



- The third Chapter would take up the Reasoning Process and the Ideas in Themselves. -  
 - The fourth Chapter would treat of the Synthesis of Science and of the forms of the Same (including the Synthesis of Ethics).  
 - The fifth Chapter would treat of Synthesis as a volitional activity, of the World as Will, of the Ideas in Themselves as the Things in Themselves, of the ~~same~~ problem of the "Object of Knowledge" (Knowledge being never a thing, but always of a thing), and, in conclusion of the ethical purpose of philosophy.

Oct. 26

- In the course of some class-room discussion on the purpose of Education, the following scheme of the content and objects of life was suggested to my mind, partly by accident, partly by reminiscences of Kropotkin's.

The Volitional Content of life is to be subsumed under the following heads: -

- A. The Pursuit of Pleasure.
- B. The Avoidance of Pain.
- A': The Willing of the Cause of Pleasure.
- B': The Willing-avoid of the Cause of Pain.
- C. The Pursuit of life as such, apart from the predominance in it of pleasure or pain.

Education is followed as a means to an end. Education may itself give us pleasure, or distract our attention from, or make

us less sensitive to pain. But because we can never be sure of such a result from Education, the end of the direct attainment of pleasure, or that of the direct avoidance of pain, is not an end sufficient to justify so much time spent upon Education. - Education may give us, however, knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain. Thus it will become indirectly useful, will, as falling under the activities A' & B', be looked upon as a good; and the result will be: Practical Education. - But now how is Theoretic Education to be justified? The answer is, by declaring it a case of the activities C. - The Pursuit of life does not mean simply self-preservation. This is present everywhere in our volition and needs not a separate head. But ~~the~~ self-preservation we ~~add~~ <sup>add</sup> the pursuit of intensity, breadth, depth of life. - This may seem at first merely a case of the pursuit of pleasure. It is not. The Will to live takes the form of a striving after self-development, extension of experience, increase of the quantity and refinement of the quality of consciousness. Such development we consider an end in itself, and choose it without reference to the probable pleasure or pain. We know that it will be pleasurable or painful, but we know that which Nature allows it. - For the sake of



Dec. 13.

The Truth of the Memory. The Memory when analyzed fundamentally cannot appear as a reproduction of the past. Memory is a present fact. This principle is the simple result of the epistemological analysis. A given fact of present consciousness includes or rather is itself, the <sup>act of</sup> Will whose content is a Past. The Present cannot, logically be based upon the Past. The Past is but one element or moment in the Present consciousness; one of the directives of the present will. — But the other side of this truth, is important. The philosophic consciousness, which on the basis of a constant postulation of a Past generalizes, and thus declares the Present to stand in Real relation to a Past, must also declare all Past in necessary relation to the Present. And the psychological expression of this postulate, ~~with its~~ <sup>with its</sup> limitation to the individual consciousness, is the so often miraculously proposed proposition that nothing <sup>is</sup> in the mind is ever really lost. This proposition takes numerous forms, but it is really but this one postulate: That the past has a reality in reference to the present; or, in reference to the individual soul, that the past for each individual has constant relation to

cf. pp. 136-37.

the present. The only objection to this latter formula is that it is apt to be misunderstood. It is in fact but the formal expression of a potential memory, an expression based on purely logical grounds. It is apt to become, through misunderstanding, a palimpsest theory of most alarmingly sentimental character. — In all this is contained at once the criticism and the justification of the Herbartian doctrine of Volkmann, Psychol. § 74, Vol. I, pp. 11, 15 on the Fortbestehen of the Vorstellungen.

— Interesting is the ~~doctrine~~ <sup>doctrine</sup> of Suabedissen (~~quoted~~ <sup>quoted</sup> by Volkmann loc. cit. p. 174) "der das Bewusstsein als eine Eigenthümlichkeit des Gemüthes definiert, nach welcher Alles, was in ihm vorhanden, nicht bloss real, sondern auch ideal ist, d. h. nicht bloss ist, sondern auch gedacht wird."

— It seems quite certain that the substantiality attributed to the object of self-consciousness is based on the fact that, owing to a certain, ~~apparent~~ <sup>apparent</sup> unity of the larger portion of it, it forms a reality and easy field for the application of the fundamental hypotheses of the Principles of Knowledge.

Dec. 14

If circumstances prove favorable the following three essays may soon be prepared:

- "In the Footsteps of Kant".
- Heinrich v. Kleist. <sup>(Significance)</sup>
- Self-Consciousness: Its Nature. <sup>(?)</sup>

(a) will discuss some of the late objections to Kant, the extension of his work contained in the efforts of Schopenhauer & Hodgson's *Alone*, and the significance of the proposed re-creating of the notion of "The World as Will".

(b) Will recast entirely the old lectures first given on Kleist, and will thus study him anew from a fresh reading of the text and the materials biographical and critical.

(c) will follow a schedule already roughly noted down.

Berkeley

1879

Jan. 16

— Rousseau *Le Nouv. Hel.*, *Oeuv.* 8, p. 74.  
 Claire writes to Julie: *la vive et tendre amitié qui nous unit — nous a, pour ainsi dire, éclairés le cœur de bonne heure sur tous les passions. Nous connaissons assez bien leurs signes et leurs effets; il n'y a que l'art de les réprimer qui nous manque.* — Perhaps here is in brief a characterization of Rousseau's aim in general, in the matter of devotion & practice.

