

Thought-Diary

1878.

Berkeley, Ca.

Sept. 24

— I note in Aristotle's *Categories*, Chap. IV (p. 4 (2) Ed. Belisle) p. 7 l. 18 sqq. Didot, the fact that the continuity of space is considered as demonstrated from the continuity of the matter that fills it, the latter fact being considered as evident from mere statement only. This has, no doubt, interest in relation to the Shadworth Hodgson's doctrine of the necessity of Matter to furnish basis for a mathematical treatment of the Form. V. *Philosophy of Reflection*, pp. 271, 272: "The time and space elements, duration and extension, are that which becomes order and figure when distinguished by differences of feeling" "The figuration of the discreteness are derived from feeling, the material element in consciousness." — Curiously enough, however, Aristotle seems to assume the continuity of time as given immediately to thought upon inspection of the form alone: ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρὸς τὸν παρόλγλυιότα κχιτον μέλλοντα. — Whence this difference of view in the consideration of time and of space?

— *Plan of an Essay on the Problem of the Things in Themselves* — This is a necessary completion to my Degree-essay. The main points of the previous one could further be noted in this, and both published thus, as it were together. The publication would have to be at my [101] own expense. An introduction would start from Prof. Clifford's article in *Mind*, and state the affinity of this with some other views, and its relation to the doctrines of Spencer, Lewes, & Hodgson, of whose the last-mentioned would be quoted as showing the nature of the problem most clearly in his treatment of it. Reference would then be made to some of the German philosophers (to Lotze, Hartmann, etc.) among contemporaries only. The need of an independent discussion would so be made manifest. Necessary, under the circumstances, would be our independent exposition, in which previous labors would be recognized as valuable, but the whole matter treated as if there existed no other exposition since Kant's. — The First Chapter would now undertake an history of the Kantian Thing in Itself. Where Kant left the problem the Second Chapter would take it up. The analysis of the general forms of thought would be given in the previous chapter. In this work would be the justification of these forms as syntheses through our analysis of the fundamental activities of thought. The chapter would be devoted to the dialectic analysis of the judgment-faculty, with the conclusion as to the truth of the single judgment. [102] — The Third Chapter would take up the Reasoning Process and the Ideas in Themselves. — The Fourth Chapter would treat of the Synthesis of Science and of the forms of the Laws (including the Synthesis of ethics). — The Fifth Chapter would treat of Synthesis as a volitional activity, of the World as Will, of the Ideas in Themselves as the Things in

Themselves, of the problem of the “Object of Knowledge” (Knowledge being never a thing, but always of a thing), and, in conclusion of the ethical purpose of philosophy.

Oct. 26

— In the course of some class-room discussion on the purpose of Education, the following scheme of the content and objects of life was suggested to my mind, partly by accident, partly by reminiscences of Schopenhauer. —

The Volitional Content of Life is to be subsumed under the following heads: —

A. The Pursuit of Pleasure.

B. The Avoidance of Pain.

A'. The Willing of the Causes of Pleasure.

B'. The Willing-away of the Causes of Pain.

C. The Pursuit of Life as such, apart from the predominance of pleasure or pain.

Education is followed as a mean to an end. Education may itself give us pleasure, or distract our attention from, or makes [103] us less sensitive to pain. But because we can never be sure of such a result from Education, the end of the direct attainment of pleasure, or that of the direct avoidance of pain, is not an end sufficient to justify so much time spent upon Education. — Education may give us, however, knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain. Thus it will become indirectly useful, will, as falling under the activities A' & B', will be: Practical Education. — But now how is Theoretic Education to be justified? The answer is, by declaring it a case of the activities of C. — The Pursuit of Life does not mean simply self-preservation. This is present everywhere in our volition and needs not a separate head. But to self-preservation we add the pursuit of intensity, breadth, depth of life. — This may seem at first merely a case of the pursuit of pleasure. It is not. The Will to Live takes the form of a striving after self-development, extension of experience, increase of the quantity and self-investment of quality of consciousness. Such development we consider an end in itself, and chose it without reference to that fact of its pleasure or pain. We know that it will be either pleasurable or painful; but we know not which. Thus for the schema — [104]

Volition
is primarily *Self-Preservation*;
But in its developed State it assumes the forms

A. Of the Desire for Pleasure	A'. Of the Desire to get undercontrol because of Pleasure	C. Of the Desire for Intensity of Life	B'. Of the Desire to get under control the cause of Pain	B. Of the Desire to avoid Pain
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<p>This desire is not directly accomplished by the most of Education. “Much study is a weariness to the flesh.”</p>	<p>This desire is served by Education in its practical departments; viz.: — 1. Individual Education: a. Dialectics b. Pract. Medicine c. Technical Study 2. Social Education a. Jurisprudence b. Politics c. The Science of Defense D. The Sciences of Commerce</p>	<p>This is a desire for Indeterminate Experience, of which the pleasure be of painful quality cannot be known beforehand, although its nature must be the one or the other. It is chosen by the Will to Live as in itself of Worth. Education in its theoretical departments serves this Desire by intensifying and refining experience in its two principal provinces, those of Thought an Emotion. Theoretic Education is therefore thus to be divided: Education of the Intellect a. Of the Judgment to Accuracy b. Of the Reasoning-powers to [illegible: faded] c. Of the constructive reasoning-powers to theoretic graph of Ideas. (To which follows the most important and complicated second branch:) Education of the Emotions a. Of Self-Consciousness, up to what is called Maturity. b. Of the Contemplative nature, up to what is called Culture of the Aesthetic Level. c. Of the Spontaneity of Emotion, up to the Originality of Mind. d. Of the Moral Sense, up to the possessing of a perfect conscience.</p>	<p>This desire is satisfied in so far as is possible by practical education, by which one can learn how to avoid and cure evils, and how to gain a livelihood. And practical social education teaches the like art to society.</p>	<p>Education does not serve this desire directly. For the theory [illegible] of the educated man is of [illegible] the [illegible] sensitive, and the Stoic philosophers, as Macaulay tells us, has never been produced, in this ideal perfection, as a product of Education.</p>
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[105] Of the volitional activities A there is an axiom, assumed tacitly by the naïve consciousness, and thus to be stated by the developed consciousness:

Axiom 1: Pleasure is in itself an end, and as such is to be followed.

