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BIOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, PHILOLOGY, PHYSICAL
SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION

AND GIVING
A TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN

WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS

AND EDITED BY

JAMES MARK BALDWIN

PH.D. (PRINCETON), HON. D.Sc. (OXON.), HON. LL.D. (GLASGOW)
STUART PROFESSOR IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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KAMES — KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

Kames, Lord: see HOME, HENRY.

Kant, Immanuel. (1724-1804.) Born, lived, and died at Königsberg. Studied theology, philosophy, and mathematics in the University at Königsberg. Engaged as private tutor, 1746-55. Became doctor of philosophy and Docent in the University in 1755, and professor of logic and metaphysics in 1770. In 1797 his age compelled him to retire. See the following topics; also IDEALISM, EPISTEMOLOGY, and PHILOSOPHY.

Kantian Philosophy: see KANT'S TERMINOLOGY.

Kantian Terminology: see KANT'S TERMINOLOGY.

Kantianism (or **Kantism**): Ger. *Kantianismus*; Fr. *Kantianisme*; Ital. *Kantismo*, *Kantianismo*. The philosophy which holds to the distinctive doctrines of Immanuel Kant. See KANT'S TERMINOLOGY, and the principal philosophical topics generally.

The features of Kant's philosophy, which have given name to later thought as Kantian, are mainly (1) the critical method, which consists in a 'criticism' of reason (*Vernunftvermögen*) with a view to discovering the *a priori* elements in knowledge; (2) the doctrine of *a priori* mental forms, which, as a theory of knowledge, is characterized as formalism; (3) the resulting antithesis between the 'phenomenal,' or that world of things or appearances to which these forms are applied, and the 'noumenal,' or that world of things in themselves, the transcendental thought-postulates, to which the forms do not apply, and which (4) are consequently unknowable; this is the agnostic element in Kantianism, especially as developed with reference to the ideas of reason—'God, Freedom, and Immor-

ality of the Soul'—and in the theory of the antinomies or contradictions which reason falls into in applying the category of infinity; (5) the recognition of the validity of the ideas of reason as postulates of the moral life (practical reason). These features at least should be included in Kantianism, though any one of them would justify the use of the adjective Kantian.

Literature: see CRITICISM, and BIBLIOG. A, 'Kant'; in English, especially the works by STIRLING, CAIRD, and WATSON; for German citations see EISLER, *Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, in locis*; a study of Kant's Psychology has been made by BUCHNER, *Monog. Suppl. (No. 4) to the Psychol. Rev.*; a Kant Bibliography is by ADICKES, *Monog. Suppl. i, to the Philos. Rev.* (J.M.B.)

Kantism: see KANTIANISM.

Kant's Terminology (in relation to the **Kantian Philosophy**).

(1) At the outset of the history of philosophical terminology, amongst the Greeks, the problem of the thinker was to adapt his native language to the novel business of expressing philosophical ideas. The word and the conception then often came into existence together. The power of mere tradition was at its minimum. Creation was relatively free. At the outset, however, of the efforts of modern philosophers to discuss their problems in the vernacular tongues, the situation was wholly different. An elaborate, and in fact often extremely difficult terminology, the result of several successive great movements of human thought—the terminology of Scholasticism—stood in the way of novelty in expression. The modern thinker sometimes, like Locke, endeavoured to escape altogether from this tradition, and was then

driven, by this very effort, into a certain disorganization of technical language, which, upon occasion, gave to his terms a capricious seeming, without freeing them altogether from the influence of the past. Locke's struggles with the term *Substance* furnish an instance of the resulting inconveniences. Or again, like Meister Eckhart, or in another way and time, like Wolff, one might make a systematic effort to find translations for a great number of terms of scholastic origin. The result varied according to the genius of the thinker. But in any such case this latter procedure was at least guided by a definite principle. New terms arose, to be sure, side by side with the old. But the process attempted to win a certain unity and continuity.

(2) In the case of Kant, however, the situation is still far more complex and problematic than that present at the outset of modern philosophy. Comparable though he is, in originality of conception, with the great thinkers of antiquity, Kant cannot, like a Plato or an Aristotle, freely invent terms, in his own vernacular, to meet his new needs. He must appeal to tradition; and in so far he is like his modern predecessors. On the other hand, he is not content to translate scholastic, nor yet simply to accept Wolfian, terminology. Nor yet is he, like Locke, in a conscious revolt against the traditions of language which all the while bind him. He wishes to reform without unnecessary transformation. He intends to select and to adapt for his own purpose. But since he cannot select and adapt with the freedom of an ancient Greek, and since the originality of his ideas equally forbids him to remain content with what he finds, in the way of means of expression, he is led to efforts at reform which follow no one principle, and which seldom seem wholly to satisfy even himself. His training and his method often appear to us to savour of pedantry. Yet as a fact, he loves his meanings so much better than his words, that he is impatient with merely terminological researches; and he has an imperfect acquaintance with the history either of thought or of usage. Moreover, while the terms used by his contemporaries and immediate predecessors are known to him in great masses, his thoughts are still far richer than his vocabulary, and at the critical stages of his mental evolution they develop much faster than his most elaborate displays of terminological skill can follow them. In consequence, there are extended passages in

Kant's works, e.g. in the 'Deduction of the Categories' in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, where the terminology alters in the course of the same discussion. Such changes are doubtless often due to Kant's habit of making up his longer works out of fragments, which were written down at various times, and afterwards collected and ordered. But the result, as we find it in Kant's printed text, is often baffling enough. His usage in such cases seems to be in a sort of Heraclitean flux, so that we do not twice step into the same river of expression while we wander in search of the thought.

