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
Royce's Urbana Lectures: Lecture II

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Notes and Discussions

ROYCE'S URBANA LECTURES: LECTURE II*

Four Types of Personality

The outcome of our opening lecture was briefly this: The ethical values of life are values that belong to single acts in so far as we judge that those acts do or do not conform to an already accepted purpose. In order that my life should have an ethical value for me, I must then possess purposes, or ideals, which I have accepted as mine. In the light of these purposes and ideals I must myself judge my own individual acts. It is with an act in life precisely as it is with a step forward, or with the turning of a corner, considered with reference to the way that one is attempting to find or to follow, when he is aiming to reach a definite place. This step in the way is the right one, this turn of the corner is the right one, if it leads toward the place to which I am going, and if it is the step or the turn that is best adapted to enable me to reach my destination. Hence if I have no destination, if I am walking nowhither, there is no definite sense in which this step or this turn is the right one, unless indeed one is walking merely for exercise, without destination, and is judging one's steps merely with reference to their value as means of exercise. In general, then, it is the already accepted purpose that makes an act, when viewed in the light of this purpose, right or wrong. And my own judgment as to what is right or wrong for me, is inevitably determined by the destination that I have accepted as I set out upon this particular section of my walk of life. It is of course true that we judge the acts of others as right or wrong. It is also true that we may judge our own purposes themselves as right or wrong. But such more elaborate forms of the moral consciousness are partly due to the fact that our purposes themselves may be more or less completely determined by acts of decision that we ourselves make; just as my choice to make a certain place the destination of my walk is itself as much an act as are the steps that I take on the way to the destination. Since the choice of a purpose is then in many cases an act, it is once more subject to moral criticism, and as a choice may be right or wrong. It is further true that since we are human beings together, with similar problems, and with the common interests of rational beings, we judge one another's deeds and choices in the light of what we take to be the wisest insight so far accessible into the purposes of life. But on the other hand, no man can possibly find out what is right or wrong for him merely by accepting the authority of another, in so far as it is mere authority.

I may indeed decide to follow a certain authority, for instance, to submit to the law of my country, or to ask my spiritual guide what I ought to do, or to obey the orders of my chief. But such decisions are themselves, from my

* Lecture I (*The Problem of Ethics*) and introductory remarks by Professor Peter Fuss, University of California, Riverside, appeared in this journal, V:1, pp. 60-78.

own point of view, acts. And they are my own acts. They are right or wrong for me, when viewed in the light of my own definition of my own purposes. If it is my purpose to submit to obey, to accept an authority, then, to be sure, my act of surrender becomes from my point of view the right act. But this decision is still my own, and only in so far as it is my own can I view it as right. In my eyes obedience is right only when it is in conformity with my own already accepted purpose to obey. Therefore it is quite impossible that any power which is wholly external to the self should be able to make anything right or wrong for the self, without the voluntary cooperation of the self that is to be thus externally controlled. Wholly external compulsion is simply of the nature of a physical force. One may yield, but one so far does not find it right to yield. The power to which I am to yield must commend itself to me as in conformity with my own voluntarily accepted purpose, or else my submission to that power will be merely a surrender to a major force, and not an ethically valuable act.

Therefore when we dogmatically say that what somebody else just now regards as right, is in truth wrong for him, our only rational warrant for this assertion must be the assurance that if he knew better what his own purposes are, he would himself see that the act which we criticize is in fact condemned by these purposes of his. Thus, as a teacher I may say that the deliberate idleness of some cheerful but lazy student is wrong, although he insists that he proposes to have his own way, and that he actually means to be lazy. But my only warrant for insisting upon this judgment of mine must lie in the fact that I believe that the student himself, as a rational human being, will inevitably discover, in the long run, that he is cheating himself by his own indolence, so that if he only knew it, since he really means to succeed, he really purposes what involves the self-sacrifice of labor. Or to take a graver case, a pirate, or the captain of a slave ship, might insist that his view of life justified his own acts, because they conformed to his purpose. And in fact the life of the pirate or of the slaver, if he were in fact both skillful and successful, would unquestionably include a good deal of rational organization, and even some fidelity to his fellows and his subordinates, and some devotion to carrying out contracts, together with a good deal of courage and resolution and endurance. And all these features of the life in question would involve positively valuable ethical attainments on the part of the rascal in question.

Yet if I am criticizing such a man and if I persist in asserting that in fact he is a rascal, my comment is morally justified only by my respect for his actual humanity. Were he a tiger devouring lambs, I should have no business to utter any sort of ethical condemnation. As a fact he is a man. I consequently presuppose that he has about him the power to understand what a really humane purpose is. In general, if I consider his life, I shall find that he does perform a good many humane and faithful acts, and that he does consider such acts right. I shall consequently judge that he has latent in him purposes which are distinctly humane purposes, and which, if they came to his own

knowledge, would lead him to condemn his own acts as pirate, or as captain of a slave ship. In brief I conceive him as Defoe conceived his Captain Singleton, as partly a victim of circumstances, partly a rational being imperfectly come to himself. I shall anticipate his awakening. And such anticipations alone can justify my presumption in attempting to decide what his duty is.