Of the volitional activities B there is an axiom, of like nature, and thus to be stated by the developed consciousness: —

Axiom 2: Pain is in itself an evil, and as such is to be avoided.

In both these pleasure and pain are considered by abstraction as coming apart from all other (e.g. moral) considerations. Only in case this abstraction is performed are the axioms understood to hold.

Of the volitional-activities C there is a postulate, thus to be stated:

Postulate: That life is in itself a good thing, whether it turn out to contain pleasure or pain; and that since it is a good thing the more of it, and the more intense it is, the better.

This Postulate, in its consequences, leads actually to the suicide of individualism, the development of conscience, the direct condemnation [illegible: faded], all because this [illegible: faded] and most [illegible: faded] life is not individual: — [106]

Dec. 13.

The Truth of the Memory. The Memory when analyzed fundamentally, cannot appear as a reproduction of the past. Memory is a present fact. This principle is the simple result of the epistemological analysis. A given fact of present consciousness induces or rather is itself, the act of Will whose content is a Past. The present cannot, logically be based upon the Past. The Past is but one element or moment in the Present consciousness; one of the directness of the present will. — But the other side of this truth is important. The philosophic consciousness, which on the basis of a constant postulation of a Past generalizes, and thus declares the Present to stand in Real relation to a Past, must also declare all Past in necessary relation to the Present. And the psychological expression of this postulate in its limitation to the individual consciousness, is the so often misunderstood proposition that no thing once in the mind is ever really lost. This proposition takes numerous forms, but it is really but this one postulate: That the past has a reality in reference to the present; or, in reference to the individual soul, that the past for each individual has constant relation to [107] his present. The only objection to this latter formula is that it is so apt to be misunderstood. It is in [illegible: faded] but the formal expression of a potential memory, an expression based on purely logical grounds. It is apt to become through misunderstanding a palimpsest-theory of most alarmingly sentimental character. — In all this is contained at once the criticism and the justification of the [illegible: faded] doctrine of *Volksnaam*, Psychol. §26, Vol. I, pp. 166-68 on the Fortbestehen of the Vorstellungen.

— Interesting is the doctrine of Sualedissen (cited by *Volksnaam* hoc. cit. p. 174) “der das Bewusstsein als eine Eigenhtümlichkeit des Gemüthes definiert, nach welcher Alles, was in ihm vorkommt, nicht bloss real, sondern auch ideal ist. d.h. nicht bloss ist, sondern auch *gestaucht* wird.”

— It seems quite certain that the substantiality attributed to the object of felt-consciousness is based on the fact that, owing to a certain unity of the larger portion of it, it forms a reality and easy field for the application of the fundamental hypotheses of the Principles of Knowledge. [108]

Dec. 14

If the circumstances prove favorable the following three essays may soon be prepared:

- a. “In the Footsteps of Kant.”
- b. Heinrich v. Kleist.

c. Self-Consciousness: The Nature of Significance.

(a) will discuss some of the late objections to Kant, the expression of his works contained in the efforts of Shadworth Hodgson [illegible: faded], and the significance of the proposed recasting of the notion of "The World as Will."

(b) Will recast entirely the old lecture of last year on Kleist, and will thus study him anew from a fresh reading of the text and the materials biographical and critical.

(c) Will follow a schedule already roughly noted down.

Berkeley

1879

Jan. 16

— Rousseau La Nouv. Hel. Oeuv. 8, p. 74: Claire writes to Julie: La vive et tendre amitié qui nous unit — nous a, pour ainsi dire, éclairé le coeur de bonne heure sur l'oude les passions. Nous connaissons assez bien leurs signes et leurs effets: il n'y a que l'art de les éveiller qui nous manque. — Therefore here is in brief a characterization of Rousseau-ism in general, in the matter of emotion & practice. [109]

Jan. 19

— As food for reflection might serve the following words prove Mosley's Rousseau, v. I, p. 77, sq., on the nature-sentiment of Rousseau and its significance: "In thinking of Rousseau's peculiar feeling for nature, which acquired such a decisive place in his character during his life at Les Charmettes, it is to be remembered that it was entirely devoid of that stormy and boisterous quality which has grown up in more modern literature, out of the violent attempt to press nature in her most awful moods into the service of the great revolt against a social and religious tradition that can no longer be endured. Of this revolt Rousseau [p. 78] was a chief, and his passion for natural aspects was connected with this attitude, but he did not seize those aspects which the poet *Manfred* for example, forced into an imputed sympathy with his own rebellion. Rousseau always loved nature best in her moods of acquiescence and serenity, and in proportion as she lent herself to such moods in men. He liked rivulets better than rivulets better than rivers. He could not bear the sight of the sea, whose infertile bosom and blind restless tumblings filled him with [110]

