
Review

Reviewed Work(s): William James and other Essays in the Philosophy of Life by Josiah Royce

Review by: H. M. Kallen

Source: *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Sep. 26, 1912, Vol. 9, No. 20 (Sep. 26, 1912), pp. 548-558

Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2012802>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*

JSTOR

premisses." It was in that sense the ought is used in this passage, so that if I am in error my sins are not of the kind mentioned, but consist of inability to connect premiss and conclusion properly. To go into that matter would involve pretty much a recapitulation of my entire article. I content myself here with pointing out that I was dealing with the doctrine that a seen light is, *ipso facto*, a knowledge (good or bad) of its cause, say an astronomical star, and with the bearing of this doctrine upon the idealistic contention concerning the numerical duplicity of the star and the star as "known" in perception—that is, the immediately visible light. And my point was that if the seen light is *per se* knowledge of the star as a real object, the physical conditions referred to can not be appealed to (this "can not" is intended in a purely logical sense) in explanation of the deficiencies and mistakes of the perceptual knowing, since they are, according to the doctrine, part of the object known by the perception. Mr. McGilvary's illustration regarding a wedding and the events that lead up to it is interesting, but not relevant, as there is no contention, so far as I am aware, that the event called a wedding is, *ipso facto*, a knowledge of that which caused it. It is somewhat "amusing" that the illustration fits perfectly what I said about the adequacy of the naturalistic explanation when applied to the happening of the perception as an event, but has no visible tie of connection with the doctrine that the perception is, *ex officio*, a knowledge of the "real" object that produced it.

JOHN DEWEY.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

William James and other Essays in the Philosophy of Life. JOSIAH ROYCE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. ix + 301.

What survives in any philosophic system is not so much its dialectic adequacy as its temperamental promptings. People do not embrace an *ism* for reason, but become reasonable by embracing an *ism*. A particular formula then becomes a genuine philosophers' stone, whose virtue it is to dissolve the dross of experience in the alembic of argument and to transmute its baser metal into the pure gold without alloy of canon or of system. These observations are commonplace, I know. But no one can fail to feel keenly the deep and living truth of them who reads this book by Josiah Royce, with its familiar arguments so rejuvenated by the freshness of new contexts and new experience, its somewhat stern but not joyless piety so suffusing every evoking occasion, lifting it by the force of personality from the realm of utterance to the realm of worship, so wide

the vistas caused to cluster about it, so deep the feeling that links them to the center. The book is made up of occasional pieces—an address before a learned society, a commencement audience, an undergraduate religious body, a congress of philosophers, a clerical assembly. The diversity of these groups is striking, but not less so than the unity of the lesson brought to them all, and the harmony and completeness with which occasion is assimilated to doctrine, so much so that the two are not to be separated, and one lives in the other as do the tones of a melody or the words of a sentence. Each piece is, in sum, a complete miniature of the great vision, a fully representative member of the self-representative system.

Admire as one must the esthetic excellence of such an interpenetration of vision with datum, the feeling is none the less inevitable that the admirable thing exists only by the rape of its individuality from the datum. In each instance the thing as it is is made over into the thing as it ought to be, and its intrinsic nature, "fragmentary," perhaps, but for all that something to be envisaged and appraised in and for itself, is absorbed in a "larger view," to be sure, lovely, but death to what enters it. To those who are interested in things as they are this is a defect, but it is a defect shared by all compensatory philosophies, and most philosophy is compensatory. It portrays a cosmos which is more loyal to desire than to perception. Perception shows a highly diversified world distinctly not made for man, inwardly discordant, a changeful flux, wherein life is a struggle to live, and human values are often lost, and when won, even at great cost. Philosophic "reality," on the contrary, from Plato to Royce is unified, harmonious, spiritual, eternally changeless, the very essence of human value, the ultimate and utter satisfaction of human desires. Such a "reality," which is biologically an ideational elaboration of the central goal of all that struggles to maintain itself—that vital equilibrium with a propitious environment which experience is always upsetting—thus designates the perennial excellences which the mind most desires, and becomes the transmuting formula of philosophic and religious reconstruction. So the world is to be thought, and the effort of most thinkers in the history of thought has been *to prove what is empirically not so*—that the world is one, of spiritual substance or spiritually regulated, and secures the eternal conservation of the being and freedom of the human mind. Systems offering such proof are compensatory: they pay to our desires, for the insolvencies of the actual, with promissory notes on the eternal. They respond to human wishes and either ignore the conditions which determine the satisfaction or disappointment of these wishes, or transmute and reconstruct them, designating these actualities as *appearance*, and reserving the eulogium of *reality* for that which is not, but is desired. This latter is then taken to be the secret and all-satisfying heart of existence.