If you really believe that a man is a rascal, it is in a sense a mark of your respect for him that you so think. For this belief of yours, if warranted by the evidence, is a tribute to the latent manhood which you believe him to possess, and which you believe to be of such dignity and reasonableness, that if awakened it would condemn what now the man ignorantly conceives to be the expression of his own purposes. In brief, to call a man a rascal has this rational warrant and this only, namely, that I believe that the man himself possesses such a nature that if he realized his true purpose, he would agree with my judgment. If I do not think this to be the case, I ought to regard him merely as insane or as hopelessly imbecile with regard to moral considerations.

It follows that that alone can be really right for a man which he himself if awakened to his own purpose would call right. Consequently duty is never a matter of external compulsion. And this is precisely as true of the divine law as of any human law. If God knows what is right and wrong for me, then this divine knowledge must be simply a knowledge of what my will as this individual truly requires me to be and to do. Such divine wisdom I may readily accept as my guide, if I believe it to be revealed to me. But my only ground for accepting it must be that I believe that God knows better than I yet do what I really want. If the divine commands were opposed to what my essential rational purpose is, when I rightly define this purpose from my own point of view, then God's commands would be merely external authority, and my yielding to them would be a mere acceptance of force. My ultimate reason for accepting even the divine will as my guide must then be that I myself see that it is right to do so. The one inalienable possession of the self, a possession which is in itself rather the possession of a duty than the mere assertion of a right, is the choice of the self's own purpose, the determination of its own ideal. Concerning such matters the self may be endlessly instructed, but it cannot be compelled, in the sense in which physical nature compels us. For whatever appears as mere compulsion, can never appear to me as my own conscientious decision.

In consequence when we endeavor to give people light as to right and wrong, we can only show them by example and by reflection, what their place in the moral world is, and what the conditions are under which alone they can define their own purpose, and can hold fast by that purpose in their acts. The teacher of physics shows you the material phenomenon, and bids you see that it is so, whether you will it or not. The teacher of ethics can at best show you your own will, and can prove to you what is right only by bringing you to see what you yourself already mean to choose as the right.

I

And yet this view of ethics gives no warrant for a mere anarchy of judgment regarding the right and the wrong. The universal nature of the distinction between right and wrong is due to the fact that we are all rational beings living under certain conditions, in view of which we define our own will. We all live in time. We are therefore restlessly moving from the past into the future. In considering the meaning of our acts we are therefore setting these acts in line, as it were, with our purposes and our goals. Our problems and doubts regarding right and wrong are due to the fact that we have so many conflicting purposes and that we find it so hard to discover what the essential purpose of the self is. In the endeavor to find out this purpose, we inevitably seek aid from our fellows. Nobody lives in entire isolation. Our natural purposes include a vast number of tendencies that are determined by our nature as social beings. We love some kind of social success. We love companionship, the customs of our tribe, the admiration, the respect, or at any rate the acceptance that our fellows may give to us. And concerning the conditions that make our life as members of society successful, we are constantly learning something new. We are therefore all the time looking to society to discover for us what our own purpose is. In this search for ourselves, a search that we carry on with great persistence during childhood and youth, we are inevitably the subjects, sometimes the victims, of an endless variety of social suggestions. Countless different selves are thus brought, as ideals, to our attention, and are rendered more or less attractive by our social training. The growing boy passes through stages where various occupations suggest to him each the notion of a self in which he might find the purpose of life. He would be a driver of horses, a blacksmith, engineer, preacher, general, circus rider, pirate, and so on endlessly. Literal occupations, such as he sees carried on by the people about him, vie with ideal occupations, such as stories and legends suggest to him as the attractive ideals. Now he longs to be a locomotive engineer whom he sees, and now the Alexander the Great, or the robber chief, or the ancient mythical hero, whom he has not seen. This eager effort to define what the self is trying to be is typical of the ethical situation of all of us, in so far as we have not accepted some one plan of life. What I reasonably want then is, not to follow the impulse of the moment, but to conform my life to a plan. And what plan I am to accept must indeed be suggested to me from without, because, by nature, when left to myself I am this mere chaos of instincts and passions, this mere material for the rational being. I restlessly long for an ideal that shall give order to the chaos, for an undertaking that shall have the meaning of a personal life and an individual destiny for me. In this search for myself I look for an ideal which suggests power rather than pleasure, control rather than mere fortune. Everybody imagines a happy life; but we all, even in our attempts to conceive what this happiness would be, define it in terms of success, self-possession, the winning of an ideal, the control of our fortune, the expression of a purpose. Therefore, we none of us define the good merely in terms

of external fortune. We want free self-expression as well as pleasurable sensation. And it is this tendency to define life as the expression of some kind of self that gives a basis for distinguishing between the right and wrong acts which either help us towards success or else drag us towards failure in our efforts to win the expression of the self.

But if we hereupon review the ethical situation in which every one of us finds himself, we see that while no purpose can be morally authoritative over against my own acts unless this purpose appears to me to be my own, appears to me as that which I choose, we are all nevertheless unable to define this purpose by merely looking within at our own instinctive prejudices and desires. I am acting rightly if I live according to my purpose. But what is my purpose? My own natural desire, my own inherited nature, my own untrained self-will, these are all silent with regard to this question. Or rather, one may say, these all speak too volubly, with an incoherent babble of voices that tell me a tale about myself which, apart from social training, is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. I cannot remember my own origin as a self. I have no innate unity of life plan. I have come out of the darkness of childhood, and I am bound towards a mysterious future. If I ask whither I am bound I find in my own natural disposition no means of deciding. Hence I must indeed look without me for guidance as for what I mean. My true self lies beyond the boundary of my present natural self, and I am always on a voyage of discovery to find what the true self is. This is the inevitable situation of anyone whom we might call an apprentice in the ethical art. The compulsion to learn from without what the very ideal is that I shall afterwards from within voluntarily select as my own—this compulsion is indeed no merely physical compulsion. I myself, in so far as I have yet to learn my ideals, am dissatisfied with my inner situation. I have not yet found my principle of control. Consequently I am discontent with myself. It is I, then, who as a social being, continually require myself to look for guidance to my social world. My comrades, my teachers, my rivals, yes, even my enemies, teach me what it is that I want. Through imitation I at length learn self-mastery. Through my social docility I come to attain my independence. My very freedom, in so far as I ever attain such freedom, will be due to the fact that I am able to learn, through social contact with others, what it is that I myself want to be.

