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
The Two-Fold Nature of Knowledge: Imitative and Reflective,
an Unpublished Manuscript of Josiah Royce

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THE TWO-FOLD NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE:
IMITATIVE AND REFLECTIVE,
AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT OF JOSIAH ROYCE*

The following is a manuscript version of an address delivered by Josiah Royce before the Philosophical Congress at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893. It is written in longhand and is included in folio 62 of Royce's unpublished writings, preserved in the Archives of Widener Library at Harvard.

I have omitted what appear to be the two concluding sections of the manuscript, principally because both have a substantial number of missing pages. The first of these sections discusses the role of imitation in the process of obtaining knowledge and self-awareness—a topic on which Royce wrote and published in subsequent years.¹ The final section attempts to relate Royce's findings to certain cardinal principles of idealist metaphysics—a subject handled more fully and more clearly in his *magnum opus*, *The World and the Individual* (1899).

The problem of selfhood occupied Royce's attention virtually throughout his philosophical career. Two strategies of analysis may be distinguished in Royce's writings on the subject. The first and more familiar one takes as its starting point the metaphysical presuppositions of absolute idealism. In this perspective Royce exhibits the human self as a fragment or "moment" of an Absolute Self. In its quest for a life of coherent knowledge and meaningful purpose, the finite human self "intends" what only an infinite Self can warrant and fulfill. This line of approach is most fully developed in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1885) and *The World and the Individual*. The other strategy of analysis, exemplified in the manuscript following, takes as its starting point a more phenomenological, experiential orientation, specifically the pioneer work done in social psychology by Royce's contemporaries Tarde, Baldwin, Durkheim, Wundt, and James, among others. Although Royce made occasional efforts to integrate these strategies of analysis, hoping thereby to gain concrete plausibility for his absolutist metaphysics, it is not unlikely that they are incompatible.

Be that as it may, Royce found himself equally dissatisfied with the dogmatic pretensions of the rationalist metaphysicians to knowledge of the self as an abiding "soul-substance," and with the skeptical outcome of empiricist analyses of self as typified by Hume. Royce was eventually led to conceive selfhood in what are essentially moral or "existential" terms, namely, as an achievement resulting from the attempt to formulate and live by an integrating life plan or purpose, rather than as a metaphysical or epistemological given.²

The manuscript that follows belongs to a substantial body of writing, undertaken by Royce roughly between 1890 and 1910, whose primary purpose is to lay the epistemological and psychological groundwork for his later ethical doctrines of loyalty and of the community of interpretation. It is because that groundwork is not fully presented in Royce's last published writings that the manuscript following, as well as certain other unpublished material dating from this twenty-year period, deserves the attention of Royce scholars.

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If you wish to understand your relation to the world, first understand the nature of your own thinking-process;—such is the principle of all critical

* Gratitude is due Royce's grandson, Mr. Stephen Royce, for permission to publish this manuscript and also Royce's Urbana Lectures (which will appear in subsequent issues of this *Journal*); to the University of California for research and travel funds in support of this project; and to the staff of the Widener Library Archives, Harvard University, for their courteous assistance.

¹ See in particular "The Imitative Functions, and Their Place in Human Nature," *Century Magazine*, III: 138 (May 1894), and "Preliminary Report on Imitation," *Psychological Review*, II: 221 (May 1895). For a discussion of Royce's theory of imitation, see my *The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (Harvard University Press: 1965), chapter three.

² For a fuller discussion of this development in Royce's thought, see my *The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce*, chapter four.

philosophy, as it has existed in the world ever since the time of Socrates. The present paper is an effort to contribute towards this general end of our self-comprehension of the business and the processes of thinking. I shall discuss certain aspects of the nature of knowledge, because of the light that such a discussion may throw upon the discoverable constitution of the world of truth.

