the “task of cooperating as loyal Americans, in maintaining and of extending our national and our social ideas, our dear bought liberties, and our fathers’ hopes, and the fruits of their labors, our constitution and our sentiments in the face of unprecedented social changes, of new immigrations, and of novel social forces.” (13-14).

In this address, Royce calls Rhodes Scholars in his audience to grow beyond preoccupation with their home America and become genuine “citizens of the world.” (18)

Some important points about this address:

- Royce is prescient about the increasing danger of war for these scholars’ lives.
- Autobiographically, he is contrite about his earlier boast that, at least from the viewpoint of “white man relating to fellow white man, the American had not used rifles and war against immigrating fellow whites, whereas in the Boer War the British had sunk to use war and rifles to kill white Dutch immigrants. In 1913, Royce felt he could no longer make that boast, for now Americans are challenged with a far greater immigration problem and are not yet able to solve it.
- The late Royce’s increasingly frequent use of the word “reverence.”
- Royce’s call for the scholars to be citizens of the world suggests his idea of the universal community.
- He again refers to the need for a *wise* provincialism in America. But the context has changed. For thought America had various regions for which a wise provincialism was fitting. Now, by 1913, America has become *itself* a province within the world of nations and must exercise its unique and wise provincialism in that wider community.

Evaluation: Though languidly otiose in his first pages of this pre-WWI address, Royce soon shifts his tone and radiates a sensitivity to global problems, and to the international role which U.S. bears in 1913.

Underlying this address are emotions which are prelude to the passionate feelings soon to show in his Tremont Temple addresses. The talk shows his development of the idea of “wise

provincialism,” since he adapts it to a changed national and international situation. [Needed, a note on the Provincialism paper in *RQP* on this growth.] And his increasing stress on “reverence” towards peoples of all stripes sounds a clarion call for America’s immigration problem one century later.

308. “‘Shop-Talk,’ prepared for The Authors’ Club, to be read at the meeting of December 5, 1913”

This MS of 37 pages, all on previously unused sheets, except for page 25, has been published in *JRLW* 2: 188-96. Royce’s twofold topic here is “the relation of philosophy to literature and how and why the literary artist may well study philosophy.” (2)

ROYCE summarizes the purpose, thrust, and history of philosophy around Kant’s three famous questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? and 3) What may I hope? As an instance of the first question, Royce autobiographically reports how, in a temporarily halted railroad car, perhaps along Cape Cod, his attention was suddenly alerted to “two boys talking together in the seat directly behind me“ and their different openness to the metaphysics of children (18-19).

Royce refers to Aristotle’s *Poetics* (29-30) and to Santayana’s far more recent *Three Philosophical Poets*, --*Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe* (37) as possibly indicating “to you [literary men] what value such a study of the relations between philosophy and literature might possess for you.”

Evaluation. This MS bears witness to Royce’s sensitivity to metaphysical speech, his easy grasp of philosophy’s history, and his life-long connection of literature and philosophy.

309. “Introductory Note”
Enriques, *Problems of Science*, trans. Katharine Royce (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company 1914)

Reprinted in *Royce’s Logical Essays* with some omissions.

310. “The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical,”
***Science*, n.s. 39 (1914): 551-66**

Reprinted in *Royce’s Logical Essays*. A reprint may be found in Box 104, folder 10.

Evaluation: Important late statement by Royce on integrating various methodologies. (Cf. Robinson’s choice in *RLE*.)

**311. “A Plea for Provincial Independence in Education; ”
Middlebury College Bulletin, 9 (October 1914): 3-19**

This piece is sub-titled: “A Letter with Reference to the Report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching on Education in Vermont.”

Evaluation: As a witness to Royce serving as mediator, this “A Plea...” deserves attention.

312. *War and Insurance: An Address Delivered Before the Philosophical Union of the University of California at Its Twenty-Fifth Anniversary at Berkeley California, August 27, 1914* (New York: Macmillan, 1914)

Reprinted without the introduction and notes in *SPJR*.

**313. “Professor Royce on His Reviewer” (1914)
(reply to a review of *War and Insurance*)**

**314. “The Spirit of the Community” (1914)
Box 91, document 5
Box 104, folders 13-14**

Royce’s prepared address for the Philosophical Union at Berkeley. He was scheduled to give this in August 1914, but WWI had just begun. He tries to determine what he can now say fittingly to his audience. Newsprint and radio roil the waters of his and their consciousnesses. See Box 114, folder 1 (notebook) and Royce’s “Notes on the Revised Berkeley Address.”

The MS which corresponds to the printed text in *The Later Writings of Josiah Royce* (pages 60-71). As the third MS in Box 91, it runs from pages 1 to 34a. The MS and the printed text run in exact parallel.

However, the MS text in Box 91 also contains an unconnected page 35--a previously drafted page—which seems related to this essay as emphasizing the current power of the idea of “insurance.” Beginning in the middle of a sentence, it reads as follows:

“the stone of usury which the ancient and mediaeval moralists rejected, is now, in a sense, the head of the corner of the modern industrial world, while the original sin of borrower and of lender is transformed into the saving grace of the harmony of the interests both of promoters and of the producers of the industrial and commercial world.” (35)

315. “A Word for the Times,”
***Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 23 (1914-15): 207-09**

Skrupskelis: “An address given at the beginning of the academic year.” *BWJR*:2 1217.

Evaluation: A good yet brief example of Royce in exhortation style. It also touches Royce’s relations to both Oliver Wendell Holmeses. (senior and junior) FDR quoted part of this essay regarding fear (at 208). See Ralph Barton Perry in *The Spirit of William James* pages 21-22.

316. “Introductory Note”
to Annie Lyman Sears, *The Drama of the Spiritual Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1915)

317. “An American Thinker on the War”
***Hibbert Journal*, 14 (1915): 37-42**

318. “Professor Josiah Royce of Harvard Advocates Insurance by the Nations of the World,”
***New York Times* (July 25, 1915): part 4, 2-3.**

Reprinted as the “Possibility of International Insurance” in *The Hope of The Great Community* at pages 71-92.

A 12 page unedited typescript entitled “The Possibility of International Insurance” is found at **Box 108**, folder 2. A manuscript for this article, identical to the typescript, is found in **Box 51**, the third document. Royce wrote the first nine pages of the MS on fresh paper. Starting at page 10 (section III), Royce used previously drafted now renumbered pages. Starting his fourth section, he uses fresh paper again, and starts pagination over at 1 through 11. The manuscript is thus 29 pages long.

Portions of the manuscript are heavily edited by Royce.

Like the typescript, the manuscript runs parallel to the book text, except for the essay’s final paragraph.

Following the manuscript in Box 51, a typescript identical to the one found in Box 108, folder two, appears.

The typescript [Box 108, folder 2] and manuscript [Box 51] run parallel to the republished book text except for the following:

1. The NYT article has an introductory paragraph not found in typescript.
2. The typescripts is divided into four sections, with headings; these are omitted from the NYT

article.

3. The typescript does not include the concluding paragraph in which Royce talks of submitting his “general plan” to his colleagues, and gives acknowledgements.

319. “Belgium as the Teacher of the Nations”
***New York Times* (December 20, 1915): 10**

Parts reprinted as “A Hopeful View of the European Situation” *Journal of Education* (Boston), 83 (1916): 92-93. Part of an address prepared for a group of philosophy teachers gathered in honor of Maurice de Wulf.

320. “The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Case of Middlebury College”
***School and Society*, 1 (1915): 145-50**

Skrupskelis notes that this is an address given to the organizational meeting of the American Association of University Professors in New York on January 2, 1915. (The *School and Society* note that it was 1914 is incorrect.) “It led to the formation of Committee D of the AAUP, on ‘Limits of Standardization of Institutions, etc.’” *BWJR*:2 1218.

Evaluation: Not needed for *Critical Edition* if at least the heart of Royce’s other publication on Middlebury College is witnessed to in the *Critical Edition*.

321. “Extension Course in Ethics” (1915-1916)
Box 105, folder 4, Documents 14-19
Box 126, folder 3, (“Outlines for University Extension Course Lectures on Ethics, undated.”)

These lectures, insofar as MSS allowed, were published posthumously in *JRLW* 2: 75-171.

322. “Duties of Americans in the Present War”
***Boston Evening Transcript* (February 2, 1916): 18**
Box 51
Box 104, folder 12
Box 108, folder 18

Reprinted in *The Hope of the Great Community* and in *SPJR*.

This essay was first delivered as an address in Tremont Temple on January 30, 1916. [See *Life* 377] The text of his address was published in *The Boston Evening Transcript* on February 2, 1916. [See HARP, Box 108, folder 18.] The version printed in *HGC* edits the address as

delivered.

Clear copy now contained in HARP Box 104 folder 12.

The MS consists of 12 pages, slightly edited. [Box 51] The manuscript and *The Boston Evening Transcript* run in parallel, except that pages 9a-9e are inserted in the middle of page 9. The text returns to the bottom of page 9 for eight lines, then picks up again on page 10. The manuscript's last lines are illegible as the paper page has deteriorated. After "We shall not thus escape suffering," the MS is illegible. We must rely on the newspaper transcript, which concludes: "... but we shall begin to endure as Belgium today endures, for honor, for duty, for mankind." [Box 108, folder 18]

The editor of the printed version of the address in the book *HGC* has somewhat altered (polished?) the text of the Manuscript and its more faithful version in *The Transcript*.

323. "Charles Sanders Peirce,"
***Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 13**
(1916): 701-09

Written with Fergus Kernal. For information about how this piece was written, see W.F. Kernal, "The Peirce Manuscripts and Josiah Royce – A Memoir Harvard 1915-16," in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 1 (1965): 90-95.

Evaluation: Certainly needs to be included in *Critical Edition*.

324. "Mind"
Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 8 (New York:
Scribner and Sons, 1916): 649-57
Box 50
Box 114, folder 1, 1

NB: Cf. Royce's own notes on "The Article on Mind", toward the end of a logical notebooks (about ten pages from back cover), Box 114, folder 1. The text of these handwritten notes is give at Part VIII of the Index, at Box 114, folder 1.

A related (the?) manuscript for this article may be found in HARP Box 50. Chapter VII of Robinson's *Logical Essays* volume.

Details (Continued after MS page 17j):

Section IV:

Page 17k

Royce adds to this section title, "The Relation of the Three Cognitive Processes to our

Knowledge That Various Minds Exist” this: “and to our views about what sorts of Beings Minds are” This added clause is included in the Hastings text.

Page 23

Before the paragraph beginning “Our own knowledge of M.”, Royce adds to the previous sentence after “. . . conversation which remains” the following phrase “as a whole essentially ‘coherent’ despite its endless novelties and unexpected incidents.”

Page 24

At the close of the paragraph beginning “But it is essential” [LWJR 71] Royce adds the following lines: “It will be and must be observed that this alter, with which I have to deal, either in reflecting on my own mind, or in seeking for new light from my neighbor, is never a merely simple or separable or merely detached or isolated individual, but a being which is the nature of a community, and “many in one “ and a “one in many.” A m[ind], knowable through interpretation is never merely a ‘Monad’, a simple detached self. Its unity insofar as it possesses genuine and coherent a unity tends, in the most significant cases, to become essentially such as the unity which the apostle Paul attributes to the ideal church: - “Many members, but one body; many gifts but one Spirit, - an essentially social unity, never to be adequately conceived or felt, but properly the object of what the Apostle viewed, in its practical and religious aspect as the spiritual gift of Charity, in its cognitive aspect as Interpretation. ‘Pray rather that ye may interpret.’”

(NB: The reference in the Hastings text to 1 Cor. 14:13 does not appear in Royce’s MS)

325. “Monotheism”

Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 8 (New York: Scriber and Sons, 1916): 817-821

HARP appears to lack this MS, but in Box 97 there is one sheet called “Notes on Monotheism” in the collection of ten fragments at the box’s end.

Evaluation:: Printed in both *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* and in McDermott’s *BWJR*, this article continues earlier Royce writings on theism (e.g., Lecture I of the Augustus Graham Lectures *On Theism*, pages 11-36) and culminates in what is a Roycean challenge to philosophers of religion (and theologians) to bring these three traditions of conceiving the Holy One into harmonious balance.

326. “The Hope of the Community” (1916)

Box 51, document 2

Box 105, folder 1

This 40-page typescript found in Box 105, folder 1 is titled “The Hope of the Community” *not* “The Hope of the Great Community” as the folder title suggests (*see* entry below of article of that title). Rather, this typescript (identical with the carbon copy in Box 51, document 2) contains three major sections --(a) 12-17, (b) 32-34, and (c) 38-40.--not found in all the previously

published texts of *HGC*: This last section “c” is the missing section V, with which Royce intended to conclude his article.

Full analysis of this piece, as well as the text of sections omitted from the published version of *The Hope of the Great Community* are found below under description of Box 105, folder 1.

327. “The Hope of the Great Community” *Yale Review*, 5 (1916): 269-91

The manuscript for this essay seems absent from HARP. However, two identical 40-page typescripts entitled “The Hope of the Community” are contained in Box 51 (document 2) and Box 105, folder 1 (*see* entry above).

This piece was originally written for *The Yale Review*. A comparison of the Yale text, the typescripts in HARP, and the printed text in *The Hope of the Great Community* follows.

A comparison of the Yale text and the version as printed in *HGC*:

The Yale Review text and the printed book text run in precise parallel. Both are titled “The Hope of the Great Community.”

The only difference, outside small editorial changes, is a footnote in the Yale Text at page 290 following the paragraph ending “... the conclusion of the present war.” The footnote does not appear in the printed text (page 66). The footnote in the Yale text reads as follows:

“In his ‘War and Insurance,’ Professor Royce proposed that in order to make such a beginning, the victors in the war devote the indemnity paid by the vanquished to ‘establish the first mutual international insurance company against national calamities, including wars.’ After this fund is deposited ‘with the trustees, and under the formal care of Switzerland or Sweden,’ he suggests that the victors then proceed to ‘draw up their rules, and thenceforth invite all sovereign states, great and small, including the vanquished states, to insure.’ - The Editor.”

A comparison of the Yale text/Printed Text with HARP typescript is more complicated. Not only is Section V of the HARP typescript not included in the Yale Text. Substantial revisions have been made to parts of the text. Furthermore, the HARP typescripts are titled “The Hope of the Community,” but the Yale Text and the Book Text are titled “The Hope of the Great Community.”

In a letter to Professor Wilbur L. Cross of the Yale Review, dated November 8, 1915, Royce talks about the article.

I enclose herewith the manuscript of the article which you requested me to prepare for the December number of the *Yale Review*. The article has been a good deal revised and condensed. I hope that, in its present form, it is not too long. You did not assign any precise limits to its length. In your letter of October 7th you named the tenth of November as the date when you wished to have the manuscript in your hands. With thanks for your kind request ...

Letters at 639.

Query: Does Royce use the word “manuscript” literally? (HARP does not contain a manuscript for this piece, just the typescripts.) The fact that there are no manuscripts in HARP suggests that a manuscript was sent, but Cross did not return it.

The typescript has titled Section numbers, but the printed texts (Yale Review and the *HGC* book) do not.

Section I: “The Great Community and the Nations.”

Section II: “International Ties”

Section III: “The Non-political Community of Mankind”

Section IV: “The Social Arts of the Great Community”

At the beginning of the piece, except for small editorial changes, the typescript and printed texts are identical until typescript page 12. After the fifth line of type strict page 12, ending “spiritual union,” the texts begin to diverge. This break happens directly before section II of the printed texts.

At the end of the piece, from the paragraph in section IV beginning “Were such an international board” (page 36 of the typescript, page 66 of the book text, page 290 of the Yale text) to the end of section IV, the typescript and printed texts also run parallel. (This is the end of the printed article in both the Yale Review and the book.)

Between these two parallel sections, sections which bookend all three texts, the typescript text has been substantially re-written and shortened in the printed version. The question is whether the longer typescript, pages 12-36 of which have never been published, deserves to be included in the *Critical Edition*. The previously unpublished material deals with Royce’s “Great Community” themes in considerably more detail, explicitly addressing the “three theses” of the Great Community, and with a much wider body of references.

328. “Professor Royce’s ‘Lusitania’ Speech”
***Boston Evening Transcript* (May 7, 1916): 13**

Reprinted as “The First Anniversary of the Sinking of the Lusitania, May 7, 1916” in *The Hope of the Great Community*. HARP contains a copy of the *Transcript* article at **Box 108, folder 18**. No manuscript appears to be available of this address in HARP.

A clear copy of *Transcript* article may be found in **Box 104, folder 12**.

329. “Words of Professor Royce at the Walton Hotel at Philadelphia,”
***Philosophical Review*, 25 (1916): 507-14**

Reprinted in *The Hope of the Great Community*.

Originally delivered [extemporaneously?] as an address to the American Philosophical Union.

Clendenning suggests the following hypothesis for the essay's genesis:

"I am inclined to take the footnote [on the first page of the essay in *The Philosophical Review* and in the published book] at face value. This is how I would write the scenario. Royce gave the speech extemporaneously on the evening of December 29, 1915. Afterwards the sponsors of the program decided to publish the proceedings as a festschrift, and asked Royce for a copy of his "Words." It was at that time -- say, January-March, 1916 -- that Royce actually wrote the text for publication. Some of his friends helped him by offering notes they had taken during or after the address. These notes were used by Royce when he wrote the piece." [John Clendenning to FMO, June 3, 1980]

For one eye-witness account of the speech, *see* an article by Theodore de Laguna in *The Journal of Philosophy* 13 (1916) 97-102 (esp. 101-02).

330. "Negation"

Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 9 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1917): 164-71

HARP appears to lack this manuscript. Chapter VIII of Robinson's *Logical Essays* volume.

Evaluation: A basic and important Royce text.

331. "Order"

Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 9 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1917): 533-40

This entry appears as Chapter IX in the *Logical Essays* volume edited by Robinson. Royce dates the typescript of "Order" contained in Box 50 April 10, 1916.

Comparing the edited 42 page typescript of the galley proof, Box 50, MS no. 3 with Royce's Chapter IX "Order" in the printed *Logical Essays* text: The *Logical Essays* text does not follow the typesetting instructions in the galley (e.g. small type instructions). There is a small bit of editing by someone other than Royce, perhaps Robinson. The galley is prepared for Hastings, then back to Robinson.

(There is a separate, unedited typescript of "Order" that is as far as we can tell identical with the galley typescript in Box 50.)

The typescript galley numbers have been apparently cut off at the top of the page. (Hence no pagination for our purposes.) The typescript galley as well as the unedited typescript in Box 50 probably precisely parallel the Hastings version.

Section I:

At galley page four, one paragraph just before section II “Law and Order” is probably by Robinson. “This elementary and decidedly inexact instance of the presence of order, and of what happens when we discover what a given order is, serves to illustrate what we mean by order in a way which will remain useful to us, however complex or significant, or scientifically or philosophically momentous the form or the instances of order may be, which attract our attention or from the topic of our investigation.”

Sections II:

The galley typescript and Robinson text run parallel.

Section III.

Robinson edits from galley proof, deleting after “acquainted is ...”: “that order which seems to have been the very first of the objects of exact science to attract the close attention of the human mind --” Then Robinson drops the entire clause of that sentence after “whole numbers,” e.g. “or what are also called the ‘natural numbers.’”

In the second sentence beginning “This order is made up of,” Robinson deletes “certain ideal objects, one of which is”

The next paragraphs are aggressively edited and severely shortened. For instance, toward the close of this section, concerning the whole numbers, the editor not only deletes the final sentence of the penultimate paragraph “Elementary as the instance ...,” he also deletes the entire lengthy last section paragraph, approximately 45 lines, before the beginning of section IV.

Section IV:

The editor drops the concluding sentence, four lines, in the paragraph immediately preceding Section V: “The spirit and the law of charity on one hand, and the dwelling-place, the expression the fulfilment of those who attain the order of charity on the other, these are thus readily to be distinguished, while their inseparability is equally obvious.”

This editor (Robinson) is distinct from the non-Roycean editor on the typescript.

Section V:

This editor deletes the first paragraph of this section, and heavily edit’s the second.

The next six pages of the typescript galley are accurately reflected in Robinson’s text. But, at the bottom of that sixth page of the typescript galley, another radical deletion begins with the paragraph “This apparently barren abstraction ...” continuing through the next page until the paragraph “In the actual work ...” (see page 217 of the Robinson text).

The rest of the section V Robinson text is faithful to the galley typescript.

Section VI.

The Galley typescript and Robinson text are parallel.

Section VII:

Two galley pages into this section, before the paragraph beginning “In brief, our power to infer ...” the editor of the Robinson text deletes a long final sentence beginning “If the order in

question” to “deepest spiritual significance to life.” (Approximately 9 lines of text.)

After the paragraph beginning “Order, then, is known .”, the Robinson text drops two full paragraphs until the paragraph “We may sum up” (page 230 Robinson text).

The next three paragraphs run in parallel.

But Robinson’s text drops the bibliographical note.

Evaluation: Despite Royce’s verbosity, the text as it appears in the Robinson collection is so abbreviated that we are not given Royce’s full sketch of arguably the most fundamental idea in Royce, viz., “Order.” Therefore any critical edition of the “Order” article must go back to the Hastings’ version.

332. “Nietzsche,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 119 (March 1917): 321-31.

This article was published after Royce’s death, probably at the initiative of Royce’s last assistant, W. Furgas Kernan, whose prefatory note states that it ‘was recently found among the posthumous papers of Professor Royce.’ Since the article was published in March 1917, Kernan’s ‘recently’ likely means ‘in the few months after Royce died (in mid-September 1916).

Royce’s notes on Nietzsche precede the turn of the century. As Skrupskelis informs us, “Royce claims the Nietzsche is most noteworthy for developing a novel form of “ethical Titanism.”[*BWJR* 2: 1220] On December 8, 1916, Mrs. Royce wrote to Mr. [Ellery] Sedgwick, editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, recommending that Kernan’s “Note” (which explains how Royce came to write the Nietzsche article) be given prominence in order to forestall readers from thinking that Royce had changed his mind in the last couple of years. Sedgwick placed the note atop the article’s first page.

The Kernan note reads as follows:

“This essay on Nietzsche was recently found among the posthumous papers of Professor Royce. It will perhaps appear strange to man that the author of *The Duties of Americans in the Present War* and of *The Hope of the Great Community* should have found so much, not merely of interest, but of sound doctrine – ‘matter for the strengthening of hearts’ – in the philosopher now claimed by modern Germany as its prophet and oracle. In reply it can only be said that modern Germany, and not Nietzsche, is at fault. Professor Royce’s thesis is that only as a prophet of the soul, the portrayer of an ideal, is Nietzsche to be understood. The revolt which he preaches is not so much a revolt against others as against the self, against the narrow or commonplace or merely habitual self in the interests of ideal selfhood. And in a sense it may be said that the rigid *Weltpolitik* of modern Germany is the antithesis of the philosophy of Nietzsche. For all politics or statecraft is relative to a stereotyped word, and with such a world Nietzsche has nothing in common, -- ‘All this is poverty and a miserable ease,’ – and the hour that he exalts is the hour ‘in which not only your happiness but your reason and virtue as well become your loathing.’ – W. Fergus Kernan.

Since the Harvard Archives contains no MS of this article, and since writing this MS and finding it are not the same, we are still ignorant of the time-period when Royce drafted this work. Given the misleading images of Nietzsche spewed forth before America's entry into WWI, Royce may have responded to the [then] current need to counter a popular fascinating view of N. with a more-evidenced and critical portrait, one fairer and more adequate to the man himself. Royce possessed an 1896 edition of Nietzsche's works in English (see copy in Robbins Library), and occasionally referred to N. after 1900.

Some FMO Notes:

That the editor of the *Atlantic* published this article seems due in part to Royce's recent death, but also to the editor's sense that educated Americans were currently interested in N, that paradoxical thinker – whether with or without any popular associations with the 'blond beast "superman"' against whom the U.S. would be at war within a month of this publication.

The size of this article – around 7,000 words, supported by Royce's 'Notes' from reading N., - means that this MS was not a 'pot-boiler' dashed off over-night at the request of some popularizing editor. The tenor of the article suggests that this article was something that Royce wanted so much on record before he died that he invested a surprising amount of time and effort to it. One can conjecture why Royce did not himself choose to publish this article. Busy with other concerns was a major factor. Internal evidence shows, however, that despite his clear divergences from N., Royce recognized that ethical discourse in America needed with N. to condemn its merely conventional morality and to scrutinize N's unique brand of 'ethical Titanism.' For N aims, 'through strenuous activity, the discovery of what that higher ideal individual is to mean.' (Royce, "Nietzsche," page 323, col. A)

I have not yet found how N was received in America during 1900-1915. This affects why Royce wrote the article, perhaps too why he didn't publish it.

Is it fantastic to ask whether Royce sees a good deal of his own 'way of striving to become a unique individual' in N.? i.e. whether the whole article is a kind of Roycean autobiography but with Royce's pointing out some big omissions in N., such as his missing the great problem of organic character of the true life of the cooperating individual, the reality of community and his oriental idea of the eternal recurrence?"

On December 8, 1916, Mrs. Royce (KR) wrote to Mr. [Ellery] Sedgwick, editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, recommending that Kernan's "Note" (which explains how Royce came to write the Nietzsche article) be given prominence in order to forestall readers from thinking that Royce had changed his mind in the last couple of years.

PART III HARP Boxes 99 - 145

The Harvard Archives Royce Papers (HARP) “boxes” numbered above Box 98 consist of boxes of folders, not mounted “folio” volumes as is the case in Boxes 1-98. When E. F. Wells pasted papers into the mounted volumes 1-98, he did so more or less thematically. These archival boxes of documents, however, are much more loosely arranged. For organizational purposes, therefore, these boxes are listed here in their number order number, and not by theme. Where the contents reflect identifiable (or suspected) relationships to recognized Royce work, cross-references are given. The gap at Box 153 provides room for future deposits of Royceana in the Harvard University Archives.

The titles given in quotes after the box and folder numbers are the labels created by the Harvard Archives personnel. Where FMO disagrees with an assigned title, an asterisk appears by the folder. FMO regards entries which lack explicit evaluations as not worthy of inclusion in the *Critical Edition*.

Logicians, historians, psychologists and biographers will have other interests in these papers than philosophers. Among these following boxes (approximately 56) of newly arranged Royce materials, a philosophical inquirer should pay particularly close attention to materials in Boxes 102 and 104-106. The historian of philosophy should note Royce’s notes and extracts from his readings (as found in Royce’s own “Index” at Box 125, folder 9, and Box 126, folder 1), as well as explication of the factual arrangement of the Royce Papers hinted at in Box 129, folder 11, and Box 142, folders 2 and 3.

Box 99 “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Class Day Program. UC Berkeley 1875”

Folder 2: “Diplomas, Certificates & Acknowledgements of Gifts by Josiah Royce”

Seven documents, including honorary degree from St. Andrews.

Folder 3: “Announcements, Programs, Invitations ca. 1890-1911”

Twenty-three program pamphlets and sheets, for *inter alia*, the Gifford Lectures and other events at St. Andrews.

Folder 4: “Announcements, Programs, Invitations ca. 1890-1911”

Thirteen documents including program notes from the Gifford Lectures and the Lowell Lectures.

Folder 5: “Josiah Royce - Confirmation of Appointments”

- Document 1: Western Union Telegraph confirmation Royce’s election to an honorary degree at St. Andrew’s
- Document 2: Certificate of Royce’s appointment as a member of Harvard’s Administrative Board (one year term).
- Document 3: Certificate of Royce’s appointment as the Ingersoll Lecturer on the Immortality of Man, for 1899.

Folder 6: “Ingersoll Lecture of 1899, The Conception of Immortality. Publication Announcement. 1907”

One 4” by 6” note, with the typeset announcement as it appeared (per a handwritten note) in *The Guardian* on February 13, 1907.

Folder 7: “Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc. [in honor of Josiah Royce] Program. December 1915”

Program for “The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association,” a 1915 meeting in Philadelphia honoring Royce on the occasion of his 60th birthday. Speeches were given by, among others, John Dewey. At the meeting, Royce himself presented what has become a well-known autobiographical sketch.

Folder 8: “Minute on the Life and Services of Josiah Royce”

A 7-page typescript, “From the Records of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Tuesday, November 7, 1916”, “prepared by a committee of the Faculty consisting of Professors R.B. Perry, Lanman, and Hocking.” Perry and Hocking had been students of Royce at Harvard. Lanman was one of his oldest friends, from their days together in Baltimore.

Folder 9: “Stephen Royce: Personal Memories of Josiah Royce ca. 1916”

A 17-page typescript on Stephen Royce’s letterhead, titled “Personal Memories of Josiah Royce by his Son Stephen Royce.” In the text, Stephen Royce refuses Harvard’s request for Royce’s personal papers. He does, however, personally write out 17 pages of biographical information regarding his father. The reflection, which he calls “Personal Memories of Josiah Royce by his Son Stephen Royce,” is written in two parts: “Exodus” and “Boyhood – The Promised Land.” Stephen’s own “Personal Memories of JR” begins at the bottom of page one, and continues to the bottom of page five.

The 17-page typescript document is written on office stationery, with each page displaying its

printed header: “Stephen Royce, Mining Engineer, Crystal Falls, Mich.” The reflections terminate abruptly on page 17.

Part I: Background – Exodus.

Stephen refuses the request of the Curator of the Harvard Archives, made shortly after Royce’s death, for “Royce’s personal and family letters and papers to be filed for the use of possible future biographers.” Stephen Royce replies, “My father would not have wanted such use made of these papers, and the request had to be refused.” [first paragraph, page 1]

Relying on “all my early very clear memories,” writes Stephen, “I draw in trying to picture to the reader what a spiritual and intellectual experience it was, to be brought up in the house of Josiah Royce.” [page 2 bottom]

From this point, until the bottom of page 5, Stephen offers his earliest personal memories of Royce—his face, kindly red hair, etc. Next, from bottom of p;. 5 until p.15, Stephen graphically narrates the scenes of his parents’ trek to California with their infant, “Mary.”

Part II: Boyhood – The Promised Land

This account is told briefly, on pages 16-17. The account tells surprisingly little of Stephen’s experiences of his father in their home at 103 Irving Street, until Royce’s death in 1916.

Evaluation: Some vignettes from pages 2-5 suggest a child’s early perception of Royce as a father. Many of these offer a good counter against popular trend to finger-point “bright red hair” with an “obscene display of forehead.” The story of his parents’ cross-country trek seems told more factually by SER.

Folder 10: “Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce”

The printed, hardback volume containing the papers delivered at “The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association,” a 1915 meeting in Philadelphia honoring Royce. The program for this meeting is contained in folder 7 of this Box (99).

Folder 11: “On Royce’s Philosophical and Other Works. Various Clippings, 1881-1903”

A large, unorganized assortment of original clippings and photocopies of reviews of Royce’s work.

FMO’s comment: It’s significant that these reviews are derived overwhelmingly from church organs, and hardly ever, if at all, from philosophical journals?

Box 100: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “St. Andrews, University of (Invitation Cards)”

A series of invitations to Josiah Royce for events at the University of St. Andrews from September 12-14, 1911.

Folder 2: “On Royce’s “War and Insurance” Clippings 1914”

A collection of notices and reviews, originals and photocopies, concerning *War and Insurance*.

Folder 3: “Various News Clippings, 1914, undated”

A collection of newspaper items relating to Royce’s family ... John B. Royce breeder of Pekingese, an obituary for Sir Henry Head (a relative of Royce’s wife), a picture of Ruth Woodbury (?) with puppies. Also a clipping of an article “My Library” by Smith Baker from *Unity* magazine.

Folder 4: “On Royce’s View of Roosevelt & on Josiah Royce Hall”

An original clip, and two photocopies.

Folder 5: “Royce’s Autobiographical Sketch ca. 1886”

Royce’s “Autobiographical Sketch,” a 22 page typescript, slightly edited, but not in Royce’s hand, dated 1886 on the basis of Royce’s phrase on page 3 “my position on coming to Harvard four years ago.”

At the top of page 1 there is a handwritten note by Royce as follows: “Solomons May 27 ‘98, before the Philos’y Comm.”

Evaluation: Peter Hare judged this sketch too off-hand and casual for reproduction in *Transactions*. FMO concedes its casual style, but the first section draws the curtain for readers to see Royce’s omnivorous reading

Folder 6: “Josiah Royce - Twenty Years After. Bixler, Julius.”

A reprint of Bixler, “Josiah Royce -- Twenty Years After” *The Harvard Theological Review* vol. 29 no. 3 (July 1936): 197-224.

Folder 7: “New Documents on Josiah Royce. Clendenning, John and Oppenheim, Frank 1990”

Typeset pages of the article Clendenning and Oppenheim, “New Documents on Josiah Royce” *Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society*, 26 (Spring 1990): 131-45.

Folder 8: “The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce. Clendenning, John. 1999”

A hardback copy of the second edition. Clendenning, *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2nd ed. 1999)

Folder 9: “The American West as Metaphysics: A Perspective on Josiah Royce. Hine, Robert. 1989”

A reprint of this article, with the cover inscribed as follows: "For the Harvard University Archives (and most especially Mr. Holden & Mr. Davies) With deepest gratitude, Robert V. Hine December 7, 1989"

Hine, "The American West as Metaphysics: A Perspective on Josiah Royce" *Pacific Historical Review* (1989).

Folder 10: "Josiah Royce. From Grass Valley to Harvard. 1992"

A hardback copy of Hine, *Josiah Royce: From Grass Valley to Harvard* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

Folder 11: "Josiah Royce - Theist or Pantheist? Johnson, Paul E."

A reprint of Johnson, "Josiah Royce -- Theist or Pantheist?" *The Harvard theological Review* vol. 221, no. 3 (July 1928): 197-205.

Folder 12: "Josiah Royce and Indian Thought Leidecker, Kurt F. 1931"

A small book : Kurt F. Leidecker, *Josiah Royce and Indian Thought* (New York: Kailas Press, 1931).

Box 101

Folder 1: "Royce Family Tree, 2nd edition. MacKinnon, Malcolm D. 1988"

A 91-page photocopied collection, with pictures.

Folder 2: "A Critical Annotated Bibliography of the Published Work of Josiah Royce. Oppenheim, Frank. 1964"

A reprint of the article: Oppenheim, "A Critical Annotated Bibliography of the Published Works of Josiah Royce," *The Modern Schoolman* vol. 42, no. 4 (May 1964): 339-65.

Folder 3: "Royce's Appreciative Interest in the More Vital. Oppenheim, Frank. 1967"

A reprint of the article: Oppenheim, "Royce's Appreciative Interest in the More Vital" *The Modern Schoolman* vol. 44 no. 3 (March 1967): 223-29.

Folder 4: "Josiah Royce as Teacher. Oppenheim, Frank. 1975"

A reprint of the article: Oppenheim, "Josiah Royce as Teacher" *Educational Theory*, 25 (Spring 1975): 168-85.

Folder 8:

An important letter from **Ruth Royce** (at Box 27, Los Gatos, Calif.) to Ralph Barton Perry, Feb. 20, 1928, in response to Perry's February 8 letter at pages 2-3: "I [Ruth] cannot quote exact words [of my brother] but my understanding of his spirit and meaning...The real man is the spirit and not the temple. He writes his own biography when he records his thoughts. Would you know the man, read his message—his growing messages through the years. The rest is only incidental and temporary." [Emphasis in the original]

p. 3 : Ruth refers to John Wright Buckham's "The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought," *Harvard Theological Review*, April 19 (11? 14? Or 18? [check out])

p. 5: Ruth says that her mother (Sarah Eleanor Royce) "wrote her diary of their trip; across the plains to California making a connected account of the trip, for my Brother to read, just before he wrote his history of California." Page 5 [Hence, the connected story is their mother's reworking around 1883 of her diary recordings.]

p. 6. Royce "had no other teacher" than his mother until the family moved to San Francisco "when he was eleven years old."

p. 7: "From his boyhood he was a talker and loved to talk and could express his thoughts."

p.7: "Of all the influences that helped in the making of Josiah Royce, the outstanding, non-deniable factor was his Mother." Despite popular misuse of the term "mystic," Ruth calls her mother not a 'quasi-mystic, but "a mystic ...in Dr. Addison's usage in his "Mysticism" book,-- "one who, believing what hundreds about him say they believe simply lives what he believes.""

p. 8: Mother certainly lived "as seeing Him who is invisible.""

p. 8 Royce "first read *Faust* in his high school days and seemed to revel in it with the enthusiasm of personal discovery."

Folder 11:

A three page typescript, reflecting papers concerning Royce in the W.E. Hocking collection in Madison., N.H. On page two this interesting note: "Letter of Royce to WEH – Jan. 22, 1908 – personal & philosophical, on occasion of death of Hockings' son – expressing in a deep, frank, and personal way the meaning of grief and its relation to personal creation. Since it refers to his own sorrow, it should not be referred to or quoted without permission of the Royce family."

Folder 14:

[FMO calls this the "**Whopper Notebook**," slightly more than 361 pages plus additions. On the page before "p. 1," in right-hand upper corner is written in pencil "Box 2, Logic Notebook"—a reference to the pre-1902 [?] "Logicialia Book, # 2" where this Notebook was then stored. Excerpts from this notebook may be found in Part VI of this Index.]

Significance:

One part could be the basis for a parallel & contrast with the 1913-14 seminar on Royce’s methodology by Harry T. Costello (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1963). The seminar includes students like the Cabots, and William E. Hocking who subsequently became rather famous.

Secondly, note that in 1901-02, Royce is already talking about system *sigma*.

Thirdly, Royce is showing himself trying to think out *World and Individual: 2* during the spring and summer of 1901.

Fourthly, Royce’s dating of his seminars and of books he read, etc. offers a closer look at Royce’s mental processes at this time of birthing the second series of *WI*.

A Description of the Notebook’s Contents:

Page Nos.	Contents
1-9	Psychology lectures, general plan
11-15	Kant Lectures of 1896
17-39	Permutation Groups or Substitution Groups.
40-59	On the Relation of Between and the Concept of Continuity <u>Revision</u> of Gifford Lectures. (This is important. At page 49, Royce talks of “reform” to the Gifford lectures. Further on, he mentions revisions of the Giffords.) NB: difficult to tell how this section divides up
61-93	The Properties of Negation and of the Logical Zero. Includes review of the general significance of Kempe’s results at page 80.
94-111	Attempt at Another statement of Kempe’s Defining Laws of the System [Sigma] August 1901.
113-17	Notes for Phil. 15, 1901-02
118-120	Notes for Philosophy 9. See also 127-29, where Royce has notes from this class. (1901-02)
131-200, 269-79	Seminary 1901-02. Including notes on Mrs. Cabot making remarks and presentations.
301-16	“Sketch of the Various Fundamental Concepts” in Philosophy 15. The Folder jacket entitles this “Sketch of Boolean Logic.” But it is in fact Royce’s sketch of fundamental concepts with a mere mention of Boolean logic.
317-19	Philosophy 1 A Plan of Discussion for 1901-02

327	Canons of Syllogism
330-38	Inventory of Works sent to binder June 15 (a list of pamphlets to be bound)
339-348	Library list of periodicals to be disposed of, June 1901 (back issues of the Atlantic, the Nation, Harpers, Nature, various Reviews, etc.)
356-57	Crown Robertson's "Elements of General Philosophy." Royce synthesizes this piece. Then Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy
358-59	Notes on Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy
361	Phil 9 "exercise"
	Inserted page on back leaf: Notes on blots for classification, selected at random from the prepared set. Publisher's typefaces.

FMO adds underlining to indicate Logical work included in this Notebook entitled "Psychological Lectures,": [with brackets for details]

"Psychological Lectures, General Plan Notes, Summary;" [9 pp]

"Kant Lectures of 1896, Notes;" [pp 11-15]

"Permutations and the Concept of Substitution Groups [pp 17-39 + 1]

"On the Relation of Between and the Concept of Continuity;" [pp. 40-48]

"The Properties of Negation and of the Logical Zero"

"Attempt at Another Statement of Kempe's Designing Laws, Philosophy 15;"

Notes on Wundts's *Völkerpsychologie*;"

"Sketch of Boolean Logic:" "Philosophy 1-A;" "Plan of Discussion," "Various Notes."

Further FMO Notes:

Pages 40-44: "Note on Applying.....to the *Kette*;

[starting pages 44-48] + "Plan for Revision of Giff." + "[Plan for] Reforming Gifford Lectures,"

After" Feb. 5, 1901": Royce seems to find "three sorts of Infinite Series";

Pp 49-53, after same date, Royce enters, "Plan for ... reform of Giff. Lectures" starting at p.48, and working from distinguishing empirically between "Things" and "Persons," pages 49-53, and from Feb. 22, on definition of Person, page 53.

July 4, 1901: "Plan for revision of Giff. Lect, I Ind vol." [rewritten] + "See also Diary entry of this date)" pages 54 →.

July 19: "Fundamental Categories of Science" [i.e., "Elements" ... "Characters" and "Operations" + note: "See Hegel's form of *Reflexion*"] pp 57-59."

NB: This "Description" omits mention of Royce's recording that he has found the Categories (page 55).

Titles of Subsequent MSS by Royce not made explicit in above "Description":

“Canons of the Syllogism” page 327

“Inventory of Books Sent to Binder, June 15 [19?]” [pp.330-38, all penciled by Royce]

[NB: The total number of volumes to be bound was 234, of which about 95% or more were German in source, for instance:

3: “Psychology Pamphlets, Seven vols.” 104 pamphlets;

30: “Husserl, *Philosophie d. Arithm.*”

35: “Monographs on Kant” (11 numbers in one vol.);

50: “Garbe’s *Sânkhya*”;

58: “Bonitz, Aristotle’s Metaph.”

113: “McGee, *Ser’i Indians*” (i.e., W. J. McGee, *The Siouan Indians*)

114: Pamphlets on Nietzsche.

“Library List of Periodicals to be disposed of, June 1901” pages 339-48. all in ink by Royce]

NB: Almost all of these are printed in English; e.g., old issues of *Atlantic Monthly*, *The Nation*, *Saturday Review*, *Science* (1895-1900), *The Critic*, and *Nature*. Royce lists only two French Journals to be discarded: *Revue Scientifique* (of 1893) and *Revue Bleue* (of 1893).]

“Summaries of Books read by JR”:

Crown Robertson’s *Elements of General Philosophy* (p. 356);

[George Trumbell] Ladd, *Introduction to Philosophy* [1895] (pp. 357-58);

[Charles C.] Everett’s article in *The New World*, II: 242-43; (p. 362) on “faith, imagination & reason” with emphasis on “the triumph of faith” (p. 249), and on page 274 notice Royce’s view on “faith” as “positive life of the world.”

“Phil[osophy] of Exercise:” in search of “what do you mean” via “cases for analysis” through “experiencing contrasts.” (pp. 361-62)

“Notes on blots for classification, selected at random from the prepared list. (Notebook’s last 2 pp., which would have been numbered 364-65) [The list of more than 960 sample pages of blot-making (i.e., blots with or without fringes and/or streaks) is analyzed by empirical psychologist Royce into 9 different “types.”]

Evaluation: An interesting “grab-bag.”

Box 102: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Please Note: In folders 1-7 of this Box, the edited typescripts reflect the final version of these lectures as printed in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. Before the edits by Royce’s hand, these typescripts, were identical with the manuscripts in Boxes 27 and 28, but the edits make them of a later date and parallel with published text of *PL*.

Folder 1: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture II. Individualism ca 1907”

A 35-page typescript, very slightly edited, is identical with the printed version. The typescript,

before the edits, is an exact transcription of the Lecture II manuscript in Box 27.

Folder 2: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture III. Loyalty to Loyalty

A text reflecting Lecture III of *PL*. Here, the 32 page typescript of the Lecture III is identical to the typescript in Box 27, *but* Royce adds in manuscript four pages, starting “Review in the light of the simple consideration,” and ending on manuscript page 35 “. . . . of the whole law.” The manuscript edition ends the printed text.

Additionally, while the Box 27 typescript is unedited, the typescript in this folder *does* have edits that are included in the printed version.

The typescript, with some small edits and the added manuscript, which are embodied in the printed version, is identical to the printed version.

Folder 3: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture IV. Conscience ca. 1907”

A 35-page typescript, whose very few edits have been embodied in the printed version. More heavily edited toward the close of the typescript.

Folder 4: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture V. Some American Problems in Their Relation to Loyalty. Ca. 1907”

A 33-page typescript. The edits are included in the printed text.

Folder 5: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures Lecture VI. Training for Loyalty ca 1907.”

A typescript, this is identical to printed text. However, please consult Box 102, folder 10, bundle b, second paper, pages 24-33 for a parallel attempt at the training of people in loyalty.

Folder 6: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture VII. Loyalty, Truth, and Reality”

This folder contains both a typescript *and* a 7-page manuscript fragment of Lecture VII. The non-edited typescript parallels precisely the printed version. The manuscript, however, headed “Lecture VII: Loyalty, Truth and Reality,” begins with a very different introduction.

This manuscript fragment concerns the connection of these ideals with day by day living. Royce turns to Plato and criticizes some of his lack of care to embody the ideals, since Royce says ideals must have a “local habitat and a human interest.” (page 2) “Moral ideals, then, must express the aims and must appeal to the interests of real men. This principle every moralist should admit.” (page 3)

At pages 5-6, Royce says: “In consequence, we now see that every moral doctrine has two aspects. First, it depends upon a study of actual human nature; and yet secondly, it tries to

transform our naturally unreasonable ways of living. It is for the real man; but it constantly asks who the real man is, and consequently bids us look for him since, in our life as we go on from moment to moment we have never yet found the real man.”

[FMO Note: Whether written before or after the final form, this fragment needs attention from scholars because of its emphasis on making the Ideal fit and attract people in their ordinary, day by day lives.]

Folder 7: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture VIII. Loyalty and Religion”

A slightly edited 35 page complete typescript. The edits are included in the final printed version. This typescript copy is increasingly edited by Royce towards its close, but all those additions are found in the published version.

Folder 8: “Outline of Proposed Lowell Lectures. The Philosophy of Loyalty”

An unedited 16 page manuscript that outlines the whole lecture series by themes, rather than by subheads. There is no date on this manuscript. But the titles of the Lectures fit the titles of the final version.

Lecture I: pages 1-5

Lecture II: pages 5-6

Lecture III: Pages 6-8

Lecture IV: Pages 8-9

Lecture V: Pages 10-12

Lecture VI: pages 12-14

Lecture VII: pages 14-15

Lecture VIII: page 16

Folder 9: “Index to the Philosophy of Loyalty 1908. Manuscript”

An 86 page manuscript of the index to *The Philosophy of Loyalty* the text of which is identical to the printed version.

Folder 10: “The Problem of Christianity ca. 1912. [Fragmented groups of notes]”

The notes are contained in various “bundles” with notes by the archivist:

- a. Untitled notes. The packet consists of typescript pages 22-24. Often in triplicate copy, with pages missing. For *PC*, Lecture XI, “Perception, Conception, and Interpretation” including Royce’s handwritten additions on pages (23b) and (24)(25) Since Royce’s editing on page 23-24 appears in published version of *PC* at page 289, this typescript was done before final published version.
- b. Untitled notes. Two fragments.

Pages 23-23a – *PC* 287-88 in published form

Pages 24-33 – *Philosophy of Loyalty* connected to Lecture VI, “Training in Loyalty”

- c. Untitled notes. These belong to preparatory draft for *Philosophy of Loyalty*. Manuscript pages numbered 13-31 may be an early introduction to Chapter I. **Critical Editors should examine this manuscript carefully.**
- d. Untitled notes. This seems to be an early draft of *PL* Lecture V “Some American Problems.” This manuscript has some parallels with Lecture V’s section IV on family and “tie-breaking or not.”
- e. Untitled notes. An early draft of *PC* Lecture 11, “Perception, Conception, and Interpretation.” The Summarizing Points by Royce do not include published points 6, 7, or 8, but only points 1-5. *See PC* 293-95.
- f. Untitled Notes. Manuscript fragment, pages 65, 65, 67, 68. Perhaps closest to *PC* 86-98. The manuscript is somewhat edited.
- g. Untitled notes. A manuscript numbered pages 36 to 42. Belongs to preparatory work for Royce’s Lecture VI, “Training in Loyalty” of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.
- h. Untitled notes. Pages 45-53 of a manuscript fragment. These pages seem an early form of the Close of Lecture 13 of *PC* “The World of Interpretation”, *see PC* 334-42.
- i. Titled “Lectures on the Problems of Christianity Vol. II. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. Lecture IX. The Conflict of Selves.” A manuscript fragment numbered pages 1-7, minimally edited.

FMO: These pages were drafted upon an **earlier** plan of *PC* (where “The Conflict of Selves” was to be the 1st Lecture of Vol. II) In his final plan, Royce recognizes how basic to his Vol. II (Metaphysical Questions) is the “Time-Process,” and so, in final draft, Royce makes Lecture IX be “The Community and the Time-Process.”
- j. Untitled notes. This manuscript fragment, numbered pages 61-69, slightly edited, seems an early draft of section VII of Chapter I of *PC*; see parallels in the published version, *PC* 70-75. Yet the numbering here, pages 61 to 69, suggests a lengthy yet unused lead-up in Chapter I to its section VII.
- k. *Untitled Notes. This bundle consists of two fragments. First draft material, these fragments seem to be* early workings of the published *PC* from the bottom of its printed version, pages 280-291.

Pages 46-47 (one fragment)

Pages 48-56 (second fragment)

- l. Untitled Notes. This is a large important manuscript, apparently drafted before the final version of *PC*. The manuscript runs from pages 3-54. There is much exposition and criticism of Henri Bergson in the latter pages of this manuscript. The first two pages are missing, and some others are missing at the close, after page 54. The MS is heavily reworked, on many redrafted pages. Perhaps the clearest hint of its place in *PC* occurs on page 5 where Royce refers to “using the three terms whose mutual relations I have explained in the last two lectures.”

FMO takes the three terms to be “Perception, Conception and Interpretations,” and thus guess that the last two lectures were Lectures XI and XII, making this manuscript an early reworked draft of what become Lecture XIII, “The World of Interpretation.”

- m. Titled, on a smaller piece of paper, “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity, Lecture XIII. The World of Signs”, the small paper precedes a manuscript fragment pages 41-65. The manuscript in this bundle chiefly consists in material moving up to a section VII at page 48, giving many pages, 48-58, to section VII, and then entering section VIII at page 58, but closing at 65. It is considerably edited by Royce. It seems, perhaps, to be an early fragmentary draft of what would become in the published *PC*, Lecture XIV, “The Doctrine of Signs.” [NB: Page 55, Royce gives CSP’s definition of “sign.”]
- n. About 10 pages of disparate manuscript pages in Royce’s hand, pertaining mainly to *PC*, one page dealing with loyalty. Royce heavily reworks some of these pages.
- o. Headed “Lecture VII The Unity of the Spirit, and the Invisible Church.” A one page manuscript outline. This is preparatory work for Royce’s page x of the published version of *SRI*.

Evaluation: A note to scholars: working editions of *PL* & *PC* will need to keep in folder 10 in mind.

Folder 11: “The Problem of Christianity [Lectures]”

- a. A 30 page manuscript, titled “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity. Lecture VII. The Christian Doctrine of Life.” Based on the way these pages are grouped, these MS pages, 1-30 (with 15-19 omitted) seems to be a fragmentary draft of the start of Lecture VII of *PC*. [It seems highly important from several perspectives.]
- b. A fragmentary manuscript, pages 13-29. Generally it is on fresh pages, and edited in parts by Royce, this manuscript is related to the final form of *PC*’s Chapter XI, Perception, Conception and Interpretation. However, it contains a critique of William James’s Theory of Knowing that is omitted in the final form. Instead, in the published piece, Royce turns to Bergson.

- c. A manuscript fragment, pages 52-61, somewhat edited. Its topic is Royce's method to be used in *PC*. To FMO, it seems that limits of space have forced Royce to drop this MS's more specific picture of his method and settle for a mere sentence on method to summarize his hint of method at the close of Chapter I (p.74). He will give a fuller picture of his method at *PC* 210-11 and against at *PC* 230-31.

Evaluation: Scholars working with *PC* need to pay attention to folder 11.

Folder 12: “Lecture IV. Physical and Social Reality [Fragment from the World and the Individual ca. 1907 *[sic]*” *

*This draft is in fact closer to 1898.

A two page typescript/MS fragment with edits, headed “Lecture IV. Physical and Social Reality.” An early introduction to his Lecture IV. This became a later lecture in a published version.

Evaluation: Scholars working with *WI: 2* need to at least footnote this embryo.

Folder 13: “Lecture. Realism and the Individual [Maybe an early version of *The World and the Individual*, I, ch. 3][ca. 1907][*sic]*” *

*True date, ca. 1898.

A 56 page manuscript entitled “Realism and the Individual,” on fresh and redrafted pages. An early MS version seemingly aimed at what became Lecture III in *WI:1*. It largely deals with the mystical conception of being. There is a prolonged exposition of Hindu philosophy and the Sankhya tradition. Royce introduces the “Eleatic” tradition of realism.

Evaluation: This lecture seems a treasure-house for supporting the principal text of *WI:1*, Chapter 3.

Folder 14: “Lectures related to Realism and Real Being. 3 lectures, untitled. Ca. 1907 *[sic]*”*

True date closer to 1898.

This folder consists of three bundles. The paper on which all of these are written contains the watermark “Chas. H. Thurston Cambridge.” The paper is slightly smaller than Royce’s usual writing paper, and of a slightly different color.

- a. A manuscript, pages 1-19. The MS breaks at 11, then returns to a page 8 and goes up to 19. This first bundle therefore embraces two manuscripts. In the first MS, Royce crosses off his old lecture title. (He had previously headed the page Lecture [illegible, blotted out] III. The Four Historical Concepts of Real Being: - *The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas*, The Real as the True; and the Real as the Whole Meaning. (The words

in italics were heavily deleted. The other lines are marked out.) The only thing left, which is not either blotted out or crossed out, is “Lecture.”

The crossed-out titles derive from earlier plans for *WI*.

The first section deals with Rosmini’s book on *the Origin of Ideas*, and his ontological argument for the existence of God.

The second manuscript in this bundle, Royce refers to Rosmini’s idea with the metaphor of “a pre-natal glimpse of the divine essence, we shall ourselves hereafter maintain, directly and literally, that every finite idea, taken just as it is, is a summary and hasty glimpse of the Divine essence, and that this fact is what is meant by the dimly represented Other which the idea seeks, by the Being towards which the idea is always turned. One can deal with this Other in either one of two ways.” Either as we do in ordinary life, or as we do in the special sciences.

NB: This seems a very important contribution to Royce’s work on mysticism and realism.

- b. A manuscript, pages 39-48, almost all previously drafted pages . It is headed “III”, with a note: “From lecture on Realism.” Royce touches on mysticism and Kempe’s theory. He moves into symbolic logic:

“The essence of a thoroughgoing realism is it leaves the psychical just as real as the extra-psychical. One implies a mutual interdependence of the mere being of the two – an independence whereof Cartesian dualism and Occasionalism, and the Sankhya doctrine, furnish interesting interpretations.... This consideration is as we shall ere long show is decisive of the logical fate of the realistic definition.” (46)

Royce adds at 48 a few lines of poetry.

NB: Logic People.

- c. A manuscript fragment, numbered pages 55 to 69 which appears to be intended for *WI*. It deals with our mistaken notion that we can grasp the individual directly. He does say, at 60, that the “individual is a central problem of our course, and we shall often return later to the concept in question.” Toward the close of this fragment, Royce moves to meet the objection that only individuals can exist in the realistic world. The close, at 69, seems to indicate that the MS is fragmentary.

Box 103: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Lecture I. The Nature and the Need of Loyalty. ca 1907”

“Lecture I: The Nature and the Need of Loyalty”—an incomplete MS of 33 pages which starts with the first lines of the published version of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*’s Chapter One, BUT which soon departs onto its own distinct path. It refers to Omar Khayam’s “mystical indifference” in a contrast-effect to the cooperative efforts of San Francisco’s re-builders of their city from out of its quaked-and-burned ruins after the 1906 earthquake.

Autobiographical Note: Royce here describes his own walking through these ruins of San Francisco and the beginnings of this rebuilding. In these tragedy-touched, courageously- animated endeavors, Royce sees symbols of the then current need to revise our moral standards. (pp; 31-32)

Evaluation: This MS needs careful comparison and contrast with the final published form of Lecture I of *PL* since it appears to be an early draft of what became the final Lecture I of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.

***Folder 2: “Lecture IX. [Untitled]**

NB: This lecture may be related to Royce’s Series of “Social Factors” Lectures

“Lecture IX”. A typescript of 23 pages which seems to fit as the 9th Lecture of Royce’s 1898 Series for the 20th Century Club on “The Social Factors in the Development of the Individual Mind”; [see Boxes 69-70].. This 9th lecture was scheduled for a March 12th delivery at Boston University’s Jacob Sleeper Hall.

Evidence for this identification is internal: the present typescript reproduces very closely the topics sketched for Lecture IX in Royce’s printed Program for this entire lecture series. Moreover, external confirmation arises from the distinctive kind of typing paper (3-holed in left margin) used for both this typescript and Royce’s New Orleans lectures along with the likely confluence of the period of time and dates expectable for Royce to request someone to type up his final 20th Century Club lectures (delivery completed by March 19, 1898) and his New Orleans lectures (delivered in May, 1898), by some typist who utilized that same distinctive 3-holed typing paper to copy both this “Lecture IX” (seemingly of his “Social Factors” series) and Royce’s New Orleans Lectures (delivered in May 1898) which was also typed on this 3-holed paper unique among Royce’s MSS.

Evaluation: Lecture IX is relevant to Royce’s Social Factors Series.

Folder 3: “Loyalty. 1 pg Fragment.”

A manuscript fragment of five lines on the topic of Loyalty to Loyalty.

**Folder 4: “Copies of California Documents. [History of California Notebooks]
1 of 4. Ca. 1880-1886”**

A 5” by 8” composition notebook, with notes in Royce’s hand.

Folder 5: “California, Social Conditions and Local Scenes, 1849-51, History of California notebooks. 2 of 4. Ca 1880-1886”

A 5" by 8" composition notebook, over 100 pages, with notes mostly in Royce's hand, some perhaps by KR.. The archivist date of 1880-1886 can likely be narrowed to 1884-1886 (*Life* 44-45), even to 1884.. Although Royce's collection of documents (see folder 4) is weightier for his argument, his interests, revealed by his selection of excerpts, are telling. He here begins with "Taylor, *California Life Illustrated* (New York, '58)," recording the picture of a minister travelling with Bible and revolver both in sight, and listing "the Dates of dedication or Organisation of Churches [in San Francisco?]. (p. 5) From Taylor's p.73, On page 7, Royce records white men's planning for Indian reservations in California, seven currently existing, with an estimated population of 10,000. (Taylor, 73). Royce also notes that, according to Taylor (p. 209), California's total population in 1856 included 507,067 inhabitants, with 70,000 caucasian females, all told, for "175,000 able-bodied men between 18 & 45 yrs." Typically, Royce contrasts the rough miners and gamblers with ministers preaching and some people at church.

From page 164 of "Brodrick's *Three Years in Cal.*, Edinb. 1857," Royce records that some white "masters" brought "black slaves" to California, who "cling" to them. He also makes an excerpt of the recent case of one slave, "Charles" by name, as recorded in the "*Placer Times*, May 27, 1850, (J. E. Lawrence, editor)" – a publication from which Royce drew many excerpts.

The latter half of this Notebook (approximately 50 pages) is occupied mostly by Royce's excerpts on "Squatter Riots" from the *Placer Times*, July 10 to Sept. 14, 1850." Royce writes in blue pencil in flowing hand, but there are several pages in a fine hand, perhaps a woman's (Katharine Royce?), all recording in diary style the daily events of this exciting period.

Folder 6: “California. Course of Events (1852-58). Vigilance Committee of '56. [History of California]. Ca 1880-1886 3 of 4 folders”

A 5" by 8" composition notebook, with notes in Royce's hand.

Folder 7: “Notes on S.F. in '51. [History of California]. Ca. 1880-1886 4 of 4 folders”

A 5" by 8" composition notebook, with notes in Royce's hand.

Folder 8: “California. Notes on cards, ca. 1892-1895, includes notes on Donner party - Emigrant life.”

Thirteen 2" by 5" (approximately) cards. The first one reads Emigrant Life Notes for "California."

Folder 9: “Philosophy”

A typeset page of chairman Royce's description of the Harvard University Philosophy

Department published in December issue of *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, 1896-1897.

Folder 10: "Preliminary Report on Imitation May 1895"

A reprint of the article "Preliminary Report on Imitation," *Psychological Review*, 2 (1895): 217-35.

Folder 11: "The Psychology of Invention December 28, 1897"

"The Psychology of Invention," *Psychological Review* 5 (1898): 113-44, read at the annual meeting of the Amer. Psych. Assoc., Dec. 28, 1897.

The text including diagrams and illustrations of psychology test drawings.

Folder 12: "Apprehension" [Dictionary entry]. Ca. 1899

Printer's galley-proof of Royce's contribution to Baldwin's *Dictionary*: Royce, "Apprehension", Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. (1901).

Folder 13: "Recent Logical Inquiries and Their Psychological Bearings. March 1902"

A reprint of "Recent Logical Inquiries and their Psychological Bearings," *Psychological Review*, 9 (1902): 105-33.

Folder 14: "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics. April 13, 1905"

A reprint of "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics," *Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1905): 197-207.

Folder 15: "Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry July 1905"

A reprint of "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry," *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, 6 (1905): 353-415.

Box 104 "Papers of Josiah Royce"

The contents of this box consist principally of Reprints, some MSS, Typescripts, & copies of Royce's books.

Folder 1: "The Problem of Truth 1908"

This is a reprint of "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion," published in

Bericht über den III Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie, pages 62 to 90. Heidelberg: Th. Elsenhans, 1909. Published also in *WJO* and *RLE*. The discussion which followed is reported on pages 91-92 of the *Bericht*.

Folder 2: “The Reality of the Temporal December 29, 1909”

A reprint of this article, published in *IJE* 20 (1910) 257-71, read at the APA annual meeting, 28 December, 1909. [Comparison with Royce’s APA address, “The Eternal and the Practical,” (of 29-31, December 1903), may reveal Royce’s mental development concerning “temporal process.”]

Folder 3: “Loyalty and Insight June 22, 1910”

A typescript copy of 33 pp., with page 26 slightly edited by Royce, perhaps the basis for the text as published in *The Simmons Quarterly* and *WJO*.

Folder 4: “Logik [Encyclopedia of philosophy.] Band, Erster. 1912”

The hardback German text of *Logik, Encyclopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, in Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband, herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge*, Erster Band, (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1912) trans. B. Ethel Meyer, (London: Macmillan, 1913). The book was formerly part of the Robbins library collection. The index of the book reads as follows:

“Index:

1. Arnold Ruge, “Einleitung” iii-viii.
2. Wilhelm Windelband, “*Der Prinzipien der Logik*,” pages 1-60.
3. Josiah Royce “*Prinzipien der Logik*,” pages 61-136.*
4. Louis Courturat, “*Die Prinzipien der Logik*. pages 137-201.**
5. Benedetto Croce (Napoli) *Die Ausgabe der Logik*, pages 202-218.
6. Federigo Enriques (Bologna), *Die Problema der Logik*, pages 219-40.
7. Nikolaj Losskij (St. Petersburg), *Die Ungesaltung der modernen Erkenntnis Theorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Logik*. pages 243-73.”
[title of 7 translated in *BWJR*:2: 1213].

*See Skrupskelis’ discovery of Royce’s noteworthy evaluation of this text, in which Royce views the general idea of Logic as the “Theory of Order” and Royce estimates this MS “as a programme of a future possible Logic,” and as a program, has a place in a fairly extensive plan. The issues discussed here have, in Royce’s opinion, an importance that is greater than the length of the paper indicates. See *BWJR* 2: 1214 for the full text of Royce’s marginal “Note” on page 61 of this *Logik*.

Evaluation: NB Logic editors: the entire quote of Royce’s “Note” (*BWJR*2: 1214) needs to be placed in the appropriate volume of the Logical Section of the Critical Edition.

** Sideline item: As a foreshadowing of the “linguistic turn,” see Courturat’s Outline of his

essay which runs from “I. *Die Logik der Satze*” to “VI. *Die Logik und die Sprache*.”

Folder 5: “An Extension of the Algebra of Logic November 6, 1913”

A reprint of this article from the *Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (1913): 617-33. [Written after Royce drafted his article, “The Principles of Logic” in 1910.]

Folder 6: “Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism October 1913”

Popular Science Monthly 83 (1913): 394-411.

Folder 7: “Some Relations Between Philosophy and Science ... October 24, 1913”

A reprint of the article “Some Relations Between Philosophy and Science in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century in Germany,” *Science*, n.s., 38 (1913): 567-84.

*** Folder 8: “War and Insurance [fragment] ca 1914” [mistitled by Wells]**

A 5-page manuscript fragment, numbered pages 18-22, of a pre-final draft of Royce’s conclusion for his 1914 address, “The Spirit of the Community,” (cf. *JRLW* 2: 68-71). [Atop page 18 of this MS, E. F. Wells red-penciled “War and Insurance--misleading, it seems.”]

Folder 9: “The Possibility of International Insurance. 1914”

A 12-page, unedited, carbon-copy typescript of Royce’s “The Possibility of International Insurance,” *New York Times*, (July 25, 1915) part 4, pages 2-3.

Folder 10: “The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical April 17, 1914”

A reprint of “The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical,” *Science*, n.s., 39 (1914): 551-66.

***Folder 11: “[War and Insurance][fragment ca. 1914]”**

Folder wrongly titled “War and Insurance, Fragment.” The folder contains two one-paged MSS:

- a) “p. (17)” —probably from a partial draft of *The Problem of Christianity*’s “Introduction” or of its Lecture I; and
- b) “p. (10)” —4 ½ lines, including Royce’s aphorism, “The world’s most creative minds are of three types, --the artists, the prophets, and the scientific discoverers.” [This contrasts in part with CSP’s more general classification of three kinds of human beings: thinkers, artists, and workers (in which classification CSP was not focusing on “creativity.”)]

Folder 12: “Addresses Regarding WWI. 1916”

Materials concerning Royce's position on World War I:

- a) 4 unedited reprints of "The Duties of Americans in the Present War," (Royce's first Tremont Temple address, 30 January 1916)
- b) William A. Shaper's sharp critique of this address in *News and Events*, (15 August 1916): 269-70. [Mr. Shaper was Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.]
- c) Reprint of "Professor Royce's 'Lusitania' Speech," *Boston Evening Transcript* (8 May 1916). Text identical with version in *HGC*.
- d) 2 newsprint copies of "The Duties of Americans in the Present War," from *Boston Evening Transcript* (8 May 1916).

Folder 13: "Hope of the Great Community 1916"

A hardback copy of the first of edition of this book, with book jacket: Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916). No marginalia found.

Folder 14: "The Hope of the Great Community. Royce, Josiah 1916"

A hardback Harvard College library copy of this book, with a library purchase date noted as November 11, 1916 (no book jacket): Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916). No marginalia found.

Box 105: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

***Folder 1: "The Hope of the Great Community"**

This 40-page typescript is titled "The Hope of the Community" *not* "The Hope of the Great Community" as the folder title suggests. This typescript (identical with the carbon copy in Box 51, document 2) contains three major sections --(a) 12-17, (b) 32-34, and (c) 38-40.--not found in all the previously published texts of *HGC*: This last section "c" is the missing section V, with which Royce intended to conclude his article. These omitted text sections are transcribed below.

A substantially revised version of this text, which among other things completely omits section V, is reprinted as "The Hope of the Great Community" in *The Yale Review*, 5 (1916): 269-91, and in *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan 1916) and in *The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce*. See Part I, above.

The carbon copy of "The Hope of the Community" in Box 51, document 2, is identical to this typescript (Box 105, folder 1). Both include the section V that is omitted in the published versions of "The Hope of the Great Community" as well as the other major additions omitted by the *HC* press.

John Kaag notes:

"The Hope of the Community" (a typescript of 40 pp.) is approximately 4000 words longer than

the article published in *The Yale Review* (January, 1916) as “*The Hope of the Great Community*,” and reproduced in the book of same title at its pages 25-70. In the following comparison of this typescript with this published article, these 2 texts will be referred to as HC and HGC, respectively. Although both texts preserve the Roman numerals of their sections. HGC does not preserve the **titles** of its sections which the HC typescript supplies, and are shown here as they occur in HC, along with page number:

- p. 4 I THE GREAT COMMUNITY AND THE NATIONS
- p, 15 II INTERNATIONAL TIES
- p. 24 III THE NON-POLITICAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND
- p. 28 IV THE SOCIAL ARTS OF THE GREAT COMMUNITY
- p. 38 V [HC adds no title; HGC omits all the text of section V.]

In the present analysis, we do not indicate where the *Yale Review* copy and HGC cut the text into more reader-friendly paragraphs if the text itself remains the same as that of HC. Moreover, to indicate fifths of a page, we add an a, b, c, d, e, so that, for example, “52d” indicates 4/5ths down page 52.

As they start, both texts run in parallel-- HC (1-12a) and HGC (25-42c)—but at 12b, HC offers 5 typescript pages (starting “A tolerance, a willingness to comprehend...” and ending with “...it will embody.” at 17b. The text of these 5 typescript pages is absent from HGC.

In place of this 5-page addition in HC, HGC simply inserts a linking paragraph at 42c. Absent from HC, This paragraph runs from “It has been this vision...[to] ... despite this tragic calamity.” in HGC 42d.

Then at HC 17b and HGC 42e, the text again run in parallel, starting with “In speaking at such a moment...” until “...for the united community.” (at HC 21e and HGC 50a). Then from 21e to 22b HC inserts a summarizing paragraph, (absent from HGC), starting with “To sum up this first feature...” and ending with “... on the part of the communities concerned.” On page 21 of HC there is a paragraph insertion that begins in “To sum up...” and runs to page 22 to “communities concerned.”

Then from HC 22b and HGC 50a, the two texts run in parallel from, “Therefore, while the great community...” down to “...could not win a lasting political unity.” at HC 26e and HGC 56e. Here HC adds a paragraph (absent in HGC) which starts “Another among the contributors to the Great Community...” and ends at 27b with “...well-known confederate song, the invader’s heel.” [This passage concerns the incapacity of India and China to achieve political unity despite their cultural unity and great contributions to “the community of Mankind.”]

Again, and this time for about 1400 words, the two texts run in parallel from HC 27b and HGC 56e, “When we remember... until HC 32d and HGC 64e “...the community of the whole shall prosper and be preserved,” except that at HC 27d the typescript reveals its unique starting clause, “Without dogmatizing, either as to the source or as to the extent of this opposition, I may say that ...” – a clause absent in HGC.

Then, at HC 32e, this typescript describes in about 500 words the first and second of Royce’s

three theses on “human solidarity”—a unique description not present in HGC. After that omission, HGC at 65a, simply inserts the linkage clause, “In “War and Insurance” I have defended the thesis that,” while HC 34e opens its new paragraph with the clause, “Now my thesis with regard to this matter is, that.”

At HC 34a and HGC 65a, both texts run for about a thousand words in almost perfect parallel from “...if the principle of insurance were introduced into international affairs...” until at page 38b HC closes its Section IV with “...true Pauline charity,—that way already lies open.”—the same words wherewith HGC stops completely at page 70b.

The exception occurs just after both texts speak of “the conclusion of the present war” (HG 35e, HGC 66d) and before both texts start a new paragraph, “Were such an international board of trustees ...” (HC 36a, HGC 66e). The exception, a clause extant only in HC 35e-36a, reads: “... and without the least regard to who the victors are, if only the victors happen still to feel sufficient interest in the Community of Mankind, to consider the undertaking in a fair and business-like spirit.”

At 38c, HC begins its unique Section V, “I have indicated in what direction lies the ideal. We stand, like Bunyan’s Pilgrim, at the wicket gate which leads toward the New World that will gradually come to human vision after this war is over, and perhaps thousands of years hence.” This Section V continues for about 550 words and ends with, “Let us be able to say of this spirit, even as we sit by our dead: Did not our hearts burn within us while He talked with us by the way?” This entire Section V of HC was omitted in both published forms of this article as it appeared in *The Yale Review* and in the HGC.

NB: Unique to HC is a passage that outlines the “three theses of Royce’s argument about “human solidarity.” In HC Royce does not number these theses, but they seem to gyrate around: a) the vast social value of the insurance principle with its “peace-breeding” effect; b) the functions of the Board of International Insurance must be neither political nor diplomatic but rather those of the wise investor and, upon proven cause, careful distributor of the Board’s funds; and c) the Trustee—Members of the Board of International Insurance must—whether victors, losers, or neutrals in the present war—have a “sufficient degree of interest in the Community of Mankind”

[FMO’s endeavor to identify Royce’s “three theses.”]

The following three typescript sections were omitted from the version of this text as published in *HGC*.

a. [typescript from page 12 to 17, beginning after the sentence ending “ its spiritual union.”]

“A tolerance, a willingness to comprehend where we cannot agree, a readiness to appreciate what we cannot yet make our own, has grown through the influence both of the fine and of the industrial arts, and in these respects modern charity has tended more and more to be something much deeper than mere philanthropy, much more Pauline, if I may say so, than

was the charity of those to whom the charitable deeds were conceived merely as the possible benevolence of a Lazarus to a beggar, or of a good Samaritan to somebody fallen by the wayside. There have been reasons to hope that when some of us talked of the triumph of human liberty, we were also speaking of the triumph of a united and spiritualized democracy, not a mere mass of faction and caprice, but a genuine Pauline church of the future, a genuine New Jerusalem, whose Tree of Life would help to heal not merely individuals but nations.

Now, no doubt this vision of a triumphant and unified humanity has often been expressed too hopefully. And no doubt it has often been misinterpreted. For nothing is harder to interpret than the life that ought to belong to a unified humanity, and that ought to triumph over the conflicts of nations, as well as of individuals, and of factions. But as a fact, we have had a clearer vision of this life than ever before in some of the great and potent tendencies of recent civilization. It has been this vision upon which a recent international crime has as violently intruded. The nation which is officially responsible for this international crime has, indeed, constantly insisted from the beginning that it was acting only in self-defense, and that its triumph would be, in some sense, what it has proposed to call a triumph of humanity. But at all the critical phases of the present conflict, the nation in question has shown that its own triumph is its overmastering purpose, that, for the moment, it has nothing to contribute to the triumph of humanity except its own masterful demand for victory, and that it will consider the claims of humanity only when its own military triumph is secured. In defence of its cause, and of the justice of its demands, it has depended upon assuring us, partly that its foes have done many things which it regards as equally bad, and partly that if it had not done what it has done, some other power would have done as ill instead. Boasting its own irresistible preparedness, it has on occasion sadly assured us that it was wantonly attacked by those who well knew how irresistible and well-prepared it was. It began its conflict by violating, not merely a so-called treaty of neutrality, but that which those who love mankind prize much more highly than they prize any mere form of words, namely the sacred dignity of a free and innocent nation, the liberty which we in our childhood all associated with the names of William Tell and of Arnold von Winkelried. Lest we should form any doubts as to whether or not it has been, in its deepest motives, the enemy not of any nation but of mankind as a whole, it has not only drowned the babies on the *Lusitania*, but has also explained to us, quite deliberately and efficiently, why it did so. Its only reason for doing so, according to its own official statement is, that it has some enemies who, if it had not sunk the *Lusitania*, might have done it some harm in the course of the war, -- harm to which, in anticipation, it objects.

Such well-known considerations make plain that the present war is a war between humanity, and at least one masterful nation which is explicitly opposed to any political course which promises to tend to the enriching or to the preserving of the unity of mankind. This, then, is no war between various nations. Nor do its merits depend upon the merits of individual nations. The various nations engaged in it have in various degree sinned and come short of the glory of the Spirit and of the Community both in the act that brought about the war and in the political and military and moral tendencies which preceded the war. There is but one nation, however, which as yet has had the opportunity to show clearly whether or not it is a deliberate foe of the community of mankind. This nation in violating (--not, I repeat, the "neutrality of Belgium," -- but the sacred liberty of a free and innocent people), in the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and in the reasons deliberately officially and publicly urged in defence of the sinking of the *Lusitania* shows that it is the intentional enemy of the

community of mankind.

Herewith the true issue of this war is defined. To be sure the defeat of this one nation which has, in fact, declared itself the enemy of the community of Mankind, would indeed not insure the victory of this community. For mankind has many enemies without and within, and some of them may be nations even now engaged in this war. Certainly many of the enemies of humanity have not yet declared themselves, and we do not yet know where to find them. But in any case, this is a war between the community of mankind, in so far as it is yet represented by any civilized influence, and one masterful nation which has declared itself opposed to the community of mankind, and particularly opposed to any spirit of Pauline charity as between strong nations and weak ones, as between submarine policies and the interests of non-combatant mothers and babies. We do not know whether the defeat of this common enemy of mankind, if it occurs, will actually further in the future the victory of mankind, but we do know that the victory of this foe of mankind would mean, if it occurred, that new gathering of the cloud, that fading away of the dawn, that return to a mediaeval night of darkness which will mean the sorrow of all who love man, and who hope for the coming down from heaven of the Holy City of the Apocalypse. So much, then, for at least one central issue of the present war.

II

International Ties

Professor Wallas, in his book entitled "The Great Society" has attempted to summarize some of the most characteristic problems of the modern social order by regarding them as due to those modern developments which have brought into existence what the Economists have called the Great Industry. Professor Wallas has proposed, as the sociological term corresponding to Great Industry, his own term "The Great Society." Professor Wallas is impressed by the fact that the material and social conditions which have accompanied the development of the Great Industry have led to certain increasing mutual estrangements, distractions, and tendencies toward separation and discontent. Professor Wallas seeks for the conditions which have most intensified such estrangements, and which have most tended to make the modern world of the Great Society a world where the unity of mankind has many industrial and social opponents. While I agree that the enemies of the community, of the ideal Pauline church of mankind, are far more numerous than are the nations engaged in the present war, and, when taken together, are far more powerful and more dangerous than the submarine policies of any, even the most pronounced and determined of the present leaders of that nation which is now most explicitly at war with the community of mankind, I have tried to indicate in the preceding that if those who be against us are indeed many, those who be for us may also be numerous, while, as all lovers of mankind hope, those who are for us may in the end prove to be more numerous and more powerful than our foes. I have as much right, therefore, as Wallas and as the Economists, to apply the adjective Great to that which I most wish in this brief discussion to call attention. I therefore call the Community of Mankind, -- the Pauline Church of the ideal future, -- the New Jerusalem of the Seer of the Apocalypse, -- I call it the Great Community. By this term I mean, not merely Wallas's Great Society, for that, on its material side is, in the main, as Wallas describes it, a realm that is still one of estrangements and distractions. By the Great Community I mean the organized spiritual community of mankind, so far as it is yet, ideally speaking, in sight, in so far as we can already define some of its main features, and can look forward with reasonable hope to

what, if ever it comes to light, it will embody.

[At this point, the printed text picks up again with the new paragraph beginning “In speaking further ...]

b. [typescript from page 32 to 34, beginning after the paragraph ending “...and be preserved.”]

Now there are many sorts of Communities of Interpretation in the social world of mankind, both in the world of individual nations, and in the world of international relations. In my book on “War and Insurance,” as well as in an article which I not long ago contributed to the New York Times () I have tried to show the truth of three distinct theses, all of which I deem worthy of the consideration of students of the problem of human solidarity, while, as I readily admit, no one of these theses has yet received, or to receive, any sort of careful consideration, or to win any kind of approval, so long as the war lasts. For while hate rules mankind, and while most of our leaders of thought either limit themselves to the condemnation of the foe, or praise war as a general good, or insist upon essentially political plans of future leagues of peace, or confine their attention to plans for international arbitration, there is indeed no time for people to think what an effort to apply international insurance to the life of the future could possibly mean. My reader says, after he has read the title of my book, and a few words of my text: “this seems to be a plan for insuring nations against war. The plan is at best utterly Utopian. If it could be carried out, it would only appeal to the financial interests of certain nations. And the present war has shown that financial considerations by themselves will never be sufficient to keep the peace amongst nations that are otherwise ready to fight. So, for the moment, my little book is discredited by its title, and the kindest of my reviewers has asked whether there is any subject about which I know less than, in his opinion, I know about insurance.

Certainly this is not place, either to defend or further to expound what my insurance plan, in the present state of its development, really means for me or ought to mean for anybody else. Let me then simply confine myself to saying here that, in my opinion, the social value of the insurance principle is very vast, and that the influence of the practice of insurance has been in the past mainly indirect. The insured party to an insurance contract is, in general, unaware of what constitutes the principal value in his own life of the possession of an insurance policy. The principal value is due to the fact that the insured is linked to his beneficiary, while his beneficiary may be personally unknown to him, and may be in many ways socially very distant from him. For this reason, insurance contracts tend to link otherwise sundered members of what may be a very vast community by indirect ties which experience has shown to be peace-breeding and enormously potent, and of such nature that if we begin to carry out any process which involves insurance, the process grows and spreads and leads to new social inventions of other forms of insurance, which also prove to be peace-breeding, which also work in largely indirect ways, and which have already been shown by experience to be profoundly transforming.

[at this point, the printed text picks up with the paragraph beginning “Now my thesis with”

- c. Typescript pages 38-40 is the Section V, 'discarded' from HGC at p.70. In conclusion, Royce wrote:

V.

"I have indicated in what direction lies the ideal. We stand, like Bunyon's [*sic*] Pilgrim, at the wicket gate which leads towards the New World that will gradually come to human vision after this war is over, and perhaps thousands of years hence. There certainly lies, too, the Valley of the Shadow of Death. There lies, too, the castle of Giant Despair, where many Pilgrims are still captive. There, also you find Vanity Fair. There Faithful may any day meet his doom, condemned by the jury to which Mr. Hate-good belongs.

But when we understand the spirit of Loyalty, when we understand that Loyalty is not best represented by the political virtues, but is better typified by the ideal life of a Pauline church, when we see that the militant virtues, which the lovers of the war-like praise, are not the essential form of the loyal spirit, but are the incidental virtues of a distracted period of human history, when we remember, too, that the greatest servants of mankind have been not the nations that have had the greatest political might, but the peoples whose souls were expressed by poets and prophets; and when, finally, considering the practical life of today, we see the international unity, if it comes at all, must come by the aid and the methods of some business which is at once practical and ideal, when we perceive that the form of business known as insurance has already shown itself to be in civic life the most potent of all the forms of business which tend to the unity of the community, --well then,

Looking forward at the long road before us, and asking our guide, as Bunyan's Pilgrim did: How shall I find the way? – surely, we shall get the answer of the Pilgrim's guide: Do you see yonder shining light?

No doubt the River of Death lies between us and the shining light, no doubt the way will often be dark. But whoever has once understood the genuine spirit of Loyalty knows where the shining light lies. He knows that it does not lie in the direction in which the powers that profit only to conquest, and whose end is power, would have us go, if they could.

And if, as we go further on the way, even this shining light is soon hidden from us again by the dark clouds of fortune, even if our "Song Before Sunrise" is, alas! followed, within the limits of our human vision, by no sunrise, if, not now like Bunyan's Pilgrim, we can always keep the light in sight, but if, more like the disciples after the walk to Emmaus, our guide vanishes from our sight, just when we at last seem to have understood his voice, his message and his meaning, let not the resulting loneliness leave us, even at the end of this war, wholly without a *true* hope for the Great Community. In and through the horrors of this war, the Spirit of whom Paul so often told, has spoken to humanity. It has not spoken through the mouths of the lovers of hatred. It has not spoken even through the most glowing political aspirations of the detached and warring individual nations. It has spoken in whatever words have most recalled the attention of men to the Great Community of all Mankind. Let mankind remember, therefore, even at the moment when Death shall have reaped all the harvest of this war, and when in their desolation the lovers of mankind long for the vanished sight of their beloved who have fallen in the good fight for the unity of the Great Community. Let us be glad that in this age we can hear as never before the Spirit of the Great Community calling to us all. Let us be able to say of this Spirit, even as we sit by our dead: Did not our hearts burn within us while He talked with us by the way?"

