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Review

Reviewed Work(s): *The Philosophy of Loyalty* by Josiah Royce

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our physical development been carried farther, we might have had (instead of our vague affective life) a corresponding increase in the number of internal sense organs" (p. 292). Despite my inability to describe what the attitude is which may be free from intellectualistic and also from teleological shortsightedness, and despite my effort to accept Titchener's tentative hypothesis, I do not feel entirely without misgivings under his flag. To be reasonable, one should offer a substitute. This would imply a treatise. This I do not presume to attempt. I have, however, honestly, even if inadequately, tried to suggest my personal reaction to the work as a whole. I suppose some of my objections may be ruled out as "epistemological." But somehow it seems to me that our epistemological presuppositions inevitably underlie and exercise some directive influence upon our characteristic attitude toward psychological problems, especially those of feeling. Moreover I can not understand exactly how we can safely divorce such considerations when we lay our elaborate groundwork for a "systematic psychology." At any rate this divorcing, in the opinion of the writer, has not been done by James, or Münsterberg, or Judd, or Titchener, etc., and when one tries to make articulate in what fundamental respects he differs from another, for temperamental or other reasons, he finds himself at their starting-point. I am myself unable to find an attitude yet worked out which seems to me sufficiently free from sensationalism and intellectualism to allow for a treatment of feeling which satisfies my own introspection. Titchener has made undoubtedly an important contribution, and the very sort that was needed. Professor Titchener ranks so high, and merits it all so clearly, that his modest and undogmatic, even at times apologetic, attitude so abashes one that it is doubly difficult for the writer, who is even in name scarcely yet a psychologist, to raise a dissenting voice.

After all Titchener has eminently succeeded in what he set out to do, stimulate systematic investigation, state critical problems, lend his name to an original theory, and offer a wealth of concrete material and well-stated considerations which can never be neglected by any future psychologist of feeling.

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*The Philosophy of Loyalty.* JOSIAH ROYCE. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908. Pp. xii + 409.

Readers of "The World and the Individual" have been awaiting with eagerness the appearance of a work which should supplement the author's metaphysics by the presentation of his ethical creed, as held by him to-day. The "Philosophy of Loyalty," in which this hope seems about to be realized, will, however, prove in some respects disappointing to the special student. For it is, as expressly announced in the preface, neither a text-book nor "an elaborately technical philosophical research," but rather a popular discussion of a single problem, which took its final form

in a course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. Nevertheless, the problem chosen is so fundamental and is treated with so much clearness that the essential features of the author's theory of ethics appear in unmistakable outlines, even though the reasons offered for its acceptance are not elaborated with anything approaching completeness.

The subject-matter of the book is, broadly speaking, the content of the moral ideal. This for Professor Royce, as for Hegel, consists in the identification of the individual will with the universal will. This universal is, of course, the organic whole of which each individual mind is a member. The creation of a harmony between myself and the world, in other words the setting before myself of ends the realization of which is at the same time the realization of the ends of my fellowmen, this is the task that the moral ideal lays upon me. Such a prescription means, negatively, indifference to all satisfactions that are merely individual, except as they may be incidental to the attainment of the ultimate end; with this will disappear all strife except that against the enemies of the ideal itself. Positively it means the giving up of one's life to the service—not of individuals as such, for there is no reason why I should supply others with what I do not allow myself, but of causes. For a cause is a tie binding a number of individuals into a unity through their struggle for or possession of a common object. What particular causes you and I are to work for must be determined mainly by our tastes, our abilities, and our circumstances. But whatever our cause may be, evidently we must so choose and serve it as to increase to the utmost of our power the amount of devotion to causes in the world. For only as society becomes thoroughly permeated by such a spirit can it become completely unified. If, by narrowing somewhat the common signification of a word, we agree to call "the willing, practical, and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" loyalty, then it follows from the preceding that all virtue is loyalty of some sort, and the supreme virtue is loyalty to loyalty.

The evidence offered for the truth of this position is twofold. In the first place, it is maintained that this unity of the one and the many is the highest good of the individual himself, that, indeed, nothing is a good except as it is supported and made what it is by this consciousness of harmony. Whence by the convenient and (among philosophers) popular assumption that the right is always and everywhere identical with the agent's highest good, the equation, morality = loyalty, is obtained. In the second place, it is asserted that the ordinarily accepted virtues, as veracity, respect for property, and the rest, find their explanation and justification in terms of this conception.