Human thinking is in every individual case an effort, made by an intelligent being, to imitate in his own way the form and structure of the truth that exists beyond this particular thinking. Consequently the business of knowing is essentially an imitative business. But human thinking is also an effort, made by this same being, to give his own ideas a certain inner clearness, self-consistency, assurance, self-possession,—in a word, to give himself a genuine self-consciousness. Hence the business of knowing is also essentially a reflective undertaking. But I imitate when I give myself over to a relatively foreign authority, whose constitution or activity I submissively try to reproduce in myself. On the other hand, so it would very obviously seem, I reflect when I retire into my own inner world, and there, with a certain relative independence endeavor, not merely to re-embody what an external authority suggests, but to construct for myself what shall, in the outcome, seem good in my own eyes. But now all our rational thinking is somehow an effort to accomplish both these ends at once. The question arises: How are the two ends related? How are these two equally necessary undertakings of our thought to be harmonized? On the answer to this question as to the relation of the imitative and the reflective aspects of thought a great deal depends as regards our philosophical definition of the world of truth. I, therefore, need make no apology for asking the attention of this Congress to so ancient and yet so perennially fresh a topic.

I

The life of our consciousness, the mental life that you and I experience from moment to moment, and so the whole world of the knowledge that you and I possess of anything in heaven or earth, may be regarded, with respect to the various individual moments of our inner lives, from three points of view, namely as the object of an Immediate Knowledge, as the object of a Reflective Knowledge, and thirdly, as the embodiment of what I shall call an Imitative Knowledge. I shall successively consider each of these points of view.

In the first place, your whole inner life, and mine too, is a mass of present experience, which is whatever it happens to be, and so has what may be called its immediate character. In this immediate character our mental life consists of present sensations, memories, feelings,—in a word, of content, of *Bewusstseinsinhalt* as several German writers have recently called it,—or again, of what Hume defined as impressions and ideas. Our knowledge then, in so far as it is merely a knowledge of the content of this moment, may therefore be called Immediate Knowledge. Your present pain or pleasure, the peculiar and indescribable quality of any sensation, of the odor of a rose, or of the tones of a violin, or of a private grief, or of a personal love of your own, such experience, I say, is of this immediate character. And such immediate knowledge enters, as we know, into all

our most elaborate and scientific knowledge. Without feeling—no insight. Without direct experience, no reflection or other thought. Without immediacy, no mediation. There is something peculiar and individual, meanwhile, about this immediate content of each moment, something unique, which can never be repeated. The moment dies, and its flavor is gone. *This* feeling you shall never feel again, *this* immediate knowledge you shall never repeat. In the phrase of Heraclitus: Into the same stream no one twice descends. And consciousness, in so far as it is immediate, is this sort of a Heraclitean flux. Each one of its moments must be appreciated alone by itself and, so to speak, not as public property. Nor can this feeling, as *this* feeling, ever be exhaustively described. Our moments are isolated like our hearts. The heart knoweth its own bitterness, and each moment its own incommunicable inner content of sensations, emotion, interests. How does the shock of a Leyden jar feel? What is the taste of olives? The moment of experience knows, and, in certain respects, it can never articulately tell this which it knows to any other moment. Memory, we say, preserves the flavor of a moment for the future. But each moment of memory is once more an individual moment,—here and not there in time, present as a memory of the past, but still a memory not in so far as its content is past, but in so far as its own peculiar experience, once more, is *here* in time, and, as it were, simply undertakes or pretends to be a representation of the past. Representations of past events are themselves present events; they are therefore not the past events represented. And the past events themselves are dead when they are represented. And so, in its immediate character, each moment of life, whether it is called a representation or not, stands alone, and is, strictly speaking, never repeated. Such is the world of immediate knowledge in so far as it is immediate. I say now that all your mental life and mine, no matter what we do or think, high or low, wise or foolish, has always, in one aspect, this immediate character.