One need not wonder, then, at that union of independence and social plasticity which marks the life of every moral agent. The two truths, (1) that nothing is right for me unless I will the end which makes this act right, while, on the other hand, (2) I never discover my own purposes without constantly consulting my social order—these two truths are not inconsistent. Their union, their interplay, determines the whole nature of ethical truth. Ethical values exist only for the self, in so far as it chooses. But the art of choosing is a fine art. We learn it very slowly. We learn it through imitation, through experience of life, and often through the provisional acceptance of very various traditions.

But it remains always the case that the decision of an individual about his own life plan can never *merely* depend upon the imitation of other people or upon the following of any social tradition. For every individual has a task that is in some respects unique, has instincts that nobody else possesses in just the same way, has a social training that nobody else repeats, and consequently comes to himself only by making decisions that nobody else can ever make. Hence duty is indeed individual. There is some duty for you that is not only duty in so far as you yourself see it to be such, but that is actually duty for nobody else, because as a fact nobody else either wants to do it or can do it. Yet even this unique duty, this unique choice of our own will and our own way, comes to the consciousness of each of us by virtue of our social education, our learning of moral values which depends upon a very great plasticity and imitativeness which all of us normally possess.

The most independent and powerful moral natures, the moral heroes and leaders of the race, have all of them been plastic, sensitive natures, characteristically open, especially during their youth, to external influences. Sometimes they have been uncommonly sympathetic natures, extremely disposed to an interest in the needs and sufferings of others. Sometimes they have been marvelously susceptible to the religious influences of their times and their peoples. Sometimes the customs, laws, and traditions of their social order have had more meaning to them than to ordinary people, and for that very reason have awakened in them scruples, reflections on social disharmony and conflict,—reflections which commonplace people do not make. Out of such exquisite social sensitiveness springs the capacity for novel moral decisions which marks these ethical heroes of the race. Their sensitiveness goes along with their vigor and with the sometimes rugged power of their personal reaction. They see more facts in the moral world than other people do. But they will not leave these facts where they find them. It is just because they are so much more sensitive to the meaning of life and of tradition than other people are, that they become reformers of life and tradition. They are strong individuals because they have been plastic learners and because for that very reason they have learned to make their own decisions and to define their own ideals.

To sum up then, so far, I can only find my own will, I can only discover what form of personality it is that I voluntarily prefer, in case I first consult tradition and society to see what it is that life suggests in the way of types of personality. But after I have thus consulted, I have to choose for myself, and nobody can choose for me.

II

My intention in dwelling thus upon these aspects of the ethical personality is to prepare the way for such light as we can hope to get upon the question, What type of personality best expresses the purposes which are most essential to a human being. From the nature of the case, as we have now come to see it, I cannot tell any one of you just what manner of self you mean or purpose to be. That you must personally find out. And in so far as you find

it out, you will inevitably solve some ethical problems which nobody else has ever solved, and which nobody else will ever solve in the future. The notion of a moral law which is in all respects absolutely and abstractly the same for all of us is a notion that is simply unjust to the very nature of our individuality. Your duty to be yourself differs in some respect from the duty of anybody else, and therefore involves some truths that are simply inaccessible to any individual besides yourself. The moral law is therefore not like the multiplication table, which we can all learn and repeat by rote. Every abstract moral formula is always therefore indeed abstract and incomplete. "Thou shalt not steal" is indeed an obvious rule. But by itself it does not in the least tell me what is the basis of the distinction between another man's property and mine. It fails to tell me, for instance, even so obvious a thing as whether breathing the air that another man might breathe is or is not stealing. It fails to give me by itself alone any guidance by which I could decide such a question. The difference between mine and thine in the world of property is often one of the hardest differences to decide justly. A great part of the machinery of the courts is devoted to deciding questions of property rights. And so while the law against theft is obviously correct, it is just as obviously abstract, and inefficacious for the decision of numerous questions regarding a rational respect for property rights. In consequence when Mr. Henry George advanced his now well-known views about the rights of property in land, some people called him one who counselled robbery. Those who spoke in this way unfairly used an abstract principle. George may have been wrong in his views, but he certainly did not counsel what he took to be robbery. And similarly when communists have asserted the well-known paradox that all property rights, so called, depend upon and involve theft, their paradox is an abstraction, as unenlightening as to the real problem as it is false to the needs of society. These illustrations may serve to suggest that the moral law can never be completely codified, and this is not because of the indefiniteness of the moral law, but because of the wealth, the beauty, and the individual significance to life.