(3) A thorough history of Kant's terminology is still to be written. Much of importance is already to be found in the authoritative, but too diffuse, *Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, by Professor Hans Vaihinger, of which two volumes have so far appeared (i, Stuttgart, 1881; ii, 1892). But the most important portions of the *Kritik* and of its terminology still await their treatment in Vaihinger's work. Paulsen, in his admirable volume, *Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre* (Frommann's *Klassiker der Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1898), has discussed (especially 144-55) a number of Kant's most characteristic and important concepts and expressions. Adickes, in his edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin, 1889), has introduced into his crisply written notes a large number of explanations of Kantian expressions. The general historical relations of the Kantian terminology are treated by Eucken, *Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie* (139-50). The psychological vocabulary of Kant, with especial reference to its relations to the Ethics, is extensively and carefully expounded by Alfred Hegler, *Die Psychologie in Kant's Ethik* (Freiburg, 1891). The fullest of all collections of Kant's terms and expressions is Mellin's *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie, oder Versuch einer fasslichen und vollständigen Erklärung der in Kant's kritischen und dogmatischen Schriften enthaltenen Begriffe und Sätze* (Züllichau and Leipzig, 1797). Mellin, who also published other contributions to the terminological comprehension of Kant, here undertakes what is to be at once an encyclopedia of Kant's doctrine, and an exposition of the sense of his expressions and ideas. The result, however, is rather a thesaurus of Kantian statements than any thorough explanation of their forms and meanings. Mellin is a

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harmonizer, who smooths over difficulties as skilfully as Vaihinger, in his commentary, emphasizes or even magnifies them. Mellin's book is published in six volumes (having eleven parts). Krug's *Philosophisches Lexikon* contains also the Kantian vocabulary, but without the modern effort at a philological treatment of the Kantian usage. The recent *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und Ausdrücke*, by Eisler (Berlin, 1899), so far as it has yet appeared, contains much valuable material for comparing Kant's usage with that of his predecessors. The monographic literature upon Kant furnishes an immense number of discussions of Kant's terms,—discussions which are, however, generally found only in subordination to some more general expository or critical interest. No attempt can here be made at any bibliographical analysis of this literature with reference to its bearings upon Kantian terminology. The original materials upon which Kant's own selection of his terms is based are to be found in the Latin and German works of Wolff; in the textbooks of Baumgarten, whose *Metaphysica* (which reached its seventh edition in 1779) was long Kant's favourite textbook in that subject; and finally in the general literature, philosophical and psychological, of Kant's day. In following the evolution of Kant's thought, upon the basis of these contemporary influences, one has constantly to deal, of course, with terminological questions, which accordingly find their place in the important monographic treatises of Benno Erdmann (*Kant's Kriticismus in der ersten und in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Leipzig, 1878), and of Adickes (*Kant-Studien*, Kiel and Leipzig, 1895)—treatises which we may select from this whole literature for especial mention in this connection. The student of Kant's language should pay due attention to Jäsche's edition of Kant's *Logik* (published in the eighth volume of the chronological edition of Kant's works, by Hartenstein, 1868, 1-141); and, in regard to Kant's psychological terminology, should also consult his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, published in 1798. Kant's own formal definitions of his terms are seldom to be accepted as final; nor are his reports of the historical or of the current usage of a term, such for instance as *a priori*, to be regarded as authoritative. Kant was once for all no historian of thought or of usage; and his resolutions as to the use of his own

terms are merely expressions of a present and serious effort, which may or may not prove permanently efficacious, to use a particular device for clarifying and organizing his ideas. In general, he is a great lover of analysis; so that while, like Aristotle and the Scholastics, he makes systematic use of the method of distinctions for the sake of explaining or removing the contradictions of thought and opinion, he is much more radical than any of his predecessors in the distinctions that he draws, and his world largely consists of definable barriers and chasms. Kant loves, meanwhile, synthesis, but is never as successful in this direction as in the other (see the excellent observations of Eucken, *op. cit.*, 143-5). One synthetic aspect of his systematic undertakings he especially emphasizes, namely, the ideal of an exhaustive enumeration of all the provinces of reality, and of all the problems of thought, which come within his scope. Many of the devices of his terminology have to do with the pursuit of this ideal. Thus the table of categories is the outcome of an effort, whose development occupied several years, to obtain a complete table of the fundamental conceptions of the understanding. Associated with this table is a list, equally intended to be complete, which enumerates the *a priori* principles of the understanding; and so on. In order to obtain such formal completeness, Kant sometimes is led to arbitrary inventions, whereby a scheme is filled out, in a way whose importance is clear only to himself. The methods of Kant's work while he was engaged in the construction of his doctrine and of its various expressions can best be studied in the *Reflexionen*, edited by Professor Benno Erdmann, and in the *Loose Blätter aus Kant's Nachlass*, edited by Rudolf Reicke. The *Reflexionen* are notes made by Kant in connection with his lectures upon Baumgarten's *Metaphysik*. The *Loose Blätter* contains a great variety of fragmentary notes, made upon various occasions. The terminology used in these notes is by no means always in agreement with that known through Kant's published works.