On the other hand, however, all immediate knowledge is essentially incomplete knowledge, and it is so just because it is, as immediate, inexpressible. Real and complete knowledge is never merely immediate but is also what may be called, technically, derived or mediated knowledge, knowledge, namely, that can, so to speak, record itself, and can say for all time—this or this truth is true, this or this insight, from this point of view, is always to be stated thus and thus. Therefore, just in so far as each moment has a unique and incommunicable character, this character, in being the object of an immediate knowledge, is no object of a complete knowledge. Complete knowledge, such as one aims to get in the scientifically or philosophically interpreted experience, involves indeed immediate knowledge as an organic part of itself, and depends upon actual experience obtained in moments, but is itself more than such knowledge. There is nothing in heaven or earth, as Hegel pointed out, whose complete knowledge does not involve a union of mediacy and of immediateness.

II

Now such completer knowledge is itself of two kinds, to be expressed in our second and third points of view. We obtain our articulate, our expressible insight, only by living through the immediate experiences of our various moments,

but the articulate insights themselves take two shapes. They are, namely, either Reflective insights or Imitative insights. To be sure, as we shall see, the two sorts of knowledge are never sundered; but they are distinguishable, and are often opposed to each other, and it is well from the first to keep them asunder.

My knowledge is, in the next place, Reflective, in so far as at any moment, or in successive moments, I say: This experience, or this expression of my experience, means to me this or this. At one moment I feel a vague longing, and at the next I happen to think of some object; and thereupon I say to myself: "Ah, that object was what my longing unconsciously aimed at, that was what I wanted, only I did not know it." At one moment I am struggling to remember a certain musical theme, say, the melody of the finale of the Heroic Symphony. At the next I recall a theme and then say: "Yes, that was what I all the while aimed at and meant, only I could not remember it until now." Or once more, I have just had a thought, no matter whether true or false, and have stated it in a proposition. I have, for example, uttered the words: *All men are mortal*. Now as I did this, my immediate experience was of the sounds of the words,—and of various fleeting images and feelings as I uttered these words. But meanwhile, for my reflection, all this mass of feelings has meant something to me. And that it has meant something appears if I restate this meaning, by immediate inference, in another shape, and say: "Ah, that means the same as saying that *No immortals are men*." If I clearly see the identity of meaning in the midst of the fleeting content of these two moments, I have a reflective knowledge,—a knowledge which transcends the immediate, and which is such that its object is not a mere incommunicable mass of momentary experience, but a meaning that can remain identical in the midst of widely changing expressions.

When I reflect thus on my meaning, what I hold before me, then, is the identity of this meaning through a series of actual or possible changes of immediate experience. When we wonder whether a man knows what he means, we ask him to restate his meaning in other language. If he can do this with a clear insight into the unity of the meaning in the midst of the changing and shifting of the immediate contents of his consciousness, then and then only can even he himself be sure that he grasps his own meaning.

Observe, the object of reflective knowledge has always also its immediate aspect. No such thing exists as a wholly disembodied or unexpressed meaning. And the embodiment of a meaning is, as such, the object of an immediate experience. Observe further, that in so far as one reflects, the important thing is not that the successive moments of his life have a more or less similar content. The important thing is that he reflectively observes them to have, not similar, but actually identical meanings. One who hears the same melody many times repeated, and whose immediate experience therefore consists of a series of repeatedly similar, but numerically wholly different contents, and who merely listens, or who even observes the mere similarity of his experiences,—such a hearer is not, in so far, reflecting on his own meaning at all. But one who in mind tries to think of the forgotten melody, and who after vain struggles at last finds it, says to himself, not: "This melody now found is as an experience similar to the one which I sought." He says: "This is the identical melody that I meant, or that I was look-

ing for." Just so, that the repeatedly similar experiences of melody should themselves *all* be experiences of the *same* melody, is again something which we know only by reflection upon what we mean by *the same*. In successive moments of immediate experience there can only be similarity, not sameness, for the moments are actually diverse. Ten thousand shocks of a Leyden jar will not give you any notion of what you will call the same shock. But for one who reflects on his meaning, the word *same*, as applied to the jar, as a permanent object, will have significance. For a permanent object, for me, is one that at many moments is meant by me as a permanent object.

