



Review

Reviewed Work(s): Race Questions and other American Problems by Josiah Royce

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admixture of matter, is only apparent, says Professor Werner. For the matter which constitutes the first heaven, or body of the Divine being, is not the blind contingent matter of things sublunary. It is simply the *subject of form*. It is perfect actuality, not inert and imperfect potentiality, and the circular world movement is pure *ἐνέργεια*.

Finally, the pure form or God is the equivalent of the Platonic Idea. Aristotle's God is the supreme term in the hierarchy of forms. The great difference between Plato and Aristotle in this regard is that, whereas Plato assumes a plurality of Ideas or forms, Aristotle assumes only one perfect form, which he identifies with the Idea of Good. The form of the cosmos is harmonious since it is God. God thinks the whole universe of beings, not in their isolated material complexity, but in their formal unity. This world-thought in God is love. In him love and desire are one, and he responds to the confused aspirations which come from all parts of the universe by an eternal act of comprehension and love. Man can, in rare moments, identify himself with this divine thought, and enjoy this intellectual love of God. In so doing man becomes identical with God.

Professor Werner's book will prove of interest and value to all students of Aristotle. It is a contribution to the understanding of the great Stagirite which is worthy of serious consideration. I find myself unable to regard as convincing Professor Werner's interpretation of Aristotle as an out and out intellectualist in his doctrine of mind, and as holding that God is the Soul of the World. Notwithstanding his apparently complete command of the text of the Master, I think that Professor Werner's exegesis has been somewhat warped by Bergsonian anti-intellectualism.

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Race Questions and other American Problems. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.—pp. xiii, 287.

It is a familiar charge against Idealism that it is anything but a practical creed, that it is an

"Abstract intellectual scheme of life
Quite irrespective of life's plainest laws."

It is not therefore without significance when an idealist philosopher seeks to answer it by a practical application of his doctrines to the problems of modern life, a life which, as he fully admits,

"Is Rome or London not Fools' Paradise?"

This is what Professor Royce undertakes to do in the present volume.

The book consists of five essays: "Race Questions and Prejudices";

“Provincialism”; “On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America”; “The Pacific Coast, a Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilisation”; “Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problem of Moral Education in America.” Each of these, as the author says in his preface, “states opinions which from my own point of view, make it a part of an effort to apply, to some of our American problems, that general doctrine about life which I have recently summed up in my book entitled *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.” A portion of the concluding essay is devoted to a brief resumé of that doctrine. The “theory is that the whole moral law is implicitly bound up in the one precept: *Be loyal*” (p. 245). “This loyal attitude makes a man give himself to the active service of a cause” (p. 235). But “you cannot devote yourself unless you are aware of yourself” and hence “loyalty is never mere self-forgetfulness; it is self-devotion” (p. 236). The cause regarded as a larger and supra-personal unity stands over against the loyal man as something which by contrast emphasizes the consciousness of self, but “despite the contrast he becomes one with it through his every loyal deed” (p. 238). Only in so far as he becomes the willing instrument of his cause, and thus gives active expression to his loyalty, does he acquire a genuine self, “an office, a function, a place, a status, a right, in the world” (p. 247). Loyalty, then, must be intelligent and it must be practical; “it is complete only in motor terms, never in merely sentimental terms” (p. 239).

But individual causes, individual loyalties, may conflict, often do, with disastrous results. “Must there not then be some higher moral principle than that of loyalty, some principle in terms of which we can find out who is right when two forms of loyalty contradict each other’s claims, while each pretends to be the only true loyalty” (p. 243)? The solution is to be found not by the introduction of some principle other than that of loyalty, but by the discovery of “the internal meaning, the true sense of the principle itself” (p. 245). The spirit of loyalty, no matter what may be the particular forms in which it embodies itself, is a common good of mankind. It alone enables a man to find a cause which he may serve and a self with which he may serve it. But, “if this be so, loyalty, taken in its universal meaning, is just as much a true good when my neighbour possesses it as when I possess it. If once I am wide awake enough to grasp this fact, I shall value my neighbour’s loyalty just as highly as I do my own. He indeed will be loyal to his cause, I to mine. Our causes may be very diverse, but our spirit will be one. And so the very essence of *my* spirit of loyalty will demand that I state my principle thus: Be loyal, and be in such wise loyal that, whatever your own cause,

you remain loyal to loyalty" (p. 248). "Let your loyalty be such loyalty as helps your neighbour to be loyal" (p. 249).