But may not the conception itself rest upon a myth? Devotion to a cause may, indeed, be the individual's highest good, but he can find it such, as Professor Royce admits, or rather insists, only on condition that he supposes the cause to be worthy of his devotion. Now a cause, as we have seen, does not derive its ultimate value from the satisfaction its realization will afford to individuals. Is worth, or value, to be defined, then, in terms of something other than satisfaction? By no means; the good must represent the satisfaction of some conscious being. If, then,

morality be not the worship of a fetish, the cause must be a super-personal being, an experience dwelling upon some higher level of consciousness than any human being ever reaches. And the cause of causes, the unity of the life of the race, can be nothing other than God. At this level of insight morality passes over into religion, and loyalty may be defined as "the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual Self." The evidence for the existence of this super-personal consciousness occupies the two closing chapters of the book. In the seventh it is presented by means of a polemic against pragmatism, in the eighth by a more purely constructive argument. As these add nothing essentially new to the exposition in "The World and the Individual" and in the presidential address, "The Eternal and the Practical," they need not detain us here.

Such are the outlines of this simple and impressive picture of the moral life. What, now, are we to say of the grounds upon which it is recommended for our acceptance? In attempting to estimate their adequacy we are confronted by the fact that the book is not a treatise, but a series of popular lectures. Now, if a lecturer wishes a second invitation to address the same audience, even if it be an average "academic" audience, he must supply entertainment or edification, not evidence. If, then, the present reviewer finds himself compelled to say that (ignoring the metaphysical discussion as something already before the philosophical public) the arguments of the earlier chapters seem to him not merely unconvincing, but flimsy, he is not so much condemning this book as giving the author a hint as to how to deal with the difficulties of at least one reader when he comes to prepare a more thoroughgoing presentation.

Professor Royce, as we have seen, reaches his conclusion by two different paths, through a doctrine of the good and a doctrine of the right. The position that loyalty, as above defined, is the supreme good, by the side of which all other objects of desire are (as I understand it) worthless, is attained primarily by the author's favorite method of eliminating alternatives. The most important alternative attacked is hedonism. But his argument, if valid, will hold equally against a number of closely related theories such as Alexander's and Simmel's, which, for want of a better name, may be called voluntarism. Now the essence of both hedonism and voluntarism is catholicity and freedom. As far as the individual's own good is concerned, they assert that the satisfaction of no desire is as such worthless, and, provided that a harmony of desires has been attained which is both comprehensive and stable, the individual's own judgment as to the relative position of his different desires is not to be condemned on any pretext, except as the interests of other persons are involved. The representatives of this position will accordingly maintain that he who picks out a single object of desire and holds it up as *allein-seligmachend*, must give definite and rigorously tested evidences to justify his contention. Unfortunately, this is precisely what we do not find. "Unless you can find some sort of loyalty," we are told, "you can not

find unity and peace in your active living." The second of these two statements gets what measure of truth it possesses—not from the author's ethical, but from his metaphysical, position, according to which the universe is perfect. For the devotee of a lost cause, if he really believes it lost forever, will gain no peace from his devotion. The similar claim with regard to unity stands as a mere bold assertion. Unity with others in the pursuit of a common end undoubtedly enhances the value of that end for most of us. For some persons it is possible that no other kind of pursuit is capable of issuing in satisfaction. Such enhancement of value can as easily find a place in the hedonistic or voluntaristic account of the good as anywhere else. What is required, however, for Professor Royce's purposes, is a demonstration that it must occupy precisely the same place in every life; and, secondly, that everything else is worthless for every one. The very beginnings of such a demonstration are lacking.

With regard to the argument that all the commonly recognized virtues can be stated in terms of loyalty, it must be pointed out that all the virtues indispensable for the conservation of existence can be justified by any theory whatever which, in Nietzsche's phrase, affirms life. The real test comes when we apply our theory to the actions which aim at something more than the protection of the conditions of existence. No attempt is made to meet this test. Furthermore, since the theory claims to describe the moral life of common sense and not merely that of the philosopher, it assumes that the judgments of common sense never regard as moral the seeking for purely individual goods (whether for self or for another), and, further, that common sense looks upon the success of a cause as having a value independent of the good that may accrue to the individuals thereby affected. For the first of these assumptions no evidence whatever is offered. For the support of the second I suppose the author has in mind the peculiar enthusiasm which a cause is capable of evoking. Doubtless a million is a more impressive figure than one. But a million is, after all, made up of units, and whatever the source of its power over the imagination, it is in any event not a product mysteriously generated by the fusion of zeros.

If, in conclusion, we turn to another aspect of Professor Royce's work, the pedagogical and homiletic, I believe all readers will agree in pronouncing it a masterpiece. The method of approach and the order and manner of treatment exhibit great skill. The style is transparently clear. Every sentence pulsates with life. And the whole glows with a warmth that can be infused only by a profound and generous nature that has seen a noble vision.

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