This substitution is at once the pathos and the glory of the mind. It would be interesting, were there space, to trace the historic processes which culminate therein, to exhibit the causes of their persistence, to specify their effect on the progress of free thought. What is here to the purpose, however, is alone the mutative power which makes every act of thought

on the part of a spirit whose force is their force a very miracle of transubstantiation. Though he be just as justice and sympathetic as love, nothing that he touches retains its own contour or nature, nor can. Thus, pragmatism has never had, perhaps, a fairer, more sympathetic or learned critic than Royce. For him, if for anybody, criticism has always meant judgment, not destruction. No one has been more intent than he in conserving whole as much of pragmatic doctrine as might be. And yet—to me, at any rate, all that is distinctive of pragmatism seems to dissolve under his handling and when he is done quite another thing appears bearing its name.

It may be said that this is the general outcome of philosophic argument concerning an opposition, but surely analysis is not transmutation, and again, the same results appear in the papers where pragmatism is not in issue. Take first the discussion of “what is vital in Christianity.” It appears that what is vital are the incarnation and the atonement. But the incarnation and the atonement as these are manifest in the mythology and history of Christianity? Not so: the incarnation and the atonement as poetic tropes for fundamental conceptions in the Roycean idealism. “First, God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude. And secondly, our sorrow is God’s sorrow. God means to express himself by winning through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life; and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and triumph of God himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity” (p. 183). The God here, be it observed, is not the God of the Christians, that is the Roycean absolute. His finite life is not the life of Jesus Christ, it is any and each empirical existence. The sorrow and evil are not those arising through freedom and original sin, they are the absolute inevitable “rule of the fame” of the far nobler Roycean “solution” of the “problem of evil.” And the triumph and salvation are not the consequences of man’s belief and God’s free grace, they are involved inexorably in the absolute’s nature. In sum, “what is vital in Christianity” turns out to be not Christian at all.

A still more striking example, because of the more radical inner difference of the mutatives, appears in the commencement address on “Loyalty and Insight.” These two views of life are confronted—naturalism with loyalty, which designates anew and significantly Professor Royce’s *lebensanschauung*. According to naturalism ideals are alien here on earth: “In no case . . . does the real world essentially care for or help or encourage [them].” The aim of life is to “be free from superstition, then; and next avoid false hopes” (p. 65). Loyalty, on the other hand, “is founded not upon a decision of nature’s supposed mechanism, but upon a study of man’s own inner and deeper needs. It is a doctrine about the plan and business of human life.” It appears in the light thereof that “the study of science is a very beautiful and human expression of a certain exalted form of loyalty” (p. 83). But now; the study of science is and leads to most often just that decision upon nature’s supposed mechanism which is the essence of naturalism, so radically contrasted with

loyalty; its programme is exactly and supremely to be free from superstition and avoid false hopes. What difference, then, between naturalism and idealism? None. But the conclusion contradicts the premise? No. The premise has been altered. Naturalism has not really been meant to be taken as it is in itself. Its very statement has involved reservations and exceptions which, when considered, shall make it over into altogether an idealistic thing. These reservations and exceptions are the ideals of which naturalism is supposed to take no account, "man's own inner and deeper needs." Naturalism gets transmuted into their form and substance and becomes a thing not natural at all.