Jan. 14

As food for reflection might serve the following words from Mosley's Rousseau, v. I, p. 77, sq., on the nature-sentiment of Rousseau and its significance: "In thinking of Rousseau's peculiar feeling for nature, which acquired such a decisive place in his characters during his life at Les Charmettes, it is to be remembered that it was entirely devoid of that stormy and evanescent quality which has grown up in more modern literature, out of the violent attempt to press nature into her most awful moods, into the service of the great revolt against a social and religious tradition that can no longer be endured. Of this ~~Rousseau~~ Rousseau [p. 78] was a chief, and his passion for natural aspects was connected with this attitude, but he did not seize those aspects which the poet of *Manfred* for example, forced into an imputed sympathy with his own rebellion. Rousseau always loved nature best in her moods of presence and serenity, and in proportion as she lent herself to such moods in men. He liked rain to be better than rivers. He would not breathe the sight of the sea, whose infertile bosom and blind rest — Rousseau always felt pain in the



Jan. 11 "melancholy" The ruins of a park affected  
 "him more than the ruins of castles."  
 "It is true that no plain, however  
 "beautiful, ever seemed so in his  
 "eyes; he required torrents, rocks, Aske  
 "for ~~rocks~~, mountains, and precipi-  
 "tices. This does not affect the fact  
 "that he never moralised appealingly  
 "any landscape, as post-revolu-  
 "tionary writers have done, and that  
 "the Alpine wastes which throw your  
 "pinnacled modern into a rapture, had  
 "no attraction for him. He could steep  
 "himself in nature without climbing  
 "fifteen thousand feet to find her. In  
 "landscape, as has been said by one  
 "with a right to speak [George Sand], Rousseau  
 "was truly a great artist, and you  
 "can, if you are artistic too, follow him  
 "with confidence in his wanderings;  
 "he understood that beauty does not  
 "require a great stage, and that the  
 "effect of things lies in their nearness  
 "----- [p. 79] "In truth, a man cannot  
 "escape from his time, and Rousseau  
 "did not belong to the eighteenth cen-  
 "tury, in being the victim of that capacities  
 "for feeling more, and the taste for  
 "objects inspiring it. Nature was  
 "a tender friend with softest bow,  
 "and no splinter with cruel enigma."  
 "He felt neither terror, nor any sense

"of the littleness of man, nor of the  
 "mysteriousness of life, nor of the  
 "unseen forces which make us their  
 "sport, as he peered over the precipice  
 "and heard the water roaring at  
 "the bottom of it; he only remained  
 "for hours enjoying the physical  
 "sensation of dizziness with which  
 "it turned his brain, with a break  
 "now and again for hurling large  
 "stones, and watching them roll  
 "and leap down into the torrent, with  
 "a little reflection and a little ar-  
 "tificate emotion as if he had been  
 "accidit."

Jan. 20 In Manfred, Act II, Sc. I, we have this:  
 "There is a calm upon me -  
 "Inexplicable stillness! which till now  
 "Did not belong to what I knew of life.  
 "If that I did not know philosophy  
 "To be of all our vanities the most, <sup>I have let the sea</sup>  
 "The nearest word that ever footed <sup>the</sup>  
 "From out the scholar's brain <sup>is</sup> <sup>forgotten</sup>  
 "The Golden secret, the sought "Hailon" found,  
 "But secret in my soul. It will not last,  
 "But it is well to have known it, though <sup>but once</sup>  
 "To breathe enlarged my thoughts with <sup>the</sup>  
 "And I within my tabernacle would not down <sup>the</sup>  
 "That there is such a feeling."  
 "The expiring breath this is, one would  
 "say, of the self-sick and weary Rousseau  
 "discussing the religious passion of the lecturer of stone

Jan. 31

Morley, Diderot (Chap. Le Encyclop., pp. 108, 9 in the Amer. Ed. - "This" (the breaking away of Rousseau from the Encyclopedic group) "was no mere quarrel of rival authors. It marked a fundamental divergence in thought, and proclaimed the beginning of a disastrous reaction in the very heart of the school of illumination. Among the most conspicuous elements of the reaction were these: the subordination of reason to emotion; the displacement of industry, science, energetic and many-sided ingenuity, by dreaming, intolerance; and finally, what brings us back to our starting-point, the suppression of opinion deemed to be anti-social by the secular arm. The old idea was brought back in a new dress. . . . Unfortunately for France, Rousseau's idea prospered, and ended by being mistaken its antagonist." - This serves as a characterization of Romanticism in its infancy.

Feb. 2 - Morley, Rousseau (vol. I, p. 140, Engl. Ed.) - "Nably (1709-85) . . . began his inquiries with Greece and Rome . . . remained entirely in this groove of thought until Rousseau appeared. He then gradually left Montaigne: to find the duties of the legislator, he said 'I descended into the abysses of my heart, I studied my sentiments'."

Feb. 12.

~~Medicine~~ Medicine before the Gate  
 I am a Valais man; and every day, by the order of the World-Spirit (whose ~~commands~~ <sup>commands</sup> we all do every day, whether we will it or no) I ~~have~~ <sup>am</sup> ~~accused~~ <sup>am</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> be found at my table in a certain place that looks down upon the Bay of San Francisco, and over the same view into the waters of the western ~~ocean~~ <sup>ocean</sup>. The place is not without beauty, and the prospect is far-reaching. Here as I do my work I often find time for contemplation. And the thoughts that ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~arise~~ <sup>arise</sup> upon the problems of our human life are such as I shall seek to ~~express~~ <sup>express</sup> in what follows.

That one ~~feels~~ <sup>regards</sup> the greatness of the world better when he rises a little above the level of the courtyards, and looks ~~out~~ <sup>out</sup> upon the large landscape, this we all know; and all of us must have wondered that a few feet of elevation should tend so greatly to change ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~feelings~~ <sup>feelings</sup> ~~towards~~ <sup>towards</sup> the ~~world~~ <sup>world</sup>. The place of which I speak is such ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>one</sup> ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> ~~hardly~~ <sup>hardly</sup> ~~imagine~~ <sup>imagine</sup> ~~there~~ <sup>there</sup> are not ~~other~~ <sup>other</sup> eyes beholding it than his own. For could a truly noble soul be nourished by the continual sight of ~~such~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~world~~ <sup>world</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~there~~ <sup>there</sup> is? But such would be not a little ~~strange~~ <sup>strange</sup>. Yet for most of us Nature is best a poor teacher.