What the ethical inquirer can hope to do, what the ethical teacher can hope to present, must be limited therefore to the definition of the great common problem of all rational beings, and to the understanding and portrayal of the common personal problems, and to the great types of personality. Now there are indeed certain types of personality which either in all ages, or else in very various ages of the higher human civilization, have been regarded by individuals or by whole peoples as ideal types. In conceiving these types men have expressed so much as they had at any given time discovered of the meaning of personal life, and of the nature of the rational self. Almost anywhere, in case society has reached a sufficiently high level of development and of reasonableness, you find these great types more or less emphasized, more or less openly or tacitly recognized as personal types that have value. One age or one people will emphasize one type rather than another. And the various characteristic types of personal ideals can be arranged in a series that in a measure stand for the evolution of our moral consciousness, in so far as the various types of personality

become emphasized in different degrees or attain a fuller and clearer statement as we pass from one stage of social evolution to another. Some types are rather characteristic of earlier stages, some become more fully defined or more clearly emphasized upon later stages of the evolution of a given civilization or of humanity as a whole. If, however, we learn to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental in the moral ideals of a given people, if we learn to distinguish the rational from the merely customary, the serious valuation of life from the more trivial expressions of personal caprice or of temporary enthusiasm, and above all if we lay stress upon the ethical ideals of civilized people, and do not attempt to dwell upon the endless varieties of primitive ethical practices, we find a few great types of personality conceived as defining the purpose of life or the various purposes of life which the men who conceive just these types have in mind. These main types are, as I say, differently emphasized as civilization progresses, and each of these types is subject to its own law of evolution as the moral intelligence of men grows. But in one way or another, the various types stand side by side, at least in our modern world, as forms of ideals which civilized peoples can understand in common.

I now wish to direct your attention to four of these great types of personality which civilized men of very various nations and races have learned to emphasize. The moral life of man has been conceived in terms of one or another of these four types by people who otherwise varied very widely in custom, in precepts, and in religion. Let me first name the four types that I have in mind. Let me then outline briefly the significance of each one.

The four ideal types of personality that I mean might be named: first, the hero, in a somewhat special sense of that word that I shall more precisely define in a moment; second, the saint, in a sense of that term which I shall also have further to specify, and which is again common to the ideals of many different nations and religions; third, an ideal type of personality that I may venture to call the Titan, the Promethean, or defiant type; and fourth, and finally, the ideal for which I can find no better name than the ideal of the loyal servant of a cause. Another way of naming these four types would be to speak: first, of the stately self; second, of the self-sacrificing or self-abnegating self; third, of the defiant self; fourth, of the loyal self. As I say, amongst peoples of decidedly high civilization, and at all events in the modern world, I suppose that all the four types are in general more or less represented amongst the prevalent ideals. But in the history of the higher civilization, the four types are very differently emphasized by different nations and in different grades or stages of cultivation. The first type, that which I called the type of the stately self, is most emphasized in the comparatively earlier stages of the higher civilization. The second type, that of the self-abnegating or self-denying being, plays a part, and a very important part, in the development of the religious and of the moral conceptions of mankind upon a stage of civilization which in general appears later than the stage in which our first type is emphasized; although, as I suggest, if you confine your considerations to the decidedly higher types of civilization, the two ideals, differently emphasized,

very frequently exist side by side. The third type, the type of the defiant or Promethean personality, becomes a prominent ideal in certain phases of civilization, is most emphasized wherever individualism is most favored by conditions, and is most emphasized in stages of civilization which succeed those in which the foregoing types have been most prominent. The fourth type of ideal personality, the loyal self, is not unknown as an ideal upon any stage of higher civilization, but certain considerations upon which we shall dwell tend to give this ideal a peculiar significance later in the progress of civilization. And, as I shall maintain, the ideal of personality which will best bear ethical criticism is most to be defined in terms that belong to the ideal of the loyal self.

Let me briefly sketch each of these types. The name Hero is a term of notoriously wide and vague application. We speak of the hero of the novel. But in the present day the hero of the novel may be, as we know, a most unheroic personage. In the older and more forcible sense a hero must be at least some ideally interesting sort of personality. And hence any one of the types of personalities that I have just enumerated might be regarded as a type of hero. One sometimes speaks of the saints of Christian history as heroes in defence of the faith. But in a still more narrow sense one uses the name hero in speaking of a person who, in a given social order, is admirable or ideal by virtue of his great powers, of his great services to his community, and of the admirable and distinguished deeds by which he wins a kind of literal and worldly prominence. A hero is one whose great deeds are a proper topic for song, for story, or for general public comment. In this sense heroism implies, so to speak, as a part of the conception the notion that what is heroic wins admiration and is consequently known to some community of people. The saint may be such in secret. The hero's deeds are known. From the point of view of most of the tales of notable heroes, as you will find them in literature, it is necessary that a hero's prowess should be something known and, as such, admired. That which makes the hero admirable may be warlike prowess, or from other points of view, it may be prowess that is shown in statesmanship, or in other forms of social service. But the hero in any case must be possessed of a certain stateliness. In fact the term "stately self" is, for my present purposes, more characteristic and accurate than the more ambiguous term Hero, and I use the word Hero as an alternative designation for this ideal, merely for the sake of arousing certain more familiar associations that that word suggests.