Of great importance, not more as an example of transmutation than for its bearing on the discussion of pragmatism, is Professor Royce's treatment of time in the present restatement of his well-known views on "immortality." Most of the experiences of life, he there asserts, "unite to show us that the reality of time is possessed especially by its past and future, over against which the present is indeed but vanishing" (p. 268). This is discovered in the act of willing. Therefore time is a function of volition. "In terms . . . of my attitude of will, and only in such terms can I define time, and its regions, distinctions, and reality." By analogy, since I discover hydrogen and oxygen by operating with water, I ought not to be able to define these gases in terms other than water. Such a definition would, however, invert the logical implications of whole with part, and where a complex used to imply its elements the elements would now imply the complex. This is logically inadmissible. And as empirically time is an element in the complex we call volition, and can itself be still further reduced to elements of which the most distinctive is duration, it becomes clear that time can be a function of volition only if the logic of implication is abrogated. The further question may yet be raised as to whether, empirically, the past and future do have superior reality. The experiences of life, I think, unite to deny that they do. But this point may be waived for the present, and inquiry made into the relation between the time in which past and future are more real than present, this "fragmentary" and relative time of actual experience, and that species of time which the absolute alone enjoys—a time in which future and past do not exist as such, but are present. It is to be noted that, though this time is the special privilege of the absolute, our own relative and fragmentary experience does contain prototypes of it. Musical progressions, at least, are experiences in which what had better be called actual duration is more prominent than elsewhere and which somewhat resemble the absolute's time. Why should this species of time be reserved for the absolute, the other attributed to men, and all identified with will, and ultimately with eternity? The answer is: compensation; but its elaboration must be postponed till the criticism of "truth."

Now if such inwardly oppugnant things as Christianity and absolute idealism, absolute idealism and naturalism, duration and eternity, can be thus transfused one into the other, so that all real distinctions get forgotten and lost, how much more facile, then, no matter how cautious and detached the investigator, a transsubstantiation of concepts that have a cer-

tain similarity of content—such as is denoted, for example, by “action,” “deed,” “purpose”—as do pragmatism and Roycean voluntarism. When, moreover, discourse is suffused by deep and commemorative emotion, and the address on “William James and the Philosophy of Life” is so suffused, it is well-nigh inevitable that feeling shall bring together and hold firmly in one glowing vision all things dear and cherished, without respect to how great be their oppugnance otherwise. The thought of William James may thus become indistinguishable from that of Josiah Royce, and I must confess that this is what seems here to have occurred, and that the address appears to me much more effective as history than as interpretation. The alignment of James with Edwards and Emerson, the exposition of his relation to his times, even the somewhat supererogatory defense of James against those who unjustly “confound pragmatism with the cruder worship of efficiency” seem rightly borne out by the facts. But as interpreted, the “Will to Believe” and the whole of James’s philosophy of life gets, as with Boutroux, a very definite twist that makes it over as Royce would have it be, but as it is not. Here are characteristic passages: “Your deeper ideals always depend upon viewing life *in the light of the larger unities that now appear*, upon viewing yourself as a *coworker with the universe* for the attainment of *what no present game of human action can now reveal*” (pp. 38–39). “Moreover, these ethical maxims are here governed, in James’s exposition, by the repeated *recognition of certain essentially absolute truths*, truths that, despite his natural horror of absolutism, he here expounds with a finished dialectic skill. . . . The need of faith in the unseen and the superhuman he finds upon these simple and yet absolutely true principles, principles of the true dialectic of life: First, every great decision of practical life requires faith and has irrevocable consequences, *consequences that belong to the whole great world*, and that therefore have *endless possible importance*. Secondly, since action and belief are thus inseparably bound together, our right to believe depends upon our right as active beings to make decisions. Thirdly, our duty to decide life’s greater issues is determined by the *absolute truth* that, in critical cases, the will to be doubtful and not to decide is itself a decision, and is hence no escape from our responsible moral position. And thus our responsible moral position is *a position that gives us our place in and for all future life*” (pp. 41–42). I have italicized the transforming phrases. They turn the doctrines of James, who had tried absolutism and found it wanting, who was radically an empiricist, an indeterminist, a pluralist, impatient of *alls* and *wholes*, always asserting the externality of relations, into just that non-empirical absolutism he instinctively rejected upon trial and reflectively combatted. Only when these phrases are accepted can he be compared with the absolutists, Fichte and Hegel. Reject them, and you find that he resembles Fichte in those respects in which Fichte was most citizen and least philosopher; you find that what he has in common with Hegel is exactly not the Hegelian *spirit*, but what is characteristic of Hegel, as he himself points out,¹ “merely as a reporter of certain empirical aspects of the actual.” Altogether, I can