Full <sup>to me</sup> ~~to me~~, she teaches something.  
 The high dark hills, on the ~~W. side~~ <sup>W. side</sup> shore  
 of the bay, the water at their feet, the  
 Golden Gate that breaks through them  
 and opens up to one ~~the view of the~~  
 sea beyond, the smoke ~~of the city~~ <sup>of the city</sup> at the  
 south of the Gate, and the barren ranges  
 yet farther to the left, these are the  
~~permanent~~ <sup>permanent</sup> background ~~wherein~~  
 many passing shapes of light and  
 shadow, of cloud and storm, of mist  
 and of sunset-glow are projected as I  
 watch ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> all from my ~~position~~ <sup>position</sup>  
~~on the hill-side~~ <sup>on the hill-side</sup>. The seasons ~~change~~  
 quietly, and without many great changes.  
 The darkest days of ~~winter~~ <sup>winter</sup> we here call  
 winter seem ~~to be~~ <sup>to be</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>one</sup> ~~period~~ <sup>period</sup>  
 the day, that just above the Gate. When  
 the rain-storms are kept back by the fresh  
 breezes from <sup>far off northern</sup> the far north, one sees the  
 departing clouds gather ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup>  
 great ~~disappearing~~ <sup>disappearing</sup> masses about the  
~~mountain~~ <sup>mountain</sup> ~~tops~~ <sup>tops</sup>, while the bay spreads  
 out at one's feet, calm and restful after its  
~~little~~ <sup>little</sup> ~~trouble~~ <sup>trouble</sup> temper. When the time of great rains  
 gives place to the showers of early spring,  
 one scarcely ~~knows~~ <sup>knows</sup> ~~how~~ <sup>how</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~delight~~ <sup>delight</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup>  
 more, the fair green ~~fields~~ <sup>fields</sup>,  
 that slope down gently to the water,  
 or the day of the ~~mountain~~ <sup>mountain</sup>, ~~filled~~ <sup>filled</sup> with  
 fantastic shapes of ~~light~~ <sup>light</sup> and ~~dark~~ <sup>dark</sup>. Nor  
 does even our long dry ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup> ~~more~~ <sup>more</sup>, with

its parched meadows and its daily  
 seen ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~ends~~ <sup>ends</sup>, leave this spot without  
 beauty. The ocean and the bay are yet  
 there; the <sup>high</sup> hills beyond change, not at  
 all; ~~but~~ <sup>for many reasons</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> ever ~~rejoiced~~ <sup>rejoiced</sup> and ~~colored~~ <sup>colored</sup>  
~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~long~~ <sup>long</sup> ~~lines~~ <sup>lines</sup> of fog  
 to run in through the Gate ~~or~~ <sup>through</sup> the  
 depression of the range, stretched out  
 over many miles of country like columns  
 of an invading host, now shining ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup>  
 innocent whiteness, as if their messengers  
 were but one of love, now ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~dark~~ <sup>dark</sup>  
 and dreadful, as when they smother  
 the sun at evening. ~~So~~ <sup>So</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~year~~ <sup>year</sup> goes.  
 By one is never without the compassion-  
 ship of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Nature~~ <sup>Nature</sup>. And there are ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> ~~beads~~ <sup>beads</sup>  
~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~cloud~~ <sup>cloud</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>land</sup>, if one  
 will but look forth and see them.

But I have in this book to speak  
 not so much of Nature as of life. And I  
 shall undertake to deal with a few problems  
 such as are often thought to be meta-  
 physical (whereby most men mean that they  
 are worthless) and are also of an quite  
 rightly called philosophical (whereby one  
 means that it were the part of wisdom to  
 solve them if we could). With these problems  
 I shall seek to busy myself earnestly,  
 because that is each one's duty; un-  
 hesitatingly, because I am a ~~believer~~ <sup>believer</sup>  
 in a ~~little~~ <sup>little</sup> ~~ground~~ <sup>ground</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~follow~~ <sup>follow</sup>  
 tradition as I am <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ ~~find~~ <sup>find</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~audience~~ <sup>audience</sup>



by preaching in this wilderness; reverently,  
 because I am thinking and writing  
 face to face with a mighty and lovely  
 nature, <sup>by the side</sup> ~~in the~~ of whose greatness I am  
 but ~~in~~.

Book I.

- Of the Nature of Philosophy, of its Ends, Methods,  
 Med. I: Of the Nature and End of Philosophy.  
 Med. II: <sup>the</sup> Method of Philosophy as a Product of Character.  
 Med. III: Of the Rationalistic Spirit in Philosophy.  
 Med. IV: Of the Romantic Spirit in Philosophy.  
 Med. V: Of the Idealistic Spirit in Philosophy.  
 Med. VI: Conclusion on the Spirit and Method of Philosophy.

Book II: Of Truth.

- Med. VII: Of Knowledge in its Essence.  
 Med. VIII: Of Knowledge in its Analysis.  
 Med. IX: The World <sup>of</sup> the Ideals of Knowledge.

Book III: Of Right.

- Med. X: Of Self and not-Self in Ethics.  
 Med. XI: Of the World in Action.  
 Med. XII: Of the World in Contemplation.