Jan. 19

melancholy. The ruins of a park affected him more than the ruins of castles. It is true that no plain, however beautiful, ever seemed so in his eyes; he recognized torrents, rocks, dark forests, mountains, and precipices. This does not affect the fact that he never moralised appalling landscapes, as post-revolutionary writers have done, and that the Alpine wastes which throw your pessimist modern into a rapture, had no attraction for him. He could steep himself in nature without climbing fifteen thousand feet to find her. In landscape, as has been said by one with a right to speak [George Sand], Rousseau was truly a great artist, and you can, if you are artistic too, following the

confidence in his wanderings; he understood that beauty does not require a great stage, and that the effect of things lies in harmony.” — [p. 79] “In truth, a man cannot escape from his time, and Rousseau at least belonged to the eighteenth century in being devoid of that capacity for feeling [illegible: faded], and the taste for the objects inspiring it. Nature was a tender friend with softest bosom, and no sphinx with cruel enigma. He felt neither terror, nor any sense [111] of the littleness of man, nor of the mysteriousness of life, nor of the unseen forces which make us their sport, as he peered over the precipice and heard the water roaring at the bottom of it; he only remained for hours enjoying the physical sensation of dizziness with which it turned his brain, with a break now and again for hurling large stones, and watching them roll and leap down into the torrent, with as little reflection and as little articulate emotion as if he had been a child.”

Jan. 20

In *Manfred*, Act II, Sc. I. we have this:

“There is a calm upon me —
Inexplicable silliness! which till now
Did not belong to what I knew of life.
If that I did not know philosophy to be of all our vanities the motliest,
The merest word that ever fooled the ear
From out the schoolman’s jargon I should deem
The golden secret, the sought “Kalon” found,
And seated in my soul. It will not last,
But it is well to have known it, though but once;
It hath enlarged my thoughts with a new sense
And I within my tablets would note down
That there is such a feeling.”

— The expiring breath this is, one would say, of the self sick and weary Romantic [illegible: faded] passion of reflectiveness yet strong. [112]

Jan. 31

Morley, Diderot (chap. the Encyclop., pp. 108, 9 in the Americ. Ed. — “This” (the breaking away of Rousseau from the Encyclopedic group) “was no mere quarrel of rival authors. It marked a fundamental divergence in thought, and proclaimed the beginning of adventurous reaction in the very heart of the school of illumination. Among the most conspicuous elements of the reaction were these: The subordination of reason to emotion; the displacement of industry, science, energetic and many-sided ingenuity, by dreamy indolence, and finally what brings us back to our starting-point, the suppression of opinions deemed to be anti-social by the secular arm. The old idea was

brought back in a new dress — Unfortunately for France, Rousseau's idea prospered and ended by vanquishing its antagonist." This serves as a characterization of Romanticism in its infancy.

Feb. 2 — Morley, Rousseau (vol. 1, p. 190, Engl. Ed.): — "Morley (1709-85) — began his inquiries with Greece and Rome — remained entirely in this groove of thought until Rousseau appeared. He then gradually left Montesquieu. 'To find the duties of the legislator,' he said, 'I descend into the abysses of my heart, I study my sentiments.'" — [113]

Feb. 12. *Meditations* before the gate I am a [illegible: faded]; and day after day, by the order of the World-Spirit (whose commands we all do everyday, whether we will it or not) I am accustomed to be found at my tasks in a certain place that looks down the Bay of San Francisco and over the same out into the water of the western Ocean. The place is not without beauty, and the prospect is far-reaching. Here as I do my work I often find time for contemplation. And the thoughts that are given to me upon the problems of our human life are such as I shall seek to write out in what follows. What are [illegible: faded] the greatness of the world better when he [illegible: faded] a little above the level of the lowlands and looks upon the large landscape, this we all know; and all of us too must have wondered that a few feet of elevation should tend so greatly to change our feeling through a [illegible: faded]. Moreover the place of which I speak is such as to make one regret when he considers how lovely it is that there are not far better eyes beholding it than his own. For could a truly noble soul be nourished by the continual sight of the nature that is here, [illegible: faded] soul would be not a little [illegible: faded] yet for most of us nature is is [illegible: faded]. [114]

Still even to me, she teaches something. The high dark hills on the Western shore of the way, the water at their feet, the Golden Gate that break through them and opens up to one the view of the sea beyond, the smoke obscured city at the south of the Gate, and the barren ranges yet farther to the left, these are the permanent background whereon many passing shapes of light and shadow, of cloud and storm, of mist and of sunset-glow are projected as I watch all from my station on the hill-side. The seasons go by quietly, and without many great changes. The darkest days of what he here call winter seems always to [illegible] one percent of the sky, that just above the Gate. When the rain-storms are broken by the fresh breezes from the far off northern farrars, one sees the departing clouds gathering in dreading masses about the hill-tops, while the bay spreads out at one's feet, calm and restful after its little bay of tempest. When the time of great rains gives place to the showers of early spring one scarcely knows which to delight in the more, whether in the fair green fields, that slope down gently to the water, or in the sky of the east, continually filled with fantastic shapes [illegible: faded]. Nor does even our long dry summers with [115] its parceled

meadows and its daily sea-winds, leave this spot without beauty. The ocean and the bay are yet there; the high hills beyond change not at all for any season; but are over rugged and cold and stern; and the long lines of fog, born in through the Gate or through the depression of the range, stretch out over many miles of country like columns of an invading host, now shining in innocent whiteness, as if their missive were but one of love, now becoming dark and dreadful, as when they another the sun at evening. So, while the year goes by, one is never without the companionship of Nature. And there are heroic deeds done in cloud-land, if one will but look forth and see them.