¹ “A Pluralistic Universe,” page 100.

not overcome the impression that as this address progresses there is a gradual transmutation of the distinctive ideas of pragmatism into the characteristic conceptions of absolutism. In the end, I find attributed to William James the philosophy of life of Josiah Royce.

In this there is the undeniable appeal of a high pathos. The mind is so inevitably decking whom it loves, even though the beloved could not and will not wear them, with all its preferred supremacies and excellences. Such desire is the universal trait of lovers. Its execution gives recollection something of the flavor and glow of actuality, forges anew the chains which bind earth to eternal good. Though the naked fact were rougher, perhaps, yet nobler to utter, here compensation has a dual right—for to that which the mind inevitably craves is joined that for which the fact itself compels the yearning. In pure discourse, however, many would challenge compensation's place. Yet nowhere does it flourish more or win greater victories, for its nature is to grow by argument and to secure itself by dialectic. Compensatory philosophies, as a rule, play their game with loaded dice, and disingenuously: their answer, as Mr. Jacks boasts, exists prior to their problem: they bet on a sure thing. Now it is not one of the least splendid qualities of Roycean idealism that with respect to it the rule does not altogether hold. Its compensations are demanded with as much frankness as unconsciousness that they are compensation, and the essential begging of excellence and salvation, as well as of the question, appears as a right, not as a trespass.

Nowhere, I think, are the virtues and defects of the system so apparent as in the weighty and important address before the international congress of philosophy at Heidelberg, four years ago, on "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion," and here reprinted. The joining of the issues between pragmatism and absolutism is subtle as well as broad; just, as well as searching, and yet—what is true of the essays examined above is true also of this: the very presuppositions on which the issues are stated render them impossible as between absolutism and its opponent. Absolutism loves pragmatism, and with cannibalistic intensity; it swallows pragmatism whole and sublates in the "larger view."

Analysis—so the fable runs—lays bare three motives in the current descriptions of truth: that derived from biology, with its conception of the survival-value of ideas; that derived from "the longing to be self-possessed and inwardly free," and ramifying into individualism, personal idealism, and irrationalism; that derived from "modern logic" and identical with the Kantian motive "which leads us to seek for clear and exact self-consciousness regarding the principles both of our belief and of our conduct," a motive not altogether properly called intellectualism. These motives appear in realism like Russell's and voluntarism like Fichte's, as well as in the pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey. Each and all of them leads to absolute idealism. "Individualism is right in saying, 'I will to credit this or that opinion.' But individualism is wrong in supposing that I can ever be content with my own will in so far as it is merely an individual will. The will to my mind is to all of us nothing but a thirst for complete and conscious self-

possession, for fulness of life. And in terms of this its central motive the will defines the truth that it endlessly seeks as a truth that possesses completeness, totality, self-possession, and therefore absoluteness. The fact that, in our human experience, we never meet with any truths such as completely satisfy our longing for insight, this fact we therefore inevitably interpret, not as any defect in the truth, but as a defect in our present state of knowledge, a limitation due to our present type of individuality. Hence we acknowledge a truth which transcends our individual life" (pp. 235-6). "We can define the truth even of relativism only by asserting that relativism is absolutely true" (p. 237). The course of our daily life even as of dialectic must presuppose this absolutism. For it assumes the past, which transcends all individual experience, and it assumes the minds of other men, which transcend the individual experience of each man. If the truth of assertions about these two assumptions, which can not be verified, consists simply in the fact that such assertions are credited, truth-telling becomes indistinguishable from lying. For truth-telling *pre*-supposes, looks backward, to already existing facts which validate assertions by their mere existence. If not, the pragmatist shares the fate of Epimenides the Cretan, who called all Cretans liars (pp. 225-233), to say nothing of the Psalmist who extended this quality to all men. Withal, "instrumentalism in so far correctly defines the nature which truth possesses in so far as we ever actually verify truth" (p. 224).