(4) Kant never lived to write the sort of encyclopedic statement of a system of philosophy which he himself desired to produce. His most important works, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, and the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, constitute, in his own opinion, merely introductory discussions, indispensable, but needing

in their turn to be followed by a reconstruction of doctrine made in the light of these critical researches. In general, Kant conceives philosophy as the sum total of what he terms *reine Vernunft*—an expression most easily translated as 'conceptual knowledge gained through pure reason alone.' The two antitheses which define philosophy are (1) the contrast with mathematics, and (2) the contrast with empirical science. Mathematics makes use of ideas of pure reason, but does so only by the intermediation of the process of construction, whereby Kant means any process such as gets expressed in a diagram or figure, when the diagram or figure is intended as the visible embodiment of a rational conception. Philosophy is not thus dependent upon a voluntary construction of its objects in sensuous form. It conceives them in their purity, and reflects upon their meanings and their connections. In contrast to empirical science, philosophy uses no empirical data, as such, amongst its presuppositions. This latter contrast in Kant's definition of philosophy was, in its origin, Wolffian, and the whole tendency of Kant's own thought is to deprive it of much of its positive meaning; since, as Kant in the end discovers, there is no theoretical knowledge *aus reiner Vernunft* except the knowledge of the necessary structure which must belong to the whole realm of experience. In consequence, a better name for Kant's theoretical philosophy would be the Theory of Experience; and this name, whose accuracy is implied by many of Kant's expressions, has been actually adopted by some modern Kantians (e. g. Cohen). Philosophy in general is divided into the two great divisions, *Theoretical* and *Practical*. Another, and co-ordinate, division of philosophy is that into its critical or preparatory portion, called *Transcendentalphilosophie*, and its systematic portion, called *Metaphysik*. The *Transcendentalphilosophie* has to deal with the sources and scope of our rational knowledge. *Metaphysik* has to set forth the sum total of our purely rational, i. e. non-empirical knowledge, concerning both the objects of theory (God, Nature, the Soul) and the objects of rational choice as such, or of freedom (Duty, the Moral Law, the Absolute Good). It is the *Transcendentalphilosophie* which Kant has most fully developed. On Kant's division of philosophy, one may consult his own essay *Ueber Philosophie überhaupt* (1794) in Hartenstein's edition (1868), vi. 373; also, the *Kritik*

der reinen Vernunft, Methodenlehre, 3tes *Hauptstück*. On the contrast between mathematics and philosophy, see the *Methodenlehre*, 2nd ed. of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 751. [As is now customary in citations from Kant, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is here to be cited after the pages of the second edition; while in case of difference between the editions, the paging of the first edition is to be cited for passages that occur only in that edition. Other Kantian works are to be cited after the Hartenstein edition of 1868.] One may compare, upon the same topic, Mellin's articles *Encyclopädie, Metaphysik, Transcendentalphilosophie*; and Paulsen, op. cit., 108 ff. Kant is by no means quite uniform in his account of these main divisions of philosophy.

(5) All further classifications of Kant's doctrines and conceptions are greatly influenced by his psychological conceptions. 'We can,' he says (*Werke*, vi. 379), 'reduce all the powers of the human mind to three:—*Intellect (Erkenntnisvermögen)*; *Feeling (das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust)*, a power always to be defined in terms of this contrast of *pleasure and pain*; and *Will (das Begehungsvermögen)*, or the power whereby mental states come to be viewed as the *causes of the existence of objects*.' The *Erkenntnisvermögen* itself is first divided into a *passive* aspect, the *Sensibility (Sinnlichkeit)*, the *lower* portion of the *Erkenntnisvermögen*; and an *active* aspect, the *intellectuelles Erkenntnisvermögen*, whose general activity is called *Denken (Anthropologie, Werke, vii. 451)*. For this latter, the *higher* portion of the *Erkenntnisvermögen*, or the intellect proper, the words *Verstand* and *Vernunft* are upon occasion used almost interchangeably, both of them in a broader or more inclusive sense (e. g. *Verstand* in the *Anthropologie*, loc. cit.; *Vernunft* in the title of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, where it also even includes the *a priori* aspect of the *Sinnlichkeit*). In more exact usage, however, the *Verstand* is only one of three special divisions of the *oberes Erkenntnisvermögen*. The three are *Verstand*, *Urtheilskraft*, and *Vernunft*. The *Verstand*, in this more special sense, is the power that forms *concepts (Begriffe)*, or that knows, or furnishes, or applies the *rules* of the formal constitution of conceptual objects. The *Verstand* also is the power to apprehend the unity which gets expressed in our judgments. And in this sense the *Verstand* can even be called (*Kritik d. reinen Vernunft*, 2nd ed., 94) the *Vermögen*

zu urtheilen. But as distinct from the *Verstand*, the *Urtheilskraft* proper is the power to find what cases fall under given concepts, or the power to 'subsume under rules.' And the *Vernunft*, in contrast with both of these powers, is the power to systematize into unity, and by means of inclusive principles, the less inclusive rules of the *Verstand* (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 2nd ed., 359). Thus the *Vernunft* is the power which conceives God, the Universe, and the Moral Law. Yet while Kant makes these distinctions, or related ones, repeatedly, he remains in his usage consistent with no one of them (cf. Vaihinger, *Commentar*, i. 123, 166, 454 note, and in many other passages). Permanent only is the tendency to define the *Verstand* as the power of thought in so far as it is expressed in single acts of judgment or of conception, and the *Vernunft* as the systematizing tendency of thought in its search for all embracing unities; while the *Urtheilskraft*, standing between the two former powers, does excellent service to Kant in completing the schematism of his accounts of intellectual processes, by taking charge of whatever the two other powers may seem to have neglected. That the three powers of the higher *Erkenntnisvermögen* have a peculiarly apt one-to-one relation, in their turn, to the three general powers of the mind (in that our objective knowledge of reality is properly to be limited to the field of the empirically applied *Verstand*, while the principles for the free self-determination of the Will belong to the *Vernunft*, and the *Urtheilskraft* is of especial service in expressing the definable aspect of the values present to the *Gefühl*),—all this is a characteristic thesis which Kant expounds in the essay on *Philosophie überhaupt*, and which enables him to explain the title of his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*—the treatise wherein Kant's doctrine of the Beautiful, and his Teleology, are both contained (see the cited essay, *Werke*, vi. 402 f.).