If by reflection we thus know the identity of our meaning at various moments of our experience, the question of course arises, how can we know this identity, when the contents of immediate experience are themselves always changing. And it is an old idea in philosophy that this identity of meaning is to be somehow explained by saying, as Kant said in the Deduction of the Categories, something of the following sort: I the Self know myself as one, in the Unity of Apperception, through all my changing experiences. My immediate knowledge flits in moments. My meaning remains identical, because I, the thinking Subject, remain one, and because now, thus remaining one, I am able to recognize the identity of my own conscious acts in many successive moments. To reflect on the identity of my meaning in various thoughts, is mediately to observe myself as one in act in the midst of the shifting floods of immediacy. This I do whenever I reflect. In reflecting on my meaning, I therefore presuppose and assume, as it were, the discovery of myself. It is then the Self, the Ego, the identical Knower of meanings, that forms the true object of reflective knowledge.

But by this assertion the problem of reflective knowledge is only introduced, not solved. No word has more manifold meanings than the word Self. This ambiguity is familiar and necessary, and for my part I cannot regret what to my mind is simply a result of the nature of things. But this ambiguity of the word Self, and of the deliverances of Self-consciousness, is at all events problematic. If, in reflective knowledge, I know myself, who then am I?

As is well known, I am at all events not *merely* an object of reflective consciousness for myself. Not alone as the knower of meanings, the Self as Subject, do I exist in my own consciousness. I am also an object to myself in numerous far less exalted ways. As so-called Empirical Ego, I exist in all kinds of immediate and derived forms as an object. As an object of merely immediate knowledge, a mere mass of organic sensations, I exist for myself, whenever I think of my own general state of personal well being and of ill being. As Empirical Ego I include also, very often, this body as a part of me. My life, my calling, my fortunes, my powers,—yes my children or even my country, I can regard as part of my empirical Ego. And in such senses I am for myself a vast mass of empirical objects and conditions which form in a greater or less degree one whole. But the Self as thus determined, the self as object in the strict sense, or the empirical Ego, is not the Self whose exalted identity, as the knower of the identity of meanings amidst the flux of experiences, reflective knowledge is to recognize. The question is, Who is this true, this identical and knowing Self, and in what form is he known to exist?

In answer it may be said, we know the true Self, this Subject-Object of reflective consciousness, this Kantian Unity of Apperception, merely through our reflective observation of the actual connection which exists between the various contents of our consciousness, when once these contents have been presented in experience. This connection, this unity of consciousness, it will next be said, is notoriously something quite indescribable, and in itself it constitutes the most ultimate and obvious of reflectively discoverable facts to every being that, once possessing it, has somehow been led to notice it. At any moment the contents of my consciousness, whether they be a mere mass of sensations, or a chance collection of perceptions, or again a collection of intelligent ideas derived from social intercourse, are shifting and fleeting. But nevertheless this shifting and fleeting mass of facts is observed by an observer who is more than the mere series itself, for he knows the series, or at least, at any instant knows some portion of it.

But here the problem of the nature of this knower, of the unity of consciousness, returns upon us in a new shape. The essential character of this observer, this knowing Subject, is, in one way, very finely expressed by a familiar passage in Hume, viz., the very passage where Hume was most endeavoring to rid himself of the idea of the unity of consciousness itself: "For my part," run the well-known words of Hume, "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in difference, whatever natural propension we have to imagine that simplicity and identity."

These words of Hume are meant to be a reduction of the Self to the mere series of states that it knows, but it is indeed true that they are explicitly opposed in the very form of their statement to the assertion that Hume supposed them to embody. "When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*," says Hume. "I enter" then, that is, I observe, I watch, I find, I know. But, adds Hume, *what* I know is always some content of consciousness, some impression or idea. Yes indeed; but to say this is explicitly to say that, when I know this content as immediate, my knowing itself is not the content known, but is just precisely the knowing thereof. *That* I know, this truth is itself more than the content known. And so Hume, in the very act of asserting that the known is, as such, merely content, and never other than content, mere ideas, and never a peculiar thing, called a Self, and yet different from all other content even while it remains a content,—Hume, I say, in asserting this about the known, implies, yes, in the words: "*when I enter . . . I stumble on, I catch,*"—he explicitly asserts, that the Knower *is*, and is more than the content known. I as Subject of Knowledge, am indeed never the known content; but that is the very proof that the Self is not, and cannot be reduced to, the series of states that it knows. I am thus far indeed known only as knower, but that is precisely what, by definition, I ought to be.