Such is, in outline, the doctrine to the illustration of which the rest of the volume is devoted. The breadth and importance of the topics discussed permit us to see in a comprehensive way its genuine significance. The first essay, as its title indicates, deals with that group of problems which the contact of various races is making daily more prominent. It is notoriously a dangerous as well as a thankless task to attempt to undermine a claim to superiority of race by calling it a prejudice, especially when the aggrieved can always fall back on the latest results of anthropology or race psychology to support him. But the author faces the undertaking, encouraged by a certain scepticism about those results. He believes that our studies upon the physical varieties of mankind are not yet sufficiently advanced to shed light upon the more important questions of moral and intellectual development. He claims further that if the investigations of anthropologists have shown anything it is that, taken at an early stage of development and viewed apart from the influences of culture, most races exhibit the same poverty in morals, intellect, and imagination. To claim a privileged position, therefore, for any one race is simply to fail to distinguish between the accidental effects of environment and culture and the essential capacity for progress. "Our so-called race problems are merely the problems caused by our antipathies" (p. 47). The solution of them lies, not in fostering those antipathies, in "training a man first to give names to his antipathies and then to regard the antipathies thus named as sacred merely because they have a name" (p. 48), but rather in realizing that the problem is essentially one of administration. The surest way to win adherents to the cause of order and good government is to exhibit that cause in operation. "Sympathy with the law grows with responsibility for its administration" (p. 28). The author cites in illustration the case of Jamaica, where the negro has been admitted to a share in the administration and "superiority" has asserted itself in deeds rather than in boasts. To this he attributes the comparative absence of friction.

The essay on "Provincialism" deals with another aspect of the same problem—the problem of the creation of a civic consciousness. In the ideal of provincialism Professor Royce sees the means for obtaining the desired end. This seems, at first sight, paradoxical enough, for the word frequently connotes those tendencies to narrow-mindedness and exclusiveness which are opposed to genuine progress. For instance, 'The Southern attitude to the negro is simply provincialism,' is a remark which the present writer has often heard. But Professor Royce gives his own

meaning to the term. "For me, then, a province shall mean any part of a national domain, which is . . . sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its own distinction from other parts of the country" (p. 61). The province, in this sense, is the digestive organ of the body politic, and the provincial atmosphere of local pride and relative local independence is that in which the new-comer may most easily become acclimatized. With the growth of this provincial spirit will go other gains. For it is the source of individuality, of independence, of initiative, of all those tendencies towards wholesome variation which the levelling influences of modern civilization are threatening to obliterate. Again, in the development and organization of those smaller groups for which the life of the provincial community affords opportunity rests the hope of avoiding the dangers of mob-rule. Upon these Professor Royce dwells at some length. "Our modern life," he says, "with its vast unions of people, with its high development of popular sentiments, with its passive and sympathetic love for knowing and feeling what other men know and feel, is subject to the disorders of larger crowds, of more dangerous mobs, than have ever before been brought into sympathetic union" (p. 86). But the efficacy of a group depends upon the variety and not upon the uniformity of its members, upon the individual's preservation of his critical judgment, upon the prevalence of a normal spirit of opposition within the group. And so, "Keep the province awake that the nation may be saved from the disastrous hypnotic slumber so characteristic of excited masses of mankind" (p. 96). This wakefulness, however, is not that of self-satisfaction and self-centeredness, but that of a community striving after an ideal and so ready to offer a hospitable spirit to new influences and to express its seriousness of purpose in the beautifying and dignifying of its own life.