(6) In general, this psychological terminology of Kant, while of the most constant use as a means of determining the divisions of his work, and the trend of his various researches, is of a bewildering complexity and changeableness. The bewildering effect is, however, due not so much to the mere changes themselves, as to the fact that Kant repeatedly makes much of the importance and exactness of distinctions amongst the various mental powers and processes, while he himself is the first soon to alter or to ignore these very

distinctions. Of considerable and very baffling importance, in Kant's psychological vocabulary, is the term *Gemüth*, used on the whole very much as recent English writers employ the term *Mind*. In general, this word is evidently felt by Kant to be relatively presuppositionless, and he so expresses himself, vi. 458. Thus the term seems not to imply any decision as to the problems of rational psychology, or as to the various aspects of the ego; so that, as Hegler well points out (*Psychol. in Kant's Ethik*, 52), this term takes the place of the more metaphysically coloured term *Seele*, where Kant has to speak of the empirical processes wherein the various mental powers co-operate, and so get their concrete expression. Yet, as the *Gemüth* can 'affect itself' and thereby produce the phenomena of the *innerer Sinn*, and has a life that evidently goes beyond what is directly revealed by consciousness (Eisler, s. v., seems incorrectly to identify *Bewusstsein* and *Gemüth* in Kant's usage), the precise implications of the term become puzzling whenever we have to deal with the problem as to the sense in which the *a priori* principles are *original*, or are innate (in so far as they are in any sense innate) in the *Gemüth*. The manifold uses of the term *Gemüth* have been well collected by Hegler (*loc. cit.*).

(7) There remain two psychological terms of Kant which cannot be passed over without some mention even in the most general sketch. These terms are *innerer Sinn* and *Einbildungskraft*. The *innerer Sinn* is a term in very general use in the psychology of the 18th century. In origin it dates back to the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of the *sensus communis*; but its 18th-century form was largely due to Locke's well-known passage upon 'the notice that the mind takes of its own operations.' As the term had to compete, in its pre-Kantian history, with the Leibnizian term *Apperception* (also used by Kant), and with still other terms for the general nature of consciousness, its place remained indefinite. In Kant's usage it is rendered perplexing because of its relations, as a *passive* power, to the intimately associated *active* processes of consciousness with which it is bound up. In a very few passages (of which two are given by Hegler, *op. cit.*, 54), the *inner sense* even appears as itself active—even as thinking and judging. In this sense it would assume the functions of the *Verstand*. In general, however, it is a capacity, within the mind or the ego, to receive, passively, the influence

of the active understanding or *Einbildungskraft*, and so to get presented the more or less organized facts of the inner life. Like the outer sense, it presents to us phenomenal and not ultimate reality, and does not show us the ego in itself, but only the self as empirical. Its form is time, just as space is the form of the outer sense. But the parallel between inner and outer sense proves to be hopelessly incomplete, and the term is an unhappy and superfluous one despite its frequent use. The *Einbildungskraft* plays a more important part. It occupies, in Kant's doctrine, the place of an essentially mediating principle. In all the history of philosophy (and also of theology) the principles that may be called in general the mediators have played an important part. The *Logos* in Stoic and Alexandrine philosophy; the *Pneuma* in later ancient psychology and theology; the *Nous* and the *Soul* in the doctrine of Plotinus; the *attributes* of the substance in Spinoza, and the *infinite modes* in the same system; the so-called *Platonic ideas* as interpreted by Schopenhauer for the purposes of his own system:—all these are examples of such mediating concepts. In terminology the names of these mediators are always confessedly more or less ambiguous. The ambiguity goes along with the synthetic tendency which gives rise to these conceptions, and this ambiguity constitutes at once the convenience and the defect of such terms. In depth of implication they are superior to the more sharply defined and abstract terms that name the opposed and extreme principles which the mediators are to bring into unity. But this depth is purchased by vagueness. The mediators suggest the actual life of things better than do the comparatively dead extremes; but they have the disadvantages of their very concreteness. The *Einbildungskraft* is such a mediator. It has many functions, *reproductive* and *productive*. The former are the more familiar; the latter are the more important, since it is through them that the data of sense are brought into synthesis, and the *Verstandesbegriffe* or forms of the understanding—the categories—get applied to experience. The *Einbildungskraft*, as productive, is at once sensuous and intelligent. It is the minister of the *Verstand*, and is in fact the *Verstand* in action, so that in places it seems to make the very concept of the *Verstand* itself superfluous. Its functions are more or less antecedent to, and apart from, our actual consciousness. We are aware, from moment to moment, rather of the results than

of the original synthetic processes of the *Einbildungskraft*. In our practical life the same power has also its important place. The stress laid upon the *Einbildungskraft* in its distinction from the rest of the higher *Erkenntnisvermögen* thus threatens to destroy the finality of the usual threefold division of the latter; but Kant is preserved from admitting this consequence because of the intimate relations which the *Einbildungskraft* all the while establishes with its neighbours. See upon this term *Anthropologie*, vii. 495–7; *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft* (1st ed.), 103 ff., especially 119, where the *Einbildungskraft* is brought into relation to *Verstand* and *Apperception* (2nd ed.), 151 ff. One may also consult Hegler (op. cit., 143 ff.); Adickes in the notes to the deductions of the two editions of the *Kritik*; and E. F. Buchner, *A Study of Kant's Psychology* (Monog. Suppl., No. 4, to the *Psychol. Rev.*), 114–17. See also Paulsen, op. cit., 175.