March 10 — Faust's contract with Mephisto is,  
 in Goethe's view, no extraordinary act,  
 no great crime, but simply the  
 necessary fundament of an active  
 life that strives for the Ideal. Here  
 is the whole view as I just now  
 conceive it to have been. In Au-  
 fang war sie That; i.e. the essence  
 of life and being is activity.  
 This activity is not on the one  
 hand simple blind force (Mephisto)

nor on the other hand pure subjective  
 thought (Faust), but the living union  
 of both as seen in the work of the  
 individual moment. The Kraft  
 never is known but in the individual  
 That; and in this individual That  
 is contained also the only possible  
 realization of the Sein. And so the  
 essence of life is found in the indi-  
 vidual moments of accomplish-  
 ment, and in those alone. But on  
 the other hand the individual  
 moment is in its most nature un-  
 restful, ~~resting~~. The Kraft is repre-  
 sented in the individual moment,  
 but not adequately. The Sein is  
 realized, but not wholly nor finally.  
 The individual moment is the Real;  
 but it is so only in so far forth  
 as it denies itself, strives to pass  
 out over itself, to plunge or into  
 a future. Were it content with itself  
 it would be no longer That. It would  
 become the dead factum, instead  
 of the living Action. — Such continual  
 striving from one moment to  
 another is the Universe itself. The  
 works of creation are glorious because  
 they are in eternal movement  
 and action. They are incompre-  
 hensible, simply because the  
 thought involved in them never

at rest in the permanent clearness of the Sun, but is ever changing with all the life of the Kraft. The to comprehend (begreifen) would be to hold fast. And the life of the individual moment may not be thus held fast; but flows eternally.

The place of man, of the individual consciousness in general, is secured, in the midst of this activity, only in and through compliance with the general law. The individual moments of our lives must be full of action, the fuller the better; but they must also be, for the very same reason, full of unrest. The content of the moment, however great, must not lead us to wish to remain stationary in this moment. This content in the present moment is denial of activity; it is death.

The rest will follow easily; I can better set it forth another time. The Act as Act comprehends only ~~itself~~. All other Acts are but phenomena, caseless visions to it. Yet in its discontent it seeks from the contemplation of them, higher development for itself. — And this seeking is contracting with the devil, the

spirit of deceit, of appearances. The contract with the devil is the eternal attendant of the striving of the present moment. — Life is action. Passivity, the negative aspect, must at every moment be set up and conquered. Every moment we must enter into contract with the devil; every moment use his services for our own development. And when we say "Derwilde doch"; at that moment the contest is over; the passive has gained its end. We sink into nothing. — But the universe, with its eternal activity, remains. For the individual the passive element, whose conquest is his own destruction, appears as of its essence diabolical. For the Universe this passive element, everywhere present as the reverse of the active, and so destructive not of the Act but of the individual, appears as Das Ewig-Weibliche.

— Bold, isn't it?

March 12

— On this whole theory of the present moment of <sup>the</sup> infancy, Tasso of Goethe, A. I, p. 3, the remarks immediately succeeding the long soliloquy of Tasso in which he imagines himself seeing his own crowned image in the water, just taking it for a spirit, and so ~~himself~~ ~~in~~ ~~himself~~ ~~in~~ ~~himself~~ —

Lenore -

Erwacht! Erwacht! Lass uns nicht empfinden  
Dass du der Gegenwart ganz verkehrt  
bist.

Es ist die Gegenwart, die mich erlöhnt;  
Abwesend schreie ich nur, ich bin entzückt!

March 17 — In the Natürl. Tochter, A. V, Sc. VII, occurs  
the following in words of the Monk to  
Egerie: —

Ja wohl! das ewig Wirkende bewegt  
Uns unbegreiflich, dieses oder jenes,  
Als wie von ungefähr, zu unserm Wohl  
zum Rette, zur Entscheidung, zum Vollbringen  
Und wir getragen werden wir uns Ziel.  
Dieses zu empfindend ist das höchste Gut  
Es nicht zu fordern ist bescheidene Pflicht  
Es zu erwarten schöner Trost im Leiden.

An often dreamed of essay on Ro-  
manticism <sup>of the past century</sup>, as it were at the mo-  
ment a more definite form in my  
thought. The works already done  
and even now in process suggests  
itself as an aid, and the subject  
must be considered in as broad  
a light as possible. — Three divisions  
suggest themselves naturally:  
A. Romanticism in Idea; B. Romani-  
cism in History; C. Romanticism  
examined as to Essence and  
Worth. — The second division

B, falls asunder into several parts,  
perhaps most conveniently named  
thus: (1) The pre-Revolutionary Roman-  
ticism; (2) Romanticism in the German Classic  
Literature; (3) The Romantic School proper;  
(4) The Romantic Reaction; (5) The English Ro-  
manticism; (6) The French Romanticism; (7)  
Pessimism. — The third division, that  
dealing theoretically with the matter,  
would be materially assisted by the  
individual studies on Ethics here  
and there already accomplished or in  
process of formation. The discussion would  
at all events give an opportunity for a  
sketch of the whole system of Philosophy  
as far as yet completed.

March 20 — Read this day the first essay in  
Baro's studies on La Philosophie de  
Goethe. The style is interesting, and  
the presentation even much that is new  
to me. — G. finds that Goethe must have  
had a philosophy, even though it be  
a priori not so certain what sort of  
philosophy he must have had. He was  
at all events not bound down to a dogmatic  
system. He knew the existing sys-  
tems well, could make them conform  
to his purposes, but was subject to  
none of them. — The actual development  
of Goethe's opinions must be sought  
in his life and works. His first ac-

acquaintance with philosophy occurs  
 in the lecture-rooms in Leipzig. Driven  
 from the school-philosophy by an over-  
 powering disgust, G. finds himself in  
 natural sympathy with Rationalism  
 first, and then with the mysticism  
 of the alchemists. In Frankfurt, after  
 his student-days are over, he passes  
 through a stage of the greatest danger for  
 the clearness of his thought. And his  
 alchemic studies never entirely lose  
 their hold upon him. Traces remain  
 in the *Mater. g. Leach. d. Farben.* —  
 Scarcely is this time past than he  
 water appears. And G. must pass  
 a time in his shadow before coming to  
 his own independence. — Spinoza  
 it is finally who frees him. — G. gives  
 an interesting description of the  
 intimacy with Jacobi during the time  
 of the Spinoza-studies, and takes oc-  
 casion to draw a very singular parallel  
 between ~~the meditations in company~~ with Jacobi and a  
 scene in Juffroy's life. — The ques-  
 tion then arises, wherein was Spinoza  
 of interest to G. — Caro makes the usual  
 distinction of doctrine and spirit in Spinoza  
 declares the former to be <sup>idealistic</sup> *acosmism*  
 and the latter to be pantheism, and  
 affirms that only the latter was followed  
 by G., whose reverence for Sp. was dependent  
 on an incomplete understanding of the former.

