

Milford, Pa
1913 June 20

My dear Royce:

I write to you for the definite purpose of asking whether you have any separate copy to spare of your review of Stout's *Analytic Psychology* (which I possess) or of anything else you may have written (or which others have written, but I have James's "Experience of Activity") that will illuminate my mind about the consciousness of volition. [Royce's review of G. F. Stout's *Analytic Psychology* appeared in *Mind*, n.s. 6 (1897), 379-99.]

I have been ill since the middle of November 1911, and my powers are so much broken that I feel I ought to make such haste as I can to put my present opinions about Reasoning in a shape to do good. As for my Pragmatism, though it is all very well as far as it goes, it chiefly goes to improve the security of inference without touching, what is far more important, its *Uberty*. It doesn't for instance seem to have any thing to say as to our exaltation of *beauty*, *duty*, or *truth*. [Uberty, from L. *ubertas*, means "fruitfulness, plenty," or literally "full-breasted abundance of goods." Royce's mature stress on the "fecundity of aggregation" (of minds, signs, interpretations, etc.) parallels Peirce's *uberty*.]

In regard to consciousness I think I see that it is of three kinds of elements. The first is pure *sensation* on which I have made an enormous amount of experiments. It involves no discrimination, not even that between the subject-mind & the object. It is the state of a new born infant or of a person half or quarter waked up in a strange place. The second element is Volition on which I made an elaborate series of observations about 1871 (I can't say certainly the exact year at this moment.) The most instructive were got in lifting a dead weight of just 1000 lb avoirdupois. I did not think anything would be gained by lifting more. Now sense of *desire* is quite a different thing, and so are various other things, such as *intention*, I came to the conclusion from these & a great variety of other observations that the only thing distinctive of volition is a peculiar consciousness of two-ness, *distension* [distension between a sharply-focussed object that volition "objects" to, though it can't *intend* to abolish since intention involves more than volition and a pushed-back back-ground that we call "Myself" {a note that Peirce added in the margin to the left of the third paragraph] between the sharply focussed object and the pushed back- ground Self; and I believe there is no other consciousness of Self. Of course, *attention* is the same thing & "unconscious attention" is a mere misnomer. Now I ask what I am asking of you in hopes of more light on this. The third kind of consciousness is *thought*, where there is always a *triad* (or a larger collection of relates.) I don't think this can take place without the help of a *sign* which stands for an *object* vaguely called up, and significant in a certain respect. So thought has those 3 parts at least that have to be held apart in consciousness of that third kind.

And I think I can show by logical analysis that the idea of *three* cannot result from any "2+1". For, in fact, 2, +, and 1 already introduces the idea of 3 as an essential part of it. 2 is already present in 1 and in the back-ground from which it is distinct. So I hold that 1, 2, 3 are

three forms of thought, though I don't mean that they are *distinctly* present in their full qualities in the mere numerals. I find the whole doctrine of inference to be full of triads.

I am going to insist upon the superiority of Uberty over Security in the sense in which *gold* is more useful than *iron* though the latter is more useful in some respects. And also that the art of making explanatory hypotheses is the supreme branch of logic.

I began your book with great interest but was obliged to lay it aside until I can do more in a day than I can yet. You may be very sure that I shall study it unless my end overtakes me, on which missing that reading would be one of my principal regrets.

very faithfully
C S Peirce

John Clendenning and Frank M. Oppenheim, "New Documents on Josiah Royce," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 141-143.