The principle stated in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*: "Have a cause; choose your cause; be decisive" (p. 187), might be taken as the text of the third essay, "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America." Professor Royce, as against many foreign critics, lays more stress on the idealistic than on the materialistic tendencies in the national life. "Yet this same American is unable to give his idealism any adequate expression in his social life" (p. 131). His idealism is for the most part ineffective because it lacks focus and intelligent direction. There is energy, there is a generously receptive attitude, but the energy is diffused, the curiosity expresses itself in an eagerness to accept the new as necessarily the good; the mental attitude shows too little discrimination. The causes of the evil are too much thought, on the one hand, and too little,

on the other; too much thought for reforming all the world and too little for improving a small part of it; too much interest in setting traps for the millennium and not enough in the problem of the moment. The individual thinks for the world instead of thinking for himself. "What then is the happy medium? Shall I cease to think? No, not so. Be thoughtful, reason out some of your ideals for yourself. Know something, and know that something well. . . . In that region be indeed the creature of hard-won insight, of clear consciousness, of definite thinking about what it is yours to know. There the formula is in order. . . . But remember life is vast and your little clearing is very small. In the rest of life cultivate naïveté, accept authority, dread fads, follow as faithfully as your instinct permits other lovers of the ideal who are here wiser than you, and be sure that though your head splits you will never think out all your problems or formulate all your ideals so long as you are in this life" (p. 159).

The essay which follows—"The Pacific Coast, a Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilisation"—stands somewhat detached from the rest of the volume. It is an estimate of the influence of topographical and climatic conditions in producing "the spirit of California,—that tension between individualism and loyalty, between shrewd conservatism and bold radicalism, which marks this community" (p. 225).

The concluding essay, which discusses "Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America," emphasizes the value of such training as a propædeutic to the expression of loyalty in the wider social activities. In the first place, "skillful and serious physical exercise involves true devotion," and secondly, "in so far as it is a part of the life of a social group" it "can more directly aid the individual to learn to be loyal to his group" (p. 272). But its most valuable results are to be found in the spirit of fair play and the intelligent self-control which, under wise direction, it may promote. For this spirit is nothing but "the spirit of loyalty to loyalty . . . that honors and respects one's very enemies for their devotion to the very causes that one assails" (p. 268), while cool-headed self-possession is an essential condition of loyal service. As the author constantly insists, "One must be in control of one's powers, or one has no self to give to one's cause. One must get a personality in order be to able to surrender this personality" (p. 255). Loyalty in any sphere must be expressed "not in confused sentiments but through clearly conscious deeds" (p. 287).

Enough has been said to indicate the way in which an Idealist ethics may approach some modern issues. Many of these are concerned with the creation of what Mr. H. G. Wells has called the state-consciousness,

and it is interesting to observe how a philosopher approaching the subject from a stand-point very different from that of many modern students of social tendencies reaches a conception of the goal not so very remote from theirs. The difference lies in the means. For Professor Royce the end is to be obtained not by coercion but through the development of public opinion in its best sense, not through mechanical devices but through a process of spiritual assimilation.

The doctrine of loyalty as here set forth neither invites nor demands criticism on the formal or metaphysical side. Here is a theory of the moral life: The question is, Is it a mere flapping of metaphysical wings, or can it endure the ordeal of a practical application? It is impossible to read this volume without admiration for the way in which the test has been withstood.

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Die Ethik Kants. Entwurf zu einem Neubau auf Grund einer Kritik des Kantischen Moralprinzips. Von WILHELM KOPPELMANN. Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1907.—pp. viii, 92.

Within the last decade or so interest in ethics has steadily grown in Germany, and this has naturally led to a renewed study of Kant's moral philosophy. To the number of able treatises written by Hegler, Schmidt, Hagerström, Vorländer, Förster, Menzer, Adickes, and Messer, we can now add that of Koppelman, the author of *Kritik des sittlichen Bewusstseins*. Owing to the significance of Kant's ethics for his world-view and the fact that many of the younger German scholars have been attracted by the ethical teachings of the great criticist, investigations such as these possess more than a historical value to students of philosophy. The present work, for example, attempts not merely to offer an interpretation and criticism of the Kantian theory, but also to develop the basal moral laws from the *a priori* conditions of a spiritual kingdom—the kingdom of ends, as Kant would say—which are held to be the same in all rational beings and can therefore be known with absolute certainty. In this respect Koppelman agrees with Kant in his endeavor to deduce the moral principles from the notion of a rational being as such, or, better, from the notion of a kingdom of rational beings. He accepts as correct both Kant's method and his premises, but tries to show that Kant reaches a perfectly barren formula by exaggerating the principle of autonomy.

As the most fruitful teaching in Kant's ethics our author regards the idea—not clearly and directly expressed—that action in accordance with the principle of 'fitness for universal legislation' will result in the highest good, in the preservation of a society in which the highest is to be