Apr. 3 —

— This is, in a certain sense, the  
 holy period of the year for me. This year,  
 curiously enough, the 13th of April is  
 Easter. Time however and thought  
 go on about as usual; the one is much  
 faster, the other much slower than  
 one would wish. Outward events have  
 also happened in such a way as to dis-  
 turb me. — This is in some measure  
 indicating the atmosphere in which  
 thought is at work.

"The New Phenomenology": Would this  
 title be sacrilegious? — And this be  
 an opening: "Every man lives in a  
 Present, and contemplates a Past and  
 Future. In this consists his whole  
 life. The ~~Present~~ Past and Future shadows  
 both, the Present is the only real. Yet  
 in the contemplation of the Shadow  
 is the Real wholly occupied; and without  
 the Shadow this Real has for us  
 neither life nor value. — No more  
 universal fact of consciousness  
 can be mentioned than this fact, which  
 therefore deserves a more honorable  
 place in Philosophy than has been  
 accorded to it. For it is in view of this  
 that all men may be said to be  
 in some sense Idealists.

Apr. 9 — This day may be noticed as one wherein a new experience, of emotional character, has so entered consciousness that much result for thought may be in future expected.

Apr. 11 — Yet a new phase, wherein the abstract becomes concrete.

May 9 — The difficulty in the explanation of complex phenomena may be said to lie in the foundation herein, that the combined effect of the individuals is more than the sum of the individuals operating. This surplus it is that makes the phenomenon in question complex rather than compound, an organism instead of an aggregate; and this surplus is the problem for explanation.

June 19. — In a proposed series of chapters on Logic the most difficult one will be that treating of the Methods of Systematic Thought. The following remarks prepare the way:—  
1. Systematic Thought looks for its definition to the general theory of the reasoning process. This process has been improved in the chapter on the Nature of Thought to be, on the one hand an effort towards overcoming obstacles to assertions, on the other hand an effort to reduce the labor of thought to the lowest limit.

2. To accomplish the ends of the reasoning process in general, Systematic Thought has to deal with the materials of

consciousness in such a way as to bring us to definite conclusions by the shortest road. A double labor = saving process is thus manifestly required:—

a. The propositions reached must be such as express the data in the way requiring least expenditure of mental energy.

b. The way by which the propositions are reached must itself be the shortest way.

The first requirement is that of the reasoning-process in general, only most definitely formulated. The second is the peculiar requirement of systematic thought.

[Please that <sup>the</sup> least expenditure is not to be understood ~~the~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~wholly~~ <sup>the</sup> least possible. No thought at all would require less energy than systematic thought, which may itself be <sup>very</sup> laborious. — But least thought = effort as such is meant, not least effort in general.]

3. — Systematic thought must satisfy yet a third requirement: its propositions must be universal; must cover that is the whole of the material under consideration. Material not yet brought under the sway of definite conclusions offends the unifying principles of thought, and so runs against the



4. - Systematic thought is constantly in presence of an actuality consisting of a continuous and indefinitely varied series of states of consciousness. To accomplish its unifying purpose thought must select from this series the most prominent portions to serve as ~~points~~ <sup>points</sup> of reference for the rest. This first activity then is the selective activity, ~~whose~~ <sup>whose</sup> primary motive is interest, and whose development follows in the service of the general unifying purpose.

5. - The selected points of reference are the fundamental or regulative notions. And the first work of all systematic thought is the definition of these notions, and the reference of all the <sup>of other</sup> elements of the series of the real to the fundamental notions themselves.

6. - But this work is always insufficient: -

a: Because the selected notions as generals, exclude those parts of the particulars that are not in agreement with them; and thus the study of the real becomes incomplete.

b: Because the real would as be exhibited as a <sup>coexistent</sup> series when it is actually a series of succession in time.

c) a. is avoided by studying the universal forms of relations  
b. is overcome by discovering the universal laws of nature.

7. - The first class of inquiries alone make possible the exact sciences. The second class of inquiries make possible and produce the physical and moral sciences. -

July 9

The peculiarity of the method of philosophic thought is conditioned in a measure by this fact; viz., that at the beginning, <sup>of philosophy</sup> the <sup>of philosophy</sup> fullness made in the various special provinces of experience by the various special sciences are set entirely aside, and <sup>the experience</sup> regarded in a new aspect, as the sum total of consciousness, is made anew ~~the~~ object of a reflection that knows no assumptions. All landmarks are torn down. Previous knowledge is regarded as if it had not been. The field is left bare. Tabula rasa has been made. The synthetic procedure must do the whole task from the first without assistance.

— The philosophic reflection has then first of all to fix on some important point whence to start. All systems of philosophy do this. The choice of a starting point, of a principle whereby to reduce the mass to order, is some-what arbitrary. ~~is not~~ <sup>is not</sup> an axiom though it may be stated as such; it is simply a convenience.

a striking feature in the immeasurable wilderness of mind; and one fixes upon it purely for convenience, to see how much it will assist him. The individual's naïve faith in the sublime importance of his own undertakings is then commonly responsible for the assumption that the chosen point of departure is absolute worth, and is the true centre. — But at all even to philosophy is never so much the propping of a system of propositions from one fundamental one, as the referring of the whole content of consciousness to one chosen system of coordinates. — It would be interesting to follow the history of philosophy through to see how this has been accomplished in every case.