Viewed as an ideal of personality, the conception of the hero has been repeatedly employed for ethical purposes. One sets before the young the story of heroic deeds or gives an account of the achievements of stately and dignified personalities, in order to define a purpose of living which is aroused in the mind as one contemplates the fortunes and the powers of the great personality. It is true that one cannot say: "It is my duty to become a great or a distinguished or a stately personality;" for of course everyone knows that the hero's success, or the great man's dignity depends upon his inherited powers and upon his good fortunes as well as upon his moral activity. But one can indeed guide one's life by the example of the great, of the heroes, of the

stately selves that any given civilization may delight to honor. Caesar or Alexander, or any other great historical character, may serve to define the purpose in life of one who does not hope himself to conquer either Gaul or Asia. One may, as they say, "burn" to be like the hero, as far as in him lies. And one may accordingly define one's purposes with reference to some such heroic ideal. In preserving the tales of their national heroes, the nations have deliberately intended to guide the lives of their youths, to give unity to their purposes, to solve the problem for the individual of what kind of self he ought to be. As for generations after the battle of Trafalgar the memory of Nelson determined the ideals of the great majority of ambitious naval officers in the British navy, so the example of a stately hero may determine the ideals of a profession or of an individual, in so far as such a hero holds up before one a concrete image of what a self might be. The individual may say: "Such and such are my heroes. In consequence such and such are the ways of living that I prefer in so far as I have will or power to act in a way that leads me, so to speak, in a direction towards which my heroes have pointed the way. I follow in their footsteps. And accordingly I am able, having thus defined the goal of my life, to distinguish between right and wrong." If I am a naval officer, I might ask, in case of doubt, how Nelson would decide these questions, or what sort of acts are most in his spirit. And in this sense whatever heroes I have chosen as my guide may furnish me by their example principles for my conduct. To define the ideal in such personal terms has been, as we all know, one of the most powerful motives of civilized peoples.

In decided contrast to the ideal of the heroic or stately personality is the ideal I have ventured to characterize as that of the saintly personality. It is true, as I said, that one sometimes conceives the saints as heroes. And so far as one chooses their lives for their guide, one certainly follows examples. But the saint, in the sense in which I now venture to define that term for our present purpose, is a different kind of personality from the stately hero. The saint is great in one's conception not by virtue of his worldly powers or of his possessions, and not by virtue of his visible achievements. He is a saint in view of his sacrifices. He is great by virtue of what he has given up or abandoned. The Buddha of the great legend of Buddhism was by birth destined to worldly dignity, so that he might have become, had he chosen, a stately self, a heroic king, conqueror, or ruler of his people. But he abandoned his worldly possessions. He made the great renunciation. He forsook his kingdom and thereby he was enabled to obtain Buddhahood. Buddha is an example of the saintly ideal, as I am now venturing to define that ideal. Some motive or other that we shall in a moment try to make clearer has led men in certain stages of their moral progress to emphasize self-sacrifice, self-abnegation, renunciation, as in itself an ideal purpose in terms of which all life ought to be conceived. To give up, to abandon, to destroy one's worldly self, to seek the peace of resignation, to win the freedom of a beautiful and negative spiritual perfection, to determine all acts by the desire to get somehow beyond the very need of action, to regard it as the highest ideal that one should have no will of one's

own whatever,—these are some of the characteristic features of the saintly ideal. One may question whether this ideal has always played a part in the complicated moral life of the higher civilized peoples. One might ask, for instance, what part it played in classic Greek moral ideals. This question I have not now to undertake to answer. It is enough for my present purpose that this ideal of a negative perfection, of a perfection which consists in resignation, of a self whose very life is deliberate abandonment of its own,—has played a considerable part in many different civilizations as religion, and is found somewhere in the background in many cases where at first you would not suppose it to be present as an ideal at all. And this negative ideal of personality is the one that I placed second in my list.

In sharp and sometimes very dramatic contrast to this ideal of resignation, stands an ideal that is often viewed merely as one of the special forms of our first or heroic ideal. It is the ideal that is especially associated in the classic literary tradition, with the name of the Titan Prometheus, who stole fire from heaven, and defied the gods for the sake of man. Other examples of the defiant type we find in the ideals such as Milton's Satan, Byron's Cain and Manfred, and, in our own day, the Zarathustra of Nietzsche, have in common. I have called this the type of the defiant self. It differs from our heroic type, first in order in our list, in that the typical hero is conceived as stately or admirable by virtue of his place in some social order for which he fights, of which he is a member, and by which he is beloved. The Titan, the idealized rebel of this third form of personality, is notable especially for his individual self-assertion, for the fact that he is aware of the inalienable value of his own personality. He may, like Prometheus, serve men, but he does so especially in order to assert what he takes to be a righteous indignation against the gods. He is a foe of arbitrary authority, while the hero of the first type is a foe of the enemies of his people. Caesar was great by the service that he did to the Roman Empire. He was an enemy of Roman authority only temporarily and through political accidents. Nelson was the destroyer of the fleet of his country's foes. But the ideal defiant self declares his independence of precisely that authority to which you would most expect him to be naturally subject. He is conscious that his own individual will is unconquerable. He is great by his self-assertion.

Both the saint and the Titan can be imitated, or can be made ideal objects of imitation by an individual. And therefore in terms of such ideals one may attempt to define his specific duty to estimate the ethical values of life, to organize conduct. And there can be no doubt of the vast extent to which men's views of right and wrong have actually been determined by both of these ideals.