(8) Between Kant's psychological and his epistemological terminology stand the important terms *Apperception* and *Einheit der Apperception*, the general names for the *active unity of consciousness*, a principle whose tendency is expressed by the fact that, in view of the presence of this apperception, or in view of the unity of apperception, every conscious state is *capable of being viewed as mine*, or as, in its form, the product of *my activity*. In its most explicit form, *Apperception* is identical with *self-consciousness*, since when I know my states definitely, I know them as *my own*. But one can speak of apperception when the *Ich denke* is viewed merely as the *possible* accompaniment of every conscious state. The idea of the self, the consciousness that *it is I who think this*, may be either clear or obscure at any moment; but, says Kant (1st ed., 117 note): 'The possibility of the logical form of all knowledge necessarily depends upon its relation to this apperception as a capacity' (*Vermögen*). So too, in the 2nd ed., 131–2, he uses the often quoted expression: 'Das *Ich denke* muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können.' This *Ich denke*, however, must be an act of spontaneity, opposed in nature to the passivity of sense. Through the work of the *Einbildungskraft*, which applies the forms of the *Verstand* to the data of sense, I come to be thus able to say, *Ich denke*. The one original act of referring all to the self is at the basis of the entire process, and the result expresses the meaning of this act, which is at first a

latent or subconscious act, in conscious form. The term *Apperception* comes to Kant from Leibnitz. Descartes had earlier employed the corresponding verb.

(9) The special terminology of the theory of knowledge in the *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft* is so complex, and the interdependence of the various terms is so intimate, that no complete account of this terminology could be given without a lengthy exposition of the whole system. One must confine the following statement to a very few important points; and in general, the remainder of this article must be devoted merely to specimens of Kant's terminology.

(10) Kant's theory of knowledge, as is well known, maintains that the internal process of applying the forms of the understanding to the facts of sense introduces into our whole conceptual world that conformity to law which the earlier rationalistic theories of knowledge had supposed to be the revelation of an absolute external truth, but which Kant views as no revelation of anything absolute. While our experience has to conform to law, and is known in advance to be thus subject to necessary principles, the lawful connectedness of our experience is due to the unity of apperception, to the synthetic work of the *Einbildungskraft*, to the activity of the *Verstand*, to the spontaneity of our thought (*Denken*) in general, and not to our knowledge of any absolute or external truth. All these expressions dwell, as we have now seen, upon various aspects of what is, for Kant, the same great fact. It is the *intellect* that weaves the unity of its own world. Meanwhile, the intellect, or the *Einbildungskraft* in particular, is indeed *produktiv* but not creative (*schöpferisch*). It needs, namely, material for its weaving, and without such *given material* it can do nothing. This material is furnished to it by the *Sinnlichkeit*. The latter, although passive, has its FORMS. These are usually called the forms of the *Anschauung*, i. e. of perception. They are space and time; and these forms (especially the latter form, time) predetermine what *schemes*, or general types of objects (*Schemata*), the *Einbildungskraft* can weave, when it applies the forms of the *Verstand* to the facts of sense. Thus there are two types of *forms*, or of characteristic *conditions of knowledge*, which are determined for us by the original nature of our sort of intelligence: viz. the forms of the *Verstand*, and the forms of the *Sinnlichkeit* or of the *Anschauung*. The forms of the *Anschauung* Kant considers in

the first division of the critical analysis of our knowledge in the *Kritik*. This division is called the *Asthetik*, as being the doctrine of *sense*. The forms of the *Verstand* are studied in the *Analytik*, whose name Kant derives from the known terminology of the Aristotelian Logic.

(11) The most general terms which express the central thoughts of the resulting theory of knowledge can be brought together by means of a series of theses. As Kant teaches:— (a) We can know only *phenomena* (*Erscheinungen*), not *things in themselves* (*Dinge an sich*), or *Noumena*. (b) But we can know, *a priori* or *aus reiner Vernunft*, that the *Erscheinungen* are subject to universal and necessary *laws* (*Regeln*), so that *a priori Grundsätze*, upon which all empirical science depends, are possible, and can be exhaustively stated, on the basis of a complete enumeration of all the categories or the understanding or of the fundamental concepts or *Begriffe*. (c) In view of this limitation and accompanying necessity to be found in the world of our knowledge, the field of human insight can be defined as *Erfahrung*. *Erfahrung* constitutes, in a sense, *one whole*; for although empirical facts are countless, and although the brute data of sense are not controlled by the understanding, the order of the realm of experience is due to the categories, and the *Einheit der möglichen Erfahrung*, or *unity of possible experience*, is assured in advance, by virtue of the relation of all special facts of experience to the *Ich denke* or to the original unity of *Apperception*. (d) The knowledge of this whole theory is, for Kant, a *transcendental* knowledge. Applied to the interpretation of the problems of philosophy, it frees us from the *Antinomien* with which human thought has thus far been beset. It rids us from bondage to the necessary *illusions*, the *Dialectic of the Vernunft*; and so at once sets the due limits to our knowledge, and assures us of the sovereignty of rationality within the sphere that is open to our science. Hereby the possibility (*Möglichkeit*) of experience, of science, and of synthetic judgments *a priori*, is established.