But I have in this book to speak not so much of Nature as of Life. And I shall undertake to deal with a few problems such as are often thought to be metaphysical (whereby most men mean that they are worthless), and are also often quite rightly called philosophical (whereby one means that it were the part of wisdom to solve them if we could). With these problems I shall seek to busy myself earnestly, because that is each one's duty; independently, because I am [illegible: faded], as little bound to fallacious tradition as I am less to find an audience [116] by preaching in this wilderness; reverently because I am thinking, and writing face to fact with a mighty and lovely pleasure by the side of whose greatness I am but as a worm.

Book I.

Of the Nature of Philosophy, of its Ends & Methods.

Med. I: Of the Nature and End of Philosophy.

Med. II: Of the Method of Philosophy as a Product of Character.

Med. III: Of the Rationalistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. IV: Of the Positivistic Spirit in Philosophy.

Med. V: Conclusion on the Spirit and Method of Philosophy.

Book II. Of Truth.

Med. VII: Of Knowledge in its Claims.

Med. VIII: Of Knowledge in its Analysis.

Med IX: Of the World or of the Ideals of Knowledge

Book III. Of Right.

Med. X: Of Self and not-Self in Ethics.

Med. XI: Of the World in Action.

Med. XII: Of the World in Contemplation.

March 10

— Faust's contract with Mephisto is, on Goethe's view, no extraordinary act, no great crime, but simply the necessary fundament of an active life that strives for the Ideal. Here is the whole view as I just now conceive it to have: Im Anfang war die That; i.e. the essence of life and being is activity. This activity is not on the one hand simple, blind force (Kraft) [117] nor on the other hand pure subjective thought (Sinn), but the living union of both as seen in the work of the individual movement. The Kraft is never known but in the individual That; and in this individual That is contained also the only possible realization of the Sinn. And so the essence of life is found in the individual movements of accomplishment, and in those alone. But on the other hand the individual movement is in its inmost nature unrestful, fleeting. The Kraft is represented in the individual movement, but not adequately. The Sinn is realized, but not wholly, nor finally. The individual movement is the Real; but it is so only in so far forth as it denies itself, strives to pass out over itself, to plunge on into a future. Were it content with itself, it would be no longer That. It would become the dead factum, instead of the living Action. — Such continual striving from one moment to another is the Universe itself. The works of creation are glorious because they are in eternal movement and action. They are incomprehensible, simply because the thought involved in them is never [118] at rest in the permanent clearness of the Sinn, but is ever changing with all the life of the Kraft. So comprehended (begreifen) would be to hold fast. And the life of the individual movement may not be thus held fast; but flows eternally.

The place of man, of the individual consciousness in general, is secured, in the midst of this activity, only in and through compliance with the general law. The individual moments of our lives must be full of action, the fuller the better, but they must also be, for the very same reason, full of unrest. The content of the moment, however great, must not lead us to wish to remain stationary in this moment. This content in the present moment is denial of activity, it is death.

The rest will follow easily; I can better set it forth another time. The Act as Act comprehended only itself. All other Acts are but phenomena, baseless visions to it. Yet in its discontent it seeks from the contemplation of them, higher development for itself. — And this seeking is contacting with the devil, the [119] spirit of deceit, of appearances. The contract with the devil is the eternal attendant of the striving of the present moment. — Life is action. Passivity, the negative aspect, must at every moment be set up and conquered. Every moment we must enter into contract with the devil; every moment use his services for our own development. And when we say "Verweiledoch"; at that moment the contest is over; th Passive has gained its end. We sink into nothing. — But the universe, with its eternal activity, remains. For the individual the passive element, whose conquest is his own destruction, appears as of its essence diabolical. For the

Universe this passive element, everywhere present as the reverse of the active and so destructive not of the All but of the Individual, appears as Das Ewigweibliche.

Bold, isn't it?

March 12

— On this whole theory of the present moment of in the Torq. Tasso of Goethe, A.I, 1.3., the remarks immediately succeeding the long soliloquy of Tasso in which he imagines himself seeing his own crowned image in the water, just taking it for a spirit and so fancies himself in Elysium: — [120]

Leonore —

Eurach! Eurach! Lass uns nicht empfinden,
Dass du der Gegenwart'ge ganzverkennet?

Tasso.

Es is die Gegenwart, die mich erhöht;
Abwesend schein' ich nur, ich bin eutzüchst?

March 17

— In the following Natürl. Tochter, A. V, Sc. VII, occurs the following in the words of the Monks to Eugenie: —

Ja wohl! das ewig Wirkende bewegt,
Uns unbegreiflich, dieses oder jeines,
Als wie von ungefähr, zu unserem Wohl,
Zum Rathe, zur Entscheidung, zum Volloringen
Und wie getragen werden wir ans Ziel.
Dies zu empfindend ist das höchste
Es nicht zu fordern ist bescheidene Pflicht,
Es zu erwarten schöner Trost in Leiden.

An often dreamed of essay on the Romanticism of the last century at the moment a more definite form in my thought. The work already done and even now in the process suggests itself as an aid, and the subject must be considered in as broad a light as possible. — Three divisions suggest themselves naturally: A. Romanticism in Idea; B. Romanticism in History; C. Romanticism as examined as to Essence and Worth. — The second division [121] B, falls asunder into several parts, perhaps most conveniently named thus: (1) The pre-Revolutionary Romanticism; (2) Romanticism in the German Classic Literature; (3) The Romantic School proper; (4) the Romantic Reaction; (5) The English Romanticism; (6) the French Romanticism; (7) Pessimism. — The third division, that

dealing theoretically with the matter, would be materially assisted by the individual studies on Ethics here and there already accomplished or in process of formation. The discussion would at all events give an opportunity for a sketch of the whole System of Philosophy as far as yet completed.