Of my fourth type of personal ideal, the loyal self, I should prefer to give a characterization only after we have become better acquainted with the three preceding ideals. It is enough if I say now that by a loyal self I mean one who has chosen a cause, such as the service of a family, a community, a state, a profession, a science, a philanthropic enterprise, a religion, and who then

conceives his own life as the life of one who is serving this power, so that, as I may say, his cause is his conscience, and he determines his distinctions between right and wrong by the requirements which the cause itself puts upon him.

III

What motives have led men to view each of these four types as ethically significant? Why have men defined the business of life now in one, now in another of these four ways? Well, in case of the first of our four types the matter is, of course, fairly obvious. I the individual seek a purpose, in terms of which I can define whether my acts are right or wrong. I cannot find within myself, in so far as I am merely this natural human being, any sufficient unity of interest or of impulse to give me a plan for living. I may seek guidance merely from the customs of my community. But these customs themselves frequently lack unity of meaning, and leave me in doubt as to many of my undertakings. I may consult the precepts of the moral code current in my community. But, as just pointed out, these precepts are abstract, and what I always seek is individual guidance, that is, an ideal for me. The life of a fascinating hero becomes known to me. Perhaps I cannot be like him, but in him the problem of being an individual self, of determining acts by purposes, of succeeding in the task of personality, seems to have been accomplished. If I cannot imitate his powers, I can at least live in his spirit. What makes such a hero ideal is his wonderful union of stately self-possession, of great opportunity, and of voluntary persistence in carrying out his great and admirable plans. So far, then, as in me lies, I who am inspired by this ideal hero will be admirable, I will use opportunities, I will win social notability, I will make a success of life. Thus, watching my hero, I formulate my own will. Of course, as my hero shows me, such success means some sort of living that the community prizes. Hence the heroic ideal of the stately self tends indeed to make me conceive the right in terms of social service. The heroes are mainly useful, whatever else they are. So whenever the stately self becomes prominent in the definition of ideals, some sort of socially serviceable righteousness is emphasized. The hero is just or merciful, or worthy and dignified, from the social point of view. In terms of such an ideal one can therefore define a moral code that is likely to be wealthy, definite, and as far as it goes, at once authoritative and welcome. The precepts of the customary code, when emphasized by the examples of the heroes, lose their abstractness. And this is the relation between hero worship and morality.

When you look through the classic literature of mankind for expressions of ideals, you can easily find many instances of ethical ideals that are defined in terms of some stately self. The hero tales of the Greeks already exemplify a somewhat primitive form of such ethical teaching. To pass at once to instances that belong to a more developed civilization, one well knows how the patriarchs of Old Testament story are figures in terms of which personal ideals at once moral and religious are defined. In the later and more reflective story of

Job, Job's wonderful description of what used to be his own dignity in the days when God still showed him favor, is a wonderful example of a form of the ideal of the stately self. In the monologue here in question, Job conceives his own moral perfection and righteousness in his former state of prosperity to have been intimately bound up, as things then stood, with his worldly status and with the esteem in which men held him. Princes then showed him reverence. Men were silent when he spoke. All praised him. And this was both because of his prosperity and of his righteousness. "Eyes was I to the blind, and feet was I to the lame." Power and beneficence were in those former times closely linked in Job's experience. His stateliness, the ideal beauty of his life, resulted from these. The pathos of Job's position when he uttered his lament is not only that he has lost his prosperity, but that his former ethical ideal has been shattered. For now men despise him, and the most despicable creatures in the community can scoff at him, so that he is no longer esteemed righteous. But nevertheless he somehow remains sure that his righteousness is intact, and for this very reason his former ideal, an ideal of stately selfhood, which he framed in the days when God's light shone about him, must now be altered. His own problem now is: How has his righteousness survived, although his good fortune and his stateliness have fled? He is sure that he still possesses the ideal value of a personality. But he is unable to define in the former terms how this can be the case. Thus in stating the ideal of the stately personality, he abandons that very ideal as inadequate, and takes refuge in another of our four ideals of personality.

But not only the popular mind, and not only the religious mind have attempted to define the ideal in the terms of the stately personality. The philosophers also have made use for ethical purposes of this form of ideal. At the culmination of Aristotle's descriptions of types of character in his *Ethics*, there is the famous account of the ideal personality whom Aristotle calls the Great-souled or Magnificent Man. The Aristotelian account of this ideal type of personality stands in most interesting contrast to Job's account of his own past greatness. Ethically speaking, however, the two ideals stand very near together. Aristotle's great-souled man is explicitly an ideal type of character. This type may inspire us, even though we may not hope to reach his greater dignity. The great-souled man is, as far as possible, superior to fortune. Yet Aristotle admits in various ways that his greatness is not of his own creation, but has come to him after all as a matter of fortune. And when we have been impressed by the spiritual dignity that Aristotle ascribes to this his hero, we observe with a certain amusement that Aristotle tells us without any hint of a change of his own ethical point of view, that the great-souled man must be tall and of slow gait, and of deep voice, for, to be sure, without these physical traits true spiritual dignity as Aristotle conceives is impossible.