(12) All the terms thus named are of central importance for Kant; and many of them are difficult. We may begin here with one of the most famous and puzzling of the list—the adjective *transcendental*. The word had in scholastic terminology its established usage, which is very different from the Kantian usage. It was an adjective applied to those predicates which the scholastic doctrine re-

garded as *transcending in generality* even the Aristotelian categories themselves. These *transcendentals* were *unity, truth, and goodness*, together with *thing and something*. But the term *transcendentals* referred solely to the high degree of generality of these predicates, and had no relation to the possibility of our knowing them, or to the conditions of our knowledge of them. In Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (§§ 72-123), while these same predicates, *unum, verum, bonum*, are treated upon the basis of the scholastic tradition, stress is laid upon the fact that, in every being, these predicates are in some sense present of *necessity*; and *unum transcendentaliter* is translated, in Baumgarten's note (§ 73), by the German phrase *wesentlich eins*, while *veritas transcendentalis* (§ 89) is translated in the note by *nothwendige metaphysische Wahrheit*. The *twofold* character of the epithet *transcendental*, as thus known to Kant in former usage, appeared to him to warrant an analogous, but novel usage. For *transcendental* had thus been (a) no direct predicate of any *object*, but a predicate technically applied to certain *predicates*, viz., as we have seen, to the predicates *unum, verum, bonum*. (b) It had also (in Baumgarten's usage) come to imply a certain necessity and universality about these predicates themselves. Having once proposed to himself the problem of a theory of necessary knowledge, or of knowledge valid in advance of all experience, Kant needed a predicate to characterize the type of knowledge which should constitute this new theory. He chose *transcendental*, and declared (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 2nd ed., 25) that by *transcendentale Erkenntniss* he intended (a) to mean not any kind of knowledge of objects, but a knowledge concerned with a particular *type of knowledge* (*Erkenntnissart*), viz. of that type of knowledge which (β) his new theory of the *necessary principles* of the understanding was to embody. This new usage thus imitated, for the purposes of Kant's theory, *both* of the aspects of Baumgarten's former usage.

(13) But the meaning of *transcendental* as *theoretical knowledge about the necessary principles of all knowledge about objects* never remains steadfast in Kant's usage, just because he had so long lectured upon Baumgarten's text, and because the old usage entered into all sorts of curious psychological complications, in his own mind, with the ideas associated with his new enterprise. The term is otherwise explained in the *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 352-3. It is otherwise used in a fashion which

Adickes calls *weitherzig* (see his note to p. 25 of the 2nd ed. of the *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*), and which Vaihinger declares to constitute the 'most difficult terminological problem' in Kant, and even in 'all modern philosophy' (*Commentar*, i. 467). The term is often confused with *transcendent*, and then means going beyond, or transcending, the limits of human knowledge. Of the other meanings, no complete account has yet been published by any student. They must be made out from the context, each time afresh.

(14) Our necessary knowledge about the world of experience is founded upon *a priori* principles. The term here used has its origin in the well-known Aristotelian distinction between what is *prior in nature* and what is *prior for us*. In modern thought, ever since the scholastic period, the Aristotelian distinction had been familiar; and the special expressions *a priori* and *a posteriori*, used as adjective phrases qualifying especially the noun *demonstration*, had been employed since the later scholasticism. To know or demonstrate *a priori* is, in this sense, to know through *causes* or *principles*, as opposed to a knowledge gained wholly through the particular facts of experience. Kant gives the term a new and more special meaning. Knowledge *a priori* is for him knowledge *in advance of all experience*, and hence is a knowledge of the content of any of the necessary concepts or principles of thought. These necessary principles are themselves *a priori*, because they are independent of experience.

(15) But by virtue of this knowledge, which we get through the *a priori* principles, we become acquainted with phenomena, and not with *Noumena*, with *Erscheinungen*, and not with *Dinge an sich*. The terms here used have become extremely familiar in recent literature. Their Kantian usage still suggests, however, many topics of controversy. The phrase *an sich* goes back to the well-known Greek usage, in both Plato and Aristotle, according to which anything that truly exists, or that truly is known, exists or is known *καθ' αὐτό*, i. e. *per se* or *in se* (cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, VII. 4. 1029 b). Kant's relative novelty in usage lies in the fact that in speaking of the *Ding an sich* he emphasizes the thing in itself, not in an abstract contrast to *other things* in general, or to its relations to such other things, but in a contrast with *knowledge only*. This contrast of the thing in itself with the thing's seeming or appearance was indeed not new; but Kant expressly emphasizes it as against

all other aspects of the *an sich*. The *Ding an sich* then is the thing as it exists independently of and apart from all knowledge. The principal problems as to the *Ding an sich* are: (a) whether Kant really assumes its existence as a positive fact; (b) how he conceives that existence; and (c) how he reconciles such affirmation of the thing's existence *an sich* with the theory of the subjectivity of all our knowledge. While a discussion of these problems belongs elsewhere, there can be no doubt that Kant does assume the independent reality of *Dinge an sich* as a positive fact, and does not make any serious attempt to demonstrate that reality. The correlate of the *Ding an sich* is the *Erscheinung*, to which, however, Kant attributes not mere existence in our private and isolated experience from moment to moment, but a certain secondary type of reality, or of *objectivity*, due to the fact that the *Erscheinung* follows universal laws, which are equally valid for all men. An *Erscheinung* is no mere *Schein*; it is a fact for all of us men,—a verifiable content of *possible experience*.

(16) In addition to the term *Ding an sich*, Kant uses for the objects of the metempirical realm two other terms: *Noumenon* and *transcendentaler Gegenstand*. The former of these terms comes to Kant from his own dogmatic period (cf. his Inaugural Dissertation, *Werke*, ii. 403). It is the relic of the stage when he still opposed to the phenomenal world the world of true Being, knowable, in abstraction from all sensuous facts, through the pure intellect. A *Noumenon* is a reality such as one *would* know who could seize ultimate truth through his understanding alone, *without the aid of sense*. As a positive concept, this is wholly rejected by Kant in his critical period. Viewed negatively, the concept of the *Noumenon* as the object which we (who are bound to sense whenever we seek to win any positive knowledge) do *not* know and cannot know,—this *Noumenon* becomes, in *denotation*, identical with the *Ding an sich*; but the two concepts have a different origin. The *Ding an sich* is a concept expressing a *selbstverständliche Voraussetzung* (see Benno Erdmann's work before cited, *Kant's Kriticismus*), viz. the presumption that phenomena somewhat independently real must correspond. The *Noumenon* is a concept reached by first conceiving an object of the pure intellect, and by then observing that such an object must for ever lie beyond our ken, since what we know is a phenomenal world, where sense-facts are subject to the *a priori* laws of the *Verstand*.