I may observe here that Hume's phrases, in this classical passage, in their very denial of the finding of a thing called an identical Self as a part or fact in the

stream of immediate conscious states, are curiously near to those other and equally classic phrases whereby the early Hindu thinkers of the Upanishads loved to express their magnificent struggle to grasp the conception of the true Self and of its unique and transcendent existence. "The Seer," says Yâjñavalkya, in the Brhadâranjakopanishad,—“The Seer no one has seen, the Hearer, no one has heard, the Thinker no one has thought, the Knower, no one has known.” So far we have, as you see, Hume, *nur mit ein Bisschen anderen Worten*. Hume consequently declares, however, what his own words in the very act of declaring it, have of necessity to contradict, viz., that there therefore is no Self different from the series of the seen, heard, and felt states, the impressions and ideas. But Yâjñavalkya goes on, upon the basis of the very same observations, to say: “The one who, dwelling in the Self, is different from the Self, whom the Self knows not, who, dwelling within, guides the Self, he is, as thy [true] Self, the immortal inner guide. . . . There is no other Seer, no other Hearer, no other Thinker, no other Knower. That is, as thy [true] Self, the immortal inner guide; whatever is other than this must suffer.” Upon the basis, however, of a similar argument, the same Yâjñavalkya, in another section of the same Upanishad, argues to his wife Maitreyî as to the transcendent unity of the Self. Maitreyî has asked her husband to explain to her immortality. He first replies that the true Self is immortal, but that after death, that is, apart from the merely empirical series of conscious states, of impressions and ideas,—after death, when the highest Self, for whose sake alone all is good that is good, has returned to itself, and dwells apart in its absolute perfection, then there can indeed be no consciousness whatever. The true Self is thus absolute and deathless, but unconscious. Maitreyî expresses doubts as to this result. It confuses her, she says. Yâjñavalkya replies: “This suffices, Oh dear one, to make the thing clear. For if there be in existence a second [that is an object other than the subject], then one sees another, then one tastes another, then one greets another, then one hears another, then one thinks another, then one knows another. But when all has become to anyone the Self, wherewith and whom should he then see? Wherewith and whom should he then taste? Wherewith and whom should he then greet? Wherewith and whom should he then hear? Wherewith and whom should he then think? Wherewith and whom should he then know? Wherewith should he know Him, through whom he knows all this? Wherewith, should he, Oh dear One, know the Knower?”

The antinomy is here, in its way, perfect. Hume and Yâjñavalkya agree as to the fundamental facts of the situation. No one has seen the Seer, or known the Knower, as part of the series of states of consciousness. Hume enters into himself only to observe that he, Hume, precisely in so far as he is the Subject, is not discoverable there, in himself, as one of his own inner states, at all. Yâjñavalkya points out to Maitreyî and to his other interlocutors that, in a similar fashion, since one necessarily sees or hears *another*, i.e., an object, and not the Seer or Hearer, therefore one who is conscious must be conscious only of empirical stuff,—must suffer in this bondage, as the Hindu likes to phrase it; must have impressions, as Hume would say. The independent and self-possessed Self cannot thus suffer. The form of the argument in the two cases is different; the outcome is so far the same. I as I, or as the metaphysicians like to define me, I the pure Subject, am