July 15 — A discussion of the mathematical notions about infinites and infinitesimals would be incomplete without a study of the relation of the symbols  $0$  &  $\infty$  to the negative judgment. Some points on this matter may be found in De Morgan's Calc., Intr. (e.g. on the double meaning of the sign  $0$ ; viz.  $a - a$  &  $\frac{0}{0}$ ). —

July 17 — Instead of the term "Principle of Knowledge", it would be far more proper to make use of the term "Constitutive Principle", thereby implying at once a reminiscence of Kant and an opposition to him. For the Categories, as he called them, are not

than regulative; they are constitutive principles of human thought and of Truth. — As knowledge pure and simple is admitted to exist only in the individual judgments, the use of the term Principle of Kn. is perhaps not clearly justified. For thereby the contrast of the principles in question with the individual judgments, i.e. with the elements of knowledge, is not sufficiently made clear.

— Constitutive are all the principles in so far as they seek to substitute for concrete reality, never more than an instant our own in any case, the validity (Lotze's *Geltung*) which is enduring and definite. To regard that which <sup>is reality</sup> is sequent as coexistent, is their common effort. — Logical validity is the first instance. — The individual and transient acts of knowledge are here regarded as truths, forever valid, and as capable therefore of classification, arrangement, development from principles, reduction to conceptual unity. Thus arises the whole organization of purely theoretical thought. — The logical reduction to unity is modified by the presence of certain uniformities of connection in experience; and thus arises the second constitutive principle; & so on.

— The known doctrine is mainly negative.

\* say rather: in seeming

July 22 A discussion of the theory of the negative judgment would have to take notice of the use of these judgments in mathematics, where the concepts of infinites and infinitesimals, of negative, irrational and imaginary quantities, and perhaps other notions, are clearly notions defined through negation mainly, if not wholly. - The curious fact of the positive significance of the imaginary quantities needs explanation on the basis adopted for the theory of the judgment. - cf. the remarks of De Morgan, Calculus p. 126, on the equation  $e^{2m\pi\sqrt{-1}} = 1$ . - "This result, when considered by itself, is one of the most singular in analysis, drawn upon no other principle except the one on which impossible quantities are used --- namely, that  $\sqrt{-1}$  is to be used as if it were a quantity, so far as rules are concerned. -

July 23 - On the theory of the concept an article by Galton in the current Cont. Rev. may be of some assistance as to the psychological part of the matter. - Some interesting considerations occur here in reference to the Berkeley and Hume attack on the abstract ideas. The attack is made on logical as well as on psychological grounds. The insufficiency of the latter Galton shows. - The former are however but preparations for Kant.

cf. in relation to this whole note to the marked passage quoted fr. D. B. in Baummann, L. v. R. 3. u. 11. v. I. p. 76. -

July 26

- The Chapter on the Elements of Knowledge will be essentially the same in doctrine as was the essay on "The Principles". The following will be its course: (1) Exposition of the nature of judgments. The same impulses will exhibit in all kinds of subject matter. (2) The first quality of all judgments, their inherent or internal truth. Answers to objections. Part of the theory of opposition and contradiction. (3) Second quality of our actual judgments: their division or reflection into groups according to similarity of subject matter. The accidental nature of this quality. Answers to the objection that the latter account of knowledge is the one that begins with the sensations as a basis for our judgments. Vagueness of the notion of basis. The elements of knowledge their own bases. Assumptions in the ordinary theory of a world affecting consciousness; and also in the theory of a succession of sensations as an immediate datum. - Critique of the psychological theory of the perception of identity and diversity as the essential in an act of knowledge. Classification of the simple judgments. (4) Judgments

are following in determined sequence.  
 (5) The first formation of Concepts. —  
 This tendency to look for the "first" act of thought, to interpret a logical construction as a time-sequence, is dangerous, and must be avoided. —

July 28

Purposes of thought in dealing with the elements of Knowledge: —

1. To think the successive as co-existent; and hence
- 2. To substitute validity for reality. —
- 3. To develop the incomplete into complete judgments.
- 4. To regard the actual as necessary.
- 5. To gain the mastery <sup>over</sup> the material
- 6. To submit to that which cannot be subdued in such a way as to cause the least possible expenditure of energy. —

Aug. 4

A possible theorem on the conditions under which the  $A$  of  $B$  is the  $B$  of  $A$ , would furnish a useful addition to the fundamental theory of the relations of concepts.

Aug. 6

Three kinds of converse propositions: —  
 (1) Ex. The differential of the sum is equal to the sum of the differentials. Here the result of two successive synthetic operations on given material is the same in whichever order the operations be

performed; provided only that the second operation is performed on the product of the first instead of on the original material.

(2) Ex.: Women that are mortal are the same as the mortal beings that are men. — Here a single synthesis results in a notion of the permanent relation of elements of the synthesis. As this relation is permanent, the order in which it was first read may be reversed.

(3) Ex. — Equilateral triangles are equiangular; and conversely, equiangular triangles are equilateral. — Here the results of two independent syntheses are found to be such that a single synthesis may be made out of both, a permanent relation so produced, and the possibility of a reverse reading made manifest as in case (2).

Sept. 3.