Evaluation: of first “omitted “ section: Royce’s three theses on Human Solidarity are significant, a deserve publication as part of a the full MS text for *The Hope of the Great Community*.

Evaluation of last ‘discarded’ section: Royce here flares into his prophetic best. He is beyond ordinary rational philosophy which he transcends by becoming radically his fullest human self—rooted in the Bible of his birth and rearing under his mother, looking like a seer into the very distant future, and suggesting a way of viewing the ‘problem of evil’ in a radically encouraging way (see last line).

Folder 2: “Note Fragments ca. 1886 - undated”

Document 1:

A 38-page manuscript (**not** in Royce’s handwriting). It is an undated essay by William Pepperell Montague (Royce has written “Montague“ at the top of page one), titled “On the Relation of the Philosophical Student and Teacher to the Central Problems and interests of Ethics”. Montague received his B.A. in 1896. MA in 1897, and PhD in 1898.

Note Montague’s ambitions as listed on page 20. Montague became a great Realist philosopher, and went on to teach at Columbia.

Document 2: “Proposal to the Committee on Substitute Subjects for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.”

A 3-page typescript, with Royce handwritten notes. On page 1, Royce writes “On motion of Rand, authorized to discuss this with other departments.” Royce’s handwritten note suggests he has gained permission from Rand to discuss this with other depts. No Date

Document 3: “Schedule of Engagements”

A small sheet. It is a one page Royce schedule for January 11-30. Although the year is not noted on the page, the dates track days of the week. FMO suggests 1899 after reference to a perpetual calendar. The schedule includes entries such as dinner at Sorley’s, Patterson’s dinner, and Provost Flemming’s dinner. The Scottish setting supports the 1899 date estimate.

Document 4:

Royce notes on the back of a “Handel and Haydn Society” program, the 79th season. He titles it “Order in Einl. [introduction] of 1813 [or perhaps 1873]” with a very brief comment on the Being of God as *Leben* (Life) because he is through himself. *Sein* of God as *Leben* because Here he seems to be copying from German and outlining the introduction to a work on the church sich [this as introduction] essence of God. This passage could be the meaning of “order” from Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* of 1813. Because of the Handel Society Program employed, this

MS cannot be earlier than Nov. 1893.

Document 5:

A one page manuscript summary of five recipients of the book *War and Insurance*. (Including 250 copies to California.) Must be around 1916.

[Such a quantity of books suggests that the recipients are people attending the International Insurance Conference in San Francisco in February 1916, with David Starr Jordan, president of the Peace Day Committee, presenting exercises at the Congress. (See *JRLW2*: 197.)

Document 6:

One page MS outline of the Lowell Institute lectures on the Philosophy of Loyalty.

Document 7:

One page list of grades given to students in Philosophy Exam. Highest grade A-, lowest grade D-.

Folder 3: “Unarranged Fragments”

Document 1:

Fragment from Royce’s work toward *WI:2*. A 12 page typescript, numbered 2-13. No edits. Section II begins on page 11. Along with Documents 2 and 7 below, this document seems tied to the first sections of Lecture V: “The Interpretation of Nature” in *WI:2*. If closer study shows this incorrect, perhaps this is an incomplete typescript copy of the Lecture Nine, “The Social Basis of Our View of Nature.”

There are preliminary notes here for the midyear exam for the Extension Course in Ethics (1916). For the final version see *JRLW 2*:135.

[John Kaag Notes:

- Typescript toward the development for *WI:2*. Seems close to the “Interpretation of Nature,” Lecture Five.
- Compare Lecture Nine summary of 1898. Perhaps the incomplete typescript copy of the Lecture Nine, “The Social Basis of Our View of Nature.”
- These are the preliminary notes for the mid-year exam for the Extension Course in Ethics (1916). For the final version *see* especially *JRLW2*: 135, but also 132-34 and 136-37.]

Document 2:

This fragment is a continuation of document 1 above. Document 7 below is a carbon of pages

14-25 of this typescript. (Evidence for the continuation: the continual pagination and section numbering, as well as continuity of theme..)

A section III begins on page 14.
A 14-32 typescript with no edits.

Document 3:

A somewhat edited manuscript, non-continuous text, numbered in non-sequential page numbers 38-67. Page 38 is headed with a section “VI,” but is untitled.

Pages 51, 52, 53, and 58-63 are missing. The text picks up again at 63a. There are, thus, three parts.

Pages 45 and 46 are on redrafted pages.

Royce thanks his audience for a series of lectures, and adds a closing. FMO cannot find a perfect parallel to *PL*. Taken as a whole, the three parts of this fragment seem the second part of some first lecture by Royce on Ethics.

Document 4:

A somewhat (not heavily) edited manuscript running continuously from pages 10 to 34. At the top of page ten, there is a Royce note “Originally for Lect. V.” There are no section headings in the MS.

[FMO: This refers to *WI:2*. On page 18, Royce refers to Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality* 2d edition. Thus this MS couldn’t be before 1897. Page 22 refers to “the world and the individual.” This fragment involves the irrevocability of the past. The final Lecture V of *WI:2* was titled “The Interpretation of Nature.”]

Document 5:

A manuscript numbered 2 to 19, with pages 1 and 3 missing.
Section I begins at page 10. 15/16 are on the same page.

Possible preparatory work for Lectures IV & V of *WI:2*.

Document 6:

A typescript, continuous from page 10 to 24.
Section III starts on page 15. Section IV starts on page 18. Section V on page 22.

There is a handwritten Royce note on the first page (10): “Gifford Mat’l. Rejected MS from the 1st Lecture Second Series.” Beyond the introductory note, it is unedited.

In the printed version, Lecture I of *WI:2* is titled: “The Recognition of Facts.” The subject matter of the fragment does seem to apply to this Lecture (Royce deals with notions of “Conceptions of Being,” . However, there are no direct parallels in the language.

Document 7a:

A blue-carbon typescript running continuously from pages 14-25. This is a carbon of document 2 above. However this typescript contains only section III. (Document 2 contains section IV as well; that entire document runs to page 32.)

Document 7b:

A somewhat edited manuscript running continuously from 7 to 49. Pages 15-25 are all on old, redrafted pages. There are no sections.

This appears to be preparatory work for *WI:2* Lecture III, “The Temporal and the Eternal. “

Clues include (a) an analysis of the sound of the church bell, (b) poetry included on the temporal theme, and (c) the doctrine of the irrevocability of the past.

Document 8:

A manuscript numbered continuously 36-50, on fresh pages, fairly heavily edited.

This appears to be preparatory work toward Lecture 2 of *WI:1*.

Document 9:

A manuscript running from pages 1 (unnumbered) to 14.

This appears to be the first pages of Lecture II of *WI:1*. (Cf. document 8 -- pages 36-50 -- for possible connections.)

Document 10:

A manuscript running from page 78 to 102. No sections are indicated. Pages 83/84 are combined by Royce.

Royce adds 89a and 100a (order transposed by Wells with 100). Pages 101-02 on redrafted pages.

Page 78 starts in the middle of a sentence.

The last page appears to resolve a thought, although it is hard to read. On pages 101-02 of the manuscript pages, Royce writes:

“My sketch of the four conceptions of reality is before you. I have tried to show

you, by a comparison with the popular metaphysics of language, that all these conceptions are efforts to be just to the same three fundamental and closely related motives. I have tried to show you that the four conceptions are themselves not mere theories, but general, and in one sense intensely practical attitudes toward life. I have meant to remind you that a metaphysical theory is also an ethical resolution - a resolution to deal with the whole of life so or so, and that in consequence the metaphysical conceptions have also been contributions to and elements in the whole spirit of civilization. And finally I have wanted as a mere matter of technical study, to remind you that you cannot understand a philosopher if you merely ask what objects he supposes to be real but that in addition you must know what he means by Reality.”

Could this be an early draft of the close of the final lecture in *WI:1*. OR could this be a draft of the “A Critical Study of Reality” (1897). Note the confessional statement that this consists in, and its call to regard the four conceptions of Being as “intensely practical” attitudes toward life. (102)

Document 11:

Preliminary draft of Royce’s mid-year exam for his 1916 extension course in Ethics. [For final published version *see JRLW 2:135.*]

Folder 4: “Unarranged Notes [Accordion Folder]”

Document 1:

The first page reads as follows:

“Finale of Lecture on
-‘Intellect & Will. -
Read Illustrations from
the Imitation Corresp.

-

Close with practical
suggestions adapted to the special audience.”

A manuscript on smaller (approx. 6“ by 9“) sheets, numbered, after the cover sheet, 23-42. The pages are loose, and un-mounted.

It is unclear to which lecture notes and pages refer. Perhaps lecture V of the New Orleans lectures? (For which there is no MS.)

To avoid splitting the mental process, Royce prefers not to use the traditional terms “intellect” and “will.” Rather, he stresses the dynamic unity of the process that involves docility, ingenuity, habits, etc.

He says we learn because we are curious. Curiosity is a radical quality the fountain from which ingenuity and docility arise.

At the last page, Royce makes a note to himself: “[Redefine the terms. Then introduce pages 32 to 37 of old MS].” These six pages have not yet been identified.

Document 2:

One page manuscript fragment that looks to be the draft of exam questions.

Document 3:

A one-page fragment, half typescript (6 lines) pasted onto a small sheet manuscript page numbered 17. The fragment begins with a new paragraph: “The problem as to Man and Nature has been rendered extremely familiar, in its modern form, by the doctrine of Evolution....” The added typescript lines begin a Section II.

Document 4:

A one-sheet, folded note that appears to be another draft of exam questions, probably Philosophy 9.

Document 5:

A small sheet note with directions to the Twentieth Century Club.

Document 6:

A manuscript numbered pages 2-22. No first page. He begins section I on page 2, section II on page 6, and section III on page 22. The manuscript is incomplete (breaking off after a few lines of section III).

FMO notes: In this fragment, Royce weighs the priority of knowing over willing, intellect over will. His illustrations are very acute, arguing the advantage of either side. The manuscript is directed to teachers, and seems one of Royce’s many series of lectures to teachers. No date, however, is found. Perhaps a pre-draft of Lecture III of the 1893 Lectures to Teachers. The subject matter of this fragment does not appear to correspond with the Cambridge Conferences.

FMO has not yet found parallels with the *Outlines of Psychology*.

Document 7:

An unedited carbon typescript fragment numbered pages 22 to 30. The text deals with two positions on causality. There is an interesting perspectivalism, at pages 27-28. It belongs to his socially conducted study that uses natural phenomena. The reference to our theory of Being on page 29 suggest some early draft of *The World and the Individual*, where our concept of

causality is treated.

Document 8:

A 9-page manuscript, numbered 2 to 10, slightly edited. At the top of page two appears the word “Evolution.” It is uncertain whether this is a title for the page, or merely the last word of the sentence carried over from the missing page 1. However, Royce does deal with a philosophy of Evolution, both within the mind and in the external world. He contrasts evolution with emanation. (5) He also discusses evolution as contrasted with a belief in creation. He holds a link between the concept of Evolution and that of Progress. Kaag suggests that this may have been used in the seminars on growth (1899-1901) in which Royce uses and discusses Ritchie’s “Darwinism and Ethics.”

An evolutionist might be, he says, a pessimist (e.g. von Hartmann).

Document 9:

Two loose small sheets with logical formulas and notes. (They appear to be a split formerly single sheet.) The resultant of collection of all elements and antecedent of all elements. (Perhaps a function chart?)

[NB: Logicians]

Document 10:

A 6-page manuscript, numbered 5-10. This seems clearly to be a fragment of an early draft of the introduction to “What is Vital in Christianity?”. The full MS for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents, although the piece is reprinted in *William James and Other Essays*. (For details, see the entry for “What is Vital in Christianity?” (1909) in Part II of the Index).

In the text, Royce asks “if I can in any way show you [young students] how to look for some escape from your spiritual unrest, then I shall have done all that my highest hopes in preparing this address have led me to attempt.” (7-8) The sentiment of this sentence comes close to the theme of “What is Vital in Christianity?”.

Royce also clarifies: “I am not here to try to exhort nor yet to preach a faith. I want to help you to interpret some of the inner sense of your faith, if faith you have, or at least to see some of the spiritual value of the faith of others, even when you do not share that faith.”

Document 11:

A 5-page manuscript fragment, pages numbered 17, 18, 21, 22, 23. FMO suggests that the text may be a fragment of *Vorarbeit* to an early lecture in *Problems of Christianity*, part I. The text deals with treatment of the second essential Christian idea, namely the individual’s moral burden, and the necessity of its treatment in Christianity. See *Problems of Christianity* Chapter III, 99 to 110.

There may also be something in the preface materials to the book.

Document 12:

A group of typescript pages, on the same paper and in the same blue ink, edited in Royce's hand. The pages have been rearranged and renumbered. An attempt has been made to re-assemble them in some coherent form, finding continuities from page to page. At one point, he inserts new sections "IV" and several pages later "V".

There are, in fact, among these pages more than one instance of certain page numbers (in the original type). This would suggest that the pages have been pulled from different texts (of different lectures in the same series), and that Royce has shuffled them with edits and repaginations to fashion a later lecture.

Royce appears to edit a draft of (or possibly the original text) of one of his lectures to teachers. Because of the strong emphasis on social factors, it is probably not part of the early Lecture to Teachers series given at Harvard in 1893. But it might easily be part of one of his other series of lectures to teachers: the New Orleans Lectures (Lectures II or III concerning the Social Basis for intellectual life, and the social origin of the reasoning processes), the 20th Century Lectures (Lectures VI or VII, concerning the social basis of the thinking and reasoning processes) or the Cambridge Conferences. On page 39 of Typescript C, the last page, Royce refers to "this opening lecture." But there is, in the margin lower on this page, a note in which Royce writes "read at close of 2d lecture."

Two good guesses: This may be the original text for the opening lecture of the New Orleans Lectures (the program to which he refers in *Typescript D* is very similar to the program notes for the New Orleans Lectures - *see* II:43), being reworked (with notes, edits, and repaginations) with the thought of publishing them as a book. (Royce had written a Mrs. Ficklen on June 11, 1897 that he wanted to rework these lectures as a book.) Perhaps these pages refer to an early (and aborted) attempt to organize such a book. (He never wrote it; he launched instead into the Gifford Lectures.) Kaag suspects that the sections come from the preparation of the lectures to teachers from 1893 due to the correspondence between Typescript C and the comment from Talks to Teachers that: "I insist that our human intelligence has no existence apart from some sort of intelligent imitative activities." See Box 64.

FMO divides this document into 4 parts: A-D

Typescript A: The text runs continuously from 18-30, although some page numbers do not track. He begins this fragment with a review of his previous lecture on the social formation of intellect. A shift occurs on the question "whence comes my social ideas?" states that it comes from my belief in my fellow, my belief that my fellow is real. The chief basis for this belief is that he (the neighbor, the other) is a source of new ideas, not created by me. How does he convey these new ideas to me? Response: by a new view which, when I imitate it, arouses in me ideas [which are] naturally basic, but which I have not put them into action. That is how I know they are new. At page 20, a handwritten note insertion

reads:

“You see then the connection of our various theses so far. I believe in my fellows because they convey to me new ideas. I get these ideas primarily by imitating the deeds of my fellows. As I do so, I regard my guide as the source of the new idea. Imitation is thus the basis of the social relations, and of the whole life of ideas that is of the intellect.”

Royce then goes into many cases of children, three- to seven-years-old, trying to see objectively how their minds read their memories. (21) On pages 20-22 is Royce’s introduction to these cases. The cases themselves run from the middle of page 22 to page 30. The children get the meaning of these new ideas through contrast with their memories. It is this “catching of the meaning” that is something added onto the perception.

Here, Royce shows himself to be a very careful observer of young children’s behavior.

Typescript B: The five pages grouped here do not run continuously. Pages 29-30 follow each other. A page type numbered “15” is torn in half (two half page fragments). Pages 34-35 follow each other.

The pages do, however, appear to deal with one over-riding topic. Page 29 begins with the nexus that intelligence has not just with skill but with docility toward the social signs the person is receiving and the length of time it takes him to acquire a skill. As an example, the sharp shooter. Testing by way of skills only for intelligence is not reliable. From signs, then, “intelligence is the capacity to be molded by experience where there is no docility, no molding of intelligence.” (30)

At page 35, Royce gives his autobiographical confession that seems to reflect his dispute with Abbott. (See Part X:6 of this index: Autobiographical Material)

Typescript C: This text runs continuously from page 23 to 30 (with the original typed page numbers). Here, Royce inserts a hand-written section “IV” after the first line of page 23. (Before its re-pagination, page 34 of the previous typescript immediately precedes this page.) This seems important for his later insertion of “V” for the separation of his lectures. He cautions adults against leaving a thinking child alone without social interactions. (23) He emphasizes his method: first to be objectively observant of the kinds of activities going on in thinking people, later he will use introspection to interpret these facts observed. At the middle of page 24, Royce speaks of the following lectures, intended to develop and apply the thesis that he here brings to awareness. The thesis is “thinking means Conscious imitation.” When children imitate non-human animals, theirs is a genuinely social act.

The contrast effect between deeds we contrast with ideas and models “is precisely the kind of consciousness which is most essential to every grade and type of rationality, or power to think, or power to set ideas consciously over against objects. (28)

Then Royce writes a note in the margin of page 29 with “V” and these directives: “Cease here. Insert reading.”

Regarding introspection, Royce says we interpret our meaning in contrast drawn from our memories, feelings of familiarity and habits of action. All this leads to what he calls “recognizing“ (32) or in Plato’s terms “reminiscence.” (33) When it comes to clearness of recognition, this is produced by observing contrast effects.

Royce gives the following summary at page 34:

“In sum then if we consider the inner or conscious aspect of the knowing process we find that knowledge implies an union of three intimately related elementary processes, namely first the assimilation of new data to former experiences, by virtue of recognition and of memory; Secondly, a comparison of present facts or of present and remembered facts, with reference to their various likenesses or similarities; and thirdly, a discrimination, by virtue of contrast effects, amongst the various facts that are presented. These three aspects, or elementary processes of knowledge are inseparable, and in their organic union consists of the sort of mental life that we possess whenever we know.

“If this is the general character of knowledge as viewed from within, it remains to observe what is the special character of that kind of process which occurs when we consciously think, or in other words when our knowing assumes a conscious rational character.”

Royce describes conscious free creation of imitation of forms and symbols (35-37), but does not go into unconscious imitation of objects by our native consciousness, although he does say “It is true that one lower levels of intelligence one has ideas that more or less unconsciously reproduce the natures of external facts.” (38) And also: “[O]ur ideas in so far as they are conscious and controllable imitations of objects give us all sorts of indirect advantages in dealing with objects.” (38)

On the last page (39), Royce brackets several sentences at the close of his lecture, and adds the note “read at close of 2d lecture” in the margin. The bracketed text reads as follows:

“Already you may see the practical lesson to be derived from all the foregoing when I warn you that it is very unfair to fear or to denounce the tendency to imitation wherever it exists, as a relatively low, or elementary, or childish, or slavish, or unintelligent activity. There are good and bad sorts of imitation; but in so far as man is rational, man is imitative. Intellectually speaking there is nothing higher than the right sort of rational imitation, namely imitation of the truth; precisely as, morally

speaking there is nothing higher than imitation of the ideal, submission to the law. Rational finite beings come into the world to imitate what they did not create, namely the truth and the right. We shall later see how in all this imitativeness there lies the true means for the expression of the only worthy kind of originality.”

Evaluation: This quotation deserves the *Critical Edition* board’s close attention.

Typescript D: The continuous typescript fragment runs continuously from page 32 to 38. The text appears to be in the middle or toward the end of the first lecture. Royce recalls the way children learn. Then he says, in coming lectures, we will take up how we view all the world as social spectacles. With regard to the theory of knowledge, he sketches Locke’s theory, then concludes by saying, “I must go much further than Locke went.” (36) He summarizes the lecture on pages 37 and 38. Hypothetically, this typescript D looks to be the closure of Lecture I of his New Orleans revision (for a proposed book or new lecture).

A quarter page typescript fragment with heavy handwritten edits is included here, but seems unrelated to the rest of the text fragment.

Document 13:

A 2-page manuscript. Royce’s exam either for an Ethics course, or possibly a History of Philosophy class, in the 1890’s.

Document 14:

A cover note by E.A. Jarvis describes an attached manuscript. The attachment is seven page manuscript on small sheets (4” by 8”) in Katharine Royce’s hand. These pages are numbered 41 to 47, the conclusion of Lecture I 1915-16 Extension Course on Ethics at Boston University. This suggests that Katharine Royce had transcribed a complete handwritten copy of this lecture, not now extant.

Document 15:

Another cover note EA Jarvis reads as follows, in description of the attached manuscript pages: The pages appear to be handwritten preparation for Lecture 2, “The Idea of Duty” of the “Extension Course in Ethics.”

The manuscript consists of an early draft, including here pages 12, and 15-18.

Document 16:

A one page fragment numbered “(5)” that FMO says is pretty clearly part of the Extension Ethics Course.

Document 17:

A one page fragment numbered “(16)” that FMO says is pretty clearly part of Lecture II of the extension course.

Document 18:

A 2-page fragment numbered 34 and 35 that, to FMO, does not sound like Extension Course material.

Document 19:

A 3-page fragment numbered pages 61-63 relating to Royce’s definition of the unique Self. “I have frequently maintained that a Self can be defined as a life lived according to a more or less conscious and explicit plan.” This is so typically Roycean that it is difficult to place or date.

Folder 5:

Two one page manuscripts (no date), examinations by Royce on the development in the modern period of the concepts:

- d. Of substance, space, and causation, and
- e. Of the meaning of “a priori” and the development of the concept of a theory of knowledge
- f. Plus: two responses by Sheldon [likely Russell Firth Sheldon, Harvard A.B. (1908), m.c.l. and M.D. (1911) cum laude:
- g. 5 page essay in response, and
- h. 4 page essay

For some reason, Royce retained these papers.

Folder 6: “The Japanese Sword”

Royce’s manuscript for a novel, 130 pages, no date. Written in five sections, somewhat edited.

Folder 7: “The Will to Interpret”

A two-sided sheet, a MS of 2 pages, an early outline of *PC*, chapter XII. It contains seven sections, unlike the twelve sections of this chapter as published. However, it contains an initial sentence worth noting: “... the art of interpretation is the chief amongst all the humanities, and can neither be taught in a lecture, nor learned in many lifetimes.” (no date given, but likely ca. 1912.)

Folder 8: “A Mechanical Philosophy”

This folder contains three items. **But** FMO finds nothing by Josiah Royce in this folder.

Document 1: “Prefatory Lessons”

Five pages of mimeographed introduction to this topic, mechanical philosophy.

Document 2:

Printed diagrams on this topic from J.J. van Nostrand

Document 3:

A fragmentary typescript, pages 7-10, with three slightest editing (p. 7), possibly by Royce to whom only the reference to G.H. Lewes *Problem of Life and Mind* might connect it to Royce and his files.

Folder 9: “The Nature, Meaning and Function of Philosophy in Life”

A 28-page MS written on stationery of “Ste of NY – State Commission on Lunacy, Pathology Institute”, in a hand not clearly Royce’s, except for 2 marginalia on page 2 and 23. The piece is very Hegelian in ascent to the Absolute; the refutes Heraclitus.

[Might this be Katharine taking a “musing moment”? But why is this stationery being used? What does this have to do with this broken off manuscript?]

If this is not Katharine’s writing, might it be Christopher’s?

Box 106: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Lecture. The Social Origin of the Conception of Natural Law, ca. 1895-1916”

This is a one-page, fragmented typescript, headed by Royce’s note “Combined with previous as lecture IV” [first guess – an early first page of Royce’s 20th Century Club series. Second guess, an early first page of *WI:2* chapter III]

Folder 2: “Mind. Ca. 1895-1916”

A one-page typescript of *Mind* identical with *ERE* or *RLE*, or *JRLW* versions.

Folder 3: “The Philosopher”

MS *poem* on two sides of 2 ½ by 5 ½ paper in pencil, seems to be Royce’s hand. No date. The theme fits Royce’s desire to do great things in logic.

Folder 4: “The One, the Many and the Infinite, Supplementary Essay. 1895-1916”

A 13-page manuscript dealing with the concept of number. It doesn’t mention F.H. Bradley until

near the close. (But in the printed version of *WI:1* Bradley is only mentioned in the latter part of the piece, at pages 474-76.

(The index to *WI:1 and 2* doesn't include the logically important topic of "number.")

FMO finds no exact replica of this in the *SE*. However, it may have been prepared as an introduction to the "Supplementary Essay" itself, but for length's sake was cut. It certainly refers to Dedekind, Couturat, and Cantor. Royce's Cantor reference: "Cantor, whose discussions of the infinite will concern us later in this discussion."

This MS may be a deletion from *SE*, or perhaps a logical manuscript. The manuscript may have been an independent study prepared as an article on number.

Evaluation: Attention Logicians.

Folder 5: "Example from the Historical Field, ca. 1895-1916"

Royce's six page manuscript on 5" by 8" sheets is entitled "Examples ..." His examples run from Kant to 1900. He creates a bibliographical list of thinkers with the titles of their work. The exact aim of this MS is undisclosed. It cannot be earlier than 1900. Royce shows how in touch he is with contemporary periodicals.

Folder 6: "Untitled Notes pages 108-116, ca. 1896-1916"

Query: Is this a cut from the "Supplementary Essay" of *WI*? Or is this a logical MS with pages ranging from 108 to 116? If so, can a connective logical manuscript be found here? Further investigation is needed, especially by logicians.

Folder 7: "Universal Diary [Appointment Notebook] ca. 1899"

A small 2" by 4" notebook, with a few entries in Royce's hand.

This is his 1899 diary running through Scotland and his lectures, then returning back to Liverpool (February 3). The last note in this section, he is on board the ship (Feb. 11 – heavy squalls and northwest wind.”).

After a big gap, on June 22 he leaves Boston for Chicago on his way to give an exam. He goes up from there to St. Paul, where he opens the exam the next day. This diary entry ends on June 29.

The diary ends on Friday June 30.

Folder 8: "Various Loose Notes. [Some titled, including William James questionnaire] ca. 1900"

Document 1:

Two 3" by 5" cards (numbered "2" and "4", both labeled "continued") on the French revolution via Sybelon, notated in Royce's hand. Royce's notes are mostly in German. FMO believes the cards come from Royce's collection of cards upon which he recorded what he has read (Royce labeled his two sets of cards "A-M" and "N-Z" Some of these cards are scattered throughout HARP.

Document 2:

Royce's two contributions on "one" and "reduction" for a dictionary. It is, in fact, ca. 1900. Baldwin's dictionary came out in 1901.

Document 3:

Royce has one set of WJ's "Instructions to Contributors" both schedule A and B, *not* filled out by Royce. This is apparently for the *ASPR* (the American Society of Psychological Research).

Document 4:

A book plate, indicating a gift of William Gilson Farlow, from the Library of Josiah Royce.

Document 5: "Notes on Herbart's Psychology"

A three page manuscript, numbered 49-51, in which Royce quotes from Herbart. This appears to be part of Royce's original notebook concerning Herbart's psychology, from 1875-76.

Document 6: "Bunsen Hyppolytus [*sic*]"

A large piece of paper, approximately 8" by 17, " folded in half. Royce has written on the back of the sheet. On the front of the sheet, a ledger entitled "Labor Roll of the men Employed by the University of California during the month of September 1874".

Royce, at *ca.* 19 years of age, used this paper to make notes on a book by C. Bunsen published in 1852 about Hippolytus. (NB. Royce misspells Hippolytus at the top of the sheet.) Walter Bagehot has written about the book. Bunsen attributed some writing to Hippolytus which others say was written by Origen. Royce here also corrects Bunsen.

(Young Royce did record data from Milman's survey of the first three or four centuries of the Christian church.)

Bunsen's book to which Royce refers was published in 1852. FMO suggests that these notes go back to Royce's very early days, when he spent time in the Mercantile Library. The library was supplied by Protestant ministers, so that Royce would have had access to writings by early church fathers. This reveals within the young Royce another expression of his early impulse to "truth-seeking."

Evaluation: a very interesting couple of pages of Royce's early work. FMO asks whether it has not been noticed before.

Document 7: "Notes on Wundt's Physiological Psychology, (pp. 1-45) with References and Remarks"

(Royce notes on the next page: "the paragraph division is my own") FMO suggests a date ca. 1876, while Royce was in Germany. The paper is very old, Royce's hand is very young, and many of the notes are in German

5 by 8 inch sheets, front and back, notes written in Royce's hand. (Early work on very fragile pages, with crumbling edges.) Twelve numbered pages, with a blank page 10. Many of the notes are in German.

The notes are a careful attempt to summarize Wundt's book. Royce is already sensitive to language.

The notes deal with the experimental method. See, e.g., on page 4, Royce summarizes "principle considerations" "a. Only by the use of the experimental method can we hope to obtain quantitatively definite results." (p. 5). B. Furthermore: "... only by experimentation founded on artificial conditions brought to pass on the outer side of the circle of processes can we hope to obtain these quantitatively definite results." Royce goes on to contrast Wundt's position with Kant's

Evaluation: Given Wundt's influence on Royce, this Document 7 shows the experimental, even pragmatic, aspect of metaphysician Wundt upon Royce. Royce's notebooks on his lectures of Wundt, Windlebrand, and Lotze deserve detailed study.

Document Fragments:

Several one-page fragments, unrelated.

Document 8:

A 10-page manuscript on thin onion skin type paper. It is conceivably in Royce's hand, although it is not entirely clear. (The handwriting differs both from his very early work, e.g. Miner's Grave, as well as later manuscripts.) At the top of the first page is a note which says this may be a study by another student. Yet there is no specific indication to this effect. On the other hand, on page two, the writer refers to "our very little girlhood," and goes on to reflect on imaginary play with a girlfriend in which they call each other "Lilly White" and "Minnie Brown." They also imagined themselves to have husbands and children.

The text deals with the three brothers that the writer "passionately desired," but lacked. The writer calls the imaginary brothers Ned (the bad one), Horace (the funny one), and Willie (the good one).

FMO finds this a puzzler. Might the work of one of his sisters somehow gotten into Royce's papers?

Evaluation: Deserves closer study.

Document 9: "Of Causality"

A 3-page manuscript, written front and back in Royce's hand. This may be Royce working pre-dissertation at Hopkins, or perhaps several years later as an instructor at UCB.

Document 10:

A Western Union telegram that says "Glad to stay at University club. Expect to reach club by noon Monday." There is no date given, The form, however, does read, "191_" thus indicating a later date.

Document 11: "Summing up of the system."

One sheet manuscript, written front and back, describing four sections: I. The Will known to us, II. The Will as *Wesen der Welt*, III. the Will as man, and IV. The worth of the World.

It ends by considering the true sin of suicide. In terms of a date, it could be anything from 1876 to 1885. It echoes Schopenhauer.

Document 12:

Another card, this one on *Ausdehnungslehre*. The notes on the front of the card deal with the congruence of a and b. There is a date on the card's back – 1879-1880. Also on the back Royce jots notes about three of his essays:

"A Purpose of Thought" (Fragment of an essay finished in other form) "Will as Principle in Philosophy" [Royce notes that the essay has been rejected], and "Spinoza on Liberty" *The Fortnightly Review* considered this manuscript."

NB Historians of Royce's early thought

Document 13: "Forensic Lectures II. Persuasion"

A one-page manuscript, front and back, probably from 1883-87.

Document 14: "Emerson Hall Lectures"

A one-page manuscript sheet, written front and back. This is a notice of the lecture courses in Emerson Hall, with Royce delivering "some aspects of Post-Kantian idealism" February 25 to March 28 at 4:30.

On the back side of the sheet are some perhaps significant logical musings on the T function, I function, and F function.

[two loose sheets follow not worth remarking]

Document Fragments 15:

Loose fragments: one page on Locke, one page on General Introductory Remarks to Section 1, on Change and its knowability, and a manuscript page numbered “(4)” concerning the interaction of instinctive and irrational acts.

Document 18:

A 14-page manuscript, that appears to be incomplete. (The last page begins a section II, but ends after one paragraph.)

In this text, Royce exposes Hillebrand’s article on the different temperaments toward religious questions in Germany and in England. (Dr. Karl Hillebrand’s “Conversations on Modern England” appeared in the June issue of *The Nineteenth Century*. Hillebrand speaks of the way English writer, “even the least theological ones” (e.g., Eliot, John Morley and Prof. Clifford), show an interest in religious issues, whereas on the continent, “the church retains only a political importance.”

Royce refers to Hillebrand saying one of his London friends has said that Shakespeare is indecent and Byron is immoral. (7) Royce does not complete this piece, but does sketch differences in attitudes toward religion in literature: lively in England, dead in Germany.

An attached note says “1880,” a possible date.

Folder 9: “Royce Diary March 17, 1903 – Dec 30, 1903”

A very fragile small notebook, written in pencil. The entries seem to reflect notes on haphazard themes that attract Royce. After April 7, all the other pages are blank.

FMO: this is not a diary, not reflective writing. These are jottings from stories he has heard. The first entry deals with ideas on syphilis. An entry later deals with hearing a recitation of a “negro” sermon. The text of third entry includes rhyming lines.

Folder 10: “Topics of the Indianapolis Lectures ca. 1903”

A one-page MS, titled “Topics of the Indianapolis Lectures.” Royce lists four titles for the lectures, and notes at the bottom of the page that the lectures are in the hands of Prof. Will D. Howe. He says that the lecture trip will come after the Feb. 2 Columbia lecture (1904). If so, the date is probably accurate for the preparation of these pieces.

1. Browning Club: "Browning's Theism."
2. The City Teachers of Indianapolis: "Will and Intellect, their General Nature and Relations."
3. The Students of Indiana University: "The Concept of the Infinite."
4. Earlham College: "Pragmatism and Truth"

Folder 11: "[Untitled] [First word inside cover is "Opposite"]"

Logic.

A logical hard-backed composition notebook, with diagrams and formulas, on linear tetrads and constructions. The middle section of the notebook is empty. But then the final pages reveal more constructions.

Folder 12: "[Untitled]"

A notebook on the logic of intersections and operations with pairs and circuits); it includes Royce's remarks on an essay contest Coenobium No. 82 – his personal verdicts on students in the class, ca. 1909-1910"

Logic

A hard-backed notebook, with entries facing different directions. Some loose cards are contained in the leaves. There are approximately 140 pages in the notebook.

FMO conjectures that Royce used this notebook for two purposes, writing in it right side up for one, and then inverting it for a second use. Unclear where archival title of the folder comes from. The notebook does appear to include evaluations for the Coenobium, but the bulk of the material is Royce's logic work.

Folder 13: "[Untitled]. First word inside cover is "generalization." [Further work in triads and pair operation], ca. 1910"

Logic. A hard-backed notebook, full of logical formulas and constructions. It is written in pencil. It represents Royce's experimentation with logical thoughts. There are approximately 140 pages in the notebook. Not all are filled. The final few pages are inverted (seemingly written upside down).

The inside front cover is headed "Generalization of what stands opposite." He is working with tetrads. At the bottom of the second page, there is this note:

"We have as Kempe's principle, $T(a/uv) \dashv\vdash \{(u=v) \dashv\vdash (u=v=a)\}$. The above shows what is needed to supplement this principle [of Kempe] so as to change it into an equation of propositions."

An archivist estimates the date as 1910, but at first glance there does not seem to be a date

reference within the notebook.

Folder 14: “[Untitled]. First word inside cover is “Suppose.” Further work in T-relation. Undated”

Logic.

A hard-backed composition notebook with approximately 140 pages in the notebook. Royce continues to work in tetrads. On the inside front cover, he opens with “Suppose ...” and gives an equation. There are three, folded loose pages inserted in the notebook full of functions and constructions. Royce notes on one that “The properties of ϵ [epsilon] are worthy of separate study.” Royce describes these three sheets as “A single intersection formula of great generality founded on the invertible pair operation.”

Royce begins to paginate the notebook, up to page 28. At that point the pages are not numbered.

If page numbering had continued, Royce inserts this note on what would be page 43:

“This gives a very remarkable transformation of $\lambda(x)$, if we suppose g variable, (a,c) fixed in $\lambda(x)$.”

In the second last “folio” (FMO’s terms for batch of 14 pages, bound into the hardback) Royce notes:

“This seems a promising single intersection formula.”

Box 107: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “[Untitled, Royce notes that pages 69 and 82 contain notable theorems]. Notebook, ca. 1910”

Logic.

Another hard-backed composition notebook full of constructions and formulas. An archivist’s inserted note calls it “notebook 7, untitled.” The folder title above comes from the heading of the first page. However, once again, many of the pages are inverted. (i.e. Royce starts at the back of the book, writing upside down.)

Royce numbers the pages through 103. Several pages are removed. The last part of the book is not numbered. At one point, Royce writes “over.” FMO hypothesizes that that means to turn the book around, and start at the back. Those pages are paginated 1-43.

In this last grouping, at page 34: “We may now investigate of the properties of p as defined by a set of elements – six in number, viz. (o,a,b,c,d,e,f) . The diagram stated without restrictions on the hexad (a,b,c,d,e,f) is a on the opposite page, rearranged for an easier survey. The entire function is definable in T[tetrad]-relations, independently of the O-element.”

Folder 2: “Untitled – Alignments.”

Logic.

A hard-backed composition notebook, approximately 90-100 pages. The archivist has inserted a note calling the book “notebook 8 [-untitled-] “alignments”.

The insider cover reads, in pencil in Royce’s hand: “Devices for passing circuits through two determinate points that are not mutually conjugate [*sic*] in their respective circuits appears in this book after the folded leaf.” Again, the notebook is full of constructions, function tables and formulae.

This notebook is not paginated.

Folder 3: “[Untitled notebook of proofs]. [12 X 9.5 in. Label torn off] undated”

Logic.

A hard-back notebook, larger than the previous notebooks (9” X 12”). Numbered through page 116. At the end of the book, 13 un-numbered pages. Two sheets are torn from the beginning of the book. Again, several of the pages are inverted. Full of function tables, constructions and formulas, as well as Royce notes concerning the operations.

At page 42, Royce writes: “The operation of page 32 continued. Consider more in detail the operation which after the foregoing seems now to promise most, viz ... ”

At page 51, he writes: “Let us base upon the operation opposite, viz. that of pages 32, 43 & 50, the following [formula] That is let [tetrad formula].”

At page 55: “The function upon which the operation of pages 32 & 42 & 50 is founded is as follows.”

At page 69: “It is plain from the foregoing that the operations defined from page 42 to page 68 constitute a group of operations which can be substituted the one for the other which can be mutually transformed by substituting....”

Folder 4: “Circuits through given pairs (a,b) when these pairs are suitably restricted”

Logic.

This folder title appears on the front of the notebook. The Royce note continues on the cover: “(Also, in reverse of book [back?], a new relation of importance).”

A hard-backed notebook, of approximately 50 pages. Royce numbers the pages through 25. Approximately 16 pages of notes follow. Turning the book over and starting from the rear, is titled on the first page

Page 5, of the inverted book back: “A new tetrad function. Suppose $O(abc) = [f=(bc+cd+bd)]$ ”

Page 6, of the inverted book back: “A new tetrad function. An equivalence of entities equated to a double F-relation of pairs.”

Folder 5: “[1] Class Lists for Philosophy A. Loose notes on Logic.”

Document 1:

Logic.

A small hard-backed notebook (5” x 8”). Two full 8 ½ x 11 page typescript pages are inserted, including the class rolls for “Introduction to Philosophy” and “History of Philosophy”.

Other handwritten lists of class names, with grades, follow. An empty envelope is inserted between pages.

The bulk of the notebook, however, contains logic. What appears to be a logic “paper” runs from pages 14 to 145, alternating between pencil and ink.

Autobiographical note: On page 58, this note appears: “Work from here to page 134 all done during voyage Aug 19-Sept. 14 1905 on Steamer Maraval at Trinidad, etc.”

At page 137, he notes “Cambridge, Oct. 15, 1905” and continues the work previously tackled on the ship.

The entire logic text is divided into sections; e.g., “§.3”.

Document 2:

Logic.

A collection of loose sheets, notes on Logic. Some of the loose sheets seem to have come from the notebook of Document 1, above. There are almost 100 pages of loose notes, on sheets of varying sizes.

Autobiographical Note: Included here is stationery from the Trinidad line of Steamships, as well as several pieces of stationery Queens Park Hotel Trinidad, Port of Spain, on which he has written out logic equations. Also a Rail Road timetable for Trinidad.

These Trinidad indications would date these notes in 1905.

Folder 6: “Construction of Linear Sets.”

Logic.

A hard-backed notebook, with the above title on its front cover. Royce has numbered the first 8 pages. But he fills many of the remaining 60 pages as well.

Box 108: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: The Entity e , and Related Constructions.”

Logic.

This title appears on the cover of the hard-backed notebook in this folder. (Along with a construction.) The pages are not numbered. Almost all the pages (approximately 100 pages) are filled.

For Royce, the e relation (the epsilon relation) is of “bonding.”

Folder 2: “Functions of Secondary Primes, the Invertible Pair Operation.”

Logic.

This title appears on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. No date is apparent from this notebook. There are approximately 200 pages (front and back), non-numbered. About a third from the front, Royce notes: “Thus we get the following rule for constructing systems of single intersection circuits.”

About 34 pages from the end, Royce notes:

“Here is a notable system of intersections.”

The entire notebook is full of logic work.

Folder 3: “[2] Logical Theory. [Constructions in terms of the T-relation], undated”

Logic.

A soft covered booklet (approx. 7 ½" x 10"), titled: “Logical Theory, Constructions in terms of the T-relation.”

The pages are unnumbered; several at the end are blank. The logic writing here is more prose than formula. Royce sets down his definitions as “§” markers. It appears, therefore, that Royce contemplates this text as a paper. He begins, with the title on the first page “Formulae for the T-relation”.

At the back of the notebook is a page of notes, and a geometrical “doodle.” The unique note on

this last page concerns transformations of lambda.

***Folder 4: “Number Concept. page 1-81”**

This folder consists of a collection of loose manuscript pages. Contrary to the folder title, this folder contains two documents. The first has pages numbered 1-81, the second numbered 1-87. Royce seems to have created these two long manuscripts in 1900 as he moved toward writing his Essay Supplementary to *WI:1*. Royce seems first to have written the latter document (1-87), marked “VIII”—i.e., in other words, Royce meant (1-81) to follow (1-87). Evidence? On pages 84-87, Royce goes into detail about Dedekind while the “1-81” document begins by discussing Dedekind as if already introduced..

How do these two manuscripts relate to the published version of *WI:1* itself, and its “Supplementary Essay”? The heading “VIII” on page one of 1-87 seems puzzling until one recognizes, from Royce’s reference there back to a “Lecture VII,” that he may have intended (1-87) as the beginning of Lecture VIII. (Notice that he doesn’t conclude this manuscript without starting a section IX.) This and the other manuscript (1-81), then, seem to be rough drafts, perhaps toward lectures VIII and IX of *WI:1*, yet created in sight of a tentatively expected “Supplementary Essay.”

Attention Scholars: These two manuscripts need careful comparison with the “Supplementary Essay” and Lectures VIII and IX of *WI:1*.

Document 1:

[Again, FMO hypothesizes that this document, in fact, was written after document 2 below.]

The first page is not numbered. There is no title on the first page, but the text begins “For Dedekind, the cardinal properties of number ...”

The first document is continuous, pages 1-81.

Wells adds a red “55” to page 56 (Royce had skipped 55).

Wells adds a red “64/65/66” to page 67 (Royce had skipped 64-66).

Royce repeatedly stresses “self-sustaining character of the reflection before us” (23), or “process of the recurrence in the self-sustained type,” (30) or, another way of putting it, a “self-sustaining purpose” (35). That is, the infinite seriation of self-reflective thought.

Royce carefully develops the theory of number, from its simplest terms, which involve an infinite series, to the basis of mathematics. One may follow Couerat (empirically) or Dedekind (looking out from the idea of a unity that generates its own diversity). This basic question is echoed in Royce’s published footnote 2 on page 514 of *WI:1*, which deals with his difference at this time from Charles Sanders Peirce (who wants to move from the many to the one) whereas Royce wants to move from the one to the many.

There are some key quotations in this document. Near the close of the manuscript, Royce states that whether one follows Couturat or Dedekind, that person has “comprehended in a most important instance, precisely the general problem of the development of diversity out of unity. And whatever else may be said about this logical problem, certain it is, that the demonstration by recurrence is one example of reflective thought.” (79)

On the last page of this document (1-81), Royce closes: “In principle it is seen to be identical with them. **And here sameness develops diversity.**” (emphasis added)

Document 2:

The document is paginated (except for the gap noted below) from pages 1-87. The first page, is headed “VIII,” with the first sentence beginning: “Our somewhat lengthy consideration of the number concept has made us acquainted with at any rate our instance when the development of variety out of unity...”

Wells adds a red pencil “a” to a second page 26 (e.g. “26a”). Wells adds a red pencil “38” to Royce’s 39. Pages 72 to 83 are missing. A page with a note to this effect is inserted. It appears to be in Wells’s hand, although it is not in red pencil.

FMO hypothesizes that, like the document 1, this document is related in some way to the “Supplementary Essay” of *World and the Individual*. It is, perhaps, a preparatory work or a rough draft for that piece. A problem, of course, is the document is headed section “VIII.”

Royce refers repeatedly to Bradley, beginning at page 12. He then continues with his argument with Bradley (*see e.g.* pages 15, 21, 22, 25, 26a, 33, 35, 37). The writing is very fluent. There is no editing. There is also the theme of the duality of reality and appearance that occurs in the *SE*.

“Already, in fact, the number series has given us an instance when a variety of expressions of our meaning appears self-evident, long before we are able to form any one final and consistent view as to how numerical variety is related to Ultimate Being.” (13)

Other themes:

The one and the many: pages 7, 10, 16, 47.

The theory of being: page 9.

The idea of “infinite repetition of the object”: page 33.

At page 35, Royce refers to a “Lecture VII”: “That all these assertions are made distinctly with reference to the discussion concerning the sameness of idea and object in Lecture VII, I expressly mention.”

A section IX begins on page 64. Royce proceeds to talk of Fichte, Bradley and Herbart, and at 67, brings in Dedekind. At 68, Spinoza.

At page 70, he refers to a “**map**” that is a distinguishing mark of the “Supplementary Essay”: “We can imagine a mathematically exact map, which passing to the limit of exactness, should

somehow precisely depict all the features of a given country.....” Royce continues to describe this map over the next page. At that point we run into the “missing pages” of 72-83. The parallel with the “map of England” in the “Supplementary Essay” seems obvious.

Royce ends this manuscript on page 87 with the comment “So far for the first stage in dealing with our problem.”

Peirce: starts from many and moves to unity.

Royce: starts with one idea that possesses its own generativity.

Folder 5: “On page 22 sqq. This Book An Associated Invertible Pair Operation is Defined”

Logic.

The above title is written on the cover of the hard-backed composition notebook, approximately 120 pages, full of constructions and function tables and formulae. The first 123 pages are numbered. Some blank pages follow (ten or so). Then, six pages of “cyclical permutations” follow. If the notebook is reversed, beginning at the back, more functions and constructions follow, with the occasional inverted page. About 16 pages of elaborations.

At page 22, per the cover title, Royce heads the page “Test for the associative property of oper’n”. At page 25, he summarizes “It appears from the foregoing that the operation now defined, pages 22 & 23, is commutative, invertible, and associative. It consequently determines a group. Questions about this group may be answered on the following pages.”

Folder 6: “On page 9, a New Invertible Operation”

Logic.

This same title is on the cover of this slightly larger hard-backed composition notebook. Within the notebook an archivist’s note reads: “On page 9, a new invertible operation ... 85 page Is this the notebook that FO refers to as notebook (no title) c. 75 p.?”

FMO responds: “No. Rather, before 2009, this was old Logicalia Box 4, document 3.”

Again, the book is full of logic formulae, tables, constructions. Pages 39 – 51 represent a “new attempt,” with perhaps significant notes on pages 42, 45 and 51.

Folder 7: “The Order of the Results of a Part of Researches Leading up to a Need of ? Collections of Triads”

Logic.

The above title is on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. One word of the title is illegible. However, there is a “λ” or “K” directly before the word “collections.” The notebook is not paginated.

Royce works on triads for about 30 pages. Then approximately 12 blank pages follow. A good way into the book, this quote: “The four principal intersections of two intersecting pairs (Kempe use [use] of the triads.”

Then, a large part of the book is inverted. (Turn over, and begin at back cover.) This part of the notebook has some (non-continuous) pagination. Pages 1-8 are on notable properties of triads. Then a new numbering section starts, after many un-numbered pages. 1-17: “A system of λ 's related to the pair (a,b)”. (FMO estimates that this is about 60 pages, 30 sheets, in from the back cover.)

Royce seems to make many repeated attempts at working.

Box 109: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “The Pair Operation, on page 93 of this book, a New Operation”

Logic.

A large, hard-backed composition notebook (9” by 12”). The folder title appears on the cover of the notebook. Royce once again brings the book from both ends. The notebook is full of constructions, formulae and function tables.

Autobiographical note: A note in Royce’s handwriting reads, “Brentano’s is the best place in NY to look up dramatic” on an un-numbered page.

Folder 2: “The Summary of the Two Invertible Pair Operations 80 their Inverse is Given on page 38 of this Book [Royce’s notes on triad theory on inside cover]. Notebook. Undated.”

Logic.

Pages at the front of the book are numbered up to 54 (with a few un-numbered pages following, and a few pages torn out). A middle section of about ten pages is left blank. Inverted pages are mixed in together.

Inside back cover, Royce’s handwritten explanation of Triad theory: “The great advance in the theory of triads in this book seems to be the construction on pages 3,4. [In the reverse of book.] This seems sound & enables us to construct any number of triads, corresponding to a given triad (a,b,c), but possessed each of its predetermined & arbitrarily chosen Kempean & T-resultant. [tetrad-resultant].”

Folder 3: “[Ultimate Reality] [J.G. Gustafson][Logic Notes]”

Logic.

A small (6" by 8") soft-covered notebook. This is apparently Gustafson's notebook, and the first few pages, an essay on "ultimate reality," are in Gustafson's hand. Royce uses the rest of the notebook to make notes on, primarily, the transformation of linear sets. Several pages in the middle of the book are torn out. Included are Royce's appraisals Whitehead's *Memoir on the Algebra of Logic* are including in this notebook (just before the ripped out pages), from the *American Journal of Mathematics*, Vol. 23 (1901). Royce begins: Whitehead begins with his concept of invariants of a function $\phi(xy\dots t)$. The values of this function are resultants of its coefficients. W 's invariants are functions of these coefficients, in particular, symm. Functions of these coefficients, viz."

Folder 4: "Variations on the Pair Operation."

Logic.

A large, hard-backed notebook, with the above title on the front cover. Fifty-two pages of notes, constructions, function tables, and formulae.

At pages 33 and 34: "Ordinals viewed with reference to the secondary primes & sec. sep. primes of Whitehead."

Folder 5: "Analogies to the Quadrilateral Construction. 1876-1877"

Logic.

A thicker hard-backed composition notebooks, approximately 8" by 11" in size. Well over 100 pages, full of function tables, formulae and constructions.

Inside the book, loose, is a picture of a tobacco store, perhaps in Cuba?

Pink Relocation Form:

Microfilm of Logicalia and Logic Notes have been relocated to HUG 1755.3.4 mfN (with microforms)

Folder 6: "Logicalia" *

* A misleading title. This is *not* logic.

Document 1:

A reprint G. A. Miller's "Groups Generated by Two Operations ..." (Warsaw, 1906).

Document 2:

One 5" by 8" sheet on Consciousness as for itself, dated Oct. 30, 1892. The height of his Hegelian period. Possibly a ten point outline for a lecture.

Document 3:

One 8 ½" x 11" sheet, manuscript chart on one side on "The Parallel Series." The seven columns are titled. The strictly descriptive sense of consciousness, leading to an appreciative sense. Royce works out the distinction of description and appreciation.

Folder 7: "Logic Notes ca. 1895-1916"

Logic.

Loose sheets of logic notations. Royce uses the back of any available paper. For instance, on the back of a Handel and Hayden society solicitation for donations, on the back of a letter from A.N. Marquis Company, another Leavitt and Peirce cigar order (200 cigars a month for June and July 1905).

Folder 8: "Unarranged Logic Notes, 1of 2 Folders"

Logic.

A thick folder of loose sheets. Some of the sheets may have been ripped out of his hardback notebooks. Again, Royce uses all sorts of scraps of papers (the backs of envelopes, invitations, etc.) for his ideas. One large manila (empty) is titled "Notes for Address to Hebraic Society, 1910" (Philosophy of Life).

One sheet headed "Whitehead's Invariant of a Tetrad" in middle of the stack. There is a reprint of an article by Louis Couterat, in German. The reprint is signed by Couterat. Royce has written many logic notes in the margins and on blank pages. Another reprint of a Hocking piece from the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* vol. 3, no. 16 (August 2, 1906), again with Royce notes.

Box 110: "The Papers of Josiah Royce"

"Pamphlets and Monographs on Logic [collected and indexed by Josiah Royce], 1893-1898"

Logic.

A hard back book, a 5" thick volume, of logic works collected by Royce. The volume includes "Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan" by Sadajir Sugiura (Philadelphia 1909).

Other authors from Royce's index:

Stern, William
Lipps, Theodore..
Owen, E.T.

Vailati, Giovanni
Urban, Wilbur
Jerusalem, Wilhem
Berman, Julius
Sugiura, Sadjir
Schuppe, Wilhelm

Box 111: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Unarranged Logic notes, probably Harvard era. 1895-1916. 2”

Logic.

Loose sheets and fragments, some in ten plus page groupings. This appears to be the second folder of loose sheets to which the folder at Box 109, “Folder 8 (1 of 2)” refers.

Fairly early in the stack, there are two pages (numbered 12 and 13) concerning Laws Governing the System Sigma, as well as elements of the system sigma. Another bundle of small sheets, page 47 to 55, is incomplete. Another bundle: a conglomeration of pages running from 80 to 90, sometimes with three pages numbered the same thing. Some sheets have very little written on them, just the beginnings of formulae.

There is bundle of about 10 pages of transformations concerning λ .

Folder 2: “Notes on Schroder and Vorlesingen [Algebra and Logic], on the Logic of Relatives, ca. 1904”

Logic.

An envelope inside (5” x 8”) is labeled “Prof. Royce’s notes on Schroder & Vorlesingen uber die Algebra der Logik” (or the Algebra *of* Logic). Inside the envelope are groups of manuscripts. One is titled “On the Logic of Relatives” (a nine page MS). (Royce’s attempt to simplify Schroder’s thought on the logic of relatives.)

The other is headed “Schroder’s Log. Of Binary Relatives in another notation (as in type more familiar)”, a five page manuscript.

Royce was very influenced by the first volume of Schroder’s three volume lectures on Logic.

Also in this envelope are logic formulae written on the back of an envelope and on the back of a Boston Authors’ Club card.

Also, on the backside of a letter are Royce logic notes.

Folder 3: “Properties of Circuits in the Logical System. [Loose notes included].”

Logic. (with one significant non-logical MS found among loose sheets.)

Document 1:

A hard-backed notebook with the title “Properties of Circuits in the Logical System Σ .” (The folder title leaves out the sigma.) (See *Life* 309.)

The inside front cover has this note by Royce: “The following notes are made preparatory to a new treatment of the relation of the system Σ (of my 1905 paper in the *Amer. Mathematical Transactions*), to Geometry. This time I look towards Projective Geometry proper.”

Many of the pages are numbered. After a group of blank pages (almost half the book), there are notes in the rear cover and last page, referring to pages 6 & 14. (Several pages have been torn out.) This section is on the double transformation of $\lambda(x)$.

Document 2:

A group of loose notes found with Properties of Circuits. They appear to be a group of bundles taken from elsewhere.

Included in this group, however, is an a-logical set of notes on 14 small manuscript sheets, written in pencil. This seems to be an outline of “The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion.” The date is likely 1908. The address itself was printed in *William James and Other Essays*, as well as in *RLE*. The philosophical conference took place in Heidelberg from September 1-5, 1908.

“Topics of Heidelberg Address: Contrast of Pragmatism and Intellectualism

Heine’s Fichtenbaum to Palme. – Antinomy, Justifications of the method of antinomies
This contrast developed. Truth as a becoming & a success. But success only possible if
experience has a certain objective character. And the objective character, if stated or
interpreted in propositions, determines a truth which is not fluent is not a temporal
success as for becoming. The flux is a flux only if it is a totality. But, as a totality, it is
static. Example from the past. Efforts to escape admitting this. – Bergson, James, etc.
used as examples.

Intellectualism stated. Objection. The eternal is nothing unless immersed in the practical.
The static only comprehensible as the truth or the fact about the
fluent. –

Summary of the antinomy. Relation to the moral antinomy.
The will to have an absolute standard thus illustrated. Such voluntarism illustrated.
Science as an expression of the will to be clear & decisive as to our undertakings. A
priori & a posteriori elements of our scientific conceptions. – Relativity of our sciences.

Relativity not mere subjectivity. Why? Because science wills the objective.

Summary.

Recommencement. What is the transition from voluntarism to objectivism? What elements of necessity are there in our intellectual-voluntaristic undertakings.

“Analytical” necessity, Kant’s rejection of it.

Self evident axioms, – Their impossibility. –

Kant’s position, its arbitrariness.

The new position as to truth: –

1. As represented by the philosophy of mathematics.
 - a. Its Voluntarism.
 - b. Its Absolutism.
2. The reflective method. Sketch its synthesis of voluntarism & absolutism.

Objections to the reflective method as barren. These depend on a failure to comprehend the one nature of Deduction. – Transcendence of the Kantian opposition between analytic & synthetic.

The reflective method, then, can be rendered constructive. It is, as such, a synthesis of voluntarism & Objectivism.

Examples of reflective method in mathematics. Modern reductions of mathematics to pure logic. –

Reflective character of the system of the categories. Outlooks for a future synthesis in this field.

Application to Ethics. The reflective method here. –

Application to empirical world. Facts as constructs. Admission of facts as a will attitude. Reflective test of this will attitude. –

Reflective basis of induction.

The categories of reality as defined by reflection.

The concept of the Absolute.”

Evaluation: This is **very important** for the background organization of Royce’s famous “Problem of Truth” address. Scholars should take note.

Autobiographical Note:

Another possibly significant find in these loose notes: a “Description of a set of Circuits written

on stationery of the Royal Mail Steamship “Pannonia” and RMS “Caronia.” There are seven pages of these stationery notes, which are 4” x 7” sheets..

Folder 4: “1st Book of 1909 Voyage. 1909”

Logic.

A small hard-backed notebook (7” x 8”), with the above title on its front cover (without the date). Inside front cover states: This book contains the approach to & first studies of the characteristic functions of tetrads. “

The first 50 pages or so are right side up. Then the pages are inverted. In this reverse direction (beginning from the back of the book), there are approximately 150 pages. This includes such topics as General Theorem for linear triads.

Folder 5: “2nd Book of 1909 Voyage. 1909”

Logic.

A small hard-backed notebook (7” x 8”) with the above title on its front cover. Inside front cover indicates that he is working with Kempe’s law VI. Again, Royce has inverted the book, to begin a second series of pages in a different direction. He numbers it all the way through from this reverse direction up to 187, although many of the pages are inverted. (88-187).

One autobiographical note: A list of expenses: “Rest. 30, table 30, bath 15, Deck 10, Music 5, Boots 5.”

Folder 6: “Untitled, referring to page 67 of Book 2nd of voyage of 1909.”

Logic.

A small hard-backed notebook (7” x 8”) untitled on its front cover. On first page, opposite inside cover he writes: “Referring to page 67 of Book 2nd”

Pages in this notebook are numbered up to 118, then blank pages, then alternating groups of logic and blank pages. After a couple more pages, the text in the rest of the book is inverted.

Non-logic:

From the rear of the book,

“Survey of the Problems to be discussed in the Yale Graduate Course: – Purpose: A general introduction to Idealism.” He has distributed a paper to the class, perhaps “The Problem of Truth,” written in 1908.

This “survey” runs for ten pages. It involves two “discussions,” and several different problems.

He points out the strong contrast to these statements about the theory of truth with recent rigidity in mathematical methods. Absolutism, the relation of truth to the will.

Box 112: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Investigation on Intersecting Circuits. October –November 1909”

Logic.

A hard-backed composition notebook, 8 ½” x 11”. This title is on the front of the notebook., which is full of about 100 pages of logic, or more.

Folder 2: “Logic Notes. November 17, 1909. Notebook”

Logic.

On first page of book: “Topics under Investigation. I. The “Ordinal” Tetrad Functions of the type [....] II. The Ordinal Triad functions of the type, III. Combinations of the latter and of I also. <See book of Oct. Nov. 1909>

He writes on page 2, “Consider the following function of the triad (a,b,c) its pairs (a,b)(b,c)(a,c) being combined with variables (u,x)(u,y)(u,z) to constitute in each case tetrad ordinal functions ...”

Folder 3: “Transformations of Linear Circuits of Logical Elements. 1909”

Logic.

Document 1:

Folded program, with Royce logic notes.

Document 2:

A smaller hard-backed notebook cover with the above title, dated “April 1909”. The pages, however, are loose leaf sheets within this hard-backed cover.

Folder 4: “Philosophy 15, Assistant’s Records”

Logic.

The above title is on the front of the notebook. There are some pages with notes on his students (and grades), by name, on separate pages. These notes are not in Royce’s hand. The assistant may have been Loewenberg.

Despite this, however, the majority of pages are filled with Royce’s own logic notes.

Folder 5: “Triads in Relation to Linear Tetrads. See [A Triad Operation and its Results]. ca. 1910-1911]”

Logic.

The above title is on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. (9" X 12") One page headed “Whiteheadeans.”

Numbered through page 23, then blank pages, then new paginations begin with some un-numbered pages interspersed. The “Whiteheadeans” section runs from new pages 1-8, just before the back cover.

On the back rear cover, a draft of a letter: “Dear Mr. Pritchett, - The correspondence to which you refer in yours of the - - is published in “Science” [*sic*] Vol. XXXI, page 799, [illegible] in the number for December 2, 1910. – Having regard to the antecedent conditions under which this correspondence was written and published I have interpreted your own expressions, in your letter to Cattell ... ”

Folder 6: “Calculations on the [General?] Pair Operations. 1912”

Logic.

This title appears to be on the cover of this hard-covered notebook (9" x 12"), although it is difficult to read. (In pencil.) 56 plus pages, with the later 20 or so unnumbered.

Royce speaks in the new un-numbered section of a new pair operation. Included in this notebook are “triangles” which have not before appeared in his logic notebooks. (*see e.g.* page 41).

Autobiographical Note concerning four trips in 1912.

On the inside front cover, Royce makes the following notes in pencil:

“Voyages in 1912.

Voyage I May 17 left Boston by Esparta.
–24. Reached Limon. Work on Lect. I.

June 2 Sunday reached Boston on return.
Lect. I worked over between June 2 & June 12.

Wed. June 12. Stephen – visit to N.Y. return Saturday

June 15. Next fortnight at home.
Elizabeth’s [illegible] Harv. Comm. Jacks.
Voyage II (Six weeks after May 17 viz.)
Leave Boston Friday June 28, 2d voyage begins on the San Jose

July 5 reach Limon: -
On this voyage Lecture II is written. Return, reach Boston

July 14. – Doubted whether or not to take next steamer. But actually went as follows

Voyage III. On Friday July 9 Leave Boston on the San Jose. Have still mis[illegible]
Write Lectures II &(in part) IV.

Reach Limon July 26
Leave Limon on Sunday July 28, & reach Boston Aug. 5. – Finish Lect. IV in the next few days at home. Stephen’s report on Monday,

Aug. 6 Options agreement by Aug 15.

Lecture V Aug. 16 to 19 or 20. Lecture VI finished by the 24 at Limon. Lecture VII written betw. Sunday the 24 & Wed. the 28th.

Voyage IV. – Leave Boston Aug. 16. By the Esparta. Lectures V, VI, VII written in this voyage Return [illegible] I.”

Box 113: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Five folders, mostly **logic**.

Folder 2: “Logic Notes, Paris [on the reverse][Notes for Hibbert Lectures”]

The Hibbert Plans

Royce drafts three brief beginnings of Lecture I of *PC*. (one page, 2-page, and 3-page manuscripts). These manuscripts were probably drafted after Royce’s 5th plan for *PC*. See Index Part I, No. 8, *The Problem of Christianity*.

Royce wrote a series of “Plans” for the lectures, the fifth (page 20) being the last contained in HARP (there were at least seven plans altogether). Box 113, folder 2 [former Logic Box 4, document 4] contains various versions of these plans, which he entitled: “Notes for a Voluntaristic Approach to the problems of the proposed Hibbert Course (General Metaphysical Problems).” These five plans show Royce toiling to revise the interpretation of his task at hand, creating plan after plan until, in his sixth or seventh plan,²⁶ he feels satisfied with what he wants to do. (**NB:** His focus on tradition in these outlines, as well as concepts of atonement and sin, is striking.) See analysis of *The Problem of Christianity* above in Part I for a more detailed analysis

²⁶ Because the fifth plan is not identical with the final organization of the lectures, FMO hypothesizes the sixth and seventh versions. See text related to note 2 *infra*. These latter two plans do not appear to exist in manuscript form in HARP.

of the “Plans.”

However, the gap between the Fifth Plan and the Lecture Series Outline that Royce gave to the Oxford audience (*PC* 49-54) is so great that further outlines or plans, e.g. six, seven, etc., must have been drafted. *Cf.* Royce’s own attempts to start Lecture I (Box 113, folder 5). *See Appendix B* for complete text.

Folder 5: “[Triads in the System; The Problem of Christianity] 1912.”

Logic.

This is the former Logic Box 4, document 4.

Within this notebook, dedicated principally to logic work, is an attempt by Royce to start the first Hibbert Lecture (*The Problem of Christianity*).

Box 114: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “A Triad Operation and its Results. ca. 1916”

Logic.

One of the larger (9” x 12”) hard-backed composition notebooks used by Royce for his logic work. “A Triad Operation and its Results” is written on the front cover of the notebook.

However, there are also other notes included in this notebook that are very significant to non-logic topics. Also some logic hypotheses (noted below) that Royce considered to be, if they held up on further examination, “discoveries of first importance.”

The inside cover page and first page are dense with formulae and function tables. On the inside front cover, Royce writes in ink (the logic writing is in pencil) “See pages 43, 44 etc. for Univ. Extension of 1916-1917.” The fact that Royce was planning something for 1917 is interesting. This is a reference, in fact, to non-logical content further on in the book.

Indeed, interspersed among the logical work of this notebook are several very significant non-logical notes, and prose notes regarding logic work.

Notes for the Mind Article (circa 1914?)

Included, toward the back of the notebook is a significant discovery: Royce makes notes concerning his concept of three kinds of knowledge, which he titles “Notes for Article on Mind”. The notes read as follows:

“Notes for Article on Mind

Three kinds of knowledge: –

1. Perceptual <appreciation>
2. Conceptual <Description>
3. K. [knowledge] of Interpretation <Expression>

1,2,3, exemplified in succession: –

1. Examples: - Knowl. Of feelings, of sensations, of the stream of consciousness, of the shock of difference, etc.
2. Examples: - Numbers, universals, forms, essences, etc, - relations, Platonic ideas
3. Examples: - Readings of an inscription, acts of an interpreter, reflections, conversations, etc.

Mind as known through first type of knowledge. – Contrast between immediate and inferred objects for first type of Knowledge. The inference is through analogy. – The minds as selves whose principle of individuation is itself an immediate datum. – Minds as centres of consciousness, as distinct wills, etc.

Minds as known through second type of knowledge. – Souls, Organisms. Functions & Faculties of Souls, __ Behaviour of Organisms. – Dualism of Matter and Mind. – Problem of Origin of mind, and of its nature: - Monism, Mind Stuff, Pluralism of monads, relational theory of mind.

Minds as known through third type of knowledge. Ideas belonging to and constituting the Self, Ideas as belonging to and constituting the alter. The Community of Interpretation as the model of mental life. – Concept of the material world as known to the Community, _ Inductive science as interpretation, _ Pluralism of minds as relative, - Evolution of mind as a social evolution.

Resulting conception of the mental or spiritual world as a community of interpretation. – Minds in second and third sense as relative to specific purposes.

Individual Mind and Corporate Mind.

2. Significant Logic Reflection

Logic interspersed with autobiography.

Autobiographical note beginning at pages 22 as “they” pass Cape Cod. Dated “Note of July 5, 1914” This prose narrative then goes on to describe work on linear triads. Another autobiographical note: “In Mass. Bay, crossing to the light-ship.”

*Royce then significantly notes as to his logical work:

“It seems, then, that if three elements of a linear triad, together with its characteristic pair (c, d), are already known, then any three elements of the tetrad determine the fourth by a construction which is wholly analogous to the anharmonic construction.

—

If this holds on further examination, it will prove a discovery of the first importance.

—

So the voyage ends on July 5, 1914.”

[This note ends on page 25 of the first notebook, Box 114, folder 1.]

3. Notes for the revision of the Berkeley Address (pages 26, 27)

FMO hypothesis: This seems to be an outline for revising what Royce calls “The Berkeley Address” – A planned revision drafted on July 5, 1914. This term “Berkeley Address” seems because of point 12 of the revision, and the overall lack of reference to war in the overall outline, to refer to “The Spirit of the Community,” the *unpublished* version for the Berkeley Union, never given. (World War I broke out.)

Notes for the revision of the Berkeley Address.

1. The Problem of the relation of the individual to the Community as the great modern problem.
2. The programme of the Philosophy of Loyalty.
3. Corporate personality.
4. Essence of loyalty. <Love to Community>
5. The mutual understanding of man the primal need for progress.
6. The failure of dual relations to satisfy.
7. The Community of Interpretation. Its unity. Loyalty of the interpreter. Examples.
8. Is this type of community a growing factor of Civilization. – Illustrations. –
 - The Judicial Community
 - The Agent’s Community
 - The Banker’s Community
 - The Community of Insurance
9. The Community of Science
10. The Community of Religion
11. The Community of Philosophy
12. Concluding Summary: - The Spirit of Community

4. Late Notes Regarding the 1916-1917 University Year

Royce was apparently already planning his university extension for the 1916-1917 year. His handwriting is shaky. At pages 44-45, he outlines this plan.

Why this note is inserted within this logic notebook is unclear.

This appears to be one of the last things Royce wrote. It is almost certain that these notes were made after May 1916. The text of this outline reads as follows:

Univ. Ext. for 1916, 1917, etc.

I. The Three Leading Ideas and their leading cases.

A list of examples of Ethical ideas.

Examples of the Detached Individ.

1. The transm. Agency
2. "After he was dead"
3. Markham. [Sir Arthur Basil M.]
4. The Man without a Country
5. The Ancient Mariner
6. Crime and Punishment

II. Attachment, Reconciliation, etc.

1. The Woman Homesteader
2. Mother & Daughter Case. [of Royce's mid-year exam, January, 1916]
3. Sorely [Royce's friend in England]
4. Eractheus
5. Pulia Huria
6. Kinita [Hindu?]
7. My Search for the Captain.

III. The Lost Cause and its Idealization

1. Simple Grief
2. The Story of [illegible]
3. T. case of the Lusitania.
4. Victor Chapman.

Folder 2: "Pussy Blackie's Travels ca. 1863"

A 31-page typescript of a story Royce is said by his family to have written as an 8-year-old. The typescript must have been created much later in Royce's life, either once he had become a prominent figure, or perhaps even after his death.

On the first page of the typescript, under the title, is a parenthesis, a summarizing subtitle, that reads as follows: “(long story of the imaginary travels of a cat, written by R when eight years old. Remarkable for its psychological and ethical masteries).” Clearly Royce did not write this himself.

Some noteworthy items. The family scene early does not include a father. Rather it is simply Sarah Eleanor and the other children going to school. There is another scene of sister Ruthie calling Blackie to supper (calling him to come for milk).

The work shows amazing talent of mind, getting the cat from California to Richmond, Virginia. This is all imaginary. The cat is seized by an eagle, thrown by a bull, etc. All things a boy’s imagination would delight in. The young Royce pictures a loving home, and a lovely family life, seen through the eyes of an eight-year-old, a “poor lad.” He mentions works by Sir Walter Scott, his poems, including the Lady of the Lake. Such references reflect the books that Sarah Eleanor almost certainly had in the home.

A scene from Canada on page 17 possibly reflects a story that Sarah Eleanor had told of her own life, or possibly of her mother, earlier in her life there.

A list following expressions:

ejaculation, page 2,
hardened in his sin, page 16,
foolish determination, page 20,
until they succumb page 22,
a sultry afternoon, page 25,
the circuit of the hole, page 29. Such words are not in the vocabulary of an ordinary 8 year old. This is obviously either his mother talking, or the product of his reading books over his head.

The lengths of the chapters, except for the last two, are very brief, fit for children, attuned to the attention span of children. The local color is very apt, spiced with dialogue. His description of Cincinnati is of “Porkopolis.” (An old name of Cincinnati, when it was the largest center of slaughter houses in the Midwest.)

The psychological rapport, and the whole gamut of emotions in there. But ethically the strong points of these: A mixture of a sense of guilt and shame (18)(the theme is several times repeated), the need for truthfulness as a key virtue (16, 18), the role of forgiveness and the joy of receiving it (27 and 28). It ends with the folly of killing fellow men in war (30-31).

The story is left unfinished.

This is the only typescript that we know of. However, it may have been published elsewhere. If other copies are extant, where the misspellings of Royce could be distinguished from the typist’s errors. See above, Part II, item 1 for evaluations.

Folder 3: “The Miner’s Grave ca 1870”

Marked “No. 1” by Royce according to his early indexing system. There is no title on the manuscript, 10 pages, front and back , on small sheets (5” by 8”).

It is not known why the archivist labeled this “The Miner’s Grave.” FMO: “This MS can be easily be confused with another manuscript of this title whereas the Romeo and Juliet theme of this, the present manuscript, suggests that a better title might be “The Grave of Two Lonely Lovers,” or “Lonesome Lovers’ Grave.”

Cf. manuscripts in Box 53, document 3, described above in Part II, item 3.

Folder 4: “Notebook 2. (General and miscellaneous)”

On the front cover “Josiah Royce, California State University. Class of 1875. Notes. No. 2.” This whole title is printed, except “No. 2.” This notebook contains extracts and notes made by Royce on his reading, over a period of several years.

On the back cover:

- “A.1. General & Misc.
- 1. Gen’l. Lit. & Sci.
- 2. Lectures (U.Gr.)

Dating this assembly: FMO hazards an estimate: ca. 1870-1877.

The notebook contains 144 pages, many of them densely filled. The notebook begins with full notes on philosophy and literature (beginning with [Henry] Buckle on the protective spirit) and runs all the way through to school notes on John Le Conte’s course in Physics and Mechanics.

The first group of pages, including his readings at UC and in Germany, run from 3-35.

The next Le Conte sections run as follows:

“Section I” runs from 45-51;

“Section II,” detailed notes concerning “Physics and Mechanics” runs from pages 71-105;

“Section III” runs from 106-125.

A “Section IV” begins on 129-144.

The early part of the notebook seems to reflect Royce’s voracious attitude to read in the garret room of the old UC library in Oakland, and perhaps in the Mercantile Library in San Francisco.. The Oakland library embraced the theological and philosophical contributions of ministers in the area supporting the new university.

Royce takes notes on many topics: Chapman, Herbert Spencer, Pythagorean theory.

Pages 3 to 10: Royce is taking extracts from Henry Buckle’s *History of Civilization* (noting especially the danger of the “protective spirit” – the disposition to maintain beliefs without critical examination – is the great enemy of civilization) (Buckle felt the impulse to the “protective spirit” to be balanced by skepticism, the positive force of investigation in civilization

that encourages progress.)

Royce also extracts from Chapman on the functions of government, and “remarks in reply to John Stuart Mills [*sic*] exceptions to the laissez-faire [*sic*] principle.” Royce is encountering the unrestrained laissez-faire doctrine. He pulls other thinkers into his analysis: Wilhelm von Humboldt as well as Herbert Spencer.

The next extract moves to Curtius’s *History of Greece* on the Pythagorean theory of history. At pages 7-8, there is a long passage in Latin on Fabricius (mentioning Ambrose and Aeschylus). Fabricius is treated for a page and a half (“A German scholar and writer.”) This leads Royce to Plato, through Becker.

At page 15, he transcribes about 5 lines of Arabic from Avicena. Also some Greek on page 12.

At 11-12, he begins with Millman’s *History of Christianity*. Royce notes Millman on Strauss, and on Renan. At 12, he cites Lecky as being “commendatory” of Millman.

At 12, Royce checks authors’ appraisals of Millman, and notes that for the life of Chevalier Bunsen, see Max Muller’s ‘Chips from a German Workshop.’ (with its appended letters between Bunsen and Muller.)

At page 13, Royce indicates he is trying to discover in the Oakland Library information on Asian culture.

At page 13, he extracts Milman’s “Vol. 1. Page 67.” “It is generally admitted that the Jewish notions about the angels”

At 16, he quotes Fiske (whom Royce reads as an undergraduate in his junior year at UCB).???

At page 20, he does a diagram (a “tabular view”) of William Hamilton’s lectures. He gives the whole outline of the lectures, beginning with General or Abstract Logic.

Page 23 reveals that he is already reading Kant. Royce states, just after commenting on Mill’s *Review of Hamilton*, and the preface of Mill’s *Logic*: “On Kant’s use of the term Category, and his ideas on the Categories of Aristotle,” see his own remarks at the end of the Deduction of the Cat. in the Crit. of Pure Reas. Also Meiklejohn’s note to his translation of Kant at this point; Sir W. Ham. Lect on Log. page 140 who also mentions his use of the word “transcendental” as compared with that of the schoolmen.” [for the importance of searching for the categories, see Royce’s diary of this period, starting with Loewenberg’s *Fugitive Essays*, 31-35.]

On pages 24-25, Royce makes notes on Homer. He is reading the 23rd book of the “Illiad” [*sic*] in Keynes’ Homer. [A date January 10. 1874]

At the top of page 25 is a date: January 26, 1874.

In February, he jots down “gleanings from Magazines.”

At page 26, Royce considers both sides of arguments concerning evolution (he studies with Le

Conte; he discusses Agassiz).

The French section on page 27 considers the Sphinx, the combination of Leo and Virgo, the symbolic force of solar reality.

At page 30: Taine's Philosophy of Art.

At page 33, he jumps to notes taken in Germany, May 1, 1876. This is not at the beginning of his German stay, but rather after he has been there for 9 months. He refers to the history of Buddhism. At 34, Royce gets into some Leibnizian thought via Herbart.

After 35, this first section ends. Several blank pages follow.

From 45-51, Royce creates a "section I", making notes on *John Le Conte* (Joseph's brother). "Section I" runs from 45-51; "Section II," detailed notes concerning "Physics and Mechanics" runs from pages 71-105; "Section III" runs from 106-125. A "Section IV" begins on 129-144.

Evaluation : As a whole, this Notebook 2 is of great importance as a window into the mind of the young undergraduate Royce – how he selects his reading, his critical attitude, his global embrace (e.g. into Asian writers).

Folder 5: "Profs. Le Conte, Le Conte, and Carr Science and course Notes. 1872"

On the front cover, "Josiah Royce, California State University, Class of 1875"

On frontis page:

"Prof. Jos. Leconte ----page 1

" John Leconte -----page 41

" E.L. Carr. ----- page 81."

The next two pages, before "page 1," a schedule of the opening lectures of the courses.

At page 1, "Department of Geology, Botany, and Natural History. S.U.C. Prof. Jos. Le Conte. ---
- Subject – Botany." "Lecture ISept. 23, 1872"

Very careful notes. He carefully labels the separate lectures. The last lecture (XIII) is on November 21.

At page 41, "Department of Physics and Mechanics SUB Prof. John Le Conte. ----- Subject of
Physics. Lecture Sept. 25, 1872."

These notes continue through the 18th lecture on Nov. 29.

At page 81, "Department of Agriculture, Chemistry & Horticulture. Prof. Ezra S. Carr. ---
Subject – Chemistry. Lecture I. Monday Sept. 30, 1872"

These notes run through Lecture 27, December 4 (with some chemical formulas, at page 107.

A last section not mentioned in his table of contents includes (pages 121-) of "Miscellaneous University Notes"

I

I: notes on Remarks on Diction by Prof. Swinton.

II: notes on writing style

II.

More on Swinton, propriety of diction, niceties of diction.

III.

A Latin quote from Livy. Distinguish “to notice” (which has to do with observance) from “to estimate” (which has to do with the assignment of values)

IV.

Notes on the Pythagorean system of Philosophy in Curtius’ *History of Greece*.

Folder 6: “Hebrew Verbs. Notebook 3”

On cover of a horizontally bound, soft-covered book on Hebrew verbs (charts) as well as declension of nouns and personal pronouns.

Folder 7: “Literature and general notes. Notebook. May 25, 1874”

Front cover, under “Josiah Royce” Label, “Lit Notebook, General”

Back cover: B.1 General: 1. Aphorisms, etc. 2. Entwürfe [abstracts]

On inside cover, “J. Royce. Jr.

May 25, 1874

Lit. Notes; General.”

A stanza in German follows, probably from Goethe, with a year “1879” Since the notebook is dated 1874, perhaps he added this poem after his return from Germany.

A typescript note is attached to the first page, describing different sections of the notebook.

pp. 1-32 Notes before Summer 1875 (despite J. Royce’s note on page 23; cf. pages 27 and esp. 33.)

pp. 23-62 Notes in Germany (although he jumps back to notes in taken in America at 27)(Then back to Germany at 33.)

pp. 63-69 Boston, 1877

pp. 69-79 Aug. 1877 [1878 crossed out]

p. 80 May 1880

pp. 87 sqq INDEX RERUM

At page one, he quotes Aeschylus and *The Seven Against Thebes*.

At two, Matthew Arnold. He quickly moves to Darwin.

He then moves into physiology, considering “gemmules” and their function at the molecular level. The differentiation of organs in the embryo.

The Machian theory that parents’ habits may be genetically passed on.

At page 7, he responds to a magazine article, Renan’s *Essai sur le Cantique des Cantiques*, and

continues on with his own description of the Song of Songs. (Dramatis Personae, etc. At page 8, he refers to Josephus and Catullus in the context of the poem. Jeremiah (as the most erudite of the prophets). Royce's interest in the growth of the Biblical canon and its inspired nature becomes evident on page 9. His discussion of the poem continues through page 10.

At 10: "further Articles of Interest. British Quarterly Rev. Apr. '74. A mention of the discovery of Troy. In Fortnightly Rev., and article on spiritualism. (Fox Sisters).

NB: In 1874, Royce is already encountering stories of spiritualism.

At page 11: Aeschylus on the Seven Against Thebes. This appears to be some of the research Royce is doing for his senior thesis, through Schultz and Dindorf.

At page 18, after some blank pages, Royce discusses Ritter, writing in German. FMO query: did Royce know when he wrote this that he was going to Germany? A quote from Lessing, on the Laocoön.

Then, lower on 18, Royce moves to Plato, and gets to some Greek at 20. (More at Greek at 22.)

At 23, there are a few pages in Germany, but then at 27, former notes from America until 33.

Back in America – at page 28: DeQuincey and opium eating. (after a speech by Pericles in Greek.) He compares DeQuincey and Wordsworth. (At 30 ... a discussion of Byron and Dante, as subjective poets, and Goethe and Shakespeare as objective poets.) He quotes at length from David Masson. This passage reveals Royce's attempt to balance different positions. [He makes these notes on Dec. 14, 1874.]

He brings in Kant again at 31. (A passage reminds him of another in *Critique of Pure Reason*.)

At 30-31, Royce admits the conception of nirvana fascinating, and agreeable with the concept of immortality, according to the era of the times. He finds the concept in Poe. But Royce concludes: "But Nirvana is after all, if a fascinating, yet a contradictory state."

This notebook's first group of notes in Germany:

23-27. At page 23, he begins with April 23, 1876. (He is about 8 or 9 months into Germany.) He calls this section Notes on the systematic treatment of Ethics. Divisions of a systematic course of Ethics and Practical Philosophy.