(17) The *transcendentaler Gegenstand* is a concept of still a different origin. The *Verstand* refers all content of sense to an object. This is the very nature of the *Verstand*. Hereby it accomplishes its task of conceiving the facts of sense as in unity. But any object once conceived, through an intellectual synthesis of sense-data, e.g. *this house*, *this stone*, remains, as an object present to our experience, still but a *Vorstellung*, i.e. a particular *idea*, or content of our consciousness. So soon as we view this *Vorstellung* as such, we are again led to seek for its object; and so on. The limit of this process of referring the contents of experience to still further objects as their basis is given by the concept of an *Etwas = x*, whereof we can only say that it is an *Etwas*, a *something* in general. This is the *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, the object that I am trying to know through every particular act of my empirical knowledge. This object, the permanently sought *beyond* of my empirical search for truth, can never be presented in experience. I therefore can only define it as *beyond every experience*. It is the law of my consciousness thus to seek for, but never to find, the ultimate correlate of my own conscious activity, namely, *the final object that I am trying to know*. While the *Noumenon*, then, as such, is first positively conceived as the object of the pure intellect, and is thereafter found to be nothing knowable to us, the *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, as such, is first conceived as that which would finally determine, and if present would satisfy, my *empirical* search for the truth of my own objects. The latter, then, is *der gänzlich unbestimmte Gedanke von Etwas überhaupt*, or *der Gegenstand einer sinnlichen Anschauung überhaupt*. Since it can never be found within experience, but is driven, through the essential endlessness of the search, *beyond all experience*, the *transcendentaler Gegenstand* comes at last to *denote*, once more, the absolute *beyond*, for which the *Ding an sich* was the first name.

(18) The three terms then, with different origin and connotation, come, in most passages where they are used, to denote the same object, the inaccessible reality. See *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 1st ed., 109, and the section 'Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phenomena und Noumena,' in both editions. Compare the *Doctor-Dissertation* of Rudolf Lehmann, *Kant's Lehre vom Ding an sich* (Berlin, 1878); Cohen's discussion in *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*

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(2nd ed., Berlin, 1885), 501 ff.; and the accounts of Benno Erdmann (op. cit.) and Paulsen (pp. 153-5 of his op. cit.).

(19) The realm of our actual knowledge is *Erfahrung*. Here again we have a word of ambiguous meaning. In general it is used in two senses: (1) as the sum total of facts so far as they are determined not by necessary principles, but by the immediate data of sense; (2) as the sum total of facts in so far as they are determined to unity by the application of the principles of the *Understanding*, and are so brought under the *unity of apperception*. In the first sense, *Erfahrung* is the source of knowledge in so far as it is not *a priori*. In the second sense, *Erfahrung* is a realm of *possible perceptions*, all of which are woven into unity by their universal and synthetic relations to the self.

(20) The judgments which we can make, in advance, concerning all objects of possible experience, are *synthetic judgments a priori*. Such judgments are opposed, as *synthetic*, to *analytic* judgments. The latter judgments express in their predicates nothing but what was already contained in the explicit or known meaning of their subjects; e.g. *Every triangle has three angles*. But a synthetic judgment passes *beyond* the direct meaning of its subject to bring this meaning into unity with that of a *new* predicate; e.g. *Every change has a cause*. That such synthetic judgments *a priori* can be made regarding the whole constitution of our experience is Kant's principal thesis in his *Deduction of the Categories*. The categories themselves (by no means identical either in name or in character with the original Categories of Aristotle, despite some points of agreement) are the fundamental concepts *a priori* of the *Verstand*, the forms in conformity with which the *Einbildungskraft* weaves into unity the data of sense. The list of the categories can be given exhaustively, as Kant thinks, and upon this basis an equally exhaustive list of the *Grundsätze* of the understanding, the principles or basal synthetic judgments *a priori*, can be drawn up.

(21) The *Analytik* of Kant's *Kritik* is devoted to the development of this theory of *Erfahrung*. The *Dialektik* is devoted to an examination of the inevitable claims and efforts of the *Vernunft*, our organ of *principles*, to transcend *all* experience by attempting to weave the provisional unities of the *Verstand* into *absolute unities*. These efforts of the *Vernunft* are as necessary as they are

doomed to failure. We cannot primarily avoid the illusions of reason, but we can detect them. In doing so we deal, first, with the *Antinomien* or necessary conflicts between contradictory propositions, to which the *Vernunft* is led. We solve these contradictions by showing that they are due to our tendency to view as absolutely true of things in themselves, principles which apply only to phenomena. The later discussions of the *Dialektik* lead to the problems of Rational Psychology and of Rational Theology. But henceforth, in the *Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, while the terminology remains intricate enough, it is oftener in touch with that of the older metaphysic; and one who has proceeded so far has grappled with the most serious of the terminological difficulties of the *Kritik*.

(22) The foregoing must serve merely as specimens of some of the most famous of Kant's terms, and as instances of the general principles regarding the nature and growth of his usage which have been discussed in the early portion of this article. No space can here be given to the terminology of the later works of Kant, except in so far as the foregoing discussions already give guidance.

GLOSSARY.

[The numbers refer to the paragraphs of this article.]