The ideal of the stately self, as I have said, has played a great part in the history of civilization. It still plays a great part. Civilization will never learn to do without its heroes. Ethical ideals will always continue to be defined in personal terms. Yet the examples just suggested indicate to us wherein

lies the problem and the paradox of trying to define the purposes of life by describing the traits of any heroic personality and by counselling us to do the best we can to imitate these traits. In the stories of heroes, in so far as they are stately selves, their physical prowess, their intellectual ingenuity, their worldly fortunes, their social status, these are so strongly emphasized, that we in vain endeavor to define to ourselves wherein the ethical work of our hero would consist, if he were physically weak, if he were mentally stupid, if he failed in his undertaking, or if people in general happened to despise him. By contemplating the lives of heroes we were to come to ourselves and to get an ideal guidance for our own lives. But what we actually learn is something like what Job learned in his misfortune, namely, that righteousness, if it is to be defined in terms of our own deliberate acts, and of their relations to our self-chosen ideals, must be something that would survive ill fortune, and weakness, and mental helplessness, and even the contempt of all the world. Therefore, the ideal of the stately self never satisfies the awakened ethical personality. All the higher normal life of humanity has depended upon insisting that my moral worth is superior to fortune, just because it depends upon my will. My hero may inspire and help me, but his very success as a hero stands in the way of his teaching me righteousness in its complete sense. For his fortunes were his own, and after all they were not identical with what constituted his moral rightness. For that consisted not in what the people said of him, but in what he meant to do, and not in his success, but in his self-possession, and in his fidelity to his own ideals.

In so far, therefore, as the moral consciousness of mankind has grown sensitive, very highly ideal, disposed to be dissatisfied with present attainments, disposed to be indifferent to fortune, and devoted to self-conscious consistency of conduct, a different form of stating the ideal has become prominent. And hereupon the scene changes. We pass to our second form of personality, the self-denying self. Because the highly sensitive moral consciousness becomes aware that what I am is far from possessing that completeness and that peaceful self-control which I ought to possess, it is natural to attempt to define the ideal by admitting through and through that my natural self as it is is wrong, is defective. From this second point of view what I am is always so incomplete that it is rational to observe that by nature I am whatever I ought not to be. For if I were what I ought to be, my acts would conform to a single purpose. But by nature I neither know any single purpose of life, nor conform my acts even to such purposes as now seem to me to be the highest. The way of life, therefore, depends upon first learning a thoroughgoing self-denial.

To state our human situation in these terms is characteristic of whatever civilization has come to view the complexities and conflicts of human life as the principal feature of our present life, and whatever individual has learned to conceive an ideal only to discover how much of a failure his present efforts to attain that ideal so far appear to be. For such a view the solution lies in self-sacrifice,—in an extreme case, in a kind of moral self-destruction. The greatest instance of a systematic conception of this ethical ideal one finds in

the original southern Buddhism, although this ideal has been very much modified in various forms of northern Buddhism. Buddha's greatness is the greatness of renunciation. His enlightenment consists in the clear conception of the misery and worthlessness of individual existence. From this point of view righteousness means the suppression of desire. Find out what it is that you naturally desire and then crush that desire. Go deeper still, reach the root of all desire, and crush that. Such is the moral counsel. Such is the way of life. Such is the verdict of wisdom. This in substance is the ethical doctrine of southern Buddhism. If one turns from Buddhism to Christianity, the motive of renunciation, of the negation and the denial of the self, has been one of two great motives which have been prominent in the history of Christianity. The other Christian motive has, indeed, emphasized the eternal worth of the individual. These two motives have struggled together throughout Christian history. If you wish to find the self-renouncing motive in its most classic Christian expression, read the devotional book called "the Imitation of Christ." You could not find a better account of the self-abnegating, self-denying self, whose whole intent is to become and to be nothing at all, so that the divine and the perfect may indeed be all,—you could not get a better expression of that view, I say, at least within the limits of speech permitted by the orthodoxy of the author, than you find in that fascinating treatise. How one can come to conceive that the whole purpose of the self is the suppression of self, you can only understand, apart from a personal experience of deep despair or of prolonged contrition, in case you become acquainted with such a book.

Now the lesson that one learns in the study of the ideal of the self-abnegating self, from the contemplation of negative saintliness, is, as I believe, a permanently valuable, although never a final lesson. The power to give up, the duty of detachment from transient desire, these are elements, moments, as some like to call them, of the genuine moral conscience. "Unless," says Goethe, "you learn to die and to grow again, you remain but a troubled stranger on the earth." Hence the lore of self-sacrifice always retains its place in the literature and in the conception of ethics. The reason is that what is ethically valuable about life is really superior to fortune. And this we can only learn when we see how much can survive our worst defeats. Moreover, since our natures are so remote from their own rational ideals, the lesson of self-contempt, or of self-sacrifice, is indeed an important step on the way to defining our own personal ideals. Nobody who defines personality in terms merely of self-abnegation seems to me to have found his own whole purpose, or to have given a rational definition of life. Yet no one who does not understand the reason why self-abnegation has seemed so precious a moral attainment to millions of the world's noblest souls has really comprehended the nature of the ethical problems.

The defeats that the stately self may receive from fortune, the hard lesson of spiritual failure that those who trust in heroes may have to learn, these, as we just saw, are especially motives that have led so frequently to a definition of the righteous or rational purpose of the self in terms of self-sacrifice, so that my value from that point of view shall consist in what I am ready to give up or to do

without rather than in my attainments or in my worldly position. But there is another lesson that, instead of this one, may be learned from the same experiences. And this other lesson leads us to the third of the ideals of personality upon our list.