March 20 — Read this day the first essay in Caro's studies on La Philosophie de Goethe. The style is interesting, and the presentation has much that is new to me. — C. finds that Goethe must have had a philosophy, even though it be *a priori* not so certain what sort of philosophy he must have had. He was at all events not bound down to a dogmatic system. He knew the existing systems well, could make them conform to his purposes, but was subject to none of them. — The actual developments of Goethe's opinions must be sought in his life and works. His first acquaintance with philosophy occurs in the lecture-rooms in Leipzig. Driven from the school-philosophy by an overpowering disgust, G. finds himself in natural sympathy with Rationalism first, and then with the mysticism of the alchemists. In Frankfurt, after his student-days are over, he passes through a stage of the greatest danger for the clearness of his thought. And his alchemic studies never entirely lost their hold upon him. Traces remain in the *Muster. z. Gesch. d. Farben.* — Scarcely is this time past than Lavater appears. And G. must pass a time in his shadow before coming to his own independence. — Spinoza it is finally who frees him. — C. gives an interesting description of the intimacy with Jacobi during the time of the Spinoza-studies, and takes occasion to draw a very singular parallel between the meditations in currency with Jacobi and a scene in Jouffroy's life. — The question then arises, wherein was Spinoza of interest to G. — Caro makes this usual distinction of doctrine and spirit in Sp., declares the former to be idealistic acosmism, and the latter to be pantheism, and affirms that only the latter was followed by G., whose reverence for Sp. so depends on an incomplete understanding of the doctrine.

Apr. 3 — — This is, in a certain sense, the holy pursuit of the year for me. This year, curiously enough, the 13th of April is Easter. Time however avid thought go on about as usual; the one is much faster, the other much slower than one would wish. Outward events have also happened in such a way as to disturb me. — This as in some measure indicating the atmosphere in which thought is at work.

“The New Phenomenology”: Would this title be sacrilegious? — And this for an opening: “Every man lives in a Present, and contemplates a Past and Future. In this consists his whole life. The Future and Past are shadows both, the Present is the only real. Yet in the contemplation of the Shadows is the Real wholly occupied; and without the Shadows this Real has for us neither life nor value. — No more universal fact of consciousness can be mentioned than this fact, which therefore

deserves a more honorable place in Philosophy than has been accorded to it. For it is in view of this all men may be said to be in some sense Idealists. [124]

Apr. 9 — This day may be noticed as one wherein a new experience, of emotional character, has so entered consciousness that much result for thought may be in future expected.

Apr. 17 — Yet a new phase, wherein the abstract becomes concrete.

May 9 — The difficulty in the explanation of complex phenomena may be said to have its foundation herein, that the combined effect of the individuals is more than the sum of the individuals operating. This surplus it is that makes the phenomena in question complex rather than compound, an organism instead of an aggregate; and this surplus is the problem for explanation.

June 19. In a proposed series of chapters on Logic the most difficult one will be that treating of the Methods of Systematic Thought. The following remarks prepare the way: —

1. Systematic Thought looks for its definition to the general theory of the reasoning process. This process has been proved in the chapter on the Nature of Thought to be, on the one hand an effort towards overcoming obstacles to assertions, on the other hand an effort to reduce this labor of thought to the lowest limit.
2. To accomplish the ends of the reasoning process in general, Systematic Thought has to deal with the materials of [125] consciousness in such a way as to bring us to definite conclusions by the shortest road. A double labor-saving process is thus manifestly required: —
 - a. The propositions reached must be such as express the data in the way requiring least expenditure of mental energy.
 - b. The way by which the propositions are reached must itself be the shorted way. [Show that by least expenditure is not to be understood the absolutely least possible. No thought at all would require less energy than systematic thought, which may itself be very laborious. — But least thought-effort as such is meant, not least effort in general.]
3. Systematic Thought must satisfy yet a third requirement: its propositions must be universal; must cover that is the whole of the material under consideration. Material not yet brought under the sway of definite conclusions offends the unifying proclivities of thought, and so sins against the first requirement. [126]

4. — Systematic Thought is constantly in presence of an actuality consisting of a continuous and indefinitely varied series of states of consciousness. To accomplish its unifying purpose Thought must select from this series the most prominent portions to serve as points of reference for the rest. This first activity then is the selective activity, whose primary motive is interest, and whose development follows in the service of the general unifying purpose.
5. — The selected points of reference are the fundamental notions. And the first work of all systematic thought is the definition of these notions, and the reference of all the other elements of the series of the real to the fundamental notions themselves.
6. — But this work is always insufficient: —
 - a. Because the selected notions are generals, exclude those parts of particulars that are not in agreement with them; and thus the study of the real becomes incomplete.
 - b. Because the real would so be exhibited as a coexistent series when it is actually a series of succession in time.
- 6.) a. is avoided by studying the universal *forms* of relations.
- b. is overcome by discovering the universal laws of sense. [127]
7. — The first class of inquiries above make possible the exact sciences. The second class of inquiries make possible and produce the physical and social sciences.