The arguments here recapitulated are familiar to all readers of Royce: Pragmatism can not account for past time, other minds, and is self-contradictory. It happens, however, that the pragmatism which so fails is not pragmatism as it is, but pragmatism in the absolutistic version. This version derives from presuppositions which the pragmatist neither acknowledges nor entertains. Of absolutism, however, these are the critical center. They regard the nature of cognition or experience with respect to its volitional-durational character and with respect to its ego-centrality. In Professor Royce's version of absolutism, the analysis of time plays a leading rôle. He concludes, as is well known, that living time, the enduring present, is less real than past or dead time and unborn or future time. But this time itself is only a function of the will, whose operation is reality, and our own wills assume but never experience past and future as such. The result is that they are both real and unreal. This is a contradiction which is sublated by turning past and future into an actual present—the immediate experience of the absolute will, which alone thus possesses "completeness, totality, absoluteness." In it wish, need, and satisfaction are identical. In the finite mind they are different, and the difference is "a limitation due to my present type of individuality." Thirst is a guarantee thus of its own unreality. My thirst guarantees that what will assuage it exists and will assuage it, even though I die of it in the meantime. The upshot of this analysis of time is, then, that the past can never be present to us, but is together with the future present to the absolute, *in actu*. Absolutely, time hasn't a temporal nature at all. It collapses into "eternity," an ordinal simultaneity in space; when

the absolute does experience it as such, he experiences it as duration (*vid. supra*, p. 551).

Now for pragmatism time is as central as for absolutism. But it finds no empirical ground for the superior reality of the past and future over the present. And as for "eternity," that is an empty, negative concept like "not-man." The real duration, which Professor Royce reserves for the absolute, pragmatism observes to be the substance of all experience. *This* it describes as *it flows*, and its flow, as Professor A. W. Moore has long ago shown, without rejoinder, consists of actual transitions from uneasiness and fragmentariness to "completeness, totality," satisfactions, the former leading durationally into the latter as one tone of a melody into another, and each in its turn supplying "conscious self-possession and fulness of life." For pragmatism, furthermore, each and every phase of this process is its own guarantee and is neither logically nor emotionally in need of aid and comfort from without. It is logically what it is, and no more, a matrix to be credited, at the creditor's own risk, as a starting-point for more experience which may or may not *grow* out of it, *indeterminately and freely*, but does not already preexist as its warranty in an absolute mind. Hence, our felt lack of a thing in idea is silent about that thing's existence or non-existence. As substance it is just that felt lack, and no more, capable of working generatively toward the making or the discovery of what is desired. It may fail to do so, and then becomes false; it may succeed, and becomes true, acquires through application or activity a new trait or function, is *verified*. We have Professor Royce's own word that this description of the nature of truth is correct "in so far as we ever actually verify truth." But what would be the "truth" of a *felt lack*, of a guiding idea which didn't guide, if it were *not* verified in some concrete way? Its truth would be *nil*; it would be mere *datum*, an existence having a logically real nature, but neither true nor false. Only if truth and existence be confused is it possible to speak of unverified truth. Such a confusion arises wherever a compensatory absolute experience is invoked to confirm natural experience. To that, since that is empirically generative, the dialectic of a block universe does not apply. Hence, the objection that not we, but the absolute only, can verify the past, falls beside the mark. A past event, even such an event as Newton's mind, may in so far as it perdures be presently known and is presently known. So we know the law of gravitation. Newton's body indeed and his lapsed emotions are, as such, irrecoverable. But they are none the less subjects of predicative propositions, are none the less terms we have *knowledge about*, that gets itself verified in acquaintance with such data as these have continued themselves into, not necessarily, but freely, determining in virtue of their inward nature our present experience of them. This consists in the books Newton wrote, the portraits that were made of him, and so forth. And so long as these are credited *forward*, and the crediting continually and prosperously enriches life, even as doctors' theses, can they be better, more truly known? Professor Royce himself agrees they can not, by us. But do they become any more immediate to us, is the truth *about* them changed for us into the fact *of* them, by declaring them

to be the immediate possession of the absolute, who is still less immediate *to us*? Such a declaration is as reasonable as an attempt firmly to found a house of cards by building it on a quicksand.