One may say: "I am far from perfection; very well, then, at present my whole value lies in that individual and independent will by which I seek to get nearer to my own perfection." What I otherwise possess is indeed of no importance. But my own will, that at least nobody can take from me, and that is not mere possession; that is a creation, new every moment. My fortunes may be whatever they happen to be; the value of my personality lies in myself. I am dependent neither upon the gods nor upon nature, neither upon the good will of my fellows nor upon my worldly success, nor upon my stateliness, for what I really need. There is no good in life but what the rational will gives it. And the will to be rational is always in my power. If one reads the lesson of life in this way one expresses one's ideal as that not of the self-abnegating self, but of the defiant self, the third one in our list of forms of personality. From this point of view a lesson of defeat and of failure is the lesson that one need be dependent upon nothing beyond one's own rational will for one's moral value, so far as that can be realized at any moment. "I praise whatever gods there be for my unconquerable soul." Or perhaps I do not even go as far as that, but glory in my moral independence for its own sake, or am sure, like Nietzsche, that the gods are dead, or like the Prometheus of Goethe, regard the gods with pity because they, like the stately heroes of song and story, need someone else to admire them and to worship them, and would not be great, unless somebody external to them did them homage. For my part, I may say, I need the gods as little as I need good fortune. Morality means self-expression, and in accordance with my own choice. Then it is conscious individuality that I need. If I have it, I have all that the gods could give, and more too.

I need hardly pursue further these expressions of Titanic individualism. They are familiar to all those who have looked into the literature of ethical individualism. What here interests us in this ideal is that in its best representatives in literature it appears not as the ideal of the merely capricious, or of those who despise morality for its own sake. The Promethean type of thinkers and poets are in general assailants of custom. But in many cases they have been vastly significant defenders of a devotion to a rational morality. Many expressions of ancient Stoicism are distinctly in the direction of this insistence upon a self-dependent, that is indifferent, attitude both to fortune and to the mere accidental convention of ordinary life. Even a religious tradition, although the Stoic uses it, has for him only the authority that reason gives it. The typical Stoic does not defy the gods, but he takes care that the gods shall be rational in his sense of rationality, before he permits their existence to concern him. It is from Kant himself, ethical rigorist that he is, it is from him that I just paraphrased the words about life having no good in it except that accordance with reason which we always have within our own control and subject to our own personal insight. Titanism, therefore, stands for an expression, which in poetry often be-

comes extreme, of one of the deepest moral insights of humanity, namely, the insight, that the self must always in the end be its own ethical director, and that the ideal cannot be defined merely in terms of fortune.

To sum up thus far: The three personal ideals that we have just sketched are both inevitable as partial moral insights, and defective because each emphasizes one aspect only of the moral undertaking. The moral undertaking is the guidance of life in accordance with a single self-chosen plan, which in order to be a plan for me must be just to my nature as a social being, and must be such as to obtain a consistency and an individual value of which in the end I myself must be the judge. The first ideal of personality, taking account of the fact that I am a social being and that I cannot conceive of ideals unless somebody sets me the example, bids me look beyond myself to observe the lives of those who have succeeded in getting a plan of life and in carrying it out, so as to win the approval of mankind and so as to insure my own sympathy. Such models are my heroes. My failure to find in such ideals what I need is a partial failure. Without the heroes I shall never be able to define concrete ideals. But the heroes are stately selves. The value that I attribute to them is therefore an adventitious value. It is their dignity, their social position, their genius, their fortune, or it is all these together that constitute the reason why they so attract me. But in none of these things does their genuine ethical worth consist. Ethical worth must be capable of surviving misfortune, as Job's sense of righteousness did. Furthermore, my heroes may in a sense corrupt my ideals. For a higher social training shows me how much beyond any of them complete self-possession and perfection must lie. The infinite remoteness of perfection from any of us, the weakness of our natures, the insignificance of our fortunes as mere fortunes, these motives are the ones that, when emphasized, lead one to define moral action in terms of the abandonment of what now is and what can now be found. And thus the ideal of the self-abnegating self gets its definition. The value of such an ideal lies in the stress that it lays upon the infinite vastness of the moral problems, upon the inadequacy of our natures to our ideals, and upon the need of defining the good, not in terms of possession, but in terms of that self-control of the will which can endure the loss of good fortune. But in its extreme form the ideal of the self-sacrificing self appears as an explicit contradiction, since it seeks the excellence of the self in the very destruction of its individuality.

Equally justified, therefore, with the ideal of absolute self-sacrifice, though from the social point of view by no means equally safe or conventional, is the Titanic ideal of individual self-assertion, in so far as this ideal takes the form not of selfish greed, but of insistence upon the dignity of individual choice, and the ethical supremacy of the rational self. Yet the ideal of a Titanic self-assertion hardly ever utters itself without showing that the whole value of this self-assertion can become real only in case there is a genuine life, having a social meaning, and a life in which the ideal gets a concrete expression. So far then these three ideals give us a kind of circuit of one-sided expressions. Each ideal demands in a sense the other as a supplement in its completion. Is there any personal ideal which combines the motives of all these three? Is there any way

of conceiving the self which is just at once to its natural dependence upon its social environment, to its search for an ideal perfection that lies beyond all fortune, and to its demand for independence of judgment, and for individual uniqueness of office? There is, I believe, such a personal ideal. It is the ideal that stands fourth on our list. It is the ideal of the loyal self. To its exposition, illustration, and defense, our next lecture shall be devoted.¹

¹ [Much of the material of the two further lectures in this series may be found in revised form in Royce's *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. For this reason these lectures will not be published here.]