July 9

The peculiarity of the method of philosophic thought is conditioned in a measure by this fact; viz., that at the beginning of philosophy, the syntheses made in the various special provinces of experience by the various special sciences are set entirely aside, once that experience, regarded in a new aspect, as the sum total of consciousness, is made anew the object of a reflection that knows no assumptions. All landmarks are torn down. Previous knowledge is regarded as if it had not been. The field is left bare. *Tabula rasa* has been made. The synthetic procedure must do the whole task from the first without assistance. — The philosophic reflection has then first of all to fix on some important point whence to start. All systems of philosophy do this. The choice of a starting point, of a principle whereby to reduce the mass to order, is somewhat arbitrary. — Note, what is thus chosen is not an axiom of thought may be stated as such; it is simply a landmark, [128] a striking feature in the immeasurable wilderness of mind; and one fixes upon it purely for convenience, to see how much it will assist him. The individual's naïve faith in the sublime importance of his own undertakings is then commonly responsible for the assumption that the chosen point of departure is of absolute worth, and is the true centre. — But at all events philosophy is never so much the proving of a system of propositions from one fundamental one, as the referring of the whole content

of consciousness to one chosen system of cöordinates. — It would be interesting to follow the history of philosophy through to see how this has been accomplished in every case.

July 15 Admission of the mathematical notions about infinities and infinitesimals would be incomplete without a study of the relation of the symbols 0 to ∞ to the negative judgment. Some points on this matter may be found in De Morgan's Calc., Intr. (e.g. on the double meaning of the sign 0 ; viz. $a-a$ & a/a). —

July 19 Instead of the term "Principle of Knowledge." it would be far more proper to make use of the term "Constitutive Principle," thereby implying at once a reminiscence of Kant and an opposition to him. For the Categories, as he called them, are more [129] than regulative; they are constitutive principles of human thought and of Truth. — As knowledge pure and simple is admitted to exist only in the individual judgments, the use of the term Princ. of Kn. is perhaps not clearly justified. For thereby the contrast of the principles in question with the individual judgments, i.e. with the elements of knowledge, is not sufficiently made clear.

— Constitutive are all the principles in so far as they seek to substitute for concrete reality, never more than an instant our own in any case, the validity (Lotze's *Geltung*) which is enduring and definite. To regard that which is in seeming is sequent as coexistent, is their common effort. — Logical validity is the first instance. — The individual and transient acts of knowledge are here regarded as truths, forever valid, and as capable therefore of classification, arrangement, development from principles, reduction to conceptual unity. Thus arises the whole organization of purely theoretic thought. — The logical reduction to unity is modified by the presence of certain uniformities of connection in experience; and thus arises the second constitutive principle; & so on.

— The knowledge of laws is mainly negative. [130]

July 22 A discussion of the theory of the negative judgment would have to take notice of the use of these judgments in mathematics, where the concepts of infinities and infinitesimals, of negative irrational and imaginary quantities, and perhaps other notions, are clearly notions defined through negation mainly, if not wholly. — The curious fact of the positive significance of the imaginary quantities needs explanation on the basis adopted for the theory of the judgment. — Of the remarks of De Morgan, Calculus, p. 126, or the equation $e^{2\pi\sqrt{-1}} = 1$: — "This result, which, considered by itself, is one of the most singular in analysis, draws upon no other principle except the one on

which impossible quantities are used — namely, that $\sqrt{-1}$ is to be used as if it were a quantity, so far as rules are concerned. —

July 23 — On the theory of the concept an article by Galton in the current Cont. Rev. may be of some assistance as to the psychological parts of the matter. — Some interesting considerations occur here in reference to the Berkeley and Hume attack on the abstract ideas. The attack is made on logical as well as on psychological grounds. The insufficiency of the latter Galton shows. — The former are however [illegible] for Kant. —

July 26 — The Chapter on the Elements of Knowledge will be essentially the same in doctrine as was the essay on “The Principles.” The following will be its course: (1) Exposition of the nature of judgments. The same impulses will exhibited in all kinds of subject matter. — (2) The first quality of all judgments, their inherent or internal truth. Answers to objections. Part of the theory of opposition and contradiction. — (3) Second quality of our actual judgments: their capability of collection into groups according to similarity of subject-matter. The accidental nature of this quality. Answer to the objection that the better account of knowledge is the one that begins with the sensations as a basis for our judgments. Vagueness of the notion of basis. Assumption in the ordinary theory of a world affecting consciousness; and also in the theory of a succession of sensations as an immediate datum. — Critique of the psychological theory of the perception of identity and diversity as the essential in an act of knowledge. Classification of the simple judgments. — (4) Judgments [132] as following in determined sequence. (5) The first formation of Concepts. — This tendency to look for the “first act of thought, to interpret a logical construction as a time-sequence, is dangerous, and must be avoided. —

July 28 Purposes of Thought in dealing with the elements of knowledge: —

1. To think the successive as coexistent; and hence
- 2. To substitute validity for reality. —
- 3. To develop the incomplete into complete judgments.
- 4. To regard the actual as necessary.
- 5. To gain the mastery over the material.
- 6. To submit to that which cannot be subdued in such a way as to sense the least possible expenditure of energy. —

Aug. 4 A possible theorem on the conditions under which the A of B is the B of A, would furnish a useful addition to the fundamental theory of the relations of concepts.

Aug. 6 Three kinds of converse propositions: —

(1.) Tax. The differential of the sum is equal to the sum of the differentials. — Here the result of the two successive synthetic operations on given material is the same in whichever order the operations be [133] profound; provided only that the second operation is performed on the product of the first instead of on the original material.

(2.) Ex.: The men that are mortal are the same as the mortal beings that are men. — Here a single synthesis results in a notion of the permanent relation of the elements of the synthesis. As this relation is permanent, the order in which it was first read may be reversed.