What I have just said about Newton's mind as a past event applies equally to all other minds as presently active. This means, of course, that pragmatism regards minds as being as little private in their essential nature as things; propositions of which they are the subjects, hence, are amenable to verification. Absolutism regards other minds as something essentially private, therefore not amenable to verification and hence subjecting the thinker to the alternative between solipsism and the absolute. As the absolute's mind is *ex hypothesis* least of all subject to verification, the validating effect of that mind is, to say the least, highly questionable. But granting that I believe in the absolute, how am I thereby to be saved from solipsism? Does the alternative offer anything more than solipsism on a large scale as against solipsism on a small? Be this as it may, it can arise only if the purely, the "merely psychological" character of the individual mind be assumed. Pragmatism declares this assumption to involve a dialectical reconstruction of objective empirical data. It declares these data to be found in actual acquaintance with other minds themselves. It finds that a knower first discovers those minds, and only afterwards understands his own in the light of these discoveries. It finds those minds to be highly complicated objective organizations of terms and relations, not simple wills. And finally while it finds that empirically not all the elements in a mind are perceivable with equal facility, any more than are all the elements of the residual world, it exhibits the purely empirical fact that one mind *does* know another and demonstrates *how* this knowledge occurs. What, then, is to be gained by violating the principle of parsimony and invoking, *in addition* to actual verifications of propositions the subjects of which are objects of acquaintance, an utterly *unverifiable* and unknowable absolute mind to validate the knowledge of other minds admitted already to be valid so far as may be?

Altogether, pragmatism seems, thus far, to fall into the toils of absolutism only when it is transmuted into a thing absolutistic from the start. Is there not, however, one instance at least in which pragmatism falls of its own momentum into absolutism, like a meteorite into the sun? Does not pragmatism assert the absolute whenever it affirms a general proposition? Can the truth even of relativism be defined otherwise than absolutely? Impossible, says Professor Royce: and the impossibility arises by the use of the most dread weapon in his dialectical armory. "An absolute truth is one whose denial implies the reassertion of that same truth" (p. 251). We are facing the famous reflexive argument. In the essay it is incarnated in many and elaborate examples, from Epimenides the Cretan, Euclid and his theorem that there is no last prime number, to all the ramifications of the "new logic." Formally it has not, so far as I know, been met. Yet it is curious that so profound and sympathetic a student of symbolic logic as Professor Royce should not long ago have observed its formal impossibility. Logically the reflexive argument is coincident with

the conception which Mr. Bertrand Russell designates as the "class of all classes" and this conception is, according to Mr. Russell's unquestioned analysis, self-contradictory. To choose one term of the contradiction and to call that the valid one is an act purely arbitrary, in no sense a solution of the contradiction. The solution of it, however, destroys the reflexive effect. When, for example, the Psalmist says, "all men are liars," all men formally become liars and not-liars at the same time. When the relativist declares, "There is no absolute truth," truth is thereby rendered both absolute and relative. Mr. Russell's conclusion of his examination of the contradiction is that the *all* type of "formal truth" is not admissible; the *any* and *every* type is. Classes have to be taken as *many*, and when so taken can be logical subjects, but only in propositions of a *different kind* from those in which their terms are subjects. The proposition which applies to the Psalmist himself will be other than that which applies to the Psalmist as a member of the class *men*. As the latter, then, he may well be a liar. In and by himself he may be altogether veracious. So, also, the assertion, "there is no absolute truth," may be in itself "absolute," as a member of the class "truth" relative. The distinctions which lead to this particularism at once destroy the force of the reflexive argument and confirm the distinctly pragmatic reply to it.