thus never one of my own contents of consciousness. I have no *immediate* knowledge or inner experience of myself as Subject. For the Self of immediate knowledge or experience is nothing but a mass of organic sensations. Nor have I such mediate or derived knowledge of myself as pure Subject as I have of the objects of the physical world. The Self as physical object is, on the contrary, merely the body, and the sum total of its deeds and works, but never the true Self as knower. Thus neither in the inner nor in the outer world do I ever find an object that can properly be called the identical Subject, the knower, the thinker, the seer, the hearer. So far, as you see, Hume and Yâjnavalkya, the shrewdly merciless modern sceptic and the dim and legendary mystic of the homilies of this Upanishad, are actually at one. They both alike say, when I appeal to experience, when with Hume I look for the "original" of my idea of myself, or when, in the mystical speech, I merely suffer from the facts of fleeting experience, I never find the so-called identical Self at all. When, in an empirical search for my true Self, I "enter into myself" I discover, so to speak, that I am not at home,—not to be found there, as identical Subject, in the world of experience. I have, so I find, simply gone out of that world of experience altogether before one can look for me there. Where then am I,—the identical Subject, the Unity of Apperception, the true Self, the one knower of the many fleeting facts? I am not here, in this tomb of experience where I look for my true Self. They have taken my Lord away, and I know not where they have laid him. This, for both Hume and Yâjnavalkya, is the essence of this situation.

But here, indeed, the two part company. Henceforward the two doctrines stand to each other as Thesis and Antithesis of a great antinomy; and as such the two may now be formally opposed to each other:

Thesis

Yâjnavalkya in substance reasons: The true Self is not object of experience, cannot be seen, felt, or even empirically thought and known. He is no object of consciousness.

But obviously the Self *is*; for, without flat contradiction you cannot avoid saying I see, I know, I am.

Hence the true Self exists, but only in a transcendent sense, beyond experience, independent, outside the world of empirical "suffering," or of bondage to *other* facts, exalted, absolute, but in himself essentially an unconscious being, unconscious just because he is all-knowing but unknown.

Antithesis

Hume in substance reasons: "When I enter into myself," I find no identical self, only the fitting impressions and ideas. Hence there is no identity in consciousness, no proper sameness, but only the illusion of sameness. Whatever is no possible object of experience is *not*. The Self as identical subject of experience is no object. Hence there simply is no such Self at all. It is a dream, an illusion.

III

No one to whom the foregoing antinomy has once come home will fail to apprehend the fact that we have here one of the most central and momentous issues

of the history of philosophy. The problem of the Upanishads and of Hume has been a favorite one both with the psychologists and with the pure philosophers. In both of these provinces of inquiry it remains today as freshly interesting a problem as it is an ancient one.

In psychology, the problem of the Ego has usually taken forms less ultimate than in pure philosophy. The psychological opponents of Hume have not often, like the thinkers of the Upanishads, sought the true Ego in any absolute realm beyond experience. They have rather been content to insist upon the actual presence in consciousness of the Knower, whom they have often somewhat naively loved to define to themselves in terms of the muscular sense, or of some similar group of "feelings of effort."

Two things, especially, concerning the knower the "spiritualistic" psychologists, i.e., the opponents of Hume, have loved to dwell upon and to prove by direct appeal to inner experience. The one is the fact that he, the Self, does actually know, and does know that he knows, and that too whenever and wherever there is any mental life at all. "No experience without my knowing that it is I who experience": this has been one watchword of the psychological defenders of the self as Subject, against the assaults of Hume. And these defenders, whose name is legion, and whose formulas are extremely familiar to all readers of traditional psychology, have very seldom been disposed to face the deep and significant antinomy implied by the very facts of experience to which they appeal. In thus making the fact of self-consciousness, and so of the existence of the self, a matter of a mere "inner sense," as Locke made it, they have actually degraded the very nature of the process of knowing, whose essence it is that when as finite being you know, you do indeed stand in the presence of the immediate, but are never satisfied with the immediate, and rather flee from it towards the truth, so that you never do become immediately conscious of the "identical self" as a resting and complete unity, nor even as the "resting pole" in the flight of immediate experiences, and for that reason can never say that you "experience at this moment a real self engaged, as identical self, in knowing," but can at best hope to say that reflectively you come to know that there is a self engaged in experiencing. Whatever the self as Subject is, it is nothing immediate, like a pain, or like a stone that you stumble upon. Yājñavalkya's wisdom was ages ago too wary to be caught by the mere lime-twigs of momentary experience that nowadays catch numberless quasi-theological psychologists who teach to us, in one form or in another, that the self, the "spiritual principle," the true and essentially immortal Ego, is a mere fact for the "inner sense" or an "immediate intuition" to grasp. No, one sees, one smells, one tastes, yes, in the inner life too one experiences, "another," namely this sight, odor, taste, inner state. One sees not thus the Seer. Kant also, after once the "last illusion" of Rational Psychology (to which, as Benno Erdmann has shown us, he indeed so late and so stubbornly clung while he toiled over the preparation of the Critique)—after once this illusion, I say, was broken—Kant was far too wary to find henceforth the knowing Ego as any "nature," or "principle," or "thing," or "spiritual existence," amongst the facts of experience in the inner life. Henceforth, for Kant, the absolute reflec-