(3.) Ex.: — Equilateral triangles are equiangular; and conversely, equiangular triangles are equilateral. — Here the results of two independent syntheses are found to be such that a single synthesis may be made out of both, a permanent relation so produced, and the possibility of a reverse reading made manifest as in case (2).

The third class are the converse propositions in eigentlichen Sinne.

Sept. 3. The Forms of Being: Individuality, Organism, Progress, all three may be found in double manifestation, as unconscious, and as conscious. — Thing, Person; Structure, Association; Growth, Self-development. — The same activity of Thought postulates both kinds of manifestations. — [134]

Sept. 27 — In Plato's Euthyphro, I find an interesting indication of the early difficulties in the formation of abstract ideas. Socr. asks Euthy. For an account of the relations of the Just and the Holy. All the holy is just, asserts Euthy. to the suggestion of Socr., and the question follows: Is all the just holy? Euthy. The representative of a religiously cultured Athenian, does not follow this so simple distinction. "You are as much younger than I as you are wiser," replies Socr., and goes on to illustrate the matter by reference to space relations. This is the interesting point. Euthy. does not immediately understand how the holy can be merely subsumed as a species under the genus just; but the matter quite clear to him when illustrated by the statement of a case wherein the adverbs ἵνα and ἐνῆα are employed. If ἵνα X, ἐνῆα Y is true, Euthy. sees at once that ἵνα Y ἐνῆα X does not follow. This illustration leads him easily to understand the more [illegible] logical and abstract question first asked. The adverbs are used in the illustration in such a way as to imply either space or time-relations; either kind seems simpler than the relation of genus to species. — "A logical

distinction,” says Grote (Plato v.I, p. 320) “highly important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.” But one must go, it seems, yet further, and note [135] the fact that an Athenian of Plato’s time who had received no special training in dialectic, but who was otherwise quite well cultured, would not recognize the distinction of extent between genus and species, but would easily grasp the same truth when presented in a form appealing directly to the space-intuition. — This fact, useful perhaps for Lange’s theory, would hardly be found to hold true nowadays for me of a corresponding grade of culture. —

Yet another form: —

The Doctrine of Being. — I. The Doctrine of Knowing. — Chap. 1. The nature of the conflict. Chap. 2. The material of Truth, to wit the elements of knowledge. — Chap. 3. — Of conflict of judgments and [illegible] judgments. Chap. 4. — Of the natural succession of judgments, and the knowledge of Time. — Chap. 5. — Of Synthesis (In all synthesis the whole is more than the mere aggregate of parts). — Chap. 6. — Of Ideas in Themselves, as resulting from Synthesis. — Chap. 7. — Of the First Constitutive principle of Thought and of the logical relations of notions. — Chap. 8. Of the Second Constitutive Principle of thought, and of Number, Space, and Substance. — Chap. 9. — Of the Third Constitutive Principle, and of Cause, Law, and Probability with some consideration of Method. — Chap. 10. — Of the Fourth Constitutive Principle, and of Worth and Right. — II. The doctrine of the Forms of Being. — Chap. 11. Of Individual Beings. [136] Chap. 12. — Of the relations of individual beings. Chap. 13. — Of the changes of individual beings. Chap. 14. Of Matter and Force, and their Resistance. Chap. 15. — Of organic union of individuals. Chap. 16. — Of the internal states of individuals. — Chap. 17. — Of Personality. — Chap. 18. Of Growth and Decay. Chap. 19. Of Freedom and Necessity. — Chap. 20. Of the worth of the individuals. — III. Of the Total of Being. — Chap. 21. Of the Doctrines concerning the world considered in their nature. Chap. 22. — Of the Doctrines concerning the world, considered in their worth. — Chap. 23. — Of Physics and Ethics. — Chap. 24. — Of the Worth of the World.

Oct. 21

All knowledge is, as rational knowledge, symbolic. To regard knowledge literally is to reflect on the content of any moment of consciousness as existing in and for itself, as independent of the content of all other moments. To regard one content as occupying a definite place in the world of thought or of being, is to regard this content symbolically, or as a symbol of an external and objective content. —

Using terms with a consciousness of their symbolic force we may say that the Real is made up of an infinity of past, present and future contents of consciousness, each however not real *qua* [137] past, present or future, but real eternally and *qua* timeless and eternal.

Succession in time is an unreality, if by succession is meant the non-existence of past and future as implied in the existence of the present. The truth of succession is this: There exist eternally among the independent and enduring contents or truths certain series of relations known as time-relations.

The world of being is thus found to be made up of an infinity of simultaneous truths; and the way in which one escapes from the bondage of the present moment is this: — Easy it is for the present to find itself as alone the real, and looks upon past and future as its own creations. They are so, viz. its past and its future. The world of being as viewed from any one of its members, is seen only as a modification of that member. But the present moment in thus seeing being itself out as the one real, fails in its claim for the reason that it must call itself *present*. By thus doing it opposes itself to a past and a future. Its own reality and truth depends upon theirs, as theirs upon itself. Of all the moments this holds true. All are alike real. All are simultaneous. It is the succession that is the real illusion.

There are no atomic beings, no monads in the world. The world is an aggregate of [illegible: faded]. — [138]

Dec. 6. Thy thoughts are dull and poor, they please thee.
And yet they bring no knowledge; like the waves,
That beat against grey water-sculptured rocks,
And thundering at the base of frowning hills
In foam and laughter die, so do they thoughts
Glistening, but breaking on the shore at last,
Insult, yet conquer not eternal truth.