[NB: Royce does *not* outline the following in this way. This is simply an attempt to follow his headings and sub-headings, written out in prose.]

I. Historical Treatment

II. Theoretic Development of the Science

1. Foundations of Moral Science: Royce writes that this theoretical development of the science must treat the fundamental nature
 - a. of the ideas of right and wrong,
 - b. of the theory of the formation and development of the moral sense,
 - c. of the relation of the moral to the aesthetic judgment. Subsidiary to this, Royce

notes one must look to the light thrown on morals by physiology, and especially the doctrine of evolution.

2. The Ideas of practice
 - a. History of practical ideas
 - b. Theory of practical ideas

3. The Ideals of practice
 - a. The Ideals relating to the present (the postulates of practice). The Ideals of the present formation of the world or of the mind itself are:
 - Freedom of the will
 - The external existence of the representatives of the true moral ideas
 - The Postulates of a Moral Government of the World: Constitutive for a teleological formation of the Universe.
 - The Postulate of the Objective Existence of the Beautiful, of the Sublime and of the Perfect

 - b. The Ideals of the future
 - Immortality
 - Perfectability of the Individuality—of the “ Soul”
 - Perfectability of the Race according to the Ideal of Humanity

[Royce comments that the solution of the difficulties are (1) religious systems (2) philosophic theories related to these systems, (3) humanitarianism, (4) pessimism which denies the possibility of any solution, (5) the skeptical emotional position parallel to the corresponding position with respect to the postulates. See page 25.]

 - c. The Ideals of the past (regarding their historical and practical significance. He insists on a relation of the future and the past to a nation’s welfare.

This notebook’s second group of notes in Germany:

Page 33: “Notes in Europe from April 26, 1876. The Categories of Moral Ideas.”
The notes concern cultural development.

(This chart is extensively filled in by Royce, but these are the categories.)

	Objective	Subjective
Theological		
Metaphysical		
Positive		

Royce notes that the subjective side is controlled by Comte's three stages, from theological to metaphysical to positive stages of human thought. Yet, Comte is not mentioned by name until page 37. He seems to be making these remarks in response to a book by Julian Schmidt.

The various tribes of the human race have started with the theological stage, with the myths and legends about Gods, and then monotheism.

More critically, there is the move into the metaphysical. As regards the metaphysical stage, he says the Greeks and the Hindus have done it, but the Hebrews did not.

The transition to the third stage into positivism is the most difficult one. Royce raises the question: how did the Christian community have the power to be spokesman for the world for four centuries of change. Royce ponders:

“But the great question that remains is: how did the world come to this idea of divine mediation as the solution to the difficulties that had beset its way. Why were not other solutions equally possible. Can a logical development of ideas give any explanation of all this?”

Royce argues that it had to be this particular religion. (page 39)

Positivism: Some sort of measuring of the worth of the world—a measuring that dispenses with all *a priori* assumptions. (Comte considered the father of positivism.)

We can't logically prove that this is going to happen.

There are two solutions to this problem (the problem being how can the human race be led by the ideal of the Deity to long for more life and complete the insufficiencies of the present existence. How can 'he' be communicated with.?) At page 42, he sketches the basic option, unless you want to be a complete positivist atheist:

1. On the one hand, objective moral ideas must be given up for the sake of the subjective ones.
2. Or man must go over to the only remaining form of theological conception. He must take the point of view that all human beings have failed. It is the deity which has moved to his side for the salvation of the race.

If the world is to retain its religious life, it is to retain it through some sort of meditative system. Thus comes the possibility of a new world religion. Royce says Christianity can't yet produce this new world religion. “It is not necessary for example that this mediation should be as it is in Christianity a sacrificial one. But the special circumstance of the case were the causes of all the particular phenomena.” (44)

Somehow this idea of God à la Spinoza is what Royce points toward in these pages. The essay ends with this:

“The foundation thought takes three forms: Nature is in general the manifestation of the Good. Nature is a progressive whole, one of the highest, if not the highest productions is man. Nature is as the totality of all real, the Substance, of which man as every other finite being is but an Accident.” (46)(emphasis added)

Autobiographical note: On page 48, “As to the logical development of these ideas, I have still at date some doubt.” (Apr. 27, 1876)

This focus on ethics may lead us to a form of ethic naturalism, as one of the powers in nature. (49)

Somehow the good in nature begins to show that the fundamental principle is Reason. And therefore, if Reason gets its central place, then less worthy systems will fall apart.

Royce concludes that all later ethical systems founded on a pure naturalism are mere repetitions of some form of the preceding [*sic*], however, ingenious they may be in particular points.”

He appends a note: “The above [essay] need not be complete since its general intention is plain. It is rather difficult to see how Hegel’s ethics finds its place in the system of Ideas as herein set up. Probably a third class Subjective-Objective would be needed. – “ (51)

Royce heads page 52 with the date “May/June 1876”. From page 52 to page 61, he drafts an essay on pessimism and optimism. He tussles with ways of evaluating the “higher feelings,” in quality and intensity. He closes with this significant note, dated June 10, 1876:

“The problem above mentioned [re: pessimism and optimism] must certainly not be considered without reference to the unifying tendency of Emotion. The total effect of a series of experiences is by no means a mere sum of the individual experiences or of parts of them. It is a function of them which is not direct, but must be called a transcendental function ... This, the foundation of the aesthetic emotions cannot be without great interest in solving the problem in question.” (emphasis added)

At page 62: a hand-drawn map of Classical Greek Philosophy, Oriental Philosophy, Christian Theology, and an unknown source (“x”) which eventually ends up in Spinoza. Royce distinguishes different connections with solid and dotted lines. Royce sets British Philosophy off by itself, an island apart. [This whole chart seems of great importance for the mind of the future Historian of Philosophy at Harvard University.]

At page 63, he is back in Boston, writing an essay “The Conflict of Will and Thought.” The effort to seek truth includes another tendency, “the emotional individual irrational side of mutual striving that can be termed Will,” without quoting Schopenhauer. (A slap at Spinoza.) The essay ends at page 69. It has three sections: The Mental life of the Individual, The Theory of Knowledge, and Application of Results attained to the General Conception of Nature.

At page 69, he writes “Occasional Notes on the Above Plan, August 1877.” He is trying to plan out his dissertation. These notes include the following:

In a note dated August 22, 1877, “On Self-Consciousness: The primary fact on which consciousness of Self builds itself up is the feeling of pleasure or pain.” (70).

“In self-consciousness is chance for unhappiness, and, in the world we live in, the certainty of it, too. In impersonal feeling there is no unhappiness. Hence the worth of self-denial. Contemplation is the self-immolation of egotism, as scientific thinking is of fancy.” (75)

On September 3 [1877]: ‘The “unconscious conclusions” are to be discussed from the standpoint of the struggle for existence among the ideas as of interest or not for the Will.’ (76)

Royce closes with an outline of the tentative first part of his dissertation, pages 77-78, leaving the ethical problems to the concluding chapter of Part I.

Finally, at page 80, he contrasts certainty, probability and ideal. This last page is written about three years later: NB: he is already noting that “there is a world of an infinite complex of inter-related consciousness.” He writes this after the category “Ideal” (in contrast with Certainty and Probability, the description of which he has already provided).

The notebook closes with an “Index Rerum,” listing topics alphabetically.

Evaluation: The endeavor in spring 1876 to create a new Ethics reveals Royce’s independence to take on Spinoza, whom he has probably just read, and create an alternate system of Ethics. This attempt to create an Ethics system different from Spinoza’s, between pages 33 and 51, is the most significant aspect of this notebook. (See also page 62 for a “map” of Spinoza’s influence.) Possibly an interesting illustration for the critical edition.) Valuable as to the influence of Spinoza at this time.

Folder 8: “The Aim of Poetry”

An old reprint of this article from the *Overland Monthly*, enclosed in a folded sheet, on which Royce has himself written out the title. See *Comprehensive Index* above at Part II for a full analysis of this article.

Folder 9: “Intention of the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus. 1875. [undergraduate thesis]”

The typeset copy of his undergraduate thesis.

Evaluation: At least certain sections (section III, e.g.) deserve close attention by scholars. **NOTE:** The manuscript in Box 143, folder 2, Royce gives 8 legal sized pages to the themes of Antigone and Creon in a high school composition; he has already been deeply influenced by

Aeschylus.

Box 115: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

UCB Notebooks

Box 116: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Newspapers Lincoln Observer June 1869 (4p.)” Box 116, folder 1

This newspaper clipping includes Royce’s very early essay written shortly after Lincoln’s assassination: “Is The Assassination of Tyrants Every Justifiable,” *The Lincoln Observer* vol. 2 (June 1869): 2.

Evaluation: Very important. Reveals Royce’s then (at age 14) theocratic basis for resolving the problem of killing a president elected by a majority amid some radical (i.e. fanatical) dissent.

Folder 2: “Newspapers Neolean Review March 1873 (4p.)”

A copy of the *Neolean Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1873) that does not contain an article credited to Royce.

Folder 3: “Newspapers Neolean Review April 1873 (4p.)”

“Sound and Silence,” *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1873): 1. The article is signed “X.Z.,” but Skrupskelis attributes it to Royce.

The importance of work “in silence” (not credited or “bugled”).

Evaluation: This article seems relevant to our contemporary “noisy” culture.

Folder 4: “Newspapers Neolean Review June 1873 (4 p.)”

A copy of *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 4 (June 1873). There is not an article in this issue attributed to Royce, nor does Skrupskelis mention him. There is, however, a poem in this issue credited to the author “El Olvidado.” Since Royce saved this paper, perhaps he contributed to the issue, although he is not credited.

Folder 5: “Newspapers Neolean Review August 1873 (4p.)”

This copy of the *Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 6 (although the number has been ripped off) has handwritten (apparently in Royce’s hand) notes in the margin which read, repeatedly “Royce,” as if Royce tries out his signature.

Folder 6: “Newspapers Neolean Review November 1873 (4p.)”

A copy of *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 8 (November 1873). Although Royce saved a copy of this issue, there is no article attributed to him here.

Folder 7: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, January 1874 (16 p.)”

“Recent Discussions on Class Feeling,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1874): 7. Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title. The piece is attributed to “J.R.”

Evaluation: Although Royce’s desire for community, union and cooperation is evident in this piece.

Folder 8: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, Feb. 1874 (16 p.)”

“The Problem of Class Feeling,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 2 (February 1874): 5. Again, Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title of this piece, which is signed “J.R. ’75”. By class, Royce means school classes, viz. freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. He notes that “Class jealousy must follow the separation of classes from each other by the space of the year.” Royce offers his analysis of the causes for the friction between classes. They are separate from each other (viz.). The feeling of the more senior class that “I’ve already done it”

Royce not only returns to the topic from his previous *Berkeleyan* piece, but focuses on “B. True’s” proposed Congress of Class.

Royce expresses his hope for the future this way: “And my belief is that the result [in the future] will be accomplished by the diffusion among students of that true spirit of freedom which is so much to be aimed at.”

Royce proposes a kind of “live and let live” doctrine, that each should be free to be themselves. “He who feels how small a part he and his fellow atoms make of the great living, moving whole, Humanity, will appreciate how minute are all the distinctions in college when compared with the truly great ends of life, the bettering of the knowledge, or the furthering of the advance of the whole race, a task in which each individual is but a drop of water, but the aggregate is the vast tidal wave of progress.”

FMO comment: Collegian Royce foreshadows his well-known response in “Meditation Before the Gate.” His desire for global human unity is already evident.

Folder 9: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, March 1874 (16 p.)”

Royce has put his name on top of this issue - *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 3 (March 1874). Skrupskelis does not list this number in the published student works. Nevertheless, Royce has kept a copy of this issue.

Folder 10: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, May 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue contains a copy of “Literary Education,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 5 (May 1874): 4-5. Again, he marks the title in the copy with a “J.” and signs the piece “J.R. ’75”.

In this piece, he replies to “Albion’s” article in a previous *Berkeleyan* issue (vol. 1 no. 4 ... that issue is in Box 116, folder 9).

Evaluation: Good, particularly as to the importance of literary education for scientists. But I doubt if space allows for inclusion.

Folder 11: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, June 1874 (16 p.)”

An issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 6 (June 1874). No article attributed to Royce in this issue.

Folder 12: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, July 1874 (16 p.)”

An issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 7 (July 1874). No article attributed to Royce in this issue.

Folder 13: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, August 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue includes the Royce piece “Comments Suggested by a Principle in the Science of History,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 8 (August 1874): 4.

Royce notes a “J.8” in a handwritten note by the title on page 4. The article is signed “J.R. ‘75”.

The importance of ideas on historical events.

Evaluation: An important idea.

Folder 14: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, September 1874 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 9 (September 1874). There does not appear to be an article by Royce in this issue.

Folder 15: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, October 1874 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 10 (September 1874). There does not appear to be an article by Royce in this issue. Although he is an editor in his final year, his name is not yet listed on the masthead.

Folder 16: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, December 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue contains Royce’s “The Prince of Denmark,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 12 (December 1874): 3-5. This is a very long article (9 columns of newspaper text). The article is signed “J. Royce ’75”.

The article evinces a tremendous admiration of Shakespeare. If the character of Shakespeare lies behind the form of Hamlet, “a critical examination of the play in comparison with other great works of art will be necessary to ascertain whether the author has hidden himself beneath the form of Hamlet.” (3) Royce wonders what part of Shakespeare is being revealed.

After preliminaries, Royce says “I believe that the parallel between Faust and Hamlet is, in this province, perfect. He admits that in Hamlet and in Faust we find points that are inextricable until the spirit of the poet is fully entered into. About Shakespeare’s poems, he says “And so, within this mighty soul, is waging ever a fearful battle. His poems are but the reliefs which he must have for his emotions.” (5)

Another quote hints at the mystery of Shakespeare: “Doubtless he [Shakespeare] was outwardly often mirthful. But many times no doubt to his own heart, outward mirth was keeping time with the spade of the gravedigger of Hamlet.” The focus on the piece is more on Shakespeare, and the mystery of his genius, than Hamlet.

Folder 17: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, January 1875 (16 p.)”

This issue contains Royce’s “The Literary Artist and the Work of Literary Art,” *The Berkeleyan* vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1875): 3-5. Royce writes “S2” beside the title in the margin. It is signed “J. Royce ‘75”

Royce aims to focus on the relation of the literary artist to the artistic production. But he can only give us suggestions. The artist *and* his production have to express art and feeling. Homer in *The Iliad*, Tennyson in *In Memoriam*. Clearly “if we are seeking for a poet’s personality, we must not expect to get more than glimpses of it from his writings.” (4)

Folder 18: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, February 1875 (16 p.)”

This issue contains several Royce pieces. He puts notes in the margin beside each of the titles, “S2-7” respectively. “J. Royce” does appear on the masthead. (Check folder 17 to see if he becomes editor with Volume 2.)

“McCullough’s Hamlet,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 5. Royce gives his appraisal.

“The Death of President Durant,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.

“Editorial Responsibility,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.

“Draper’s Religion and Science,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 9.

Instead of entitling his book *The History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science*, Royce suggests that Draper entitle it *Treatise on the Ignorance of Our Ancestors*. Royce views Draper’s book as sufficiently repressing righteous indignation to write a charitable indictment of past generations. Royce criticizes Draper for not coming up to the standards of genuine

historians.

Royce differs with Draper's judgment that St. Augustine suffered from a mental aberration in the *Confessions* and suggests that we treat Augustine scientifically with all fairness.

"Henry Durant," *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-11.

"The Exercises on the Day of the Funeral Monday, January 25," *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-12.

This piece is unsigned, but is initialed here on this copy.

"Notes on Exchanges," *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 12.

In these exchanges, Royce foreshadows his own editorial work at the *International Journal of Ethics* by skim-reading many college periodicals, offering his comments.

Folder 19: "Newspapers The Oakland Daily News. March 2, 1875 (3 p.)"

"Truth in Art," *The Oakland Daily News* (March 2, 1875): 1

A heading at the top of the article reads: "Prize oration delivered by Josiah Royce of the Senior Class of the State University." The speech had been delivered on February 26, 1875.

This newspaper article described in Skrupskelis *BWJR*:2 1174. How different is this from his article as it appears in the April issue of *The Berkeleyan*. This *Berkeleyan* issue is not contained in HARP.

See Skrupskelis *BWJR*: 2 1174.

Evaluation: This piece documents the emotional side of Royce, the seed of his interest in the Romantics.

Folder 20: "Newspapers The Berkeleyan, March 1875 (16 p.)"

A copy of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875). There are several articles by Royce in this issue. Again, he makes handwritten notes next to their titles in the margins, S8-11 respectively. On the masthead in this issue, he is listed simply as an editor.

"Turgenieff's 'Liza,'" *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 6

Royce writes a long piece, exhibiting his talent as a literary critic.

"The Vassar Miscellany and 'Middlemarch,'" *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 8-9.

Unsigned, but Royce does make a mark in the margin by the title. The effect of Eliot on Royce

appears in “For our part, we rather find encouragement in the fact that so many of life’s vexations and dangers have been anticipated and pointed out by so truthful and sympathetic an advisor as George Eliot.” [Royce had experienced the problem of evil and had already found some balance to deal with it.]

“Irving and his Critics,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 10.

Irving is an English actor. Royce adduces a criticism against the lavish praise that Irving is receiving. He suggests the criticism is too harsh.

“Notes on Exchanges,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 11-12

Not all of this article is by Royce.

Folder 21: “Newspapers *The Berkeleyan*, May 1875 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5, in which there are several pieces by Royce.

“Elaine and Ophelia,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 4-5

Again Royce the literary critic. Royce counteracts the unfavorable criticism imposed on the painting by Rosenthal in San Francisco. The very painting of the two women together suggests that they are equal. This results in a very great misinterpretation, not against the painter. Tennyson tells us much more of Elaine than Shakespeare does of Ophelia.

“Let us be reverent when we utter these names.”

“For the ideal of female perfection partakes much more, perhaps, of the character of that mysterious creation, Undine, that unfathomable union of tenderness and gaiety, of affection and sternness, of glowing humanity and half-conscious dreaming divinity....” (5)

“A Chess Club,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 8.

Royce calls chess “this finest and profoundest of all games of skill,” and calls for the formation of a chess club.

“The Aim of Criticism,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 9.

On controversies regarding college papers. Royce on the purpose of the literary critic: “And if, finally, he be an artistic or a literary critic, his task is to separate true from false art, to give means of distinguishing the one from the other in cases in which they seem indissolubly joined, and greatest of all, to enter into the soul of the artists and to interpret to himself and to other the divine thought which the inspiration of the beautiful gave in full form, but which the duller eye of common life sometimes fails to catch sight of.” (9)

“The Commencements Appointments,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 10.

He represents the students surprise and regret at the choices for commencement appointments were made. (The students didn't think it was fair.)

Evaluation: Perhaps useful for an anthology of small quotes from Royce. (concerning, e.g., the role of the literary critic; the Undine, etc.)

Folder 22: "Newspapers The Berkeleyan, June 1875 (16 p.)"

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6, in which there are several pieces by Royce. He is still listed as an editor on the masthead. Royce graduates this month from UCB; this is the last issue of *The Berkeleyan* with which he is involved.

"The 'Holy Grail' of Tennyson," *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 4-6.

Royce doesn't put an "S" marking by the title of this piece. Royce's discussion of higher religious sentiments are a precursor of further thought.

A noteworthy point: Royce quotes the conclusion of *The Idylls* in this article, including these last three lines: "And one hath seen the vision face to face,/And now his chair desires him here in vain,/However they may crown him elsewhere." Forty years later, Royce uses these lines to conclude his last course in metaphysics, 1915-16.

"No one fails of understanding the Holy Grail stands as the representative of the highest and noblest ideals of the soul, those which call forth the religious, as opposed to the passionate emotions. Each one attains to an understanding of these highest things in proportion as his life is elevated and harmonious" (4) This was, says Royce, Tennyson's principle ideal.

The question of the relative reality of the object itself (the cup) or is the cup a phantom, versus the issue of the reality of the grail lying in the quest itself. Royce sees the Holy Grail as the representative of the beautiful. In beauty, the religious and passionate emotions meet and blend.

In this piece, Royce goes into what is the seedbed into his later notion of lost causes. For example "over some spots where universal but superficial opinion has said 'failure, defeat, disgrace, where some cherished plan has met its death-blow, where some life hope has seen its final day, we should write the wiser inscription; Sacred to the memory of a cherished, a divine, but now forever depart delusion. While it lived it gave strength and courage in endeavor, persistence in duty, faith in the noble and the right. Now when it is dead, when it is known for a delusion, we cannot look upon it as worthless. The thought of it is still strength, its former counsels still give persistence, the beauties it revealed still inspire faith. The Beautiful and the True shone through it, and lost though it be, we will worship its memory."

Royce will apply this to Lee and the cause of the Confederacy, as well as to any proponent of a scientific theory that has proven inadequate, but which by its being there has advanced science. And of course, Royce will come to apply this perspective to the life of his son Christopher.

Evaluation: This article shows Royce considering the issues that first roused him to philosophy.

“A Word about the ‘Ideal’ in Science and in Art,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875):

Occasioned by Lewes’ Book *Problems of Life and Mind*, vol. 1, his first chapter on the “Ideal Construction of Science.” (George Henry Lewes was Marian Evans’ (George Eliot’s) partner.) Royce concludes that “these ideals tend to show that science and art have a deep connection, that the faculties of mind which they respectively employ have much in common,” and will advance together.

“Draper and ‘Religion,’” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 8-9

Attributed to Royce because it refers to an earlier essay on Draper. (The piece is not signed.) Again, a piece on the ostensible conflict between religion and science.

“The Tragic as Conceived by the Ancients and the Moderns,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 10

This is almost a précis of his undergraduate thesis on *Aeschylus*. He contrasts ancient and modern times on the point of tragedy. Although both are founded on pathos, he says it used to be aimed at figures like King Lear, outstanding heroes. “We have come to feel that we are human, and that to be human is to suffer. And any human sorrow, we are resolved, shall not be alien from us. This is the true spirit of modern art, and this is at least one great point of difference between ancient and modern Tragedy.”

“Notes on Exchanges,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 13

Again, this is unsigned.

Folder 23: “Newspaper *The Berkeleyan* December 1878 (55p.)”

A copy of Vol. VI of the *Berkeleyan*, including the piece “The Monkish Chronicle,” *The Berkeleyan* vol. 6 (1878): 265-80

FMO does not recall a letter by Royce in which he refers to this article. There is a question as to whether Royce actually wrote this piece. Royce has been at Berkeley only for four months at this point, and is caught up in teaching responsibilities. On the other hand, the Berkeley archivist and a friend of Royce (one year ahead of him at UCB) said this is genuine Royce material.

The article begins with memories of being in “a company of youth,” students retired to a certain secluded spot, a sort of monastic life “seeking little company but their own.” (265) Royce has just left JHU, and his “German Club” that met once a week. He had said it was “bliss to be alive” with those people. He doesn’t have that at back at Berkeley.

Evaluation: See Part III of this Index. Relying on both the internal and external evidence (Rowell’s verdict, and he knew Royce well) FMO thinks this implies Royce’s longing for a male

community life after 20 years largely without it, and that this article lets the idea of the “Beloved Community” come to some articulation long in advance of its explicit formulation in *PC*.

Box 117: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Notebooks on lectures by Lotze, Baumann, and Enneper, whose lectures Royce attended in Germany. Scholars should note that a Johns Hopkins University work has been included in this Box which consists largely of Notebooks from Royce’s year in Germany, for instance, in Folder 5, Royce’s “Return to Kant” lectures, proposed at Johns Hopkins in the Springs of 1877. However, two notebooks from Royce’s German period are not found here, but in Box 143, Folders 4 and 5: “History of German Philosophy Since Leibnitz. [Dr.] Stumpf. Winter Semester, 1875-1876” and “Logic and Nature Research, Winter Semester, 1875-1876”

Evaluation: These five folders may be a treasure house for future dissertations.

Box 118: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

[Foreward to Box 118: In examining this Box under time constraints, FMO simply had to skim Folders 1 to 5, and 8 to 12. These folders are left to experts in German Literature, Hegel, and Kant.

Folder 1: “German Literature, Classic to Romantic Periods. B3(I), B3(II), B3(III) Notebooks. Ca 1876-1878”

Royce Notebook from when he was a student at Johns Hopkins.

Folder 2: “B.4(I). Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876”

Royce notebook from when he was a student at Johns Hopkins. Notes are in German and English. Royce does not mention Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in this notebook. 40 pages, numbered 1-40.

Folder 3: “B.4(II), Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876”

Royce student notebook, while a student at Johns Hopkins. In this notebook Royce does not mention Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the work that will become his principle focus in his Hegel research. 40 pages, numbered 41 to 80.

Folder 4: “B.4. (III). Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876.”

Royce class notebook while a student at Johns Hopkins. Notes in English and German. 4 ½ pages of notes, numbered 81-85.

Folder 5: “B.5(I). Hegel Logik. Nov. 1876”

Royce class notebook, while a student at Johns Hopkins. 40 pages, numbered 1-40.

At page 17, Royce first deals with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Two months into his time in Germany, Royce encounters what will become in his own work the central Hegelian text.

Royce speaks of the development of the science of logic after Kant, and the recognition that the beginning of philosophy must now be the real beginning of pure thought. At pages 17-19, Royce's discussion of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* reads as follows:

A full understanding as to the nature of Knowledge can only be obtained in and through the science itself, but the Introduction contained in the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* is supposed to have shown the transition from the knowledge of the senses to the absolute knowledge. This transition has been from the only true Direct Knowledge (that of the senses themselves) up to that in which this knowledge, or certainty, first attains to its own Real Truth, in the giving up of its own objectification by the identifying itself with its object. [*sic*]--- Now upon this standpoint there remains only to consider what really is present in this simple, direct knowledge which is to depend on no other but be the [three unintelligible German words, perhaps "ein fach Unmittelbar ___?]. The answer is that the Real here is the simple pure Being, and so this is that from which we are to commence. --- This Beginning is to be sure dependent on the preparation for it in the reaching of the standpoint of pure and absolute Knowledge. But as beginning of Logic it is absolute, assumes nothing, contains the whole development of the science in itself.

This is the only means of solving the problem in question. The attempt to assume a problematic beginning for philosophy, and so to develop the science with the view of proving the value of this assumed principle, has indeed a foundation in the fact that every Principle which is assumed must develop itself into a science by a self-analysis [*sic*], by going back to that which is its real truth. But on the other hand the beginning really continues at the bottom of the whole development from first to last, and is necessary to it. The whole system of the movement of Thought is a Circle, which returns into itself. What was at first is in its undeveloped form, not yet known, not yet fully given. However the mentioned view is not a justifiable one. The very fact that the whole system is a development [*sic*] from a single principle requires that every step of the development [*sic*] should be necessarily and determinately given. The principle above assumed is assumed because it is the necessary stand-point for the commencement of the absolute Knowledge, as has been shown (in the Phaen. d. G.) in tracing the development [*sic*] of the absolute Knowledge itself from the lower forms of thought. From this principle now the entire science develops itself, and this is the only proper standpoint for the comprehension of Logic.

Evaluation: This last paragraph has a number of seedlings of Royce's future thought.

Folder 6: "B.6(I). Spinoza. Abstracts and Criticism. Nov. 1876"

Royce class notebook, while a student at Johns Hopkins. 40 pages, numbered 1-40. [See notes directly below at folder 7.]

Folder 7: “B.6(II). Spinoza Abstracts and Criticisms.”

Royce class notebook, while a student at Johns Hopkins. 30 pages, numbered 41-71.

With the two notebooks (“fascicles”) included in folders 6 and 7, Royce makes notes on Spinoza, beginning with the intention to examine both Spinoza’s *Ethics* and his *De Deo*. These two “fascicles,” however, treat Spinoza’s *Ethics* only. Royce ends by criticizing Spinoza for “Weakness of the Exposition from a Critical Point of View” (page 70). The text reads as follows:

That the principle of Spinoza was the nothingness, changeableness, of all individual things, that he sought above all to rise to the real grounds of these things, and that he thus gave a complete and unswerving analysis of the *veritates aeternae* in giving an objective presentation of their results when their validity is once assumed, this was his service to Philosophy. But the form in which his doctrine was presented was a gigantic mistake.

Query: will Royce, in a few years, or in a few decades, see more than “a gigantic mistake” in Spinoza’s form of presentation? See Royce’s “System Sigma.”

Folder 8: “B.8(I). Kant Abstracts and Criticisms. Nov. 1876”

Folder 9: “B.9(I). Kant Abstracts and Criticisms. [Supplement] 1877”

Folder 10: “B.10(1) Kant Abstracts and Criticisms [Critical period] undated”

Folder 11: “B.11(1) Kant, General Comments, undated”

Folder 12: “B.11(II) Kant, General Comments, 1877-78”

Notebooks numbered 8 to 12 (from Royce’s Johns Hopkins period). In need of a Kant expert’s analysis.

Folder 13: “General notebook for Literature, Classics, Philology, and Criticism, Part I. 1875”

Royce’s notebook, directly after his arrival in Germany. Page 1-79.

Section I:

Royce reads G. Curtius, *Foundations of Greek Etymology*, (page 2) and finds a “first lie” at the

root of the last century's Dutch School of Philology. This error is their use of analogy as their first principle of method. Royce goes into what endangers the present search into Sanskrit roots (à la Curtius).

At pages 10-15 of the notebook, Royce reads an article in *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft* (no author is mentioned). The article concerns the early church father Justin's relation to the Fourth Gospel (Paul). Royce cites the author as presenting two hypotheses to explain the numerous parallels between Justin and John, and Justin's elaborations on specific Gospel passages. First, the author hypothesizes that Justin wrote with the Fourth Gospel before him. The second hypothesis is that Justin wrote his work before the Fourth Gospel was written. The author, cited by Royce, leans toward the first hypothesis. "Justin therefore never refers to the Fourth Gospel as supplying historical material. He draws upon it for doctrinal matter, not for facts." Royce concludes: "The Fourth Gospel therefore cannot be considered as having historical value as to the facts of the apostolic age. It can only be regarded as a document valuable in the history of Christian Gnosticism." (15)

NB: This passage hints at Royce's choice to become more familiar with current German scriptural investigation. This will lead him to "swim" into Germany's "higher biblical criticism" – Struass, Bauer, etc., names his notebook soon mentions.

Section II:

Royce begins a second section of this notebook at page 35. This section is titled: "Note Book for General Matter in the Provinces of Literature, Classics, Philology and Criticism (Fasc. II page 35-64)" This section is dated June 11, 1876.

At page 36, Royce makes notes on Gervinus' *History of German Poetry*. His notes deal with the topics of primitive cult and mythology. Royce notes that German Poetry has a more historical character unlike Scandinavian poetry which is more mythological (42). At page 47, Royce deals with Novalis, using Hettner's "*Litterat. Gesch.*" as a guide. The theme is of Novalis as a poet and a hero. He quotes Novalis verse at page 59.

At page 64, Royce reads the *Göttinger Dictabund* on extravagant friendships, especially via a letter of Herder. At page 72, Royce returns to Julian Schmidt, then at 74-75 to Trendelenberg.

Folder 14: "New Books and Essays. General Notes on Periodic Literature. Notebook B12(II). November 1876."

Royce's notebook, while at Johns Hopkins. 12 pages, numbered 1-12.

Royce is voraciously reading articles, often in German and French. Examples from this notebook:

Literarisches Centralblatt (with "Notice of Janet, *Les Causes Finales*).

Gegenwart

Revue Philosophique

Academy

Jenaer Literaturzeitung

This reading reveals the fact that Royce is keeping up with both philosophical and literary worlds.

Folder 15: “Notes on Logic, Wundt’s Lectures. Notebook B.13 (I). 1875-1876”

Logic.

Caution: This folder puts a reader back in Germany. It does not fall in sequential chronological order.

Wundt is one of Royce’s most important teachers.

Cf. Box 106, folder 8, document 7, for loose notes on Wundt that appear to come from the same period.

The title from the notebook: “Note Book On Logic. Section I. Wundts’ Lectures (Leipzig, Winter Sem. ’75-6”

At page 1: “At present, the term Logic is made to include the entire exposition of the method of Science.”

Page 2: Wundt’s definition of Logic as “The General Science of Method.”

Page 3: Wundt finds Plato’s and Aristotle’s definitions of philosophy far too narrow, because they focus on objects rather than on thought itself.

Wundt divides philosophy into Metaphysics, Logic (the study of methods) and the Theory of Knowledge.

In the History of Philosophy, Wundt gets only as far as Aristotle’s book on Logic (page 14).

NB. No mention here of the symbolic in Symbolic Logic

Folder 16: “Notes on the Theory of Knowledge. B14(I).”

The inside cover of this notebook is titled “Notes on the Theory of Knowledge. I. The Development [*sic*] of the Intellect: A. In the Individual.” Royce notes that this “fascicle” runs from pages 1-48, but in fact it runs from 1-31. The entire notebook deals with Herbert Spencer.

In the first 1 ¼ pages, Royce gives a background sketch on the development of “pure intellect.” Then from pages 2-31, he gives the “Substance of P.II, Ch.I” of Herbert Spencer’s treatment of “The Evolution of Mind.” Royce summarizes Spencer’s sub-sections §58-§90.

[**FMO Note:** These materials need review by experts in German Literature, Hegel and Kant. As for Folder 16’s “Notes on the Theory of Knowledge,” this accurately reflects Royce’s title for this Notebook. Nevertheless, the notebook also contains Royce’s summary of part of Herbert Spencer’s work on the development of the intellect.]

Folder 17: “General Notes on Mathematics. B.15. 1876-1878, 1882”

This Notebook contains Royce's summations of two articles, the first read in Germany, the second read near the close of his instructorship at UCB:

1. "J. C Becker's Investigation on Space," from *Zeitschrift f. Math. u Physik*, 17ter Jahrg. (1872) page 314; (this corresponds to pages 1 to 9 in Royce's Notebook. There is no date, but it is likely 1875-76, based on the Notebook's size and color, similar to the notebook found in folder 6 of this Box.
2. "MM. J. Mace d L'Epinau et W. Nicati, "Récherches sur la Compar-Photometr. des Diverse Parties d'un Meme Spectre," *Annales de Chimie et de Physique*, XXIV (Nov. 1881), pages 289 and following (pages 10 to 17 in Royce's Notebook, dated "Jan. 1882").

Regarding the Becker article, via Royce's sidebars:

Becker based his article on Kant, and refuted Mr. J. Rosanes' lecture at Breslau, published 1871);

the Empirical Theory;

The Kantian Theory and the General Grounds on which it is Assailed. —Answers.;

Becker's Theory of the Space-Intuition;

Hemholtz in the *Gel. Nachr.* on the Basis of Geometry;

Assumption # 1: The Hypothesis of the n-fold Extension, the coordinates, & the differential coefficients;

#2: The Hypothesis of Groups of related Points which remain unchanged—*Congruenz; feste Korper*; III. The Hypothesis of Free Movement of Point-Systems & *Congruenz* independently of Position. [IV]—Hypothesis as to the Nature of Revolution on an Axis; The Development.

Stating that "the latter is not a necessary postulate of the first three conditions assumed above," Royce follows Becker's application of II, III, & IV exclusively for points with infinitely small coordinates. The inferences are then calculated on pages 8 to 9.

Regarding the Epinau and Nicati article:

At UCB, Royce was interested in empirical psychology. Here, he summarizes: "This article introduces certain investigations destined ultimately to furnish some means of testing the consequences of the rival theories (of Young and of Hering) concerning color-perception." Page 10, dated "Jan. 1882."

Folder 18: "Notes on the History of Philosophy 1875-1876"

Royce notes at bottom of cover of the fifth and final Folio of his "Notebook on the History of Philosophy" "Chiefly from Zeller, Brandis, & Ueberweg. ---Commenced in connection with notes of Windelband's Lectures &c, Winter Sem 1876--& continued with Baumann's Lec., 18."

Document Group 1:

A set of five bundles, each comprised of 5 or more folded sheets. Royce makes notes within each, not always filling all sides of the pages. The bundles are titled as follows:

“Sheet I. Notes on the History of Philosophy. Part I. Introduction”

“Sheet II. Notes on the History of Philosophy Part. I. Introduction”

“Notebook on the History of Philosophy Part II. Greek Philosophy Section A. (Introduction: Origines [*sic*] to General Char.) Sheet I.”

“Note Book on the History of Greek Philosophy Section A. Introduction, Origines [*sic*], General Character. P (23-44) Part II of the Note Book on the Hist. of Phil.”

“Notebook on the History of Philosophy Part II. Greek Philosophy Section B (pre-Socratic Schools) Sheet I.”

Document 2: Wildeband

A unnumbered manuscript comprised of 9 small sheets, in Royce’s handwriting on front and back.

Box 119: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

(NB. The folders in this box move back and forth between Royce’s year in Germany (1875-76) and his first year back in Baltimore (1876-77).

Folder 1: “Student notes. (“J. Royce” on Cover). 1875-1876 [notebook]”

A small notebook, 3” x 5”. The inside front cover contains some pencil notes, that indicates an address (258 N. Eutaw), perhaps jotted in on his return to Baltimore. The notebook is not dated, but looks to be a very early notebook from his time in Germany.

Many of the pages are blank. Approximately ¼ of the pages are used, written in pencil. . In the beginning, the notes that do exist reflect the fact that he seems to be reading Ferrier. The notes begin: “p. 45, Vol. I. Ferrier’s Lectures and philosophy Remains –...” The notes concern the Greek philosopher Thales, and the Ionic and Eleatic systems in general. (Pre-Socratics). “In this respect, Parmenides must be right....” Royce covers the history of philosophy from Thales on down. The pages are un-numbered. Page numbers given here are counted from the front of the book.

At page 3 and 4 of the notebook, Royce writes of the Ionic system (at page 57 of Ferrier) “these systems are truly philosophical in so far as they are imitated and carried forward by the conviction, obscure and inexplicit though that conviction may have been, that the universal in all things is the ultimately real – is the truth for all intelligence; and that they aim at such a unity, and that they are to a large extent, actuated, and inspired by such a conviction; this I think is undoubted.” Whether these are notes on the book, or Royce’s own reflections, is unclear. However, these ideas will come to mark much of Royce’s philosophy.

He moves to Hegel, Steinthal (introductory notes on Lange and Lotze). Royce attempts to use his German (almost half of these notes are in German); Then back to English to deal with problems in Kant and Schopenhauer.

At pages 15-16: We know the major influence of Schopenhauer on Royce. However, in this early student notebook Royce notes:

“Despite all Schopenhauer can do then, despite all laments ... or attempts to tear away the same, the fact still remains that according to his own theory, there is a reality in the individuation and causal Relations of experience, and his system is no nearer the One and Unchangeable in the succession of deceptive experience than was the Idealism of Berkeley.”

At one point, Royce creates a list of thinkers/topics whose books he apparently wants to buy, with what may be prices. (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Schlegels, Novalis, Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Solder, Misc., Leibnitz, Hegel, Herbart, Modern)

The inside back first page contains a list of approximately 20 titles, for entering into study of the Romantic school (on topics of German culture and literature, including Solger, Schlegels, Haym, Herbart, Novalis, Fichte, e.g.)

Evaluation: Selected quotes reveal Royce’s independent criticality while reading even as a student.

Folder 2: “Class Notes on Schopenhauer and his “Vierfache Wurzel.” (6 parts) Winter 1876-1877”

A set of six lectures on Schopenhauer, six separate bound “folios.” At the top of the first is the title “Class Notes on Schopenhauer and his “Vierfache Wurzel.” In pencil on the back of the last folio, in Royce’s hand, “Class Notes on Schopenhauer 1876-7 Winter.”

Yet these are carefully recorded manuscripts of the first class he *taught*, on Schopenhauer, at Johns Hopkins as a graduate student. (See *Life* at 67.) The manuscripts are so carefully done, it raises the question of whether Royce may have considered them for publication. (These are not, as the title implies, notes Royce made of a class he took in Germany or at JHU.)

The manuscripts are continuously paginated through the six folios to page 135.

Folder 3: “Early Draft of Introduction to [Royce’s] Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins. Ca. 1877”

A 5-page manuscript of a draft for the introduction to his dissertation, titled at the top of page one: “Introduction. Scope and Method of the Undertaking.” As for method, Royce avoids the immediate question “what’s ultimately the Reality” by stepping back to examine some pre-supposed questions.

Folder 4: “[German] Romanticists. Ca. 1876-1877”

A soft bound “folio,” with only three and a half manuscript pages filled in. The “folio’s” first page is numbered, however, 53. This folio, therefore, seems to be the second or third of a series, for which we lack the first two. The notes appear to be excerpts of reading, particularly in periodicals.

Excerpts from Kuno Fischer, J. Schmidt (*Criticism of Kleist*) Saint René Taillandier – from the *Reveu de Deux Mondes*, and from articles in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

Royce closes by listing the birthdays of many of the German Romanticists.

Folder 5: “Growth of Indo-European Structure. Prof. Whitney. ca. 1876-1877”

Reveals Royce’s interest in language and close attention to traditions. The first page of this small 3” by 5” notebook, which hinges lengthways, is headed “Prof. Whitney. Growth of Indo-European Structure.”

There are 46 pages of notes in pencil. The fact that Royce took this course reveals his interest in getting to the roots of different cultures and religious traditions.

**Folder 6: “Ph.D. Thesis of the Interdependence the Principles of Knowledge.ca 1878.”
[sic]**

A bound typescript volume, 152 pages long. This is a copy of the original manuscript, which is housed in the Johns Hopkins archives. The title on the title page: “Of the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge,” with the subtitle “An Investigation of the problems of Elementary Epistemology. In two Chapters. With an introduction on the Principal Ideas and Problems in which the Discussion takes its Rise.”

The volume includes a six page preface, in which Royce writes:

“The very meaning of the word Existence cannot be assumed as defined until the work of the Theory of Knowledge has been done.... Therefore I begin with the following question: what kind of a mode of consciousness is that which call Knowledge?” Royce says this question is inextricably bound to the question “What do we mean by the certainty of Knowledge?”

“From here on the intention is to aim at a definition of the meaning of existence. And this aim I seek to realize by a discussion of the Principles of Knowledge.”

By principles, Royce means the Causal Principle and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (or Consistency Principle). Whether these two principles are connected or not is the controlling problem of a Theory of Knowledge. What does one mean by existence?

This hard bound copy of the dissertation is a 1927 Gift Walter E. Rothman, with the proviso that

it not be copied or reproduced. That limitation was removed in 1958 by the archivist. Query: how did Rothman get this volume.

One can hardly overestimate the importance of this work as it sets the framework for the work he will be doing over the next four years at Berkeley.

Evaluation: See Part II, item 59 above.

This material is not “reader friendly.” However, this text is very fundamental to Royce’s epistemological outlook. FMO believes Royce condenses the basic position of his dissertation in some of his UCB and early Harvard papers. Royce himself made no effort to publish his dissertation. The six page preface does a good job of summarizing his positions.

Box 120: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “On the Origins of German Philosophy. 1876”

Contained here are three 5” x 8” “folios,” going to 107 pages of manuscript. Page one bears the title “(Note) On the Origins of German Philosophy.” (A Jan. 1876 date occurs at page 27 of the first folio. He gives the date “Nov. 1876” at the top of the third folio.) He appears to be moving through a big book on German philosophy, although the work is not identified.

§ I “Early German Philosophy” (pre-Leibniz, from the time of Charlemagne, the Scholastics, Albert the Great, Medieval Philosophy, Nicolas von Kuse, Bruno up through Eckhart, whom he discusses at pages 7 and 8.

A bit on Paracelsus (and alchemy).

§ Influences from outside of Germany: Bacon, Hobbes, Leibniz, Jacobi, Schelling, Spinoza.

At 27, he moves into Spinoza (and the charge that Spinoza is a pantheist). FMO: It is amazing how much Spinoza did affect him. He presents different interpretations of substance, and notes that Spinoza’s position is a combination of various aspects of these interpretations.

At 31-32, he returns to Germany with Fichte. Toward the end of folio one, Royce begins a careful look at Spinoza. This look continues with the next folio.

Second folio begins (37):

“Spinoza conceives the business of philosophy as Science to be that of giving as complete as possible a picture of the Universe considered as Sein. For this he commences his preparation by the definition – ‘Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens.’ What is already assumed in this definition?”

Royce continues with consideration of Spinoza through 67. The pages reflect quite a bit of work on the topic. At page 41, he lists, e.g., various assumptions he sees Spinoza making. Royce

moves through, and analyzes, various fundamental Spinozan ideas. Royce notes that Spinoza identifies a third principle, besides cause and sufficient reason: “What is necessary in our ideas of things is necessarily existent in the things themselves.” (58) NB: with this focus on Spinoza, Royce appears to have gotten a bit off-track from the stated purpose of this collection of notes.

At page 67, moves into consideration of a different book. Royce quotes Lewes at p 76. and the problem of evolution is with him.) Yet Royce returns to Spinoza. From 76-77, Royce may be reading “Trendelenburg” (German philosopher, 1802-72, whose one book is on the history of the doctrine of categories. Indeed, Royce may be translating parts of this book. Royce quotes him trying to explain the unity of substance in Spinoza (the idea of “God, den Mensch” *en Deselفة und Welt.*) Royce comments, “The whole matter is one of much interest.” At the end of the folio, pages 83-84, he moves to Schopenhauer.

But with the third folio, he has returned to Spinoza. At page 86, Royce writes of the “fundamental originality of Spinoza.” This folio is headed “Trendelenburg” He pursues his interpretation of Spinoza throughout this folio.

At page 98, Royce records Trendelenburg’s 4-point critique of Spinoza including a criticism of Spinoza’s four assumptions: “The summing up of the criticism gives 1. The formality of the procedure has cut off self-criticism into the principles of the system. 2. The parallelism is not to be consistently followed. 3. The inadequate notions are not explained, which is an essential failure. 4. In the morals the teleological notion is inconsequently introduced (a) in the assumption of the individual independence, (b) in the assumption of an action of the thinking part beyond its sphere, (c) in the falling back on higher moral ideas than the system permits, finally (d) in the promise of immortality to the Intellectus, – so the attempt of Spinoza fails, and his system must pass over in its consequences into one or the other of the two other systems of philosophic thought.” (98-99)

Royce tacks on a reading on Avenarius on page 101.

Evaluation: This is the largest early study of Spinoza by Royce that FMO has seen, at this age. In 1892, Royce will start his study of modern philosophy not with Descartes, but with Spinoza. (Knowledge of German script is required to get a complete grasp of these manuscripts.)

Folder 2: “Notes Relating to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge (3 parts). July - August 1877. Preliminary to the Degree Essays.”

During the summer of 1877, Royce did work in Cambridge and Boston in preparation and research for his dissertation. The notes reveal his very careful work in preparation for his dissertation.

Three “folios” with the title on the first page, “Notes Relating to Logic and The Theory of Knowledge.” The first page is dated “Boston July 1877.” Royce labels the folios A, B and C.

The first folio begins with a discussion of an article on epistemology by Windelband (who taught him in Germany). Royce investigates the psychological foundations of the principles of

knowledge. Royce is noticing even at this point questions of origin and questions of validity.

Subtitles in the margins deal with topics covered.

At page 4, Royce critically compares Shadworth Hodgson and Windelband.

- The relation of concepts to the principle of contradiction.
- On the Parallelism between the logical Consciousness and Fourier on the Illogical
- The Principle of Contradiction. Its Subjective Significance.
- It Presupposes the Liability to Error
- The Principle of Sufficient Reason.
- Thought Concerned with the Formation of Defined Logical Concepts rather than with the making of Judgments. The latter either an Act of the Will or a Means to the Former- A Provisional Thesis.
- Essay on the Space Problem
- Essay on the Time problem.
- Sigwart's Logik – General Abstract. Transcript of Paragraphs
- Definitions of Thought in General – Its Objects and its Basis.
- Thought, as in all cases, based upon a Consciousness of Certainty as a final Justification.
- Logic distinguished from Epistemological Theory
- Psychological Character of Thought as an Activity of Judging
- Logical treatment of Judgments as distinguished from psychological Treatment.
- Grenzen d. Aufgabe [Limits of the task]

In the second folio (“B”, 17 pages) with an examination of Everett's *Science of Thought*. Also Grund, Fournier, Charaux.

- Everett on the Incompleteness of Ordinary Logic.
- Charaux on L'Ésprit Philosophique
- Ravaisson on Empiricism in Philosophy
- Ravaisson on Cousin's View of the Place of the Reason in Philosophy
- Ravaisson on Humanitarianism
- Ravaisson on Compte
- Ravaisson on the Second Stage of Compte's historical scheme
- Kant's theories
- On the Principle of Cartesian philosophy

At the end of the second folio, at page 15, he begins to underline Latin and German in red.

In the third folio (“C”), he discusses Schwegler and the Metaphysical Philosophy, then Bonitz. He quotes Greek extensively, from the Nichomechian Ethics, e.g., and more Bonitz to get to Aristotle.

Folder 3: “[Romantic.] Literature. Childs and Lowell. 1876-1877”

These are notes from lectures delivered by visiting Harvard professors during Royce's time at Johns Hopkins, probably spring 1877.

On the back of the 3 x 5 notebook, there is a light pencil marking "J. Royce. Childs" These appear to be notes as he listens to a lecture at JHU. (Childs and Lowell, from Harvard, visited JHU to deliver lectures during Royce's time there.) The notes continue about 12 pages.

Then the book, *in verso*, consists of notes on Lowell. The notes run 17 pages. The lecture deals with such topics as Arthurian and Grail legends.

Folder 4: "Schopenhauer and other philosophy notes ca. 1876-1877."

Document 1:

A folio begins with "Notes on an Introductory lecture to a class about to take up the study of Schopenhauer's *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. There is about 13 pages on this topic. This will feed directly into his dissertation.

Slightly larger folded sheets (5" x 9") are stuck into this folio, with the heading "The development of Schopenhauer's Metaphysik and the Aesthetic and Ethics as founded thereon; cursory note." This inserted note is divided into seven sections. As introduction: "The foundation was the parallelism of the Will and the [seemingly] dead forces of Nature. The latter were thereby seen to be really living manifestations of the Will."

- III. The Will is therefore *Ding an Sich*.
- IV. The forces of Nature as separate stages of the objectification of the Will.
- V. The Will is Man, and the Moral Consciousness
- VI. The Will in respect to the inner consciousness.
- VII. The Stages of Objectification as the Ideas of Plato

Document 2

A folio that starts with page number 109. The folio begins with consideration of Delboeuf. Then a quote from Descartes. The notes are numbered through page 120. There is a good deal of material on how science develops.

The notes seem to constitute a précis of the article by Delboeuf, who quotes different philosophical sources.

The notes close on page 119 with a remark of Kant, in a different pen. Then, on page 120, there are five references to Schopenhauer.

Document 3

Various loose sheets.

- A title page from a notebook.
- A one page sheet, written in pencil. Notes on the eye.
- A title page from a notebook on the History of Philosophy.
- Julian Schmidt notes
- Dated June 12, 1876. Royce is writing about Julian Schmidt's work. Manuscripts written on 6 small sheets, consecutively numbered 5-1, summarizing in German and in English. This was written while Royce was still in Germany.

Folder 5: "The World and the Will, Schopenhauer. Ca. 1876-1877"

An archivist's note inside says "Box 104"-- its pre-2009 location in HARP. Six 4" x 8" sheets, a manuscript with the title "The World and the Will" at the top of the first page. The small essay deals with Schopenhauer – and his "brilliant yet unsatisfactory works."

Page 3: "Schopenhauer's philosophy is the phantom ship of post-Kantian speculative thought. When you least expect it, it suddenly enters within your thought horizon."

Royce becomes critical of Schopenhauer: "This irrational substratum of Thought, postulated, yet unexplained, and inexplicable, remains for those who read Schopenhauer a puzzle that calls for light, and a principle that threatens all attempts at rational philosophy with failure." (page 4)

Folder 6: "Misc. Incoming Correspondence [Relations of Students of Josiah Royce] Correspondence from students; exam questions 1891-1909."

Out-of-date sequence with the other folders and documents in this box. FMO's brief review did not uncover any notable student names. One letter here was directed to Ruth Royce, not Josiah.

Evaluation: Box 120 seems indispensable for a close study of Royce's approach to Schopenhauer and his dissertation.

Boxes 121 – 124:

Correspondence in these boxes comprise letters written *to* Josiah Royce. They are chiefly professional in character. The letters are arranged alphabetically by sender. For the individual correspondents' names, *see* the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Papers at Boxes 121-24.

Box 121: A-E (41 folders)

Box 122: F-L (51 folders)

Box 123: M-R (31 folders)

Box 124: S-Z (41 folders)

NB: Box 123, folder 19 contains correspondence from C.S. Peirce to Josiah Royce, 1898-

1905. Box 123, folder 41 contains Correspondence from Josiah Royce to C.H. and G.B. Dorr, 1887-1910.

Box 125: “The Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Letters from Josiah Royce to Family Members. 1884-1916”

Correspondence.

Royce to Stephen Royce – July 8, 1914. With the iron market depressed and unexpected health expenses for Stephen, Royce is ready to help him. Royce encouraging.

Royce to “Dear Little Mister” March 24, [18]84 – no address evidently.

Folder 2: “Correspondence, Other

Correspondence.

Folder 3: Correspondence

To Royce from Wm. B. Medicott, Springfield Massachusetts (in Harv. Univ. Grad. School of Bus. Administration) April 1, 1915.

Royce had sent WBM a MS on March 25th (1st line) See *Life* 367, 411.

Royce accepts a “Psych. Lecture” at Columbia U. set for Thursday February 9, 1911, as Royce scribbles on text of James M. Cattell’s letter to Royce.

On January 3, 1910 (mistake for 1911) on Royce’s way back from Philadelphia Lectures on 6, 7, 8 of February.

Royce to Prof. E. R. Hedrick. Univ. of Missouri, Columbia on June 19, 1904. Royce calls Hedrick’s attention to Christopher’s pending application for a position at the University of Missouri, esp., in Mathematics.

Folder 4:

NB: And ALS from Royce to the Rev. Charles Day, Head of Andover Theological Seminary, June 13, 1904. Re: Royce’s honorarium for a lecture at Andover Theological Seminary—a letter only “calendared” in *Letters* 676, Yet it sets out Royce’s policy in 3 different situations of his giving lectures where endowment is involved.

Royce to Miss Manson (no date) [but Feb. 16-17, 1900, seems to be the date from events in the letter]. Royce’s account of arriving in NYC “The day after the latest blizzard.” Royce made the 5 pm train to Boston from Grand Central—Tuesday. Found KR and boys doing OK now but they “have had indeed an extremely hard time.” To Miss Manson: “Don’t be concerned re thesis.

Get rest. If your return to Cambridge is delayed, we can make it up ... “I shall report if what I say secures your making your visit a complete one and rest sufficient.”

[This Miss Manson was a Royce student. She was stranded by the blizzard in NYC and worried about missing Royce’s classes. Archivist Jane S. Knowles at Radcliffe identifies her as a “Special” student, probably Elizabeth Emerson Manson, born 1863, who in 1898-1899 (aged 35) took Royce’s Phil 3 (the Philosophy of Nature).]

Three letters to Professor Warner Fite (temporary lecturer at Harvard in the 1st term of 1911-1912 – especially preparing for Phil. 8. – Advanced Logic – which he and Royce taught jointly.)

On July 11, 1911, Royce wrote to Prof. Fite (see *Letters* 556)

On September 5, 1912 Royce to Fite (see *Letters* 580: Royce’s attitudes to the New Testament, his aim in *PC* and his differences from both traditional Christianity and modern liberal thought ... No getting back to “its ‘primitive state.’”)

On July 16, 1913, Royce to Professor Fite (see *Letters* 604-09.) On p 409, NB the added PS on how fundamental the *epsilon* relation is to Royce’s most mature thought

A 31-page manuscript of a letter from Royce to G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, dated February 14, 1898. See *Letters* 366-73. Some significant autobiographical detail, especially page 367. He gives a good quote about “moral seriousness” (371)

A 12-page reply by Royce to B. P. Baker whose signature was mistaken by Royce as “Mr. Potter.” *Letters* 427-29. Autobiographical information on 427. On Thievery – can’t be classified as a disease universally.

Folder 5: “Correspondence, including copy of a letter to the mother of Jared Sparks, 1884-1915”

Folder 6: “The Work of the Truth Seeker ca. 1878-1882”

Two folios, of 24 and 28 manuscript pages respectively, (12 and 14 sheets written front and back), without page numbers. If these dates are accurate, this is writing from Royce’s Berkeley instructorship and much of this will go into *RAP*. The fact that the last 9 pages of the second folio are in Katharine’s hand may help to date this piece. They were married on October 2, 1880.

“Folio 1”

The first (with a crossed-out title “Truth-Seeking and its Consequences”) is completely in Royce’s hand. However, in the left margin Royce gives the title as “The Work of the Truth-

Seeker (a Lecture for a Learned Society)". Whether delivered or not, Royce drafts these 56 pages because he wants to create this draft. Whether this shows Royce's judgment of its importance will depend on its inner content and judgment of the *Critical Edition*.

Royce begins by alluding to Oliver Wendell Holmes' formulation of the "six people in dialogue, when there are only two," from *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*. This allusion sets the whole tone of the manuscript essay.

The manuscript is originally written in blue ink, and edited in black.

A note (in black, inserted across the text) on the fourth page: "See concerning the following the communication of Mr. Francis Galton to the journal *Nature* at various times within the past two years and his article in *Mind* for July 1880." The text reveals Royce editing, sometimes heavily, as on page 7. Here he writes:

"All this illustrates the fact that we live in worlds differing far more from one another than we commonly like to think. Our normal man would surely be hard to choose. If we chose him we should hardly comprehend him to be more particular in our study. Let us glance briefly at the wide range of what I may call purely general impressions ..." (7)

Or again, as on pages 10 to 11:

"The difference between Herbert Spencer and Cardinal Newman, or between Prof. Huxley and Mr. Ruskin, or between Hegel and Heinrich Heine, shall we call it merely a difference in the interpretation of the recorded facts of experience. No, evidently there are here different kinds of experience concerned, actually different worlds, different orders of truth. These men cannot come to a good understanding, because they have qualitatively different minds, irreconcilably various mental visions. Each of two such individuals may be inclined to regard the other as perverse. Both are in fact shut up within the narrow bounds of the poor individual experience. They will never understand one another so long as they remain what they are, finite minds, full of fallacy and self-confidence and of a darkness that is broken only here and there by flashes of light. If the world's leaders are thus such narrow men, what are we who follow?" (10-11)

Thereupon, Royce leads into the problem "why should we be truth-seekers?" At page 13, Royce begins to state the problem:

"To this problem we are led thus irresistibly. Here is a chaos of various minds, whose simpler ideas seem to vary very greatly, whose feelings grow so far asunder that each man becomes a mystery to his neighbor, whose conflicting opinions in consequence are all the results largely of accident, and certainly of narrowness of view. Yet it seems to be thought an excellent thing for each one of them to form fixed opinions about at least some matters, a sane undertaking of them to look for some sort of abiding truth, and a grand act to suffer loss or even death for the sake of the strongest and highest at least among one's beliefs. Why should this be the case? What is the use of truth-seeking,

when so little truth will ever be found on this planet? What is the worth of remaining true to one's opinions, when everything tends to make them fleeting? These questions must, I think, come into the mind of every active person at some time during his life. I have not in the foregoing stated the sceptic's [*sic*] case nearly as strongly as I could state it. The more you consider human knowledge the more you will see that some of the dearest pretenses are found upon examination to be only pretenses. And when you see this you are, if of vigorous mental constitution, once for all aroused from what a great philosopher called the "dogmatic slumber" and sent out upon a new search. The questions you then propose to yourself can thus be stated: What kind of truth may I hope to discover? In what spirit ought I to search for truth? Am I to hope for much success? And to bear myself as one to whom truth will certainly be revealed if he but work for it? Or shall I in a humbler spirit say that I am probably to remain in doubt so long as I live? Or finally shall I, neither confident of success, nor resigned to defeat, rise with all my strength and declare that whether finding or baffled, whether a wanderer forever or one who at last is to reach secure harbor of faith, I will through confidence and through doubt, through good and through evil report, search earnestly for truth though I never find anything that it is worth my while to call abiding? Some suggestions about the answer to this whole series of questions forms my subject in the rest of this lecture. And for the first, what is the spirit in which we should search for the truth that now, from this skeptical point of view, seems so far away from us." (13-14)

[JJK note: that this section is quite important and a great find in light of RAP. A little more might be said in reference to this seeking and Royce's reading of the history of philosophy, especially his interpretation of *Wesen* as a "searching for a City out of Sight."]

At this point, Royce deletes several paragraphs.

"Folio 2"

In the second group, the last nine pages are in another's hand, probably KR's. This folio does appear to continue the essay in the first, although the first ends with a completed sentence and the sentence begins with a new one. This folio, like the first, is heavily edited, with whole paragraphs and pages crossed out.

At page 48, Royce concludes the lecture with a section III, pointing out the solid reasons for avoiding either naïve complacency with one's belief, or complete skepticism and despair of finding any dream by stressing various consequences of truth-seeking, consequences which ground the hope of the truth-seeker.

This entire article is like a trumpet call to the complacent who don't want to be bothered with the call to scrutinize their beliefs for solid evidence. It is not, however, a call to nihilistic skepticism, but a fierce yet humble commitment to searching for truth for these hoped for consequences:

- I. to liberate the widespread states of narrowness, intolerance and instability of many (48);
- II. to people from an exaggerated confidence of reaching important truths without working through the community (49); and
- III. to achieve the overall benefit for all humankind of a genuine truth discovered.

Evaluation: This material and its guiding ideas are here put forth in longer and darker terms than the introduction to *RAP* allowed. But the themes of *RAP* page 9-14 are clearly foreshadowed in this 52-page manuscript which shows a fairly careful later editing, cross-outs, deletions and re-working of a piece that seems never to have gotten to birth as a “lecture to a learned society.” In *BWJR* 2: 1177, this manuscript, as unpublished, went unmentioned, but as a source of *RAP*, at least pages 9 to 14, it is of significant interest to scholars.

Autobiographical Note: Prior to his religious insight of January 1883, Royce drafted this far longer lecture with its dark tones and its hopes for one honestly facing the problem of truth-seeking. It shows Royce struggling with the problem personally.

Folder 7: Lecture III, Course Introductory, ca. 1878-1882.

Folder 8: Lecture IV, Psychological Examination [ca. 1878?]

Logic.

**Folder 9: “(1) Index A-M (First half) ca. 1878-1882
 (2) Summary of essay on the “Theory of Truth”**

First half of book, Royce’s alphabetical index of notes from his readings. It begins a record of his past voracious reading. Hence, important. [For the second half of this Index, see Box 126, folder 1.]

At page 100 of this hard-backed volume, Royce’s title is “Summary of an Essay (projected) on the “Principles of the Theory of Truth” The manuscript runs from page 100 to page 106. It begins with an outline for five books. (I-III are elaborated with chapter titles, but for IV only one chapter is given, and V has no chapters.)

- I. General Analysis
- II. The Logical Forms
- III. The Constitutive Principles
- IV. Historical
- V. Ethical

From pages 101 to 102, Royce gives a more detailed “Sketch of another Essay to cover part of the same ground” with the following chapter titles:

- Chapter I. “Succession and Time. Experience and Thought.”
- Chapter II. “The Idea of Self”
- Chapter III. “The Notion of Reality External.”
- Chapter IV. “Certainty and Error.”
- Chapter V. “Of Judgment”

Chapter VI : “Of Conception and of Ideas in Themselves.”
Chapter VII: “Of Thought-Synthesis in General.”

At 103, he begins a four page elaboration on Chapter I. (two sections)

Autobiographical Note: pages 103 and 104 are significant, as Royce pictures himself lolling on the Berkeley hillsides in what he calls a “dreamy and delightful passivity” (104) Allowing himself to experience the last kind of consciousness before falling asleep. But this too is always a stream, a “stream of experience, the time-series.” (106) On reflection, Royce sees the danger of adding to this experience the notion that this time series is unlimited in both directions. (106)

Box 126: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “‘Special Questions Selected’ Contains:
Kant p 1-53
Thought Diary page 100-145”
Index “N-V,” page 151-212

A single hard-backed 8” x 10” notebook, divided into three topic sections, as suggested by the folder title. But as given in that folder title, the three sections are listed distractingly in a “c, a, b” order. “Special Questions Selected” is the title on the front of the notebook. Many pages are blank or absent, e.g., 54 to 99.

The title page reads: “Notes on Special Question, Selected from Various Authorities (With Comments & References) pages 100 end p.) Thought Diary. Date of First Entry Sept. 24, 1878.” Pages 100 to 145 are Royce’s Thought Diary, of which the first entry is dated September 24, 1878. Yet the entire book begins at November 1876, a date inscribed at the bottom left corner of the title page. This early date probably refers to Royce’s latterhalf of his Index (“N-V”) built by Royce’s 4” by 6” cards. These contain the handwritten gists of his reading. The second half of his Index is found as the third and final section of the notebook (pages 151 to 212). For the first half of this Index, see Box 125, Folder 9.

Pages 1-53: The heading “Kants’ Transc. Aesth and the Cosmol. Probl.” heads top of each page, 1-53. This is a two part essay that runs from 1-29, and then from 35-53 (with intervening pages blank, except for a note at 34 bottom where Royce states that he will rely on Benno Erdman’s theory of space, while first examining Euclid’s axioms.)

I. “What is the value of the Kantian Doctrine of the Subjectivity of the Ideas of Space and Time in relation to the Doctrine of General Cosmology?”

First Part Section “A” begins on page 1.

Royce begins with Wundt’s essay on the general question, giving the threefold nature of the problem. There is a tie-in between the physical problem and the epistemological. Royce then comes to the question of the finiteness of the universe. At page 3, there are three theses:

- Finite in Time, but infinite in space and mass.

- As to Time and Mass, it is finite, but infinite according to the extendibility of space
- The universe according to time, space and mass is of finite size.

Royce takes up Kant’s theories.

[He handles the possibility of miracles on page 7: “Whether there was or was not a miracle “we come into conflict with the highest of the principles of knowledge; viz. never to assume anything as occurring by accident.”]

At page 8, Royce goes into a threefold *infinity* of the universe. He continues to work his way through Wundt. Then he goes into the epistemological side of the question (at 17). On page 25 he presents a fuller statement of the question at issue, depending on Riemann’s investigations. “Remarks” on 24; “Conclusion” on 25.

Section B appears on page 26.

Second Part begins Section C (dated Sept. 1877). pp **100-145**

Royce’s thought diary pages begins on Sept. 24, 1878 and moves him through December 11 [1879]. Autobiographically very central.

The first entry focuses on Aristotle’s views, particularly concerning the continuity of time. On October 20 he plans an essay on the problem of things in themselves.

On page 104, he creates a chart on Volition [of which not all his text is including in the following chart:

Volition

is primarily Self-Preservative;
but in its developed state it assumes the forms.

		<p>C. Of the Desire for Intensity Of Life</p> <p>This is a desire for Indeterminate experience, of which the pleasurable & painful quality cannot be known before hand, although its nature must be the one or the other. It is chosen by the Will to Live as in itself of Worth.</p>		
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	A. Of the Desire to get under control the causes of Pleasure		B. Of the Desire to get under control the causes of Pain	
A. The desire for pleasure				B. The desire to avoid pain

At page 106, he gives the date December 13, and goes into the Truth of Memory for two pages. At Dec. 14, he thinks of writing three essays. At the new year, he is interested in Rousseau. By Jan. 20 he reads Manfred. Then Diderot on Jan 31, then back to Morley on Rousseau.

At 113, on Feb. 12, 1879, Royce sits looking out over the bay and envisions a philosophical work he calls: "Meditations before the Gate". Royce heavily edits these 3 ¼ pages. What Royce may have viewed as an Introduction to his work, Loewenberg calls "Meditation before the Gate," (FE 6-7) as if it were Meditation I of Book I in Royce's outline that follows. In the printed version, Loewenberg omits the following phrases as ellipses: "... and the thoughts that are given to me upon the problems of our human life are such as I shall seek to write down in what follows." (FE. 6; notebook 113)

Loewenberg: "But I have here... to speak not so much of Nature ..." (FE 7)
 Royce "But I have in this book to speak not so much of Nature ..." (115)

Royce gives the outline for his complete work on philosophy (p.116):

Book. I.

Of the Nature of Philosophy, of its Ends & Methods.

Med. I: Of the Nature and End of Philosophy.

Med. II: Of the Method of Philosophy as a Product of
 Character.

Med. III: Of the Rationalistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. IV: Of the Romantic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. V: Of the Positivistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. VI: Conclusion on the Spirit and Method of Philosophy.*

Book II: Of Truth.

Med. VII: Of Knowledge in its Claims.

Med. VIII: Of Knowledge in its Analysis.

Med. IX: Of the World or of the Ideals of Knowledge.

Book III: Of Right.

Med. X: Of Self and non-Self in Ethics.

Med. XI: Of the World in Action.

Med. XII: Of the World in Contemplation.

*Royce's repeated use of "Spirit" merits note. In December, 1915, ten months before he died, he identified the result of his decades-long efforts to reflect philosophically—his "doctrine of life and the nature of truth and of reality"—worked out by connecting logical and metaphysical issues. On that date he described this effort as:

it now seems to me not so much romanticism, as a fondness for defining, for articulating, and for expounding the perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the 'spirit,' in a sense which is indeed Pauline, but not merely mystical, superindividual; not merely romantic, difficult to understand, but perfectly capable of exact and logical statement." (*HGC*, 131)

On March 10 (1879), After describing Faust's contract with Mephistopheles. Royce states, "*Im Anfang war die Tat*, i.e., the essence of life and being is activity." Then Royce, who soon would be engaged to Katharine Head, closes this entry with a reference to the Feminine Ideal, *Das Ewig-Weibliche* (or "the everlasting womanly") [*FE* 34-35; note the neuter *Das* and adjectival form.]

On April 3, 1879, he deals with his "The New Phenomenology"

"Every man lives in a present, and contemplates a past and future. In this consists his whole life. The future and past are shadows both, the present is the only real. Yet in the contemplation of the shadows is the real wholly occupied; and without the shadows this real has for us neither life nor value. No more universal fact of consciousness can be mentioned than this fact, which therefore deserves a more honorable place in Philosophy than has been accorded to it. For it is in view of this that all men may be said to be in some sense Idealists." (*FE* 31; *MS* 123)

On April 9 - "a new experience of emotional character has so entered consciousness that much result for thought may be in future expected." (124)

"The Methods of Systematic Thought" runs for over two pages (124-126).

At 128: On July 19, "Instead of the term 'Principle of Knowledge', it would be far more proper to make use of the term 'Constitutive Principle', thereby implying at once a reminiscence of Kant and an opposition to him." Royce then goes on to discuss his meaning of constitutive. (129) He tries to get down to the concrete reality of the present. He cites Baumann, to whom he has referred during this period.

After referring to C. S. Peirce on July 25 (*FE* 32), he writes next day, "The Chapter on the Elements of Knowledge will be essentially the same in doctrine as was the essay on "The

Principles.” [his dissertation] (page 131)

Sept.3, he notes: “The Forms of Being: Individuality, Organism, Progress, all three may be found in double manifestation, as unconscious, and as conscious. Thing, Person; Structure, Association; Growth, Self-development. – The same activity of Thought postulates both kinds of manifestations.” (page 133)

Page 134-35, on Plato.

Page 135: A subdivision: “The Doctrine of Being.” The first part has ten chapters. The second part has 18 plus at least three more. Then a third part.

October 21, instructor Royce writes

“All knowledge is, as rational knowledge, symbolic. The regard knowledge literally is to reflect on the content of any moment of consciousness as existing in and for itself, as independent of the content of all other moments. To regard one content as occupying a definite place in the world of thought or of being, is to regard this content symbolically, or as a symbol of an external and objective content.— Using terms with a consciousness of their symbolic force we may say that the Real is made up of an infinity of past, present and future contents of consciousness, each however not real qua past present or future, but real eternally and qua timeless and eternal.” (136-37)

[FMO: Royce’s insight into the present as actual with the past and future as postulated “extensions” is fundamental.]

“There are no atomic beings, no monads in the world. The world is an aggregate of simultaneous truths.” (137)

Page 139: Royce sets out Propositions of Philosophy, but begins “anew” December 11, and goes into the use of antinomies. This ends what diary notes we have.

Pages 151-212

Royce completes the later half, “N – V,” (of the record of his earlier readings) by pasting his index cards in order into the last third of this notebook. The earliest date appearing on the cards appears to be 1875. [For the first half of these “notes on readings,” see Box 125, folder 9.]

Evaluation: Both “Meditations Before the Gate” and “The New Phenomenology” are extremely important, both autobiographically and doctrinally. The entire collection of cards from his past readings is “a must read” for any Royce scholar.

[**Note:** the following folders 6 to 12 were not examined by the “dig” team.]

Folder 6: “Thesis notes for students in Philosophy 4, ca. 1883-84”

Folder 7: “Notes on Kant. Graduate Course, October 1887”

Folder 8: “Cosmology. General Outlines. Notebook 1, 1890-91”

Folder 9: “Cosmology. Expositions for Lectures. Notebook II, 1890-91”

Folder 10: “Cosmology. 1892-93.”

Folder 11: “Notes on Introduction to Philosophy, 1892-1893, 1895-1896.”

Folder 12: “Notes on the History of Modern Psychology, 1893.”

Box 127: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Lectures on Ethical Ideals in Relation to Society. Notebook.”

A small (3" x 5") leather soft-covered notebook. Not dated. But this seems to contain Royce's 1883 lectures, when he starts at Harvard. See *Life* at 115.

Evaluation: Interesting.

Folder 2: “Lecture IV.”

A small (3" x 5") leather soft-covered notebook. (This cover has a different leather pattern than the notebook in folder 1 in this Box.) Several pages are cut out from the book's front at several intervals. On the first page remaining, Royce writes “Lecture IV.” The “lecture” is undated. The pages are not numbered.

Why it is called “Lecture IV,” we don't know. But it seems to be a big discovery. This manuscript raises the question for scholars whether it might be the text of the Fourth of Royce's *RAP* lectures of 1883 at Harvard.

The writing is deeply autobiographical. The introduction begins:

“No moment of life seems to us more solemn than that in which we first determine to revise some trustfully accepted creed of childhood. The foundations of the Great Deep are broken up. The old life of simple faith lies behind us. We can no longer rest there. We look out into the darkness of a world that is not now enlightened by happy confidence. We know not where we shall find peace. We know not whether we are doing well or ill, whether we are heroes or wretches. Of freedom of thought we have as yet very little clear conception. We have found out how to doubt. Even that is a new lesson and a painful one. We have reached our first valley of humiliation.

“In this little valley we cannot long remain. It is marvelous how soon we find doubting an easy, even a delightful task. Nobody becomes mature in doubting so fast as the man that has abandoned a very lengthy creed, and that therefore has a great deal to doubt. Nobody is so proud of his mental work as the man that has performed the feat of

doubting the significance of whatever his friends think to be most sacred. Such a man finds himself soon able to spend days in barely naming the things that seem to him doubtful. To be sure he generally leaves geometry and physical sciences out of the list of things doubtful; but he does this not so much because he is unequal to the task of doubting them, but because they do not seem to him quite worth doubting. There is nothing very sacred about them; the move nobody's feelings.

"This stage of the pride of doubt we all pass through our way to the study of philosophy. I do not despise that stage. I find it as admirable as it is amusing. It is the period of the growth of the wings of thought. We do well to plume our features a good deal even while they are still very downy.

"But after a while it occurs to us that not the mere fact of doubting, but the aim and method of doubting are the important things. Thorough-going doubt is an essential preliminary to sound philosophic study. But doubting is like raking the ashes from an old fire before adding fresh coal. When one is first promoted to the childish dignity of making over a fire, he may raise more dust with the ashes than other people think pleasant, he may also rake out both the ashes and the fire. But by and by one learns that the ash heap and the cloud of dust are not the sole objects of the work and that raking ashes is a fine art. Just so one comes in time to regard doubting as not an end. Then one begins to philosophize in earnest. Useful fruitful doubt is a delicate and difficult task.

"I repeat, doubt is essential to all our philosophic progress. But bare brute doubting without constructive effort is a task that anybody can learn, just as even the humblest of us knows how to put out a fire. But the genuine philosophic doubt is of a different sort. It is founded on careful analysis. It is the expression of a demand for clearness and consistency of thought. It is in itself often half the work of construction, just as cleaning the grate properly is half the work of making the new fire. Happy the man who knows what kind of doubt to cultivate. Happy the agnostic whose agnosticism is of that careful, reasoned [?] cautious kind which enables him clearly to define of what sort are the things that in any direction he does not know. To doubt effectively is to find in the ashes the glowing coals that shall light the new fire of assurance. Honor, then, the enthusiasm of the ardent doubter, but by all means keep him hard at work. A doubter has one mission in this world, viz. to help us to form an independent philosophy, just as a stylographic pen has one mission in the world, to make us independent of our inkstand. A lazy doubter is like most stylographic pens, which persuade us to leave behind our inkstand whose ink flows not when you most need it, even as the lazy doubter has nothing to give you just when your thought most needs help."

The experience described here seems parallel to the sentiment Royce described in a letter to George Buchanan Coale, December 5, 1881, where he described when he first doubted. "I remember the failing at heart when I first had to throw overboard my little old creed" (*Letters*, 104-105)

Section I deals with a critique of religious beliefs, using the method of science (although we have no "science" of dreams and resentments and things like that.) He will use this section to get into math and physics.

"Mechanics, like all the rest, has two parts" "The whole of mechanics depends on the

description of emotion dependent on the point of view from which you regard.” Royce’s perspectivalism begins to show. He considers Maxwell and Milton, the rotation of the earth on its axis (how to prove that?). How does dynamics, the second part of mechanics, come to a chronology of forces? “What is the origin of the universe? The whole aim of dynamics is to be able to predict. The effort to explain these forces in the simplest way possible lies at the heart of dynamics. Natural laws don’t change. What we say of nature is true for all time.” (Royce is already inclined to go along with Peirce on this issue.)

Royce’s reference to having raised an issue “at the last time” (at the fourth to the last page) would imply that he is offering a series of lectures. [See his confession of finding his “religious insight” around January 1883.

Royce continues:

“I pointed out at the last time how this postulate which seems to me not a result of experience, but only a demand, only an ultimate need of our thought, without which nothing of thought can be justified, how this postulate helps us to understand in a sense otherwise impossible the nature and the possibility of [“thought” crossed out] truth and error. Not for the sake of fantastic speculation, but because of a need of my thought which I cannot otherwise satisfy, I am inclined to see in this postulate of one universal all-embracing thought or consciousness the great postulate of philosophy. But I do not want to force it upon you. I only suggest it. I want still to suggest the use of it.

“Possibly you cannot accept that postulate. Possibly you will not use this all-embracing universal consciousness. If so you are wel-”

[At this point a page is torn out.] All the afore-going quotations occur in about the last six pages of this notebook. In it no Section II occurs. He ends, before the conclusion below, by shifting into a religious insight. How does he move to this “all embracing consciousness”?

“And so it is fair to say that whenever we find law or unity in facts we are in so far nearer to the absolute truth. And therefore we do well to postulate that any law once found is more apt to continue true than is any mere lawless chaos of phenomena apt to return.* In assuming law we have on our side that the highest thought at least as united and complete as our highest ideal of unity and completeness. Even so when we assume this all embracing thought, we do right to assume that moral truth corresponding to our highest ideals of morality means at least as much for that all embracing thought as it does for us. And this is but the religious assumption. If truth of any sort is objective, not merely subjective, then it is realized in the all embracing conscious thought. Moral truth is then realized,” [At this point a page torn out.]

[Royce here sounds as if he was already thinking with Peirce’s law of the gradual predominance of order over chaos.]

The notebook ends with this on the back cover:
“by the use of the considerations, just suggest ...

Conclusion. Position assumed:

1. Morality as service of the universal consciousness.
2. Human nature tending to morality when free developed.
3. The external world as conscious thought answering alike the highest scientific & the highest religious ideals.
4. Purpose of lecturer, to excite interest & to suggest that these questions are more complex than usually supposed.”

Evaluation: This is early material, and **is important**. This raises some questions for the editorial board whether this more likely is the Fourth of his *RAP* lectures at Harvard in 1883; and if this seems more likely, how does it affect the *RAP* book?

Folder 3: “Guide for Thesis Work in Philosophy 4 ca. 1882-1883”

The second of two guides. The first is found above in this Box at Folder 1. Phil. 4 is Royce’s Ethics class.

Folder 4: “Philosophy 3 Class Rolls and Notes; Fragmentary “California” Notes; Philosophy 13 Class Roll – ca. 1886-1887; Notes on Spinoza; Spencer”

A List of Contents:

Logic note on inside front cover.

A fragile, hard backed notebook, 5: x 8”. On the inside cover page, notes for an exam for this class. (A logical formula is jotted on this inside cover as well.) The sheets in this book have for the most part come loose from their binding.

These are sketches of lectures, rather than manuscripts of lectures.

Some loose sheets with class rolls, then handwritten notes on the Sutter Case (it would be interesting to know if it is included in the *California* book. There are about 10 pages on Sutter. Then, he moves into “Lecture Sketches” (dated October 1, 1886), headed The Philosophy of Nature. The pages are not numbered.

The third lecture is dated October 6. Lectures 4 and 5 are dated October 8. Detailed entry into the historical method. The lectures proceed numerically.

A few very interesting doodles in this notebook. (Not seen in other manuscripts and notebooks.)

On the back of an interesting illustration (Christina of Sweden?), some notes on Spinoza.

At Lecture XIV, he moves to illustrate passages of his correspondence. On November 12, he moves into Spinoza’s “modes.”

Interspersed are some student grades.

Then, on February 14 (the “second half of the year”), he comes to “Idealism & Spencer.” Many pages of reflection are given as background preparatory to studying Spencer directly. Royce talks of Spencer’s essays, “Progress, its Law and Causes.”

Then, the notebook pages break back to notebooks on California. He takes notes from the “Nat. Intelligencer,” with different date notes relating to incidents in California. (Data, perhaps, for his book.) He includes notes on emigration, e.g. “Calif. 13000, Americans 32,500, Foreigners 18600” and other population notes.

Included are what appear to be seating charts for his class.

Notes for his Phil. 3 class (roll and notes).

Lecture II (Oct 6, 1886): Royce is now in his second year as a regular teacher.

The notebook closes with Phil. 3 Psychology (“second half of year”) and six pages of notes on psychology. On the inside back cover is an apparent seating chart for Phil. 13, with notes as to whether they are juniors or seniors.

Folder 5: “Kant Lectures 1888-1889”

List of Contents:

The introductory lecture is dated “Oct. 2 ‘88”. Royce is back from Australia.

The notes evidently are for a seminar. A note to himself, at one point: “Follow the note-book on Kant, Fasc. I. in this part”

At one point he turns the page sideways to note a number “7” in which he describes Kant’s philosophy of nature. He moves on to, *inter alia*, a critique of causation. All the notes are on the *early* Kant. “As metaphysician in this period, Kant’s greater work is the *Nova Dilucidatio* of 1755.”

Royce enters into a distinction: “Real causation, requiring a priori basis for every contingent thing, differs from logical foundation, which lays not stress on the real time order, but only upon the order of our knowledge [Germ here of Kant’s coming empirical theory of knowledge].”

Then Royce goes into Leibniz, perhaps Kant’s encounter with Leibniz. Then he moves into Kant’s Second Period, and assigns reading in that regard. (The date is Oct. 23.) Then he takes the students through the “Plan of [Kant’s] essay of 1770” and views of the *Ding an Sich*. The notebook ends with a group of blank pages.

Evaluation: Interesting for a Kant scholar.

Box 128: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

(10 cards) Psychology. Philosophy. [Two groups of cards], ca.1892-1895.

(118 cards) Progress, Philosophic, undated.