tive assurance is indeed there, the assurance, "*dass ich bin.*" But the question "What am I?", finds no answer in the world of inner experience, just because I am no one of my own states, or just because, to borrow De Morgan's well known and rougher phraseology, I am wiser than to hold a candle in order to look down my own throat. It is this latter feat by which the psychological partisans of the Self of the "inner sense," whether or not they prefer to use the words "inner intuition," have often attempted to prove the immortality of the soul.

The other character of the Self of immediate intuition upon which the psychological opponents of Hume have almost always insisted is the "activity" which this knowing self is felt to have whenever it knows. Upon this activity a great deal of stress has been laid; and there can indeed be no doubt that, when there is knowledge, we have, in general, a good deal of consciousness of what is called "inner activity." But a great mistake has been made in supposing that, as psychological data, ass *Bewusstseinsinhalt*, these feelings of effort, this sense of active accomplishment, all this complex of experienced "spontaneity," with which our attention, and our thinking processes generally, are so frequently, yes, so universally accompanied, have any peculiar advantage over other psychological data in helping us to any immediate intuition as to what the Self is, or what its essence as Knower may be. If, whenever one tried to attend or to think, one always, as accompaniment of one's knowing, heard the same sweet music, or saw, in internal vision, rainbow colors, some psychologists would doubtless be found asserting that the knowing Subject is directly known not only as active, but also as sweet voiced and bright colored. That would be not less unwise than to suppose that because, as a fact, certain muscular sensations and certain organic feelings do now attend, in us human beings, the process of knowledge, therefore these feelings, as such, characterize and serve to define the essential nature of the Ego as the Knower. As a matter of empirical psychology, our human knowing only occurs in connection with motor processes whose internal organic relations are of course very complex. Attention, even of the most spiritual kind, is impossible apart from muscular contractions. And along with these motor and other internal processes there occur numerous resulting feelings of interest and of effort, which color our consciousness. Readers of Ribot's admirable little monograph will know already something of the evidence for such an analysis of the "active consciousness" which accompanies attention and thought. Readers of the animated discussions which within the past few years have been aroused by Professor Münsterberg's published investigations, will recognize that, amidst all the strife which has been waged as to special points of difference, the essential harmony of even the bitterest opponents as to the presence of these results of motor processes amongst the chief factors of our "active consciousness" has been obvious. Through the unmistakable utterances of the lately published new edition of Wundt's *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierseele* we have now learned that the once famous *Apperception* of this author is henceforth to be regarded, despite all the painful ambiguity of the past utterances of the master, as a process whose accompaniments of a subjective and active sort are simply *Muskelempfindungen* and *Gefühle* (*op. cit.*, p. 267). Nor is this the only passage