Thou who hast formed within us high desire,
Thou who we worship through our shadowed way
Oft shuts from us they beam, though oft delay,
Oft wished-for growth makes weary, though expire,
Almost our faith and zeal, dost thou not tire,
O thou Divine One, since from day to day
We see thy truth but as in dawn-light gray
One Quaking sees dark mountains ere the fore
That wars need the waters of the night has paled;
Art thou not weary with our halting pace.

And service the weak? Yet no! To ask is vain.
Thou canst not tire though all our weak hearts failed
Thou art unmoved seest from thy sacred place
Cold, unapproachable, a glorious star, our form [139]

Dec. 10. — *Propositions of Philosophy*

I. Everything that can be known must become known by means of a judgment.

II. In every act of judgment something (i.e. some content of feeling) is distinguished from something else, and at the same time identified with yet a third thing. By thing is here meant content of consciousness.

III. That from which the first thing is distinguished is called the Medium, or Mass of consciousness, and is itself not identified in the judgment with any thing else; but is found merely as the possible material of further judgment, and the actual subject of none.

IV. That which is identified with the third thing and distinguished from the Medium is the Subject of the judgment, is that which becomes known through the judgment, which is recognized, in other words, by being identified with the third thing. Concerning that Subject, this may be generally noted; viz., that the Subject is found as a content of consciousness which is distinguished from the medium in which it is found, but which [140] is only distinguished by and in the act of identification and recognition. The Subject is distinguished from the Medium but not merely distinguished. That would be impossible. The distinction of the Subject from the Medium is accomplished through the identifying of the Subject with the third content of consciousness. We do not first distinguish and then identify. We distinguish and identify together. The more we distinguish the more we identify, and the more we identify the more do we distinguish.

V. That with which the Subject is identified is called the Predicate.

Dec. 11 To begin anew: —

I. Whatever is known, as distinguished from what is merely felt, is known by and in an act of Judgment. Such act may or may not be formulated throughout in words, but has at all events the following marks:

(1) In it some content of Feeling is distinguished from the mass of the accompanying feeling, and is recognized in its quality as of such and such kind.

2. That which is distinguished is the Subject of the Judgment. That from which it is distinguished is the Me- [141] dium. That as which it is recognized, the quality discovered in the

Subject, forms what is predicated in the Judgment. And Subject, Medium and Predication are alike present facts of consciousness.

3. The Subject and the Medium are present contents of feeling. The predication is not present content of feeling, but is a present reference to a past content of feeling.

4. A present reference to a past content of feeling is then what is meant by knowing or recognizing anything.

To judge or
To know =

To refer a present content to a past content of feeling. To recognize a present content of feeling. To discover a quality in a present content of feeling. To distinguish a present content of feeling from the Medium wherein it is found.

For each and all these things are accomplished by the one act; or rather these are but different modes of describing the same act. To distinguish a content of feeling from its Medium is to recognize it as such and such in kind, is to refer it to past content of feeling, is to find in it a certain quality.

II. Common usage calls the reference of the present content to a past content an identification. Yet the act of reference if so described is not easily to be understood without further analysis. And therefore we have not [142] used the term as yet. To explain the nature of predication and of the predicate it will be useful to consider the following Antinomy: —

Thesis	Antithesis
<p><i>The Predicate is a present content of feeling with which the Subject is identified. Predication consists in identifying two contents of feeling, both at once distinguished from the Medium.</i></p> <p>1. If the Predicate be not a present content of feeling, then must the subject, in that it is distinguished from the Medium, be compared with, or referred to, or in some wise brought into connection with, a past content of feeling. But the past content of feeling cannot itself be present. For, before we have studied anything of the nature of succession, we know so much [143] at least; viz., that what is past, cannot <i>qua</i> past, be in existence in the present. Hence either the Subject is compared with a non-existent content of feeling, or else the past content that was said to constitute the Predicate is really represented by some present content of</p>	<p><i>The Predicate is no present content of feeling. In the act of judgment or predication a likeness is stated between a present and a past content of feeling. There is no identification.</i></p> <p>Jan 17, 1880</p> <p>1. That the predicate is no present content of feeling, appears immediately upon analysis. For when we say A is B (e.g. this man is my brother) then if B has no reference to anything past, the whole character of recognition, of reference of the subject to some previously class, would disappear from the act of judgment. The judgment would [143] at most be the noting of a likeness or agreement in two present facts of feeling; and there would be no such consciousness of appeal to past knowledge knowledge as always occurs to anyone who makes a judgment of any degree of moment or difficulty.</p>

<p>feeling which takes its place, and with which the subject is compared to. The real Predicate however is then this present content. So much for the first part of the first sentence of the thesis.</p> <p>2. But if it be said that the Predicate is no content of feeling at all, then in reply one may note the evident meaning of every act of judgment. For in every [144] judgment some content as A, is declared or found to be B. Now either the predicate B is a content of feeling, or A is found to be no content of feeling at all; which would be absurd.</p> <p>3. The subject is identified with the predicate, since if the content A is not the same as the content B the judgment which declares A to be B is false in so far forth as A is not wholly B.</p> <p>4. Hence as the subject and predicate are both present contents of consciousness or feeling, and as in the judgment they are identified or declared to be the same, we find as a result that knowing or predication consists in identifying present contents of consciousness. [145] 5. And that the Predicate as well as the Subject must be a content distinguished from the Medium, is evident. Otherwise something distinguished is identified with something not distinguished. [manuscript ends]</p>	<p>2. That likeness is expressed in a judgment between a present and a past impression or idea is equally evident upon the analysis of any judgment.</p> <p>3. That identification is impossible follows from the fact that of two ideas, one present, the other past, there may indeed be comparison, but cannot possibly be what one may but to call identification</p>
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