The third class are the converse propositions in eigentlichen Sinne. The Forms of Being: Individuality, Organism, Progress, all three may be found in dual manipulation, as unconscious, and as conscious. — Being, Person; Structure, Association; Growth, Self-development. — The same activity of thought postulates both kinds of manipulations. —



Sept. 27 - In Plato's *Euthyphro*, I find an interesting indication of the early difficulties in the formation of abstract ideas. Socr. asks Euthy. for an account of the relation of the just and the Holy. All the holy is just, assents Euthy. to the suggestion of Socr., and the question follows: Is all the just holy? - Euthy. the representative of a religiously cultured Athenian, does not follow this so simple distinction. "You are as much younger than I as you are wiser", replies Socr., and goes on to illustrate the matter by reference to space relations. This is the interesting point. Euthy. does not immediately understand how the holy can be merely subsumed as a species under the genus just; but ~~the matter~~ <sup>the matter</sup> is quite clear to him when illustrated by the statement of a case wherein the adverbs *ἐν* and *ἐξ* are employed. If *ἐν* X, *ἐξ* Y is true, Euthy. sees at once that ~~ἐν~~ *ἐν* X *ἐξ* Y does not follow. This illustration leads him easily to understand the more <sup>logical</sup> ~~logical~~ and abstract question first asked. The adverbs are used in the illustrations in such a way as to imply either space or time-relations; either kind seems simpler than the relation of genus & species. - "A logical distinction", says Grote (*Plato* v. 5, p. 320) <sup>highly</sup> important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic". But one must go, it seems, yet further, and note

the fact that an Athenian of Plato's time who had received no special training in dialectic, but who was otherwise quite well cultured, would not recognize the distinction of extent between genus and species, but would easily grasp the same truth when presented in a form appealing directly to the space-intuition. This fact, useful perhaps for Lange's theory, would hardly be found to hold true nowadays for men of <sup>clearly superior</sup> ~~the~~ culture. —

Yet another form:—

The Doctrine of Being. — I. The Doctrine of Knowing. — Chap. 1. The nature of conflict. — Chap. 2. The material of truth, to wit the elements of knowledge. — Chap. 3. — Of conflict of judgments and negative judgments. — Chap. 4. — Of the natural succession of judgments, and the knowledge of time. — Chap. 5. — Of Synthesis (In all synthesis the whole is more than the mere aggregate of parts). — Chap. 6. — Of Ideas in themselves, as resulting from Synthesis. — Chap. 7. — Of the first constitutive principle of thought, and of the logical relations of notions. — Chap. 8. — Of the second constitutive principle of thought, and of Number, Space, and Substance. — Chap. 9. — Of the third constitutive principle, and of Cause, Law, and Probability, with some consideration of Method. — Chap. 10. — Of the fourth constitutive principle, and of the *τίμη* and *δίκη*. — II. The doctrine of the forms of Being. — Chap. 11. — Of Individual Being.



Chap. 12. - Of the relations of individual beings.  
 Chap. 13. - Of the changes of individual beings.  
 Chap. 14. - Of Matter and Force, and their Persistence.  
 Chap. 15. - Of organic union of individuals.  
 Chap. 16. - Of the internal states of individuals.  
~~Chap. 17. - Of the internal states of individuals.~~  
~~Chap. 18. - Of the internal states of individuals.~~  
 Chap. 17. - Of Personality. - Chap. 18. - Of Growth and Decay.  
 Chap. 19. - Of Freedom and Necessity. - Chap. 20. - Of the worth of the individuals.  
 III. Of the total of Being. - Chap. 21. - Of the Doctrines concerning the world considered in their nature. Chap. 22. - Of the Doctrines concerning the world, considered in their worth. - Chap. 23. - Of Physics and Ethics. - Chap. 24. - Of the Worth of the World.

Oct. 21 All knowledge is, as rational knowledge, symbolic. To regard knowledge literally is to reflect on the content of any moment of consciousness as existing in and for itself, as independent of the content of all other moments. To regard one content as occupying a definite place in the world of thought or of being, is to regard this content symbolically, or as a symbol of an external and objective content.

Using terms with a consciousness of their symbolic force we may say that the Real is made up of an infinity of past, present and future contents of consciousness, each however not real qua

past present or future, but real eternally and qua timeless and eternal. Succession in time is an unreality, if by succession is meant the non-existence of past and future as implied in the existence of the present. The truth of succession is this: There exists eternally among the independent and enduring contents or truths <sup>of the</sup> series of relations known as time-relations.

The world of being is thus found to be made up of an infinity of simultaneous truths; and the way in which one escapes from the bondage of the present moment is this: Easy it is for the present moment to find itself alone the real, and to look upon past and future as its own creations. They are so, viz. its past and its future. The world of being as viewed from any one of its members, is seen only as a modification of that member. But the present moment in thus regarding itself as the one real, fails in its claim for the reason that it must call itself present. By thus doing it opposes itself to a past and a future. Its own reality and truth depends upon theirs, as theirs upon itself. Of all the moments this holds true. All are alike real. All are simultaneous. It is the succession that is the true illusion.

There are no atomic beings, no moments in the world. The world is a maggot of simultaneous truths.

Dec. 6.

Thy thoughts are dull and poor, <sup>eternally pleasant</sup>  
 And yet they bring ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> knowledge; like waves,  
 That beat <sup>against</sup> grey water-sculptured rocks,  
 And thundering at the base of frowning hills  
 In foam and laughter die, so do thy thoughts  
 Glistening, but breaking on the shore at last,  
 In salt, ~~yet~~ <sup>yet</sup> conquer not eternal truth.

~~Thou who hast formed within me high desires,  
 Thou whom I worship, though my way  
 Of thine ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> from my sight, or else delay  
 Of growth makes~~

Thou who hast formed within ~~me~~ <sup>us</sup> high desire,  
 Thou whom ~~I~~ <sup>we</sup> worship through ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> shadowed way  
 Of thine ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> from ~~my~~ <sup>our</sup> beam, through oft delay  
 Of wished-for growth makes weary, ~~and~~ <sup>through</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~effort~~  
 Almost, ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> faith and zeal, dost thou not tire,  
 O thou ~~Divine~~ <sup>Divine</sup> One, since from day to day  
 We see thy truth but as in dawn-light gray

One ~~who~~ <sup>who</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~walking~~ <sup>walking</sup> ~~sees~~ <sup>sees</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~mountains~~ <sup>mountains</sup> ~~or~~ <sup>or</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~fire~~ <sup>fire</sup>  
 That warms the water of the rugged hills;  
 Art thou not weary with ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> halting pace,  
 And service weak? Yet no! To ask is vain.  
 Thou ~~canst~~ <sup>canst</sup> not tire ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~through~~ <sup>through</sup> all ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~weak~~ <sup>weak</sup> hearts  
 Thou art ~~the~~ <sup>summed</sup> ~~summed~~ <sup>summed</sup> ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> thy sacred place  
~~As~~ <sup>As</sup> ~~like~~ <sup>like</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~star~~ <sup>star</sup>, ~~glorious~~ <sup>glorious</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~bold~~ <sup>bold</sup>.  
 Bold, unapproachable, a glorious star, our sun

Dec. 10. -

Propositions of Philosophy.