- A priori*, 14.
- Aesthetik, 10.
- Analytic Judgments, 20.
- Analytik, 10, 21.
- Anschauung, 10; see also TERMINOLOGY (German).
- Antinomien, 21.
- Apperception, 8, 11.
- Begriff, 5, 7, 11.
- Categorien, 7, 11.
- Denken, 5, 10.
- Dialektik, 11, 21.
- Ding an sich, 11, 15; in relation to Noumenon and to transcendentaler Gegenstand, 16-18.
- Einbildungskraft, 7; produktive, 10.
- Einheit der Apperception, 8; Einheit der möglichen Erfahrung, 11.
- Erfahrung, 11, 19.
- Erkenntnisvermögen, 5.
- Erscheinung, 11, 15.
- Forms of Sense and Understanding, 10.
- Gefühl, 5.
- Gemüth, 6.
- Grundsätze *a priori*, 11.
- Ich denke, 8, 11.
- Innerer Sinn, 6, 7.
- Intellect, 10.
- Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, general character of terminology, 9; terminology of its principal theories, 10-21.

Metaphysik, 4.
 Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, 11.
 Noumenon, 11, 16-18.
 Oberes Erkenntnisvermögen, 5.
 Phenomena, 11.
 Philosophie in general, 4.
 Praktische Philosophie, 4.
 Produktive Einbildungskraft, 10.
 Regeln, 5, 11.
 Schein, 15.
 Schemata, 10.
 Seele, 6.
 Sinnlichkeit in general, 5. See also 10.
 Synthetische Urtheile, 11, 20.
 Theoretische Philosophie, 4.
 Transcendent, 13.
 Transcendental, 11-13.
 Transcendentaler Gegenstand, 17, 18.
 Transcendentalphilosophie, 17, 18.
 Urtheilskraft, 5.
 Vernunft, 5, 21.
 Vernunftkenntnis, 4.
 Verstand, 5, 17.

(J.R.)

Karma [Sansk. *Karman*, from *Kar*, to do or create]. In Hindu philosophy, the principle of individual existence by virtue of which the sum of moral desert in the life of one sentient being becomes the germ which develops another in whose destiny it is a predetermining factor.

Whether the Brahmic metaphysic of the Vedanta or the more negative conceptions which underlie Buddhism be regarded as the truer expression of Hindu thought, it is still true that in the phenomenal world of causation and change the only persistent feature is the process of metempsychosis, which is an endless re-creation of the world in obedience to moral necessity. The source of this necessity is Karma, which is the seed out of which a new life emerges. A man dies but leaves his Karma, the sum of his moral desert, which necessitates another life as the bearer of its retribution. The process is unending, but the motive of it is Karma exerting the pressure of a moral destiny that is imperishable and inexorable. The only escape from this fatality is through the suppression of Karma itself, which can be attained only by travelling the Hindu road of salvation. The suppression of Karma means freedom from the necessity of existence and absorption into Nirvana, which is either Brahm, the universal life, or nothingness. See ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (India).

Literature: DEUSSEN, Die Sûtras des Vedanta (Leipzig, 1887); Appendix to his Metaphysics; and art. Buddhism, in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.); Buddhism, in Oriental Religions Series (ed. by Max Müller). (A.T.O.)

Karyokinesis [Gr. *kárvov*, a nut, + *κίνησις*, movement]: Ger. (the same); Fr. *cariocinèse*; Ital. *cariocinesi*. Indirect nuclear division, involving the formation of a spireme or nuclear thread, its segmentation into CHROMOSOMES (q. v.), and the splitting of the chromosomes.

A term suggested by Schleicher in 1878; equivalent to the mitosis of Flemming (1882). See MITOSIS.

Literature: SCHLEICHER, Die Knorpelzelleilung; FLEMMING, Zellsubstanz. (C.L.L.M.)

Karyoplasm [Gr. *kárvov*, a nut, + *πλάσμα*, a thing formed]: Ger. *Zellkernsubstanz*; Fr. *carioplasme*; Ital. *carioplasma*. The nuclear, as opposed to the cytoplasmic, substance of the cell.

A term due to Flemming (1882). In the same year Strasburger introduced the term nucleoplasm for the same substance.

Literature: FLEMMING, Zellsubstanz; STRASBURGER, Ueber den Theilungsvorgang der Zellkerne. (C.L.L.M.)

Katabolism [Gr. *κατά*, down, + *βάλλειν*, to cast]: Ger. *Katabolismus*; Fr. *catabolisme*; Ital. *catabolismo*. The distinctive METABOLISM (q. v.) whereby complex organic substances break down into less complex forms with concomitant liberation of energy.

A term introduced by Gaskell in 1886. Cf. ANABOLISM. (C.L.L.M.)

Katatonis [Gr. *κατά*, down, + *τείνειν*, to stretch tightly]: Ger. *Katatonie*, *Spannungsirrsinn*; Fr. *catatonie*; Ital. *catatonia*. A mental disorder with marked neuro-muscular symptoms, described by Kahlbaum in 1874.

Although not admitted by all writers as a distinct disorder, but only as the presence of a group of symptoms in cases of mental stupor or of circular insanity, &c., yet clinically, as well as theoretically, the term has been recognized in recent literature (cf. Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie*, 441 ff.).

In typical cases the disease shows at first a condition of depression, melancholia, and distress; which condition is at times preceded by a period of nervousness, unsettlement, headache, languor, desire for solitude, and the like. With the depression are apt to occur hallucinations and illusions, mostly connected with the self-accusations and distress of the patient. The depression gives place to, or is at times replaced by, a condition of excitement and agitation, of wild, senseless actions and exciting hallucinations; and it is in this stage that the more distinctive symptoms of katatonia are observed. There is an abeyance or absence of movements, even movements of