Box 129: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: Student Gradebook, ca 1892-1895

Folder 2: Philosophy 12 (First Half) , ca 1892-1895
Heavy on Kant, and the *Ding an Sich*

Folder 3: Hegel’s *Phaenomenologie*. Lecture Course of 1889-1890

Royce starts by revealing Hegel’s roots in Fichte and Schelling

***Folder 4:** “Lecture III on Religious Philosophy. Philosophy Notes. Ca. 1892-1895”

A small (5" by 7") hard-backed notebook., with many pages torn out and MS not paginated. The date above (**1892-1895**) is misleading. Royce’s handwriting here seems early. It is, however, well before 1892. Clendenning suggests that this is part of one of Royce’s early Harvard lectures of 1883. (*Life*, 115, 392) The notebook itself makes no reference to which series of lectures it belongs but “Lecture III on Rel. Phil.” is written on the notebook’s cover. In verso, a list of students, with Royce adding each one’s intentions for their futures.

Autobiographical material here. Royce begins by referring (pp. 3-4) to *Evidences against Christianity*, the work of a Californian author he knows [likely John S. Hittell]. Royce finds him exemplifying what some call “freedom of thought.” Against this author, he says that pure freedom is unanimity because “All freedom is relative” to the postulates and purposes of thought. He invites his students to engage in genuine philosophy.

The final page of the last lecture concludes this way:

“Leave then for the time all your problems about providence and about a future state, about the origin of evil and the worth of life, until you have contemplated this sublime assumption of modern thought, with which we have a philosophy, without which we have not even science, but only an irrational nonsense of subjective imaginations. Contemplate this which [page torn] eternally is and then [page torn] be no more at a loss [page torn] a religious aspect in [page torn] reality. {Echo of Spinoza}

Choices:

- I. Faith
- II. Scepticism
- III. Idealism

Result:

- I. Augustinianism

- II. True judgments are God's thoughts
- III. All truth, all art, all possibility of good, realized in God.
- IV. We are in the midst of the spirit we are not alone."

Folder 5: Notes of System of Philosophy 1888, Theism Course of 1884 [fragments of notes], 1884, 1888.

This dating misleads. True, Royce entitled the front-cover of this Notebook, "Fragments of Lecture-Notes. Theism (course of 1884)." **NB**, however, that at least the first 25 sheets of this notebook (approximately 50 pages or more) have been cut away from its front. And on same front cover, Royce later added: "(See Other End of Book for other notes of more value)" Evidently, in 1888, when packing for his Australian voyage, Royce found this notebook still had many blank pages, and at some time cut away the Notes of his 1884 Theism course. Hence, *in verso*, this notebook starts from Barque Freeman, 1888, and offers reflections during his "trip down under" and after until July 14th, 1889. So, we find written in ink:

"Barque Freeman Apr. 5, '88" [On this first day of using this notebook aboard, Royce outlines on 16 unnumbered pages a projected book of 17 chapters. A noteworthy inclusion: Royce adds a Ch. XIV : "The *Principium Individuationis*"—a topic of much concern seven years later.]

Next day, Apr. 6th, Royce writes 4 pp., starting with his]: "supreme individual of the contemplative consciousness, i.e., as the universal thought. . . for which moreover the world is a world of differential co-efficients {--of facts analogous in nature to differential co-efficients}" [parenthesis inserted in pencil, likely on a later reading. In this metaphysical musing Royce uses the idea of analogy as well as mathematics: "differential co-efficients." [[Ntbk, page 17]

Next entry, back home, "Cambridge, Oct. 31, '88" [p. 21] "Theses,--Uniting [Necessity] & Freedom." There follows a nine page effort, expressing 21 theses of which the last numbered states: "21. But we do not affect one another save as spiritual beings. My fate is fixed, so is yours. But I can comment selectively on my fate, illuminating this or that fact . . . & I can affect your comment on your fate." (29)

p. 31: "Dec. 25, 1888" [Royce plans a treatise which he entitles "The Philosophical Problems of the Present Day" to consist of 3 books and 16 chapters. [on 10 sheets, 19 pp.]

"July 3, 1889: Outline of a System of Philosophy" comprised of 4 books, 24 chapters.

"July 14 [1889?] "No, a mere system won't do. It must be in the form of a confession as thus:

"**A Philosophical Confession**" which leads Royce via 4 pages into an outline of 4 Books (of which Book I shows 7 chapters in some detail, whereas the remaining Books show titles only, yet interestingly: "Book III. The World as Will. Book IV. The World as Life."

Last page (inserted from another notebook) "Outline: An Essay on Teleology."

Folder 6: Notes on the Vocabulary of Hegel, ca 1892-1895

The vocabulary comes after a philosophical contrast of Spinoza's thought with Hegel. Royce

prefers Hegel. [The 1892 date fits Royce's acknowledgement that Hegel's influence on his thought reached its high-water mark in 1892.] Remainder of MS treats Hegel's basic terminology. Royce gives especial attention to *Negativitat*. Royce references Hegel's *Logik* far more frequently than the *Phaenomenlogie* (of which FMO uncovered only one reference).

Folder 7: Bunyan, ca 1892-1895

Notes which led to Royce's 1894 article, "The Case of John Bunyan," reprinted in *SGE* 29-75.

Folder 8: Psychology Notes, 1891

A 3" x 5" yellow note adds, "May 14 1891."

Folder 9: Notes on Metaphysics, ca 1892-1895

"Notes on Metaphysics"—"Philosophy in Outline." Hegelian echoes ring here. Feeling now gets explicit attention, adding balance to reason and will.

Folder 10: Devices for Holding the Rhythm, ca. 1892-1895

Shows Royce as an experimental psychologist.

Folder 11: Notes and letters. [Includes correspondence about arrangement of Royce materials], 1895-1904

Includes the E. F. Wells and FMO correspondence which contains important remarks by Wells on his non-reflective way in which he went about his job of mounting the Royce MSS into 97 folio volumes.

Folder 12: Ph.D. Reform [5c?] Powers of Division Comm., ca. 1891

Most of this Notebook consists of blank pages in its middle. Eight pages at the beginning concern reform of the PhD program. In verso, 10 pages contain Royce's "Notes on Miss Thompson's Thesis on Fichte."

Folder 13: Examination Work of Benjamin Rand {Exam schedule and questions}, 1891-1897

B. Rand's research and evidence regarding question of reforming PhD program. [*See* folder 12 above.]

Folder 14: Outlines of a System of Philosophy, ca. 1895

Another proposal for a book, this one of 24 chapters. Final chapter "XXIV. The World as Divine Tragedy."

Folder 15: Royce's Argument for the Absolute, 1889

2 typescripts of William James's counter-claim to Royce's Argument, along with an envelope sketching WJ's plan for rest of his Phil 9. No hint of Royce's Response.

[Note to the Critical Edition Committee: Were this to be included in the Critical Edition, it would require special attention to Royce's response, with particular attention to his main point amid his subordinate points. Ralph Barton Perry missed this "arrow" of attention. FMO]

Folder 16: Philosophy 15, Plans, 1903

On pages 9-16 of this notebook, Royce plans his 1903 Phil. 15 course, dating page 9 with "1903." [NB: This plan sounds bland compared with Royce's plan for Phil 15 in his May 1903 letter from Catalina Island to Richard C. Cabot (23 pp.) in which Royce intends a large-scale revision of his next teaching of Phil. 15. This Notebook, then, seems penned in early 1903 before Royce left with his son Stephen for California.]

Folder 17: Philosophy 9, [Metaphysics]. 1906-1906

This plan of Royce's Phil. 9 for 1906 grows into a plan for a Book-like course of 27 chapters, consisting of 90 lectures, tabulated in margin by Royce. In verso, cover marked "1906-07"; and within an "Opening Statement Plan" and a roster showing "E. [Edward] Royce" as a class member.

Folder 18: Diaries of Seminaries for Philosophy 20f Methods, for Philosophy 20c Logic, and for Philosophy 1c Elementary Logic, 1906-1910

Folder 19: [Untitled Notes in two groups], ca 1895-1916]

First group seems another Royce diary of a seminary.. Second so-called "group" has 2 parts: a) one fragmentary page (69) on "Self-reflective Knowledge"; and b) 3 pages on the logic of a "Universe of the First Order" but **NB** the **if** these 3 pp are Royce's writing, he was using an unusually fine pen whose result is chicken-like scratching.

Folder 20:

- **Philosophy 20c, Class List and Records, 1904-1905**
- **Philosophy 20c, Plan, 1904-1905**
- **Philosophy 15, Logic, Advanced. 1903-1904, 1903-1904**

A large 8" x 10" notebook. Pages 1- 58 = Phil 15, Advanced Logic, 1903-1904. Midway in course, Royce takes his students into symbolic logic. Page 60= Plan for Phil 20c in Royce's 1904-1905 course. Pages 61-101 = Royce's diary of seminary in Phil 20c + one inserted page (339) showing seminary members' names and topics for presentational.

Folder 21: Philosophy 9, Grade Sheet, 1906-1907

Royce gave no student a pure "A". Loewenberg and two others received "A-'s:" Several "D-'s." No "F's."

Folder 22: Philosophy 9. [Notebook and class listings], 1908-1909

Third meeting: “Oct. 8 [1908]: “problem of the course” [is] “the difference between the what & the that ... [between] nature or character or essential, and existentia, or reality.” At 5th meeting and thereafter, Royce describes in more detail his “**reflective method**” illustrating how we treat our experience in two ways: a)describing it; or b) trying to control it (with a future bearing that is pragmatic)

Folder 23: Philosophy 2. Logic and Psychology, undated

Implicitly dated by Royce’s labeling this notebook “Josiah Royce, 14 Sumner St., Cambridge” Therefore, written during Royce’s first home in Cambridge. In this course eventually takes these students into basic symbolic logic.

Box 130: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: Philosophy 15, 1908-1909

Folder 2: Philosophy 20c Seminary, 1911-1912

Seminary members included George page Adams and Norbert Wiener. On Feb. 27, 1912, [during the period following Royce’s apoplexy attack], Prof. L. J. Henderson presented “Fitness in Biology” to the seminary.

Folder 3: [Exam questions and other notes], ca 1900-1907

Folder 4: [Untitled notebook with alphabetical tabs], ca. 1895=1916

Folder 5: Committee on Normal Course, ca. 1892-1895

Folder 6: Diary, 1901

Folder 7: Correspondence from Royce’s students regarding publication of Harry T. Costello’s notebook by Rutgers University Press [Grover Smither, ed.]

Folder 8: Letters to the faculty at Harvard’s philosophy department, 1896-1898

Folder 9: Assignments of Royce’s students and correspondence, 1904-1905 and undated

Box 131: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

This box includes folders of notes from the Nancy Hacker collection. Full of biographical information.

Folder 1: “Seminary in Comparative Methodology. [notes of Harry T. Costello] 1913-14]

These are 274 pages of Costello’s notes from this well-known Royce seminar, now published via editor Grover Smith. Folder contains duplicated copies of Costello’s notes. A very interesting picture of Royce at this time emerges with people like T.S. Eliot and Norbert Weiner in the seminary.

A note in red pencil, with the initial “G.S.” and dated 1961 reads. “Marginal queries are in nearly all cases those of the typist who prepared a typescript.”

Folder 2: “Ethics manuscript by Rome G. Brown”

A thick typescript, probably a dissertation, entitled “Evolutional Ethics: A Criticism of the Spencerian Theory of the Basis of moral Distinctions.” Royce may have served on Brown’s dissertation board.

Folder 3: “Josiah Royce [Sr.] 1812-1888 General biography, obituary genealogical chart”

Apparently a tribute by Sarah Eleanor and one of her daughters to their husband/father.

Folder 4: “Rochester NY. Royce, 1845, 1846-1845 [Bayliss]

Folder 5: “Iowa to California, 1849 April – October Typed Summaries”

Excerpts from *The California Trail, an Epic with Many Heroes*, by George Stewart (1962). Reference to a famous trail guide which many ‘49ers used. Many of these incidents are drawn from SER’s *A Frontier Lady*.

Folder 6: “Placerville, Weaverville, Mississippi Bar California undated Typed excerpts”

Folder 7: “Another Josiah Royce? Nancy Hacker inquires about land transactions”

Apparently, Nancy Hacker was looking in Shasta County to see if there had been Royce family property transactions there.

Folder 8: “Contra Costa County 1852 census information, lawsuit”

Copy of the lawsuit against Josiah Royce [Sr.]

Folder 9: “Auburn, CA Summaries of newspaper articles and interview notes”

Hacker notes include list of churches in Auburn (and notes about Sarah Eleanor’s

denominational affiliation).

Folder 10: “Grass Valley, CA undated summaries and excerpts”

Town plans and land deeds, plus Hacker typewritten notes.

Folder 11: “Nevada 1962- 1965 Letter from Josiah Royce Sr. to his brother, inquiries about land transaction”

This is Nevada County, not the state. A well known letter from Josiah to his brother Robert. The folder contains a map, including I-80. (The environs of Grass Valley.) Copies of pages from a book that describes towns in the area.

Folder 12: “San Francisco 1865-1870 City directory information and church attendance information”

Handwritten Hacker notes, more information about where the Royce family lived, etc.

Folder 13: “Los Gatos 1881-1888? Newspaper photo of town”

This is the home of Sarah and Ruth after Royce leaves. TA white frame house one and a half stories high. This is the home where his father, Josiah Royce senior, died.

A newspaper photo of two buildings on West Main Street (including the “Christian Church” founded in 1884).

A letter from the minister of the Christian Church in Los Gatos.

Folder 14: “San Jose 1889-1891”

Where Ruth Royce (Royce’s sister) was a librarian. Sarah Eleanor is buried here, alongside her husband. (She died in 1891) in the Oak Hill Memorial Mortuary. A map of the cemetery.

Folder 15: “Mary Eleanor Royce”

Royce’s oldest sister, who went on to marry Ossian Ingraham. Included in this folder, an 1866 manuscript in her hand called “Government.” A manuscript and typescript of “Our Sitting Room.” A manuscript dated 1865 titled “My Room.” A graduation certificate as well, with her “Standing in Examination.”

There is another manuscript with various sub-headings (“My Sister”, “The Ass”, “The Cow”, “My History” “Silver”) that appear to be much earlier than the others. All the entries are signed “MER” Here are the texts of these pieces:

My Sister

I have a little sister I love her very much she has Golden hair and dark blue eyes.
And I call her my darling pet. Her name is Ruth and it is plain and mother says

'tis a Quaker name. I love her to [*sic*] well to part with her. She is the pet of us all we call her the pet girl and Josiah the pet boy. She loves us all very much.

The Ass

The ass is a very useful animal and very patient, too. I once read that when an ass wishes to go down a steep [?] place, he stops and brings his hind feet and his forefeet together and slides right down. It would be very dangerous for his rider to try to guide him and would be likely to prove fatal to both. The Bible speaks of the Ass. There was a very wicked man named Balaam and a king named Balah. Balah wished Balaam to prophesy against the children of Israel but God would not let him. But he got on his ass and went to do it. God sent an angel from heaven and it stood with his sword in his hand. The ass was afraid of him and would not go on and her driver struck her. The angel went between two walls and the ass frightened and ran against the wall and hurt Balaam's foot. Then he struck her again and she sank down on her knees. Balaam struck her again. Then she spoke to him saying. "What have I done to thee that thou has smitten me this 3 times?" Balaam [the page ends here. Incomplete MS]

The Cow

The Cow is very useful. If it were not for the cow, we could not have any good milk. The goat gives us milk, but is not so good as the cos. Boys and sometimes men will throw stones at and annoy this useful and harmless creature. That is not right. It is wrong to hurt anything which God has made. Especially an animal which is so useful as the cow. I think we never be thankful enough to God for all the mercies he gives us.

Grammar

English grammar teaches us to read and write the English language correctly. We should not speak very well without some knowledge of it. There are nine parts of speech. Viz. the noun, article, adjective, Pronoun Verb, adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, Interjection. All these parts of speech we ought to learn about and when we have learned about them all we shall be pretty good grammarians. We ought to be very thankful to God for all the privileges he gives us of learning.

Silver

Silver is a metal very commonly used for coin. It is found in Russia and in Brazil, and some is found in California. It is not as valuable as gold. But every dime we get helps to make up the dollars and if we save all we get we will be rich. But we must not be selfish we must do all the good we can with our money. I think we ought to be very thankful to God for he is very kind to us.

My History

I was born in Rochester New York on the 23 of November. We stayed in New York seven or eight months. Then we went to visit at my Grand. Father's awhile. After that we went to my Uncle's house and stayed all winter My cousin and I used to play together. Clara for that was m cousin's name was one year and a half older than I. We used to go to the cupboard and get something to eat. My Uncle was a cabinet maker and so everything in his house was very nice. After we had stayed there we went out west and went to Iowa and my mother taught the Public school. You may think she had trouble with her scholars but she did not have but one occasion to punish the whole winter. We stayed in Iowa six or seven months and then we started for California on the last day of April. The day we started was very pleasant but while we were going through Iowa it rained very hard. It took us one month and four days to go through Iowa and five months more to get to California. We rode in covered wagon drawn by oxen. We were several times surrounded by Indians but they did not hurt us. We stayed at Salt Lake City ten days and then we went on the way. We got to the mines of California on the 24th of October.

Also included, a couple of letters apparently written by Mary to her daughter Stella.

Also, a letter with a note by Ruth Ingraham (Mary's daughter) writing about her mother.

Folder 16: "Ruth Royce"

Biographical notes (Hacker) on this Royce sister. A handwritten copy (by Ruth?) of Longfellow's "Footsteps of Angels." Newspaper articles on her resignation (after 37 years) as librarian of the "State Normal School." (San Jose State college)

There are two letters in this folder from "Aunt Ruth" to "Roy," one dated May 25 1890, and one dated July 7 1892. A letter dated March 11, 1929 (the year she died) to "Nancy."

Folder 17: "Harriet Royce [Barney]"

Biographical information. Harriet married Charles S. Barney, and had one son, Roy (Charles Royce Barney). She worked as an insurance saleswoman. Roy apparently served in World War I (he wrote a poem included here). She is called Hattie

Harriet's death certificate. She died in February 1930, soon after Ruth's death (November 1929). There is a picture of Harriet's daughter-in-law ("Mrs. Royce Barney").

Folder 18: "Other Royces"

Extended Royce relatives, genealogy collected by Nancy Hacker.

Folder 19: “Loose material 1979-1985 1 of 5 folders undated”

Confirmation of the Hacker collection as source of these notes in this box. (A letter, e.g., to “Dear Cousin Nancy”)

Biographical material.

First document reflects the Royce pew at the First Congregational Church in Oakland. Other documents reflect Nancy Hackers notes, copies of articles, etc., dealing with such issues as church attendance, DAR records, etc. There are some handwritten notes as to genealogy of the Royce clan. (Royce had three uncles, and three aunts ... siblings of his father.)

Folder 20: “Loose material 1854-1889 and undated 2 of 5”

More Hacker biographical material.

Folder 21: “Loose Material 1976, 1997 3 of 5 folders”

More Hacker biographical material regarding the Royce family.

Folder 22: “Loose Material 1954-1972 4 of 5 folders”

More Hacker biographical and genealogical material regarding the Royce family. This folder deals with the Head family (Katharine’s family) and “Clements”. One letter begins “Dear ‘HEAD-hunter’”.

Folder 23: “Loose Material Reese River Reveille [newspaper] 5 of 5 folders 1976”

A sample of the newspaper where Royce family lived.

Folder 4: “Oakland 1873-1881”

Dates just before Royce started going to UC. Hacker has made notes from the Oakland California Directories for this period of time. By 1875, there is no Royce left.

“Oakland, California, Directories

1876-7. Josiah Royce, provisions, res 960 Clay

1877-8. S.E. Royce, res. W s San Pablo av nr Twenty-second

1878-9 Royce, S.E. Mrs. Res N s 25h bet Telegraph and Grove

1880-81. Royce, Sarah E. Mrs. Res. 523 Thirty-sixth

1873: Royce, Josiah, traveling trader, dwl. S s Washington near Clay

1874. Royce, Josiah, produce dealer, dwl. W s 26th bet. Broadway and Telegraph

1875-76. No Royce.”

Letters 60-61, Royce to Gilman, September 16 1878: “I find affairs at my home quite satisfactory; with one exception, the permanent ill-health of my father, now quite advanced in years. He has long been in failing strength.”

Box 132: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

More Nancy Hacker papers, relating to the Ingraham family. (Nancy Hacker is descended from Royce’s sister Mary, whose married name was Ingraham.)

Box 133: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

More genealogical information from Nancy Hacker.

Folder 5: “Correspondence 1967-1983 Nancy Hacker”

Extensive correspondence on genealogical issues. Much of the correspondence is with a “Betty Kanouse” of Los Angeles CA. (Betty and Ed.)

Folder 10: “Ohio 1977-1980”

The first document deals with land records in Ohio (and the Bazier/Brazier family). More correspondence with Betty Kanouse.

Folder 12:

Contains very detailed genealogy chart.

Box 134: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Family Correspondence, the Crystal Falls Collection.

Folder 1: “Date Unidentified (1)”

Family correspondence from Katharine to Josiah, e.g., when their children are at camp. Also one of Ned to Royce “Papa”, Oct. 3 [1914] from Middlebury College; Ned reports “Elizabeth and the children could perfectly safely return [during a health threat]. Ned adds. “I am giving six courses” and adds many other musical activities.

Folder 2: “Date Unidentified (2)”

Family correspondence, Katharine to her sons, Anna Head (Katharine’s sister) to KR. (“Kitty is coming back...”), one to “Dear Puppy.” A letter from the Nevada Land Company. Many from Marion (Stephen’s wife)

Folder 3: “Date Unidentified (3)”

Extensive family correspondence (“huge stockpile”). With Katharine Royce as principle recipient

Eliza Head (Katharine Royce’s mother) to Katharine. Stephen to his mother. Letter to Stephen. From Ned to Katharine Royce (from the Hotel Manhattan.) Letter from Bessie Sill [?] (wife of E. R. Sill?) to Mrs. Head.

Folder 4: “Date Unidentified (4)”

Correspondence, circa 1881-89, among the Head women. Letters to Katharine Royce, from her mother, Eliza, in San Francisco. Katharine to her sister Anna. Some commemorating the births of different boys.

Also, an apparent letter from Stephen to “Mama.”

Possibly, a letter from Judge Edward Head to his wife Eliza (KR’s mother) at Brookline, MA, during her visit East

Folder 5: “Date Unidentified (5)”

More correspondence. Letters from Eliza (to Katharine and to her husband) mixed in with later letters from Katharine’s daughters-in-law, Elizabeth and Marion .”(Nan”)..

Much from Eliza to Katharine (dear Kitty.... [signed] Mother).

Also, a much later correspondence between Elizabeth (Ned’s first wife) and Katharine Royce about Randolph.

Then Marion Royce (Stephen’s wife) to Katharine, just before Royce’s death.

More from Elizabeth and Stephen.

A letter from Eliza to her husband, while she visited relatives in Brookline. (Apparently to him, back in private practice in San Francisco, after his judgeship?)

Fragile letter (contained in separate folder within folder 5) to “Dearest Stephen” from Nan (Marion) circa 1914 -15.)

about first-born Stephen, who “is a perfect mammoth”...”standing up.” “Pet took 3 steps alone today.”

Folder 6: “Date Unidentified (6)”

Mostly from “Nan” (Marion): Nan to Katharine Royce (“Puppsie”) or to Stephen. One note from Katharine to Nan. Correspondence, principally written by Marion (Stephen’s wife), with some correspondence to her and Stephen from various family members.

Interesting note: A letter from Anna Head (in Mill Valley) to Stephen and Marion, includes a “birth card” for Josiah Royce (IVth) dated July 19, 1920.

A postcard from Katharine to Stephen and Marion, with a snow scene with a Whittier quote.

Folder 7: “1862-1869”

Katharine, as a young girl (13), to her father from Brookline, reporting on Civil War in 1862 . She mentions her grandmother (the Head family is from Brookline) A message from Eliza (KR's mother) to Edward (the father) is attached.

Letters from Eliza to Edward, from Brookline.

A letter from Charles Head to his father. (1862), with more from Eliza attached.

Letters from Judge Head to his wife, and children.

Folder 8: "1870-1879"

More Head family correspondence. Charlie in New York to his mother (Eliza) in California. Judge Head to Anna at her brother Charles' house in Brookline. Other letters to Kitty. Much Eliza to Katharine Royce and to husband, Judge Edward Head.

Folder 9: "1880"

More correspondence to Anna at her brother's home in Brookline (from the Judge and Eliza). A letter from Eliza to Katharine ("Mrs. Josiah Royce"), newly married, new mother, in her first home in Cambridge at 14 Sumner Street. Mostly frequent writer Eliza Head to Anna Head.

Box 135: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

Folder 1: "1881-1884"

Head family correspondence. Anna is staying with her brother Charles in Brookline. Her parents write from Redwood.

Many letters from Judge and Eliza Head to Katharine.

Two letters from E.R. Sill, who has moved to Cayahoga Falls, Ohio, to E.F. Head in California. There has apparently been some discussion about how Annie is doing in Massachusetts, and where she should be living.

A letter from "Katharine Royce" to her mother in California.

Folder 2: "1885-1890"

Head family correspondence. Much writing from Eliza.

A letter from Charles Head to Josiah Royce, regarding his appreciation of Royce's *California*.

During this period, Josiah and Katharine move first to their Lowell Street address, then to 103 Irving Street.

A letter "to Eliza" from "your affectionate brother" Charles Head ... does Eliza have a brother named Charles? (After whom she has named her son Charles?)

A letter to Katharine from Eliza that has been seriously redacted (in black pen). The letter concerns the judge's illness. (May 1990)

Folder 3: "1891-1899"

Royce family correspondence:

Sarah Royce to Josiah (as well as a letter from Sarah's doctor to Royce describing her health).

Ruth Royce to Josiah.

Letter to Josiah from his nephew Roy Barney (Harriet's son).

Charles Head to Josiah.

Eliza Head to Christopher.

Charles Head ("Bankers and Brokers") to Josiah.

Charles Head to Josiah, on "The Headlands, Lake Champlain" stationery.

Letters from Katharine Royce to her husband (from South Yarmouth), one including a description of the servant girl Margaret, some describing how the boys are mistreated by other boys.

A letter from Eliza (in Belmont) to her daughter Katharine.

Letters from Charles Head to Royce.

Telegram from Ruth Royce to Josiah: "Mother died peacefully at nine fifteen this evening."

More from Eliza, many letters.

A letter from Ned to his grandmother Eliza.

A letter from Ned to his mother Katharine.

Folder 4: "1900"

Eliza Head letters. Katharine letters to the boys (103 Irving Street stationery), sons to Katharine.

Folder 5: "1901"

Katharine Royce letters to her sister Anna, in Greece (circa 1901). Eliza letters. Perhaps some from Ned ("Nenny-Penny"), and other sons to their mother. Some signed "Fuffy" to Stephen, Fuffy being what they called their mother, and what she sometimes called herself. (Many notes on stationery with black edging.)

Folder 6: "1902-1903"

Correspondence among Katharine and her sons. Correspondence from Stephen to his mother from California, and Catalina Island.

A letter from Royce (in Berkeley, July 28, 1902) to Stephen. Two full sheets, one half sheet. He signs the letter "Yours lovingly Josiah"

A letter to Stephen from Ruth Royce.

Folder 7: "1904-1905"

Correspondence among Katharine and her sons. Some, the boys to each other, some from the mother to the boys, some the boys to their mother. Also from Ruth Royce (in San Jose) to Stephen.

Folder 8: “1906-1910”

A letter written to Josiah Royce around the time of the earthquake. Signed “A.H.” (Anna Head). Reports on the safety of his sisters. (Although she is not sure about Harriet (? ... “your sister”), she knows Mary was in Carmel.)

Principally letters to and from Stephen:

A letter to Stephen Royce from one of his brothers (lots of doodles on it). A card sent, with his chemistry grades for the year (two B’s). Katharine letters to Stephen. Letters back to her. (To “Fuffy” and “Mummum” and “cunning little Fuffy”, at one point, from this time at the engineering school.) A Stephen letter to Fuffy and Papa.

Letter to Stephen from Ned in Germany, signed “E. Royce”.

Letter from Stephen to his father, from New York.

One letter from Ned to his mother.

Box 136: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “1911-1912”

After Christopher’s death, before Royce’s death.

A letter from Ned to his mother.

A letter from Harriet to “My Very Dear Brother” (Josiah).

A letter fragment from Elizabeth, in Bryan Texas (1911) to [not known, as first page not there]

Letter to Katharine from Stephen.

Ned to his father from Urbana Illinois.

Ned to his mother.

Letters from Stephen to his mother, and some to his father, from various points of his trip out west. Some typed, some by hand.

A letter from Ned, outlining his music program (Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Rachmaninoff, Chopin and his own work. One of which is called “Vineyard Sound.”)

Folder 2: “1913”

Stephen correspondence from out west.

Letters from Ruth to Josiah.

Letter from Katharine to Stephen.

A letter from Marion to Stephen, with a tribute to Josiah in saving their relationship (in the wake of the Ms. Grady scandal). (They will come to name their own son Josiah.)
Letters from Katharine to Stephen (no doubt about the business of the “broken” engagement).
More letters from Marion to Stephen.

Folder 3: “1914”

Family correspondence, principally from Stephen and Marion (newlyweds) to Katharine and Royce. Some letters back to them from Katharine. Some other material from Charles Head, a note from Elizabeth (Ned’s first wife). Also, a note to “K” (Katharine) from “HCH” in Berkeley. (In a letter in the next folder, she signs her entire name: Helen C. Huse” (sp?)

Folder 4: “1915 Jan-May”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce.

Folder 5: “1915 June-Sept”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce. The last letter in this folder, one from Stephen to his mother, outlining his financial situation.

Folder 6: “1915 Oct-Dec”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce. A letter here, also, from Hattie (Harriet) to “Dear Brother” (Josiah).

Box 137: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: 1916 January –March

Folder 2: 1916 April-June

Folder 3: 1916 July-December

Folder 4: 1917-1919

Folder 5: 1920 January-March

Folder 6: 1920 April-May

Folder 7: 1920 June-December

Box 138: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: 1921-1924

Folder 2: 1925-1929

Folder 3: 1930-1939

Folder 4: 1940-1944

Box 139: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

Folder 1: "Re: Christopher Royce"

A manuscript note from Jeanette L. Markhauser [sp?] to Royce about Christopher. The note is undated, with her address given as "6 Riedesel Avenue, Sunday evening."

"My Dear Dr. Royce,".....

Apparently last spring Royce had told her he'd "assume any extra expenses incurred for Christopher. Not wanting him to go as slowly as others (boys & girls) in French. Christopher has tutor in French, at \$35/year. Christopher might not accomplish as much here as in an all boy's school (more matter covered to high emulation) but he's "really doing very well in all his work He seems ambitious and earliest."

A second manuscript note from "Jeanette L. Markauser [sp?] 64 Buckingham St." to Royce, 2 sheets, an 8-sided MS. It says "Monday evening," but no date is given. Apparently, this is a day in January.)

"My dear Dr. Royce:

...

Christopher is coming late nearly every day since Xmas recess. We sent him home today. Need to be v. strict with Christopher. His work and behavior are both better when we are so.

He is most sweet and obedient in his attitude both to Miss Swift and myself. The only way that he ever really troubles is by being at times dreamy and absent-minded in his study time. Jeanette is trouble by painful doubts as to how much he ought to be interacted with when he is lost in his own thoughts."

She thinks Christopher's absent mindedness is a cause of his coming late. Maybe a word from Royce would help.

A letter to Royce from Hamilton Osgood, Boylston Street Boston 12/22/91 [4 sided MS]

"Dear Prof. Royce... "

He thanks him for bulletin re: "suggestion in its application" to Christopher. Had hoped for more

success. But doesn't see as a failure. Suggest Royce's daily assertion to Christopher in his waking state & "Morton's movements [method?] a command not to "make water" when he's asleep & press his bladder with the suggestion there would be no trouble, that power has come to him during sleep, that he "will have *no desire* to make water unless his inside [illegible]" when he will at once get up. Osgood mentions "Maton Movements" as "idiosyncratic... A merry Christmas to you all. Sincerely yours, Hamilton Osgood."

A second letter to Royce from Osgood.

"Wed. pm ... Christopher is a very interesting case, unlike any of my other subjects... Christopher remembers I've been talking, but doesn't recall what I said... Yet his limbs and fingers move constantly. Talks very maturely. Osgood asks Christopher to come at 9:30 tomorrow." H.O.

Folder 2: "Correspondence to and from Katharine Head Royce ~ 1900-1938"

This folder contains many loose documents. Documents to Katharine Royce are in the front part of the folder. Documents written by Katharine (they appear to be draft copies from which she typed) are included in a separate file within this folder.

FMO notes:

To Katharine:

NB. Continuing and saved correspondence from "Mary Cutis Richardson" (also known as "Molly" Richardson. Portrait painter eventually residing in San Francisco) from 1911 – 1922.

May 2, 1928 [Prof.] Hugh Miller [UCLA, Ernest C. Moore, Director] to Katharine Royce regarding the opening of "Royce Hall"

Miller, respecting KR's and Royce's explicit wishes regarding a Royce biography. Miller mentions "the books came safely, and many thanks for them." [are they Royce's books? Are they in UCLA Royce Hall enclosed cabinet? Or what?

From KR:

An interesting letter from Katharine to her son Ned, concerning some legal matters with his son (her grandson) Randolph. Because of an inheritance due him, lawyers have informed Katharine that Randolph (who is living with her) needs a "legal guardian." She offers to serve as his "legal guardian" (Randolph's parents at this point are only considered his "natural guardians"), and needs Ned's formal, witnessed consent in order to act in that capacity.

The draft of this letter, dated Mar. 28, 1934, from Katharine Royce to Ned reads as follows:

Dear Ned,

This letter is about a littler matter of business nothing to trouble you or me or to change existing arrangements at all, but as a matter of necessary & correct proceeding it has to be attended to – Please read this letter carefully twice through paying attention.

Sometime ago I received a letter from a Phila. Firm of lawyers stating that Randolph R. has (like his sister K) a “contingent interest” in the estate (or income of the estate) of Eliza S. Turner. She was Eliz. & Dorothy & Archer Randolph’s grandmother – 1st husband was Randolph 2nd husband Turner – I was asked if a legal guardian had been appointed for R. he being feebleminded – I said no, had not known it was necessary.

Reason why necessary – Archer Randolph whom we knew at college age has died leaving a son N.A. Randolph who is just now about to come of age and so will be inheriting his share of above estate & will be soon demanding an “accounting.”

The audit or accounting has to be held up until all interested parties (of which R. is a small one) have received some legal notice or statement. R. is entitled to this, but being of unsound mind is not qualified to receive & comprehend it. Therefore in order that the proceedings may not be uselessly held up, & that young N.A.R. may receive what is [illegible] coming to him, a legally appointed guardian is needed for R.R. to receive such notice for him.

Randolph’s interest is “contingent” and remote as he and K. w’d only inherit their bit in case of their mother’s death, as young N.A.R. now because of his father’s death.

I have consulted my friend & neighbor Judge F.T. Hammond about this matter & he ... is advising me thro’ neighborly friendliness. He & I agreed that the simplest thing is for me to be legally appointed guardian – as R. lives with me & this correspondence has all been with me. They could & would “force” an appointment in order that the notice or statement or whatever its right name is sh’d be rec’d for R. by a legally ap’ted guardian. We have no reason whatever for making the delay concerning young N.A. R’s property nor does the apptm’t of me as R’s guardian change our arrangements or give any outsider authority over R. So it seems to Judge H. & me the best way, & the bother, small as it is, of corresponding with Phila. Firm will then disappears in the past.

It seems that in law you are R’s “natural guardian” not his “legal guardian.” Hence appointment of legal guardian – chiefly because this one point holds up the audit or accounting & receiving of inheritance of young N.A.R.

At the moment Judge H. is away for a few days. On his return he or I will send you some little legal blank or form to fill out & sign giving yr. consent to my apptm’t as aforesaid. If it shall be a thing to sign before witnesses, get witnesses. But I do not know yet.

I have been over all the little matter carefully with Judge H. and there seems no objection to my apptm't. We, Judge Hammond or I, shall probably have to ask the Phila. Lawyers to write to E. for her consent. If they make it plain to her that it is a mere form to save delay and bother about N.A.R. – she will probably consent.

I never want to urge you to answer ordinary family letters sooner than you wish – but when you get the blank to fill and sign Do be prompt about that – so that we may get clear of the biz.

Folder 4: “Unidentified Correspondence”

Folder 5: “Josiah Royce’s Bible January 1869”

In 1869, Royce’s mother, Sarah Eleanor Royce, gave this bible to her son”Josie” as a New Year’s gift. About two years earlier, back in Grass Valley, he had been “forced to be baptized.”²⁷ Noteworthy, Sarah is wisely concerned that academics will lead to his loss of faith in the Bible. For her, that would hve meant his loss of salvation and eternal separation, which she would even have died to prevent. Her love of him and her faith were that strong. Thus, inside the Bible, she inscribed her own poem, dated “January 1st, 1869.” It reveals her loving relation of fiery yet challenging witness toward her independent, “stubborn,” and somewhat “rebellious” 13-year-old boy.²⁸

As Josiah later acknowledge, it was his Bible-based Christian mother who “determined my ideas to take a generally theological turn,”²⁹ and who influenced him as his “earliest . . . teacher of philosophy.”³⁰ His mother inscribed her poem on the inside front cover and first sheet of this Bible. Through it she gives her impressionable yet resistantly independent son (and potential scoffer?) the wtiness of her “pioneer tough love.” The entire poem follows:

Remember, love, who gave thee this,
When other years shall come,
When she who had thine earliest kiss,
Sleeps in her narrow home.
Remember, ‘twas another gave
This gift to one she’d die to save.

That mother sought a pledge of love,
The holiest for her son;
And from the gifts of God above,
She chose a goodly one.
She chose for her beloved boy,
The source of light, and life, and joy.

²⁷ This is according to his wife Katharine Royce, who said he had told her the story, describing it in that way.

²⁸ See *HGC* pages 124 and 130.

²⁹ Royce, in his 1893 Lectures to Teachers, Lectur VI, HARP Box 64, pages 76-77.

³⁰ *HGC* page 123.

And bad him keep the gift, that when
The parting hour should come,
They might have hope to meet again,
In an eternal home.
She said his faith this would
Sweet incense to her memory.

And should the scoffer, in his pride,
Laugh that fond faith to scorn,
And bid him cast the pledge aside,
That he from youth had borne,
She bade him pause, and ask his breast
If he or she had love him best.

A Mother's blessing on her son,
Goes with this holy thing;
The love that would retain the one,
Must to the other cling.
Remember! 'tis no idle toy,
A *Mother's* gift! Remember boy!

(emphases in the original)

Until he died, Royce always kept this Bible and his mother's poem with him. Much earlier, when bidding him God-speed in 1875 for his study abroad to far away Germany and its teachers of "higher biblical criticism," Sarah Eleanor had already selected and inserted in the corners of this Bible's cover the references to seen key biblical passages, all from the New Testament, save one: Mt 5:16, Phil 2:14, 1 Pt 2:12, Is 53:3; Jn 4:12, 7:37; and Rv 22:1.³¹ Overall, the tension between his mother's faith-filled witnessing love and Royce's own lifelong endeavors to forge a rational philosophy of religion emerges as a central neuralgic dynamic in his life story.

Box 140: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

Box 141: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

Folder 1: Sarah Royce, *Journey Across the Plains* [published as, *A Frontier Lady: Recollections of the Gold Rush and Early California*, (ed. R. H Gabriel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932)]

Folder 2: Transl. by Katharine Royce of Federigo Eriques' *Problems of Science*, 1914³²

³¹ Later on, at different times, Royce himself inscribed in his own hand on the inside cover the names and key dates of his family members' chronologies.

³² See Clendenning, *Life*, 313.

Folder 3: Transl. by Katharine Royce of Federigo Eriques' *Problems of Science*, 1914

Folder 4: Transl. by Katharine Royce of Federigo Eriques' *Problems of Science*, 1914

Box 142: "Papers of Josiah Royce"

Folder 1: "Romance of a Princess"

By Carmen Sylva. Translated by KR, 287 manuscript pages. The novel is set in a series of letters in the late 1800's, between Ulrique the princess of the Castle of Rachenstein, on the Lahn, and a Doctor Bruno Halmuth, Professor in the University of Greifswald. Sylvia Carmen was the pen name for the Queen of Romania, a noted author of the time.

Folder 2: "Loewenberg Check List" (7" x 8 ½")

[Because of their continuing historical importance, This "Check List" and the four "Lists" in folder 3 deserve, in FMO's estimate, a "center front" position in Box 1 or at least in Box 99 of this Index.]

To grasp the historical order of these 5 lists seems essential for understanding them. Hence, as FMO grasps that order in 2009:

First: Loewenberg's Check List, ca 1915-1917, (described below) (NB: Loewenberg taught at Berkeley in 1915-1916, but after Royce's death in September 1916, he returned to Cambridge, Mass., in summer 1917 to assist Katharine Royce sort through and order her husband's professional papers.)

Second: B. Rand's list. Harvard's Librarian recorded the shipment of nine packages of Royce's manuscripts in 1917 Loewenberg to aid his research and writing of *LMI* (1919) and *FE* (1920). (The original record went to Royce's wife Katharine, who was at that point the owner of Royce's manuscripts, with a copy kept by Rand.)

Third: Twelve years passed. W.E. Hocking wanted these manuscripts returned to Harvard for study by members of his two seminars on "The philosophy of Josiah Royce" (1929, 1930). Hocking asked Loewenberg to return the loaned manuscripts to the Harvard Library. Almost concurrently, Katharine Royce donated all Royce's professional papers that remained in their home to Harvard. Loewenberg shipped, along with an inventory, all the Royce papers he had borrowed in 1917, except Royce's 1878 dissertation. (He had already returned the manuscript of Royce's dissertation to Johns Hopkins University at the insistence of JHU's Arthur Lovejoy.)

In December 1929, Hocking tried to check the safely returned shipment of Royce manuscripts Loewenberg had sent by using "Loewenberg's Check List of 1917. He found many discrepancies.

Hocking created *his own* first list (1929) of manuscripts "not received in Dec. 1929" – a list based on a misunderstanding. (Hocking's first list is found inside the front cover of the notebook

“Loewenberg’s List” in Folder 3 of Box 142.)

Fourth: Loewenberg’s shipment to Hocking had in fact included the his account of the contents of the box. This is called “Loewenberg’s List” (*not* “Checklist”). It agrees with Rand’s list, except for Royce’s JHU dissertation mentioned above. This notebook is found at Box 142 Folder 3.

Fifth: W. E. Hocking finds Loewenberg’s List and recognizing its import, and creates a second Hocking list in January 1930. Discrepancies were reconciled. Loewenberg had organized some of Royce’s manuscripts into various lecture series. (Hocking’s second list is now found inside the front cover of the notebook “Loewenberg’s List” in Box 142 Folder 3.)

These two notebooks are of critical importance for archivists and Royce scholars. The first and smaller notebook contains one written item, In this first notebook Loewenberg hastily records Royce’s early works and the works that followed. The entry, “Thought Diary,” is emphasized with special markings. Loewenberg supplied the date of its first entry as “September 24, 1878, Berkeley, Calif.” Later he added a list of Royce’s periodical articles on slightly larger sheets inserted at the close of this notebook.

This smaller notebook in folder 2 seems clearly written with much haste, often without dating the titles of books or putting question marks behind uncertain dates. Although hastily written, this notebook from Royce’s Assistant of many years surely offers precious information and notes as well as lists of different lecture series, individual papers, and presentations by Royce.

Loewenberg’s list of “reprints” runs for seven handwritten pages. He then goes into a five page list of published manuscripts by Royce. Then Loewenberg carefully works out a list of unpublished materials (20 pages). [He soon published his list of Royce’s “unpublished” writings, arranged chronologically and in sections, “A Bibliography of the Unpublished Writings of Josiah Royce,” *Philosophical Review* 26 (1917): 578-82. Skrupskelis calls it “incomplete and often unreliable” [BWJR 2: 1169]

Some examples of Loewenberg’s entries may clarify. E.g., the item, “Will as a Principle of Philosophy” is listed as a “rejected essay”—probably meaning rejected from publication in *FE*. Again, Loewenberg cites “Social Factors on Mind, ‘The New Orleans Lectures of 1897,’ fragmentary Ms, these lectures – possibly useful as transition stages) Evaluation. Philosophical Interpretation of 1897.” Or finally, a quote on one page:

“The Conception of Immortality. (Essay read at Bryn Mawr, and then to Free Rel. Ass. In 1899. Then when Ingersoll Lecture was prepared in 1899, a few pages of the paper were used. The rest left as frag, with some fragm add.)”

Interestingly, when “A Monkish Chronicle” is listed, an “x” and “?” appear beside it. Indeed, there are “x” marks besides several of these entries. [FMO: Perhaps the “x’s” indicate the essays Loewenberg considered for his *Fugitive Essays*. Many of the titles he that he “x’ed” are included in *FE*, but a few are not.

For people searching Royce's Logic. Loewenberg notes: "New conclusion for singly intersection circuits April 1909."

Folder 2:

This folder contains the entire notebook entitled "Loewenberg Check List" (1917) records the familiar titles of Royce's work. This smaller notebook (7" by 8 ½") clearly seems written with much haste. Not all its book-titles are dated, and some that are dated display question marks of doubt after them.

FMO dates this hastily written checklist in the smaller notebook as after Royce's death, about the summer of 1917, after Loewenberg's first year of teaching at UC Berkeley. Loewenberg had returned to Cambridge to help Katharine Royce sort her husband's manuscripts. He then made his request that some of those manuscripts be shipped on loan to him back at Berkeley for his preparation of his own work, *FE* and *LMI*. In this notebook, Loewenberg seems to be checking the collection of Royce's manuscripts and reprints left in the study on Irving Street (the Royce home), almost certainly in the presence of Mrs. Royce.

Loewenberg lists Royce's early works and the works that followed. Dates are added to some books but some dates are followed by question marks. At the notebook's close, one finds on slightly larger sheets a hasty listing of Royce's journal articles, via reprints. Loewenberg's list of reprints runs for seven handwritten pages, followed by a five-page list of Royce's published manuscripts. Then Loewenberg carefully worked out a list of *unpublished* materials (20 pages). He soon published his list of Royce's "unpublished writings, arranged chronologically and in sections," in *Philosophical Review* 26 (1917): 578-82. Skrupskelis calls it "incomplete and often unreliable." (*BWJR*2:1169).

Interesting information and notes accompany some entries. For instance, "Will as a Principle Philosophy" is listed as a "rejected essay" – a sign that at Johns Hopkins Royce found his desire of publishing this lengthy essay blocked.³³ When Loewenberg jots down a reference to one of Royce's lectures as "The Opening of the Great West Del.[ivered] at "Old South" in a Summer Course, Rough Ms.", one can assume Katharine Royce's input. Loewenberg himself would have been unlikely to have access to such data.

Or again, some marks accompany and emphasize an entry. For instance, "Thought Diary" adds the date and site of its first entry as "September 24, 1878, Berkeley, Calif." Later, Loewenberg added a list of Royce's periodical articles on slightly larger sheets inserted at the close of this notebook.

When Loewenberg encountered Royce's manuscript "Social Factors on Mind," he added "'The New Orleans Lectures of 1897," fragmentary MS, these lectures – possibly useful as transition stages. Evaluation. Philosophical Interpretation of 1897."

Loewenberg scribbled an informative entry: "'The Conception of Immortality" (Essay read at Bryn Mawr, and then to Free TRel. Ass. In 1899). Then when Ingersoll Lecture was prepared in

³³ See Clendenning, *Life*, 81-82.

1899, a few pages of the paper were used. The rest left as frag, ith some fragm add.)”
Finally, when listing “A Monkish Chronicle, Loewenberg places an “x” and “?” after the title.

On the whole, seeral other entries are followed by an “x.” FMO wonders whether Loewenberg designated some entries as possible candidates for his *Fugitive Essays*. For many of such “x’ed” items are included in *FE*, but a few are not.

Logic: Loewenberg notes: “New conclusion for singly intersection circuits April 1909.”

Evaluation: *Very interesting for scholars.*

Folder 3: “Lo[e]wenberg’s List, Rand’s and Hocking’s Check Enclosed, 1930”

The folder title refers vaguely to 4 lists, as noted under folder 2. More specifically, these are Loewenberg’s compilation of Royce’s work, Rand’s shipping list (ca. 1920) and the two Hocking lists (1929 and 1930). The larger notebook (9” x 12”) is described in folder 2 above. This larger notebook includes 3 other significant lists, inserted inside, namely B. Rand’s list circa 1915-17, Hocking’s December 1929 list (based on the misunderstanding); and Hocking’s January 1930 list.

This larger notebook concludes with Loewenberg’s list of Royce’s “Writing of Early Youth,” including about ten items, from “Pussy Blackie’s Travels” to the fragmentary “Wildwood Family.” His list of “reprints” runs fro seven handwritten pages. Then, Loewenberg lists Royce’s published manuscripts for five pages.

Loewenberg carefully works out (for 20 pages) a list of unpublished materials. (See his use of these materials in his *Philosophical Review* article in comments to the folder 2 directly above.)

Evaluation: *Very interesting for scholars.*

Folder 4: Box A Finding Aid [Indices], undated

Folder 4 begins the collection of the old (pre-2009) “Finding Aids” to the Harvard Archives Royce Papers. These are loose documents, and therefore were *not* included in the bound papers of Boxes 1 to 98. These are largely “non-logicalia” writings housed prior to 2009 in eight large boxes designated “A-H.” These non-mounted papers had concerned non-logicalia procedures and problems, and were arranged more or less in chornolgoical order.

As for the old (pre-2009) “finding aids to Royce’s *logical* writings, they are now collected between Box 106, Folder 11, and Box 113, Folder 8. It is not clear whether, where or how the old “finding aids” to Royce’s logical endeavors were found in the post-2009 web-based “Finding Aid” to Royce’s work. Researchers into Royce’s logical work should be aware that a good deal of this work lies scattered in Boxes 1 to 98 as well as in the old non-logicalia Boxes A-H. The contents of these boxes are currently collected in Box 106, Folder 11 to Box 113, Folder 8. “A word to the wise is enough.”

Folder 5: Box B Finding Aid, 1875-1876

Folder 6: Box C Finding Aid, Fall-Summer 1878

Folder 7: Box D Finding Aid, Fall 1878 – Summer 1882

Folder 8: Box E Finding Aid, Fall 1882 – Summer 1895

Folder 9: Box F Finding Aid, Fall 1895 – Fall 1916

Folder 10: Box G Finding Aid, undated

Folder 11: Box H Finding Aid, undated

Box 143: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

Folder 1: “Various News clippings, 1914, and undated”

One reprint from *The New Republic*. Titled “Norman Hapgood,” signed “P.L..” it is a memorial to Hapgood. There is one reference to Royce in its first sentence.

Folder 2: “Untitled Manuscripts ‘Fairy Tales, The Greeks.’ Ca. 1872”

A very early group of manuscript pages in Royce’s hand. Not one organic manuscript. There are 8 manuscript sheets, with reverse side used (with parts of his first draft on the back sides of the pages). The main composition here concerns a famous passage in Antigone, and deals with themes presented by Antigone and Creon.

Also on the back side of page 8 are “points.”:

“1st. The Greek Tragedian took his ideals from the commonest stories. Thus resulted unity of Hellenic culture. The same tale serving as an illustration and as an amusement. Thus were the emotions of the Greek complicated.”

There is no date given on the sheets themselves. It is unknown how the archivist arrived at the 1872 date, but it seems a good guess. (It does appear to be from his preparatory year, just before Royce’s going to UCB.)

Cf. Box 114, folder 9, the typeset text of Royce’s undergraduate thesis on Aeschylus. (Clearly he had been influenced by Aeschylus at this much earlier point in high school.)

After describing the role of the poets and the dramatists on the Greek mind, and retelling the story of Antigone’s obeying the “Eternal Law,” rather than the king’s decree, Royce moves at page 5 to elaborate the meaning of this story:

“We now know that every human being is subject to influences from an indefinite period of time before him, influences that can in no wise be summed up in the word tradition, or

yet in the word law. These influences are those which are the common property of the race and which are transmitted from generation to generation by the laws of heredity. They consist of tendencies, sensibilities, emotions, in which is more or less summed up the whole experience of the race since it had existence. And among them our ideas of right and wrong no doubt hold a prominent place. Morality is with us two-fold. There is one portion of it which does depend upon circumstances, which does change with changing seasons and which we call expediency. But there is another portion which is our property by virtue of our humanity. We have promptings to follow it, because this universal transmitted instinct, this summed up experience of the past, says it is best to do so. This part of our nature is independent of circumstances, and because it is the result of a higher and wider experience than our own it is to be obeyed. This transmitted moral law is something that is for the individual not to be transcended or violated.

“Thus far we follow the teachings of science. We advance nothing that is not advanced by it. But now how does all this make us stand as regards the poet’s words. “They endure forever, and no man knows whence they sprang.” “Ah,” says the objector “but we do know whence they sprang; science has told us. In the very fact of showing that these principles are unchanging because they are the common property of the race, science informs us of their origin.” Does it inform us of this, I would reply. It tells us something of the origin of these things, enough to show whence their authority comes, but from what hidden sources they themselves had their origin far back in the wastes of time, what steps of progress they passed through, yes still more even how they as instincts have come to have such power over us today, all this must remain unknown. In them we stand in presence of one of nature’s greatest mysteries. Like the poet we know enough of them to feel that they endure forever. Like him we have a theory of their origin which time may modify. And like him we must say of them as we say of all the other deeper emotions of our nature; no man knows which [*sic*] they spring.”

“If science had revealed all to us, if there were no mystery in the matter, still would the truth remain that principles arising from a higher experience than that of the individual, being the property of the race, must be obeyed. And now when science only partially explains the mystery, when she but tells us enough for us to see how much remains unknown, there is added to our intellectual assent something of the poet’s reverence. We not only obey, but we worship the eternal principles.

“And so the words of Sophocles continue to ring in our ears, bearing with them what is truth to us as much as it was to the ancient. Among the other influences to which his heart was attuned even as ours, let this influence, the tendency to do right be numbered. Let poetry take its place by science, and let us feel that with him we stand before a mystery that is to be revered, even as we know, better than he could that we are the subjects of a moral power in our own natures which must not be resisted.

“Perhaps we are taking the Greek mind a little out of its usual mood when we can find in it the expression of so lofty a morality. But let us remember that all this delight in beauty which made the Greek an artist rather than a moralist, did not yet prevent him from knowing what is piety. And when he worshipped, we may be sure that it was some object worthy of worship. Even because he so seldom bowed before the thought of his moral responsibility, because of that very thing, when he did bow before it, we may be all the more sure that it was presented in some of its grandest forms.” [5-8]

Evaluation: For an early composition, this seems to FMO a **most valuable document**, and most relevant to our situation in contemporary U.S. culture.

Folder 3: “Truth in Art, by Aleph, 1875” (1 MS and 1 newsprint version, in 2 sheets)

See *BWJR* 2; 1172 S 22, and 1174, 5. Printed in *Oakland Daily New*, 18, Tuesday, March 1, 1875. Last Friday, Royce won Gilman Prize in oratory at State University. He “received the unanimous verdict of the Committee on Award.” (col. 1). Question: By calling himself “Aleph,” was college senior Royce viewing himself as “first” among his competitors? The “Aleph” does not seem to refer to his own Indexing system which doesn’t use other Hebrew letters.

About the **MS itself**: 12 legal sized pages (8 ½ x 12 inches); edited with Royce cross-outs, inserted words and phrases, ends apparently incomplete on page 12 with “...disappointingly, that can....” Pages have distinctive threefold marginal line at left (central blue, with 2 companioning red lines, all very fine). Several pages (4, 7, 10) now show cuttings-off

About **text itself** : The MS and Newsprint version seem to run in parallel. Royce refers to Undine as a perfection of form. His major point is that of all the arts **music** which doesn’t use image is most effective in evoking emotions in its audience, esp. rest and quiet to troubled and unsettled souls.

Evaluation: It reveals a senior full of romanticism even before going to Germany, rooted in the need of situating one’s thought in its historical context, and undergirded logically by the framework of his argument. Royce’s point is that, among all the arts, music, without using images as the other arts do, best effects the truthfulness of expressing all kinds of emotions (in artist and in audience) even while its salutary effect is to be continuously restrained enough not to slip into discord..

Folder 4: History of German Philosophy Since Leibnitz. Strumpfel. Winter Semester, 1875-1876

Folder 5: Logic and Nature Research, Winter Semester, 1875-1876

Folder 6: Royce and Compton families, undated

Folder 7: Correspondence to and from Katharine Head Royce [not family], 1900-1938]

Folder 8: Obituaries and memoria related to Edward F. Head (father-in-law of Josiah Royce), ca. 1896.

Boxes 144-151: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

These boxes contain photographs.

Box 152: “Papers of Josiah Royce”

HUG 1755 (1) Stephen Royce: Nitrate negatives in ten sleeves, 5 negatives in each sleeve.

Sleeve 1: “Trees, Landscapes ca. 1910”

Sleeve 2: “Possibly from Stephen Royce as Mining Engineer, Mining landscapes, Ca. 1910”

Sleeve 3: “Mining Landscapes, Unidentified Worker, ca. 1910”

Sleeve 4: “Trees, Landscapes, Ca. 1910”

Sleeve 5: “Trees, Landscapes, Ca. 1910”

Sleeve 6: “Trees, landscapes, Road, Ca. 1910”

Sleeve 7: “Unidentified Workers, Mining Landscapes, Ca. 1910”

Sleeve 8: “Unidentified People in Early 20th Century attire, Boater on lake or river, Hotel or Residence, ca. 1910”

[Among these, perhaps some Royce family photos?]

Sleeve 9: “Unidentified People in Early 20th Century attire, Trees, Landscapes, ca. 1910.”

[Among these, perhaps some Royce family photos?]

Sleeve 10: “Houses, Trees, Landscapes, ca. 1910.”

[BOX 153: Open for later incoming Royceana]

BOX 154: Negative microfilm

HUG 1755.5.3 mfN Class Day Exercises program. June 8, 1875

HUG 1755.5.5.3 mfN Royce microfilm of newspapers, undated

HUG 1755.5.5 mfN Pittsburgh Lectures, [1910]

HUG 1755.3.4 mfN Logic Notes notebook. November 17, 1909

HUG 1755.3.4 mfN Logicalia, 1892 and undated

HUG 1755.5.1 mfN Cosmology, 1892-1893

HUG 1755.5.1 mfN Cosmology. Expositions for Lectures, Notebook II, 1890-1891

HUG 1755.5.1. mfN Cosmology. General Outlines. Notebook 1, 1890-1891

HUG 1755.5 mfN Ethical ideals in relation to society, undated

HUG 1755.5.5.2 mfN Negative microfilm of Royce shelf list, undated

BOX 155 : Photographs

APPENDIX A

Biographical Materials

I. Introduction

Biographical materials for Royce run through the HARP collection. For the purposes of this *Comprehensive Index*, our considerations are broken down as follows:

- The classic biography of Royce remains John Clendenning's *The Thought and Character of Josiah Royce*, revised and expanded edition, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999). This work, taken as a whole, outshines all of the following approaches by close associates of Royce's own individual actions and habits.
- Ruth Royce, sister of Josiah Royce, responded to Royce's biographer, Ralph Barton Perry, who on February 26, 1928 requested "her memories of her brother." Her unpublished response lies in Harvard U. Archives, HUG 1755, Box 101, folder 8. An analysis and excerpts from the letter are included below.
- Stephen Royce, son of the philosopher, drafted a 17-page typescript entitled "Personal Memories of Josiah Royce by his Son Stephen Royce." In the text, Stephen Royce refuses Harvard's request for Royce's personal papers. He does, however, give 17 pages of biographical information about his father. The typescript may be found at HARP Box 99, folder 9
- A seven page typescript, "From the Records of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Tuesday, November 7, 1916" ... "prepared by a committee of the Faculty consisting of Professors R.B. Perry, C. R. Lanman, and W. E. Hocking." Perry and Hocking had been students of Royce. Lanman was one of his oldest friends, from their days together in Baltimore. The typescript may be found at HARP Box 99, folder 8.

II. Autobiographica

Perhaps the most significant biographical information may be gathered by listening to Royce himself, via a non-taxative collection of his own self-sharings.

1855-1882 Royce's 1915 "Autobiographical Sketch" drawn from his birth to his 1882 arrival at Harvard; delivered Dec. 29, 1915 at Royce's 60th birthday banquet, (*HGC*, 122-36) and then continued, on January 11, 1916, *qua* his intellectual development from 1871 to January 1883, in his:

1855-1876 Royce's Autobiographical Note on the Influence of Men and Books

---HARP Box 96, document 2

[E. F. Wells's note at the top of this page reads: "Autobiographical note on influences of men and books. (A later paper found among student notes, University of California"')]³⁴

As to a dating, Royce must have written this after his German experience. Perhaps he writes the first four panels while at Johns Hopkins, circa 1876 (?) and then later the second four panels at UCB (?). His text follows:

[panel 1] *The educational influences that have been most important to one, he cannot easily define. Our world as a whole, the mass of our experience, is the greatest educator. And here are influences, physical, social, psychological, which we cannot fully know until we have attained a better and higher science than we now possess. Moreover, when one leaves the general, and comes to the particular educational influences, his field of study if seemingly open to more exact investigation, is hardly less difficult. Only here and there can we pick out a man or a book that has been a power in our lives. And often where we know this much, we are still unable to say exactly how and in how far the influence of this man or of this book was exerted.*

The influence of a man over us is commonly like the influence of very changing weather on growing plants. It is far better [line below blurred, perhaps reads: than the chang[illegible] changeless?] [panel 2] a desert, of entire solitude; but the influence is, if great yet inconstant and scarcely twice of the

³⁴ The document is written in pencil, with lines occasionally blurred. It is written on two pieces of paper approximately 8" by 10" which have been folded length-ways. JR writes on each of these folded pieces, as separate panels. He does not number these panels or pages, so their sequence must be inferred. To infer the sequence, fold the sheets, and read the way one would a Christmas card. The sequence makes some sense when read.

The first sheet is entirely in pencil, with some ink edits/mark-overs. The sentences are full, with no abbreviations. On the four panels of the second sheet, the handwriting, though clearly JR's, is slightly larger. This suggests that the second four panels were not written at the same time as the first four panels on the first sheet. Also, there are more markings in ink, entire phrases not simply edits. The second sheet contains many abbreviations; many of the sentences are incomplete and fragmentary.

same significance. A man is never to you the expression of a single idea or tendency. The very trouble with him is that he is too concrete, too real, too interesting. As a man, as an individual, he arouses your sympathy, or your affection, or your enmity, your confidence, or some like passion. In the strong flow of emotion many of the treasures of abiding influence are borne away; the man may [give?] and leave little behind him but the memory of your meeting with him. - I do not mean to say that a man must of necessity be a changing fickle thing, unable to influence because never twice alike. I mean only that our relations to him will be ever changing, be he stable or not. At one time your friend or adviser or relative seems to you simply a human being like yourself, with like passions, like joys and sorrows.

[panel 3] In such a case you give him your sympathy. You find satisfaction in your intercourse with him. You are enjoying the development of the human sentiment in yourself. At another time he is strange to you. A word or look has let you see a difference unknown before. You feel that you do not understand him, or that he does not understand you. Then you fear, or half dislike, or suspect or at best coldly criticise [sic] him. All the past grows dim in your memory. It is as if you had never known him nor come near to him. - Again he stands in no personal relation to you at all; he is a mouthpiece for an idea that you accept or reject. Then you dispute with or for him. You treat him as a shadow and his ideas as the only substance - Or yet again he assumes an arbitrary feigned official or social relation to you. - Or he is for a time very much your superior. He has shown a power that puts him far above you. You submit to him, and [panel 4] regard him as entirely out of your sphere - Or you rebel once more against his authority. Your selfishness comes out. You are jealous of him. You are stubborn. You want to free yourself. His influence is a charm. You wish to break it.

All this shows that the man is much to you, that his influence is great; not that it is enduring, or that the man is very important to your life as a whole.

Different is the power of a book. This may be small in quantity, but it is all or almost all in one direction. When you look back at books you have read,

you can feel the more important of them as abiding elements in your life. You can say what they meant. This book meant this idea; that book taught you that truth. - Each book was a blow with an axe on the trees of the forest. The mark is small but it remains, one of the [panel 5] way marks of your life. Men have done much more for you, but much more also at random. The way marks they leave behind them are as contradictory as numerous. They have cut away brushwood in heaps but left no road.

You may not submit to a man. You must in some way overcome him. The man you know best, yourself, you must overcome most thoroughly. But to an idea, as embodied in a book, you may in some cases surrender. With individuals you war. Humanity, and ideals, and patience, and truth, and sacrifice, and love, these you serve, and become their slaves. No one else has the right of your allegiance, unless as the messenger and representative and embodiment of these ideals themselves. In the book the ideals may be much more simply and perfectly expressed than in any man. [panel 6] Hence our debt to books. - It is not surprising that the utterances of a man's best moments should be worth more than his everyday commonplace life. -

As I try to sum up my own experiences in education, I can remember some half a dozen human beings whose influence was strikingly good, and two or three whose influence was distinctly bad. But I can remember a score or more of epoch-making events in the way of books. A. Grote's history of Greece in the H.S. Libr. in S. F.; two or three mathematical books [in] the M.I. Libr.; A few novels in the same place; an imposing copy of Homer in the Univ. Libr. - John St. Mill; Mansel's Limits of Relig. Thought; Kant's [panel 7] Crit. as I first met it. My first exp. in Germ. Lit.; a [here inserted in pen is Royce's note] 'J. Schm.' Hist. of Romant. A little of Hegel, rather more of Schop. - all these mean events that have given me a new turn in life, a new insight into the world, in some important way a new being. --

[in ink] The infl. of men has of course been much greater in mass, but in quality not often so marked.

Educational exp. have been most val. when they came spont. German

experience.

The worst teachers have been those who followed a formal trad[ition].

The best professional those who desired to impart the spirit of investigation or of living.

The best of all, the most influential, are the ones who are the least conscious. [panel 8] It is as if, in that they are unconscious of their influence upon us, human beings approach to the singleness of effect, the ideal definiteness of influence [of a dist.[?-inguished?] book --[sentence is not finished; a little lower, the words “german experience” are crossed out.]

[close of the non-completed document]

ca 1855-1865 Royce shifts to early personal memories to illustrate social condition of California.

First, he vividly describes how he felt when growing up in “one of our far western settlements”—read Grass Valley—beholding “all these rickety, wooden houses, and half-graded streets, full of rubbish, as the outcome of an immense past, . . .” etc., along with the many social traditions which those ancestors brought with them..

--*Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 55

Second, Royce describes the mining community as being five years older than himself. Royce expands his own references in his autobiographical sketch, viewing Grass Valley as simultaneously an old community and a new community. Especially on page 52, Royce elaborates on the sense of tradition (the “old”) in a new community, via the teaching of England’s history, and the institutions of schools and families and churches. As a child, his mind and heart also felt the impact of a national crisis and struggle, the Civil War, --“I had a country as well as a religious interest.” Royce uses Grass Valley as an example of the dynamics that underlie national assimilation of immigrants.

-- Box 92 , document 2; “Some Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization” (1900), page 51-52; HGC. 122-25

1860-1861: “The earliest connected story that I independently read was the Apocalypse, from a large print New Testament, which I found on the table in our living room. The Apocalypse did not tend to teach me early to acquire very clear ideas. On the other hand, I did early receive a great deal of training in dialectics, from the sister nearest to me in age [Ruth]”

--HGC 124

1860-1880 Early record of Royce the “voracious reader”: His series of index cards on which he wrote excerpts and offered criticisms of the books and articles he read. This entire collection of cards should be “a must read” for any serious searcher into Royce and his thought. .

--Box 125, folder 9, and Box 126, pp, 151-212.

Ca 1863 Royce opens this address (see below) with his memory of a story he read in his childhood about a “bold bad elder boy” who tempted a “too trustful little boy ... to disobey the express commands of the hero’s parents” and “play truant.” (257) Passing a shop, the older boy bought some nuts. “[C]racking one of them [he] held up the kernel and said: ‘Did anybody ever see that before?’ The hero was obliged to respond, ‘No.’ Thereupon the bad boy, instead of offering this nut or any other of the nuts to his comrade, cruelly ate the kernel and said: ‘Will anybody ever see that again?’ and the small boy sorrowfully answered with another ‘No,’ and returned through tribulations to the paths of virtue.” (257-58)

--“**The Reality of the Temporal,**” (April 1910),. *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, no. 3 (1910): 257-71-- text of a paper read at New Haven on December 29, 1909, before the American Philosophical Association.

Ca 1860-1867 Reflection from childhood about his boyhood in the Sierra Nevadas, with a bit of a reflection on gold mining. Royce later said that the main person to influence him was

his mother, “who determined my ideas to take a generally theological turn.”³⁵ Royce talks of the “literary” influence of *Revelation*. (76-77) (He was raised away from any knowledge of the ocean, or open water.) (79) “The law of nervous habit is the true law of apperception.” He mentions these things as a counterbalance to Herbart’s one-sided theory of apperception. An excerpt from pages 76-79 is appropriate here:

“In my own childhood I lived in the Sierra Nevada mountains far from any large body of water. I was familiar from the outset with gold-mining, both quartz mining and placer mining. As I happened to dislike nearly all the miners whom I saw, my imitateness was never excited by them. I accordingly formed almost no apperceptive masses of ideas about gold or about mining, and always heartily despised the whole enterprise. The one person whom I most imitated was, I suppose, my mother. She determined my ideas to take a generally theological turn. Accordingly, as it happened, the first book that ever I read with true and appreciably independent delight, was the Revelation of St. John. Here was to me, for the moment the most thrilling of literary interests. I read it as Eva and Tom read it in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. I could apperceive but vaguely anything in it. I loved it all. As for the rest of my thoughts, the civil War was then under way. I lived as it were on the news about the war. I commanded imaginary armies whenever I played and often defeated in pitched battles the chickens. For picturing the true pomp and glory of war I had in that remote place absolutely no apperceptive masses; yet half my early ideas of things were based on what I passionately thought concerning the war. I heard people talk too of the ocean. The ocean was accordingly a daily dream with me. I tormented my mother with endless apperceptive questions about ships. Yet I had not as yet the faintest respectable mental image either of an expanse of water or of the ships themselves.

³⁵ J. Royce, in his 1893 Lectures to Teachers, Lect. VI, HARP Box 64, pages 76-77.

“Now these things were accidents, but, such as they were, they determined the whole future of my education. I do not imagine them in the least uncommon. On such thrilling interests in the wonderful unknown, many childish minds thrive. And if you ask why these interest, I reply that every child is like Tennyson’s boy in Locksley Hall, who sees the lights of London flaring like a dreary dawn. The child wants to be in with men, and to share their life. He is imitative.”

--Lectures to Teachers (1893), Box 64, Lecture VI, 76-79.

1860-1865 A word-picture of the young Royce preaching down to other boys, and being disciplined by the “majesty of the community.” Royce closes with a recognition of the need for reverence and waiting. But the challenge is: “to recognize the mystery of conduct and still not to lose heart. But that is the problem of life. Do not fear early to let the child feel what he cannot hope to understand, that life is a problem, and still, for that, is sacred.” (436)

Lectures to Teachers (1893), Box 66, Lecture XII, “On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training,” Section III , pp 433 -36, published in *International Journal of Ethics* vol. 3 (1892-93): 413-36. At page 434 occur more explicit autobiographical reflections. (See also HGC 126, without neglecting Skrupskelis’ notes at BWJR 2: 1192.

1860 Royce’s reading of the Book of *Revelation*, as a 5 yr-old:

HGC 124.

ca. 1862: Royce’s recollection of his ear-ache as a boy:

“When I was a boy, I used to be troubled with a disorder known to me only under the name “ear-ache.” There was no doubt about the fact of the disorder; but if I suffered so now [1902], I should expect the doctor to find out, by examination, *what made* my ear ache. At the time in question, I never learned and nobody knew.”

--Royce to G. Page Baker, January 30, 1902,
Letters, 427

1863 “Pussy Blackie’s Travels,” a story by an eight year-old boy insofar as this young imaginative lad created the adventures of this story and fleshed out his outline with the story of the adventures of Royce’s lost cat. Readers can see through the polish added by his more educated feminine family members. Our focus is on this imaginary history (or travelogue) about Royce’s lost cat, written by a young story-teller who provided the basic outline and the adventures of the cat..

--Box 114,
folder 2

ca.1862-70 Royce’s address to Clergymen contains a note-worthy autobiographical passage:

“I remember clearly the ministrations of such men [ministers] as I heard them more than once in my boyhood, and in my early youth. They used to quicken my wits by the

hostility which they awakened in my mind, and to arouse my boyish fury by their dogmatism. They probably helped to turn me in the direction of philosophical study. They therefore may have aided me to find my own calling in life. But they certainly drove me away from their own form of religious life.”(26) [This passage first taught FMO why Royce did not become a clergyman.]

“They did so by ostentatiously pretending to reason about philosophical problems under conditions which all the while made the spirit of leisurely and dispassionate inquiry simply impossible. They undertook to investigate; but theirs were forgone conclusions. They said, ‘come let us reason together;’ and then they hurled their dogmas at me, and denounced more or less ingenuously all possible opponents. They in any case taught me one thing, which I have never forgotten, and which I hope that all of you recognize; namely, they taught me the pulpit is no place for philosophical investigation. Whatever the clergyman is, he is, as clergyman, no teacher of philosophy. If he tries to unite the two offices, that of philosophical and that of religious teacher in the pulpit, he sins doubly against the truth. ” (26-27)

The double sin: (1) the sin against “the philosophical business of truth-seeking.” [emphasis added by FMO], and (2) the sin of confusing the hearer with technical formulations (thus breaching his duty to present religious and moral truth.) (28).

The minister’s philosophy will, as such, not determine the content of his preaching. (32) Only the religious experience which he has will nourish his people, and indirectly the social question, new testament problems, and higher criticism.

Later in this address, Royce sketches the life of the philosopher who agrees with him (really a self-portrait) (69). He contrasts this with a portrait of the clergyman. (71) He ventures to define a clergyman’s ideals: “to make people practically and effectively aware, in whatever they do, of how near they are to God, and of how near God is to them. It is [the clergyman’s] business to get people to live in accord with this insight.” (72) Royce continues:

“-- In any case, gentlemen, it is your ideal to make people feel and live as if they knew that God is in them. It is the philosopher’s business to inquire whether this is true that God is in them. As you well know, I have long since publicly asserted that there is room here for much division of labor, and that, for my own part, I prefer to see at least some philosophers at work upon this task in entire freedom from personal connection with any branch of the visible church. I myself deliberately avoid such connection. It is as such an outsider that you have called me here. I am able to speak frankly. You see that I do not want our respectively [*sic*] callings confounded. But I am glad to feel that, with very different means at our disposal, with means that in my own case I feel to be indeed poor, we are still, in the intimacies of a common divine task, -- coworkers.” (75)

--Box 75, document 1, pages 26-27 “Andover Address: “The Clergyman’s Relation to Philosophical Inquiry,” (first delivered June 7, 1904), a 75-page MS.

1864-65 Royce undergoes “one of the earliest metaphysical experiences” of his life when he was 9 or 10 years of age. He reports his early dread and loneliness when confronted with thoughts of infinite space and time.

“Recent Discussions of the Concept of the Infinite” (1902?)

HARP Box 72, document 2, pages 1 to 8.

1867-68 There is almost a picture of the young Royce preaching down to other boys, and being disciplined by the majesty of the community. At 434, for more explicit autobiographical reflections.

HGC 126, and “On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training,”

***International Journal of Ethics*, 3 (1892-93): 413-36, esp., page 433,
with further autobiographical reflections on page 434.**

1869 January 1. Royce’s mother, Sarah Eleanor Royce, gifts a new bible to her son, “Josie,” as a New Year’s present. About two years earlier, back in Grass Valley, he had been “forced to be baptized.”³⁶ Sarah is concerned that academics will lead to his loss of faith in the Bible. She firmly believes that this would mean his loss of salvation and eternal separation, which she would even die to prevent—so strongly does she love him. So, inside this bible’s folder, she inserts her own poem, dated “January 1st, 1869.” Its gist? “Remember, son . . . a Mother’s gift.” It reveals her loving relation of fiery yet challenging witness toward this her independent, “stubborn,” and somewhat “rebellious” 13-year-old boy.³⁷ [For text, see CI, Part III.]

--Box 139, folder 5: “Josiah Royce’s Bible, January 1869”

ca. 1872 Written by Royce in high school or early UCB days. His introduction begins:

“No moment of life seems to us more solemn than that in which we first determine to revise some trustfully accepted creed of childhood. The foundations of the Great Deep are broken up. The old life of simple faith lies behind us. We can no longer rest there. We look out into the darkness of a world that is not now enlightened by happy confidence. We know not where we shall find peace. We know not whether we are doing well or ill, whether we are heroes or wretches. Of freedom of thought we have as yet very little clear conception. We have found out how to doubt. Even that is a new lesson and a painful one. We have reached our first valley of humiliation.³⁸

“In this little valley we cannot long remain. It is marvelous how soon we find doubting an easy, even a delightful task. Nobody becomes mature in doubting so fast as the man that has abandoned a very lengthy creed, and that therefore has a great deal to doubt. Nobody is so proud of his mental work as the man that has performed the feat of doubting the significance of whatever his friends think to be most sacred. Such a man finds himself soon able to spend days in barely naming the things that seem to him doubtful. To be sure he generally leaves geometry and physical sciences out of the list of

³⁶ According to his wife Katharine, who said Royce told her so.

³⁷ HGC 124, 130.

³⁸ The allusion is to Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress*.

things doubtful; but he does this not so much because he is unequal to the task of doubting them, but because they do not seem to him quite worth doubting. There is nothing very sacred about them; they move nobody's feelings.

"This stage of the pride of doubt we all pass through our way to the study of philosophy. I do not despise that stage. I find it as admirable as it is amusing. It is the period of the growth of the wings of thought. We do well to plume our features a good deal even while they are still very downy. But after a while it occurs to us that not the mere fact of doubting, but the aim and method of doubting are the important things. Thorough-going doubt is an essential preliminary to sound philosophic study. But doubting is like raking the ashes from an old fire before adding fresh coal. When one is first promoted to the childish dignity of making over a fire, he may raise more dust with the ashes than other people think pleasant, he may also rake out both the ashes and the fire. But by and by one learns that the ash heap and the cloud of dust are not the sole objects of the work and that raking ashes is a fine art. Just so one comes in time to regard doubting as not an end. Then one begins to philosophize in earnest. Useful fruitful doubt is a delicate and difficult task.

"I repeat, doubt is essential to all our philosophic progress. But bare brute doubting without constructive effort is a task that anybody can learn, just as even the humblest of us knows how to put out a fire. But the genuine philosophic doubt is of a different sort. It is founded on careful analysis. It is the expression of a demand for clearness and consistency of thought. It is in itself often half the work of construction, just as cleaning the grate properly is half the work of making the new fire. Happy the man who knows what kind of doubt to cultivate. Happy the agnostic whose agnosticism is of that careful, reasoned [?] cautious kind which enables him clearly to define of what sort are the things that in any direction he does not know. To doubt effectively is to find in the ashes the glowing coals that shall light the new fire of assurance. Honor, then, the enthusiasm of the ardent doubter, but by all means keep him hard at work. A doubter has one mission in this world, viz., to help us to form an independent philosophy, just as a stylographic pen has one mission in the world, to make us independent of our inkstand. A lazy doubter is like most stylographic pens, which persuade us to leave behind our inkstand whose ink flows not when you most need it, even as the lazy doubter has nothing to give you just when your thought most needs help."

--Box 127, folder 2 (Notebook "Lecture IV")

The experience described here parallels the sentiment Royce described in his letter to George Buchanan Coale, December 5, 1881, where he described his first deep doubt: "I remember the failing at heart when I first had to throw overboard my little old creed ..." (*Letters*, 104-105; emphasis added)

[In this first experience one detects doubting as also a process, not merely an experience of loneliness, loss of support, and an opening up of "scatter-shot" possibilities (some of which may evoke radical fear), but also an experience of feeling at work within this doubting a living nerve which, as Royce says, has a method and purpose (or goal). Although in this passage Royce does not explicitly name "the truth-seeking instinct," is not this the vital motive with which he is already gradually getting in touch? -FMO]

1871-74 While lecturing to teachers in 1883, Royce harkened back to his UCB days when he, at first standing outside, and later sitting in the lecture hall of Joseph Le Conte became profoundly “infected” by his “personality” and “method of [mental] work.”

“I once heard a full year’s course of lectures on geology,--a subject that I have never since seriously pursued. The personality of my teacher, Prof. Jos. Le Conte, deeply impressed itself upon me as he told us about his science. The result is that the habits of mental work then formed proved for me profoundly infectious. They seemed in many ways to transform me. I have never since thought upon any subject without being more or less under the spell of the personal influence of Le Conte. Of geology, as a special science, I have thought hardly at all since that time. Of Le Conte’s method of work I am today consciously or unconsciously a creature.”

-- HARP Box, 66, J. Royce’s 1883 Lectures to Teachers, Lect. XI, pages 24-25; “Joseph Le Conte,” *International Monthly*, 4 (1901): 324-34 ; see also “Logic as an English Study” Box 61, page 43, and *Life*, pages 44, 46-47, 55-57, 89.

ca. 1873-75 Royce grows explicitly aware of his most central mental attitude, a passionate pursuit of further truth, an attitude he labored to experience and describe in the following article, which in *RAP* he did not acknowledge as a source.

--“The Work of the Truth Seeker,” Box 125, folder 6, esp., pages 9-14.

1872-75 Royce recalls rich memories of his early days at UCB

--“The Old and the New: A Lesson,” *University of California Chronicle*, 2 (1902): 92-103

1875 “Remarks at a dinner in honor of William James,” held on January 18, 1910. Royce offers some autobiographical remarks about Royce’s first contact with Wm. James. The usually timid and self-contained Professor Royce opens up and shares his inner soul because, ‘I love him [WJ].’

--“A Word of Greeting to William James” *Harvard Graduates’ Magazine* 18 (1909-10): 630-33; see also *BWJR*: 2: 1211-1212.

1875, Fall: Royce’s starts research into the origins of interpretation of the Gospel. In his first months in Germany, Royce reads an article in *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft* (he mentions no author). The article concerns Justin, the early church father, and his relation to the Fourth Gospel of John and it offers two hypotheses for interpreting this relation. The article’s author leans toward the first hypothesis. Royce notes, “Justin therefore never refers to the Fourth Gospel as supplying historical material. He draws upon it for doctrinal matter, not for facts.” And Royce concludes: “The Fourth Gospel therefore cannot be considered as having historical value as to the facts of the apostolic age. It can only be regarded as a document valuable in the history of Christian Gnosticism.” (p. 15). **NB:** This passage hints at Royce’s choice to become more familiar with current German scriptural investigation, and this will lead him to “swim” into the currents of German “higher

biblical criticism”—Strauss, Bauer, etc., names his notebook soon mentions.

--Box 118, folder 13, page 15; see also *Crit. Index*, Part III, page 91

1876, April 27: In Germany, Royce already expresses fallibilism: “As to the logical development of these ideas, I have still at date some doubt.”

-- Notebook in Germany, under date of April 27, 1876, p.48

1877 Royce recounts his second meeting with James, a root of Royce’s deep dependence on WJ, reciprocally tied to a strong dependence through the years of WJ on Royce.

. --“James as a Philosopher” (1911), *Boston Evening Transcript* (June 29, 1911): 13; see also *WJO* 9

1877 Royce recalls his personal meeting in a Baltimore literary club at Johns Hopkins, where there was “*one man, the central figure* to whom we all did homage A tall man he was, our leader, and a bit handsome.” one who came from New York City. (20-21), Royce expects him eventually to author the long-expected Great American Novel

--Box 80 , item 5, “What Constitutes Good Fiction“ (1878-79?), esp., pages 20-27

1877 Summer of research at Cambridge and Boston Public Library: John Fiske provides Royce with guidance into various libraries. Royce’s description of this (in MS pages 6h-6i), does not reappear later in Royce’s lengthy “Introduction” to Fiske’s 4 volume *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*.