- I. ~~That~~ <sup>Everything</sup> that can be known must become known ~~by means~~ <sup>by means</sup> of a judgment.
- II. In every act of judgment something (i.e. some content of feeling) is distinguished from something else, and at the same time identified with yet a third thing. By thing is here meant content of consciousness.
- III. That from which the first thing is distinguished is called the Medium, ~~or~~ <sup>or</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> consciousness, and is itself not identified in the judgment with anything else; but is found merely as the possible material of further judgment, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> the actual subject of none.
- IV. That which is identified with the third thing and distinguished from the Medium is the Subject of the judgment, is that which becomes known through the judgment, <sup>which</sup> is recognized, in other words, by being identified with the third thing. Concerning <sup>of</sup> this may be generally noted; viz., that the Subject is found as a content of consciousness which is distinguished from the medium in which it is found, but which

is only ~~present~~ distinguished by and in the act of identification and recognition. The subject is distinguished from the Medium, ~~not~~ but not merely distinguished. That would be impossible. The distinction of the subject from the Medium is accomplished through the identifying of the subject with the third content of consciousness. We do not first distinguish and then identify. We distinguish and identify together. The more we distinguish the more do we identify, and the more we identify the more do we distinguish.

V. That with which the subject is identified is called the Predicate.

Dec. 11

To begin anew! —

I. Whatever is known, as distinguished from what is merely felt, is known by and in an act of judgment. Such an act may or may not be formulated throughout in words, but has at all events the following marks:

(1) In it some content of feeling is distinguished from the mass of the accompanying feeling, and is recognized in its quality as of such and such kind.

2. That which is distinguished is the subject of the judgment. That from which it is distinguished is the Me-

dium. That as which it is recognized, the quality discovered in the subject, forms what is <sup>predicated by</sup> ~~the predicate~~ the judgment. And subject, Medium and Predicate are alike present facts of consciousness.

3. The subject and the Medium are present contents of feeling. The Predicate is not a present content of feeling, but is a present reference to a past content of feeling.

4. A present reference of a present content of feeling to a past content of feeling is then what is meant by knowing or recognizing anything.

To judge or know = {  
 To refer a present content to a past content of feeling.  
 To recognize a present content of feeling.  
 To discover a quality in a present content of feeling.  
 To distinguish a present content of feeling from the Medium wherein it is found.

For each and all these things are accomplished by the one act; or rather these are but different modes of describing the same act. To distinguish a content of feeling from its Medium is to recognize it as such and such in kind, is to refer it to past ~~experience~~ <sup>contents of feeling</sup>, is to find in it a certain quality.

II. Common usage calls the reference of the present content to a past content and identification. Yet the act of reference if so described is not easily to be understood, without further analysis. And therefore we have not

used the term as yet. To explain the nature of predication and of the predicate it will be useful to consider the following Antinomy:-

Thesis.

The Predicate is a present content of feeling with which the subject is identified. Predication consists in identifying two contents of feeling, both at once distinguished from the Medium.

1. If the Predicate be not a present content of feeling, then must the subject, in that it is distinguished from the Medium, be compared with, or referred to, or in some wise brought into connection with, a past content of feeling. But the past content of feeling cannot itself be present. For, before we have studied anything of the nature of succession, we know somewhat

Antithesis.

The Predicate is no present content of feeling. In the act of judgment or predication a likeness is stated between a present and a past content of feeling. There is no identification.

Jan 17, 1888

1. That the predicate is no present content of feeling, appears immediately upon analysis. For when we say A is B (e.g. this man is my brother) then if B has no reference to anything past, the whole character of recognition, of reference of the subject to some pre-visually formed class, would disappear from the act of judgment. The judgment would

at least; viz., that what is past, cannot qua past, be in existence in the present. Hence either the subject is compared with a non-existent ~~thing~~ content of feeling, or else the past content <sup>was said to</sup> constitutes the Predicate is really represented by some present content of feeling which takes its place, and with which the subject is compared. The real Predicate however is then this present content. So much for the first part of the first sentence of the thesis.

2. But if it be said that the Predicate is no content of feeling at all, then in reply one may note the evident meaning of every act of judgment. For in every

at most be the noting of a likeness or agreement in two present facts of feeling; and there would be no such consciousness of appeal to past knowledge as always occurs to anyone who makes a judgment of any degree of moment or difficulty.

2. That likeness is expressed in a judgment between a present and a past impression or object is equally evident upon the analysis of any judgment.

3. That identification is impossible follows from the fact that of two ideas, one present, the other past there may indeed be comparison, but cannot possibly be what one may be apt to call identification.

judgment some <sup>content</sup> ~~thing~~ as A, is declared or found to be B. Now either the predicate B is a content of feeling, or A is found to be no content of feeling at all; which would be absurd.

3. The subject is identified with the predicate, since if the content A is not the same as the content B the judgment which declares A to be B is false in so far forth as A is not <sup>being</sup> B.

4. Hence as the subject and predicate are both present contents of consciousness or feeling, and as in the judgment they are identified or declared to be the same, we find as a result that knowing or predication consists in identifying present contents of consciousness.

5. And that the Predicate as well as the Subject must be a content distinguished from the Medium, is evident. Otherwise something distinguished is identified with something not distinguished.