This reply points to the fact that the *all* form of being is possible only in a block-universe in which time is unreal. Now empirically the universe is a collection of *eaches*, *i. e.*, of particulars, and time is real. The block-quality appears always in retrospect, for experience grows and *all* implies *more than all*. Reflexion is impossible under such conditions. The judgment in which it is said to occur is a *new fact* in the world, the latest in so far forth. What it regards and designates is not itself, but its predecessors. The *all* it makes use of becomes in this very use less than all. This is why, as Mr. Russell points out, it is subject to predicates of a *different kind* from those applying to its own members. Epistemologically, the reflexive argument rests on a confusion of kinds, namely, of *knowledge of acquaintance* with *knowledge about*, of existence with truth, of the perception of the *datum*, "all truth is relative" with the particular proposition "It is true that all truth is relative." The former is a fact, neither true nor false, but just so much brute being which may or may not perdure. It is the class as many. The latter is not designative, but predicative, it is *knowledge about*, and validates itself, in so far as it can validate itself at all, pragmatically. It may be added that only in the latter form can or does knowledge require validation. An illustration will clinch the argument: Suppose that on entering a room I formulate my perception thus, "There is no one here." According to the reflexive argument I contradict myself, for I deny that I am in the room while I am in it. Yet who, even among absolute idealists, would accuse me of self-stultification? Philosophers, none the less, in strictly similar logical situations make this accusation, and in good faith. Which exhibits again the attitude of pragmatism and of absolutism toward the actual processes of experience, one taking it as it comes, the other making it over.

The upshot is that the reflexive argument, no less than that from the knowledge of the past and the knowledge of one mind by another, is based on premises which pragmatism points to experience as denying. The empirical data with which it starts must be dealt with alchemically before they can yield the desired results. Premises are made to conform to the wished-for conclusion rather than the conclusion to the premises. Unsatisfied interests must have their compensatory satisfactions. "Then what I have called the trivialities of mere instrumentalism will appear as what they are—fragmentary hints and transient expressions of the will whose life is universal, whose form is absolute and whose laws are at once those of logic, of ethics, of the unity of experience, and of whatever gives sense to life."

H. M. KALLEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland. (Aus *Natur und Geisteswelt*, Band 41.) OSWALD KÜLPE. Leipzig: Teubner. 1911. Pp. viii + 136.

This little volume has become very popular in Germany. Its title, however, is quite misleading; for it does not deal with present-day philosophy, but only with the philosophy of the past. The philosophers represented in the booklet: Mach, Dühring, Haeckel, Nietzsche, Fechner, Lotze, Hartmann, Wundt, were typical of German thought during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and they are typical of what German thought of the early twentieth century is *not*. As a history of German philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century, however, Külpe's exposition can be recommended. It is popular, easy reading, and furnishes a good deal of useful knowledge.

GÜNTHER JACOBY.

GREIFSWALD UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

LA CIENCIA TOMISTA. May, 1912. *El feminismo en Alemania* (pp. 181-194): A. G. MENÉNDEZ-REIGADA. — An Account of the Programme and Discussions of the Congress of Women held in Berlin in February, 1912. *El ascetismo de D. Diego de Torres Villaroel* (pp. 195-227): J. DE LAMANO Y BENEITE. — The true character of Torres Villaroel is not generally known. Behind the humorous and sarcastical writer, there was a man imbued with asceticism and heroic charity. *Las Cortes y la Constitución de Cadiz* (pp. 228-247): J. D. GAFO. — The question of the legitimacy of the Cortes and of the Constitution of 1812 has given rise to numerous inconsistencies and contradictions on the part of so notable writers as Strauch, Puigcerver, and especially Rafael Vélez. *El Filósofo Rancio* (pp. 248-264): G. A. GETINO. — A study of the work and influence of the forerunner of neo-scholasticism in Spain. Francisco Alvarado. *Boletín de Apologética. Boletín de Filosofía. Crónicas científico-sociales. Revista de Revistas. Bibliografía.*