“I remember that, upon my own first meeting with him in the summer of 1877, when as a student I visited Cambridge in order to carry on some research work in the library, Fiske, to whom I had a letter of introduction said, as he welcomed me to the Library, and granted me every possible privilege, that he felt himself already growing rusty regarding philosophical studies. His work as Librarian, he said, was absorbing. He could not foresee when the time would come to return to his former plans of work. As a fact, he was destined never to return to them in the sense that he himself desired.”

“John Fiske: His Work as a Philosophical Writer and Teacher”

Boston Evening Transcript, July 13, 1901

Harvard Graduate’s Magazine 10 (1901-02): 23-33

HARP Box 72, document 1, pp, 6h—6i

1878-1879, Royce’s first months at UCB as instructor. Royce’s “Thought Diary” begins on September 24, 1878 and moves him through December 11 (1879). Very central for his intellectual development.

--Box 126, folder 1, Notebook “Special Questions Selected,” pages 100-145; see *FE* 31-35

[**Caution:** The second half of Royce's Card Index of readings, "N-V," begins in Box 126, folder 1, Third Part, pages 151 to 212. For first half "A-M," see Box 125, folder 9.]

At page 116, Royce supplies the outline for the complete work on philosophy he then envisioned

Book. I.

Of the Nature of Philosophy, of its Ends & Methods.

Med. I: Of the Nature and End of Philosophy.

Med. II: Of the Method of Philosophy as a Product of Character

Med. III: Of the Rationalistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. IV: Of the Romantic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. V: Of the Positivistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. VI: Conclusion on the Spirit and Method of Philosophy.³⁹

Book II: Of Truth.

Med. VII: Of Knowledge in its Claims.

Med. VIII: Of Knowledge in its Analysis.

Med. IX: Of the World or of the Ideals of Knowledge.

Book III: Of Right.

Med. X: Of Self and non-Self in Ethics.

Med. XI: Of the World in Action.

Med. XII: Of the World in Contemplation.

1878-1879: On Berkeley Hills' western slope Instructor Royce finds his contemplative nook to look out westward over the Bay toward the Gate between the headlands and the city. Recording his thoughts in his "Summary of a [projected] Essay on the "Principles of the Theory of Truth,"" he finds this scenic setting fit for creating the Introduction to his planned book, "Meditations before the Gate." Royce pictures himself lolling on the Berkeley hillsides in what he calls a "dreamy and delightful passivity." (104) He allows himself to experience the last kind of consciousness before falling asleep. Yet this too is always a stream, a "stream of experience, the time-series." (106) On reflection, however, Royce

³⁹ Royce's repeated use of "Spirit" merits notice. In December, 1915, ten months before he died, he identified the result of his decades-long efforts to reflect philosophically which produced his "doctrine of life and the nature of truth and of reality"—worked out by connecting logical and metaphysical issues. On that date he summarized how the whole symphony of his life as a philosopher now sounded to him: [It] ... now seems to me not so much romanticism, as a fondness for defining, for articulating, and for expounding the perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the 'spirit,' in a sense which is indeed Pauline, but not merely mystical, superindividual; not merely romantic, difficult to understand, but perfectly capable of exact and logical statement." (*HGC*, 131; emphasis added)

sees the danger of adding to this experience the notion that this time series is unlimited in both directions. (106)

--Box 125, folder 9, esp. pages 103-104.

On March 10 (1879), After describing Faust's contract with Mephistopheles. Royce states, "*Im Anfang war die Tat*, i.e., the essence of life and being is activity." Then the Royce, who soon would be engaged to Katharine Head, closes this entry in his diary with a reference to the Feminine Ideal, *Das Ewig-Weibliche* (or "the everlasting womanly").
--FE 34-35; (note the neuter *Das* and the adjectival form.)

On April 3, 1879, Royce weighs the enterprise of his "The New Phenomenology."

"Every man lives in a present, and contemplates a past and future. In this consists his whole life. The future and past are shadows both, the present is the only real. Yet in the contemplation of the shadows is the real wholly occupied; and without the shadows this real has for us neither life nor value. No more universal fact of consciousness can be mentioned than this fact, which therefore deserves a more honorable place in Philosophy than has been accorded to it. For it is in view of this that all men may be said to be in some sense Idealists."

--FE 31; MS in Box 126, folder 1, p.123

A series of later excerpts from Royce's '78-'79 Diary further reveals his mental growth:

April 9, 1879 - "a new experience of emotional character has so entered consciousness that much

result for thought may be in future expected." [Royce's "The Methods of Systematic Thought" runs over more than two pages (124-126)].

--MS page 124

July 19, 1879 -- "Instead of the term 'Principle of Knowledge,' it would be far more proper to make use of the term 'Constitutive Principle', thereby implying at once a reminiscence of Kant and an opposition to him." (128)

[Royce then goes on to discuss his meaning of "constitutive." trying to get down to the concrete reality of the present. He cites Baumann, to whom he has already referred.]

July 25, 1879: Royce refers to C. S. Peirce (FE 32), and writes next day, "The Chapter on the Elements of Knowledge will be essentially the same in doctrine as was the essay on "The Principles." [his dissertation] (131)

September 3 Royce notes: "The Forms of Being: Individuality, Organism, Progress, all three may be found in double manifestation, as unconscious, and as conscious. Thing, Person; Structure, Association; Growth, Self-development. -- The same activity of Thought postulates both kinds of manifestations." (133)

Royce follow with two pages on Plato, and by page 135 offers a plan for a book, “The Doctrine of Being,” of which the first part has ten chapters, the second part has 18 plus at least 3 more; all of which are followed by a third part (chapters not specified).

October 21, Instructor Royce writes:

“All knowledge is, as rational knowledge, symbolic. To regard knowledge literally is to reflect on the content of any moment of consciousness as existing in and for itself, as independent of the content of all other moments. To regard one content as occupying a definite place in the world of thought or of being, is to regard this content symbolically, or as a symbol of an external and objective content.— Using terms with a consciousness of their symbolic force we may say that the Real is made up of an infinity of past, present and future contents of consciousness, each however not real qua past present or future, but real eternally and qua timeless and eternal.” (MS in Box 126, folder 1, pp.136-37)

Royce continues:

“There are no atomic beings, no monads in the world. The world is an aggregate of simultaneous truths.” (MS p.137)

Royce sets out Propositions of Philosophy, but begins “anew” December 11, and goes into the use of antinomies. This ends what diary notes we have.(MS page 139) Almost a year later, on

July 21, 1880, Royce summarizes:

“Reflected further on the present state of the systematic development of philosophy I am undertaking. The opening and foundation thereof is surely the theory of the world of reality as a projection from the present moment.”

FE 35.

1881-1882 Prior to his religious insight of January 1883, Royce drafted this far longer lecture (see below) with its dark tones and its hopes for one facing the problem of truth-seeking. It shows how much he was struggling with the problem personally.

**Group of Essays and Essay Fragments (1878); Box 55, under “folio 2.”
See especially Box 125, folder 6: “The Work of the Truth Seeker.”**⁴⁰

In Box 55, two folios of 24 and 28 manuscript pages each, (i.e., 12 and 14 sheets written front and back). Without page numbers. If the dates above are accurate, this work was written in Berkeley yet much of it will enter into RAP. The fact that the last 9 pages of the second folio seem in Katharine’s hand may help to date this piece. They were married on October 2, 1880.

cf. Box 79, with its three “Truth Seeking” manuscripts, as well as “Doubting and Working” in *Fugitive Essays*. *FE*, page 322, n. 1 says that this essay is a “[r]evision of

⁴⁰ See below under “1882-1883.”

an earlier essay on ‘The Work of the Truth-Seeker,’ read before a [Berkeley] Literary Society. As FMO sees it, Truth-Seeking is at the core of Josiah Royce’s philosophical life.

1881-1882 “I lately saw an old Mexican farmer driving along a steep dry hillside . . .”
--**Box 79, document 6, “Reality and Consciousness,”** pages 21-22.

1881-1882 After experiencing Californian politicians who pressured for their appointments to UCB which favored their party, Royce held throughout his life a passionate quest for academic freedom. Like Peirce, he opposed whatever blocked the path of free research.
“**The Freedom of Teaching,**” *The Overland Monthly*, n.s. 2 (1883): 235-40;
see also Life 262.

1882: September: Royce starts an enduring relationship with George Herbert Palmer, which grows for over three decades until Royce’s death in 1916.
“**In Honor of Professor Palmer**” *Harvard Graduates’ Magazine*, 19 (1910-11): 575-78.

1882-83: Prior to Royce’s “religious insight” of January 1883, Royce struggled through the creation of a lengthy lecture, replete with its dark tones and its hopes for one facing the problem of truth-seeking. This MS, “*The Work of the Truth-Seekers*,” (in 2 folios that amount to 52 MS pages), reveals his own personal struggling with this problem and prepared him toward writing *RAP*..

--**Box 125, folder 6**

1883, January, 11-12: Royce’s “**Religious Insight**,”

Dated with high probability from Royce’s telling the story of his intellectual autobiography—which he had begun two weeks earlier at his 60th birthday banquet (*HGC* 122-32)-- and just two weeks later, continued by describing that “decided reversal of point of view,” which occurred exactly 33 years earlier, as recorded in his autobiographical lecture of January 11, 1916.

—**Royce’s 1915-16 *Metaphysics*, pp.80-83, esp., 83**

Back in January 1883, Royce seems to have first written out his “religious insight” in what we find in “Lecture III on Religious Philosophy. Philosophy Notes,”⁴¹ as evidenced in **Box 129, folder 4**. Clendenning interprets this small (5” by 7”) hard-backed notebook as dating from six months after Royce’s arrival at Harvard. (*See Life*, 115, and its note at page 392,)

And/Or in Royce’s “Lecture IV” which more probably shows him developing his

⁴¹ Archives attaches a “Ca. 1892-1895” dating to this MS—perhaps from mis-locating it, or from slipping to a “9” instead of an “8.”--but 1883 seems a sounder dating.

notable discovery. This manuscript raises the question for the editorial board whether it might be the text of the fourth of Royce's four *RAP* lectures at Harvard in March 1883; (see *BWJR* 2: 1178)

-- **Box 127, folder 2**

1883 "Two Days in Life's Woods," published in 1883, but written after Royce strolled through woods around Berkeley. The poem reveals a Royce who walks through woods and mulls over their effects on the tensions within himself as well as on his dealing with philosophical problems.

--*Overland Monthly*, n.s., I, (June 1883): 594-95,

1883-84 When drafting what would become pages 3-4 of Lecture III in *RAP*, Royce later—on January 11, 1916-- portrayed himself as then (1883) having been:

"led... to the decided reversal of point of view which followed. . . This led me to the doctrine of the nature of error as involving interpretation. I said to myself, this view which I set forth about the nature and conditions of error is true or false. Whether it is true or false, we have here a teleological situation which brings the thought of the moment into contact with a type of consciousness which is not the merely human type."

--*Josiah Royce's Metaphysics, 1915-1916* (SUNY, 1998), page 83

1886 Royce's "Autobiographical Sketch of ca. 1886" a 22 page typescript, slightly edited, but not in Royce's hand, dated 1886 on the basis of Royce's phrase on page 3 "my position on coming to Harvard four years ago." [At the top of page 1 there is a handwritten note by Royce as follows: "Solomons May 27 '98, before the Philos'y Comm."] --**Box 100, folder 5**

1888-89

Royce's tale of his encounters "down under" which expanded his heart and mind, in his two issues of "Reflections after a Wandering Life in Australasia." Royce undergoes a cross-cultural personal expansion as he contrasts the geology, foods, political history, pace of life and life of native peoples in Australia and New Zealand over against those of Cambridge and California.

--*Atlantic Monthly*, 63 (1889): 675-86 and 813-28.

1893 At HARP Box 105, folder 4, Document 12, Typescript B, page 35, Royce offers his confession which seems to reflect his dispute with Abbott. If this manuscript is indeed from his 1893 Lectures to Teachers, as FMO now tends to think, Royce wrote this for presentation less than two years after his debate with F. E. Abbott climaxed in late 1891. At page 35, Royce offers an example from his own life which seems to reflect his quarrel with Abbott. The question it occasions is whether Royce's intelligence had become docile enough by the conflict experience to be fittingly molded by it. Speaking of people who regard their thoughts and ideas as truly original, Royce is led to what seems an early "confession":

"If I may add an instance from the field of my own studies, let me assure you that

the history of Philosophy contains much of this kind of originality, the individual philosopher often imparting, as his own unheard of and mysterious invention, ideas sometimes as old as civilization, sometimes as old as Plato or Kant, but never before existent in his particular mind. Nothing, as I must also confess to you, is so likely to enrage a philosopher beyond reconciliation, as to remark in such a case that his views have been expressed by his predecessors long before he in his wondrous childhood lisped his first metaphysical problem. And when I say this, I speak from a sad experience in dealing with my fellow students⁴² in philosophy. Never, I beg you, as you value your peace, inform a philosopher that he is not an original thinker. On the other hand, it is generally safe to assume in your own mind that his theories existed before him.”

--Box 105, folder 4, document 12, typescript B, page 35

1895? Royce scratches down a note, “Brentano’s is the best place in NY to look up dramatic.”

--Box 109, folder 1, on an unnumbered page.

Ca. 1896: Royce visits some Southern battlefields of the Civil War. Later he shares this experience and its meaning for him.

“A few years ago, during a vacation, I made a visit to some of the best known, and tragically remembered, of our Southern battlefields. In many places, even where little local attention has been devoted to preserving the traces of the old conflicts, or to setting up monuments to mark historic spots, one still finds the original lines of earthen works, about which, in some cases, young forests of pines have now sprung up, half hiding the signs of the days of bloodshed and of patriotic devotion. Here brave men and true fought, sometimes for days in succession, and often apparently useless struggles, which for the time decided nothing, but led to new and equally stubborn conflict elsewhere concerning dangers and defense of all that their hearts held dearest, and in the furious hatred that only bretheren can know when they war together. Yet now, when one wanders in the solitude under the warm Southern sky, and amongst the young pines, whose roots grow through the banks of the old entrenchments or whose branches overshadow, in the cemetery nearby, the graves of the dead, it is indeed a comforting thought to remember, with reverence for all those who died there, that they died not in vain, that their devotion has led to the solving of the old problems, and to the coming of a new life which none of them could have foreseen, - to the passing away of much that was narrower, and to the higher consciousness of a more united civilization. The descendants of those foemen will not retain the old hatreds. They will honor each other the more because the fathers knew so well how to die for ideals. Had not both sides been so much in earnest, there would be today far less hope for our common country, for our race, and for our type of civilization.

“And so, when the frivolities and the frequent social ills that are indeed present in some aspects of our national life sometimes sadden us Americans, the memory of the Civil War always helps us to look deeper, to know that the most formidable appearances of weakness of character which we can observe, are but superficial symptoms, and that at bottom our people are the inheritors of the blood and of the traditions of the men of ‘61. In brief, our war, just because it had to be fought out to a finality, resulted in attainments which our civilization could never have won without it. No desire for a renewal of any of its most essential issues survives amongst us in the mind of people whose feelings are of any serious social or national significance. The future of the American Negro is still a great problem; but nobody desires to see him again a slave, or seriously

⁴² Royce customarily uses “students” for all who “seek for more truth” whatever be their rank or age.

wishes the old slavery days back again. The Southerner, as I have said, is still as proud of his history, including that of the Civil War, as ever he was. But nobody genuinely desires any form of revenge, or keeps alive the sentiments that inspired the conflict. The South has still a keen and common political consciousness, and votes, where national issues are concerned, in a decidedly sectional fashion; but the honor and the deeper unity of the nation are today as clear to the former Confederate, as to his New England brother. In brief, the outcome of our greatest national crisis, and of one of the bitterest and most stubbornly contested of all modern conflicts, has been, not separation, not yet mere conquest, nor even prolonged hatreds, but national unity, a satisfied sense of historic honor in the minds of all those most concerned on both sides, a deep lesson in the seriousness of national life, - a record of devotion, - And, above all, the outcome has been a measure of true assimilation of North and of South without any merely destructive confusion or simple mingling of their types of civilization. For these types still preserve a certain wholesome individuality at the same time when they contribute to the life of on nation.” (18-22)

--“**Some Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization,**” *Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society*, 3 (1900): 194-217; or **Box 92 Document2, Section II, pages 18-22.**

- 1898** Royce offers a near portrait of himself in 1898 while he is reads Vierkanndt, a student of Wilhelm Wundt, on the difference between nature people and culture people.
--**Box 70, Lecture 1, “Aspects of Social Psychology,” (1898), pp 8-10**
- 1902** Royce shares his thoughts on thieves: “Well, just so, very various sorts of people may steal,--missionaries in Peking during the late unpleasantness, bank officers, Legislators, pickpockets, hysterical women, cranks and degenerates of all sorts that could happen to tend that way, small boys looking for apples, professional bandits in Turkey, &c. &c. -- Royce. goes on at length to arrive at the conclusion, “There is then no “theft-disease” any more than there is a disease of “cold feet” or of “backache” or of “earache.”
--**Letters, 427-28**
- 1903** Royce tells the humorous (self-ironical) story of himself caught in “the bondage of Absolutism.” He also goes back to a story about the 21 year-old Royce (when he was a “pure pragmatist”) in contrast to the 48 year-old Royce (who has something to say about the eternal as well as the practical)..
--“**The Eternal and the Practical,**” *Philos. Review*, 13 (March 1904): 113-42, esp., 116-18.
- 1905** Royce summarizes his voyage with the note: “Work from here to page 134 all done during voyage Aug 19-Sept. 14 1905 on Steamer Maraval at Trinidad, etc.”
Also included here is another Note on stationery from the Trinidad line of Steamships, plus pieces of stationery with mastheads of the Queens Park Hotel, Trinidad, Port of Spain, on which Royce has written out logic equations. These and other indications of Trinidad suggest dating these notes around 1905.
--**Box 107, folder 5, document 2, “Loose Notes on Logic,” page 58**
- ca. 1905-16** What did Royce’s personal library at home look like? One can picture some of it from his list of books in his personal library being sent to the binder. He also lists

various volumes of different periodicals, no longer current, of which he plans to dispose of, e.g., *Atlantic Monthly*, *Nation*, *Nature*, etc.

--Box 101, folder 14, from pages 330-47

1906 Royce here describes his own walking through the ruins of San Francisco and the beginnings of its rebuilding. In these tragedy-touched, courageously-animated endeavors, Royce sees symbols of the then current need to revise our moral standards.

--Box 103, older 5, pages 31-32.

1907: In sketching “the philosopher,” Royce approaches a self portrait.

--Box 77, Lecture I: “Introductory Statement for The Yale Undergraduate Ethics Course, Sept. 28, 1907,” pp, 12-13 of a 42 page MS

1907 For effective contrast, Royce talks of a friend whose ‘moral’ standard was “love your friends and whack your enemies.”

--Yale Course in Ethics. Lecture II, Oct. 5, 1907,” p, 22

1909: Logical insight? As another possibly significant logical find in these loose notes, Royce records his “Description of a set of Circuits written on stationery of the royal Mail Steamship “*Pannonia*” and RMS “*Caronia*.” Here are seven pages of these stationery notes, which are 4” x 7” sheets.

--Box 111, folder 3

1909-1910 On the need of the “spirit of philosophy” in treating practical problems, always fallibly, Royce presents his ideal of a teacher and sage—perhaps a self-portrait-- when he states:

“And so, whether the philosophers have correctly solved their own problems or no, we need their spirit and the guidance of this spirit whenever we have practical problems to face and to solve which concern the greater and deeper ideals and mysteries of life, and which, as it chances, our personal instincts are inadequate to solve or to master.

“As a teacher, I have indeed often warned people against expecting too much from philosophical study. I know that there is much in life which only an unconsciously wise instinct can undertake to overcome. And I have a deep respect for an unconsciously wise instinct. And I know that philosophy, which is the effort to become conscious of the problems of life, and to solve those problems by rational inquiry, and to find out what we can know about God, and the world, and the soul, and our duty, and the art of life, must always remain imperfect so long as men remain fallible. But I am also sure that we all need to have philosophers at work. I know that the social problems of our modern world, -- that for instance [of] your social problems here in this city, -- will never be solved unless philosophy is in due time and measure added to common sense, unless theory gets joined to practice, unless somebody, properly called to the task, reasons and criticizes, and faces mysteries with serious methods of thought. And I know too that no pursuit of the special sciences will alone suffice to accomplish the work of reason in this field. I know that the philosopher’s love of unity and of connectedness, and of fundamental

questions is needed to keep our too much distracted civilization from losing its ideals, from forgetting its mission, from degenerating in its instincts, from failing in its highest undertakings.”

-- **Boxes 77 of “Smith College Lectures on Modern Philosophy, (1909-10), folder c), “Philosophy and Life,” pages 48-50.**

1909 “I consider it a proper part of a philosophical student’s business to keep himself relatively naïve, unreflective and directly practical regarding at least some important portion of his own life’s business. Upon certain problems it is my duty to reflect, in as critical a fashion as I may. I do reflect about those problems with a good deal of persistence, and I discourse upon those topics at wearisome length. They are topics of logic, of metaphysics and of general ethical doctrine. In the rest of my life I try to stick to business without much reflection.” (p. 401 of published text)

-- **Box 48 document 2, “The American College and Life” (1909) *Science*, 29 (March 1909): 401-07, esp. 401**

Ca, 1909 A list of expenses. “Rest. 30, Table 30, Bath 15, Deck 10, Music 5, Boots 5. “
--**1909 Box 111, folder 5, 2nd Book of 1909 Voyage**

1909-1910 Royce witnesses that the question, “How live life wisely?” is currently central with philosophers: It is natural “for me to remember that whatever else may interest the students of logic, of metaphysics, or of the theory of knowledge, the problem of the wise conduct of life is at present the central issue with which the men of my calling are busy.”
--**Box 78, “Smith Lectures on Present Problems in Philosophy,” folder f., pages 3-9**

1909 Royce offers his opinion on current collegiate education :

With a demurrer that he has no “right to speak as a representative of a distinctively Harvard point of view,” Royce proceeds to reflect upon the nature of learning and education at the collegiate level in America. He speaks in a strongly pragmatic vein, urging his audience to “beware of those theorists who, in the name of what they call the American college, want to sunder afresh what the whole course of our modern American development has wisely tended to join, namely, teaching and investigation, the more technical training and the more general cultivation of our youth.” (407 of the published text)

(Not surprisingly, Royce also argues for making the “college boy work harder by giving him more work to do.” (406))

--**Box 48, document 2; MS of 40 pp., “The American College and Life,” published in *Science*, n.s., 19 (1909): 401-407**

1910 Royce creates his “Principles of Logic” and adds his personal appraisal of this essay’s logical achievement and of its consequent importance, in his judgment. For this noteworthy appraisal, see ***BWJR* 2: 1214**. First published, without this appraisal, as

“Prinzipien der Logik” in *Logik* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1912): 61- 136.

1910 Royce compares the “very novel insight into the nature of Time” proposed by the “New Realists” to the lessons of his oft-repeated story of the “bold bad elder boy” who tempted a “too trustful little boy .” (258)⁴³ “To be sure, they [the “New Realists”] have told me the truth, but in how disappointingly familiar and commonplace a fashion.” (259)

“The Reality of the Temporal” (April 1910), *The International Journal of Ethics* vol. XX, no. 3 (1910): 257-71

ca. 1911? Royce claims perhaps a significant logical “find” amid loose notes – “Description of a set of Circuits written on stationery of the Royal Mail Steamship “Pannonia” and RMS “Caronia”.” 7 pages of these stationery notes, (4” x 7” sheets).

-- Box 111, folder 3

1912 Royce creates his first eight lectures for Part One of *The Problem of Christianity*, on 4 cruises, May 18—August 28, 1912.

On the inside front cover of this Notebook, Royce makes the following notes in pencil:

“Voyages in 1912

“Voyage I May 17 left Boston by Esparta.

-24. Reached Limon. Work on Lect. I.

June 2 Sunday reached Boston on return.

Lect. I worked over between June 2 & June 12.

Wed. June 12. Stephen – visit to N.Y. return Saturday

June 15 Next fortnight at home.

Elizabeth’s [illegible] Harv. Comm. Jacks.

“Voyage II [Six weeks after May 17, viz.]

Leave Boston Friday June 28, 2d voyage begins on the San Jose

July 5 reach Limon: [Costa Rica]

On this voyage Lecture II is written. Return, reach Boston, July 14

– Doubted whether or not to take next steamer. But actually went as follows:

Voyage III. On Friday July 9 Leave Boston on the *San Jose*. Have still mis[illegible]

Write Lectures II & (in part) IV.

Reach Limon July 26

Leave Limon on Sunday July 28, & reach Boston Aug. 5

. – Finish Lect. IV in the next few days at home.

Stephen’s report on Monday, Aug. 6

Options agreement by Aug 15.

Lecture V Aug. 16 to 19 or 20.

Lecture VI finished by the 24 at Limon.

Lecture VII written betw. Sunday the 24 & Wed. the 28th.

Voyage IV. – Leave Boston Aug. 16. By the *Esparta*.

⁴³ See above, “Ca. 1863.”

Lectures V, VI, VII written in this voyage
Return [illegible] I.”

--“Notes on the Hibbert Lectures,” Box 113, folder 2

ca 1912? Royce reports how, as he sat in a temporarily halted railroad car, on a line from Cape Cod to Boston, his attention was suddenly alerted to “two boys talking together in the seat directly behind me“ and their different openness to the metaphysics of children .

--““Shop-Talk,” prepared for The Authors’ Club,” for its meeting of Dec. 5, 1913.
Box 78, document 5, pages 18-19; Royce’s 1915-1916 *Metaphysics*, page 10, and *LWJR* 2:
192

1912 Royce shows his deep interest in logic and his increasing use of “illustrations,” much as C. S. Peirce did. Royce recommends to “modern mathematical logicians. . . [d]efine your problems as far as possible by designating typical examples.” He also recommends taking the Peircean tack of using examples to concretize demonstrations.

Secondly, he recommends that they “marshal” the various possible varieties of opinion which you regard as worthy of discussion, [since] it is of course natural to divide some universe of discourse into classes, and then to enumerate the possible views by pointing out the logically possible relations amongst these classes.”

Yet, “do not ignore those most momentous aspects of modern exact theories, namely the ‘existence-theorems,’ or ‘existential postulates’ and their contradictories (the assertion that declare or deny some of your defined classes to be ‘zero-classes’).”

--Box 48, document 3, Section VII, pages 68-69; or “On Definitions and Debates,”
The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 9 (February 15, 1912): 85-100.

1913 Royce on Americans’ inter-racial problem amid the swelling tide of immigration: Royce is contrite about his earlier boast that, at least from the viewpoint of “white man relating to fellow white man, the American had not used rifles and war against immigrating fellow whites, whereas in the Boer War the British had sunk to use war and rifles to kill white Dutch immigrants. In 1913, Royce felt he could no longer make that boast, for now Americans are challenged with a far greater immigration problem and are not yet able to solve it.

-- “Address for the Meeting of American Students at Oxford, Feb. 22, 1913”
Box 78, document 2, near opening

1914, July 5, Royce, sail boating with his son, [Stephen], and working on logic, intersperses his writing with notes on external progress, “they pass Cape Cod.” “Note of July 5, 1914.” This prose narrative then goes on to describe work on linear triads. Soon another note appears, “In Mass. Bay, crossing to the light-ship.” Royce then sets down a significant

note about his logical work:

“It seems, then, that if three elements of a linear triad, together with its characteristic pair (c, d), are already known, then any three elements of the tetrad determine the fourth by a construction which is wholly analogous to the anharmonic construction.

“If this holds on further examination, it will prove a discovery of the first importance..

“So the voyage ends on July 5, 1914.”

--Box 114, folder 1, document 2, “Significant Logical Reflection,” Note ends on page 25

1915 Royce’s repeated use of “Spirit” merits notice. In December, 1915, ten months before he the result of his decades-long efforts to reflect philosophically—his “doctrine of life and the nature of truth and of reality”—worked out by connecting logical and metaphysical issues. On that date he described this effort as:

It “... now seems to me not so much romanticism, as a fondness for defining, for articulating, and for expounding the perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the ‘spirit,’ in a sense which is indeed Pauline, but not merely mystical, superindividual; not merely romantic, difficult to understand, but perfectly capable of exact and logical statement.”

HGC, 131; also see Royce’s use of “spirit” in his outline of Book I (p. 12 above)

1916 Is it fantastic to ask whether Royce sees in Nietzsche a good deal of his own ‘way of striving to become a unique individual’? -- i.e., whether Royce’s whole Nietzsche article is a kind of Roycean autobiography but with Royce’s pointing out some large omissions in Nietzsche, such as his missing the great problem of the organic character of the true life of the cooperating individual, plus the reality of community, and the weakness of his oriental idea of the eternal recurrence?”

--“Nietzsche,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 119 (1917): 321-31

III. Biographical Witness

Josiah Royce’s sole surviving (at that time) sister, Ruth Royce, via her unpublished 1928 Letter to Ralph Barton Perry, preserved in Harvard Archives Royce Papers [HARP], Box 101; folder 8:

On February 20, 1928, **Ruth Royce**⁴⁴ wrote a significant response to Ralph Barton Perry. Earlier, on February 8th, Perry had requested that Miss Royce share her decades-long knowledge of her brother, Josiah. Perry asked her help—her view after more than sixty years of interacting

⁴⁴ Address: Box 27, Los Gatos, Calif.

with the philosopher in a family-based way --to support the article which Perry was writing on Royce for the *Dictionary of American Biography*. She replied,⁴⁵ “I cannot quote exact words [of my brother] but my understanding of his spirit and meaning....The real man is the spirit and not the temple. He writes his own biography when he records his thoughts. Would you know the man, read his message—his growing messages through the years. The rest is only incidental and temporary.”⁴⁶

Some highlights follow:

p. 3 : Ruth refers to John Wright Buckham’s “The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought,” *Harvard Theological Review*, VIII (April 1915).

p. 5: Ruth says her mother Sarah Eleanor Royce “wrote her diary of their trip; across the plains to California making a connected account of the trip, for my Brother to read, just before he wrote his history of California.” [Hence, the “connected account” is their mother’s reworking around 1883 of her diary recordings.]

p. 6. Royce “had no other teacher” than their mother until the family moved to San Francisco “when he was eleven years old.”

p. 7: “From his boyhood he was a talker and loved to talk and could express his thoughts.”

p.7: “Of all the influences that helped in the making of Josiah Royce, the outstanding, non-deniable factor was his Mother.” Despite popular misuse of the term “mystic,” Ruth calls her mother not a ‘quasi-mystic,’ but “a mystic ...in Dr. Addison’s usage in his “Mysticism” book,-- “one who, believing what hundreds about him say they believe simply lives what he believes.”⁴⁷

p. 8: Mother certainly lived “as seeing Him who is invisible.””

p. 8: Royce “first read *Faust* in his high school days and seemed to revel in it with the enthusiasm of personal discovery.”

Evaluation: Ruth’s witness, even if only its most telling parts, deserves entry into the Introduction either to Vol. I of the *Critical Edition* or to the Forward of an autobiographical volume that gathers together all the autobiographical facets that Royce himself has left to his various audiences.

⁴⁵ See pages 2-3.

⁴⁶ Ruth’s emphasis.

⁴⁷ Charles Morris Addison, *The Theory and Practice of Mysticism* (New York: E. page Dutton & Co., 1918).

Appendix B

Excerpts From Manuscripts And Various Notes⁴⁸

- I. **Plans for the Hibbert Course (*PC*)**
- II. **Omitted Sections (V-VIII) from *PC*'s Lecture XIV, "The Doctrine of Signs"**
- III. **On the "Mystery of HARP Boxes 52 and 68," and the omitted final section of Royce's last Graham lecture, "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature,"**
- IV. **Notes re Royce on Immortality**

I.

- I. **"Plans" for the Hibbert Course (*The Problem of Christianity*)
Box 105, folder 7 (?)(Former Logic Box 4, document 4) (*cf.* notes in
Box 113, folder 2).**

Royce wrote a series of "Plans" for the lectures, the fifth (page 20) being the last contained in HARP (there were seven plans altogether). Logic Box 4, document 4 contains various versions of these plans, which he entitled: "Notes for a Voluntaristic Approach to the problems of the proposed Hibbert Course (General Metaphysical Problems)." The five plans show Royce toiling to revise the interpretation of his task at hand, creating plan after plan until, in his sixth or seventh plan,⁴⁹ he feels satisfied with what he wants to do. (NB: His focus on tradition in these outlines, as well as concepts of atonement and sin, is striking.) *See* Document 3 *The Problem of Christianity* for more detailed analysis of the "Plans."

However, the gap between the Fifth Plan and the "Lecture Series Outline" that Royce gave to the Oxford audience [*PC* 49-54] is so great that further outlines or plans, e.g. six, seven, etc., must

⁴⁸ This appendix reflects various ongoing notes regarding discoveries, not easily categorized, in the process of the review of the HARP documents.

⁴⁹ Because the fifth plan is not identical with the final organization of the lectures, FMO infers a subsequent plan or plans. *See* text related to note 2 *infra*. These latter plans do not appear to exist in manuscript form in HARP.

have been drafted. [For evidence, see Royce's own attempts to start Lecture I (in Box 113, folder 5) *See also* his synopses of the Lowell Institute lectures in Box 39.

Royce's notes (in Box 105, folder 7), pages 1-23, read as follows:

“Intuition and Action.

”Notes for a Voluntaristic approach to the problems of the proposed Hibbert Course (General Metaphysical Problems.) [Say 12 lectures devoted to these, out of the 20 or 24 assigned for the “three terms” proposed.]”

[Part I. Lectures I to VI] Time and Reality

Lecture I. James's contrast of Percept and Concept sketched, after his posthumous treatment of the issues - The estimate of the significance of concepts not definable in terms of antithesis of concrete (percept) and abstract (concept), because concept is a plan or way of action, & gets its expression in deeds, while deeds are concrete in the highest degree. Deed as determinate and irrevocable. Antipragmatism sketched (in the sense of the Philadelphia lectures ... barest outline). The field of logic as the field of deeds. Chronosynopsis introduced. A superhuman intuition demanded as the fulfilment of the logical motives.

Lecture II. The consciousness of Time. Bergson's theory sketched. Time Appreciation. The “interpenetration,” etc. - Concept of Real Duration. -- Duration as object of intuition demands articulation. This demand as at once voluntaristic & logical. Chronosynopsis approached from this side. Logic thus leads to ideal of intuition; intuition equally leads to an ideal of logical articulation. The synthesis of the two as the philosophical ideal.

Lecture III. The real structure of the temporal order: (1) A succession of will-acts; (2) A synopsis of the significance of such a succession. Time space and its arbitrary character. Variations of temporal survey and time-span. Possibility of the evolution of various types of time span. - Misunderstandings corrected. The synopsis of a temporal sequence is no event of that sequence.

Lecture IV. Time and Teleology. Relation of “Means” to “end” determined by time-span, and variable therewith. Interpenetration and reconciliation of mechanism and teleology. Peirce's form of teleology. -Recapitulation of this view of the time world.

(Lectures V & VI. - Outlines of a Voluntaristic Philosophy of Nature and theory of Evolution on the basis indicated)

The foregoing would be the first part of the Hibbert Metaphysical lectures. The second part would restate the idealistic argument in newer voluntaristic terms. - The lectures on Christianity would form a separate part, which might be a prologue to the general metaphysics.”

[page 7 of folder 7]

“Another form of the whole plan might run thus. -

Christianity and Reality.

Part I. The tradition of the Divine Tragedy.

Lecture I. The Christian Conception of God [“God” is written over “faith” in Royce’s hand]

Lecture II. The Tradition of the Fallen World.

Lecture III. The Tradition of the Suffering God.

Lecture IV. The Paradoxes of Tradition

[page 8]

“Another Form of the plan for the
Proposed Hibbert Lectures - Make a separate first part on Christianity

General Title. The Vital in Christianity.

Lecture I. The Paradox of Christian Tradition.

- a. The Perfect Deity.
- b. The Fallen World.
- c. The Suffering Deity.
- d. The Process of Salvation.

Lecture II. The Ethical Interpretation of Christian Tradition.

- a. The life of Jesus as a revelation of life & character
- b. The approach to God through this revelation
- c. Salvation as the result of such approach.
- d. Escape from the paradoxes of tradition

Lecture III. The Inadequacy of the Ethical Interpretation

- a. Historical Doubts
- b. The Moral and the Religious Interpretation of the Individual. Their conflict.
- c. The types of Individuality, and the unity of the Spirit -
- d. The Unity of the Spirit not presented in the historical person of Jesus.
- e. Resulting limitations of every individualistic form of Christian interpretation

Lecture IV. Tradition in its relation to the Constitution of the Spiritual World.

- a. What is vital in tradition?
 - α. Historical elements
 - β. Metaphysical elements.
 - γ. Religious elements
- b. Outlines of the constitution of the spiritual world.
 - α. Individuals & their deeds.
 - β. Unity and the Good. - Love, Loyalty, and the Volition of Individuals

- γ. Evil and the Tragedies of the spirit
- δ. The struggle with Evil.
- ε. The Remedy for Evils. - Its Limitations. - Pessimism. -

Lecture V. Atonement and Forgiveness.

Lecture VI. The doctrine of the Incarnation. - The Spirit and the Church

Lecture VII. The Transient and the Abiding in Christianity

Lecture. VIII. The Verifiable, the Ideal, and the Metaphysical in Christianity. -

Part II. The Metaphysics of Time.

(This part would contain
The critique of Bergson
As an incident.)

- Lecture 1. Bergson summarized (on time)
- Lecture 2. Logic, Intuition and Action
- Lecture 3. Time Order and Time synopsis
- Lecture 4. Time Span
- Lecture 5. Evolutionary Types in relation to Time Span
- Lecture 6. General Theory of Teleology
- Lecture 7. Time and Idealism.
- Lecture 8. Freedom and Unity.

Part III.

The Moral, the Natural
And the Absolute Orders

(A recapitulation and defense
of absolutism upon the foregoing
basis)

Lect. I. Personality in its relation to Time. A Person as one interested in the past and future as realism of absolute values. That is, the deed once done assigns a value that affects the value of all the life of the person in question, or in fact of all life. The postulate of absolute value thus relates above all to time totalities. - Resulting antipragmatism restated.

Lecture II. The Moral World as presenting three sorts of values.

- a. Values of experience (fluent)
- b. Values of deeds (originating but never revocable)
- c. Values of persons

The c-values are determined by the relation of the person to an organic or synoptic totality of persons.

(see previous page)

Lecture II. Continued. Theory of redemption or metabolism of values founded on the previous. In how far the value of an irrevocable deed itself a changeable fact. - The essence of sin, as disloyalty of deed to its own whole life (personal or super personal). The sense in which the sin is therefore beyond atonement. But the person whose sin this is can be redeemed through a new deed of the organism. (Over)”

[pages 17-20 of folder 7]

“Another plan for the
Christianity section or volume of the Hibbert Lectures, might run thus: -
What is Vital in Christianity?

Lecture I. The Issue stated. Three answers suggested as prominent in modern discussion: -

- a. Christianity as a solution of the Problem of Character. Personalism, the Person of the founder as ideal, etc. - The position of “Liberal Christianity”
- b. Christianity as a mystical transformation of personality
- c. Christianity as a Religion of Redemption from the consequences of Sin. - Preliminary statement of the three answers, and illustration.

Lecture II. Tradition and Religious Experience in their contrast as means of presenting & solving the problem.

Lecture III. The Value of Personality. A study of the defects of our “form” of consciousness, - resulting in a view of the inadequacy of the first and second solutions as above stated.

Lecture IV. Loyalty & Disloyalty. - The problem of sin.

Lecture V. Atonement, its essence. -
Grace & Good Works.

Lecture VI. The Eternal Christ & the temporal manifestation.

Lecture VII. The Historical Creeds and the Christian Life.

Lecture VIII. The Place of Christianity in Universal Religion.

This plan might be abbreviated,
in its statement, as follows:

Lecture I: Three (recent) forms of Christianity:

- a. Liberal Christianity
- b. Mystical Christianity
- c. Traditional Christianity

Lecture II. Religious Tradition and Religious Experience

Lecture III. The worth of Personality.

Lecture IV. The problem of Sin.

Lecture V. Atonement.

Lecture VI. The Christ Ideal and its manifestations.

Lecture VII. The Historical Creeds and the Christian Life

Lecture VIII. The Place of Christianity in Universal Religion

[page 21-23]

“[Essence of the previous plan {plan 5}: Defence of a rationalized form of the Atonement Doctrine as the true interpretation of the permanent office of religion in human life. - For the doctrine of sin as needing penalty is to be substituted the doctrine that the essential penalty of sin is the fact that, as irrevocable, the disloyal act takes its place in the whole of life, and is valued as an irrevocable stain, affecting that whole, and the personality involved, precisely in proportion as the spiritual self-consciousness [*sic*] concerned takes on integral and concrete form and “memory.” - This can be very concretely worked out. 0 For the doctrine of “substitution” atonement is to be substituted the concept that each disloyal deed is an opportunity for a new loyalty, in so far as the new loyalty is initiated by another person than the one who does this disloyal deed. Hence the symbolic doctrine that only the sinless can atone. - The resulting transformation of Christian doctrine is to be viewed as an absolute religion that must, in various lands, times, etc., take on endlessly new forms. Each new form is an hypothesis to be tested by religious experience.]”

[End of Royce’s first five “Plans for the Hibbert Course”]

II.

The Problem of Christianity, Lecture XIV: “The Doctrine of Signs”

Sections V-VIII—i.e., page 16a to page 39 -- of the MS of this Lecture XIV in HARP Box 37) have been omitted from the printed text. They read as follows:

“V

I can best begin my answer to this question [“How can he test the metaphysics of his community?”] by sketching the form in which the problem of the community presented itself to us at the outset of our study of metaphysical problems, and then by indicating the results to which our philosophy of interpretation has now shown the way. Both the earlier and the later phases of our inquiry are here to be summarized in their practical aspects. What attitudes of the will towards the real social order were expressed by the theories of the community with which we began? What change in these attitudes is required by the new view of our social situation to which the discussion of the cognitive process of interpretation has set before us?

In stating the Christian doctrine of life, we tried to bring into unity certain ethical counsels, and certain results of religious experience. The outcome of this effort was the assertion that the salvation of man comes through practical devotion to the Universal Community. Ethically speaking, loyalty to this community is the supreme virtue. From the religious point of view, the spiritual union of the individual with the life of the community constitutes the very essence of the redeeming process. The grace that saves is the love which the community awakens in its members. The essence of original sin is that hatred towards the authority of the social will which our natural cultivation awakens and inflames. The source of this love which redeems the individual is, indeed, for the traditional Christian consciousness, a divine mystery. The transforming magic of loyalty is regarded, by Paul, as due to the spirit who vivifies the community. And this spirit, when we look into it from the level of our natural life of moral detachment, seems divine.

VI

The Christian ideas, when estimated in the light of such a survey, were distinctly practical ideas. They expressed attitudes. They also appear to us to be at once human and mysterious. That they

have saved men, and why, when they have indeed taken hold upon men's lives, they have done this saving work, we could indeed at least partially learn from history and from human experience. But whence the Christian ideas came, and for what metaphysical truth they stood, we could not thus fully determine. It therefore became our business to inquire further into these matters. We needed to discover, if possible, the relation of the Christian ideas to the real world. In voluntaristic terms we could express our problem by saying that we needed some deeper justification for the loyal will, and for our hope that it will triumph, than is yet visible to man.

To this end we passed over to our study of the sense in which a community such as any stable social order brings before us, is a reality and furnishes a firm foundation for the values which we now so imperfectly find, but which we hope to understand more richly as the human world grows wiser.

At the outset of this part of our work, we consulted social common sense. The first result of this appeal was that our ordinary account of the nature of human individuals appears to emphasize, but not to solve the problem of the community. For common sense views individuals as sundered streams both of feelings and of ideas, as mutually inaccessible realms of feeling, as mutually secretive lives, as divided from one another by chasms, and as capable of communicating with one another only through the intermediation of physical processes. And this intermediation seems to depend upon the mysterious union of body and mind!

On the other hand, the same common sense which thus regards men as monads, also knows that sometimes their lives seem actually to blend; and that, under certain conditions, some strange compounding of consciousness appears to occur; so that communities are, after all in some sense realities which have the value of souls.

We turned to still other sources for light upon our problem regarding the meaning of this singular union of divisions and of interpenetrations, -- this alliance between the conditions which keep men apart, the powers that engender human hatreds, and the grace which, whatever its nature may be, nevertheless saves those whom it joins in spirit, and of whom it makes one undivided soul.

The next stage of our inquiry first made us of what we have since learned to call the cognitive process of interpretation. A community, we said, is a real unity by virtue of the fact that many selves, despite their various lives and their social chasms, can so interpret their individual lives that selves who are now many and who are at present divided possess in

common, various past and future events; and can for that reason view themselves as in spirit one.

For when many men extend, each his own ideal life into the far off past and future, the social divisions of the present moment become perfectly consistent with a common recognition that, in some respect, all these selves possess an identical past and future, the social divisions of the present moment become perfectly consistent with a common recognition that, in some respects, all these selves possess an identical past and future. Thus we may indeed form an idea of a community of hope or of memory wherein we the many live and move and have our being.

Such a recognition first appeared, in our discussion, in its purely practical forms. Festival days, and the reverence of many men for their common ancestors, the hopes of patriots for the one coming event which means the triumph of their country; Paul's unification of his churches through the memory of the divine deed to which all the members owed their salvation; and through the hope of the united resurrection in which all were to share, -- these events and processes serve to illustrate that, by virtue of a perfectly intelligible interpretation of the various selves and of their temporal relations, the unity and the reality of communities can be defined; and can become, not merely a mystery, but a reasonable and practical force in men's lives.

Communities thus formed, thus unified, thus inspired through their common hopes and memories can be loved as unities. Such communities not only possess a genuine reality; but they have part in the working of the grace which wins loyalty. And such communities can aid in teaching the otherwise divided human individuals to acknowledge the common life of the spirit.

The result thus reached attracted our attention to the nature of the process of interpretation itself. Hereby we were gradually led, first to a study of the logic and of the psychology of interpretation and then to our metaphysical theory of the world of interpretation. And thus we have gained a new view, first of how a human community can be real, and of how its constitution can become definite, and then of how the world itself can interpreted as a real community.

Looking back over the course of this study, we see that, the whole process had involved a profound change in the attitude of the will, in terms of which we had learned to estimate the lives of men. At the outset, it was the sundered individuals who seemed to be the primarily important realities, while the community seemed to be either a divine mystery, of a figure of speech, or an unsolved problem of social psychology.

But at the conclusion of our study, the typical community of interpretation offered itself,

by virtue of its form, as worthy to be the dwelling place of the interests and of the unity which we sought. The members are the mind which is interpreted, the mind to which the interpretation is addressed, and the mediator or interpreter. This community has offered itself as, in form at least, a solution of the problem regarding the sense in which a community can be real, and can possess a more concrete reality than belongs to its individual members. A community of interpretation is an union of individuals whose very being consists in their becoming members one of another. In such a community there is one who is interpreted, and one who is addressed, and a third who interprets. When we recall the fact that the foundations of all higher civilized life rest upon processes of mutual interpretation, whereby men come to a better mutual understanding, when we recall the fact that a reasonable love amongst men cannot exist until they have learned to understand one another, when we remember too that every advance in mutual understanding furnishes to individuals new opportunities for love, --we see that the theory of interpretation tends to throw light both upon the nature and upon the unity, and upon the value,--the saving power, the spiritual meaning of genuine communities. Let us see wherein such light may be of further aid to us.

VII

You will remember that interpretation occupies in our literal social life a place precisely analogous to the place which the process of explicit comparison fills in the inner life of any one individual. This, in fact, is why we are all accustomed to say that two men who are in conversation are comparing ideas. We here mean that each man is interpreting his own ideas to his fellow man. We thus speak as if each were comparing ideas that were really before him.

Now when I compare two ideas of my own, I do so for a purpose. This purpose is to find some third idea. And the third or mediating idea is to bring the two ideas which we compare into a closer union with each other than existed before the comparison. Yet this closer union, in cases wherein Peirce's type of triadic comparison takes place, never annuls or blurs the contrasts. Comparison unites ideas without permitting them to blend. It removes their estrangement without confounding their distinctions. Or, as we have already said, it so mediates between contrasting ideas, that it neither confounds their persons, that is their distinct meanings, nor divides their substance.

Such an unification of ideas by means of an interpreter, solves before your own internal vision, the problem of the One and the Many. Your own internal processes of comparison

produce, when they are successful, communities of ideas, communities such that, in each of them, the body and the members are as clearly distinguished as they are intimately linked. This community of three of your own ideas is and remains, while you compare and mediate between contrasting ideas, One. Yet this One has three members, and the being of each member consists in its belonging to this inner community. One of the ideas is interpreted to or in the light of the other, while the third idea acts as the mediator.

The result of any such comparison, when it is followed out with a definite purpose, and succeeds, is that some question is answered, some problem is solved, some doubt is clarified, some embarrassing diversity or inner estrangement of your own meanings and activities is diminished or removed. Yet all this occurs without a blending of the ideas in question and without any loss of their diversities. The unity of the ideas becomes at once a fact, and a fulfilment of a purpose. Their unity is simply inseparable from the diversity.

Comparison is an instrument of simply indispensable value for all our insight. Whatever art or science or practice or business we follow, such triadic comparison of ideas is our constant instrument; our constant means of solving problems. There is no sort of explanation which you cannot reduce to a series of comparisons, each belonging to the triadic type which Peirce defined. There is no issue, personal or social, logical or practical, moral or religious, which cannot be rendered more controllable through processes of such comparison, through observing differences and finding mediating ideas.

So far, then, we speak of interpretation as it goes on within the individual life of each of us. Comparison is a sort of inner conversation, wherein our ideas are mutually interpreted one to another. And all this inner activity expresses our will, and constitutes a sort of drama of inner self-enlightenment.

But when we turn from internal comparison to our literal social life, we have further seen that there is no social function which more serves to unify men while keeping them from losing their distinct individualities than does the social function of mutual interpretation. Whatever else you seek to do for the true good of mankind, and whatever form of social unity you intend to bring to pass among them, one practical rule for your enterprise might be stated, in our own technical terms, thus: -- Form them into communities of interpretation. That is, so join them that each man is adequately interpreted to those fellow men with whom, for good cause, he is grouped. And this, in general, requires for each pair of men the presence of a third member, the

interpreter. The will to interpret is therefore the most fundamental expression of the civilized social will. Herein lies the true basis of spiritual progress. Without mutual interpretation, no rational love, no lasting loyalty, no life in the spirit.

Through any community of interpretation, moreover, whatever be the special purpose for which it may be formed, the problem of the many members and the one body is peculiarly well exemplified --and solved. For whenever an interpretation is taking place, each participant in the process exists, for the purposes of this community, only in his office, in his place, in the community. The diversity of the members is essential to the common task. The goal is one for all concerned. Yet these members must be many in order to define the common goal.

Such a community is peculiarly well adapted then, both to present to us a solution of the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many, and to furnish a basis upon which all the higher forms of spiritual unity may develop. In any individual case, acts of interpretation may be trivial. But for mankind in its larger unities, interpretation is the expression of the will that all may be One.

VIII

Such then, was the advance which our doctrine of the human community made in consequence of our study of the process of interpretation. Our last lecture generalized the theory of the social relations which our elementary doctrine of interpretation had already exemplified: Our metaphysical thesis became this: The real world has the constitution of a community of interpretation.

For this was what our doctrine of Signs really means. The doctrine of Signs is an assertion that the world contains its own interpreter. There are ideas and there are minds whose diversities are interpreted. There are minds to which this interpretation is addressed. And through the total process of this community which constitutes the universe, the ideal of interpretation is fulfilled, while the end of interpretation is the very purpose for the sake of which the whole world, with its endless histories and its manifold varieties, exists. This, then, constituted our doctrine of Signs. Whatever is in the world of temporal events, is a sign calling for interpretation. And every sign finds its interpreter.

I am not asking you, at this point, to estimate the very incompletely stated argument whereby we reached this result. Our present concern is with the mental attitude, with the will, with the life-purpose, with the interest; which such a thesis is fitted to arouse in the mind of one

who accepts it. We shall soon see that, in characterizing this attitude, we shall furnish new evidences for our metaphysical thesis.

Mystics seek to come, through contemplation, into immediate touch with the real, by winning some final, some immediate, some universal perception, beyond which there will remain no further reality to perceive.

Those whom it is now customary to call intellectualists, or rationalists, possess, as we all possess, an acquaintance with certain universals, with certain laws, relations, orders. These are realities. And such thinkers seek to define the real, as Plato or as Spinoza did, in terms of some final, some all-sufficient, some necessary system of conceptions. Thus then are framed those philosophies of perception or of conception which we have now repeatedly characterized.

But one who believes in our world of interpretation: How is his acceptance of this world as a reality related to the actuality of his will?"

III

The Mystery of HARP BOXES 52 & 68, and the omitted final section of Royce's last Graham lecture, "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature,"

Frank Oppenheim

When our "dig team" of 2008-2009 examined the MS in Box 68, document 6, entitled "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature," we noticed how this MS ended abruptly on page 34 with an incomplete sentence. Several weeks later, our "digging" led us into the lengthy MS in Box 52 document 2, entitled "The Problem of Job." Here we encountered a glitch in page numbering – the first part of this MS ended at page 39, and what seemed its next part started at page 35 and ran continuously to page 87. Something here was awry with the mounting of pages.

While recording this on her computer, Dawn Aberg questioned whether this apparent second section of "The Problem of Job" did not sound like something we had already encountered in Box 68 's "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature." Here as a puzzle. We asked that Box 68 be again hauled up so we could compare its document 6 with the MSS in Box 52 under document 2. On closer inspection, we found that what was mounted as the "second part" of "The Problem of Job" actually started at a page 35 with the one word "presence."—Note well the small "p" and the period. This, we found, completed the sense and structure of the incomplete sentence that ended page 34 of "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature," as mounted in Box 68, document 6. Light began dawning.

More and more clues came to light. The MS in Box 52 continued the themes of pessimism and Schopenhauer which Royce had been treating on page 34 of "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature," as mounted in Box 68, document 6. Moreover, the kind of MS paper was the same. Then, too, Royce used the phrase "theistic interpretation of the natural order" in the early lines of the apparent second part of the "Problem of Job" lecture, etc. etc.⁵⁰

This called for rechecking the published version of the "Problem of Job" in *SGE*. Here we found on page 15 the paragraph which begins, "In endeavoring to grapple..." This paragraph, however, begins the MS of the longer portion of Royce's 5th Augustus Graham lecture, mounted in Box 68, document 6. Recall that Royce delivered his "Problem of Job" lecture at Concord seven months *after* he delivered his 5th Augustus Graham lecture.⁵¹ It seems, then, that Royce compensated for the shortness of his "Problem of Job" MS –it provided him with only about twenty minutes reading time--by falling back upon that part of his 5th Graham lecture which would fit his treatment of Job (i.e., pages 35-75 of the MS in Box 68, document 6; or in *SGE* 15-28). Limits of time evidently led Royce at Concord to spare his ministerial audience the climactic conclusion of his 5th Augustus Graham lecture found in pages 76-89 in the MS of Box 68, document 6. See below for the text of this conclusion, never before published. Thus the

⁵⁰ For further details see Comprehensive Index, Part I, under Box 68, # 6.

⁵¹ Lecture V, on "The Theistic Interpretation of Nature," given at the Brooklyn Institute on March 1, 1896.

general lines of the “Mystery of the Boxes” seem to gain clarity.

Royce’s climax of his 5th Augustus Graham lecture, “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature,” seems to have been a 13 pages MS which Royce chose not to use seven months later with the Ministers at Concord, or at least chose not to use when in 1898 he prepared “The Problem of Job” for publication in *SGE*. By 1898, at latest, this final portion of the MS of the 5th Graham lecture had become a “tag-along” piece of Royce’s lengthy “addition” to his Problem of Job lecture.

Deposited in HARP Box 52, as the conclusion of its document 2, this 13 page MS very probably had originally functioned as Royce’s concluding climax to the last of his five Graham Lectures on “Theism.” Forty-five years later, it became mismounted into HARP Box 52, document 2, as part of “The Problem of Job.” These pp.75-87 of MS, however, deserve in reading to be conjoined to its preceding pages 35-74, as the last and second last parts, respectively, of his fifth Graham Lecture, “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature.” (The 1st part still lies in Box 68, document 6).

The likely scenario, then, is that on October 1, 1896, seven months *after* delivering his fifth Graham Lecture at the Brooklyn Institute, and amidst the start-up pressures of Harvard’s academic year, Josiah Royce, aware that his text for his “Problem of Job” lecture to the Ministers at Concord comprised an incomplete MS of only 39 pages, (just 20 minutes of delivery time), picked up the MS of his fifth Graham Lecture as a “fall-back,” and somehow chose its pages 35--74 to round out his Job lecture at Concord.⁵² Since the final pages 75-87 of “Theism V” did not fit his aim in handling of the problem of Job, Royce perhaps chose not to further tire the Ministers with it. All this suggests a reason why both MSS became misplaced upon Royce’s return home from Concord, and why they stayed misplaced forty-five years later when mounted separately and misleadingly into HARP Boxes 52 and 68.

[N. B. As a helpful entry into the following conclusion, read Royce’s mid-section build-up to it in his *Studies in Good and Evil*, pages 15-28. Currently (April 2010), the opening section of Royce’s “5th Graham lecture lies as a still unpublished MS of pages 1-34 in HARP Box 68, document 6, under title, “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature.”]⁵³

The full and previously unpublished text of that fifth section of Lecture V follows.

⁵² In 1898 Royce published this same pair of MSS as one continuous lecture, “The Problem of Job,” in his *Studies of Good and Evil*, pages 1-28. He inserted 17 printed lines to link this pairing of MSS; see pages 14-15.

⁵³ John J. Kaag has an article on the “Mystery of the Boxes” forthcoming. Perhaps, the “5th Graham” may finally appear in the form of *one continuous reading* either in print or internet version.

Augustus Graham lecture series⁵⁴
Lecture V: “The Theistic Interpretation of Nature”
Section V:⁵⁵

In concluding let us return to our theoretical problem for yet one moment and say a word as to the positive aspect of the theistic interpretation of the natural order. Why the evils of the natural order may have their place in the perfection of the eternal order we have seen. But we have also frequently spoken of the phenomena of nature as the hint of a concealed but deeper truth. What have we meant by this?

Nature has two aspects. Of one of these aspects I spoke at length at the last time.⁵⁶ This is the aspect of nature which is revealed in our human experience, and through our science. This is the aspect that belongs to phenomenal nature as such. Here what is known has, as we saw validity, [*sic*] but only human validity. Science knows phenomena, and really knows them. The world as science views it is objective for all men, and is therefore not in the least the expression of any individual’s private belief or opinion, but is simply the world of appearance as it is for the experience of our entire race. But apart, indeed, from the human point of view, nature as science knows it has no valid existence. The nature world, [*sic*] in this aspect, is the world of actual and possible experience of mankind; and another being, not a man, in case he viewed the hidden truth that lies beneath what we call nature, might find there exemplified wholly different laws and a wholly different significance.

But now I doubt not that behind our nature phenomena there are indeed systems of facts, present to the divine point of view, of whose presence our experiences of nature are hints. Just as behind and beyond your phenomenal body there is your individual mind, which you know directly, but which is inaccessible to anybody else, except in so far as you communicate with us who in common observe the phenomena of your bodily movement, just so, beyond the phenomena of nature there is unquestionably an inner nature of things, - a nature not seen, not

⁵⁴ For the *already published* middle part of his 5th Theism Lecture, see his SGE 15-28.

⁵⁵ Pages 76 to 87 of manuscript numbered pages 35 to 87 in HARP Box 52

⁵⁶ i.e., in his (unpublished) Augustus Graham lecture, “God and Nature: Evolution and Ethics,” HARP Box 68, document 4.

got at by the experience of science, but hinted at by all the facts that we observe in nature. This inner life, behind the phenomena of nature, - this second nature beyond the first or phenomenal nature, - this is conceived, by a philosophical idealism not as an unintelligible substance, or dead collection of things in themselves, but as a world of finite but real minds, minds that like our own form part of the vast City of God, and that somehow, in the divine order, are linked with our minds in the organization of the world of the Spirit. The phenomena of nature reveal to us, not the contents of these other minds, but the mere fact of their presence. That there is no other way than this to interpret the hidden meaning of the facts of our nature experience, an idealistic doctrine endeavors at length to make clear, by arguments for which this is not the occasion. Other minds than ours, other finite beings, conscious like ourselves, but no doubt very differently related to time and to space than we ourselves now are, there are the hidden realities of which nature is the hint. The true and inner meaning of the process which our science calls evolution, I take it, is, [*sic*] not that mind has anywhere developed from dead nature, but that, by some process of spiritual differentiation, our type of experience, with just its special contents and temporal limitations, has gradually become differentiated from the other types of experience possessed by that community of finite beings whose presence is hinted to us in the mysterious facts of nature. The spiritual and truly significant laws of this process of differentiation are not revealed to us. Our science learns only of the fact of the continuity and gradualness of the process. But this fact, of the continuity of humanity with nature read in the terms of our interpretation of the phenomena of nature, gets indeed the seeming of scientifically clear definition, in human terms, but loses for our vision the ethical significance that would attach to it if we could see it as God sees it. Hence while the evolution of man from nature stands for a hidden fact that if known to us would be spiritually significant, it is vain for us to declare that our science can see, in the phenomena of evolution, an observable manifestation of a moral process. In growing thus set apart, differentiated, from the community of finite minds that constitute the hidden inner life of nature, we have fallen away from any definite sort of communication with any portion of that community save the small portion now represented, in phenomenal nature, by the expressively moving bodies of our socially intelligible fellows. Or, if you like, Nature, in her hidden inner aspect, is continually speaking to us, but in tongues whose meaning, in the course of our evolution, we have, as it were, forgotten. But we ought not to talk of dead nature. We ought to talk only of uncommunicative nature. We live in God's world, which is wholly a world

of mind. Sundered as we are from the concrete apprehension of any finite interests save human interests, we find ourselves in presence [*sic*] of a phenomenal nature that, so far as science can know it, appears to have only the most brutally accidental relation to these our interests. Hence the endless and mysterious ills of the natural order.

But this our isolation and finite loneliness is but one case of that law of tension, of limitation, of conflict, through which the divine perfection is realized. If we could but know, we are linked by close spiritual ties to that vast community of finite minds of whose presence every nature [*sic*] phenomenon is a hint. We have not been evolved from dead nature, but set as it were apart from the rest of the community of the City of God, whereto, after all, the Eternal Purpose binds us with sacred ties that we know not, save in so far as we can be in general assured of the divine and transcendent harmony that, amidst all the conflicts and separations links the spiritual world in one.

IV.

Royce on the topic of Immortality Notes from the Harvard Archives Royce Papers

- a. **Fragments of “Conception of Immortality” (ca. 1899)**
[Box 61, document 4, and Box 90, document 1]
- b. **The 112 page MS “Conception of Immortality” (1899)**
[Box 61, document 3]
- c. ***The Conception of Immortality* (London: Longmans, Green, 1900)**
- d. **“Immortality” in *William James and Other Essays* (1906)**
[Box 48(?)]

Historical Perspective:

The problem of immortality is a life-long problem for Royce. Royce confronts it during his reflections about the dead buried around Grass Valley and later in the Oakland Cemetery, in his early writings about the “Miner’s Grave,” and the “Lonely Lovers’ Grave.”. As an

undergraduate he refers to it in his “The Search for the Holy Grail.” There is critical turning point in Royce’s youth when his studies of evolution led him to let go of his faith in the doctrine of immortality. He reports this later in his letter of December 5, 1881, to Benjamin Coale, his friendly sage in Baltimore, (*Letters* 103-106).

In 1883 when Royce began his lecture series at Harvard, on “The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,” he addressed the question and arrived at an agnostic conclusion. After his breakdown in 1888, his trip to Australia and New Zealand probably added fresh data to his musing on the topic. He encountered gross tales of ghosts along with highly imaginative myths yet the sturdy belief of seamen and the native Maori folk counterbalanced these.

When asked in 1900, on a three-week deadline, to deliver the annual Ingersoll lecture on Immortality, Royce had already completed his first series of his Gifford Lectures, Volume One of *The World and the Individual*. He approached this Ingersoll lecture by showing that a human self’s unique and thus ‘never-finish-able’ quest to clarify “Who am I?” cannot be terminated at the individual’s bodily death. At that point the problem of one’s identity and individuality remains uncompleted and not fully answered. Hence, some further series of searchings are needed. Thus, for Royce, from the serially unending search for identity, the assertion of immortality follows as a simple corollary. So taken up was he with the topic at the time that he wrote out, in a long 112 page MS, a distinctly different approach to the topic, one he probably delivered in Britain. (See HARP Box 61, document 3.) Turning to the second volume of *The World and the Individual*, Royce summarized the question of human immortality this way: “the possibility of the immortal existence of a Self that begins in time, as the product of evolution, and as a being subject to natural conditions.”

By 1906, in his “Talk to Ministers” in Boston, Royce again took up the topic of immortality. He showed that how all abstract views about immortality, séances, and Plato’s description of the soul are false and futile because of their implied and excessive dualism. (*WJO* 273) Royce held, “Time is in God rather than God in time”... “Time, to my mind is, is an essential practical aspect of reality, which derives its whole meaning from the nature and from the life of the will.” The seriation of time lies in the act of willing. (*WJO* 271). For a human being to exercise finite will is also to exercise it in harmony with the World’s will. The World’s will did not want my finite will until the present century, so why would it will my identity after my death? It would do so only in an underlying love for the search that the individual undertakes for the sake of its unique self-realization. This address contains sketches of Royce’s general idealistic thesis, especially his understanding of the divine as a union of many finite human wills with the world will. This union is established for the sake of harmony.

In writing the *Philosophy of Loyalty* 1907, Royce concluded that “through our factual human loyalty we come like Moses, face to face with the true will of the world, as a man speaks to his friend.” (PL 181-82) This echoes his earlier description of the immortal in *The World and the Individual*. Yet by 1912, his “Peircean insight” transformed his thought from still thinking of “the problem of immortality” into a hope that all the genuinely loyal will find continuing life in the Universal and Beloved Community.

Report on MSS:

**a. Fragments of “Conception of Immortality” (ca. 1899)
[Box 61, document 4, and Box 90, document 1]**

-- As for the eight page fragment at the close of Box 61, called “The Conception of Immortality,” it shows Royce aware of superstitious approaches to the question of human destiny, his commitment to a critical, reasonable investigation of the topic, and breaks off saying that though his result will be “partially irrational and ... deeply unsatisfactory” yet this study “form[s] a necessary part of our finite task.” (page 8)

--As to the two fragments (2” x10”) in Box 90 (questionable dating); trivia..

b. “The Conception of Immortality,” in Box 61, the 3rd MS, 112 pp.⁵⁷

An unpublished fragmentary MS of 112 pages in Box 61, document 3 (ca. 1899). Overview and detailed analysis follow. Dated mainly on internal evidence, (p. 54), “my colleague Dr. Dickinson Miller.” Since Miller joined Harvard’s philosophy department in Fall 1899, the document cannot antedate 1899.

A description of this manuscript, drafted by FMO **ca. 1980**, nearly three decades ago:
“The Conception of Immortality is very important for real intentionality, for a clearer view of immortality as not simply a series of pulses of ongoing consciousness as we now experience it, and for a realism in Royce around 1899.”

112 page manuscript, fragment, not dated by Royce. Yet internal and external evidence points to 1899 or 1900. – Perhaps an early draft of the Ingersoll lecture but quite different because Royce’s approach here works from the “internal and external meanings of an idea” to individual immortality. (“A Self is a conscious meaning -- a series or a total of experience embodying a purpose -- a plan of life more or less fully expressed in an actually present life.”(p. 93 of this MS, which lacks anything like the concentration on the INDIVIDUAL distinctive of Royce’s published Ingersoll Lecture, **c.** below). This latter may have profited through Royce’s long drafting of the present uncompleted MS.

Details on this **b.** manuscript:

Pages 26-27, 66-68, 101-02, 107 utilize previously drafted manuscripts, inserted into the present MS and renumbered. Pages 47-53, 61-64, and 69 are missing. (Were these used in final draft of his *CI* lecture?) The paper is old and fragile, with holes within the text on pages 18 and 19.

Royce’s reading directions as to “omits,” etc. are found on pages 5, 11, 18, 22, 38 and 83. This certainly means that Royce read this at some main meeting, perhaps in Scotland or England.

(See Royce to Professor Knight, January 10, 1900]

On pages 54-60 occurs an important critique of D.S. Miller where Royce is more Realist than Miller -- Royce criticizes the “little-copy” theory of knowledge.

On page 112, Royce is the clearest FMO has seen on the how of individual immortality.

⁵⁷ This MS is quite distinct from that of his 1900 Ingersoll Lecture. Though treating the same general topic, JR used a different approach in this MS. Result? Same topic but the two MSS are unlike in striking ways..

On pages 6, and 78 ff, Royce faces death directly.

On pages 66-68, he treats of how far that “*beyond*” is beyond. He here provides some helpful distinctions.

A 2009 Synopsis of details in this b. MS (from Box 61, document 3), entitled “The Conception of Immortality”

This fragmentary MS of 112 pages (some pages missing) has six sections. The physical paper Royce employed for this MS seems to resemble the paper used when he composed *WI* and its “Supplementary Essay.” This paper has aged and is extremely fragile.

Introduction:

Unlike *CI*, which has no introduction, this MS has a five page introduction starting with “The most pathetic of our problems are the very ones that most stand in need of dispassionate consideration....”

Section I:

In the MS, Section 1 starts at page 5 with:

“The problem of method first demands our attention. Shall we appeal directly to [illegible] experience as our sole guide in this matter? Are there sufficient purely empirical proofs of immortality? Or may we look beyond the range of present [illegible] experience for our guidance?”

Royce then picks up the topic of death and its meaning for the individual. Royce refuses to settle for present experience only (8). He proposes doctrines about immortality and claims that they are not evidenced empirically (9-10). He picks up the doctrine of evolution as answering the question of immortality (11-12). He grants that our human race will go on by evolution, but raises the question of individual survival.

He closes the first section by highlighting the need to bear with life’s sufferings and losses. “Is there any known limit, then, to the amount that we mortals may have to resign?”

Section II: Royce addresses Plato’s argument for immortality (18):

“The Platonic arguments in their original form no longer satisfy us; but the Platonic issue remains permanently the one upon whose solution every theory of immortality, if such a theory be possible, must depend. You cannot prove by any mere induction from our limited human experience that so reasonable a good as immortal life is the possession of any one of us.” (20-21)

Objections to this position follow, and Royce replies:

“But for my own part I cannot side with such purely inductive investigators of our problem when they hope to solve the problem of the dying Socrates by any inquiries regarding mediums or by an occult experiences.” (23-24)

He repeats Socrates' question: "Am I such that I cannot die?" (24)

Royce makes an opening for his position with his assertion:

"A rational account of the basis of my conviction that you exist, or of your conviction that I exist, must therefore involve a philosophy which transcends both your experience and mine, and even the private experience of any man who has ever lived." (27)

He continues a critique of a merely empirical approach. Focusing on the time span of human consciousness, Royce claims that our conviction of an existence of our fellows' minds is not blind faith. (32) Rather:

"Such a conviction must always be an interpretation of facts, and for its ultimate rational basis, if it has any, you will always have to look to a philosophy. And the only philosophy that can help you must have reasonable general grounds for holding that there is other than human life, that there is life of higher than the known human type in the universe." (33)

Royce criticizes the concept of communication with the dead. He refers to trained observers of psychical phenomena, long skeptical as to communications from the dead. (40) Even if psychical phenomenon showed that one individual person existed beyond death does not show that all human beings survive. (43) Royce refers to recent psychological literature (43-45).

Section III-IV:

"The classic doctrine of immortality is concerned with the final destiny of a rational self." (45) But Royce notes that no empirical research sufficiently supports this. Then he states the final objection from empiricist, viz., if we can't get knowledge from experience, we can't get knowledge. Royce's reply probably occurred on missing pages 47-53.

At page 54, Royce starts paragraph by expressly referring to "my colleague Dr. Dickinson Miller." Since Miller started teaching at Harvard in 1899, Royce implicitly dates this 112 page manuscript.

At this point, Royce picks up the central theme from *WI*:

"To this question, some writers upon the 'Theory of Knowledge' simply answer, 'The relation in question is a wholly unique and indescribable relation to be called simply the Reference of an idea to an object. This relation is an ultimate fact. Without it there is neither knowledge nor error.'"

Royce proposes as possible paths the well-known answer of Dickinson Miller, or the illusory nature of the soul-body dichotomy, and then Royce replies (58) that this assumes one can separate soul and body, or ideal and object.

Pages 61-64 of the MS are missing.

Missing pages (47-53 or 61-64) may account for missing "IV" from section identification.

At 65 ff., Royce continues the relationship of idea to meaning and refers to Dr. Miller's position, using the incompleteness of any current knowledge to press for the beyond contained in my present meaning. Here and now "you do not just now consciously face the whole of what you still consciously intend." (67)

MS page 68 is missing.

At 71, Royce's idea of immortality includes personal will which always involves a "not yet" or "beyond" contained within it. "What it asserts is that they are always as ill partial expressions of a still dissatisfied Will" concerning the sufferings we go through. (75)

In his reading the text, Royce skipped from page 75 to the bottom of page 83. (See his "omit" notation on page 75.) He repeats his basic position that a finite idea, including Will, will always have a "beyond" beyond the finite object known or willed.

Section V:

Royce tries to apply directly his general considerations of Sections I and IV to the Immortality problem.

"I exist, for I am conscious. I call myself an individual, -- a Self. Yet just now, in my finitude, I know not only who I am, or what I mean, or how to win my ends. MY whole will is not at present expressed. I seek, but in my human form of consciousness, I find not. I desire; but the very end remains mysterious, still more its expression in my fortune." (77-78)

On pages 79-82, Royce gives a personal analysis of his consciousness of dying and death, highlighting the experience of incompleteness in his own personal destiny, the experience of the beyond not yet realized. For instance he says of death:

"Death then does not merely occur, apart from any consciousness. Its very *esse* [=actuality?] is its presence to the whole selfhood of which my transient human consciousness is a partial expression. In my wholeness, in the complete Selfhood of which my momentary human life is a limit, and a fragment, death has its place, amongst other ill, as a partial fact. When I face death in idea, I already ask, What is it? What being has it? I inquire as to its meaning, and, in all of this I seek for an Other. I have no whole knowledge of death. What I call death is then only the negative hint of a positive and conscious being. In my wholeness, as one with the Self whose life is the world, I must then witness my death and cessation as this mere finite human being. Or again, unless I thus in my final expression as the seer of reality in its wholeness consciously observe my own human death, there is no such death at all. For to no fact do I take as a real fact, unless just that fact forms an element in the complete expression of my own final and integral will, life, and meaning." (81-82)

Detailed description of two-fold aspects of the Self: one as the truth-seeking thinker and will, the other as the relationships bonded to other men in the field of common sense. (83-87) Without

going along with “resignation to bodily death” as a final proper answer to this question, Royce first raises the question “in what sense, for us, a finite human Self can exist at all ?” Rejecting popular common sense views and views of the Self as grounded in substance, he insists that “in our account of reality, purpose is everywhere primary.” (93)

Royce focuses upon his moral life and finds that in its insistence on carrying out his duty, there is a meaning in himself as unique (and every human is unique). There is a sense in which “[i]t follows then that I have in any sense the conscious will to do my duty, I even thereby define and know myself as a finite being whose unique will must be somehow fulfilled, since the Absolute aim is attained, but cannot be fulfilled in this life. In this sense, but in this sense only, have I so far the right to declare that I, this man, am not limited to the temporal happenings of this earthly life, or to the narrow bounds of this human form of consciousness.” (105-06).

Section VI:

Royce acknowledges that his unique meaning needs further existence through and beyond death, but he breaks off from fully developing this. The fragment ends with Royce saying:

“An immortal life would be conscious and individual, but not after the present human [illegible] consciousness, which is a very wretched type. What remains to us is the doctrine that the ethical individual is not limited to the present form of consciousness, and that the man who means to serve universal ends in unique ways, does, as individual in the consummation of things, come himself to see of the travail of his soul, and to be satisfied, -- knowing in his own individual person that he has done his work.”

The next phrase begins illegibly, then continues with “And that is what I offer [illegible] as conception of purpose.” [This a tentative reading.] The MS then breaks off.

Evaluation: The Ingersoll lecture, Royce’s immortality lecture in Britain, *WI:2*’s pages 431-445, and *WJO*’s essay on immortality are each important enough to be included in some way in the Critical Edition.. My recommendation is that the Ingersoll lecture and his latest essay on immortality (in *WJO*) be published as they stand, (for they seem to warrant little critical editing). The essay for Britain (Box 61, document 3) and the section from *WI 2* (pp. 431-445) need lengthy notes that expose their novel points and make comparison-contrasts with the two previous essays.

c. *The Conception of Immortality* (London: Longmans, Green, 1900): The Ingersoll Lecture of 1899.

Is not treated here because no MS of it is found in HARP.

**d. “Immortality” in *William James and Other Essays* (1906)
[Box 48]**

A 78-page MS, written on entirely fresh pages. An address delivered to the Congregational

Ministers' Association in Boston, March 1906. This immortality MS runs parallel to the published version in *WJO*, except for the introduction (MS pages 1-6) which is deleted from the *WJO* version at p 257.

Appendix to Harvard University Archives Finding Aid For The Papers of Josiah Royce

By **Dawn Aberg**
Frank M. Oppenheim, SJ

The Harvard University Archives has graciously agreed to append these notes to the Finding Aid to the Josiah Royce Papers in their collection. Based on Frank Oppenheim's work with the collection, and his *Comprehensive Index of the Writings of Josiah Royce*, this Appendix is conceived as both a detailed assessment of the Royce Collection's contents, and a broad scholarly context for the materials. It is hoped that the Appendix may serve as a "roadmap" to guide future scholars and researchers in their work with the collection.

Such a guide is particularly important for the Harvard Archives Royce Papers (HARP). The collection (currently contained in 155 "boxes," 98 of which consist of pages mounted in bound "folio" volumes) has undergone a number of organizational efforts over the years. An understanding of the collection's history, and of Royce's own working process, is critical to an understanding of Royce's intellectual development as it is reflected in the collection.

By way of introduction to the Appendix, we present a brief history of the collection, how it has evolved through the years to its present form, and a description of how it is currently organized. Also included are notes concerning Royce's apparent drafting habits and editing processes. An understanding of these work habits has led to some interesting "discoveries" among his manuscript papers, many of which have never been published and have yet to be examined by scholars. No doubt other discoveries have yet to be made.

The History of the Collection

The summer after Josiah Royce's death on September 14, 1916, Jacob Loewenberg sat down with Katharine Head Royce (Royce's widow) in what was probably the first formal posthumous attempt to sort through the Royce papers. Loewenberg, a former Royce teaching assistant and a Harvard Philosophy PhD, identified materials he wanted shipped to University of California at Berkeley, for work he planned on Royce. Later that year (1917), Loewenberg published an article based on what he had found: "A Bibliography of the Unpublished Writings of Josiah Royce," *Philosophical Review* 26 (1917): 578-82.

Loewenberg's lists of Royce materials may be found in HARP (Box 142, folder 2 and 3). It is possible that some of Loewenberg's work as Royce's assistant is also contained in the collection.

(See, e.g., Box 112, folder 4).

Loewenberg's decision to have many original Royce papers sent to California created an early obstacle to the systematic organization of the papers. Harvard librarian Benjamin Rand, who had known Royce when he first arrived at Harvard in the 1880's, created a list of the materials to be shipped to California. Rand's list catalogues nine bundles of manuscripts, and was used as a checklist against Loewenberg's list of the documents that were to be returned from California in 1929. When William Ernest Hocking decided to teach a course on Royce's philosophy at Harvard, he worked with Katharine Royce to have the papers returned from California to Cambridge. It is not entirely clear that all the papers did in fact come back to Harvard. Both Hocking and Rand's "checklists" may be found in Box 142, folder 3, inserted as loose pages in a Loewenberg notebook.

In 1940, Harvard Ph.D. candidate E.F. (Edgar Franklin) Wells was hired by the Harvard Philosophy Department to help organize the Royce papers the department had in its collection for the Harvard Archives. It is unknown, at present, how the Department decided which manuscripts rose to the level of archival quality, and whether any manuscripts were held back. (Some research into department correspondence around this time might prove interesting.) Wells dedicated himself to the project, and worked with the papers until he finished his degree in 1941. Correspondence between Wells and Frank Oppenheim, in which Wells describes his work with the papers, can be found in Box 129, folder 11.

In the course of his work, Wells pasted loose manuscript and typescript sheets into the albums or "folios" which are now called "Boxes" 1-98. (They are also referred to as "volumes" by some scholars who have worked with the collection.) Wells titled each of these "boxes" according to his assessment of the contents. Wells characteristically makes his notations in red pencil; his notes appear throughout the "albums" he assembled. For the most part, his notes attempt to clarify what he (Wells) saw as technical errors (doubled or missing page numbers, for instance). Wells also makes suggestions as to dates where papers are undated, and even makes suggestions as to the provenance of certain writings. It should be noted, however, that the Wells titles and dates may not always be accurate. This is significant, given the fact that some archival attributions are based on his notes.

Wells occasionally makes more interpretive statements as to whether a manuscript is complete, or what the manuscript's purpose might have been (whether, for instance, it was delivered as a lecture and where that lecture might have taken place). Again, red pencil notes point to his authorship; and again, the notes should not be assumed to be definitive of a date or designation. Some Wells red pencil notes also appear in loose papers in folders in Boxes 99-145.

Two key additions were made to the Royce papers after his death. One, referred to as the "Crystal Falls Collection" contains family correspondence and memorabilia that had been in the possession of Royce's son Stephen. (Stephen lived in Crystal Falls, Michigan at the time of his own death. The Royce family materials were not discovered until his house was sold, and the new owner stumbled upon the boxes in the attic.) Another collection of family papers was donated to Harvard by Nancy Ingraham Hacker, the granddaughter of Royce's sister Mary. An avid genealogist who was deeply interested in her great-uncle's career, Ms. Hacker accumulated

a good deal of information from different sources about Royce family members. Also included is correspondence from people who had contacted her with queries about Royce's life.

The Evolution of the Box Numbers

While Box numbers 1-98 have remained stable since Wells worked with them in 1940-41, the manuscripts that remained loose (unbound) have been categorized and organized in various ways through the years. The manuscripts were at one point grouped in "Logicalia" Boxes 1-6 and "Non-Logicalia" Boxes A-H. Even after the boxes had been numbered sequentially, Boxes 99 and up, some reorganization of the materials continued to occur.

It is important to be aware of these changes regarding the materials in boxes currently numbered 99 and higher; scholars working in HARP pre-2009 may cite to an older system. A chart for comparison of the numbering systems may be found in the Finding Aid.

Royce's Working Methods

A 19th century cartoon, included as a frontispiece in Jacqueline Ann Kegley's book *Josiah Royce in Focus* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009) portrays Royce as he delivers one of his many lectures. Standing at the podium, Royce is surrounded by piles of paper on the floor. It was apparently his habit as he spoke to toss pages down onto the floor once he had finished reading from them. The habit was sufficiently well-known to give rise to this caricature. Given that Royce's lectures averaged anywhere from 60 to 80 manuscript pages in length, one can imagine the state of their organization at the end of a talk, much less at the time of his death.

As a further confusion regarding his own organization of his papers, Royce tended to take huge chunks of manuscript pages from finished work to incorporate into later texts. He would then "renumber" these pages to fit into the new manuscript. In this Appendix, manuscript and typescript pages are often referred to as either "fresh" (still with the original page number) or "redrafted" or "renumbered." It is not uncommon for Royce to renumber a page three, or even four times.⁵⁸

This process is significant, as it allows a researcher to trace the development of Royce's thought on certain subjects. The balance of redrafted and fresh pages in a given manuscript may also elucidate Royce's thought process while wrestling with a given topic. For instance, does he return to an idea previously considered to carefully work it through? Does he simply polish a redrafted page? Or does he charge ahead with a new thought on fresh sheets?