wherein Wundt and his pupils have made plain, of late, what the Wundtian analysis of Apperception is henceforth to mean. Now such psychological analyses merely remind us afresh of the already obvious consideration that, if one feels active when he knows, this feeling active is itself a fact *in* consciousness, just as much as if it were a color or a taste, and serves to reveal the essence of the knowing Subject, as such, precisely as much and precisely as little as does any other frequently repeated fact of consciousness. Some men think best with pen in hand, and can notice, if they choose, while they are thinking, their activity in grasping and moving the pen. Now were this habit, with any man, an absolutely constant one, so that he never did any thinking otherwise, then such a man, as subjective psychologist, might readily be tempted to define the true Ego as essentially a pen-grasping and consequently spiritual being. The logic of such an analyst of his own thinking processes would be no worse than the logic of those who think that they have grasped the essence of the Knower when they first observe their internal sensations of knit brow or fixed eyes or erect head, or of other functional conditions associated with thought, and when they then joyously proclaim: "By intuition we have come to know the Knower, for we now find him active." Not thus is the central secret of consciousness to be won.

But is there then no more than this in the ancient and highly dignified opinion that the Self is what he is by reason of his spontaneous, of his self-originated activity? Is there no other, no deeper sense in which the knowing consciousness is active? Is the *consensus* of nearly all the psychological defenders of the reality and the spirituality of the knowing Ego wholly founded upon so careless an analysis as this? Is the "active" Self merely a collection of feelings, principally muscular in type?

I answer, there is indeed a far wiser conception of activity known to us through the history of philosophy. It is also a conception far too much neglected by the common run of the psychological opponents of Hume. Yet is it a conception as deep as it is ancient. And that is Aristotle's marvellously ingenious conception of the "Unmoved Mover," as that conception was opposed by him to the conception of the "self-moving." That which, while itself at rest, still causes motion in others, which moves others as their goal, that which wins by leading something beneath it towards itself, because this something beneath it, dimly knowing it, longs to know and to possess it fully,—that, according to Aristotle, can be called, on the one side, the most potent, and so, if you like, in this sense the most active of nature's powers; while, on the other side, in respect of its very perfection, it remains the most changeless, and so, if you will, the most inactive of realities. I suggest in passing that, were one able (as at this point we are not yet at all able) to define the Subject of consciousness as related to some portion or process of consciousness in the same way as that in which an Aristotelian unmoved mover is related to that which it moves, then indeed the Ego might appear as active with a very much deeper teleology than that of the muscular sense at the bottom of its activity. But this must serve, at this stage, only as the barest of hints. I hold that the conception of the activity of the Ego has in the past been much degraded by a psychological analysis which has laid sole stress upon those

mere feelings of effort that accompany the phenomenal moments of our knowledge. I also hold that, when duly purified, the conception of the activity of the Ego in knowing may indeed be restored to philosophy, although, when thus transformed, such a conception will indeed have no place in empirical psychology, which has no more use for a teleological metaphysic than has any other descriptive natural science.

Empirical psychology, then, does little to meet the difficulty which lies beneath Hume's objection to the concept of the Self. Indeed it may be said that the position of empirical psychology as to our present problem must always tend to be identical with Hume's position, precisely in so far as such an empirical psychology is serious in its aims as a natural science and conscious of the limitations of its office. That there is a Self, no empirical psychologist will avoid asserting whenever he expresses his opinions as to the content of his consciousness, any more than Hume himself avoided such assertion. But the empirical psychologist will in the end inevitably tend to analyze all the manifestations of the Self into more or less massive groups of sensations and of feelings.

Such then the situation of reflective knowledge thus far. It must always presuppose, yet cannot find, the true Self, the identical subject for whom meanings are one in the world of fleeting immediate facts. How, once more, shall we deal with the antinomy between Hume and Yâjnavalkya?

Well, it is the rule that one tends to clarify situations of this sort if one first, for a while, turns one's attention away from a direct examination of the conflict, and considers, perhaps still in a highly empirical and tentative way, the mental processes whereby the conflict has arisen. One solves, to be sure, no ultimate philosophical problems by a direct application of the methods of empirical psychology. But one often, by means of such methods, clarifies to one's own mind the situation, until it is ready for a philosophical solution.