Portions of manuscripts previously identified as "missing" may be found in different but subject-related manuscripts with re-numbered pages. For instance, when Royce excerpted a huge section of his fifth Augustus Graham lecture for the text of "On the Problem of Job," he inadvertently grabbed the final section of that lecture as well. This "excerpted" bit of the Fifth Graham lecture is found in the manuscripts along with the other "Studies of Good and Evil" manuscripts (Box 52), *not* with the Graham Lectures (Boxes 67 and 68). The result is that the final section (not

⁵⁸ Some renumbering may simply be the product of a pagination error, or the slip of a pen. But the renumbering is noted in any case.

published in the Job essay) had been lost to scholars for years. It is a fascinating piece of work, summing up the Graham Lecture project as a whole. That lecture series followed closely after the *Conception of God* lectures in Berkeley, and the vigorous response those lectures received.

The Organization of this Appendix

For easy cross-reference to the Finding Aid and the collection materials, the titles of boxes and folders given here precisely mirror the titles assigned by Wells and the archivists. To the degree there is a disagreement with the identification or dating of a particular set of materials, the disagreement is noted in the entry, with an asterisk beside the box or folder.

In the bound “folio volumes” that comprise Boxes 1-98, the Appendix lists the documents in the order in which they appear in the album. Where there is a title given to a manuscript or typescript in quotes, it is the title that heads that text. If a document is not titled, no title is suggested.

Boxes 99-145 organize loose documents and memorabilia into folders which are in turn contained in document boxes. Again, this appendix follows the Harvard Archives identification system and folder title. If there is a disagreement concerning the contents of a given folder, that disagreement is marked by an asterisk, and explained in the entry. In many cases, many documents are contained in a given folder. Sometimes those documents have been organized into “bundles” by the archivists. In those instances, this appendix lists the documents or bundles in the order they appear in the folders.

This Appendix is organized by box number, not by topic or chronological sequence. Dr. Oppenheim’s *Comprehensive Index*, organized chronologically and by topic, will be available on-line, with links to the Harvard University Archive Finding Aid and this Appendix.

Description of texts

Texts are here described as either a manuscript (handwritten) or a typescript (prepared on a typewriter). Occasionally Royce incorporates chunks of typeset materials clipped from copies of his published work. The Appendix entries expressly note such cut and paste work.

As to pagination, although this Appendix will note that a manuscript has, e.g., “20 pages,” this simply refers to the page number on the last page. In reality, a manuscript may have more or less pages given missing pages, combinations of pages (e.g. 12/13/14) and the addition of insertions (e.g. 17a-e). We have attempted to note such pagination markings within the manuscripts and typescripts.

Notes added by scholars

Over time, scholars working with the collection have added their own notes to clarify some materials, or express opinions about their dates and/or identification. Those scholars include Loewenberg and Wells (described above) as well as J. Harry Cotton (Wabash University), Frank Oppenheim, SJ (Xavier University), and John Clendenning (Cal State, Northridge), among

others. As noted above, the red pencil markings throughout the folio volumes (and occasionally among loose sheets in Boxes 99 and up) belong to E.F. Wells, who organized the papers in 1940-41. Dr. Oppenheim's notes appear in pencil in the margin of the Folio Volumes, or on loose inserted sheets. Drs. Cotton and Clendenning insert their notes on loose pages in the folders or Box.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations appear in this Appendix:

HARP – The Harvard Archives Royce Papers

BWJR – *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*. Ed. John J. McDermott. 2 vols. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969.

CG – *The Conception of God*. New York: Macmillan, 1897.

FE – *Fugitive Essays*, Ed. J. Loewenberg. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1920.

HGC – *The Hope of the Great Community*. New York: Macmillan, 1916.

Letters – *The Letters of Josiah Royce*. Ed. John Clendenning. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970.

Life – *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce*. By John Clendenning. 2nd edition, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999.

PC – *The Problem of Christianity*. 1913. Reprint, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1968.

PL – *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. 1908. Reprint, Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 1995.

RAP – *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1885.

RLE – *Royce's Logical Essays*, ed. Daniel S. Robinson, Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1951.

RQP – *Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems*. New York: Macmillan, 1908.

SGE – *Studies of Good and Evil*. New York: Appleton, 1898.

SMP – *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1892.

SRI – *Sources of Religious Insight*. New York: Scribner's, 1912.

WI – *The World and the Individual*. 2 vols. [noted here as *WI:1* and *WI:2*]. New York: Macmillan, 1899-1901.

WJO – *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Folio Volumes, Boxes 1-98

(Compiled by E.F. Wells, 1940-41)

Box 1: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy through ch. IV*

Document 1: “Table of Contents”

The first page of the MS in fact has the name “S.G. McFarland” written directly above “Table of Contents.” A six page, handwritten table follows, for chapters I - XII, plus Epilogue.

Document 2: “Preface”

A 20 page manuscript, written on 5” by 8” sheets (these smaller sheets comprise the rest of the manuscript pages in Box 1.) Pages 13 and 14 are combined. Pages 12 through 17 appear to be on re-numbered sheets.

The “Preface” title heads the first page.

Document 3: “Chap. I: Introduction: Religion as a Moral Code and as a Theory”

A 48-page manuscript on small, fresh pages. The title given above heads the first page.

Document 4: “Book I. The Search for a Moral Ideal. Chap. II The General Ethical Problem”

A 40-page manuscript, with two “page ones” (one of them, apparently an introduction - the above title appears on both first pages), and pages 3a-3k following page 3. Pages 6 through 20 are on re-numbered pages.

Document 5: “Chapter III: The Warfare of the Moral Ideals”

A 95-page manuscript, on small sheets, with the addition of pages 12a-c, 13a, 16a, 44a, and 52a. Pages 18 and 19 are combined. Pages 54-87 are renumbered pages. Once again there are two “page ones,” one page introductory, with the title on both pages.

Document 6: “Chapter IV. Altruism and Egoism in Certain Recent Discussions.”

An 173-page manuscript, on small sheets, with the addition of pages 2a-f, 28a, 41a, 68a-c, and 169a-b. Again, there are two “page ones,” one page introductory, with the title on both pages. Pages 2a-d and 2f, 3-13, 32-34, 36-40, 41a-43, 79-84, , 100-07, 131-131a, 151-52, and 169-169a or on renumbered pages. Pages 9-12, 14-22, 86-89, 109-30, 153-58, 159-60 are on combined pages, respectively.

Box 2: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy Chapters V-VII*

Document 1: “Chap. V. Ethical Scepticism and Ethical Pessimism.”

A 30-page manuscript on small sheets, with the above title on two first pages (one of them introductory; a pagination from the previous chapter continues on these pages). Page 17a is renumbered. Pages 17a-b are added. Pages 14/15 are combined. Between page 14/15 and page 15 are inserted printed pages 298-307 from the published *Pessimism and Modern Thought*.

Document 2: “Chap. VI. The Moral Insight”

A 131-page manuscript on small sheets, with the above title on the two first pages (one of them similar to a title page, with a quote from Shelley). Pages 89a-g are added. Pages 25/26 and 89/89a are combined. Pages 68-88a, 89b-f, 90-103 and 115 are on renumbered pages.

Document 3: “Chap. VII. The Organization of Life”

A 173-page manuscript on small sheets, with a type-set insertion. The above title appears on two first pages, one of which functions as a title page. Pages 74a, 136a, 165a, and 171a-b are added pages. Pages 43-52 are combined as “page” 43/52. Page 165a is renumbered. And on page 68, there is a paste-in of a type-set page from a publication.

**Box 3: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*
 Chapters VIII-X**

Document 1 “Book II. The Search for a Religious Truth. Chapter VIII. The World of Doubt.”

A 130 page manuscript on small sheets, with type-set insertions. Unlike the other MS chapters, there is only one first page leading Chapter VIII. The entire title, as noted above, heads the first page.

Pages 18/19, 76/77/78 and 85/86 are combined. Pages 82a (by Wells) and 99a are added. Also added are pages 12-12u (with Wells adding the “u” in red pencil to the 12u notation. Several of the pages in this “12” series are renumbered.

On page 3, Royce inserts a type-set paragraph on the manuscript page.

For “pages” 45-45c, Royce inserts type-set pages, with extensive handwritten edits as “pages” 45, 45a, 45b and 45c. He heads these pages section “III.”

Document 2 “Chap. IX. The World of the Postulates.”

A 75 page manuscript, on small sheets, with type-set insertions. Once again, Royce has two first pages, with one functioning as a title page. (In this case, Wells adds a red pencil note “(1)” on the second first page.) Then added pages 1a-1e follow. Also inserted are pages 12a, 27a, and 67a.

Pages 17, 18 and 20-22 may be renumbered. Pages 43-45 are renumbered (Wells adds red pencil notes to clarify the pagination).

Beginning at page 25, and continuing through page 42, Royce inserts cuttings from type-set pages, intermingling them with manuscript notes and paragraphs. Some of these pages have been renumbered. (Wells adds red pencil notes for clarification.)

Document 3: “Chapter X. Idealism.”

A 61 page manuscript on small sheets with type-set insertions. Again, there are two first pages, with the first serving as a title page. (On this one, an Aristotle quote in Royce’s handwritten Greek.)

Eleven type-set pages are inserted between pages 16 and 16a. The pages are edited in Royce’s hand.

Royce then adds manuscript pages 16b-e. He numbers the following type-set pages 16f-m, with manuscript pages resuming at 17. Pages 35a-d are added. (But note: Wells writes “35d” in red pencil. The original Royce notation calls the page “36d”.)

Although some page numbers are smudged, this entire manuscript appears (except for the type-set pages) to be written on fresh manuscript sheets.

Box 4. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* Chapter XI to end

Document 1: “Chap. XI. The Possibility of Error.”

A 141-page MS on small sheets. There are two first pages, one of them serving as a title page, the above title on both.

Page 16 is missing, according to Wells, who inserts an extensive note in red pencil following page 15, and quoting the words from the printed text that are missing from the MS.

Many of the pages have been renumbered in the MS: 21-27, 28-29, 31, 38-43, 47-49, 51-52, 57, 62-63, 65-69, 71-73, 80-85, 89, 91, 93-95, 98-99, 103-08, 110-12, 114-24, 126-27.

The following pages have been added: 27a, 37a-c, 70a-b, 89a, 113a-f, 128a-q (the entirety of section VIII), and 138a-b.

12/13/14 are combined onto one page.

Document 2: “Chap. XII. The Religious Insight”

A 108-page document on small sheets. There are two first pages, one of which serves as a title

page. Pages 25a, 72a-j, 88a-k, 89a-d (Wells has changed an “88l” to 89 with his red pencil) have been added. Pages 25, 28-34, 36-38, 40-44, 74-85, 89a-d, , 96-108 have been renumbered from previously drafted sheets. Page 90/91/92 is combined into one page.

Document 3: “Epilogue

A 25-page manuscript on small sheets. Pages 4a, 14a-c has been added. Page 7 is missing; Wells writes in red pencil the omitted text from the published version. Page “(10)-(13)” appears as one page. Pages 20-21 are renumbered from previously drafted sheets.

**Box 5: *The Conception of God* through section 4 of Part I of the
“Supplementary Essay”**

Document 1: “The Address by Professor Josiah Royce, on The Conception of God.”

A 103-page manuscript. Pages 98-100 are missing. Wells has copied the text from the published book in red pencil at those pages. Large chunks of the manuscript contain renumbered pages as follows: 6-8, 33-39, 45-97, and 101-03.

Document 2:

A two page manuscript Table of Contents headed “Paper supplementary to the lecture on the “Conception of God” by Josiah Royce. The Absolute and the Individual”

Document 3: “The Absolute and the Individual”

A 27-page typescript with handwritten edits, some of which do not appear to be Royce’s writing. Pages 19a, 20a-b, and 21a-b have been added. Pages 19-21b have been renumbered (by hand). At the time this Appendix was written, there were several loose sheets inserted among the pages.

**Box 6: “Supplementary Essay” to *The Conception of God* from section 5 of Part
I to end**

Document 1

A 176-page text beginning with page number 23 (in sequence with the last typescript page in Box 5). Pages 23-150 and 170-76 are typescript sheets; pages 151-69 are manuscript. On page 53, Royce writes out a full page of manuscript under four lines of typescript. He then adds a full manuscript page as page 39.

The typescript pages are consistently, in some places heavily, edited in Royce’s handwriting. There are also edits in a different handwriting (purple ink), with extensive purple ink notes on pages 65 and 145.

Box 7: Manuscripts Modified for *The Conception of God*

Wells writes in red pencil on the Box title page: “MSS. which appeared in The Conception of God in modified form”

The next Wells page note in red pencil reads: “The Place of the Will in the Conception of the Absolute pages 1-76, incomplete. Much of this MS. appeared in *The Conception of God* in modified form. For example, pages 2 ff. of the MS. Appeared, with some alterations, as pages 187 ff. of *The Conception of God*.”

Document 1: “The Place of Will in the Conception of the Absolute”

A 76-page manuscript. Royce writes above the title on the first page “I on page 2 [illegible]. Then omit to K. Then copy to end.”

Royce adds pages 20a-f. He combines pages 42/43/44 on one page and pages 45-50 on the next page. This last page “45-50” he has renumbered from a previous page “50”. Other renumbered pages: 14-19, and 20a-3.

Document 2: “The Principle of Individuation”

A 96-page manuscript, with Wells providing the last “96” in red pencil.

Wells adds an “a” in red pencil to the second page 40. Page 16 is renumbered. All other pages are fresh and sequential until the end of the document. Renumbered pages 91 and 92 are followed by a fresh 93. Then renumbered pages begin again at 90 and continue through 95. The page, Royce has numbered “94,” but Wells changes it in red pencil to 96.

Directly before this manuscript in this volume is a Wells page note headed “The Principle of Individuation” and reading as follows: “This manuscript was considerably modified before being used for Part III of the Supplementary Essay in The Conception of God.”

Box 8: Gifford Lectures First Series Lectures I & II

Document 1: “Gifford Lectures. The World and the Individual. Part I. The Four historical Conceptions of Being. Lecture I. Introduction: The Religious Problems and the Theory of Being”

A 95-page manuscript. The full title as listed heads page one. Most of these pages have been renumbered: 1, 14-16, 18-55, 57, 63 and 68-93.

Document 2: “Lecture II. Realism and Mysticism in the History of Thought”

A 99-page manuscript. Royce heads page one with this title, after crossing out an earlier version which had read: “The Four Historical Concepts of Real Being: The Realistic and the Mystical Conceptions”.

An extensive renumbering of certain pages has taken place, particularly toward the end of the

text: pages 10-20, 58-69, 73-77 and 82-95. The pages between 82 and 95 have been renumbered up to four times. The page following page 20 has been renumbered as “(21) to (34)”.

Box 9: Gifford Lectures First Series Lectures III & IV

Document 1: “Lecture III. The Independent Beings: A Critical Examination of Realism”

An 88-page manuscript; page 7 is missing. Pages 46a-d have been added. The following pages have been renumbered: 15-30 (some of these repeatedly renumbered), 59, 65, 68, 71-76 and 79-80.

Document 2: “Lecture IV. The Unity of Being, and the Mystical Interpretation.”

A 102-page manuscript written on mostly fresh pages. Pages 5/6 and 9/10 have been combined. As Royce apparently omitted to paginate a page 98, Wells has written in that number on page 99 to combine the pages. Pages 76 and 92 have been renumbered.

Box 10: Gifford Lectures First Series Lectures V & VI

Document 1: “Lecture V. The Outcome of Mysticism, and The World of Modern Critical Rationalism.”

An 84-page manuscript with extensive page renumbering. The title, given on page one, appears over a crossed-out original version: “Reality and Validity: the World of Modern Critical Rationalism.” Wells has added a red pencil “a” to a second Royce page 82. Pages 39 to 82a are renumbered, some repeatedly. Pages 37/38 were combined by Royce. Wells clarified a page 35 pen-slip. And page 5 appears to be renumbered, but may simply be another pen-slip.

Document 2: “Lecture VI. Validity and Experience”

A 95-page manuscript. The title given here is written over a marked out former title that is difficult to read.

Pages 8-12, 14-29 and 36-52 have been renumbered.

Box 11: Gifford Lectures First Series Lectures VII & VIII

Document 1: “Lecture VII. The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.”

A 104-page document. The title given here is written over a crossed-title that is difficult to read. A page 36a has been added (a renumbered page). Pages 43-56, 79-83 and 94-104 have also been renumbered. Wells clarifies page 87, where the number had been obscured by Royce edits. Pages 20/21 have been combined, as have pages 68/69/70.

Document 2: “Lecture VIII. The Fourth Conception of Being”

A 91-page document. Pages 15-17, 25-27, 48-65, 70 and 90 have been renumbered. Wells adds a 72a to a second Royce page 72, and adds an 85 to page 86 for a page combination. Royce adds a page 27a, and combines pages 18/19/20/21.

Box 12: Gifford Lectures First Series Lectures IX & rejected beginning of Lecture X

Wells title page in red pencil at the beginning of this box reads: "Gifford lectures First Series Lecture IX (in manuscript and typed) Also rejected beginning of Lecture X".

Document 1: "Lecture IX. Universality and Unity."

An 88-page manuscript, with first half composed of renumbered pages (2-52). Pages 53 to 88, however, are on completely fresh pages.

Document 2: "Lecture IX. Universality and Unity."

A 42-page unedited typescript of this lecture.

Document 3: "Lecture X. Individuality and Freedom."

A 12-page, incomplete manuscript on fresh pages. Wells writes in red pencil on the first page: "Incomplete."

Box 13: Gifford Lectures Supplementary Essay to First Series MS. pages 1-203

Document 1: "The One, the Many, and the Infinite. An Essay supplementary to First Course of Gifford lectures. Section I. Mr. Bradley's Theory Regarding The One and the Many"

A 203-page manuscript, with a loose page inserted between pages 193 and 194 in the box. Pages 6-13, 15-18, 43-47, 58, 80, 80, 121, 134-43, 108, 188-203 have been renumbered (although page 58 appears to renumber a previous page 58) Royce has added pages 80a-c. Wells has added a red pencil "a" to a second page 123.

Box 14: Gifford Lectures Supplementary Essay to First series MS. pages 204-406

Document 1:

A continuation of the manuscript in Box 13, running to 406 pages. Pages 338a and 365a have been added. A large number of pages -- 204-23, 255-77, 344-49, 354, 359-64 and 366-7a -- have

been renumbered.

There is no title or section heading on page 204.

Box 15: Gifford Lectures Second Series First Draft Lectures I & II

Document 1: “Gifford Lectures. Second Course. Lecture I. Retrospect and Outlook.”

A 72-page manuscript with no renumbered pages. Royce has added a page 25a. Wells has added a “46a” to a second Royce page 46, and “56” to Royce’s page 57.

Document 2: “Lecture II. Physical and Social Reality.”

An 87-page manuscript. Royce has written the title on page one above a crossed out title that is difficult to read. Other than page 61, which may be a pen-slip, there are no renumbered pages. Royce has combines pages 18/19/20, 32/33 and 18/19/20.

Box 16: Gifford Lectures Second Series First Draft Lectures III-V

Document 1: “Lecture III. The Social Origin of the Conceptions of Natural Law”

A 59-page text on a combination of manuscript and typescript sheets. Pages 1-14, 22-29 and 42-59 are manuscript pages. Pages 15-21 and 30-41 are typescript. The typescript pages are heavily edited in Royce’s handwriting. On page 41 of the typescript, Royce begins the manuscript of section IV of this Lecture. On page 30, Royce has cut off the top of the typescript page and inserted three lines of manuscript.

The pages have been renumbered as follows: 15-21, 31-41, and 45. In essence, all the typescript pages have been renumbered, indicating that they have been taken from another draft. Wells adds an “a” in red pencil to a second page 26. Royce combines pages 11/12 and 15/16/17/18 (although Wells crosses out “15” here, given that there is in fact a page 15 in the text).

Document 2: “Lecture IV. The Interpretation of Nature.”

A 60-page text on manuscript and typescript pages. Pages 1-7 and 42-60 are manuscript. Pages 8/18-41 are typescript. All the typescript pages, and pages 42-60 of the manuscript have been renumbered. Royce combines pages 7-18 as one page, although Wells corrects this to “8”-18, as there is a previous page 7.

Document 3: “Lecture V. The Human Self.”

A 104-page manuscript. Royce combines the pagination of 4-23 on one page. That page (4/23), along with pages 24, 84, 86, 93-94, 96 and 103 have been renumbered. Royce adds pages 72a and 94a.

Box 17: Gifford Lectures Second Series First Draft Lectures VI & VII

Document 1: “Lecture VI. The Place of the Self in Being.”

An 89-page manuscript. Pages 37-50, 72, and 80-89 have been renumbered. Wells has added a red pencil “a” to page 55. The title given here is written under a crossed-out former title that is largely illegible, but reads in part “The Freedom and Dependence ... and Duty of the Self”.

Document 2: “Lecture VII. The Temporal and the Eternal”

A 90-page manuscript. Only pages 32, 34 and 77; these may be pen-slips. No pages are added or combined.

Box 18: Gifford Lectures Second Series First Draft Lectures VIII & IV

Document 1: “Lecture VIII. The Moral Order”

A 92-page manuscript. No pages have been renumbered. Wells has added red pencil “a” notations to a second page 34 and a second page 38.

Document 2: “Lecture IX: The Struggle with Evil.”

A 73-page manuscript with no renumbered pages.

**Box 19: Gifford Lectures Second Series Revised but not final form
Lecture I and Lecture II through Section III**

Document 1:

A one page manuscript in Royce’s hand that reads as follows:

“Revision, but not so complete & final a form,
as in the copy in green box

Gifford Lectures.

—
Second Series.

Nature, Man and the Moral Order”

Document 2: “Gifford lectures. Second Course. Lecture I. Introduction: The Recognition of Facts.”

A 113-page text of typescript and manuscript pages. The title given here heads page one, with the title of Lecture I having been crossed-out several times before the present title is written.

Pages 1, 2 and 9 are typescript (pages 3-8 are missing). Half of page 11 and all of 12 are typescript. The rest are manuscript sheets. Pages 12, 14-15, 17, 19/20, 21, 24/25, 26 and 28-31 have been renumbered. Royce has added a page 10a and a page 44a. Pages 22/23, 24/25 and pages 60 to 65 are combined.

Document 3: “Lecture II. The Linkage of Facts”

A 78-page manuscript, it is the first part of this lecture (continued in Box 20). In the title the words “and the Sundering” are crossed out after the word “Linkage.” A page 20a has been added. Pages 20a, 22, and 63-77 have been renumbered. Pages 2/3 and 4/5/6 have been combined.

Box 20: Gifford Lectures Second Series Revised but not final from Lecture II from Section IV to end and Lectures III & IV

Document 1: “IV”

This manuscript continues Lecture II from Box 19, pages 79 to 157. The “IV” heading indicates that the manuscript begins here with section IV. Only pages 96 and 151 are renumbered (and may be pen slips).

Document 2: “Lecture III. The Temporal and the Eternal”

A 41-page typescript with no edits. Royce has crossed out a “VII” after Lecture in the title to make this his third instead of his seventh lecture.

Document 3: “Lecture IV: Physical and Social Reality.”

A 36-page typescript (which looks to be a carbon copy) with no edits. Royce has crossed out a “II” after Lecture to make this his fourth instead of his second lecture.

Box 21: Gifford Lectures Second Series Revised but not final form Lectures V-IX

Document 1: “Lecture V. The Interpretation of Nature.”

A 37-page typescript. Royce has crossed out the previous lecture number to make this lecture V. Page 19-25 have been renumbered. Other than the page renumbering, there are no edits to the typescript.

Document 2: “The Human Self. Lecture V.”

A one page typescript title page. Wells has put a red pencil “VI” above the typescript “V”.

Document 3: “Lecture VI. The Human Self.”

A 33-page typescript with no edits, except for Royce’s change of the typescript “V” to “VI”, making this his sixth rather than fifth Lecture.

Document 4: “Lecture VII. The Place of the Self in Being.”

A 38-page typescript with very slight proof edits. A handwritten “VII” has changed the number of the Lecture on page one.

Document 5: “Lecture VIII. The Moral Order.”

A 45-page typescript with only slight proof edits.

Document 6: “Lecture IX. The Struggle with Evil.”

A 39-page typescript with very slight proofing edits. Wells has added a red pencil “a” to the second page 35 appearing in the typescript.

Box 22: Gifford Lectures Second Series Final Draft Preface, Table of Contents, and Lectures I-III

The documents in boxes 22 through 26 comprise in fact one long document, the pieced together manuscript and typescript pages that form the book *The World and the Individual*, and that were sent to Royce’s editor George Brett at MacMillan and Company. The pagination begins on page 1 of Lecture I and continues through to page 600 at the end of Lecture X. An index, contained in Box26, follows the last lecture. They are broken down in this appendix, however, as separate documents.

Document 1: “Preface”

A 35-page manuscript. Page 25 has been renumbered.

Document 2: “Contents”

A one page manuscript table of contents for Gifford Lectures I - X.

Document 3:

A one page manuscript title page which reads as follows:

“The World and The

Individual
Gifford lectures
Delivered before the University of Aberdeen.
Second Series
Nature, Man, and the Moral Order
By
Josiah Royce, Ph.D., LL.D (Aberdeen)”

Document 4:

A one page typescript title page which reads as follows:

“Gifford Lectures.
— ” —
The World and the Individual.
— ” —
Second Series.
Nature, Man and the Moral Order.
— ” —”

Added in Royce’s handwriting are delivery directions to his editor, George page Brett, at Macmillan.

Document 5: “Lecture I. Introduction: The Recognition of Facts.”

A 50-page text composed of typescript and manuscript pages. The typescript sheets are edited as are the manuscript sheets; there is extensive renumbering. The typescript pages run from 1-28 and 34-72, with the manuscript pages beginning on page 72 (after five lines of typescript) and continuing to page 33.

The renumbering consists of the proof-reader making the page numbers run in sequence (in blue pencil).

Document 6: “Lecture II. The Linkage of Facts.”

A text of typescript and manuscript sheets, running from pages 51 to 125, in a consecutive

pagination with the last lecture. The typescript sheets run from pages 51 to 72, and the bottom of 82 to page 125. The manuscript pages begin on page 72 after five pages of typescript, and run through the first half of page 82. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Document 7: “Lecture III. The Temporal and the Eternal”

A text of typescript and manuscript sheets, running from pages 126 to 170, in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The manuscript pages run from 126 to 128, with the typescript pages finishing out the lecture. Both manuscript and typescript sheets are edited. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Box 23: Gifford Lectures Second Series Final Draft Lectures IV-VI

The documents in boxes 22 through 26 comprise in fact one long document, the pieced together manuscript and typescript pages that form the book *The World and the Individual*, and that were sent to Royce’s editor George Brett at MacMillan and Company. The pagination begins on page 1 of Lecture I and continues through to page 600 at the end of Lecture X. An index, contained in Box 26, follows the last lecture. They are broken down in this appendix, however, as separate documents.

Document 1: “Lecture IV. Physical and Social Reality.”

A text of typescript and manuscript sheets, running from pages 171-252 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The manuscript pages run from 171-82 and 204-45. The typescript pages are from 183-203, and 246-52. Although the renumbering in blue pencil reveals the proof-readers attempt to run the pages consecutively, Royce has himself renumbered some of the manuscript pages, apparently before handing them over to the proof-reader.

Document 2: “Lecture V. The Interpretation of Nature.”

A lightly edited typescript running from pages 253-89 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Document 3: “Lecture VI. The Human Self.”

A lightly edited typescript running from pages 290-322 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Box 24: Gifford Lectures Second Series Final Draft Lectures VII & VIII

The documents in Boxes 22 through 26 comprise in fact one long document, the pieced together

manuscript and typescript pages that form the book *The World and the Individual*, and that were sent to Royce's editor George Brett at MacMillan and Company. The pagination begins on page 1 of Lecture I and continues through to page 600 at the end of Lecture X. An index, contained in Box 26, follows the last lecture. They are broken down in this appendix, however, as separate documents.

Document 1: "Lecture VII. The Place of the Self in Being"

A text composed of (principally) manuscript and typescript pages, running from pages 323-422 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. Both the typescript and manuscript pages are edited. The manuscript pages run from 323 to the top of 325, and from the bottom of page 338 to 414. The typescript pages run from 325-38 and 415-22. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Document 2: "Lecture VIII. The Moral Order."

An edited typescript running from pages 423-68 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Box 25: Gifford Lectures Second Series Final Draft Lectures IX + X

The documents in Boxes 22 through 26 comprise in fact one long document, the pieced together manuscript and typescript pages that form the book *The World and the Individual*, and that were sent to Royce's editor George Brett at MacMillan and Company. The pagination begins on page 1 of Lecture I and continues through to page 600 at the end of Lecture X. An index, contained in Box 26, follows the last lecture. They are broken down in this appendix, however, as separate documents.

Document 1: "Lecture IX. The Struggle with Evil."

An edited typescript running from pages 469-508 in a consecutive pagination with the last lecture. The renumbering (blue pencil) is principally the work of a proof-reader working to make the pages run in sequence.

Document 2: "Lecture X. The Union of God and Man."

A 92-page manuscript (numbered 1-92 by Royce) running from "blue pencil" pages 509-600. Royce has renumbered pages of his text, before the blue pencil changes, as follows: 8-24, 29-34 and 62.

Box 26: Gifford Lectures Index

The documents in Boxes 22 through 26 comprise in fact one long document, the pieced together manuscript and typescript pages that form the book *The World and the Individual*, and that were

sent to Royce's editor George Brett at MacMillan and Company. The pagination begins on page 1 of Lecture I and continues through to page 600 at the end of Lecture X. An index, contained in Box 26, follows the last lecture. They are broken down in this appendix, however, as separate documents.

Document 1: "Index to the First and Second Series of the World and the Individual."

A 162-page manuscript in Royce's hand. The renumbering that occurs in this text is an attempt to keep the entries in alphabetical order. The entries run from "Absolute, The" to "Zeller".

Box 27: First Four Lectures of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*

Document 1: "Lecture I. The Nature and the Need of Loyalty."

A 64-page manuscript in Royce's hand. He has renumbered pages 14-17 and 36-64 and combined pages 5/6.

Document 2: "Lecture II. Individualism."

A 63-page manuscript in Royce's hand. Pages 38 and 39 are inverted; Wells inserts a red pencil "37." (There is none in the text.) Royce has renumbered pages 3, 5-7 and 31.

Document 3: "Lecture III. Loyalty to Loyalty"

A 32-page typescript with no edits.

Document 4: "Lecture IV. Conscience."

A 65-page manuscript in Royce's hand. He has added a page 19a; Wells adds a red pencil "a" to a second page 38a. Royce has renumbered pages 6-13, 19a, 23, 34-37 and 44.

Document 5: "Lecture II. Individualism."

A 3-page manuscript in Royce's hand that Wells states, on page 1, is a "rejected beginning of Lecture II."

Box 28: Last Four Lectures of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*

Document 1: "Lecture V. Some American Problems in their Relation to Loyalty."

A 44-page text composed of both typescript and manuscript in Royce's hand. Manuscript pages run from 1-3, 16-29 and 36-44. Typescript sheets run from 4-15 and 30-35. The two typescript sections appear to come from two different previous texts. (Page numbers are in different places and the ink is different. One appears to be a carbon.) Both the manuscript and typescript sheets are extensively edited.

Royce has renumbered all the typescript pages, as well as manuscript page 36. He has added a page 23a. Wells has written a page number “39” on page 40 to combine those pages.

Document 2: “Lecture VI. Training for Loyalty.

A 65-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. He has renumbered pages 15-16, 21-23, 31-49 and 53-62. He has added a page 16 a.

Document 3: “Lecture VII. Loyalty, Truth, and Reality”

A 65-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. He has renumbered pages 16-20, 46-54 (the top of page 47 has been torn off, with a Royce renumbering added) and page 65. He has himself combined pages 7/8/9/10 and 26/27.

Document 4: “Lecture VIII. Loyalty and Religion.”

A 63-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Pages 15 and 39 are renumbered (perhaps pen-slips). Wells has added a page 51 in red pencil to page 52.

Box 29: First Two Essays of *William James and Other Essays*

Document 1: “William James and the Philosophy of Life.”

A 64-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Royce has added a page 53a, and has renumbered pages 12-13, 19 and 47-52.

Document 2: “Loyalty and Insight”

A 67-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Wells notes in red pencil above the title on page 1: “Kansas University Address for June 8, 1910”.

Wells has added an “a” and “b” to two extra pages numbered 16. Virtually the entire text consists of redrafted and renumbered pages: pages 16b-67.

Document 3: “William James and the Philosophy of Life”

A 26-page typescript, with light editing in Royce’s hand.

Document 4: “Loyalty and Insight”

A 33-page typescript, with no editing, but occasional pencil marks noting passages.

Box 30: Principles of Logic

Document 1: “Principles of Logic: Section I. The Relation of Logic as Methodology to Logic as the Science of Order.”

An 174-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Wells notes in red pencil on the first page: “Last paragraph of Section II and remainder of MS missing.” Royce has renumbered page 18. He has combined pages 3, 4, and 5. Wells has inserted a red pencil “158” on page 159. Royce has added a page 146a.

Document 2

An untitled nine page manuscript, containing toward its end logical formulas. Wells has written above the first page in red pencil: “Supplementary Notes?”, referring perhaps to the previous document in this box.

Box 31: *The Problem of Christianity* Lectures I & II

**Document 1: “Lectures on The Problem of Christianity.
Lecture I. The Problem and the Method.”**

An 81-page manuscript in Royce’s hand, with substantial edits in parts. Pages 32-36, 41-51, 54-59 and 62-70 are on redrafted pages. Page 7/8 is combined; page 3a is added.

This manuscript corresponds to pages 57 to 74 of the published text of *The Problem of Christianity*.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle j for a manuscript fragment, numbered pages 61-69, slightly edited. This appears to be an early draft of section VII of Chapter I of *PC*. The page numbers of this fragment suggests a lengthy yet unused lead-up in Chapter I to that chapter’s section VII.

Document 2: “Lecture II. The Idea of the Universal Community.”

An 85-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Pages 5-12, 33, 38-62, 64/65-73, and 79 are on redrafted pages. Page 64/65 is combined.

Wells renumbers the last five pages in red pencil, to correct Royce’s use of two pages marked “79.”

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle f. The bundle contains manuscript fragments that parallel *PC* Chapter II, sections VIII and IX.

Box 32: *The Problem of Christianity* Lectures III & IV

Document 1: “Lecture III. The Moral Burden of the Individual.”

A 77-page manuscript in Royce's hand. Pages 31-32, 39-58, 69-71, 74 and 77 are on redrafted pages. Royce combines page 13/14. Wells adds a red pencil "8" to page 9.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 99-119 of the published text.

Document 2: **"The Problem of Christianity.
Lecture IV. The Realm of Grace."**

An 80-page manuscript principally written on redrafted pages. Indeed, the pages are all redrafted from 23 to 79, except for the insertion of a page 50 that has only a few lines (apparently to make pages 49 and 51 into continuous text). Page 17 is also on a redrafted page, although Wells renumbers this "17a" in red pencil. (Royce has already used a "17.") Royce combines page 13/14.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 121-42 of the published text.

Box 33: *The Problem of Christianity Lectures V & VI*

Document 1: **"Lectures on The Problem of Christianity.
Lecture V. Time and Guilt"**

A 76-page manuscript in Royce's hand. Pages 5, 22-24, 35-36, 38, 40 and 65 are on redrafted pages.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 143-63 of the published text.

Document 2: **"Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture VI. Atonement."**

An 80-page manuscript in Royce's hand. Pages 3-4 and 21-34 are written on redrafted pages. Royce combines pages 13/14/15, and adds a 67a.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 165-186 of the published text.

Box 34: *The Problem of Christianity Lectures VII & VIII*

Document 1: **"Lecture VII: The Christian Doctrine of Life"**

A 76-page manuscript, with substantial editing, in Royce's hand. All the manuscript pages are "fresh" with their original page numbers. Wells adds "(6)(7)" in red pencil to Royce's page "(8)(9)." Pages 9a and 11a are also added in the text.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 187-208 of the published text.

Cf. Box 102, folder 11, bundle a. This bundle contains a 30 page manuscript titled "Lectures on

the Problem of Christianity. Lecture VII. The Christian Doctrine of Life.” Based on the way these pages are grouped, these manuscript pages in Box 102 (numbered 1-30 with 15-19 omitted) seem to be a fragmentary draft of the start of Lecture VII of *PC*.

Document 2: **“Lecture VIII: The Modern Mind and the Christian Ideas**

An 83- page manuscript in Royce’s hand, heavily edited. Pages 45-71 are redrafted; all the other pages are fresh. Pages 30/31/32, “(13)-(17),” 5/6 and 3/4 are combined. Page 20a is added.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 209-26 of the printed text.

Box 35: ***The Problem of Christianity Lectures IX & X***

Document 1: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Part II. The Real World and the Christian Ideas.
Lecture IX. The Community and the Time-Process”**

An 89 page manuscript in Royce’s hand, extensively edited in parts. Pages 10-13, 16-17, 29, 36, 42, 45-53, 75 and 87-88 are redrafted. Page 57/58 is combined on one page. Pages 76a and 77a are added.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 229-49 of the published text.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle i. This bundle contains a manuscript fragment titled “Lectures on the Problems of Christianity Vol. II. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. Lecture IX. The Conflict of Selves.” The fragment is numbered pages 1-7, and is minimally edited. Oppenheim hypothesizes that these pages in Box 102 were drafted under an **earlier** plan of *PC* (in which “The Conflict of Selves” was to be the 1st Lecture of Vol. II) In his final plan, however, Royce recognized how basic the “Time-Process” and its metaphysical questions are to the second volume. Thus, in Royce’s final draft, Lecture IX becomes “The Community and the Time-Process.”

Document 2: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture X. The Body and the Members”**

A 75-page manuscript in Royce’s hand with substantial edits in parts. Pages 4/5, 6, 8, 10, 49 and 66-70 are on redrafted pages. Pages 4/5, 12/13, and 47/48 have been combined. Pages 7a, 17a and 25 a have been added.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 251-71 of the published text.

Box 36: ***The Problem of Christianity Lectures XI & XII***

Document 1: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture XI. Perception, Conception and Interpretation.”**

An 82-page manuscript, with the following pages written on redrafted pages: 9-10/11/12, 19/31-37, 44-50, and 54. Pages 10/11/12 and 5/6 have been combined. Pages 54a and 68a have been added.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 273-95 of the published text.

Cf. Box 120, folder 11, bundle b. This bundle contains a fragmentary manuscript numbered pages 13-29. This manuscript is related to the final form of *PC*'s Chapter XI, Perception, Conception and Interpretation. However, it contains a critique of William James's *Theory of Knowing* that is omitted in the final form. In the final published piece, Royce turns to Bergson, not James.

**Document 2: “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture XII. The Will to Interpret.”**

An 84-page manuscript. Royce wrote the manuscript on fresh pages, except for pages 13, 13a, 14. Pages 13a, 13b have been added; pages 4/5 and 6/7 have been combined.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 297-319 of the published text.

Cf. Box 105, folder 7 which contains one manuscript page, written front and back, and headed “Lecture XII. The Will to Interpret”. In the MS, Royce begins to write the essay, but then breaks off to outline the entire chapter in eight sections. In the published version of this Lecture there are 12 sections.

Box 37:

**Document 1: “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture XIII. The World of Interpretation.”**

An 83-page manuscript. Pages 16, 34, 51-59, 64 and 74 are on redrafted sheets. Wells renumbers a second page 34 “34a.” There are no combined pages

The manuscript corresponds to pages 321-42 of the published text.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle h. The bundle contains a manuscript fragment which may be preparatory material for this chapter.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle l. The bundle contains a large, untitled manuscript, numbered pages 3-54. This manuscript appears to have been drafted before the final version of *PC*. Perhaps the clearest hint of its place in *PC* occurs on page 5 where Royce refers to “using the three terms whose mutual relations I have explained in the last two lectures.” Oppenheim takes these “three terms” to be “Perception, Conception and Interpretation,” and further surmises that the reference to the “last two lectures” are to Lectures XI and XII. Under this analysis, this manuscript is an early reworked draft of what become Lecture XIII, “The World of Interpretation.”

Document 2: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
The Doctrine of Signs.”**

An 87-page manuscript in 15 sections. (The published text contains 14 sections.) The following pages are written on redrafted sheets: 6-12, 13a-f (13 is fresh), 15, 15a-e, 16, 39, 61, 69, 71/72-80. Pages 16a, 15a-e, and 13a-f have been added. Pages 7/8, 21/22, 35/36, 40/41/42 have been combined.

Pages 343-62 of the printed text reflect the manuscript. **Significantly**, Section V of the manuscript is omitted from the published text. The full text of that deletion may be found at pages 16a to 30 in Box 37, and in the *Oppenheim Comprehensive Index*.

Cf. Box 102, folder 10, bundle m. This bundle consists of a small piece of paper headed “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity, Lecture XIII. The World of Signs.” The small paper precedes a manuscript fragment numbered pages 41-65.

Box 38: ***The Problem of Christianity Lectures XV & XVI***

Document 1: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture XV. The Historical and the Essential**

A 92-page manuscript, written on fresh pages except for pages 13-17, 19 and 81. Wells adds a red pencil “21” to page 22 to make up for a pagination error.

Oppenheim adds a note in pencil on page 61 that deciphers a nearly illegible line in the manuscript text.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 363-84 of the published text.

Document 2: **“Lectures on the Problem of Christianity.
Lecture XVI. Summary and Conclusion.”**

A 90-page manuscript, written entirely on fresh pages.

The manuscript corresponds to pages 385-405 of the published text.

Box 39: ***The Problem of Christianity Summaries, Early Draft, Proof***

Wells’s title to this box is misleading. Box 39 in fact contains an outline of Lecture I, a collection of synopses or summaries of the other lectures, and a “page proof” of Lecture XVI. It is unclear whether these materials were created before or after the Lectures themselves. (The Lectures are contained in Boxes 31-38 listed above.)

One note: Royce distributed a hand-out to his Oxford audience for these Lectures entitled “Topics of the Individual Lectures.” These ‘topics’ may be found at pages 51-54 of the

published book.

The purpose of the eight short summaries that open this box (called variously “outline,” “summary” and “synopsis”) is unclear. They may be Royce’s own summaries of his Lowell lectures after the fact. Indeed, in several of these synopses, he uses the past tense, suggesting that the lecture has already been given. Yet, the pieces are too long to be a hand-out or a newspaper report.

Document 1: “Outline of the First Lecture on the Problem of Christianity Lowell Institute Course, Nov. 18, 1912”

A 13 page manuscript. The first sentence begins “The lecture opened” Page 5 may be written on a redrafted page.

Document 2: “Synopsis of the Second Lecture”

A 15 page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 3: “Synopsis of the Third Lecture “The Moral Burden of the Individual” <Lowell Inst. Course on The Problem of Christianity.>”

A 22 page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 4: “Synopsis of the Fourth Lecture <Lowell Inst. Course on the Problem of Christianity>”

A 14 page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 5: “Synopsis: Fifth Lecture of the Lowell Institute Course”

A 16 page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 6: “Summary of the Sixth Lecture, Lowell Institute Course.”

A 15 page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 7: “Summary of the Seventh Lecture in the Lowell Institute Course”

An 11-page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 8: “Synopsis of the Eighth and Final Lecture of the Lowell Institute Course on the Problem of Christianity”

A 13-page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages.

Document 9: “Synopsis of the Third Lecture. “The Moral Burden of the Individual”. (Lowell Institute Course on The problem of Christianity.)[sic]”

A 7-page typescript, with a few slight and non-substantive edits.

Document 10: “The Problem of Christianity. Lecture I. The Master, the Religion, and the Modern Spirit.”

A Wells note in red pencil precedes this document as follows:

“The Problem of Christianity
Lecture I (unrevised).
Written at sea, May 3-14, 1912
[Wells then quotes Royce]:
“This M.S. is superseded by the draft
of Lecture I which by June 24 was
typewritten and is in K.R.’s hand.”

Document 10 itself is a 65 page manuscript, written principally on redrafted pages (5,7, 17-20, 25-26, 28-45, 45a-f, 46, 52). Pages 47 through 51, a section in the middle of redrafted pages, is missing.

The manuscript is quite different from the published Lecture I.

Document 12: “Lecture XVI Summary and Conclusion”

Unedited page proofs for the “Summary and Conclusion of Lecture XVI: Summary and Conclusion.” The text is complete. On the last page, Wells adds certain words/lines that have inadvertently run off the page.

Document 13: “Synopsis of the Fourth Lecture (Lowell Institute Course on the Problem of Christianity)”

A 4-page unedited typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 4 in this Box.

Document 14: “Synopsis. Fifth Lecture of the Lowell Institute Course”

A 4-page typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 5 in this Box.

Document 15: “Summary of the Sixth Lecture. Lowell Institute Course”

A 4-page typescript. This typescript appears to be an accurate transcription of the manuscript, Document 6 in this Box.

Note: For a full draft of Royce’s method in *The Problem of Christianity*, see Box 102, folder 11, bundle (c). This bundle contains a somewhat edited manuscript fragment, running from pages 52 to 61, on the express subject of the method Royce intends to employ in *PC*. Oppenheim

hypothesizes that space limitations forced Royce to drop this manuscript's specific methodological portrait from the published text, settling instead for one sentence that hints at method at the close of Chapter I (p.74). Royce gives a fuller picture of his method at *PC* 210-11 and again at *PC* 230-31.

Box 40: Four of the *Fugitive Essays*

On the first page of this folio volume, Wells writes in red pencil:

“Fugitive Essays
1920
“The Nature of Voluntary Progress”
“Tests of Right and Wrong”
“On Purpose in Thought”
“Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty”

Loewenberg assembled the collection *Fugitive Essays* after Royce’s death.

Document 1: “The Nature of Voluntary Progress”

A 52-page manuscript, without page numbers,⁵⁹ in a smaller version of Royce’s hand, with only minor edits. Wells notes in red pencil on the first page “In Berkeley Quarterly, 1879” and “Also in *Fugitive Essays*.”

Document 2: “Tests of Right and Wrong”

A 73-page manuscript, written entirely on fresh pages. The manuscript is moderately edited in Royce’s own hand. At the top of the first page, above the title, a note in red ink in Royce’s hand: “1880 (July to Sept.?) Fortnightly Club.” The note appears to reflect his attempt to identify the piece, many years after the event.

Document 3: “On Purpose in Thought”

A 73-page manuscript, with page numbers. Above the first page, Wells notes in red pencil: “Bal. Metaph. Club transmitted from Berkeley”. (Referring to the Baltimore Metaphysical Club, of which Royce had been a member during his days as a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins University.)

Document 4: “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty.”

A 23-page manuscript. At the top of the first page a notation “1880” is written in pencil. Pages 21-22 are written on redrafted sheets. Page 2 contains a footnote written in red ink in Royce’s hand. Wells adds a red pencil “15” to page 16. Royce writes another footnote in red ink. (Either Wells or Royce edit out a repeated word, “of,” at the top of the page.

⁵⁹ Although there are numbers inserted at regular intervals throughout the text, at the bottom of the page.

A 49 page manuscript version of this text appears in Box 55. The longer version was never itself published.

Royce published a third version of this text before he died, an even more condensed version of the Box 40 manuscript, as a brief article in *the Berkeley Quarterly*, “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty,” vol. 1 (October 1880) 312-16.

Box 41: First Three of *Lectures on Modern Idealism*

Document 1: “**Lecture I. Introduction. Kant’s Conception of the Nature and the Conditions of Knowledge.**”

This title, at the top of the first page, is inserted in red ink in Royce’s hand. The previous lecture title, “Aspects of Post-Kantian idealism,” is crossed out, as is a note stating “(Feb. 2) Friday lunch 1:30”

A 70-page manuscript. Only pages 6 and 56 are on redrafted pages. The manuscript is edited in Royce’s hand in red ink, black ink, and pencil.

Document 2: “**Lecture II. The Modification of Kant’s Conceptions of the Self.**”

This title, at the top of the first page, was originally the subtitle to the lecture. The first part of the title, “Fundamental Conceptions of the Early Post-Kantian Idealism,” has been crossed out in red ink.

A 64-page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages. Royce has edited the text in his own hand in red ink and black ink. Wells adds a red pencil “a” to the second page “32.”

Document 3: “**Lecture III. The Concept of the Absolute, and the Dialectical Method.**”

A 61-page manuscript written entirely on fresh pages. Royce has edited the text in his own hand in red ink and black ink.

Box 42: IV, VIII & IX of *Lectures on Modern Idealism*

Document 1: “**Lecture IV. “The Dialectical Method in Schelling.”**”

This title on the first page of the text is added in red ink. The heading, “Post-Kantian Idealism” is crossed out.

A 68-page manuscript. Pages 58,59 and 61 are on redrafted pages. Wells has added a red pencil “45” to page 46 to correct a pagination error. Red ink and pencil edits in Royce’s hand appear in addition to the heavy text edits in black ink.

Document 2: “Lecture VIII. The Dialectical Progress of Hegel’s *Phaenomenologie*”

This title on the first page of the text is added in red, replacing the crossed out “Hegel’s *Phaenomenologie* Complete.”

A 72-page manuscript written entirely on fresh sheets (although page 41 is crossed out in an apparent attempt to correct a pagination error). Royce adds a page 6a. Royce edits the piece in black and red ink. (The red ink corrections appear to be more stylistic, the black ink more substantive. On the first page, for instance, a red ink correction changes “Ph□nomenologie” to *Phaenomenologie*.”

Document 3: “Lecture IX. Hegel’s Mature System.”

The sub-title, “Later Problems of Idealism.” on the first page of the text is crossed out.

A 54-page text written on what appear to be entirely fresh pages, although several page numbers are corrected. Again, Royce edits the text in black and red ink.

Box 43: Published Articles, 1896-1902

Document 1: “Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes.”

This is the manuscript of a review Royce wrote of James Mark Baldwin’s *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895). The review appeared in *Psychological Review*, 3 (1896): 201-11.

A 41-page manuscript written on entirely fresh pages, there are blue pencil type-setter’s notes in the text, as well as Royce’s own black ink edits.

Document 2: “Systematic Philosophy in America in the years 1894 and 1895”

This is the manuscript of an article Royce wrote for the German journal *Archiv fur systematic Philosophie*, 3 (1897): 245-66.

An 86-page manuscript on entirely fresh pages.

The text reveals Royce as an historian of contemporary philosophy.

Document 3: [“The Old and the New – a Lesson”]

Wells identifies this as the manuscript for “The Old and the New – a Lesson,” an article published in *The University of California Chronicle*, 2 (1902): 92-103

Page one of the manuscript is missing. Other than page one, the 37 page manuscript is complete, written entirely on fresh pages. This is the text of an address Royce delivered on June 30, 1902.

Document 4: “The Old and the New – a Lesson”

The printed text of this article, apparently torn from a copy of *The University of California Chronicle*. (See Document 3 directly above.)

Box 44: Published Articles 1902, 1903

Document 1: “Recent Logical Inquiries and their Psychological Bearing”

A 96-page manuscript, with the above title heading the first page. All pages are written on fresh sheets, except for pages 6-9, 11, and the page headed “50-53.” Page 92 is missing.

The article was published under the same title in the *Psychological Review*, 9 (1902): 105-33. Reprinted in *RLE*. See *BWJR*:2, 1205. Royce describes the piece, in his own hand, on page one as an “[a]ddress of [*sic*] the president before the American Psychological Association. Chicago Meeting. January 1902”.

Document 2: “The Present Position of the Problems of Natural Religion”

A 111-page manuscript, with the title given on page one. The manuscript is written on fresh pages, except for pages 57, 96, and 98-108. Royce includes page numbers 9/10/11 on one page; page numbers 16/17 also mark one page. Royce appears to have forgotten a page 40, which Wells groups with 41.

On this first page, Wells notes that the text appeared as “The Problem of Natural Religion: The Present Position” in the *International Quarterly*, vol. 7 (1903): 85-107. Wells also notes that the manuscript is the text for the Duddleian Lecture at Harvard University for 1901-02. Skrupskelis notes that this lecture was given on March 10, 1902. *BWJR*:2, 1206.

Box 45: “The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry” 1905 Revised proof and original MS, through § 72

Document 1: “The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry”

The “revised proof” galleys for this article by Royce. The article was published in *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, 24 (1905): 353-415, and reprinted in *Royce Logical Essays*.

Originally 63 pages long, this copy of the proof is missing (as Wells notes in red pencil) pages 11-12 and 32-61.

Document 2: “The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry. Introduction.”

A 30-page manuscript in Royce's hand, with printer's blue pencil markings throughout. This appears to be the manuscript for the introduction of the essay above at Document 1. The manuscript is written entirely on fresh pages.

Directly before this manuscript in the Folio Volume, Wells inserts the following red pencil note, which looks to be something *Wells* is quoting: "Original MS. On the Restatement of the Kemp-Theory of the Rel'n between Logic and Geometry. Written during winter 1904-5. Sent to E.H. Moore May 4, 1905, at Chicago, for printing. Returned with proof in June. To be printed in *Transact'ns A.M.* [Transactions of the American Mathematical] Society, July 1905."

Document 3: "The System Σ , and the O-Collections. Chapter I. Definitions and Principles."

A manuscript in Royce's hand running to "66a" pages. This manuscript is completed in the next Box, Box 46.

Pages 3-4, 22a-27, 30/31-33, 35-41, 51-52, 54, 56-58, and 59-65 are on redrafted pages. Pages 14/15 and 30/31 have been combined. Pages 16a, 22a, 57a, 65a, and 66a have been added. The Folio page on which pages 57a and 58 have been mounted is, for some reason, upside down in the Folio Volume.

Box 46: "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry" 1905 MS from § 73 to end"

Pages 67 to 196, continuing the manuscript from Document 3 in Box 45 above. Pages 67-74, 77-80, 87, 93, 97-98 are on redrafted pages. Pages 112a, 12a, 144a are added. Page 154 is renumbered by Wells in red pencil as 153/154.

Box 47: Published Articles 1905, 1906

Document 1: "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics"

Galley proofs ("First Proof") of this article, which appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 2 (1905): 197-207. The essay was read in Philadelphia at the December 28-30 meeting of the American Philosophical Association. The galleys are not edited.

Document 2: "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics"

A heavily edited 16 page typescript; the edits are in Royce's hand. A note in red ink across the top of the first page reads: "Address: Professor Josiah Royce. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 10pt." The note appears to be inserted by the editor of the journal listed above, document 1. (The footnote from page one of that galley is also written here in red ink.)

The typescript is signed on the last page, in pencil "Josiah Royce. Harvard University."

Document 3: "The Sciences of the Ideal"

A 70-page manuscript in Royce's hand, with his own note: "[address for the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences, before the Division of "Normative Science"] Wells makes a note in red pencil: "Address given Sept. 20, 1904".

Pages 2, 4, 6-49a, 61 and 64-70 are on redrafted pages. Wells has added an "a" to Royce's second page 9.

Document 4: "The Sciences of the Ideal"

An incomplete 29-page typescript, lightly edited in Royce's hand. Other notes in a different hand, probably the publisher, appear on the first page in ink, and throughout in blue pencil. The paper was in *Science* n.s. 20 (1904): 449-62) on October 7, 1904. Other work based on or referring to this paper may include "Symmetrical and Unsymmetrical Relations in the Exact Sciences" (1905) (found in Box 72, document 4) and "The Present State of the Question Regarding the First Principles of Theoretical Science," *The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 45 (1906): 82-102.

Document 5: "Race Questions and Prejudices"

A 74-page manuscript, heavily edited in Royce's hand, with publisher's notations throughout. Pages 14a, 29 and 41-62 are on redrafted pages. Pages 14a-c, 28a, and 29a have been added. Pages 9/10 are combined.

This manuscript was published in the *International Journal of Ethics*, 16 (1906): 265-288, and reprinted *Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems* (New York: Macmillan Col, 1908), 3-53, and in *SPJR*.

Box 48: Published Articles 1907-1912

Document 1: "Immortality"

A 78-page manuscript written entirely on fresh sheets. The text is substantially edited in Royce's hand, principally in black ink, but also in pencil.

Royce crosses out the first 4 ½ pages of the manuscript with a penciled "X". Wells notes that the parts crossed out were not published.

Royce's note at the top of page one notes that the manuscript is a text of "a paper prepared by request for a Congregational Ministers' Association. Boston, March, 1906." The piece was published as "Immortality," *Hibbert Journal*, 5 (1907): 724-44.

Document 2: "The American College and Life"

A 40-page manuscript of a piece that was published in *Science*, 29 (March 1909): 401-07.

Written entirely on fresh sheets, the piece is heavily edited. Publisher's notes occur throughout.

Document 3: "On Definitions and Debates"

A 70-page manuscript, with the following pages written on redrafted sheets: 37-49, 51-53, 55, 69-70. Pages 2/3, 5/6/7, and 56/57/58 are combined.

The piece has an interesting genesis. The American Philosophical Association had tried to set up rules without discussing these rules with the membership. Royce wrote this essay in response to this attempt. He "cheerfully submits" the criticism to F.J.E. Woodbridge, Jan 5, 1912, the editor of the *Journal of Philosophy & Ethics* following the APA meeting in late December 1911. See *Letters*, 560-62.

The piece was eventually published in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. IX, no. 4 (February 15, 1912): 85-100.

Box 49: Published Articles 1913-1914

Document 1: [Letter]

One manuscript page, on The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods letterhead to Royce. The typescript letter to "My dear Professor Royce" is five lines long, and signed [illegible]. Then, in his own hand, Royce writes a list of seven "articles proposed to follow the article on the "Extension" of etc." (emphasis in original). Royce apparently refers to the article which follows in the folio volume, document 2 (a fragment) and document 3 (complete) below.

Document 2: "An Extension of the Algebra of Logic"

An 8-page manuscript fragment, with page four on a redrafted sheet. This title heads the first page.

Document 3: "An Extension of the Algebra of Logic"

A 65-page manuscript, much of which (pages 5-37) consists of redrafted sheets. Pages 43/44 are combined by Royce; Wells adds a red pencil "63" to correct a pagination error at page 64.

In addition to Royce's own edits, publisher's proof marks run through the piece. A stamp for "The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods, sub-station 84, New York City" is inked on page 1.

This logic essay was published in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 10 (1913): 617-33, and reprinted in *Royce Logical Essays* with corrections. (RLE omits the last paragraph of three lines.)

Document 4: "The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical."

I. Practical Purpose of this Meeting.”

A 77-page manuscript. Pages 5, 18-20, 22-23, 31, 41-42 and 72 are written on redrafted sheets. Pages 9/10, 35/36 and 43/44 have been combined. Page 50 is missing.

This piece was published in *Science*, n.s. 39 (1914): 551-66. It was reprinted in *Royce's Logical Essays*. A reprint of the text may be found in HARP at Box 104, folder 10.

Document 5: **“The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical. I. Motives which lie at the basis of the present undertaking”**

A 9-page manuscript that Wells notes, at the top of the first page, is fragmentary. Page 6 is a redrafted sheet.

Document 6: **[untitled]**

An eight page manuscript fragment, numbered pages 6-13. On page 9, there is an apparent section II titled “Vitalism in Greek Philosophy.” The text is heavily edited in Royce’s hand.

Document 7: **[“A Word for the Times”]**

Wells gives the title to this five page manuscript. There is, however, no title in Royce’s hand on the first page. The manuscript sheets are written on the back of typescript sheets which, because they are pasted into the Folio Volume, cannot be read.

The article, “A Word for the Times,” was published in *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, 23 (1914-15): 207-09.

Document 8: **“The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and The Case of Middlebury College”**

A 12-page typescript, with a few handwritten edits by Royce. The piece was published in *School and Society*, 1 (1915): 145-50.

Box 50: Contributions to Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics

The first 4 texts in this Folio Volume reflect two of Royce’s contributions to Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 8 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916).

The last two documents, however, are not contributions to the Encyclopedia. Oppenheim hypothesizes that they may be part of Royce’s 1904 Columbia Lectures (lectures which concerned the same subject matter as the logical “Order” entry to Hastings’ *Encyclopaedia*).

Document 1: **“Mind”**

A 34-page unedited typescript. Wells notes at the top of page one that the encyclopedia article

has additions and omissions to this typescript. Cf. Royce's notes concerning "The Article on Mind", toward the end of one of his logical notebooks (about ten pages from back cover), Box 114, folder 1.

The Mind article appears at pages 649-57 of the Encyclopedia.

Document 2: "Mind"

A 25-page text of combined typescript and manuscript pages. In addition to manuscript inserts into the typeset pages, Royce adds manuscript pages 17a-j, as well as a final page 25 in manuscript. The typescript pages are heavily edited in Royce's hand. Wells notes at the top of page one that this is a revision of the article for the Hastings' Encyclopedia. He also notes that the fifth and final section of the article is missing.

Document 3: "Order"

A 42-page typescript (most of the page numbers have been cut-off). The edits do not appear to be in Royce's hand, but seem to reflect the publisher's edits (including blue pencil typesetter marks).

This article appeared at pages 533-40 of the Encyclopedia.

Document 4: "Order"

A 49-page unedited typescript.

Documents 5 and 6: [parts of the 1904 Columbia Lectures "Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process"]

A heavily edited typescript numbered pages 41-60. All the pages are on redrafted sheets. Royce has changed typescript page numbers "1-20" to "41-60" with handwritten edits. Immediately following this typescript is a one page with the words "Lecture 3" typed on it, and then one page of typescript numbered page 20.

Oppenheim suggests that this typescript (and the one page typescript which follows it as "Lecture 3") was at one point part of Royce's Columbia Lectures "Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process," delivered in 1904.) These sheets appear to follow a typescript found in Box 74 which is typed on similar paper in similar ink.

The typescript picks up again in Box 74 with typescript page 25. (This would indicate pages 23 and 24 of Lecture are missing from this collection of typescript pages.)

Evidence to support this hypothesis may be found in the Dr. Oppenheim *Comprehensive Index*, Part II, the Columbia Lectures and the "Mystery of the Boxes."

Box 51: "Various Posthumous Publications"

Document 1: “Words prepared for the Meeting on ‘The Duty of Americans in the war.’ (Sunday, Jan 30, 1916)”

A 12-page manuscript, with the above title heading page one. Pages 5-7 are on renumbered pages. Pages 9a-9e have been added.

Document 2: “The Hope of the Community.”

A 40-page unedited typescript titled “The Hope of the Community.” An identical typescript may be found in Box 105, folder 1. Wells adds a note above the first page dating the piece as 1916, and stating “Section V omitted in published article.” The published article to which he refers is “The Hope of the Great Community” in *The Yale Review*, 5 (1916): 269-91. The article was reproduced in *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan 1916).

Substantial revisions, beyond the omission of Section V noted by Wells, were made to this typescript before the article was published. See Oppenheim Index for details as to the revisions.

Document 3: “The Possibility of International Insurance”

A heavily edited, incomplete 18-page manuscript in Royce’s hand with the above title on page 1. Wells notes in red pencil: “Published article has additional final paragraph.”

Pages 7 and 9-18 are on substantially renumbered sheets. Wells combines a page 13 with 14 to make pagination consistent.

Document 4: “State Insurance and International Reinsurance”

An 11-page manuscript in Royce’s hand, with the above title heading page one.

Document 5: “The Possibility of International Insurance”

A lightly edited 12-page typescript, with the above title heading page one.

***Box 52: MSS. Similar to Published Works**

The texts in this Folio Volume represent an interesting collection of work by Royce circa 1896. Pulled from various sources to flesh out the ideas of his “Problem of Job” essay, the first three manuscripts in the box illuminate his thinking directly after the *Conception of God* address in Berkeley in 1895. This box is a good example of how an understanding of Royce’s work-process can lead to connections among and discoveries within the HARP manuscripts.

Document 1: “Introduction to Paper on Problem of Job, as read at Philos. Conf. 168 Brattle St. Nov. 22, 96”

When Royce presented his paper “The Problem of Job” to the Philosophy Conference in November, 1896, he delivered this 11 page manuscript as an introduction. This introduction was not published with the essay “The Problem of Job” in *Studies of Good and Evil* but is a significant exposition of his thoughts on the problem of evil.

Document 2: “The Problem of Job”

Manuscript, with pages numbered 1-39. This manuscript reflects the first part of the essay “The Problem of Job,” published in *Studies of Good and Evil*.

***Document 3:Untitled**

A continuous manuscript page numbered pages 35-87 (a section IV begins on 35. A section V begins on page 75.) Oppenheim hypothesizes that these are the fourth and fifth sections of the fifth Augustus Graham lecture. Section IV (pages 35-75) is published in “The Problem of Job.” Neither the paragraph preceding Section IV on page 35, nor Section V are a part of that essay. The reason: this document consists of the pages 35-87 of Royce’s Fifth Augustus Graham lecture. The rest of the Graham lectures may be found in Boxes 67-68.

The last as yet unpublished section V of the last Augustus Graham lecture is an illuminating summary of the Graham Lecture Series as a whole. Entitled “On Theism,” the Graham Lectures reveal Royce working through the critical response to his *Conception of God* address less than a year after that address was given. (The Graham Lectures were delivered in Brooklyn over a three month period, from January to March 1896.)

Document 4: “Hegel’s Terminology”

A 178 page manuscript, page one many other pages missing, as Wells notes on a page preceding the text: “Hegel’s Terminology.” (This might be productively compared with the article bearing this title in Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*) 1901. Many pages are missing from this manuscript: 1, 4-6, 8-31, 36-38, 44-46, 54, 56, 57, 60-77, 79-89, and 146-160.

Box 53: Records of Student Days University of California and German Universities

The documents in this box incorporate Royce’s own numbered “index” system for his early writing.

Document 1: “The Miner’s Grave”

One ½ sheet manuscript, with this title and an outline on one side. A full page manuscript in Royce’s hand is attached, with writing on the front and back.

*A Wells note in red pencil states “University of California,” but Oppenheim has crossed this out in pencil, noting that it is rather from Royce’s High School Class, adding “cf. Royce’s Index under H. 7[Box A] For a different MS on grave scene.” These notes refer to Royce’s own earlier

box organizational system. The current location is Box 114, folder 3.

Document 2: “A Nocturnal Expedition”

A 2½-page manuscript in an early Royce hand. An undated school essay, concerning a dream about Australia. The piece brings out the fear of loneliness.

Document 3: Untitled

A 3-page manuscript in an early Royce hand. A story based on Greek mythology, with the character “Mr. Phoebus.”

Document 4: Untitled

A 6½-page manuscript in an early Royce hand. One of the “graveyard” stories. Oppenheim suggests this piece be titled, “The Lonely Lovers’ Grave” to distinguish it from document 1 above.

Document 5: “An Incursion into the Regions of the Sentimental, In Imitation of Certain Novelists”

A 7-page manuscript in an early Royce hand, in which Royce claims to recount a dream.

Document 6: “Casual Observation of Human Nature”

A 5-page manuscript, in an early Royce hand, with page three missing. It is signed “J. Royce.Jr.”

Document 7: “Personification in Early Tongues”

A 17-page manuscript on 5” X 8” sheets, and one final sheet turned sideways (or a regular size sheet cut in half). The piece is signed “J.R.’75.” This piece appeared the *Neolean Review*, vol. 1 (October, 1873):1, 3.

Document 8: “No. 2. Mr. President and Fellow Members”

An 8-page manuscript on small sheets, this is an address to “the president and fellow members” of (perhaps) the Neolian Society. There is no date. The first page of the manuscript is written front and back (with the bottom torn off), then goes on to 7 additional manuscript pages.

Document 9: “Our Union”

A folded page manuscript, written on three of the four sides in an early Royce hand. On the fourth side, it is labeled “Editor Scrap Book”. It is signed mysteriously with something that looks like “Trauth.” or “Trauts.” or “Trants.”

Document 10: “The Last Days of ‘75. From a Manuscript Written about 1975 (A.D)”

A 6-page MS on full pages. Page three is in pencil. All the rest is in ink.

Document 11:(Title blurred by paste or watermark)

A 12½-page MS, with all its pages “x-ed” out in pencil, except for the last page. The “J. Royce, Jr. ‘75” signature is crossed out at the end of the MS.

This may be an early draft of “The Modern Novel as a Mode of Conveying Instruction and Accomplishing Reform.” vol. 1 (April 1874). If so, it was delivered as a prize-winning oration.

Document 12:Untitled

A 4½-page MS (with some notations on backs of pages) on the topic of Plato’s argument concerning the “unmoved mover,” which Royce identifies as the Soul. Royce sees its applicability the modern scientific notion of the indestructibility of force.

Document 13:Untitled Fragments

Two small pieces of paper on one page of the box volume. One folded horizontal slip is title, on one half “Notes.“ The first piece of paper is written in pencil, the second in pen.

The first 4” by 5” scrap is almost illegible.

The second long strip of paper (2” by 8”) is headed “[X.]” [note for a Chapter Ten?] “Arrangement of Essay on the Connection of Lit. Art. and his Work.” The last line of the fragment: “Art is not an old ruin merely whose builders mostly excite curiosity.

Document 14:Untitled

A 3-page manuscript in which Royce tackles the argument of Parmenides against Plato’s Doctrine of the Ideas.

Document 15:“Mill and Spencer”

A 6-page manuscript, this appears to be a critique of another university publication entry (there is a reference to “an article that was intended to appear in the April No. of the Berkeleyan”). There are clues that Royce was encountering Peirce’s work at this time.

The MS is signed “J.R. 75”.

Document 16: “The Life Harmony”

Pages from *The Overland Monthly* vol. 15 (August 1875) 157-64, the printed text of “The Life

Harmony.” Royce’s friend Milicent Shin (editor of *The Overland Monthly*) accepted his piece before he left for Germany.

Document 17: [Miscellaneous Documents relating to Royce’s German Study]

- Certificate for Royce’s registration at the university at Leipzig.
- Envelope fragment with his German address.
- Department of State traveling papers.
- Royce’s degree from the Leipzig university
- A university “college book”
- Royce’s grades
- Royce’s signature, accepting the obligations of the university’s study requirements

Box 54: Fragments of Ph.D. Thesis and Notes Preliminary to Degree (1877-78)

The title of this box is based on Wells’s note on the first page of this box (Folio Volume).

Regarding Royce’s dissertation, *see Life* at 69: “On April 2, 1 878, Royce submitted his doctoral thesis in 343 holograph pages entitled “Of the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge: An Investigation of the Problems of Elementary Epistemology, in Two Chapters, with an Introduction on the Principal Ideas and Problems in which the Discussion Takes its Rise.”

A five page manuscript of the introduction to the dissertation may be found in Box 119, folder 3, and a bound typescript of the dissertation in Box 119, folder 6. A bound typescript copy of the dissertation may be found at Box 119, folder 6.

Document 1:

An 83-page manuscript with an intricate pagination system that includes numbers and letters. In this “text”, all pages have reference to a roman numeral “I”.

- An “Introduction and Argument” is numbered “i.a.” 1-21 (with no page “1” number).
- A “Part I. Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge: Of the basis of the Theory, and of the nature of the Principles of Knowledge” is numbered “I.a” pages 22-52 (with no page “22” number).
- A text titled “Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge” is numbered “I.b” pages 1-11 (with no page “1” number).
- A text titled “Part I. Prolegomena to the Theory of Knowledge” is numbered “I.c.” pages 12-31 (with no page “12” number).

Document 2:

A series of possibly continuous manuscript pages, all of which have reference to a roman numeral “II” in their pagination system. The pages are numbered as follows:

- An untitled manuscript numbered “II.a.” pages 1-4.
- A manuscript titled “Part II. Of the Definition of Knowledge; and of the Bearing of the same

- upon the Principles of Knowledge“, numbered “II.b.1” through “II.b.6”
- A manuscript titled “The Natural Ideas of Existence of the Forms of Existence“ numbered “II.c.1” through “II.c.8.”

Document 3:

A manuscript headed in Royce’s hand: “Fragment (of use further on)”, pages 35-39.

Document 4:

A 45-page manuscript fragment, with pages 1 and 2 apparently missing. (Wells makes a note of the missing pages on page 3.) The manuscript appears to be incomplete at page 45, with only three pages of Chapter 2 included. The text is not titled, but contains the following “part” and “chapter” headings:

- “I. Definition and Nature of Knowledge.” Page 11.
- “Chap. 1. Of the Subject as capable of possessing Knowledge A. Of the variety of the distinctions between Knowledge and Error.” Page 11.
- “Chap. 2.. - Of the Subject as Capable of Possessing Knowledge. - B: Of Knowledge and True Opinion, and of certain Conditions whereby alone the Former may be made Possible.” Page 42.

Document 5: “Notes on Essay”

An unpaginated 9-page manuscript in an early Royce hand, with the title “Notes on Essay” at the top of page one. Royce adds the further heading in red ink “Preliminaries to the Degree - Essay” at the top of the first page.

Box 55: Papers Written 1877-78

Document 1: “The Spirit of Modern Philosophy”

A 62-page manuscript in Royce’s hand, carefully inked, with footnotes in red, ready for publication. The manuscript was not, however, published. Wells has noted “A Review” in red pencil above the first page. Royce signs the essay on the last page “Josiah Royce.” The piece is dated October 1877 in Royce’s hand at on page one.

The text appears to be a review of Francis Bowen’s *Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann* (New York: Scribners, 1877). But much of the text consists of an outline of much of Royce’s dissertation at Johns Hopkins. If this piece *had* in fact been published, it is unlikely that Royce would have secured his appointment at Harvard, where Bowen sat on the admissions board of the Philosophy Department. (In essence, Royce states the opinion that Bowen did not have “the spirit of modern philosophy.”)

Document 2: “Fragment”

An 8-page manuscript, with page 5 missing. Again, Royce’s handwriting is careful and neat.

The date (“about “Dec. 1877”) is in Royce’s hand, as is the notation “Fragment.”

Document 3: “Spinoza’s Theory of Religious Liberty in the State”

A 49-page manuscript which does not appear to be complete. Royce notes at the top of the first page that it was “[r]ead before the Historico-Political Science Club, Friday, March 1, 1878.” Royce wrote this piece while at Johns Hopkins, again in the small and careful hand that is characteristic of his earlier work. See also *Fugitive Essays*, page 90, fn. 1. This text had several incarnations over the years. This first longer version was never itself published.

Royce condensed this manuscript into a shorter 23 page manuscript that may be found in Box 40 (a 23 page MS) in Box 40. The shorter Box 40 version was eventually published posthumously by Loewenberg in *Fugitive Essay* (290-99) as “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty.”

Royce published a third version before he died, an even more condensed version of the Box 40 manuscript, as a brief article in *the Berkeley Quarterly*, “Natural Rights and Spinoza’s Essay on Liberty,” vol. 1 (October 1880) 312-16.

Document 4: “Fragments”

A piece of a manila envelope (one page), with titles of the essays that had apparently been contained within it, as follows:

“Fragments 1878

- (1) In the Footsteps of Kant
- (2) The Historical Method in Sociology
- (3) Of Causality [this is crossed out]
- (4) The Truth Seeking Instinct
- (5) Definitions of Knowledge”

Wells notes that these essays seem to have been bound together at some point, given “similar holes in the MS sheets.”

Document 5: “In the Footsteps of Kant”

An 11-page manuscript fragment that was not apparently published. The pages are somewhat edited. Wells dates the essay by reference to the manila envelope that contained this bundle of manuscripts.

Document 6: “Historical Method in Sociology: - Its Significance and Its Principles”

A 20-page MS which Wells dates by reference to the manila envelope fragment at Document 4 above.

Document 7: “Historical Method in Sociology: - Its Significance and Its Principles”

A 5-page manuscript fragment with this title.

Document 8: “The Truth Seeking Instinct”

A 3-page manuscript fragment which Wells dates to either 1878 or 1880. The manuscript begins with “Chap. I. Of Truth-Seeking as an Activity that is Largely Instinctive.” The three pages contain 3 subheads.

It is not clear whether Royce intended to write a book on this subject. Compare Box 125, folder 6: “The Work of the Truth Seeker.” Also compare the three “truth seeking” manuscripts in Box 79, as well as “Doubting and Working” in *Fugitive Essays*. (At page 322 of *FE*, n. 1, notes one of these essays is a “[r]evision of an earlier essay on ‘The Work of the Truth-Seeker,’ read before the Literary Society.”

Document 9: “Chap. I: Definition of Knowledge”

A 6-page manuscript fragment .

Document 10: “The Critical Theory of Knowledge, Part I: The World in Thought, Chap. I: Introduction”

A 9-page MS fragment. It is only slightly edited.

Document 11: “Of the Principles of Ethics. An Essay in Lectures”

A 5-page MS, this is evidently an introduction to a series of lectures on ethics entitled “Moral Science or Ethics.” It is unclear whether Royce ever gave this lecture series. Only this introduction survives.

Document 12: “Notes”

An 11-page manuscript beginning on page 3, with detailed section marks at the tops of the pages in Royce’s hand. (e.g. “§.1.IV.4”)(where “s” is a section mark ... can’t find it in Vista.) These are apparently notes to himself, not meant as footnotes, but notes of his own thinking on topics. There are four “notes” contained in this manuscript.

Document 13: Untitled Fragment

A 13-page manuscript fragment, with page one missing. A piece of literary criticism, referring e.g. to George Eliot as a “great romance writer,” but then going on to criticize her.

Document 14: Untitled Fragment

An untitled 12-page manuscript, with pages one and two missing. The text is only slightly edited.

Box 56: Lectures on Romanticism 1878 Lectures I-VI

These manuscripts were written for a lecture series Royce delivered at Johns Hopkins. He later reworked the lectures for his classes at UCB. (See *Letters* 67, 68, 72, 91; see *Life* 69)

Document 1: **“On the Poetry of the German Romantic School.
Lecture I Introduction”**

A 36-page manuscript written on lined paper.

Document 2: **“Lecture II. The Romantic Critics and the Critics of Romanticism.”**

A 46-page manuscript. Wells notes that pages 2-37 are missing. Oppenheim writes “Not so. There is no break in text Previous page (unnumbered)= 37.” The manuscript remains incomplete (as Wells notes). It ends in the middle of a sentence.

Document 3: **“Part II – The Individuals. III. Novalis (Friedrich v. Hardenberg)”**

A 33-page manuscript, with some editing.

Document 4: **“Lecture IV – Ludwig Tieck”**

A 26-page manuscript.

Document 5: **“Lecture V. Tieck (concluded): Minor Romanticists.”**

A 34-page manuscript. There is a break between the Tieck conclusion at page 27, and the next topic of the minor romanticists.

Document 6: **“Lecture VI. Minor Romanticists (concluded).”**

A 33-page manuscript.

**Box 57: Lectures on Romanticism 1878 Lecture VII, “Conclusion,” Appendices,
Early Drafts, Notes**

Document 1: **“Lecture VII. Hoffmann – Heinrich v. Kleist.”**

A 60-page manuscript.

Document 2: **“Conclusion”**

A 15-page manuscript.

Document 3: “[Appendix B] Translations & Abstracts.. Novalis: Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Werke, II.p.74 seq.”

An 8-page manuscript.

Document 4: “Lecture I: Of the Nature of Romanticism.”

A 12-page manuscript. Wells notes that this is “apparently an early draft” of this Lecture.

Document 5: “Lecture II. – Of the Nature of Romanticism. Of the Early History of our Modern Romanticism.”

A 12-page manuscript, with the last two pages appearing to be more notes than continuous text. Royce does not number these last two pages. Wells notes that this is “apparently an early draft” of this Lecture.

Document 6: “Lecture III. The Beginnings of Romanticism. A. The Study of Nature and Poetry”

A 12-page manuscript, written in a very small Royce hand. He writes in two columns on each sheet, with some writing on the backs of pages. Wells notes that this is “apparently an early draft” of this Lecture.

Document 7: “Lecture IV. The Beginnings of Romanticism. B. The Doctrines Concerning Nature and Art and the influences of these Doctrines on Literature”

A 19-page manuscript. Pages 1-13 are written in double columns on each sheet. Pages 14-19 are not written in columns. Wells notes that this is “apparently an early draft” of this Lecture.

Document 8: “Lecture V. The Romanticism of the Sturm.Drang Period of German Literature”

A 7-page manuscript written in two columns on each sheet. Wells notes that this is “apparently an early draft” of this Lecture.

Document 9: “On the Poetry of the German Romantic School”

An 8-page manuscript that Wells notes is an apparently rejected beginning of the second draft of the lectures on Romanticism.

Document 10: “On the Poetry of the German Romantic School”

A 7-page manuscript that Wells notes is an apparently rejected beginning of the second draft of the lectures on Romanticism.

Document 11: “Of the Poetry of the German Romantic School”

A 4-page manuscript that Wells notes is an apparently rejected beginning of the second draft of the lectures on Romanticism.

Document 12: “Notes on Romanticism &c.”

A one page manuscript which a subtitle describes as “Notes for Lecture on Fiction. Special topic, What constitutes Good Fiction.”

Box 58: Berkeley Lectures 1878

Wells makes the following note at the beginning of this Box: “Royce’s own judgment: These lectures were hastily prepared (mainly on the day or evening preceding the delivery of each) and only partially written out. The course was attended by about a half dozen students. A number of good things are to be found in these MSS., along with much which is commonplace and useless.” Wells notes that “[t]he above was written on the envelope containing the following MSS., in handwriting which was obviously not Royce’s.”

Document 1: “Program of Lectures Introductory to Philosophy”

A one page typeset program.

Document 2: “Lectures Introductory to Philosophy. Berkeley, 1878”

A one page manuscript on a 4” by 8” sheet in Royce’s hand. Royce describes the series.

Document 3: “Lecture I.”

A 40-page manuscript. Wells notes on the first page that it was delivered on October 29, 1878.

Document 4: “An Elementary Analysis of the Thinking-Process.”

A 24-page manuscript. At the top of page 1, Royce writes in red ink: “Berkeley ’78-’79 Lectures on Logic/ Lectures on Philosophy, [Lectures on] Modern Thought.”

Document 5: “Lecture II.”

A 43-page manuscript. Wells notes at the top of page one that this lecture was “delivered Oct. 31, 1878.”

Document 6: Untitled

A 49-page manuscript written on small 5” X 8” sheets. Pages 1 and 2 are missing.

Document 7: **“Lecture VI. Course Introductory &c. The Knowledge of Nature.”**

A 47-page manuscript written on small 5” X 8” sheets.

Document 8: **“Lecture VII. Course Introductory &c. The Knowledge of Nature
(Second Discussion: Historical)”**

Box 59: Berkeley Lectures 1879

Document 1: **“Lecture I: Introductory”**

A 36-page manuscript. An interesting diagram involving the “heretical” and the “conforming” on page 34. Some of the pages have notes on the back. Wells notes that the lecture was delivered on January 21, 1879.

Document 2: **“Lecture II: Notes.
Des Cartes 1596-1650
Spinoza 1632-1677”**

A 7-page manuscript. Not a narrative, but notes on the subject matter.

Document 3: **“Lecture III. Cartesianism (concluded). English Empiricism from
Locke to Hume.”**

A 28-page manuscript. Wells notes that it was delivered on February 4, 1879. Some of the pages have notes on the back of the sheets.

Document 4: **“Lecture IV. The English Philosophy. The Eighteenth Century”**

A 19-page manuscript. Wells notes that it was delivered on February 11, 1879. Some of the pages have notes on the back of the sheets.

Document 5: **“Lecture V. Sub-Topic II: Leibniz’s life.”**

A 3-page manuscript. Wells notes that this lecture was delivered on February 18, 1879. Oppenheim adds a note to compare this document with the next manuscript (Document 6) at page 2.

Document 6: **“Lecture V. Topic: Continental Philosophy of the 18th Century. Sub-
Topic: The Philosophy of Leibniz.”**

A 25-page manuscript.

Document 7: **“Lecture VI. Introductory to Kant, the Wolffian School must be
treated”**

A one page manuscript in which Royce makes notes about the lecture. Wells notes that this lecture was delivered on February 25, 1879.

Document 8: “Lecture VI. Kant; and the Significance of Modern Thought.”

A 26-page manuscript. There are notes written on the backs of some of the pages.

Box 60: Papers 1879-81

Document 1: “The Purpose of Thought. Introduction”

An edited eight page manuscript. Wells makes the note at the top of page one: “Fragment of an essay finished in another form, namely “On Purpose in thought” in *Fugitive Essays*” and gives the dates as 1879-1880. Thus, the notes are only an early attempt at the subject matter tackled in the printed text version in *Fugitive Essays*, a 41 page essay. (See *Life* 86)

Document 2: “Sketch of the Infinitesimal Calculus. Introductory”

An 11-page manuscript, in which Royce makes numerated points 1-19.

Document 3: “Outlines of Critical Philosophy. Chap. I Introductory.”

A 20-page manuscript.

Document 4: “The Work of Thought. Chap. I. The Truth of Propositions.”

A 13-page manuscript.

Document 5: “Chap. I. Thought-Purposes.”

A 12-page incomplete manuscript. (It ends in the middle of a sentence.)

Document 6: Untitled

A one page manuscript that begins “Synthetic judgments *a priori* comprise all universal synthetic judgments that are valid or that can pretend to be.”

Document 7: “The Scope and Purpose of Psychology”

A 33-page manuscript, ending more in notes than narrative. Much of it is edited. At the top of page one, Royce notes in red ink: “Nov. 1880. Introductory paper read to the first meeting of the Psychology Club at Berkeley.”

Document 8: “Reality and Consciousness”

A 45-page manuscript. Page 7 is missing. Wells, in a note at the top of page one, describes it as

“Incomplete (?)” Royce himself writes in red ink at the top of page one: “Vorarbeit to the Essay on “Mind & Reality.”

Document 9: Untitled

A one page manuscript listing three essays in Royce’s hand in red ink:

“Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy”
“Matter & Consciousness” (Fragment of Mind Essay)
“Logic as an English Study.”

Wells notes: “these three essays were originally bound together.” He then crosses out a note that reads “Following are the first and third.” Oppenheim adds a pencil note: “The First follows pp 1-5, 40-96. Second and third are in Box 61 [illegible]”

Document 10: “The Theory of Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy”

A 96-page manuscript. Pages 6-39 are missing. Pages 1/2/3 are combined on one page. The manuscript is much edited.

Box 61: Essays and Papers: 1881-89

Document 1

A piece of a manila envelope with handwritten markings (unclear whether Royce’s hand), dated 1881. The note lists three essay titles, stating first that the “Three Short essays [are] bound together.” “Three” is crossed out, with the numeral “2” added above. The three essays named are:

- “(a) Evolution in its Relation to Philosophy (pp 6-39 missing)
- (b) Matter and Consciousness (Fragments of Mind Essay)[“Mind Stuff and Reality” - Mind VI 1881
- (c) Logic as an English Study pp 365-77”

Wells makes a note that “b” and “c” follow in the box.

Document 2: “Matter and Consciousness”

A 6-page manuscript which Wells calls a Vorarbeit to “Mind-Stuff” and Reality” in *Mind*, VI (1881): 365-377. The title appears on the first page.

Document 3: “Logic as an English Study”

A 44-page manuscript; the title appears on the first page. Wells adds the note “1881” above the text on page 1. Page 41 may be missing. (Wells adds “(41?)” to page 42.) Except for page 33, all pages are freshly numbered.

Document 4: “The Conception of Immortality”

A 112-page manuscript; the title appears on the first page. Though undated, the manuscript may be dated to 1899 or later. See page 54 of the text, in which Royce refers to “my colleague Dr. Dickinson Miller,” who taught as an instructor at Harvard from 1899-1904. All pages are fresh,

except the following: 26-27, 65-68, and 101-11. Pages 47-53 and 69 are missing.

Document 5: “The Conception of Immortality”

An 8-page manuscript on fresh pages.

Box 62: Notes and Paper 1889-1893

Document 1: Hegel’s Phenomenology. Lecture Course of 1889-90. Book I. Lectures I —[not fully written out] Passages, notes, outline

Pages from a small 5” X 8” notebook have been disassembled and remounted in the folio volume. The brown notebook cover bears the title listed above. The pages are not numbered. But there are 32 manuscript pages, including the backsides of some of the sheets, included here. (Not counting the cover.)

Document 2: “Report on Recent Philosophical Discussions”

A 25-page manuscript, all on fresh pages. Wells adds the date “1892” at the top of the first page in red pencil.

Document 3: Untitled

A scrap of manila envelope, not all handwriting on it visible. Royce appears to indicate that what was contained in the envelope had been a “Paper read in 1893 at Phil’l Congress in Chicago.” He adds: “MS later mutilated for the paper in the Philos’l Res. On “External World & Soc’l Consc.” Present MS has interest as to the Reflection prob”

Wells tends to insert these bits of manila envelopes where they have contained the essays that follow in the folio volumes.

Document 4: “The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective”

A 90-page MS in four sections. Pages 4-5, 23-32, 44-49 and page 74 are re-numbered used sheets. All others are freshly written. Royce skips page numbers 78 and 79. Pages 50-69 and 71-73 are missing from this MS.

Royce notes in his hand on the first page that the original draft of this address was delivered at the Philosophical Conference at the World’s Fair in Chicago. But the present MS entails several revisions to that original draft. The original version was presented in August 1893. This MS must be dated at some later point.

This paper is *not* to be confused with “The Imitative Functions, and Their Place in Human Nature.” *Century*, 26 (1894) 137-45. *see BWJR*:2 1195, 4.

Box 63: Lectures to Teachers 1893 I, II, III

The full title of this public lecture series -- twelve lectures delivered to teachers at Harvard University from February to May 1893 -- is "Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers." Box 63 contains the first three lectures. (Perhaps only one of these was published.) .

No mention is made of the lectures in the *Letters*. They appear to be some of Royce's "bread and butter" work, full of anecdotes and humor.

Skrupskelis deals with these lectures at *BWJR*:2: 1192. "The lectures were reported extensively in the *Journal of Education* (Boston) (37 [1893] [issue of June 15, 1893])" Royce used the same lecture subjects on several other occasions. On February 20, 1893, for instance, he lectured at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences on 'The Psychology of General Ideas from the Teacher's Point of View.' From October 14 to November 11, 1893, he gave a series of five lectures at the Brooklyn Institute with the general title 'Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers.'"

Document 1: "Lectures to Teachers. Lecture I: What is a General Idea?"

A 71-page manuscript. Pages 21, 23-48, 50-51 and 71 are on redrafted pages. A piece of manuscript floats loose between the leaves at page 71.

Document 2: Untitled

A loose one page manuscript page floats before Lecture II between the leaves of the folio volume.

Document 3: "Lectures to Teachers. Lecture II: General Ideas and the Theory of Habits."

A 69-page manuscript. Pages 4-18, 20-48 and 53-53 are written on redrafted pages. Page 53a is added to the text.

Document 4: "Lectures to Teachers. Lecture III. The Constituents of a General Idea: - the Relations of Intellect, Feeling and Will."

A 67-page manuscript. Pages 7-10, 21 and 39-50 are written on redrafted pages.

Box 64: Lectures to Teachers 1893 IV, V, VI

Document 1: "Lecture IV: General Ideas as Product of Imitation: The Psychology of Suggestion, and the Lessons of Hypnotic Research."

A "49b"-page manuscript. All drafted on fresh pages. Pages 49a and 49b have been added.

Document 2: "Lecture V: The Psychology of Imitation Continued; The Place of Authority in Education; The Psychology of Our Belief in the External

World, and the Educational Significance of this Portion of Psychology.”

An 81-page manuscript. Pages 12-17, 27-48, 56-68 and 70 are written on redrafted pages.

Document 3: “Lecture VI. Apperception, Attention, and the Theory of an Orderly Acquisition of General Ideas.”

An 81-page manuscript. Pages 3, and 32-35 are on redrafted pages. Pages 40/41 are combined.

Box 65: Lectures to Teachers 1893 VII & VIII

Document 1: “Lecture VII. Some Imperfections of General Ideas. “Unconscious” and “Segmented” Processes and Ideas.-“

A 78-page manuscript. Pages 5a, 12a-b and 43a-b have been added. Apparently pages 12a-12b and 59 are written on redrafted pages. All the other pages or written on fresh sheets.

Document 2: “Lecture VIII. The Psychological Theory of Self-Consciousness from the Teacher’s Point of View.”

A 68-page manuscript. Pages 9, 43-44 and 67 are written on redrafted pages.

Box 66: Lectures to Teachers 1893 IX, XI, XII

Document 1: “Lecture IX. On a Due Regard for the Variety of Individual Temperament”

A 68-page manuscript, drafted entirely on fresh pages.

Document 2: “Lecture XI. On Some Special Devices for Mental Training”

A 68-page manuscript. Pages 13-29 are on redrafted pages. Page 32a is added.

Document 3: “On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training”

This 12th Lecture to Teachers was published in the *International Journal of Ethics*, vol.3 (1892-93): 413-36. Included in this box are 8 galley pages, pasted out of order into the folio. Oppenheim gives penciled instructions for reading the pages in sequence. (The entire article is included here, albeit out of order, by way of the galleys.)

Box 67: Augustus Graham Lectures 1896 I, II, III

Document 1: “The Augustus Graham Lectures on Theism. Brooklyn Inst. Jan 5 – March 1. ‘96. Lecture I. The Present Position of Theism.”

A 70-page manuscript. Royce adds a page 4a. Wells adds a red pencil “a” to the second page 50. Pages 7 and 25 appear to be renumbered.

Document 2: **“The Augustus Graham Lectures for 1896. Lecture II. The Philosophical Conception of God.”**

A one page typescript outlining the topics for Lecture II.

Document 3: **“Lecture II. The Philosophical Conception of God.”**

A 44-page manuscript, with typeset pages inserted among the manuscript sheets.

Document 4: **“Lecture III. The Moral World as the Revelation of God.”**

A 51-page manuscript. Wells notes at the top of page one: “Incomplete?” The text is drafted entirely on fresh pages.

Box 68: Augustus Graham [nos. IV and V] and Other Lectures

The title of this box is based on the Wells note at the beginning of the volume, which reads in full: “IV and V of August Graham Lectures (1896) Also: Live Lectures “on the Psychology of the Intellect” (1897?)”

Document 1: **“The Augustus Graham Lectures for 1896. Lecture IV: God and Nature; Evolution and Ethics”**

A 79-page manuscript; this title appears on page one of the text. Pages 29a through 41, and 50 through 79 are written on previously drafted pages. All the rest are freshly written.

Document 2: **“Augustus Graham Lectures for 1896. Lecture V The Theistic Interpretation of Nature.”**

The title appears on page one of the text. The lecture was delivered on March 1, 1896.

Only the first 34 pages of this lecture are found in Box 68. The rest of the lecture, pages 35-87, may be found in Box 52. Royce apparently pulled pages 35-75 of this lecture verbatim to finish his essay “The Problem of Job,” published in *The Study of Good and Evil*. In Box 52, the pages which conclude the lecture (pages 76 to 87) conclude this lecture, but are not included in “The Problem of Job” essay as published in *SGE*.

Document 3: **“The Social Factors of the Human Intellect. Syllabus of a Course of Lectures On the Psychology of the Intellect with Special Reference to the Influence of Social Factors on the Formation of Intellectual Processes”**

A 4-page typescript syllabus for a series of lectures that Wells tentatively identifies as lectures

given in New Orleans in 1897. (Those lectures were given in May and June of that year.) The words “The Social Factors of the Human Intellect” are written in Royce’s hand at the top of the first page of this typescript.

Document 4: “Lecture I The General Nature of the Human Intellect”

An incomplete 14-page typescript, with the above title on its first page.

Document 5: “Lecture II The Social Basis of the Intellectual Life”

An apparently complete 17-page typescript, with the above title on its first page.

Document 6: “Lecture III The Social Origin of the Reasoning Process”

A 15-page typescript that may or may not be complete. The above title appears on the typescript’s first page.

Document 7: “Lecture IV. The Social Origin of Our Fundamental Ideas”

An unfinished 31-page text, with pages 1 to 23 in typescript, and page 24 to 31 in manuscript. The above title appears on the typescript’s first page.

Box 69: Lectures I-III on “Social Factors in the Development of the Individual Mind” 1898

Document 1: “University Courses of Lectures and Instruction Under the Auspices of the Education Department of the Twentieth Center Club 1897-8”

A printed program of the 20th century lecture course delivered by Royce to the Twentieth Century Club at Jacob Sleeper Hall, Boston University. He gave ten lectures over the course of 10 Saturdays, at 9 a.m., beginning January 15, 1898. The 4 page printed program includes a “Syllabus of Course of Lectures by prof. Josiah Royce,” giving the title ascribed by Wells to this Volume.

Document 2: “Lecture I. General Nature of the Intellect.”

A 51-page text, composed of both manuscript and typescript pages. The text is highly edited, an extreme example of a Royce “cut and paste” job. Many of the pages are renumbered formerly drafted sheets. Many of the typescript pages are written on by hand, and renumbered to incorporate into the ongoing manuscript narrative.

***Document 3: “Second Lecture. The Basis of our Social Consciousness.”**

A 40-page text, incorporating both manuscript and typescript pages, highly edited. Many of the typescript pages are written on by hand, and renumbered to incorporate into the ongoing manuscript narrative. Wells note at the top of page one that this is one of the “1897-8 lectures to

teachers” may be misleading. While Royce did occasionally refer to the 20th Century Club/Sleeper lectures as “Lectures to Teachers,” this series should not be confused with the series delivered at Harvard in 1893.

Document 4: “Third Lecture. The Beginnings of Social Life in the Individual.”

A 37-page typescript with pages 17-21 missing. The typescript is heavily edited. Again, Wells misleadingly labels this document as a “lecture to teachers. Oppenheim adds the pencil note of the dates of the lecture series at the top of page one.

Document 5: Untitled

A one page Xerox of page 32 of an unidentified typescript is inserted between the final leaves of this folio volume. The typescript copy begins “sciousness by the activities of other people, my fellows, or by the ideal modes of activity which I gradually learned to conceive after a long process of social training” (sentence continues for a while).

Box 70: Lectures V-VII on “Social Factors in the Development of the Individual Mind” Also: I & VI of “Cambridge Conferences” Lectures 1898

(This lengthy binder label reflects Wells note on the first page of the folio volume.) Wells notes throughout this volume referring to this series as “Lectures to Teachers” should not lead to the assumption that these are the same as the 1893 Lectures to Teachers delivered at Harvard.

***Document 1: “Lecture V. More Detailed Statement of the Argument of the Present Lecture.”**

This first document is a 3 page printed program outlining the points from this lecture in program form.

Document 2: “Fifth Lecture. Theory of the Origin of the Ideas of Ego and Alter”

A much edited 27-page typescript.

***Document 3: “Sixth Lecture. The Social Basis of the Thinking Process.”**

(Again, Wells misrepresents this text by referring to it as a “Lecture to Teachers.” This is Lecture V of the 20th Century Club lecture series given in 1898, not of the Harvard series known as “Lectures to Teachers” given in 1893.)

A 32-page typescript. The text is unedited except for notes to “Om.” (omit) certain sections that are contained with penciled brackets.

***Document 4: Untitled**

A highly edited 26-page typescript.

Wells notes at the top of the first page that this is “The Social Basis of Reasoning,” the Seventh of the 1897-1898 lectures to Teachers. Again, to call this a “Lecture to Teachers” is misleading.

Document 5: “First Lecture.- Cambridge Conferences”

A much edited 45-page text composed of typescript and manuscript pages, dated by Royce at the top of the first page as “Feb. 6, 1898.” The typescript pages have been heavily re-worked. Manuscript pages 21a-21f have been added. The text ends with manuscript pages beginning at the middle of page 29, and continuing to the end at page 45.

Document 6: Untitled

A piece of a manila envelope cover, on which Royce has written: “Cambridge Conferences. ’98. Sixth Lecture. Other lectures except first of this series of Cambridge Conf. adapted from the 97-8 course of lectures to teachers.”

Document 7: “Cambridge Conference – Sixth Lecture.”

A 40-page text consisting of typescript and manuscript pages. The manuscript pages (all on fresh pages) have apparently been added to the heavily edited typescript sheets.

Box 71: Lectures 1897-1899

This box title follows Wells title page, at the beginning of this box.

Document 1: “Philosophy IX. 1897-8”

A 41-page manuscripts written entirely on fresh pages. The title appears on the first page. Royce then begins “Gentlemen: -” Wells notes, in his red pencil, that this is an opening lecture of a course in Metaphysics. (“Phil.9” was *the* introductory Metaphysics course at Harvard.)

Document 2: “On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America”

An 88-page manuscript in five sections, on all fresh pages. The text is only slightly edited. Pages 28-29 are combined into one page. The manuscript text is only slightly edited. The manuscript is tentatively dated 1897-1899, but the text may in fact be dated earlier. It must, however, have been written after 1890, given references (at page 63-64) to William James’s chapter on “Habit” in *The Principles of Psychology*.

Box 72: Lectures, Papers, etc. 1901-1905

Document 1: “John Fiske”

A 50 page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Royce writes two notes at the top of page one, one of which almost obscures the title of the piece. The notes read: “Revised and presented as a

Memorial Address before the Brooklyn Institute, Dec. 11, 1901” and “An address before the Ethical Society: Philadelphia. Nov. 10, 1901”. Royce adds pages 6a-o; he renumbers page 6-o.

An article titled “John Fiske as Thinker” is printed in *Harvard Graduate’s Magazine* 10 (1901-02): 23-33. First printed in the *Boston Evening Transcript*, July 13, 1901 (with the title “John Fiske: His Work as Philosophical Writer and Thinker”); the *Harvard Graduate’s Magazine* article revises the *Transcript* article. This printed text precedes two addresses he gave concerning Fiske listed below. It is not clear where he gave the address reprinted in the *Transcript*.

The Box 72 manuscript and the printed articles do not resemble each other.

Document 2: “Recent Discussions of the Concept of the Infinite”

A 94-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Pages 19-50, 52-56, and 75-91 are missing. Royce has renumbered ages 51, 57 and 60-64.

Document 3: “Plan of Course. Notes for Phil 15, 1903-4”

Pieces of a manila envelope, which outline one of Royce’s Harvard courses. One page of pieces in Royce’s handwriting.

Document 4: “Outlines of Elementary Logic. I. The Operations of Thought.”

A 34-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. At the top of page one, Royce adds the note: “Introductory Lectures on General scope of Logic, Epistemology, etc., Are presupposed in this MS. Notes for Phil 15, 1903-04.” This may well be the manuscript contained inside the envelope noted about in Document 3.

Document 5: “Symmetrical and Unsymmetrical Relations in the Exact Sciences”

A lightly edited (in Royce’s hand) 17-page typescript. Royce inserts hand-drawn logical diagrams at certain points of this essay. Wells writes “1905” in red pencil at the top of page 1.

Box 73: Papers and Notes 1903

Document 1: “Mr. Bertrand Russell’s problem of ‘The Contradiction’”

A 55-page manuscript, in six sections.

Document 2: “Introductory Statement at the Philosophical Conference of Oct. 19, 1903”

A 29-page manuscript.

Document 3: “Closing Words Addressed to the Philosophical Conference 1903-04

A 2-page manuscript response to Dr. Cabot.

Document 4: “Concluding Summary of the Philosophical Conference”

This 17-page typescript that leads into the next manuscript, “The Hero Burk,” then apparently concludes with a two page typescript.

Document 5: “The Hero Burk”

A Turkestan story, from Vambery, used by Royce in the “Concluding Summary.” This is an 18-page manuscript that transcribes 120 lines of poetry. (A text with significant Islamic overtones.)

Document 6: “Concluding Summary” End

The two page typescript that apparently finishes the “Concluding Summary” text. Royce handwrites notes on the back of the second page.

Document 7: “Notes on Logic”

A single manila envelope fragment reads as follows.

“Notes on Logic. 1903

1. Note on Transitive Relations
2. Note on Complex Relative Numbers
3. Points Viewed as Products of Points.
4. Relative Products in three dimensions and the tridimensional representation of binary relatives.
5. Note on Rules for representing dyadic relations in terms of triads.
6. Definitions of the Logical Universe of Disc[ourse]”

Six manuscripts follow in Box 73 with the following titles:

Document 8: “Transitive Relations. [A restatement of Schroeder’s statement).” [sic]

A 15-page manuscript, plus an added page “6a.”

Document 9: “Complex Relative Numbers, or Relative Complex Numbers.”

A 4-page manuscript.

Document 10: “Points viewed as products of points”

A one page manuscript.

Document 11: “Relative Products in three dimensions; and the tridimensional representation of binary relatives.”

A 4-page manuscript.

Document 12: “Notes on Rules for representing trans. rel’s.”

A 2-page manuscript.

Document 13: “Definition of Logical U. of Discourse”

A 2-page manuscript.

Box 74: Columbia Lectures 1904

Document 1: “Programme of Lectures (Columbia Course). Some Characteristics of the Thinking Process”

A 69-page manuscript, all written on fresh pages. Page 3 is torn (Wells notes that it was torn before it was mounted.) Pages 68/69 are combined.

Document 2: “Lecture II. General Survey of the Concepts useful in Various Sciences.”

A 40-page manuscript that is incomplete in this Box. The last thirty pages of the lecture may be found in Box 50. (See notes at Box 50, *supra*.)

Various notes on loose sheets and in the margins in this volume attempt to explain the connection of these manuscripts with those in Box 50.

Document 3: Untitled

A 70-page typescript, beginning here on page 25. The typescript reflects the last half of Lecture Three and all of Lecture Four of the Columbia Lecture series. The first part of Lecture III, minus two pages, may be found in Box 50.

Document 4: “Columbia Lectures: V.”

A 58-page manuscript. Pages 15/16 are combined. All pages are drafted on fresh sheets except for 19 and 22a. A page 22a and a page 54a (the latter “a” added by Wells) are included.

At the top of page one, Royce makes the note: “Engagement 11 A.M. Sunday 21.”

Box 75: Notes and Papers 1904-1907

Document 1 **Untitled**

A cutting from a manila envelope with the words “The Andover Address on Relation of Philosophy to Clergyman’s Profession” June 7, 1904. This is apparently from the envelope containing the address, the manuscript of which follows as document 2.

Document 2: “The Clergyman’s Relation to Philosophical Inquiry”

A 75-page manuscript, with this title on its first page. The text is written on all fresh pages, and is extensively edited.

The address was given on June 7, 1904 in Andover Massachusetts. Royce also delivered an address on a similar subject to the Harvard Divinity School on February 20, 1908.

This appears to be an unpublished text. (There is no mention, in any case, in Skrupskelis.) There is, however, an article on a similar topic was published at around the same time, and may be useful for comparison: “What Should Be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?” *International Journal on Education* 13 (1902-03):280-85. See *BWJR*:2, 1206.

Document 3: Five Pieces from Covers from Manila Envelopes

Several clipped fragments of envelope covers with notes and content lists. Wells dates these fragments as 1904.

Document 4: “Mem. On the Chapter on Grades”

A single sheet manuscript, front and back, in Royce’s hand. He outlines the topics for this Chapter. This manuscript appears to relate to the envelope covers listed above.

Document 5: Two Pieces of manila envelope covers.

Two manila envelope cover fragments. They relate to the “Proposed Supplement to the Alg. Of Log.” etc.

Document 6: “A Study Toward A Generalization of the O=Relation. Being a Supplement to the paper in the Am. Math. Soc. Trans. For July 1905”

A 9-page manuscript, with roman numeral page numbers. The lengthy title precedes it on a first non-numbered page. See *Letters* page 610.

Document 7: “A Study towards A Generalization of the O=Relation”

A 9-page manuscript, with above title is listed on its first title sheet. A logic piece.

Document 8: “A Generalization of the O-relation”

A 22-page manuscript, with page 21 missing. The above title heads the first page. The piece is divided into 14 logical sections.

Document 9: “Introduction”

A 4-page manuscript (the first page is headed simply “Introduction“) to Vassar students that expressly mentions Phi Beta Kappa.

This 4 page MS was previously identified by Wells (in a red pencil note) as being introductory to a 1907 Vassar Phi Beta Kappa lecture. Skrupskelis, however, seems to more accurately identify this MS as part of a 1909 Vassar lecture, which was eventually included in the essay “What is Vital in Christianity?” in the *Harvard Theological Review* 2 (1909): 408-45. The piece is reprinted in *William James (1911-4)* and in Clark S. Northup, William C. Lane, John C. Schwab, eds., *Representative Phi Beta Kappa Orations* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915), pages 404-41. See *BWJR*:2 121, 5.

Document 10: “What Sort of Existence Have the Entities of Mathematics” (1907)

The position of this manuscript in Box 75 (following the above introduction) seems to suggest that it is the manuscript of the address given as a Phi Beta Kappa lecture to Vassar students. (Wells gives the date as March 8, 1907.) An 86 page MS, this address was likely also given at the University of Illinois at Urbana.

This manuscript does not appear to have been published. (It is not mentioned in Skrupskelis.)

The 86-page manuscript is in four sections. Some of the sheets have been renumbered, but most are fresh.

Box 76: Urbana Lectures 1907

Document 1: “1907. Urbana Lectures.”

A single manila envelope fragment in Royce’s hand, reading as follows:

“These Lectures to be worked over for a book on ‘Loyalty & Personality’. In this book the annexed three lectures on ‘Race-Questions’ (International Journal of Ethics April 1906), Provincialism’ ‘Limitations of Thoughtful Public’ would find a place.”

Oppenheim notes in pencil at the top of this page the dates of the Urbana lecture series.

Document 2: “1907. Urbana Lectures.”

A 59-page text composed of typescript and manuscript pages. The manuscript pages are drafted on fresh sheets, except for pages 11, and 21-22. Wells adds a red letter “a” to the second page 15. The typescript pages are heavily edited.

Document 3: “Four Types of Personality”

A 35-page typescript, with some editing.

Wells notes “Urbana Lectures” at the top of page one in red pencil. Oppenheim adds “Second” in pencil before the Wells note.

Document 4: “Loyalty as a Personal and as a Social Virtue”

A 42-page text composed of typescript and manuscript pages (page 18 is missing). Wells notes that this is the “Third of Urbana Lectures on Ethics” in red pencil at the top of page one. He notes on the last page that the text is incomplete.

Document 5: Untitled

A typescript fragment beginning at page 19. No title is on the document itself. It runs, in an odd purple ink, to 33 pages. Wells notes on page one that it is part of the fourth Urbana Lecture, “Loyalty as a Factor in American Life.”

Document 6: “Lectures on Ethics [Course prepared for delivery at the University of Illinois, Jan. Feb., 1907] Lecture I. The Problem of Ethics

A 5-page manuscript fragment.

Box 77: Lectures 1907-1910

Document 1: “Introductory Statement for The Yale Undergraduate Ethics Course: Sept. 28, 1907.”

A 42-page manuscript, highly edited, all on fresh sheets, with the above title appearing on the first page. Although “Lecture I” does not appear on the text, because this document is followed by Lecture II from this series, this is probably the first lecture.

Document 2: “Yale Course in Ethics. Lecture II October 5, 1907.”

A “34a”-page manuscript, all on fresh pages. Wells has added the red pencil “a” to the second page 34 (on which there are only 2 lines).

Document 3: Untitled

An untitled one page manuscript which appears to be exam questions for an ethics class (It begins: “Select some moral principle”)

Document 4: Untitled

A fragment cut from a manila envelope labeled “Smith College Lectures on Modern Philosophy

1909-10,” and containing notes concerning the Smith Lecture series. The notes seem to indicate that the three manuscripts which follow in this folio volume were contained in this one envelope.

Document 5: “Smith College Lectures. <Notes>“

An 8-page manuscript on fresh sheets. Apparently relying on Royce’s own notes from the envelope fragment, document 4, Wells notes in red pencil that these are “Introductory Remarks.”

Document 6: “Philosophy and Life.”

A 55-page manuscript. Pages 19-23, 25, 40, and 52 have been renumbered.

Document 7: “Feb. 1910 Notes for the Smith College Course”

A 25-page manuscript, all on fresh pages (the renumbering of page 22 appears to be a transcription error). Wells adds in red pencil on the first page that the title of this lecture was “Nature in Modern Philosophy.”

Box 78: Various Lectures and Addresses 1910-1913

Document 1: “Smith College Lectures, 1910”

A one page manila envelope fragment describing (in Royce’s hand) “A second series of four lectures on Recent [the word “present” is crossed out] problems of Philosophy,” with notes on the discussion contemplated. February 25, 1910 is given as the date.

Document 2: “Smith Lectures on Present Problems of Philosophy.”

A 5-page manuscript. All are drafted on fresh sheets except for 23 and 36.

Document 3: Untitled

A manila envelope fragment, reading as follows: “<1910> Notes For Address before Yale Theological Club. May 14, 1910.

Document 4: “I Topics:-”

A 2-page manuscript, no doubt relating to Document 3 above.

Document 5: “The Sources of Religious Insight.”

A 21-page manuscript, written on entirely fresh pages. Royce begins “Gentlemen of the Theological Club:” Therefore this address no doubt also relates to Document 3 above.

Document 6: “What is Philosophy and Why Study Philosophy.”

A 27-page typescript. Except for redaction of large chunks of text, there is no editing. The date "1910" occurs in Royce's hand in pencil at the top of page one.

Document 7: "Address for Meeting of American Students at Oxford, Feb. 22, 1913"

A 22-page manuscript written on fresh pages. The last page ends with notes as to the presentation of the address, rather than on ongoing narrative.

Document 8: "'Shop-Talk,' prepared for The Authors' Club, to be read at the meeting of December 5, 1913"

A 37-page manuscript, written entirely on fresh pages, except for pages 4, 21, 25, and 32.

Box 79: Early MSS Undated

The Wells note in red pencil on the box's "title page" states: "Apparently MSS. of early date."

Document 1: "On the Will as the Principle of Philosophy"

A 67-page manuscript, slightly edited, on neat, fresh sheets. In 1879, Royce sends this MS to the *Princeton Review* "for a trial." Since it was never published, the inference is that it was rejected.

Document 2:

A 34-page manuscript, with typeset insertions from a published piece in *The Berkeleynan*. Page 1 is missing. Pages 2-18 consist principally of typeset pages, with Royce's manuscript edits and insertions. Pages 19-34 are freshly drafted in manuscript.

On page 2, in red ink, Royce has written: "Unfinished Rewriting of an essay in the 'Californian' on 'The Decay of Earnestness'" [sic - no internal quote after Earnestness]

Document 3: "Reality and Consciousness"

A 30-page manuscripts on fresh pages, slightly edited. The text is written after "Mind-Stuff and Reality," *Mind*, 6 (1881): 365-77 (in which he critiques the "mind-stuff" writers). This manuscript may be considered a preparatory work for his own construction of "a positive doctrine as to the nature of knowable reality." (page 9), which ultimately appeared as "Mind and Reality" *Mind*, 7 (1882): 30-54.

Document 4: "The Interpretation of Consciousness"

An incomplete 33-page manuscript.

Document 5: "The Truth-Seeking Instinct: A Study in Philosophical Analysis: In Three Books"

A 4-page manuscript outline. The above title heads the first page.

Document 6: “Book I: Truth and Reality, Chap. I: Of Wonder as even yet the Beginning of Philosophy.”

A 9-page manuscript, corresponding to “Book I. Chap. I“ of the above outline.

Document 7: “The Postulates of Truth-Seeking. Chap. I. The Fundamental Postulate of All Truth-Seeking.”

A 6-page manuscript.

Document 8: “Knowledge and Nature”

A 13-page manuscript, all on fresh pages. (Royce has numbered page 7, but it is blank.)

Document 9: “Friedrich Albert Lange and his Ethical Idealism”

A 9-page manuscript, all on fresh pages.

Document 10:

A 9-page manuscript, on fresh pages. Page one is missing. There is no heading or title for the piece. It may have been written in the summer of 1877, and seems to project some themes for Royce’s dissertation.

Box 80: Undated Papers 1878(?) - 188? (?)

***Document 1: “Certain Points in Aristotle’s Treatise of Poetry considered in relation to the light thrown on the Subject by the Developments of Modern Poetic Art”**

An incomplete manuscript fragment composed of six, non-paginated, legal-sized pages. The handwriting does not appear to be Royce’s. The text is totally unedited.

Wells suggests (on page one above the title) that this may be an essay from Royce’s days at Johns Hopkins. A better estimate, however, dates the essay to Royce’s Berkeley days, specifically to the time of an April 22, 18XX address he gave to a literary society, two months before his graduation. The fact that Royce published “The Aim of Poetry” two months later in *The Overland Monthly* on a similar topic (including a discussion of Aristotle’s *De poetica*) supports this conclusion (although the texts of these two essays do not directly correspond).

Document 2: “What Constitutes Good Fiction”

A 40-page manuscript all on fresh pages. The text reflects he probably gave to an evening group in Berkeley in 1878-79, and begins “Ladies and Gentlemen...”

Document 3: “What Constitutes Good Fiction”

A 6-page manuscript fragment in Royce’s hand that is apparently part of an early draft of the above essay.

Document 4: “Some Illustrations of the Structure and Growth of Human Thought”

A 62-page manuscript in Royce’s hand, all on fresh pages. This is almost certainly an address given to the Berkeley Club on January 8, 1880. (*See Letters* 74: “I have just come home, after reading a terribly dry and long-winded discourse ... to the Berkeley Club.”)

Document 5: “The Possibility of Experience”

An 11-page manuscript in Royce’s hand, all on fresh pages.

Document 6: Untitled

A note from J. Harry Cotton, a professor from Wabash College, dated 1952, giving reasons that document 7 below should be dated to the late 1890’s:

“The reference to Peirce, page 47, and more especially to the “four historic conceptions of being” (p. 48) would date this paper in the later 1890’s. It looks like an early draft of the argument in Vol. I of The World and the Individual.”

***Document 7: “Some Characteristics of Being”**

An incomplete 54-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. The manuscript is most certainly misplaced in this box. Rather than being an “undated paper” from the 1870’s or 1880’s, it is most probably preparatory work for the Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual: Series I*.

Royce has renumbered page 11.

Box 81 Beginning of a Book on Metaphysics (1897?)

“A Critical Study of Reality. Chap. I Scope and Method of the Present Work.”

This folio volume consists of one document, a 168 page manuscript with the above title. The title of the Box and the date estimate follow Wells’s note on the first page. The pages are written primarily on fresh sheets, except for: 34 and pages 130-39. Pages 16a, 35a-c, and 67a have been added.

It is possible that other manuscripts relating to this effort might be found in other places in HARP. See, e.g., Box 105, folder 3, document 10.

***Box 82 Pittsburgh Lectures (1910?)**

The date conjecture is based on a Wells note and not a dated text.

***Document 1: "The Conflict of Loyalties"**

A 64-page manuscript, on entirely fresh pages, except possibly for pages 4 and 9. Wells adds a "61" in red pencil (with a question mark) to page 62. Royce himself adds pages 2a-e to the text.

Wells identifies this text as Pittsburgh Lecture I, and gives it a tentative date of 1910 (Hence the "?" of the volume title.) Oppenheim, however, suggests a date of 1908. A note inserted between pages 45 and 46 observes that the Yale Lectures (mentioned at the bottom of page 45) took place in 1907.

***Document 2: "Lecture II. The Art of Loyalty."**

A 58-page manuscript, with pages 12-23, 36-37, 42-44, and 51 on renumbered sheets. Royce has added pages 24a and 52a.

Again, Wells's 1910 date estimate is open to conjecture.

Document 3: "Loyalty and Individuality."

A 70-page manuscript, all on fresh sheets.

Box 83 First Two Philadelphia Lectures 1910 or later

Document 1: "Lecture I. The Nature and the Use of Absolute Truth."

A 73-page manuscript, all on fresh pages. Wells adds a red pencil "48" to page 49 to correct a pagination error.

Document 2: "Lecture II. Theoretical and Practical Truth."

A 49-page manuscript, much edited, with pages 22 and 31 renumbered.

Document 3: "Lecture I. The Nature and the Use of Absolute Truth."

A 37-page typescript, with a substantial manuscript addition on page 11. Otherwise, the typescript is little edited. See Box 85, document 3 for another copy of this typescript, with a substantial manuscript edition on the last page.

Document 4: "Lecture II. Theoretical and Practical Truth."

A 27-page typescript, with few edits, but some underlines added in ink.

Box 84 Undated Material (1915?)

The Box title is based on Wells's note on the first page.

Document 1: "The Triadic Theory of Knowledge."

A 35-page typescript, with many "reading notes" (e.g. "read" and "omit," with arrows) inserted. Royce also makes manuscript additions at different points, particularly at the end (where he inserts numbered points).

Oppenheim has inserted a note, dated 8/21/88, at the beginning of the text on a loose sheet which makes reference to a "Prof. Cotton" note which no longer appears in the volume. Oppenheim suggests that this typescript reflects the fourth of the six 1914 Berkeley Lectures.

Document 2: Untitled

This 56-page typescript (with pages a, b, and c added at the end) is not titled. However, a pencil note above the first page (not Royce's hand) identifies this as "On the Social Character of Scientific Inquiry."

Again, the text reflects "reading notes," but no substantive edits.

Document 3: "Berkeley Conferences. I. Illustrations of the Philo. Of Loyalty."

A 60-page text composed of both manuscript and typescript pages as follows: pages 1-37 are manuscript (principally on fresh sheets); pages 38-60 are typescript pages, previously numbered 1 to 23. The renumbering is in Royce's hand. Most of the manuscript pages are on fresh sheets with the exception of pages 4b and 4f. Royce apparently wrestled with the first section by adding a pages 4a and 4b, combining pages 4c-4e, and renumbering a heavily edited 4f (apparently the original page 4).

Box 85 Undated Material

Document 1: "A Speculation as to the Nature of Mind."

A 90-page manuscript in an early Royce hand. Wells estimates the date to be 1886-7, and notes that the piece is unfinished. Oppenheim estimates 1887-8, and points to the reference on page 83 to the recent publication of George T. Ladd's "Physiol. Psych.", first published in 1887.

The manuscript is written on entirely fresh pages. Royce combines page numbers 50-60.

Document 2: "Reason. V. The Assurance and the Truth of Reason."

A 5-page manuscript, which appears to be complete. It ends with this sentence: "Reason is the conscious assurance that all reality exists only as consciousness: in these words is expressed the

insight of Idealism.”

A note in Royce’s hand at the top of the page reads “Ph□nom. P 169.”

Document 3: “Lecture I. The Nature and the Use of Absolute Truth.”

A 37-page typescript, identical to Document 3 in Box 83 (Philadelphia Lecture I), except that Royce has added a manuscript paragraph on the last page.

Document 4: “Lecture II. Theoretical and Practical Truth.”

A 38-page text composed of both typescript and manuscript pages. The first 27 pages of typescript are identical to Document 4 in Box 83 (Philadelphia Lecture II), except that Royce has added manuscript throughout. Following the last typescript page, Royce continues with manuscript pages 28-38.

Document 5: “Lecture III. The Accessibility of Absolute Truth.”

A 27-page typescript, lightly edited in Royce’s hand. A Wells note identifies it as a Philadelphia Lecture.

Box 86 Notes on Logic

Document 1: “A Triad of Operations.”

A 7-page logic manuscript.

Document 2: Untitled

A single folded sheet. On one side, a printed docket for the Faculty of Arts and Sciences Meeting and Tea “Docket” (October 24, 1905). On the other, a logic proof in Royce’s hand.

Document 3: Untitled

A 3-page manuscript of logic work, in ink.

Document 4: Untitled

Six pages of manuscript logic work in pencil.

Document 5: “A system of postulates.”

A 3-page manuscript of logic work, in ink.

Document 6: “A System of Postulates for the Algebra of Logic.”

A 7-page manuscript of logic work, in ink. It may be incomplete – a page 16, headed “Postulates”, and listing four of them, follows.

Document 7: “The Study of Conceptions.”

An unpaginated single manuscript sheet.

Document 8: “Notes on the Conditionally Invertible Operation by Pairs.”

A piece of manila envelope probably containing the logic documents which follow. Also written on this fragment is an “If/Then” construct in Royce’s hand.

Document 9: “Definition of the Operations upon Pairs”

Eight pages of logic manuscript written on folded sheets.

Document 10: Untitled

A piece of manila envelope with logic formulae.

Document 11: Untitled

Two pages of pencil logic manuscript.

Document 12: Untitled

Two pages of inked logic manuscript on a single folded sheet, similar to the configuration of document 9 above.

Document 13: Untitled

Assorted logic fragments.

Document 14: “A Theory of Logical Domains (Second Draft of the theory of the I-triads & a-triads”

A single manila envelope fragment, with this title. The following logic pages may have been included in the envelope.

Document 15: “Revision of Triads”

A single manuscript sheet, written on front and back.

Document 16: “A Theory of Logical Domains”

A 38-page manuscript. Pages 9, 14, 16-20, 22-23, 25-27 and 35-36 have been renumbered.

Document 17: **“Summary of a System of Correspondence of Resultants.”**

A 5-page manuscript on fresh pages.

Document 18: **Untitled**

A single sheet with diagram and logic notes.

Document 19: **“Five Elements”**

A 3-page logic manuscript in ink.

Document 20: **“Condition that two triads possess an unique resultant in common.”**

A one page proof in ink.

Document 21: **“New Conditions for singly intersecting circuits. <April 4 & 5, 1909>”**

A single manila envelope fragment, with this title.

Document 22: **“A System of Circuits with single intersections”**

A 17-page manuscript in pen and pencil. Royce dates it, in his own hand, as April 4, 1909.

Document 23: **“The Relative Representation of U. of D. as field of trans. Rel. R.””**

A one page narrative manuscript in ink.

Document 24: **Untitled**

A one page proof, written front and back.

Document 25: **“Examples on the Universe of Discourse”**

A 2-page manuscript, with numbered points 1-7. Above the title, Royce writes these lines: “Land is out of sight. Home is not near. Russia does not want any part of China, she wants the whole”, at which point the note stops.

Document 26: **Untitled**

A 2- page manuscript of a proof, which begins “Let the transformations of two elements, ab& b...”

Document 27: **“Rule for a transformation system of lines of resultants of a given pair (p,q).”**

A one page manuscript.

Document Group 28: **Untitled**

Four single page proofs.

Document 29: **“General Theorem”**

A one page manuscript.

Document 30: **Untitled**

A 4-page manuscript exercise with five parts, followed by a page of illustrations (which may or may not be related).

Document 31: **Untitled**

An eight page manuscript proof.

Document 32: **Untitled**

One manuscript page. On the front, a diagram and formulae. On the back, calendar and appointment notes: “Miss S. Report Tuesday, Jan. 15, 1907,” followed by a series of dates that appear to reflect the 1907 spring semester.

Document 33: **“An intersection formula”**

A 5-page manuscript in pencil with formulae, proofs, and corresponding charts and diagrams. The last page is written on a half sheet.

Document 34: **“§.12. The Aggregation and Array of the Elements of Σ ”**

Fragments of a manuscript that run here from 64-68 (with a proof on the back of page 68) and 93-100.

Document 35: **Untitled**

A 4-page manuscript (first page in pencil), containing a narrative proof in four sections.

Document 36: **“Definition of a set of restricted circuits, intersecting only on a single point, & joining this point with the points of an unrestricted circuit.**

A fragment from a manila envelope, with the above title, and formulae.

Document 37: Untitled

An 8-page manuscript (last page unnumbered), beginning, “A linear set of elements”

Document 38: “Notes on the relations of the symmetrical tetrads and the Kempe resultants”

A fragment of an envelope with this title written in Royce’s hand in pencil. Also written in ink: “Note on the relations of pairs products of pairs, &c.”

Document 39: “Relation of Tetrad-relation $T(abcd)$ to the Kempe resultants.”

A 5-page manuscript proof, with writing on the backs of pages 2, 4 and 5.

Document 40: “To define relations amongst pairs of logical elements”

A seven page manuscript in 14 sections.

Document 41: “Transformations”

A 3-page narrative manuscript.

Document 42: “The Transformation of a Triad (Linear), with reference to a fourth element. Assume $F(m/ab)$ ”

One page manuscript with diagram.

Document 43: “The Construction of Linear Tetrads. Linear Sets of Many Elements.”

An envelope fragment, with this title. Given Wells’s working style, the following two documents were contained in this envelope.

Document 44: “Preliminary Remark on Triads. (Lemma used in the following)”

A one page manuscript.

Document 45: “The construction of Linear Tetrads.”

A 13-page manuscript. Royce has added pages 9a and 9b. Pages 5, 8-9a and 10-13 are worked on renumbered, previously drafted sheets.

Document 46: **“Transformations of Circuits, intersecting not more than once.”**

An envelope fragment with this title.

Document 47: **Untitled**

A 10-page manuscript. Although there is no title on the first page, given Wells’s working style, this document was contained in the envelope noted directly above, with that same title.

Document 48: **Untitled**

A 7-page proof (with writing on the back of the last page).

Document 49: **“Transf’n by x_1, x_2 ”**

One manuscript page of formulae.

Document 50: **“A Transformation of a linear collection λ by a pair (a,b)”**

A 6-page manuscript, with a page 3a added. Also, followed by an unnumbered page of formulae and diagrams.

Box 87 Notes on Logic

Document 1: **Untitled**

A 7-page manuscript of logic notes.

Document 2: **Untitled**

A 2-page manuscript of logic notes.

Document 3: **“Plan for investigation”**

A one page manuscript.

Document 4: **Untitled**

A 4-page manuscript of logic notes.

Document 5: **“The broad transformation.”**

A one page manuscript of logic notes. Above the title, Royce writes “non-resultants in question.”

Document 6: **Untitled**

Document 16: “A new derivative of a tetrad (a,b,c,d)”

A 5-page manuscript of logic notes. On the back of page five, this note: “A still further transformation of a tetrad,” with supporting formulae.

Document Group 17: Untitled

Three unrelated manuscripts of logic notes. An interesting note on the first, in Royce’s hand: “Having written to the mother, as he has,” at which point that note breaks off.

Document 18: “Application”

A 3-page manuscript of logic notes.

Document 19: Untitled

Seventeen pages of apparently unrelated manuscript sheets of logic notes. At the top of one, the title “Of the Transformation of a Line.” That page is numbered one, but no page two follows.

Document 20: Untitled

A 2-page manuscript of logic notes.

Document Group 21: Untitled

Three pages of apparently unrelated manuscript sheets of logic notes.

Document 22: Untitled Fragment

Five pages of a manuscript, numbered pages 24-28. All pages are renumbered, on previously drafted sheets.

Document 23: “VIII. The Canonical Form of Scientific Theories”

A 2-page manuscript fragment, numbered 49 and 50.

Document 24: Untitled

A one page manuscript fragment of logic notes, numbered page 15. (Reference is made to “p. 14 opposite.”)

**Document 25: “On the cross relations of an arbitrarily chosen tetrad.
(a,b,c,d).”**

An envelope fragment with this title, as well as explanation of variables.

Document 26: **“Tetrad cross-relations”**

A 4-page manuscript of logic notes, no doubt contained in the envelope at document 25.

Document 27: **“First Draft of a Theory of the Constitution of an Universe of Discourse, based upon the properties of so-called ‘I triads’”**

An envelope fragment with this title.

Document 28: **“A Set of Principles Relating to the Constitution of an Universe of Terms or Statements. Introductory Note.”**

An 9-page manuscript of narrative logic notes. The page numbers are given as roman numerals.

Document 29: **“A Set of Principles Relating to the Constitution of an Universe of Terms or of Statements. Chap. I. Introductory Statements.”**

A 42-page manuscript of narrative logic notes. Royce adds pages 16a, 18a, 24a-c, 31a, and 34a. Pages 37-41 are renumbered, previously drafted pages.

Document 30: **“Chapter III. Consistency and Independence of the Postulates”**

A manuscript fragment running from pages 30 to 56. Chapter IV, “The Equivalence of Elements – Linked Pairs.” Page 44 is worked on a renumbered, previously drafted sheet.

Document 31: **“Suggestions on a reform. Two types of triads.”**

A single manuscript sheet, written front and back with logic notes.

Box 88 Lectures and Notes on the Philosophy and Science of Logic

Prof. Cotton inserts a letter in the beginning of this folio volume regarding the “Richmond Lectures” included here. He notes that University of Richmond records reveal that Royce gave three lectures in November 1904 on the following topics:

- The Orderly Arrangement of Facts and Ideas: ‘Series’ and ‘Levels’
- Transformations and Their Laws
- The World and the Will

Document 1: **“Richmond Lectures on ‘Some Fundamental Conceptions of Science’. Lecture I. The Orderly Arrangements of Facts and Ideas: Series and Levels.”**

A 47-page manuscript, heavily edited, with pages 33-40 on renumbered pages.

Box 90 Thoughts on the Philosophy of Religion and a “Philosophical Interpretation of Evolution”

Document 1: “Religious Experience & Religious Truth.”

A 2-page manuscript outline. Oppenheim has written a pencil note above to date the text as circa 1908.

Document 2: “Religious Experience and Religious Truth.”

A heavily edited 29-page manuscript in Royce’s hand. Pages 20-21 and 25-27 are renumbered, previously drafted sheets.

Document 3: “Browning’s Theism”

A 38-page manuscript written on entirely fresh sheets. The top corner of the first page is torn away, and is thus missing part of a note Royce wrote regarding the text: “Rewritten for ... Indianapolis Br. ... from the old paper, by [?] .. request.” Oppenheim notes at the top of the page that this was delivered in Indianapolis on Friday, February 5, 1904.

Royce had published an article with the same title in 1896 in *The New World*, 5 (1896): 401-22.

Document 4: “The Conception of Immortality”

An 11-page manuscript that Wells notes on the first page to be incomplete. Pages 5 and 8 are renumbered. Wells adds a red pencil “(9)” to page 10 to correct a pagination error.

Document 5: Untitled Fragment

A collection of ten manuscript pages numbered in rough sequence as follows: 2, 4, 5, as second page ”5” (to which Wells inexplicably adds a red pencil 6), then sequential pages 6-11.

Document 6: “The Philosophical Interpretation of Evolution”

An 83-page manuscript with particularly heavy edits toward the end. Pages 11-15 and 77-83 are redrafted pages.

Document 7: “The Philosophical Interpretation of Evolution”

An incomplete 7-page typescript (sections I and II), entirely unedited. The typescript appears to track pages 1-16 of the immediately preceding document in this box.

Box 91: Thoughts on Various Aspects of the Social Mind

Document 1: “The Growth of the Social Mind”

A heavily worked manuscript fragment (see above, Document 5) running from pages 52 to 90a, with many added and renumbered pages. At the top of page 52, Royce has added in pencil “14 to” immediately before the page 52 marking.

Pages 89a-z and 90a have been added by Royce. Wells adds a red pencil “a” to a second page 64. Pages 60-89 are on renumbered, previously drafted pages.

Box 92: Observations on Various Aspects of American Civilization

Document 1: “Some Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization”

An 80-page manuscript. Pages 1-39 and 70-80 are in Royce’s hand. Pages 40 to 69, however, while apparently paginated by Royce, are written by someone else. There are edits in Royce’s hand to the middle section of the text.

Pages 55/56/57/58 are combined by Royce on one (redrafted) page. Pages 25/26/27/28 are combined by Royce on one page, with the section heading changed from “V” to “III”. A page 4a is added by Royce. Pages 33, 54, 64, 78-80, as well as the combined 55/56/57/58, are written on renumbered, redrafted pages.

Oppenheim notes in pencil on the first page that this was written circa 1901.

Document 2: “The Opening of the Great West. Oregon and California”

A 71-page manuscript. On page one, Wells has taped a (now deteriorating) bit of envelope fragment with writing on it. (It is Wells’s typical red pencil arrow at the top of the page to indicate that there is writing on both sides.) Royce combines pages 67/68 and adds pages 7a-7f. These 7a-f pages are on redrafted sheets.

Document 3: “The Influence of Christmas Festivities upon the Welfare of Children. A Circular of Inquiry.”

A 7-page manuscript. Pages 4 and 5 are redrafted pages.

Document 4: “A few Observations upon the Celebration of Christmas.”

A 32-page manuscript, on entirely fresh pages.

Document 5: Untitled Fragment

A 3-page typescript fragment concerning Christmas, with one Royce edit in pencil.

Box 93: Addresses on Aspects of Education in Colleges and Universities

Document 1: “Some Relations of the Teaching of Psychology and Philosophy to the Problems of Religious Education in the Colleges”

A 31-page manuscript. On the first page, Wells has taped a fragment of an envelope that reads “Providence Ass’n for Rel. Educ’n Remarks. Feb. 15.” Page 25 has been renumbered (but does not appear to be redrafted).

Document 2: “The Recent University Movement in America”

A 70-page manuscript, with pages 34 and 62 renumbered, and pages 32a and 66a added. An inserted note from “VP” reads: “Same title as lecture published in *Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society* 3 (1900), 131-49 Communicated to the Society of Jan. 31, 1899.”

Document 3: “Address to Graduates.”

A 50-page manuscript. Pages 7 and 8 are renumbered.

Wells notes at the top of this page that, on an envelope containing this MS, Royce had written: “An address of welcome to members of the Graduate School at the opening of a Harvard Academic Year.”

Box 94: Extension Course on Ethics Lectures II-V Also fragment of “Lectures to Teachers on Ethics”

Document 1: “Extension Course on Ethics Lecture II The Idea of Duty”

A 26-page typescript with red pencil “reading” notes (with this as a text for a lecture).

Document 2: “Extension Course on Ethics Lecture III Wallas’s Problem of the Great Society”

A 23-page typescript with no edits.

Document 3: “Extension Course on Ethics Lecture IV Pleasure and Pain Happiness and Unhappiness”

A 27-page typescript which Loewenberg notes on page one to be a “2nd copy, incomplete.” There are no marks or edits to the typescript.

Document 4: “Extension Course on Ethics Lecture V The Self”

An 18-page typescript, unedited.

Document 5: “University Extension Course Lecture IV Pleasure and Pain. Happiness and Unhappiness.”

A heavily worked 43-page manuscript, which Loewenberg notes on page one to be incomplete. Royce adds pages 5a, 7a-b, 12a and 13a. Pages 12, 12a, 13a, 18-19 and 33-43 are on

renumbered, previously drafted pages.

Document 6: “University Extension Course Lecture V The Self”

A 31-page manuscript with many edits. Royce combines pages 6/7, and reworks pages 17-29 on renumbered (previously drafted) pages.

Document 7: “University Extension Course Lecture IV Pleasure and Pain happiness and Unhappiness”

A 19-page draft manuscript, with pages 7-11 missing. Loewenberg notes that page one is incomplete. Pages 16-18 are on redrafted pages.

Document 8: “Lectures to Teachers on Ethics”

A 27-page manuscript. Pages 10-20 are on renumbered, previously drafted pages. Wells adds a red pencil “2” to page three to correct a pagination error.

Box 95: “Comments upon the Problem of the Mid-Year Examination Paper” and a lengthy fragment on “Duty &c”

Document 1: “Comments Upon the Problem of the Mid-Year Examination Paper”

A 63-page typescript, with light editing in the first 19 pages in Royce’s hand. Loewenberg notes at the top of page one that this is a “Report on University Extension Mid-Year Examination,” and that is a “First Copy.”

Document 2: Untitled Fragment

An untitled manuscript fragment running from pages 47 to 160. The first sentence begins “What is Duty &c” Royce combines pages 112/113/114/115. But other than some pen slips, the text appears to be on completely fresh pages.

A note from VP (Vincent Punzo) inserted in the folio volume reads: “This fragment seems to be an early statement of what is found in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* Compare pages 51-52 of this manuscript with pages 53-54 of *RAP*. See also close similarity between *RAP* 96 and p58ff of this manuscript.”

Royce’s handwriting in this manuscript – a smaller neater hand that is found in his earlier work – seems to confirm the approximate date by “VP.”

Box 96: Miscellaneous Material – Reviews, Letters, etc.

Document Group 1: [Macmillan Company Publicity Files]

A large collection of newspaper clippings, notices and reviews relating to Royce and his publications by one of his publishers. The clippings and materials are mounted on Macmillan forms, and were apparently part of company files.

Document Group 2: [Macintosh Correspondence]

Royce letters to Professor Douglas Clyde Macintosh.

Document 3: Untitled

Wells notes in red pencil that this two sheet, front and back manuscript (written in folded columns) is an autobiographical note on the influence of persons and books on Royce's thought.

Document 4: Untitled

A 2¼-page purple (carbon copy) typescript. Wells titles the text "Loyalty" in red pencil. Oppenheim suggests a date for the text as circa 1905-06.

Document Group 5: [Royce Memorabilia]

A collection of programs and letters of some apparent significance to Royce, including programs at which he was a speaker, and the letter from President Charles M. Eliot appointing him to his position of Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard in 1885.

Document Group 6: [Correspondence]

A collection of correspondence that may be identified by the manila envelope fragments labeled in Royce's hand as follows: "Amer. Philosophical Assn. Committees & Material," and 1908-1909 Correspondence w. Prof. Gardiner of Smith."

Document 7: "Preliminary Survey of some metaphysical Problems & Opinions"

A 4-page manuscript outline of four lectures, with lectures I and II outlined in detail.

Document 8: "Topics of Lectures on Method."

Seven pages of manuscript (on folded sheets), the pages appear to be notes on ideas rather than a completed text.

Document 9: "Introduction to Metaphysics"

A 2-page manuscript that Loewenberg describes as an outline of a course.

Document 10: "Phil 4a. Final Examination. [Radcliffe. Special paper.]"

A 5-page manuscript with five questions.

Document 11: **“Examinations for Honors in Philosophy”**

A 4-page manuscript with seven questions.

Document 12: **“Philosophy 9. Radcliffe.”**

A 5-page manuscript, with four questions. On the last page, Royce makes this note: “Special paper prepared for Radcliffe, but equivalent to Harvard Final Exam’n. – J. Royce. May 30, 1898.”

Document 13: **“Questions for Phil 2a”**

A one page manuscript.

Document 14: **“Honors Examination Thursday, May 11.”**

A 2-page manuscript (which Royce numbered pages 1 and 3).

Document 15: **“Preliminary Examination for Candidates for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. May 1899. History of Philosophy.”**

A 3-page manuscript with five questions.

Document 16: **“Special Examination – Philosophy 1a (1901-02) Logic”**

A 5-page manuscript, with four questions.

Document 17: **“Preliminary Examination for Ph.D. logic (May, 1902)”**

A six page manuscript.

Document 18: **“Preliminary Doctor-Examination (May, 1904) Ethics.”**

A 3-page manuscript.

Document 19: **“1905: May. Preliminary Ph.D. examination. Department of Philosophy. History of Philosophy.”**

A 2-page manuscript with seven questions.

Document 20: **“Philosophy 15. Mid-Year Examination.”**

A one page manuscript, with the note of only one question (a proof).

Document 21: **“Philosophy 15. Mid Year Examination”**

A one page manuscript with two questions.

Document 22: **“Specimen Examination Questions.”**

A2- page document on logic topics.

Document Group 23: **[Typeset Exam Questions]**

Nine typeset pages of philosophy examinations.

Document Group 24: **[Typeset Lecture Programs]**

Three pages of Lecture programs from Royce’s 1893 Lectures to Teachers:

- Lecture IX. On a Due Regard for the Varieties of Individual temperament.
- Lecture X. Mental Defect and Disorder from the Teacher’s Point of View.
- Lecture XI. On Some Special Devices for Mental Training.

Document 25: **“Questions and Exercises on the Theory of the Proposition and of the Syllogism”**

A 2-page typeset sheet.

Document 26: **“Notes on the Logic of Measurement. For the Seminary in Economics.”**

A 4-page manuscript, with sixteen points.

Document 27: **“Summary of a Discussion Preliminary to the Seminary.”**

A 2-page manuscript, numbered pages 2 and 3, with three points.

Box 97: **Miscellaneous Material**

Document 1: **“The Teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche.”**

A 19-page manuscript, with page 16 on a redrafted page. Loewenberg notes this manuscript is unfinished. Cf. Royce’s article on Nietzsche in *The Atlantic Monthly*, 119 (1917): 321-31.

Document 2: **“The Place of Philosophy in the Intellectual Life of the Present Day.”**

An 18-page manuscript on entirely fresh pages. Loewenberg notes that it is incomplete.

Document 3: “Plan of Discussion for the Hebraic Society.”

A 2-page manuscript outline.

Document 4: “Address before the Hebraic Society.”

A 16page manuscript on entirely fresh pages.

Document 5: “Introductory Note to the Story of Puhī Huia & Ponga”

A 10-page manuscript that begins as narrative, but ends as notes on page 10. Page 3 and 9 are renumbered. Wells adds a red pencil “a” to a second page 9.

Document 6: Untitled Fragment

A manuscript fragment numbered pages 14-29. Wells titles this War and Insurance.

Document 7: “Suggestions Concerning the Metaphysics of Individual Self-Consciousness.”

A 4-page manuscript that Loewenberg calls “unplaced,” and Oppenheim identifies as “Berkeley 1895.”

Document 8: “Part IV. The Self-Conscious Individual.”

A 13-page manuscript written in pencil. A note from “VP” states that “[t]his is a draft of part IV of Royce’s Supplementary Essay in *CG*” and that this is “[t]he introductory material to Part IV.”

Document 9: “The World and the Social Consciousness.”

One sheet, two sided, a list of chapters that Loewenberg calls a “[p]lan of a book”.

Document 10: “Book I. The Self and its Fellows. Chap. I. The Origin of the Social Consciousness.”

A 12-page text, a manuscript except for pages 7 and 8 which are a single spaced typescript, with handwritten page numbers by Royce. Pages 10 to 12 are written on renumbered, redrafted sheets.

Document 11: “A. Objective Consciousness. The Assurance of Sense, and the Appropriation of Data.”

A 14-page manuscript on entirely fresh sheets.

Document 12: “Discussion on The Reality of Time.”

A manuscript written on 9 faces of folded railroad stationery (“The New York New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company,” New York – Boston).

Document 13: **“Discussion of the Concepts: Equal, Greater, Less, order, Series, Number, Quantity, Infinite.”**

A manuscript written on 8 faces of folded railroad stationery (“The New York New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company,” New York – Boston).

Document 14: **“Principles relating to Duty to Animals.”**

One manuscript sheet written front and back.

Document 15: **“The Concept of Fitness.”**

A small manuscript sheet (Colonial Club Cambridge stationery) written front and back.

Document 16: **“Notes for Remarks upon Absolute Truth.”**

A 3-page manuscript, with last page misnumbered as “4.” There is no date given.

Document 17: **“Notes for article on Monotheism Hasting Encycl. Of Rel. & E.”**

A manuscript written on four faces of a folded sheet. No date, but this is probably 1916, when Royce works on his articles for the Hastings volume.

Document 18: **“Preface”**

A one page manuscript containing the preface to Royce’s address to the Boston Physical Education Association. See *BWJR*:2:1209, no. 5. The pamphlet is reprinted in *Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems* (New York: Macmillan, 1908) at chapter 6.

Document 19: **Fragment**

An undated, untitled six page manuscript that begins “Cartesianism“. This may be a draft for a dictionary entry.

Document 20: **Untitled**

A 4-page manuscript outline of a project entitled “The Nature of Reality.“ The outline may refer to a project book. No date is given, but was probably written circa 1897.

Document 21: **“Poincaré on Space”**

A subtitle in Royce’s hand, in pencil, reads “Poincaré: Monist, Vol. IX, page [marked out in

ink]”

The three page manuscript reflects Royce’s reading of the Poincaré article in *The Monist*, Vol. IX, and making notes with references to specific page numbers.

Box 98: “Royce MSS. *The Sources of Religious Insight*”

This “Folio Volume” is different (smaller) than the Box 1-97 binders. Its typescript sheets are not mounted on larger sheets, but are bound directly into the volume.

Document 1: “**Bross Lectures on The Sources of Religious Insight. Lecture I. The Religious Problem and the Human Individual.**”

A 31-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand, principally for typos, with an occasional underline added.

Document 2: “**Lecture II. Individual Experience and Social Experience.**”

A 40-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand for errors and emphasis.

Document 3: “**Bross Lectures. Lecture III. The Office of the Reason.**”

A 38-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand, chiefly for typos and emphasis.

Document 4: “**Bross lectures. Lecture IV. The World and the Will.**”

A 47-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand, chiefly for typos and emphasis.

Document 5: “**Bross Lectures. Lecture V. The Religion of Loyalty.**”

A 47-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand, chiefly for typos and emphasis, with occasional small additions of text phrases.

Document 6: “**Bross Lectures. Lecture VI. The Religious Mission of Sorrow**”

A 45-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand.

Documents 7: “**Bross Lectures. Lecture VII. The Unity of the Spirit and the Invisible Church.**”

A 46-page typescript, very lightly edited in Royce’s hand for typos and emphasis. Slightly more extensive edits on the next to the last page.

Boxes 99-154

Document boxes numbered 99-154 contain folders of loose documents and materials. Materials from the Crystal Falls and the Hacker contributions are found here, as are materials from the various former “logic” boxes and the boxes previously identified by letters (A-H). This Appendix describes the contents by folder, and (where appropriate) by document within the folder.

Box 99: **Papers of Josiah Royce**

Folder 1: **“Class Day Program. UC Berkeley 1875”**

Folder 2: **“Diplomas, Certificates & Acknowledgements of Gifts by Josiah Royce”**

Seven documents, including honorary degree from St. Andrews.

Folder 3: **“Announcements, Programs, Invitations ca. 1890-1911”**

Twenty-three program pamphlets and sheets, for *inter alia*, the Gifford Lectures and other events at St. Andrews.

Folder 4: **“Announcements, Programs, Invitations ca. 1890-1911”**

Thirteen documents including program notes from the Gifford Lectures and the Lowell Lectures.

Folder 5: **“Josiah Royce - Confirmation of Appointments”**

Document 1:

Western Union Telegraph confirmation Royce’s election to an honorary degree at St. Andrew’s

Document 2:

Certificate of Royce’s appointment as a member of Harvard’s Administrative Board (**one year term**).

Document 3:

Certificate of Royce’s appointment as the Ingersoll Lecturer on the Immortality of Man, for 1899.

Folder 6: **“Ingersoll Lecture of 1899, The Conception of Immortality. Publication Announcement. 1907”**

One 4" by 6" note, with the typeset announcement as it appeared (per a handwritten note) in the Guardian on February 13, 1907.

Folder 7: "Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc. [in honor of Josiah Royce] Program. December 1915"

Program for "The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association," a 1915 meeting in Philadelphia honoring Royce on the occasion of his 60th birthday. Speeches were given by, among others, John Dewey. At the meeting, Royce himself presented what has become a well-known auto-biographical sketch.

Folder 8: "Minute on the Life and Services of Josiah Royce"

A 7-page typescript, "From the Records of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Tuesday, November 7, 1916", "prepared by a committee of the Faculty consisting of Professors R.B. Perry, Lanman, and Hocking." Perry and Hocking had been students of Royce at Harvard. Lanman was one of his oldest friends, from their days together in Baltimore.

Folder 9: "Stephen Royce: Personal Memories of Josiah Royce ca. 1916"

A 17-page typescript on Stephen Royce's letterhead, titled "Personal Memories of Josiah Royce by his Son Stephen Royce." In the text, Stephen Royce refuses Harvard's request for Royce's personal papers. He does, however, give 17 pages of biographical information regarding his father.

Folder 10: "Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce"

The printed, hardback volume containing the papers delivered at "The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association," a 1915 meeting in Philadelphia honoring Royce. The program for this meeting is contained in folder 7 of this Box (99).

Folder 11: "On Royce's Philosophical and Other Works. Various Clippings, 1881-1903"

A large, unorganized assortment of original clippings and photocopies of reviews of Royce's work.

Box 100: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "St. Andrews, University of (Invitation Cards)"

A series of invitations to Josiah Royce for events at the University of St. Andrews from September 12-14, 1911.

Folder 2: "On Royce's "War and Insurance" Clippings 1914"

A collection of notices and reviews, originals and photocopies, concerning *War and Insurance*.

Folder 3: “Various News Clippings, 1914, undated”

A collection of newspaper items relating to Royce’s family ... John B. Royce breeder of Pekingese, an obituary for Sir Henry Head (a relative of Royce’s wife), a picture of Ruth Woodbury (?) with puppies. Also a clipping of an article “My Library” by Smith Baker from *Unity* magazine.

Folder 4: “On Royce’s View of Roosevelt & on Josiah Royce Hall”

An original clipping, and two photocopies.

Folder 5: “Royce’s Autobiographical Sketch ca. 1886”

Royce’s “Autobiographical Sketch,” a 22-page, slightly edited typescript. The edits are not in Royce’s hand. The typescript is dated on the basis of Royce’s phrase on page 3: “my position on coming to Harvard four years ago.”

There is a handwritten note by Royce at the top of page 1 that reads as follows: “Solomons May 27 ‘98, before the Philos’y Comm.”

Folder 6: “Josiah Royce - Twenty Years After. Bixler, Julius.”

A reprint of the article by Bixler, “Josiah Royce -- Twenty Years After” *The Harvard Theological Review* vol. 29 no. 3 (July 1936): 197-224.

Folder 7: “New Documents on Josiah Royce. Clendenning, John and Oppenheim, Frank 1990”

Typeset pages of the article by Clendenning and Oppenheim, “New Documents on Josiah Royce” *Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society*, 26 (Spring 1990): 131-45.

Folder 8: “The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce. Clendenning, John. 1999”

A hardback copy of the second edition of Clendenning, *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2nd ed. 1999)

Folder 9: “The American West as Metaphysics: A Perspective on Josiah Royce. Hine, Robert. 1989”

A reprint of this article, with the cover inscribed as follows: “For the Harvard University Archives (and most especially Mr. Holden & Mr. Davies) With deepest gratitude, Robert V. Hine December 7, 1989”

Hine, “The American West as Metaphysics: A Perspective on Josiah Royce” *Pacific Historical Review* (1989).

Folder 10: “Josiah Royce. From Grass Valley to Harvard. 1992”

A hardback copy of Hine, *Josiah Royce: From Grass Valley to Harvard* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

Folder 11: “Josiah Royce - Theist or Pantheist? Johnson, Paul E.”

A reprint of Johnson, “Josiah Royce -- Theist or Pantheist?” *The Harvard theological Review* vol. 221, no. 3 (July 1928): 197-205.

Folder 12: “Josiah Royce and Indian Thought Leidecker, Kurt F. 1931”

A small book: Leidecker, *Josiah Royce and Indian Thought* (New York: Kailas Press, 1931).

Box 101: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Royce Family Tree, 2nd edition. MacKinnon, Malcolm D. 1988”

A 91 page photocopied collection, with pictures.

Folder 2: “A Critical Annotated Bibliography of the Published Work of Josiah Royce. Oppenheim, Frank. 1964”

A reprint of the article: Oppenheim, “A Critical Annotated Bibliography of the Published Works of Josiah Royce,” *The Modern Schoolman* vol. 42, no. 4 (May 1964): 339-65.

Folder 3: “Royce’s Appreciative Interest in the More Vital. Oppenheim, Frank. 1967”

A reprint of the article: Oppenheim, “Royce’s Appreciative Interest in the More Vital” *The Modern Schoolman* vol. 44 no. 3 (March 1967): 223-29.

Folder 4: “Josiah Royce as Teacher. Oppenheim, Frank. 1975”

A reprint of the article by Frank Oppenheim, “Josiah Royce as Teacher” *Educational Theory*, 25 (Spring 1975): 168-85.

Folder 5: “Josiah Royce’s Intellectual Development. Oppenheim, Frank. 1976”

A reprint of the article by Frank Oppenheim, “Josiah Royce’s Intellectual Development: An Hypothesis,” *Idealistic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1976): 85-104.

Folder 6: “Royce’s Contribution to Logic. Robinson, Daniel S. 1967”

A bound “*extrait*” of the article by Daniel S. Robinson, “Royce’s Contributions to Logic,” *La Revue Internationale de Philosophie*,” numéro 79-80 (1967): 60-76. The article appears in

English.

Folder 7: “Some Marginalia of Josiah Royce. Robinson, Daniel S. 1969”

A bound reprint of the vol. VI, no. 1 issue of *Coranto*, published by the University of Southern California in 1969. The issue includes the article by Daniel S. Robinson, “Some Marginalia of Josiah Royce,” at pages 2-5.

Folder 8: “Ruth Royce Correspondence with Ralph Barton Perry. 1928”

An important letter from Royce’s sister Ruth Royce to Ralph Barton Perry, Feb. 20, 1928, in response to Perry’s February 8 letter earlier that month. Like other Royce family members, Ruth resists providing biographical information about her brother. Ruth states that she “cannot quote exact words [of my brother] but my understanding of his spirit and meaning. . . . The real man is the spirit and not the temple. He writes his own biography when he records his thoughts. Would you know the man, read his message—his growing messages through the years. The rest is only incidental and temporary.” [Ruth’s own emphasis in the original]

Folder 9: “Skrupskelis, I.K.. ‘Annotated Bibliography of the Published Works of Josiah Royce,’ 1969”

A photocopy of pages 1167-1227 of volume two of *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, ed. John J. McDermott (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005) . These pages contain Ignas K. Skrupskelis’ definitive bibliography of Josiah Royce’s published work.

Folder 10: “Josiah Royce. Sorley, W.R. ca 1920”

A bound reprint from *The Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. VII by W.R. Sorley, entitled “Josiah Royce 1855-1916”.

Folder 11: “Royceana in W.E. Hocking Library, Madison [up to July 1967]”

A three page typescript that listing contents of the Hocking collection that refer to Royce. An indication that Hocking was in communication with Katharine Royce shortly after Royce’s death. W.E. Hocking’s “Royceana” may be found in the Houghton Library.

Folder 12: “The Conception of God”

A copy of the first edition of this volume, printed 1895. The text reflects the address given by Royce to the Philosophical Union of the University of California, including comments by Mezes, Joseph LeConte and Howison. (It does not include Royce’s 1897 “Supplementary Essay.”)

Folder 13: “Plan for Gifford Lectures [Two drafts] ca 1897, and October 1897”

Two manuscript pages, written front and back, that reflect the first and second (“second try at”) plans for the Gifford Lectures that would eventually become *The World and the Individual*. The

manuscript pages are written in Royce's hand. The first plan is divided into parts I-X. The second plan is numbered 1-20, with 11-20 being considered a "Second Course."

Folder 14: "Psychology Lectures. Kant Lectures of 1896. Permutation Groups or Substitution Groups. On the Relation of Between and the Concept of Continuity. Revision of Gifford Lectures. The Properties of Negation and of the Logical Zero. Attempt at Another Statement of Kempe's Defining Laws. Philosophy 15. Notes on Wundt's Volkpsychologie. Sketch of Boolean Logic. Philosophy 1A, Plan of Discussion. Various notes."

An 8" x 10" hardback notebook, 1" thick. Approximately 364 pages (not counting notes on inside covers) in Royce's hand.. A rough catalogue of the notebook's contents follows:

Pages	Contents
1-9	Psychology lectures, general plan
11-15	Kant Lectures of 1896
17-39	Permutation Groups or Substitution Groups.
40-59	On the Relation of Between and the Concept of Continuity Revision of Gifford Lectures (This is important. At page 49, Royce talks of "reform" to the Gifford lectures. Further on, he mentions revisions of the Giffords.) NB: difficult to tell how this section divides up
61-93	The Properties of Negation and of the Logical Zero. Includes review of the general significance of Kempe's results at page 80.
94-111	Attempt at Another statement of Kempe's Defining Laws of the System [Sigma] August 1901.
113-17	Notes for Phil. 15, 1901-02
118-120	Notes for Philosophy 9. <i>See also</i> 127-29, where Royce has notes from this class. (1901-02)
131-200, 269-79	Seminary 1901-02. Including notes on Mrs. Cabot making remarks and presentations.
301-16	"Sketch of the Various Fundamental Concepts" in Philosophy 15. The Folder jacket titles this "Sketch of Boolean Logic." But it is in fact Royce's sketch of fundamental concepts with a mere mention of Boolean logic.
317-19	Philosophy 1A Plan of Discussion for 1901-02
327	Canons of Syllogism
330-38	Inventory of Works sent to binder June 15 (a list of pamphlets to be bound)

339-348	Library list of periodicals to be disposed of, June 1901 (back issues of the Atlantic, the Nation, Harpers, Nature, various Reviews, etc.)
356-57	Crown Robertson's "Elements of General Philosophy." Royce synthesizes this piece. Then Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy
358-59	Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy notes
361	Phil 9 "exercise"
	Inserted page on back leaf: Notes on blots for classification, selected at random from the prepared set. Publisher's typefaces.

Folder 15: "The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture I. The Nature and the Need of Loyalty ca 1907 [2 drafts]"

This folder contains two separate 33 page typescripts of *Lecture I* from the "Philosophy of Loyalty" lecture series. (See note below at the beginning of Box 102.) The first typescript contains handwritten edits by Royce which are contained in the final printed text of the series. The second unedited typescript is an exact transcription of the manuscript in Box 27.

Box 102: Papers of Josiah Royce

Note: Folder 1 of this box begins with a typescript of *Lecture II* of the "Philosophy of Loyalty" lecture series. Lecture I of this series may be found in the previous Box 101, folder 15, and in Box 103, folder 1. Manuscripts and typescripts of the entire "Philosophy of Loyalty" lecture series are also found in order in Boxes 27 and 28.

As one interesting note: the lectures contained here (Box 102) reflect final versions of the texts as they were eventually printed. (The manuscripts and typescripts in Boxes 27 and 28, seen as definitive by Wells, in fact reflect earlier versions of Lectures II-VIII.) Lecture I of this series, however, as it appears in Box 103, folder 1 seems to be a very early version of the lecture. It does not remotely resemble the final version of the text. In the case of Lecture I, the Box 101, folder 15 version seems to reflect the final version.

Folder 1: "The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture II. Individualism ca 1907"

A 35-page typescript, very slightly edited, identical with the printed version of the text.

Folder 2: "The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture III. Loyalty to Loyalty"

A text reflecting Lecture III of *PL*. Here, the 32-page typescript of the Lecture III is identical to the typescript in Box 27, *but*, Royce adds in manuscript four pages, starting "Review in the light of the simple consideration," and ending on manuscript page 35 "... of the whole law." The manuscript edition ends the printed text.

Additionally, while the Box 27 typescript is unedited, the typescript in this folder *does* have edits

that make it into the printed version.

The typescript, with some small edits and the added manuscript, which are embodied in the printed version, is identical to the printed version.

Folder 3: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture IV. Conscience ca. 1907”

A 35-page typescript, whose very few edits have been embodied in the printed version. The text is more heavily edited toward the close of the typescript.

Folder 4: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture V. Some American Problems in Their Relation to Loyalty. Ca. 1907”

A 33-page typescript. The edits are included in the printed text.

Folder 5: “Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures Lecture VI. Training for Loyalty ca 1907.”

A 34-page typescript that is identical to the printed text. Compare folder 10 in this box (102), bundle b, second paper, pages 24-33. (a parallel attempt to address the topic of “training people in loyalty.”)

Folder 6: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture VII. Loyalty, Truth, and Reality”

This folder contains both a 35-page typescript *and* a seven page manuscript fragment of Lecture VII. The unedited typescript parallels precisely the printed version. The manuscript, although headed “Lecture VII: Loyalty, Truth and Reality,” begins with a very different introduction.

Folder 7: “The Philosophy of Loyalty. Lectures. Lecture VIII. Loyalty and Religion”

A slightly edited 35-page complete typescript. The edits are included in the final printed version. This typescript copy is increasingly edited by Royce towards its close. All the edits make their way into the published version.

Folder 8: “Outline of Proposed Lowell Lectures. The Philosophy of Loyalty”

An unedited 16-page manuscript that outlines the entire Lowell Lecture series by themes, rather than by subheads. There is no date on this manuscript. But the titles of the Lectures fit the titles of the final version.

Folder 9: “Index to the Philosophy of Loyalty 1908. Manuscript”

An 86-page manuscript of the index to *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, the text of which is identical to the index in the printed version.

Folder 10: “The Problem of Christianity ca. 1912. [Fragmented groups of notes]”

The notes here are contained in various “bundles” with notes attached by the archivist:

- a. Untitled notes, typescript pages 22-24. Often in triplicate copy, with pages missing. For *PC*, Lecture XI, “Perception, Conception, and Interpretation” including Royce’s handwritten additions on pages (23b) and (24)(25) Since Royce’s editing on page 23-24 appears in published version of *PC* at page 289, this typescript was done before final published version.
- b. Untitled notes. Two fragments:
 - Pages 23-23a – *PC* 287-88 in published form
 - Pages 24-33 – *Philosophy of Loyalty* connected to Lecture VI, “Training in Loyalty”
- c. Untitled notes. FMO believes that this belongs to a preparatory draft for *Philosophy of Loyalty*. Manuscript pages numbered 13-31. Perhaps an early introduction to Chapter I. This fragment deserves close attention.
- d. Untitled notes. Seems an early draft of *PL* Lecture V “Some American Problems.” This manuscript has some parallels with Lecture V’s section IV on family and “tie-breaking or not.”
- e. Untitled notes. An early draft of *PC* Lecture 11, “Perception, Conception, and Interpretation.” The Summarizing Points by Royce do not include published points 6, 7, or 8, but only points 1-5. See *PC* 293-95.
- f. Untitled Notes. Manuscript fragment, pages 65, 65, 67, 68. Perhaps closest to *PC* 86-98. The manuscript is somewhat edited.
- g. Untitled notes. A manuscript numbered pages 36 to 42. Belongs to preparatory work for Royce’s Lecture VI, “Training in Loyalty” of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.
- h. Untitled notes. Pages 45-53 of a manuscript fragment. These pages seem an early form of the Close of Lecture 13 of *PC* “The World of Interpretation”, see *PC* 334-42.
- i. Titled “Lectures on the Problems of Christianity Vol. II. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. Lecture IX. The Conflict of Selves.” A manuscript fragment numbered pages 1-7, minimally edited.
Oppenheim: These pages were drafted upon an **earlier** plan of *PC* (where “The Conflict of Selves” was to be the 1st Lecture of Vol. II) In his final plan, Royce recognizes how basic to his Vol. II (Metaphysical Questions) is the “Time-Process,” and so, in final draft, Royce makes Lecture IX be “The Community and the Time-Process.”
- j. Untitled notes. This manuscript fragment, numbered pages 61-69, slightly edited, seems

an early draft of section VII of Chapter I of *PC*; see parallels in the published version, *PC* 70-75. Yet the page numbering here, pages 61-69, suggests a lengthy yet unused lead-up in Chapter I to its section VII.

- k. Untitled Notes. This bundle consists of two fragments. First draft material, these fragments **seem** to be early workings of the published *PC* from the bottom of its printed version, pages 280-291.
 - Pages 46-47 (one fragment)
 - Pages 48-56 (second fragment)
- l. Untitled Notes. This is a large important manuscript, apparently drafted before the final version of *PC*. The manuscript runs from pages 3-54. There is much exposition and criticism of Henri Bergson in the latter pages of this manuscript. The first two pages of missing, and some others are missing at the close, after page 54. The MS is heavily reworked, on many redrafted pages. Perhaps the clearest hint of its place in *PC* occurs on page 5 where Royce refers to “using the three terms whose mutual relations I have explained in the last two lectures.” FMO takes the three terms to be “Perception, Conception and Interpretations, and thus guess that the last two lectures were Lectures XI and XII, making this manuscript an early reworked frat of what become Lecture XIII, “The World of Interpretation.”
- m. Titled, on a smaller piece of a paper, “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity, Lecture XIII. The World of Signs”, the small paper precedes a manuscript fragment pages 41-65. The manuscript in this bundle chiefly consists in material moving up to a section VII at page 48, giving many pages, 48-58, to section VII, and then entering section VIII at page 58, but closing at 65. It is considerably edited by Royce. It seems, perhaps, to be an early fragmentary draft of what would become in the published *PC*, Lecture XIV, “The Doctrine of Signs.” [NB: Page 55, Royce gives CSP’s definition of “sign.”]
- n. About 10 pages of disparate manuscript pages in Royce’s hand, pertaining mainly to *PC*, one page dealing with loyalty. Royce heavily reworks some of these pages.
- o. Headed “Lecture VII The Unity of the Spirit, and the Invisible Church.” A one page manuscript outline. This is preparatory work for Royce’s page x of the published version of *SRI*.

Folder 11: “The Problem of Christianity [Lectures]”

- a. A 30-page manuscript, titled “Lectures on the Problem of Christianity. Lecture VII. The Christian Doctrine of Life.” Based on the way these pages are grouped, these MS pages, 1-30 (with 15-19 omitted) seems to be a fragmentary draft of the start of Lecture VII of *PC*. [It seems highly important from several perspectives.]
- b. A fragmentary manuscript, pages 13-29. Written for the most part on fresh pages, and edited in parts by Royce, this manuscript is related to the final form of *PC*’s Chapter XI, “Perception, Conception and Interpretation.” However, it contains a critique of William

James's Theory of Knowing that is omitted in the final printed version. Instead, in the published piece, Royce turns to Bergson.

- c. A manuscript fragment, pages 52-61, somewhat edited. Its topic is Royce's method to be used in *PC*. To FMO, it seems that limits of space have forced Royce to drop this manuscript's more specific picture of his method and settle for a mere sentence on method to summarize his hint of method at the close of Chapter I (p.74). He will give a fuller picture of his method at *PC* 210-11 and again at *PC* 230-31.

Folder 12: "Lecture IV. Physical and Social Reality [Fragment from the World and the Individual ca. 1907 [sic]]"

The date of this draft is in fact closer to 1898.

A 2-page typescript/MS fragment with edits, headed "Lecture IV. Physical and Social Reality." An early introduction to his Lecture IV. This became a later lecture in a published version.

Folder 13: "Lecture. Realism and the Individual [Maybe an early version of the World and the Individual, I, ch. 3][ca. 1907][sic]"

The date of this draft is in fact closer to 1898.

A 56-page manuscript entitled "Realism and the Individual," on fresh and redrafted pages. An early MS version seemingly aimed at what became Lecture III in *WI: I*. It largely deals with the mystical conception of being.

***Folder 14: "Lectures related to Realism and Real Being. 3 lectures, untitled. Ca. 1907 [sic]"**

The date of this draft is in fact closer to 1898.

This folder consists of three bundles. The paper on which all of these are written contains the watermark "Chas. H. Thurston Cambridge." The paper is slightly smaller than Royce's usual writing paper, and of a slightly different color.

- a. A manuscript, pages 1-19. The MS breaks at 11, then returns to a page 8 and goes up to 19. This first bundle therefore embraces two manuscripts. In the first MS, Royce crosses off his old lecture title. (He had previously headed the page Lecture [illegible, blotted out] III. The Four Historical Concepts of Real Being: - *The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas*, The Real as the True; and the Real as the Whole Meaning. (The words in italics were heavily deleted. The other lines are marked out.) The only thing left, which is not either blotted out or crossed out, is "Lecture."

The crossed-out titles derive from earlier plans of *WI*. Royce addresses Rosmini's work.

- b. A manuscript, pages 39-48, almost all previously drafted pages. It is headed "III", with a note: "From lecture on Realism." Touches on mysticism and Kempe's theory.
- c. A manuscript fragment, numbered pages 55 to 69. Intended toward *WI*.

Box 103: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "Lecture I. The Nature and the Need of Loyalty. ca 1907"

A heavily edited 33-page manuscript in Royce's hand. Written on fresh sheets except for pages 15-16

Although the folder is labeled "Lecture I: The Nature and the Need of Loyalty," only the first few sentences correspond to the printed version of *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.

Folder 2: "Lecture IX. [Untitled] May be related to the World and the Individual."

A 23-page typescript heavily edited in Royce's hand. Royce handwrote "Lecture IX" at the top of the first page. The paper is three-hole-punched.

Folder 3: "Loyalty. 1 pg. Fragment."

A fresh page, numbered "29," with five lines of text, and some deletions.

Folder 4: "Copies of California documents. [History of California notebooks]. 1 of 4 ca 1880-1886"

A 6" by 8 ½" composition notebook with only a few pages at notes at the start of either end of the notebook. (Note: Royce had a habit of starting notebooks from both ends.) One end is title "Letters in the Consular Books," the other "Panama Affairs: Early Cal. Legisl."

The title on the cover: "Copies of Cal. Documents. For notes on papers see other end of book. Josiah Royce." (emphasis in the original)

Folder 5: "California, Social Conditions and Local Scenes, 1849-51. History of California notebooks. 2 of 4 ca 1880-1886"

A 6" by 8 ½" composition notebook, filled with notes in Royce's hand, in various inks. Includes notes on the Squatter Riots from the Placer Times, July 10- Sept. 14, 1856. The title on the cover, after the notation "J. Royce": "California. Social condition & Local Scenes. 1849-51. (Including Early Mines Generally)"

Folder 6: "California. Course of Events (1852-58). Vigilance Committee of '56. [History of California] ca 1880-1886. 3 of 4 folders"

A 6" by 8 ½" composition notebook, including only 11 pages of notes in Royce's hand. The title on the cover, after the notation "J. Royce": "California Course of Events (1852-58) Vigilance Committee of '56."

Folder 7: "Notes on S.F. in '51. [History of California]. Ca. 1880-1886 4 of 4 folders"

A 6" by 8 ½" composition notebook, with writing in Royce's hand.

Folder 8: "California. Notes on cards, ca. 1892-1895, includes notes on Donner party - Emigrant life."

Thirteen 2" by 5" (approximately) cards. The first one reads Emigrant Life Notes for "California."

Folder 9: "Philosophy"

A typeset page of chairman Royce's description of the Harvard University Philosophy Department published in a Dec. issue of *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*.

Folder 10: "Preliminary Report on Imitation May 1895"

A reprint of the article "Preliminary Report on Imitation," *The Psychological Review*, 2 (1895):217-35.

Folder 11: "The Psychology of Invention December 28, 1897"

A reprint of Royce's article "The Psychology of Invention," *The Psychological Review* 5 (1898): 113-44, read at the annual meeting of the Amer. Psych. Assoc., Dec. 28, 1897.

The text including diagrams and illustrations of psychology test drawings.

Folder 12: "Apprehension" [Dictionary entry]. Ca. 1899

Printer's galley-proof of one of Royce's contributions to Baldwin's dictionary, namely the article Royce, "Apprehension", Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1901).

Folder 13: "Recent Logical Inquiries and Their Psychological Bearings. March 1902"

A reprint of Royce's article "Recent Logical Inquiries and their Psychological Bearings," *Psychological Review*, 9 (1902): 105-33.

Folder 14: "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics. April 13, 1905"

A reprint of Royce's article "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics," *Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1905):197-207.

Folder 15: "Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry July 1905"

A reprint of Royce's article "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of

Geometry,” *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, 6 (1905): 353-415.

Box 104: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “The Problem of Truth 1908”

A reprint of Royce’s article “The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion,” published in *Bericht über den III Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie*, pages 62-90. Heidelberg,: Th. Elsenhans, 1909. Published also in *WJO* and *RLE*. The article, although listed as “von Josiah Royce,” is in English.

Folder 2: “The Reality of the Temporal December 29, 1909”

A reprint of Royce’s article “The Reality of the Temporal,” *International Journal of Ethics*, 20 (1910): 257-71. The paper was read at the American Philosophical Association’s annual meeting on December 28, 1909. [A comparison of this article with Royce’s earlier APA address, “The Eternal and the Practical,” (December 29-31, 1903), illuminates the development of his thinking concerning “temporal process.”]

Folder 3: “Loyalty and Insight June 22, 1910”

An edited 33 page typescript which may be the basis for the text published in *The Simmons Quarterly* and (ultimately) *WJO*. The title and date head the first page.

Folder 4: “Logik [Encyclopedia of philosophy.] Band, Erster. 1912”

The hardback German text of *Logik, Encyclopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, in Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband, herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge*, Erster Band, (Tubingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1912) trans. B. Ethel Meyer, (London: Macmillan, 1913). The book was formerly part of the Robbins library collection.

Folder 5: “An Extension of the Algebra of Logic November 6, 1913”

A reprint of Royce’s article from *The Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (1913): 617-33. [Written after Royce drafted his article, “The Principles of Logic” in 1910.]

Folder 6: “Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism October 1913”

A reprint of Royce’s article “Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism,” *Popular Science Monthly* 83 (1913): 394-411.

Folder 7: “Some Relations Between Philosophy and Science ... October 24, 1913”

A reprint of Royce’s article “Some Relations Between Philosophy and Science in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century in Germany,” *Science*, n.s., 38 (1913): 567-84.

*** Folder 8: “War and Insurance [fragment] ca 1914” [mistitled by Wells]**

A five page manuscript fragment, numbered pages 18-22 (with two pages numbered “21”).

Wells writes “War and Insurance” in red pencil at the top of page 18. But in fact this manuscript is a pre-final draft of the conclusion of “The Spirit of the Community” See *Josiah Royce Late Writings* vol. 2, especially 68-71.

Folder 9: “The Possibility of International Insurance. 1914”

A twelve page, unedited, carbon-copy typescript of Royce’s “The Possibility of International Insurance,” *New York Times*, (July 25, 1915) part 4, pages 2-3.

Folder 10: “The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical April 17, 1914”

A reprint of Royce’s article “The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical,” *Science*, n.s., 39 (1914): 551-66.

***Folder 11: “[War and Insurance][fragment ca. 1914]”**

This folder is mistitled. The folder contains two pages of manuscript:

- a) “p. (17)” —probably from a partial draft of *The Problem of Christianity*’s “Introduction” or of its Lecture I; and
- b) “p. (10)” —4 ½ lines, including Royce’s aphorism, “The world’s most creative minds are of three types, --the artists, the prophets, and the scientific discoverers.” [This contrasts in part with CSP’s more general classification of three kinds of human beings: thinkers, artists, and workers (in which classification CSP was not focusing on “creativity.”)]

Folder 12: “Addresses Regarding WWI. 1916”

This folder contains materials related to Royce’s position on World War I:

- a) Four unedited reprints of “The Duties of Americans in the Present War,” (Royce’s first Tremont Temple address, 30 January 1916).
- b) William A. Shaper’s sharp critique of the above address in *News and Events*, (15 August 1916): 269-70. (Mr. Shaper was Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
- c) Reprint of “Professor Royce’s ‘Lusitania’ Speech,” *Boston Evening Transcript* (8 May 1916). This text is identical with the version printed in *The Hope of the Great Community*.

- d) 2 newsprint copies of “The Duties of Americans in the Present War,” from *Boston Evening Transcript* (8 May 1916).

Folder 13: “Hope of the Great Community 1916”

A hardback copy of the first of edition of this book, complete with book jacket: Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916). No marginalia found.

Folder 14: “The Hope of the Great Community. Royce, Josiah 1916”

A hardback Harvard College library copy of this book, with a library purchase date noted as November 11, 1916 (no book jacket): Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916). No marginalia found.

Box 105: Papers of Josiah Royce

***Folder 1: “The Hope of the Great Community”**

The folder is mistitled. (The 40 page typescript is titled “The Hope of the Community” (*not* “The Hope of the Great Community.”) A substantially revised version of this text, which among other things completely omits section V, is reprinted as “The Hope of the Great Community” in *The Yale Review*, 5 (1916): 269-91, and in *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan 1916). See above at page [].

Folder 2: “[Note Fragments] ca. 1886 - undated”

Document 1:

A 38 page manuscript (not Royce’s handwriting), this is an essay by William Pepperell Montague. Royce has written “Montague” in his own hand at the top of page one. The manuscript is titled “On the Relation of the Philosophical Student and Teacher to the Central Problems and interests of Ethics”. Montague received his Harvard B.A. in 1896, and his Harvard PhD in 1898. Montague became a great Realist philosopher, and went on to teach at Columbia.

Document 2: “Proposal to the Committee on Substitute Subjects for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy”

A three page typescript, with notes in Royce’s hand. The title heads the first page. At the bottom of that page, Royce writes “On motion of Rand, authorized to discuss this with other departments.”

Document 3: “Schedule of Engagements”

A small sheet one page “Schedule of Engagements” written in Royce’s hand for January 11-30. Although the year is not noted on the page, FMO suggests 1899, after reference to a perpetual calendar, as Royce gives days of the week along with dates.

Document 4:

Notes written by Royce on the back of a “Handel and Haydn Society” program, the 79th Boston season. He titles it “Order in Einl. [introduction] of 1813 [or perhaps 1873]”

Document 5:

A one page manuscript summary of five recipients of the book *War and Insurance*. (Including 250 copies to California.) Probably circa 1916.

Document 6:

One page manuscript outline in Royce’s hand of the Lowell Institute lectures on the Philosophy of Loyalty.

Document 7:

One page list of grades given to students in a “Philosophy Exam.” Highest grade A-, lowest grade D-.

Folder3: “Unarranged Fragments”

This folder contains a large collection of significant loose manuscripts. FMO has grouped the manuscripts with clips, and has attached notes to each. The notes reflect FMO’s assessment of the document contents.

Document 1:

A 12 page typescript, pages numbered 2-13. No edits. FMO suggests this text to be related to Royce’s work toward *WI:2*.

Along with Documents 2 and 7 below, the text seems tied to the first sections of *WI:2*’s Lecture V: “The Interpretation of Nature.”

Document 2:

A typescript fragment, numbered pages 14-39, which appears to be a continuation of document 1 above. Document 7a below is a carbon of pages 14-25 of this typescript.

Document 3:

A somewhat edited manuscript, non-continuous text, numbered in non-sequential page numbers 38-67. Page 38 is headed with a section “VI,” but is untitled. In the text, Royce thanks his audience for a series of lectures, and adds a closing. The fragment seems to reflect a second part of a lecture by Royce on Ethics.

Document 4:

A somewhat edited manuscript in Royce’s hand running continuously from pages 10 to 34. At the top of page ten, there is a Royce note “Originally for Lect. V.” Oppenheim suggests these pages refer to *WI:2*.

Document 5:

A manuscript in Royce’s hand, with pages numbered 2-19. Pages 1 and 3 are missing. Possibly preparatory work for Lectures IV and V of *WI:2*.

Document 6:

A typescript with continuous page numbers 10 to 24, headed by a handwritten Royce note on page 10: “Gifford Mat’l. Rejected MS from the 1st Lecture Second Series.” Beyond the introductory note, it is unedited. In the printed version, Lecture I of *WI:2* is titled: “The Recognition of Facts.” The subject matter of the fragment does seem to apply to this Lecture (Royce deals with notions of “Conceptions of Being,” e.g.). However, there are no direct parallels in the language.

Document 7a:

A typescript running continuously from pages 14-25, a carbon of document 2, above, section III. (Document 2 above contains section IV as well.)

Document 7b:

A somewhat edited manuscript in Royce’s hand running continuously from pages 7 to 49. Pages 15-25 are renumbered on previously drafted pages. This appears to be preparatory work for *WI:2* Lecture III, “The Temporal and the Eternal.”

Document 8:

A heavily edited manuscript in Royce’s hand, on fresh pages. The text appears to be preparatory work toward Lecture II of *WI:1*.

Document 9:

A 14 page manuscript, without page numbers. This appears to be the first pages of Lecture II of *WI:1*. (*Cf.* Document 8 above -- pages 36-50 -- for possible connections.)

Document 10:

A manuscript in Royce's hand numbered pages 78-102. Pages 83/84 are combined by Royce. Royce adds 89a and 100a (order transposed by Wells with 100). Pages 101-02 are on redrafted pages. The first page, page 78 begins in the middle of a sentence. This might be an early draft of the close of the final lecture in *WI:1*. Or it could be a draft of the "A Critical Study of Reality" (1897).

Document 11:

Preliminary draft of Royce's mid-year exam for his 1916 extension course in Ethics. (For final published version see *JRLW* 2:135.)

Five Single Page Fragments Following Document 11:

A single typescript page numbered "-36-" that appears to resemble the typescript pages from document 1 above.

A single manuscript page 5.

A single manuscript (2/3 full) page 31.

A ½ page typescript with heaving handwritten edits.

A ½ page typescript numbered 14.

These single page fragments do appear to track substantively *WI:2* text drafts in this folder.

Folder 4: "Unarranged Notes [Accordion Folder]"

Document 1: "Finale of Lecture on Intellect and Will"

Beyond a first "cover page" with this title, a manuscript on smaller sheets running from pages 23-42 (pages 34-35 missing). It is unclear to which lecture the "finale" refers. Perhaps Lecture V of the New Orleans lectures (for which there is no manuscript in HARP).

Document 2:

One page manuscript fragment that looks to be the draft of exam questions.

Document 3:

A one-page manuscript fragment, plus six lines of typescript pasted onto a small sheet numbered 17. The fragment begins with a new paragraph: "The problem as to Man and Nature has been rendered extremely familiar, in its modern form, by the doctrine of Evolution...." The added typescript lines begin a Section II.

Document 4:

A one-sheet, folded note that appears to be another draft of exam questions, probably Philosophy 9.

Document 5:

A small sheet note with directions to the Twentieth Century Club.

Document 6:

A manuscript numbered pages 2-22. No first page. The manuscript is incomplete (breaking off after a few lines of section III). Perhaps an early draft of Lecture III of the 1893 Lectures to Teachers. The subject matter of this fragment does not appear to correspond with the Cambridge Conferences.

Document 7:

An unedited carbon typescript fragment numbered pages 22 to 30. The reference to a theory of Being on page 29 suggests an early draft of *The World and the Individual*, where the concept of causality is treated.

Document 8:

A nine page manuscript, numbered 2 to 10, slightly edited. At the top of page two appears the word "Evolution." It is uncertain whether this is a title for the page, or merely the last word of the sentence carried over from the missing page 1. However, Royce does deal with a philosophy of Evolution, both within the mind and in the external world.

Document 9:

Two loose small sheets with logical formulas and notes. (They appear to be a split formerly single sheet.)

Document 10:

A six page manuscript, numbered 5-10. This seems to be a fragment of an early draft of the introduction to "What is Vital in Christianity?". The full manuscript for this essay cannot be found in the HARP documents, although the piece is reprinted in *William James and Other Essays*.

Document 11:

A five page manuscript fragment, pages numbered 17, 18, 21, 22, 23. Oppenheim suggests that the text may be a preparatory fragment to an early lecture in *Problems of Christianity*, part I

Document 12:

A group of typescript pages, all of which are on the same paper and in the same blue ink, edited in Royce's hand. The pages have been rearranged and renumbered. An attempt has been made to re-assemble them in some coherent form, finding continuities from page to page. At one point, Royce inserts new sections "IV" and several pages later "V". Royce appears to have shuffled the pages, with edits and repaginations, to fashion a later lecture. The text appears to relate to one of his lectures to teachers.

Oppenheim divides these typescript pages into 4 parts: typescripts A-D, as follows:

Typescript A: The text runs continuously from 18-30, although some page numbers do not track.

Typescript B: The five pages grouped here do not run continuously. Pages 29-30 follow each other. A page type numbered "15" is torn in half (two half page fragments). Pages 34-35 follow each other. The pages do, however, appear to deal with one over-riding topic.

Typescript C: This text runs continuously from page 23 to 30 (with the original typed page numbers). Here, Royce inserts a hand-written section "IV" after the first line of page 23.

Typescript D: The continuous typescript fragment runs continuously from page 32 to 38. The text appears to be in the middle or toward the end of the first lecture. A quarter page typescript fragment with heavy handwritten edits is included here, but seems unrelated to the rest of the text fragment.

Document 13:

A two page manuscript. Royce's exam for an Ethics course (or possibly History of Philosophy) circa 1890's.

Document 14:

A cover note by EA Jarvis describes an attached manuscript. The attachment is seven page manuscript on small sheets (4" by 8") in Katharine Royce's hand. These pages are numbered 41-47, the conclusion of lecture I 1915-16 Extension Course on Ethics at Boston University. This suggests that Katharine had transcribed a complete handwritten copy of this lecture, not now extant.

Document 15:

Another cover note EA Jarvis reads as follows, in description of the attached manuscript pages: The pages appear to be handwritten preparation for lecture 2, "The Idea of Duty" of the "Extension Course in Ethics."

The manuscript consists of an early draft, including here pages 12, and 15-18.

Document 16:

A one page fragment numbered “(5)” that FMO says is pretty clearly part of the Extension Ethics Course.

Document 17:

A one page fragment numbered “(16)” that FMO says is pretty clearly part of Lecture II of the extension course.

Document 18:

A two page fragment numbered 34 and 35 that, to FMO, does not sound like Extension Course material.

Document 19:

A three page fragment numbered pages 61-63 relating to Royce’s definition of the unique Self. “I have frequently maintained that a Self can be defined as a life lived according to a more or less conscious and explicit plan.” This is so typically Roycean that it is difficult to place or date.

Folder 5:

Two one page manuscripts (no date), examinations by Royce on the development in the modern period of the concepts:

- a) Of substance, space, and causation, and
- b) Of the meaning of “a priori” and the development of the concept of a theory of knowledge

Plus: two responses by Sheldon [likely Russell Firth Sheldon, Harvard A.B. (1908), m.c.l. and M.D. (1911) cum laude.

For some reason, Royce retained these papers.

Folder 6: “The Japanese Sword”

Royce’s manuscript for a novel, 130 pages, no date. Written in five sections, somewhat edited.

Folder 7: “The Will to Interpret”

Document 1:

A two sided sheet, a 2 page manuscript, an early outline of *The Problem of Christianity*, chapter XII.

Folder 8: “A Mechanical Philosophy”

This folder contains three items. **But** FMO finds nothing by Josiah Royce in this folder.

Document 1: “Prefatory Lessons”

Five pages of mimeographed introduction to this topic, mechanical philosophy.

Document 2:

Printed diagrams on this topic from J.J. van Nostrand.

Document 3:

A fragmentary typescript, pages 7-10, with slight editing, possibly by Royce. Otherwise, only the reference to G.H. Lewes’ *The Problem of Life and Mind* might connect it to Royce and his files.

Folder 9: “The Nature, Meaning and Function of Philosophy in Life”

A 28 page MS written on stationery of “Ste of NY – State Commission on Lunacy, Pathology Institute”, in a hand not clearly Royce’s, except for 2 marginalia on page 2 and 23. The piece is very Hegelian in ascent to the Absolute; he refutes Heraclitus.

Box 106: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Lecture. The Social Origin of the Conception of Natural Law, ca. 1895-1916”

This is a one page, fragmented typescript, headed by Royce’s note “Combined with previous as lecture IV” Perhaps an early first page of Royce’s 20th Century Club series, or an early first page of *WI:2* chapter III.

Folder 2: “Mind. Ca. 1895-1916”

A one page typescript of *Mind* identical with *ERE* or *RLE*, or *JRLW* versions.

Folder 3: “The Philosopher”

A manuscript poem, written on two sides of 2 ½ by 5 ½ paper in pencil, seems to be in Royce’s hand. There is no date given. The theme fits Royce’s desire to do great things in logic.

Folder 4: “The One, the Many and the Infinite, Supplementary Essay. 1895-1916”

A 13-page manuscript dealing with the concept of number.

Folder 5: “Example from the Historical Field, ca. 1895-1916”

Royce’s 6-page manuscript on 5” by 8” sheets is entitled “Examples ...” His examples run from

Kant to 1900. He creates a bibliographical list of thinkers with the titles of their work. The exact aim of this MS is undisclosed. It cannot be earlier than 1900. Royce shows how in touch he is with contemporary periodicals.

Folder 6: “Untitled Notes pages 108-116, ca. 1896-1916”

Folder 7: “Universal Diary [Appointment Notebook] ca. 1899”

A small 2” by 4” notebook, with a few entries in Royce’s hand.

This is his 1899 diary running through Scotland and his lectures, then returning back to Liverpool (February 3). The last note in this section, he is on board the ship (Feb. 11 – heavy squalls and northwest wind).

After a big gap, on June 22 he leave Boston for Chicago and exam. He goes up from there to St. Paul, where he opens the exam the next day. This diary entry ends on June 29.

The diary ends on Friday June 30.

Folder 8: “Various Loose Notes. [Some titled, including William James questionnaire] ca. 1900”

Document 1:

Two three by five cards (numbered “2” and “4”, both labeled “continued”) on the French revolution via Sybelon, notated in Royce’s hand. Royce’s notes are mostly in German. Oppenheim believes the cards come from Royce’s collection of cards on which he records what he has read (Royce labeled them “A-M” and “N-Z” These cards are scattered throughout HARP.

Document 2:

Royce’s two contributions on “one” and “reduction” in some dictionary. It is, in fact, ca. 1900. Baldwin’s dictionary came out in 1901.

Document 3:

Royce has 1 set of William James’s “Instructions to Contributors” both schedule A and B, *not* filled out by Royce. This is apparently for the American Society of Psychological Research.

Document 4:

A book plate, indicating a gift of William Gilson Farlow, from the Library of Josiah Royce.

Document 5: “Notes on Herbart’s Psychology”

A three page manuscript, numbered pages 49-51, in which Royce quotes from Herbart. This

appears to be part of Royce's original notebook concerning Herbart's psychology, from 1875-76.

Document 6: "Bunsen Hyppolytus [*sic*]"

A large piece of paper, approximately 8" by 17", folded in half. Royce has written on the back of the sheet. On the front of the sheet, a ledger entitled "Labor Roll of the men Employed by the University of California during the month of September 1874". (Royce misspells Hippolytus at the top of the sheet.)

Document 7: "Notes on Wundt's Physiological Psychology, p (1-45) with References and Remarks"

A 12 page manuscript on 5 by 8 inch sheets, front and back, notes written in Royce's hand. Page ten is blank. The paper is very fragile, with crumbling edges. Royce's hand is very young, and many of the notes are in German. Oppenheim suggests a date ca. 1876, while Royce was in Germany.

Document Fragments:

Several one page fragments, unrelated.

Document 8:

A ten page manuscript, on thin onion skin type paper. It is conceivably in Royce's hand, although it is not entirely clear. (The handwriting differs both from his very early work - e.g. Miner's Grave – as well as later manuscripts.) The text deals with the three brothers that the writer "passionately desired," but did not have. The writer calls the imaginary brothers Ned (the bad one), Horace (the funny one), and Willie (the good one).

Oppenheim hypothesizes that Royce wrote this piece with his sisters

Document 9: "Of Causality"

A three page manuscript, written front and back in Royce's hand. This may be Royce working on his dissertation at Hopkins, or perhaps it is several years later when he is an instructor at UCB.

Document 10:

A Western Union telegram that says "Glad to stay at University club. Expect to reach club by noon Monday." There is no date given, The form does read, however "191_" indicating a later date.

Document 11:"Summing up of the system."

One sheet manuscript, written front and back, describing four sections: I. The Will known to us,

II. The Will as *Wesen der Welt*, III. the Will as man, and IV. The worth of the World.

Document 12:

Another card, this one on *Ausdehmungslehre*. The notes on the front of the card deal with the congruence of a and b. There is a date on the card's back – 1879-1880. On the back he notes on three essays: "A Purpose of Thought" (Fragment of an essay finished in other form) "Will as Principle in Philosophy" (he notes that the essay has been rejected), and "Spinoza on Liberty" (The Fortnightly Review considered this manuscript)

Document 13: "Forensic Lectures II. Persuasion"

A one page manuscript, front and back, probably from 1883-87.

Document 14: "Emerson Hall Lectures"

A one page manuscript sheet, written front and back, this is a notice of the lecture courses in Emerson Hall, Royce delivering "some aspects of Post-Kantian idealism" February 25 to March 28 at 4:30. On the back side of the sheet, are some perhaps significant logical musings. (the T function, I function, F function.

Document Fragments 15:

Loose fragments: one page on Locke, one page on General Introductory Remarks to Section 1, on Change and its knowability, and a manuscript page numbered "(4)" concerning the interaction of instinctive and irrational acts.

Document 18:

A 14 page manuscript, that appears to be incomplete, concerning Karl Hillebrand. (The last page begins a section II, but ends after one paragraph.)

***Folder 9: "Royce Diary March 17, 1903 – Dec 30, 1903"**

A very fragile small notebook, written in pencil. The entries seem to reflect notes on haphazard themes that attract Royce. After April 7, all the pages are blank.

Oppenheim does not believe this is a diary, as the writing is not reflective. Rather, these appear to be notes from stories he has heard. The first entry deals with ideas on syphilis. An entry later deals with hearing a "negro" sermon. The text of a third entry includes rhyming lines.

Folder 10: "Topics of the Indianapolis Lectures ca. 1903"

A one page manuscript sheet listing, titled "Topics of the Indianapolis Lectures." Royce gives four titles for the lectures, and notes at the bottom of the page that the lectures are in the hands of Prof. Will D. Howe. He says that the lecture trip will come after the Feb. 2 Columbia lecture

(1904). If so, the date is probably accurate for the preparation of this piece.

1. Browning Club: "Browning's Theism."
2. The City Teachers of Indianapolis: - Will and Intellect, their General Nature and Relations."
3. The Students of Indiana University: - "The Concept of the Infinite."
4. Eastham College: "Pragmatism and Truth"

Folder 11: "[Untitled] [First word inside cover is "Opposite"]"

A hardbacked composition notebook on logic topics, with diagrams and formulas, linear tetrads and constructions. The middle section of the notebook is empty. But then the final pages are more constructions.

Folder 12: "[Untitled] notebook (On the logic of intersections and operations with pairs and circuits, includes Royce's remarks on an essay contest Coenobium No. 82 – his personal verdicts on students in the class, ca. 1909-1910"

A hard-backed notebook on logical topics, with entries facing different directions. Some loose cards are contained in the leaves. There are approximately 140 pages in the notebook.

Folder 13: "[Untitled]. First word inside cover is "generalization." [Further work in triads and pair operation], ca. 1910"

A hard-backed notebook, full of logical formulas and constructions. It is written in pencil. There are approximately 140 pages in the notebook. Not all are filled. The final few pages are inverted (written upside down).

The inside front cover is headed "Generalization of what stands opposite." The archivist estimates the date as 1910, but at first glance there does not seem to be a date reference within the notebook.

Folder 14: "[Untitled]. First word inside cover is "Suppose." Further work in T-relation. Undated"

A hard-backed composition notebook dealing with logic topics, in approximately 140 pages.

Box 107: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: [Untitled, Royce notes that pages 69 and 82 contain notable theorems]. Notebook, ca. 1910"

A hard-backed composition notebook containing Royce's logic work, full of constructions and formulas. An archivist's note inserted calls it "notebook 7, untitled." The above title comes from the heading of the first page.

Folder 2: "Untitled – Alignments."

A hard-backed composition notebook containing Royce's logic work, approximately 90-100 pages. The archivist has inserted a note calling the book "notebook 8 [-untitled-] "alignments".

The insider cover reads, in pencil in Royce's hand: "Devices for passing circuits through two determinate points that are not mutually conjugate [*sic*] in their respective circuits appears in this book after the folded leaf." Again, the notebook is full of constructions, function tables and formulae.

This notebook is not paginated.

Folder 3: "[Untitled notebook of proofs]. [12 X 9.5 in. Label torn off] undated"

A hard-back notebook containing Royce's logic work, larger than the previous notebooks (9" X 12"). Numbered through page 116. At the end of the book, 13 un-numbered pages. Two sheets are torn from the beginning of the book. Again, several of the pages are inverted. Full of function tables, constructions and formulas, as well as Royce notes concerning the operations.

Folder 4: "Circuits through given pairs (a,b) when these pairs are suitably restricted"

This folder title appears on the front of the notebook. The Royce note continues on the cover: "(Also, in reverse of book [back?], a new relation of importance)."

A hard-backed notebook containing Royce's logic work, approximately 50 pages. Royce numbers the pages through 25. Approximately 16 pages of notes follow. Turning the book over and starting from the rear, it is titled on the first page

Folder 5: "[1] Class Lists for Philosophy A. Loose notes on Logic."

Document 1:

A small hard-backed notebook (5" x 8"). Two full 8 ½ x 11 page typescript pages are inserted, including the class rolls for "Introduction to Philosophy" and "History of Philosophy".

Other handwritten lists of class names, with grades, follow. An empty envelope is inserted between pages.

The bulk of the notebook, however, contains logic. What appears to be a logic "paper" runs from pages 14 to 145, alternating between pencil and ink.

Document 2:

A collection of loose sheets, notes on logic topics. Some of the loose sheets seem to have come from the notebook of document 1, above in this Box. There are almost 100 pages of loose notes, on sheets of varying sizes. Autobiographical Note: Included here is stationery from the Trinidad line of Steamships, as well as several pieces of stationery Queens Park Hotel Trinidad, Port of Spain, on which he has written out logic equations, and a railroad timetable for Trinidad. These

Trinidad indications would date these notes in 1905.

Folder 6: “Construction of Linear Sets.”

A hard-backed notebook, with the above title on its front cover. Royce has numbered the first eight pages. But he fills many of the remaining 60 pages as well.

Box 108: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “The Entity ϵ , and Related Constructions.”

This title appears on the cover of the hard-backed notebook in this folder. The pages are not numbered. Almost all the pages (approximately 100 pages) are filled. For Royce, the “ ϵ relation” (i.e., the “epsilon relation”) concerns “bonding.”

Folder 2: “Functions of Secondary Primes, the Invertible Pair Operation.”

This title appears on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. No date is apparent. There are approximately 200 pages (front and back), non-numbered. The entire notebook deals with logic topics.

Folder 3: “[2] Logical Theory. [Constructions in terms of the T-relation], undated”

A soft covered booklet (approx. 7 ½” x 10”), entitled: “Logical Theory, Constructions in terms of the T-relation.”

The pages are un-numbered; several at the end are blank. The logic writing here consists more of prose passages than logic formulae. Royce sets down his definitions as “§” markers. It appears, therefore, that Royce contemplates this text as a paper. He begins, with the title on the first page “Formulae for the T-relation”. At the back of the notebook is a page of notes, and a geometrical “doodle.” The unique note on this last page concerns transformations of lambda.

***Folder 4: “Number Concept. page 1-81”**

This folder consists of a collection of loose manuscript pages. Contrary to the folder title, there are in fact two documents in this folder. Only the first one is numbered pages 1-81.

The second document is numbered 1-87. Royce seems to have created these two manuscripts as he moved toward writing his *WI* “Supplementary Essay” in 1900, likely after giving the first series of *WI* lectures.

Document 1:

An 81-page manuscript. There is no title on the first page, but the text begins “For Dedekind, the cardinal properties of number...” Wells adds a red “55” to page 56 (Royce had skipped 55), and a red pencil “64/65/66” to page 67 (Royce had skipped 64-66)

Document 2:

An 87-page manuscript. Wells adds a red pencil “a” to a second page 26 (e.g. “26a”). Wells adds a red pencil “38” to Royce’s 39. Pages 72 – 83 are missing. A page with a note to this effect is inserted. It appears to be in Wells’s hand, although it is not in red pencil.

Folder 5: “On page 22 sqq. This Book An Associated Invertible Pair Operation is Defined”

The above title is written on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook, on logic topics. There are approximately 120 pages, full of constructions and function tables and formulae. The first 123 pages are numbered. Some blank pages follow (10 or so), then six pages of “cyclical permutations.” If the notebook is reversed, beginning at the back, more functions and constructions follow, with the occasional inverted page. There are approximately 16 pages of elaborations.

Folder 6: “On page 9, a New Invertible Operation”

This same title is on the cover of this slightly larger hard-backed composition notebook. An archivist’s note within the notebook reads: “On page 9, a new invertible operation ... 85 page Is this the notebook that FO refers to as notebook (no title) c. 75 p.?” Oppenheim responds to this with “no,” seeing this rather as the old Logicalia Box 4, document 3. Like the other logic notebooks, this book is full of logic formulae, tables, and constructions.

Folder 7: “The Order of the Results of a Part of Researches Leading up to a Need of ? Collections of Triads”

The above title is on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. One word of the title is illegible. However, there is a “λ” or “K” directly before the word “collections.” The notebook is not paginated.

Royce works on triads for about 30 pages.

Box 109: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “The Pair Operation, on page 93 of this book, a New Operation”

A large, hard-backed composition notebook (9” by 12”) on logic topics. The folder title appears on the cover of the notebook. Royce once again begins the book from both ends. The notebook is full of constructions, formulae and function tables.

Folder 2: “The Summary of the Two Invertible Pair Operations 80 their Inverse is Given on page 38 of this Book [Royce’s notes on triad theory on inside cover]. Notebook. Undated.”

Pages at the front of the book are numbered up to 54 (with a few un-numbered pages following, and a few pages torn out). A middle section of about ten pages is left blank. Inverted pages are

mixed in together.

Folder 3: “[Ultimate Reality] [J.G. Gustafson][Logic Notes]”

A small (6” by 8”) soft-covered notebook on logic topics. This is apparently Gustafson’s notebook, and the first few pages, an essay on “ultimate reality,” are in Gustafson’s hand. Royce uses the rest of the notebook to make notes, primarily on the transformation of linear sets. Several pages in the middle of the book are torn out. Included are Royce’s appraisals of Whitehead’s “Memoir on the Algebra of Logic” (just before the ripped out pages), which Whitehead had published in the American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 23 (1901)

Folder 4: “Variations on the Pair Operation.”

A large, hard-backed notebook on logic topics, with the above title on the front cover, containing 52 pages of notes, constructions, function tables, and formulae.

Folder 5: “Analogies to the Quadrilateral Construction. 1876-1877”

A thicker, hard-backed composition notebook on logic topics, approximately 8” by 11” in size. Well over 100 pages, full of function tables, formulae and constructions. Inside the book, loose, is a picture of a tobacco store, perhaps in Cuba?

Pink Relocation Form:

Microfilm of Logicalia and Logic Notes have been relocated to HUG 1755.3.4 mfN (with microforms)

***Folder 6: “Logicalia”**

Although this folder is titled “Logicalia,” not all the documents concern logic.

Document 1:

A reprint of G.A. Miller’s “Groups Generated by Two Operations” (Warsaw, 1906).

Document 2:

One 5” by 8” sheet in Royce’s hand. The page is headed “Cambridge, Mass. Sunday, Oct. 20, ’92.” Possibly a ten point outline for a lecture on consciousness.

Document 3:

One 8 ½” x 11” sheet, manuscript chart on one side on “The Parallel Series.” Presented in columns, and with Greek alphabet notations, Royce appears to attempt a “logical” portrayal of “consciousness,” working out distinctions of description and appreciation.

Folder 7: “Logic Notes ca. 1895-1916”

Loose sheets of logic notations. Royce uses the back of any available paper. For instance, on the back of a Handel and Hayden society solicitation for donations, on the back of a letter from A.N. Marquis Company, another Leavitt and Peirce cigar order (200 cigars a month for June and July 1905).

Folder 8: “Unarranged Logic Notes, 1 of 2 Folders”

A thick folder of loose sheets on Logic topics. Some of the sheets may have been ripped out of one of his hardback notebooks. Again, Royce uses all sorts of scraps of papers (the backs of envelopes, invitations, etc.) for his ideas. One large manila (empty) is titled “Notes for Address to Hebraic Society, 1910” (Philosophy of Life).

One sheet is headed “Whitehead’s Invariant of a Tetrad” in middle of the stack. There is a reprint of an article by Louis Couturat, in German. The reprint is signed by Couturat. Royce has written many logic notes in the margins and on blank pages. Another reprint of a Hocking piece from the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* vol. 3, no. 16 (August 2, 1906), again with Royce notes.

Box 110: Papers of Josiah Royce

A three inch thick, hard-backed volume titled *Pamphlets and Monographs on Logic*. Inside, is a manuscript note (not Royce’s hand) stating “collected and indexed by Josiah Royce.” The volume includes various printed texts, bound together as one volume, including “Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan by Sadajir Sugiura (Philadelphia 1909). Other authors include William Stern, Theodore Lipps, E.T. Owen, Giovanni Vailati, Wilbur Urban, Wilhem Jerusalem, Julius Berman, and Wilhelm Schuppe.

Box 111: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Unarranged Logic notes, probably Harvard era. 1895-1916”

Approximately 90 loose manuscript sheets of logic notes written in Royce’s hand, many of which have page numbers, with some running in sequence. One typeset sheet of “Questions and Exercises on the Theory of the Proposition and of the Syllogism.” A few logic notes written on the back in Royce’s hand.

Folder 2: “Notes on Schroder and Vorlesingen [Algebra and Logic] On the Logic of Relatives, ca. 1904”

A 5” by 8” envelope, on the front of which is written (*not* in Royce’s hand): “Prof. Royce’s notes on Schroder & Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik – vol. III – Logik of Relatives.” Within the envelope are the following documents:

Document 1: “On the Logic of Relatives.”

A folded nine page manuscript in Royce's hand headed with this title.

Document 2: "Schweder's Log. Of Binary Relatives in another notation (as in type more familiar)."

A folded five page manuscript in Royce's hand headed with this titled.

Document 3:

A letter from a Radcliffe administrator to Royce regarding a student's grade, along with its envelope. Royce has written logic notes on the back of both.

Document 4:

An announcement card from the Boston Authors' Club, with Royce's logic notes on the back.

***Folder 3: "Properties of Circuits in the Logical System. [Loose notes included]."**

Document 1:

A hard-backed notebook with the title "Properties of Circuits in the Logical System Σ ." (**The folder title leaves out the sigma.**) (See *Life* 309.) Royce writes this note inside the front cover: "The following notes are made preparatory to a new treatment of the relation of the system Σ (of my 1905 paper in the *Amer. Mathematical Transactions*), to Geometry. This time I look towards Projective Geometry proper." Many of the pages are numbered.

Document 2:

A group of loose notes, with the archivist's note: "found with Properties of Circuits." Also included in this group, however, is a non-logical set of notes on 14 small manuscript sheets, written in pencil. This seems to be an outline of "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion." The address itself was printed in *William James and Other Essays*, as well as in *RLE*. The Congress took place in Heidelberg, from September 1-5, 1908.

Folder 4: "1st Book of 1909 Voyage. 1909"

A small hard-backed notebook (7" x 8"), with the above title on its front cover (without the date). Royce writes on the inside front cover: "This book contains the approach to & first studies of the characteristic functions of tetrads."

Folder 5: "2nd Book of 1909 Voyage. 1909"

A small hard-backed notebook (7" x 8") with the above title on its front cover (not in Royce's hand; in his own hand he has written – in pencil so that it is barely legible – "2 of Books of voyages 1909." (Inside the front cover Royce indicates that he is working with Kempe's law VI. Also included among the logic notes is a list of trip expenses: Rest. 30, table 30, bath 15, Deck

10, Music 5, Boots 5.

Folder 6: “Untitled, referring to page 67 of Book 2nd of voyage of 1909.”

A small hard-backed notebook (7” x 8”) untitled on its front cover. Pages in this notebook are numbered up to 118, blank pages follow, then alternating groups of logic notes and blank pages.

From the rear of the book is the non-logical manuscript, a “Survey of the Problems to be discussed in the Yale Graduate Course: - Purpose: A general introduction to Idealism.” He has distributed a paper to the class, perhaps “The Problem of Truth”, written in 1908. This “survey” runs for 10 pages.

Box 112: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Investigation on Intersecting Circuits. October –November 1909”

A hard-backed composition notebook, 8 ½” x 11”. This title is on the front of the notebook, which is full of approximately 100 pages of logic.

Folder 2: “Logic Notes. November 17, 1909. Notebook”

A hard-backed composition notebook, 8 ½” x 11”. This title is on the front of the notebook, which is full of approximately 100 pages of logic. Royce writes on the first page of book: “Topics under Investigation. I. The “Ordinal” Tetrad Functions of the type [....] II. The Ordinal Triad functions of the type, III. Combinations of the latter and of I also. <See book of Oct. Nov. 1909>”

Folder 3: “Transformations of Linear Circuits of Logical Elements. 1909”

Document 1:

A 6” by 8” hard-backed notebook cover, with the above title on its cover, plus the date April 1909. The pages within this cover are loose leaf sheets.

Document 2:

A folded program from the 1909 American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, with Royce logic notes written on it in his hand.

Folder 4: “Philosophy 15, Assistant’s Records”

The above title is on the front of the notebook. There are some pages with notes on students (and their grades) by name. These notes are not in Royce’s hand; the assistant may have been Loewenberg. Despite the ostensible purpose of this notebook as a class record book, the majority of its pages are filled with Royce’s own logic notes.

Folder 5: “Triads in Relation to Linear Tetrads. See [A Triad Operation and its

Results]. ca. 1910-1911]”

The above title is on the cover of this hard-backed composition notebook. (9” X 12”)

Folder 6: “Calculations on the [General?] Pair Operations. 1912”

This title appears to be on the cover of this hard-backed notebook (9” x 12”), although it is in pencil and difficult to read. Included are autobiographical details about four trips Royce took in 1912.

Box 113: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “In the Reverse of This Book a New Invertible air Operation is Contained [Triads]. ca 1912-1913. Triads derived from a given triad.””

A 7” by 9” hard-backed notebook, with the following title on its cover: In the Reverse of This Book a New Invertible air Operation is Contained.

Folder 2: “Logic Notes, Pairs [on the reverse][Notes for Hibbert Lectures] 1912”

A 7” by 9” hard-backed notebook, with the following title on its cover: “Notes for the Hibbert Lecture – Logic Notes on Reverse.” Royce drafted at least five, and possibly six or seven plans for the Hibbert Lectures, which became *The Problem of Christianity*.

Folder 3: “Reversal of Triads. Notebooks on Logic. [Resultants of Triads. 1912”

The title “Notebooks in Logic Box 3” is written on the cover of this 7” by 9” hard-backed notebook in a hand other than Royce’s.

Folder 4: “[Transformation of Triads].”

An untitled notebook, with “Transformation of Triads” written at the top of its first page.

Folder 5: “Untitled Triad Notes at reverse of notebook.] [The Problem of Christianity, 6 p.] [Triads in the system].”

Within this 7” by 9” hard-backed notebook, dedicated principally to logic work, is an attempt by Royce to start the first Hibbert Lecture (*The Problem of Christianity*).

Folder 6: “[7] Notes on the Pair Operation Invertible ca. after 1912 and of the Secondary Primes and the Triad Operation. Toward a Quadrilateral Construction. Philosophy 24, plan. ”

A 7” by 9” hard-backed notebook, with this title on its cover: “Notes on the Pair-Operation Invertible & of the Secondary Primes and Triad Operation.”

Folder 7: “Studies Toward an Operation on [Triads?] ca. 1913”

A large 9" by 12" hard-backed notebook.

Folder 8: "Work on Triads]. 1913 [First page begins with words "We thus may get for each element..."

A 7"by 9" hard-backed notebook, no title on its cover.

Box 114: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "A Triad Operation and its Results. ca. 1916"

One of the larger (9" x 12") hard-backed composition notebooks used by Royce for his logic work. "A Triad Operation and its Results" is written on the front cover of the notebook. There are, however, also notes included in this notebook that are very significant to non-logic topics. Included here are some logic hypotheses that Royce considered to be "discoveries of first importance."

Notes for the Mind Article (circa 1914?)

Included, toward the back of the notebook is a VERY SIGNIFICANT discovery: Royce makes notes concerning his concept of three kinds of knowledge, which he titles "Notes for Article on Mind". Of particular interest:

Significant Logic Reflection:

Logic interspersed with autobiography. An autobiographical note begins at page 22 as "they" pass Cape Cod. Dated "Note of July 5, 1914" This prose narrative then goes on to describe work on linear triads. Another autobiographical note: "<In Mass. Bay, crossing to the light-ship>

*Royce then notes: "It seems, then, that if three elements of a linear triad, together with its characteristic pair (c, d), are already known, then any three elements of the tetrad determine the fourth by a construction which is wholly analogous to the anharmonic construction. If this holds on further examination, it will prove a discovery of the first importance."

Notes for the revision of the Berkeley Address (pages 26, 27)

Oppenheim hypothesizes that this is an outline for revising what Royce calls "The Berkeley Address" – a planned revision drafted on July 5, 1914. Given "point 12" of the revision, and the overall lack of reference to war in the outline, This term "Berkeley Address" seems to refer to the *unpublished* version of his intended address to the Berkeley Union, eventually entitled "The Spirit of the Community." The piece was written just before the outbreak of WWI (and never presented because of it).

Late Notes Regarding the 1916-1917 University Year

Royce was apparently already planning his university extension for the 1916-1917 year. His

handwriting is shaky. He outlines this plan at pages 44-45. Why this note is contained in a logic notebook is unclear.

This appears to be one of the last things Royce wrote. It is almost certain that these notes were made after May 1916.

Folder 2: “Pussy Blackie’s Travels ca. 1863”

A 3-page typescript of a story Royce was said by his family to have written as an 8-year-old. The typescript must have been created much later in Royce’s life, either once he had become a prominent figure, or perhaps even after his death. On the first page of the typescript, under the title, is a parenthesis, a summarizing subtitle, that reads as follows: “(long story of the imaginary travels of a cat, written by R when eight years old. Remarkable for its psychological and ethical masteries).”

Given its vocabulary and syntax, it is doubtful that the typescript reflects something Royce actually wrote at the age of eight.

Folder 3: “The Miner’s Grave ca 1870”

Marked “No. 1” by Royce according to his own early indexing system. There is no title on the 10-page manuscript, written front and back on small sheets (5” by 8”). It is not known why the archivist labeled this “The Miner’s Grave.” Oppenheim cautions, “This manuscript can be easily confused with another manuscript of this title whereas the Romeo/Juliet’s theme of this the present manuscript suggests a better title would be ‘The Grave of Two Lonely Lovers.’”

Cf. The manuscripts in Box 53, and above at page [__].

Folder 4: “Notebook 2. (General and miscellaneous)”

A 144-page notebook, many of the pages densely filled. The notebook begins with full notes on philosophy and literature (starting with Henry Buckle on the protective spirit), and runs through to school notes on John Le Conte’s course in Physics and Mechanics.

Folder 5: “Profs. Le Conte, Le Conte, and Carr Science and course Notes. 1872”

The front cover title, “Josiah Royce, California State University, Class of 1875,” indicates that these are class notes from Royce’s time as an undergraduate at UC Berkeley.

Folder 6: “Hebrew Verbs. Notebook 3”

The title is listed on the cover of this horizontally bound, soft-covered book on Hebrew verbs (charts) as well as declension of nouns and personal pronouns.

Folder 7: “Literature and general notes. Notebook. May 25, 1874”

A class notebook that begins with notes from Royce’s UC Berkeley student days, then moves to

notes taken during his time as a student in Germany. The German notes begin at page 23, with the date April 23, 1876. (He would have been about 8 or 9 months into his time in Germany at that point.) A second group of German notes begins at page 33 (dated April 26, 1876), titled “Notes in Europe from April 26, 1876. The Categories of Moral Ideas.” The endeavor reflected here, to create a new Ethics, reveals Royce’s philosophical independence, as he challenges Spinoza, whom he has probably just read.

Folder 8: “The Aim of Poetry”

An old reprint of this article from the *Overland Monthly*, enclosed in a folded sheet, on which Royce has himself written out the title. See Index Part II for a full analysis of this article.

Folder 9: “Intention of the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus. 1875. [undergraduate thesis]”

A typeset copy of his undergraduate thesis.

Box 115: Papers of Josiah Royce

More notebooks from Royce’s student days at UC Berkeley.

Folders 1-5: “Profs. le Conte and Rising Lecture notes. 1 of 5 Folders ca. 1872-1875”

These folders contain small 3” by 5” notebooks full of Royce’s penciled notes from these science classes.

Box 116: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Newspapers Lincoln Observer June 1869 (4p.)”

This newspaper clipping includes a very early Royce essay, written shortly after Lincoln’s assassination: “Is The Assassination of Tyrants Every Justifiable,” *The Lincoln Observer* vol. 2 (June 1869): 2. Royce was 14 at the time.

Folder 2: “Newspapers Neolian Review March 1873 (4p.)”

A copy of the *Neolean Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1873) that does not contain an article credited to Royce. Since Royce saved this paper, perhaps he contributed to the issue, although he is not credited.

Folder 3: “Newspapers Neolean Review April 1873 (4p.)”

“Sound and Silence,” *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1873): 1. The article is signed “X.Z.,” but Skrupskelis attributes it to Royce.

Folder 4: “Newspapers Neolean Review June 1873 (4 p.)

A copy of *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 4 (June 1873). There is not an article in this issue attributed to Royce, nor does Skrupskelis mention him. There is, however, a poem in this issue credited to the author “El Olvidado.” Since Royce saved this paper, perhaps he contributed to the issue, although he is not credited.

Folder 5: “Newspapers Neolean Review August 1873 (4p.)”

This copy of the *Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 6 (although the number has been ripped off) contains notes (apparently in Royce’s hand) in the margin which read, repeatedly “Royce.”

Folder 6: “Newspapers Neolean Review November 1873 (4p.)”

A copy of *The Neolean Review*, vol. 1, no. 8 (November 1873). Although Royce saved a copy of this issue, there is no article attributed to him here.

Folder 7: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, January 1874 (16 p.)”

“Recent Discussions on Class Feeling,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1874): 7. Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title. The piece is attributed to “J.R.”

Folder 8: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, Feb. 1874 (16 p.)”

“The Problem of Class Feeling,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 2 (February 1874): 5. Again, Royce handwrites a “J.” beside the title of this piece, which is signed “J.R. ‘75”. By class, Royce means school classes, viz. freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. Oppenheim notes that this “collegian” Royce foreshadows the well-known response in “Meditation Before the Gate.” His desire for global human unity is already evident.

Folder 9: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, March 1874 (16 p.)”

Royce has put his name at top of this issue - *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 3 (March 1874). Skrupskelis does not list this number in the published student works. Nevertheless, Royce has kept this copy.

Folder 10: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, May 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue contains a copy of the article “Literary Education,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 5 (May 1874): 4-5. Again, he marks the title in the copy with a “J.” and signs the piece “J.R. ’75”. In the piece, he replies to “Albion’s” article in a previous *Berkeleyan* issue (vol. 1 no. 4; that issue is contained above, Box 116, folder 9).

Folder 11: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, June 1874 (16 p.)”

An issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 6 (June 1874). No article attributed to Royce in this

issue.

Folder 12: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, July 1874 (16 p.)

An issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 7 (July 1874). No article attributed to Royce in this issue.

Folder 13: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, August 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue includes the Royce piece “Comments Suggested by a Principle in the Science of History, *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 8 (August 1874): 4.

Royce notes a “J.8” in a handwritten note by the title on page 4. The article is signed “J.R. ‘75”.

Folder 14: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, September 1874 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 9 (September 1874). There does not appear to be an article by Royce in this issue.

Folder 15: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, October 1874 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 10 (September 1874). There does not appear to be an article by Royce in this issue. Although he is an editor in his final year, his name is not yet listed on the masthead.

Folder 16: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, December 1874 (16 p.)”

This issue contains Royce’s “The Prince of Denmark,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 1, no. 12 (December 1874): 3-5. This is a very long article (9 columns of newspaper text). The article is signed “J. Royce ‘75”.

Folder 17: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, January 1875 (16 p.)”

This issue contains Royce’s “The Literary Artist and the Work of Literary Art,” *The Berkeleyan* vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1875): 3-5. Royce writes “S2” beside the title in the margin. It is signed “J. Royce ‘75”

Folder 18: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, February 1875 (16 p.)”

This issue contains several Royce pieces. He puts notes in the margin beside each of the titles, “S2-7” respectively. “J. Royce” does appear on the masthead. The Royce articles in this issue are as follows:

- “McCollough’s Hamlet,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 5.
- “The Death of President Durant,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.

- “Editorial Responsibility,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 8.
- “Draper’s Religion and Science,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 9.
- “Henry Durant,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-11.
- “The Exercises on the Day of the Funeral Monday, January 25,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 10-12. (This piece is unsigned, but is initialed here on this copy.)
- “Notes on Exchanges,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1875): 12. (In these exchanges, Royce foreshadows his own editorial work at the *International Journal of Ethics* by covering skim reading many college periodicals, offering his comments.)

Folder 19: “Newspapers The Oakland Daily News. March 2, 1875 (3 p.)”

A copy of “Truth in Art” in *The Oakland Daily News* (March 2, 1875): 1. A heading at the top of the article reads: “Prize oration delivered by Josiah Royce of the Senior Class of the State University.” The speech had been delivered on February 26, 1875. This newspaper article is described in Skrupskelis *BWJR*:2 1174.

Folder 20: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, March 1875 (16 p.)”

A copy of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875). There are several articles by Royce in this issue. Again, he makes handwritten notes next to their titles in the margins, S8-11 respectively. On the masthead in this issue, he is listed simply as an editor. The Royce article in this issue are as follows:

- “Turgenieff’s ‘Liza,’” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 6
- “The Vassar Miscellany and ‘Middlemarch,’” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 8-9. (Unsigned, but Royce does make a mark in the margin by the title.)
- “Irving and his Critics,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 10. (Irving is an English actor.)
- “Notes on Exchanges,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1875): 11-12 (Not all of this article is by Royce.)

Folder 21: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, May 1875 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5, in which there are several pieces by Royce as follows:

- “Elaine and Ophelia,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 4-5
- “A Chess Club,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 8. (Royce calls for the

formation of a chess club.)

- “The Aim of Criticism,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 9.
- “The Commencements Appointments,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1875): 10.

Folder 22: “Newspapers The Berkeleyan, June 1875 (16 p.)”

A copy of an issue of *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6, in which there are several pieces by Royce. He is still listed as an editor on the masthead. Royce graduated this month from UC Berkeley; this was the last issue of *The Berkeleyan* with which he is involved. The following is a list of his articles in this issue:

- “The ‘Holy Grail’ of Tennyson,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 4-6. (Royce doesn’t put an “S” marking by the title of this piece.)
- “A Word about the ‘Ideal’ in Science and in Art,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875):
- (Occasioned by the first chapter of George Henry Lewes’ Book *Problems of Life and Mind*, concerning the “Ideal Construction of Science.” Lewes was Marian Evans’ – that is, George Eliot’s -- partner.)
- “Draper and ‘Religion,’” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 8-9 (Attributed to Royce because it refers to an earlier essay on Draper. The piece is not signed.)
- “The Tragic as Conceived by the Ancients and the Moderns,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 10 (This is almost a précis of his undergraduate thesis on *Aeschylus*.)
- “Notes on Exchanges,” *The Berkeleyan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1875): 13 (This is unsigned.)

Folder 23: “Newspaper The Berkeleyan December 1878 (55p.)”

A copy of Vol. VI of the *Berkeleyan*, including the piece “The Monkish Chronicle,” *The Berkeleyan* vol. 6 (1878): 265-80. Although this piece is usually attributed to Royce, there is a question as to whether he actually wrote it. Royce had at this point been back Berkeley at to teach for only for four months.

Box 117: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “A2. Lotze, Metaphysik. Praktished Philosophie. Ca. 1876”

A bound hard-backed 8 ½” by 11” volume of Royce’s notes from lectures heard in Germany.

Folder 2: “A3. Prof. Baumann. History of Ancient Philosophy. 1876”

A bound hard-backed 8 ½” by 11” volume of Royce’s notes from lectures heard in Germany.

Folder 3: “A4. Prof. Enneper. Integral Calculus. ca. 1876

A bound hard-backed 8 ½” by 11” volume of Royce’s notes from lectures heard in Germany.

Folder 4: “A5. Misc. Fragments. Analyses & Scraps. 1876 (material dated 1872 have been cut out”

A hard-backed notebook, with this title on its cover: “Josiah Royce, California State University, Class of 1875.” Many pages have been cut out. The first page of notes is numbered “41,” and continues through “67.”

Folder 5: “Lectures on the Return to Kant. A6. March 1877”

A thick, hard-bound volume, with colorful end papers. Royce titles them, on a handwritten title page, *The “Return to Kant,” in Modern German Thought. Lectures with Notes and Appendices*. It is signed “J. Royce. Fellow J.H.U. Baltimore, March 1877.” (Royce did his doctoral work at Johns Hopkins University.) An “Introductory Note” to the volume states that the lectures were given “as a sort of informal presentation of a few thoughts on one of the most significant movements of contemporary German thought.”

Box 118: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “German Literature, Classic to Romantic Periods. B3(I), B3(II), B3(III) Notebooks. Ca 1876-1878”

A soft-covered Royce notebook from when he was a student at Johns Hopkins.

Folder 2: “B.4(I). Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876”

A soft-covered Royce notebook, with pages numbered 1-40, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. His notes are in German and English. He does not mention Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Folder 3: “B.4(II), Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 41-80, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. Royce does not mention Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in this notebook.

Folder 4: “B.4. (III). Hegel, History of Philosophy. October 1876.”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 81-85, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. Notes in English and German.

Folder 5: “B.5(I). Hegel Logik. Nov. 1876”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-40, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. 40 pages. At page 17, Royce first deals with Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Two months into his time in Germany, Royce encounters what will become in his own work the central Hegelian text.

Folder 6: “B.6(I). Spinoza. Abstracts and Criticism. Nov. 1876”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-40, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. [See notes directly below at folder 7.]

Folder 7: “B.6(II). Spinoza Abstracts and Criticisms.”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 41-71, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins.

In the two notebooks included here and in folder 6, Royce makes notes on Spinoza, beginning with the intention to examine both Spinoza’s *Ethics* and his *De Deo*. The two notebooks, however, treat Spinoza’s *Ethics* only.

Folder 8: “B.8(I). Kant Abstracts and Criticisms. Nov. 1876”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-38. On the inside cover, Royce calls this section “The Writings of the Pre-Critical Period.”

Folder 9: “B.9(I). Kant Abstracts and Criticisms. Sec. 1 Supplement. Jan. 1877.”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-11, with the “supplement” designation on the inside cover.

Folder 10: “B.10(I). Kant Abstracts and Criticisms.”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-26.

Folder 11: “B.11(I). Kant. General Comments”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-22. This title appears on the front of the notebook.

Folder 12: “B.11(I). Kant. General Comments. 1877-1878”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 49-70.

Folder 13: “General notebook for Literature, Classics, Philology, and Criticism, Part I.

1875”

A hard-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-79. These notes were made directly after his arrival in Germany.

Folder 14: “New Books and Essays. General Notes on Periodic Literature. Notebook B12(II). November 1876.”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-12, from Royce’s student days at Johns Hopkins. Royce is voraciously reading articles, often in German and French. His reading reveals the fact that Royce is keeping up with both philosophical and literary worlds.

Folder 15: “Notes on Logic, Wundt’s Lectures. Notebook B.13 (I). 1875-1876”

A hard-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-15, titled “Note Book On Logic. Section I. Wundts’s Lectures (Leipzig, Winter Sem. ’75-6”). Wundt was one of Royce’s most important teachers.

Cf. Box 106, folder 8, document 7, for loose notes on Wundt that appear to come from the same period.

Folder 16: “Notes on the Theory of Knowledge. B14(I).”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-31. The inside cover of this notebook is titled “Notes on the Theory of Knowledge. I. The Development [*sic*] of the Intellect: A. In the Individual.” The entire notebook deals with Herbert Spencer.

Folder 17: “General Notes on Mathematics. B.15. 1876-1878, 1882”

A soft-covered notebook, with pages numbered 1-17.

Folder 18: “Notes on the History of Philosophy”

This folder contains two groups of folded page “fascicles.” The first group contains one such “fascicle,” and is titled “Windelband.” It consists of 16 of these folded pages, written front and back.

The second group is titled “Notebook on the History of Philosophy Part II. Greek Philosophy” It consists of five “fascicles” of various lengths. The notes are in English, Greek and German.

Box 119: Papers of Josiah Royce

The folders in this box contain materials from Royce’s year in Germany (1875-76) and his first year back in Baltimore (1876-77). The folder materials move back and forth between these two periods in this box.

Folder 1: “Student notes. (“J. Royce” on Cover). 1875-1876 [notebook]”

A small 3” x 5” notebook . The inside front cover contains some pencil notes, that indicates an address (258 N. Eutaw), perhaps jotted in on his return to Baltimore. The notebook is not dated, but looks to be a very early notebook from his time in Germany. The notes reflect his reading and study of the German philosophers, as well the Greek philosopher Thales, and the Pre-Socratics generally. The notes reveal Royce’s independent criticality even as a student.

Folder 2: “Class Notes on Schopenhauer and his “Vierfache Wurzel.” (6 parts) Winter 1876-1877”

A set of six lectures on Schopenhauer, six separate bound “folios.” These are carefully recorded manuscripts of the first class he *taught*, on Schopenhauer, at Johns Hopkins as a graduate student. (See *Life* at 67.)

Folder 3: “Early Draft of Introduction to [Royce’s] Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins. Ca. 1877”

A 5 page manuscript of a draft for the introduction to his dissertation, titled at the top of page one: “Introduction. Scope and Method of the Undertaking.”

Folder 4: “[German] Romanticists. Ca. 1876-1877”

A soft bound “folio,” with only three and a half manuscript pages filled in. The first page, however, is numbered 53. This folio, therefore, seems to be the second or third of a series, for which we lack the first two. The notes appear to be excerpts of reading, particularly in periodicals. Royce closes with a list of the birthdays of many of the German Romanticists.

Folder 5: “Growth of Indo-European Structure. Prof. Whitney. ca. 1876-1877”

A small 3” by 5” notebook, which hinges lengthways. The first page is headed “Prof. Whitney. Growth of Indo-European Structure.” The contents reveal Royce’s interest in language and close attention to traditions.

Folder 6: “Ph.D. Thesis of the Interdependence the Principles of Knowledge.ca 1878.” [sic]

A bound 152-page volume, this is a typescript of Royce’s doctoral thesis, which he submitted on April 2, 1878 at Johns Hopkins University. The original 343 page manuscript is housed in the JHU Archives. See *Life*, 69; see also Box 54 for various manuscript drafts of the dissertation. Other manuscript drafts are found throughout the HARP collection, e.g. at Box 120, folder 2.

The title page of this full copy reads: “Of the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge,” with the subtitle “An Investigation of the problems of Elementary Epistemology. In two Chapters. With an introduction on the Principal Ideas and Problems in which the Discussion takes its Rise.”

The volume includes a six page preface. This particular hard bound copy of the dissertation is a 1927 Gift Walter E. Rothman, with the proviso that it not be copied or reproduced. That limitation was removed in 1958 by the archivist.

Box 120: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “On the Origins of German Philosophy.”

A collection of three “fascicles,” consisting altogether of 107 pages on folded sheets, written front and back. (Previously collected at Box 104.)

Folder 2: “Notes. Relating to Logic and the theory of Knowledge (3 parts). July-August 1877. Preliminaries to the Degree Essays.”

A collection of three fascicles that are preliminary drafts of sections of the Royce doctoral dissertation. See Box 119, folder 6 above, for a complete copy of the dissertation.

Folder 3-6:

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Boxes 121-24: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection. These boxes contain letters written to Royce, many by prominent philosophers of the day.

Box 125: The Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1-5:

Folders 1-5 contain correspondence, with folders 1 and 4 containing letters written by Royce. See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection for details. Folder 4 contains a letter to “Miss Manson,” who had been a Royce student. Radcliffe Archivist Jane S. Knowles identified Manson as a “Special” student, probably Elizabeth Emerson Manson, born 1863, who took Royce’s “Phil3” class (The Philosophy of Nature) at Radcliffe in 1898-1899 at the age of 35.

Also included in folder 4 is a 31 page manuscript of a letter from Royce to G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, dated February 14, 1898. See *Letters* 366-73.

Folder 6: “The Work of the Truth Seeker ca. 1878-1882”

Contained in this folder are two “fascicles” (groups of folded pages written front and back) with 24 and 28 manuscript pages respectively. The pages are not numbered. If these dates are accurate, this is Berkeley writing and much of the material will go into *RAP*. The fact that the last 9 pages of the second folio are written in Katharine’s hand may help to date this piece. They

met in 1879, and were married on October 2, 1880.

“Fascicle 1”

This first group of pages (with a crossed-out title “Truth-Seeking and its Consequences”) is completely in Royce’s hand. In the left margin Royce gives the title as “The Work of the Truth-Seeker (a Lecture for a Learned Society)”.

“Fascicle 2”

In this second group, the last nine pages are not written in Royce’s hand; they were probably written by Katharine Royce. This fascicle does appear to continue the essay in the first. Because the first group of pages ends with a complete sentence and the second group begins with a new sentence, it is difficult to tell for certain. This fascicle, like the first, is heavily edited, with whole paragraphs and pages crossed out.

Folder 7: “Lecture III. Course, Introductory. ca. 1876-1882”

A group of loose, but apparently previously bound, un-numbered pages in Royce’s hand. These pages were formerly found in Box 106.

Folder 8: “Lecture IV [Logic] Psychological Experimentation. Ca. 1878?”

A small (3” by 8”) soft-covered notebook written in Royce’s hand, titled only “Lecture IV” on its first page.

**Folder 9: “(1) Index A-M (First half) ca. 1878-1882
(2) Summary of essay on the “Theory of Truth”**

A group of loose sheets between two hard covers. The first half of the “volume” incorporates an alphabetical index of Royce’s reading notes. At page 100, Royce begins a “Summary of an Essay (projected) on the ‘Principles of the Theory of Truth.’” That manuscript runs from page 100 to page 106. It starts with an outline for five books. (Books I-III list chapter titles; Book IV only has one chapter listed; Book V lists no chapters.)

Box 126: Papers of Josiah Royce

**Folder 1: “‘Special Questions Selected’ Contains:
1. Index N-V page 151-212
2. Kant p 1-53
3. Thought Diary page 100-145”**

A single hard-backed 8” x 10” notebook, divided into three topic sections, as suggested by the folder’s archival title. The volume is titled “Special Questions Selected” on its front. It’s title page reads: “Notes on Special Question, Selected from Various Authorities (With Comments & References) pages 100 end p.) Thought Diary. Date of First Entry Sept. 24, 1878.” The whole book, however, starts November 1876. (The date is noted in the bottom left corner of the title page.) This early date probably refers to the cards in the index in the last third of the book. Many pages are blank.

Much interesting autobiographical information is included in this notebook.

Folder 2-12

See the Harvard University Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection for details.

Box 127: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "Lectures on Ethical Ideals in Relation to Society. Notebook."

A small (3" x 5") leather soft-covered notebook, it is not dated. But these seem to be lectures from 1883, when Royce had just begun teaching at Harvard. See *Life*, 115.

Folder 2: "Lecture IV."

A small (3" x 5") leather soft-covered notebook. (This cover has a different leather pattern than the notebook in folder 1 in this Box.) Several pages are cut out from the front of the book at several intervals. On the first page remaining, Royce writes "Lecture IV," but the "lecture" is undated and the pages are not numbered. The writing is deeply autobiographical, and something of a discovery.

Folder 3: "Guide for Thesis Work in Philosophy 4 ca. 1882-1883"

The first of two "guides." Phil. 4 is Royce's Ethics class.

Folder 4: "Philosophy 3 Class Rolls and Notes; Fragmentary "California" Notes; Philosophy 13 Class Roll – ca. 1886-1887; Notes on Spinoza; Spencer"

A fragile, hard-backed 5" by 8" notebook. On the inside cover page are notes for an exam in this class. (A logical formula is jotted on this inside cover.)

Folder 5: "Kant Lectures 1888-1889"

The introductory lecture is dated "Oct. 2 '88". Royce had just returned from Australia. The notes were evidently prepared for a seminar.

Box 128: Papers of Josiah Royce

This box contains three bundles of cards on which Royce has made, as was his habit, notes relating to specific topics.

Box 129: Papers of Josiah Royce

***Folder 4: "Lecture III on Religious Philosophy. Philosophy Notes. Ca. 1892-1895"**

A small (5" by 7") hard-backed notebook. This may be the notebook to which Clendenning refers in his notes to *Life* at 115. (formerly Box E) The date in the folder title is misleading. This appears to be one of Royce's early lectures at Harvard, circa 1883. (See *Life*, 115.) The manuscript is not paginated.

There may be autobiographical material in this lecture. The notebook itself does not make reference to which lecture this is. "Lecture III on Rel. Phil." is written on the notebook's cover. As an autobiographical note: at the start of "Religious Aspect of Philosophy Lecture III" on the third and fourth pages, there is an autobiographical linkage between Royce and John S. Hittell. In describing R examples of illimitably free thought, Royce discusses California and Hittell. He doesn't name Hittell, but cites his book, *The Evidences Against Christianity* (1857). See *Letters* 1884.

Folder 1-3 and 5-13:

See the Harvard University Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection for details.

Box 130: Papers of Josiah Royce

Materials from various of Royce's classes at Harvard. See the Harvard University Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection for details.

Box 131: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folders 3-24 contain materials contributed to HARP by Nancy Ingraham Hacker.

Folder 1: "Seminary in Comparative Methodology. [notes of Harry T. Costello] 1913-14]

A copy of 274 pages of Harry Costello's notes from this well-known Royce seminar. These notes have been published. The notes provide a very interesting picture of Royce at this time. T.S. Eliot was among the students who took part in the seminar. The notes were edited for publication.

A note in red pencil, with the initial "G.S." is dated 1961, and reads: "Marginal queries are in nearly all cases those of the typist who prepared a typescript."

Folder 2: "Ethics manuscript by Rome G. Brown"

A thick typescript, this is probably a dissertation. It bears the title "Evolutional Ethics: A Criticism of the Spencerian Theory of the Basis of Moral Distinctions." Royce appears to have been on Brown's dissertation board.

Folder 3: "Josiah Royce [Sr.] 1812-1888 General biography, obituary genealogical chart"

This is apparently a tribute by Sarah Eleanor Royce (Royce's mother) and one of her daughters to their husband/father.

Folder 4: "Rochester NY. Royce, 1845, 1846-1845 [Bayliss]

Folder 5: "Iowa to California, 1849 April – October Typed Summaries"

Excerpts from *The California Trail, an Epic with Many Heroes*, by George Stewart (1962). Reference to a famous trail guide people used. Many of these incidents from *Frontier Lady*.

Folder 6: "Placerville, Weaverville, Mississippi Bar California undated Typed excerpts"

Folder 7: "Another Josiah Royce? Nancy Hacker inquires about land transactions"

Apparently, Nancy Hacker was looking in Shasta County to see if there had been Royce family property transactions there.

Folder 8: "Contra Costa County 1852 census information, lawsuit"

Copy of the lawsuit against Josiah Royce [Sr.]

Folder 9: "Auburn, CA Summaries of newspaper articles and interview notes"

Hacker notes include list of churches in Auburn (and notes about Sarah Eleanor's denominational affiliation).

Folder 10: "Grass Valley, CA undated summaries and excerpts"

Town plans and land deeds, plus Hacker typewritten notes.

Folder 11: "Nevada 1962- 1965 Letter from Josiah Royce Sr. to his brother, inquiries about land transaction"

This is Nevada County, not the state. A well known letter from Josiah (Royce's father) to his brother Robert. The folder contains a map, including I-80. (The environs of Grass Valley.) Copies of pages from a book that describes towns in the area.

Folder 12: "San Francisco 1865-1870 City directory information and church attendance information"

Handwritten Hacker notes, more information about where the Royce family lived, etc.

Folder 13: "Los Gatos 1881-1888? Newspaper photo of town"

A newspaper photo of two buildings on West Main Street (including the “Christian Church” founded in 1884). Royce’s mother and sister Ruth live in this house after Royce leaves. It is the home in which Royce’s father died. Also included is a letter to Hacker from the minister of the Christian Church in Los Gatos.

Folder 14: “San Jose 1889-1891”

Royce’s sister Ruth was a librarian in San Jose. His mother, Sarah Eleanor, is buried here, alongside her husband in the Oak Hill Memorial Mortuary. A map of the cemetery is included.

Folder 15: “Mary Eleanor Royce”

Several essays (manuscripts) by Royce’s oldest sister Mary are included in this folder. Their mother had been a school teacher. It was apparently her practice to require her children to write essays, above and beyond their school. Mary, who married Ossian Ingraham, is Nancy Hacker’s grandmother.

Also included are letters apparently written by Mary to her daughter Stella. Another daughter, Ruth Ingraham, writes a note about her mother Mary.

Folder 16: “Ruth Royce”

Biographical notes concerning Royce’s sister Ruth, as well as a handwritten copy (by Ruth?) of Longfellow’s “Footsteps of Angels.” Newspaper articles concerning her retirement after 37 years as librarian of the “State Normal School,” the college that eventually became San Jose State.

Two letters in this folder are from “Aunt Ruth” to “Roy,” as well as a letter dated March 11, 1929 (the year Ruth died) to “Nancy.” Roy is the son of Royce’s third sister Harriet or “Hattie.”

Folder 17: “Harriet Royce [Barney]”

Biographical information concerning Royce’s sister “Hattie.” Harriet married Charles S. Barney, whom she later divorced; they had one son, Roy (Charles Royce Barney) who apparently served in World War I (his poem is included here). Hattie worked as an insurance saleswoman. She died in February 1930, soon after Ruth’s death (November 1929). Her death certificate is included here. Also included is a picture of Harriet’s daughter-in-law (“Mrs. Royce Barney”).

Folder 18: “Other Royces”

Extended Royce relatives, genealogy collected by Nancy Hacker.

Folder 19: “Loose material 1979-1985 1 of 5 folders undated”

Confirmation of the Hacker collection as source of these notes in this box. (A letter, e.g., to “Dear Cousin Nancy”) The first document reflects the Royce pew at the First Congregational Church in Oakland. Genealogical notes compiled by Hacker.

Folder 20: “Loose material 1854-1889 and undated 2 of 5”

Hacker biographical material regarding the Royce family.

Folder 21: “Loose Material 1976, 1997 3 of 5 folders”

Hacker biographical material regarding the Royce family.

Folder 22: “Loose Material 1954-1972 4 of 5 folders”

Hacker biographical and genealogical material, with specific reference to Katharine Head Royce’s family. (One letter begins “Dear ‘HEAD-hunter’”.)

Folder 23: “Loose Material Reese River Reveille [newspaper] 5 of 5 folders 1976”

A sample of the newspaper from the town where the Royce family lived.

Folder 24: “Oakland 1873-1881”

Hacker has made notes from the Oakland California Directories for this period of time. By 1875, there is no one by the name of Royce left in Oakland.

Box 132: Papers of Josiah Royce

Nancy Hacker papers, relating to the Ingraham family.

Box 133: Papers of Josiah Royce

Genealogical information from Nancy Hacker. folder 12 contains a very detailed genealogy chart.

Box 134: Papers of Josiah Royce

Royce family Correspondence from the Crystal Falls Collection (Katharine to her children and husband, correspondence among Katharine and her family).

Box 135: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “1881-1884”

Head family correspondence, as well as two letters from E.R. Sill. Anna (Katharine Head Royce’s sister) is staying with her brother Charles in Brookline.

Folder 2: “1885-1890”

Head family (Katharine Royce's family) correspondence.

Folder 3: "1891-1899"

Royce family correspondence, including letters from Royce's mother, his brother-in-law, and sisters (inter alia).

Folder 4: "1900"

Eliza Head as well as Katharine's letters to her boys on 103 Irving Street stationery.

Folder 5: "1901"

Katharine Royce letters to her sister Anna, in Greece (circa 1901) as well as Eliza letters. Other letters from her sons (Ned writes under his nickname "Nenny-Penny." Stephen writes to "Fuffy," that name being apparently what the Royce sons called their mother, and what she occasionally called herself. Many of the notes are on stationery with black edging, indicating a death in the family.

Folder 6: "1902-1903"

Correspondence among Katharine and her sons, as well as a letter to Stephen from Ruth Royce. A letter from Royce to Stephen is included in this folder (from Berkeley, July 28, 1902). He signs the letter "Yours lovingly Josiah."

Folder 7: "1904-1905"

Correspondence among Katharine and her sons. Some, the boys to each other, some from the mother to the boys, some the boys to their mother. Also from Ruth Royce (in San Jose) to Stephen.

Folder 8: "1906-1910"

A letter written to Josiah Royce around the time of the earthquake. Signed "A.H." (Anna Head). Reports on the safety of his sisters. Other than this principally letters to and from Stephen Royce.

Box 136: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "1911-1912"

Family correspondence after Christopher's death, before Royce's death.

Folder 2: "1913"

Stephen correspondence from his time out west; letters from Ruth to Royce; a letter from Marion

to Stephen, with a tribute to Josiah in saving their relationship (in the wake of the Ms. Grady scandal). (They will come to name their own son Josiah.) Much correspondence about “the broken engagement.”

Folder 3: “1914”

Family correspondence, principally from Stephen and Marion (newlyweds) to Katharine and Royce. Some letters back to them from Katharine.

Folder 4: “1915 Jan-May”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce.

Folder 5: “1915 June-Sept”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce.

Folder 6: “1915 Oct-Dec”

Family correspondence, Stephen and Marion, Ned and Elizabeth, with Katharine Royce. A letter here, also, from Hattie (Harriet) to “Dear Brother” (Josiah).

Box 137: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Box 138: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Box 139: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1-4:

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Folder 5: “Josiah Royce’s Bible January 1869”

A bible given to Royce in 1869 by his mother Sarah Eleanor Royce, printed in 1867. She inscribes her gift in the front of the book.

Box 140: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Box 141: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Box 142: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: "Romance of a Princess"

By Carmen Sylva. This 287 page manuscript is a translation, by Katharine Royce, of Carmen Sylva's novel by this name. The novel is set in a series of letters in the late 1800's, between Ulrique the princess of the Castle of Rachenstein, on the Lahn, and a Doctor Bruno Halmuth, Professor in the University of Greifswald. Sylvia Carmen was the pen name for the Queen of Romania, a noted author of the time.

Folder 2: "Loewenberg check list"

This list, in a 7" x 8 ½" hard-backed notebook is titled by Loewenberg. The next folder (3), is a much larger notebook (9 ½ X 14) titled simply "Loewenberg's List" (without the "check").

In this list, Loewenberg details much of the material that eventually comes down to HARP. This notebook seems to be Loewenberg checking the collection in Royce's study, perhaps after Royce's death, before Loewenberg goes to California, and before he makes the request that these manuscripts be sent to California. FMO would date this checklist ca. late 1916 early 1917.

These two notebooks are of radical importance for archivists and Royce scholars. The first, the smaller notebook, seems to be Loewenberg's notes, as he listens to Royce describe his work. There is a list of Royce's periodical articles on slightly larger sheets at the close of the notebook. That Royce may have been dictating the titles of his works is shown by such references as to "The Opening of the Great West Del.[ivered] at "Old South" in a Summer Course, Rough Ms." This seems to be something that Loewenberg would not have known without information from Royce.

Folder 3: "Lo[e]wenberg's List, Rand and Hocking's Check Enclosed, 1930"

A larger 9" x 12" notebook, referred to in older folder 2 above. It includes two additional, significant lists, inserted inside the notebook on loosed sheets.

Like the list above, this is full of different Royce writings, beginning with "Pussy Blackie's Travels," and going on to a list of reprints.

Notations beside the entries may indicate which of the texts Loewenberg considers for his collection of Royce work published shortly after Royce's death, *Fugitive Essays*.

Box 143: Papers of Josiah Royce

Folder 1: “Various Newsclippings, 1914, and undated”

One reprint from *The New Republic*. Titled “Norman Hapgood,” signed “P.L.” it is a memorial to Hapgood. There is one reference to Royce in its first sentence.

Folder 2: “Untitled Manuscripts ‘Fairy Tales, The Greeks.’ Ca. 1872”

A very early group of manuscript pages in Royce’s hand. Not one organic manuscript. There are 8 manuscript sheets, with reverse side used (with parts of his first draft on the back sides of the pages). The main composition here concerns a famous passage in *Antigone*, and deals with themes presented by *Antigone* and *Creon*.

There is no date given on the sheets themselves. It is unknown how the archivist arrived at the 1872 date, but it is a good guess. (It does appear to be from his preparatory year, just before UCB.)

Cf. Box 114, folder 9, the typeset text of Royce’s undergraduate thesis on *Aeschylus*.

Folder 3: “Truth in Art, by Aleph (2 C) 1875”

Folder 4-8:

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Boxes 144-151: Papers of Josiah Royce

Photographs.

Box 152: Papers of Josiah Royce

Nitrate negatives in ten sleeves, 5 negatives in each sleeve. Oppenheim hypothesizes that Royce family members may be among these pictures?

Box 154: Papers of Josiah Royce

See the Harvard Archives Finding Aid to the Royce Collection.

Box 155: Papers of Josiah Royce

Photographs.