

LECTURE II

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE

In the first lectures of this course we merely undertook to lay the basis for our real undertaking. Upon this real undertaking we enter for the first time in the present discussion. What at the last time we endeavored to set forth after our preliminary survey of the scope and methods of psychology was the general nature of intelligence of the kind of intelligence that we called thinking. Our mental life is a life of intelligence in so far as we get moulded by experience. We show intelligence by acts that involve the adaptation of old habits, the products of former experience to new cases which are presented in current experience. This definition of intelligence for all grades of intellect, whether animal or human. The particular kind of intelligence that we call thought takes its origin in the imitative life of childhood; and throughout our lives through remains identical with conscious imitation, just in so far as it is conscious. Such was the outcome of the former discussion. We now have to consider how the intelligent life, and, in particular the life of thought is related to the social world in which every man grows up. I shall first try to illustrate in a general way, how deeply the habits of our intellect are affected by our social relations. And then I shall [typescript cut off]

[2] I

Everybody is at least vaguely aware that his intelligence is dependent upon the social conditions under which he has grown up. His mother tongue, his religion, his moral training, and his political opinions, are all of them of an unquestionably social origin. But in order to comprehend the real depth of the social influence to which every man's intellect has been subject we must go beyond a mere observation of the extent to which our beliefs and opinions have obviously received a direct social guidance which has been continuous since very early in our infancy. The society in which we live modifies us not only directly, but now. Everybody recognizes that the mind of a man who has ever lived all his life in a great city differs from the mind of a countryman in many more respects than can be accounted for merely by pointing out that the dweller in towns is acquainted with many facts that the countryman does not know, while on the other hand the countryman is equally possessed of much knowledge that has not come under notice of his city-bred brother. The two men know different things, - so much we easily recognize. But they differ not merely in their ideas; they differ in the quality of intellect, in their fundamental intellectual attitude towards many problems. Give them each the same practical problem to solve, for instance, put them both on a jury, - and you will not expect to find them proceeding to the study of the question before them in the same way. Just so again, the whole intellectual method of a man in one profession or calling may differ in ways hard to define, but recognized by us all from the ways characteristic of some other profession or calling. The doctor

and the lawyer, the clergyman and the politician, not only know different things, not only hold perhaps decidedly contrasting opinions about matters which fall within the professional range of all of them; but furthermore, if you get them all to deal with some new problem, especially with some new practical problem that lies outside [3 (5)] the calling of all of them alike, they will proceed to this new problem with characteristically different methods, interests, ideals, showing you the familiar fact that our intellectual training determines not only what we know and what we believe, but also our general intellectual character, our whole disposition towards new problems and novel issues. It is unsafe to undertake offhand any very precise characterization of the intellectual habits of a profession in view of the complexity of the intellectual habits concerned; but there is one aspect of the matter which invites our present scrutiny; because it illustrates the way in which our social habits, connected with our various callings as they are, modify our intellectual attitudes, in extremely subtle ways. To take one example, it is a matter of common notoriety that the men who follow certain callings, are more prone than their fellows in other callings, to permit intellectual differences to lead to bitter personal quarrels. Thus it is well known that certain groups of scholars in various ages have been disposed to rather unfortunately bitter personal controversies. In some ages the philologists have been thus unhappily eminent. The classical scholars of a former century in Europe introduced a most furious and as it now seems to us a most outrageous personal abuse, into discussions that grew out of intellectual differences whose interests the layman in many cases fails to comprehend. I am sorry to say that the philosophers have not always been exempt from similar vehemence of expressions of feeling with regard to on another's errors. The controversies of the theologians, now happily no longer so bitter were once carried on in the spirit of the religious wars themselves; and intellectual difference easily passed over into a spirit of the most bitter persecution. Even today it is hard for many extremely conscientious and high minded students of great philosophical and theological questions to refrain from [4] approaching them in an intellectual mood that easily leads to personal bitterness toward opponents. And yet if one stands dispassionately out side of any such controversy, how sad it often seems to find the very person who are trying to study the highest things, or who are disciplined by the calm methods of science, clouding the clear air where alone the truth might be seen by purely personal passions.

On the other hand, in strong contrast to these quarrels of the scholars, and of too many of the leaders of philosophical opinion, there stands a phenomenon which often arouses the wonder of the laymen. There is a profession, and one of our foremost professions, whose whole method and practice often seems to them through and through nothing but controversy. This profession is law. Of course I well know that in the practise of the law there is really very much besides controversy. There is the judicial side of the profession; there is the lawyer's office as adjuster and arbitrator of difficulties; and there is much else which is not controversial. But on the other hand there is no doubt that in the practise of law a great deal of the method is one of direct conflict and controversy. Yet - and this is what surprises the layman, one all the while sees

certain lawyers who are very active in their professional controversies, and who are yet, in their personal relations, often remarkably free from the sort of personal bitterness which so easily mars the private relationships of rival scholars, artists, or philosophers. Of course lawyers too are capable of bitter personal controversy; but on the whole they often seem in the midst of their professional conflicts so much less given to personal bitterness than one would expect, so that one asks in surprise why this is. Why can lawyers meet in exciting professional conflicts, again and again and yet remain as they often do such excellent friends? Why does a discussion feel so much less bitter to a lawyer than it does to a theologian or [5] scholar or artist. Now here is a case of a characteristic professional habit of the intellect. Lawyer friends of mine in answer to questions such as the foregoing have told me that lawyers get used to controversies that somewhere get definitely decided, by a force which one accepts as beyond appeal, or as such that one does not care to appeal from it. Controversies are so conceived, are viewed as matters of intense interest while they last, but as concerns which it is vain to regard with too much personal vehemence. Sooner or later the judge is there, and one must yield to his opinion. Thereupon the case is settled; everybody concerned knows how and why. The scholars and the theologians, as my lawyer friends assure me grow disturbed in mind because they never meet this [in] life the judge of final opinion. To wait for the day of judgment, is for them long. They do not lack in confidence; but confidence, in the absence of an unquestionable present judge, has to become a matter of personal fidelity. One's loyalty, one's soul, one's honesty is at stake. The only way to be assured of these things, as over against the opponent's hostile revilings or unsympathetic scepticism is to become vehement. That at least is the temptation to which one is subject in the absence of the judge. From this point of view he more deal the more remote, or the more evanescent the object of faith and controversy, the greater the temptation to bitterness. It is perhaps for this reason that musicians often seem amongst all artists the ones most sensitive to criticism, the most tempted to personal feuds. The musical art is on every performance evanescent. The music dies with the moment. The artist and his critic dispute without any umpire, without any court of highest appeal, over the beauty of something that is no longer existent. Where both umpire and object are absent, controversy easily grows personal and bitter. Such would be the application of the theory of my lawyer friends.

[6] I lay no stress upon the assertion that such personal differences amongst the members of the various professions are universally or necessarily present. There are calm philosophers, there are genial and unruffled scholars, and there are ill-tempered lawyers in the world. But what I wish to point out is, that such professional habits as the foregoing are more or less recognizable as existent; that they are intellectual differences, as well as emotional differences; that they concern one's whole mental attitude towards the issues which one considers; that they influence the intellectual results which one reaches; and finally that they are due to essentially social habits, and relationships. The habit of doing your mental work in the presence of an actual umpire who finally settles your controversies, with an irresistible force behind him to

enforce his decisions profoundly influence the kind of mental work you do, the fundamental ideals that influence your method of work, the ultimate conceptions in terms of which you will be disposed to conceive your whole world of truth. I have the good fortune to meet occasionally a distinguished jurist who is also a philosopher. I have heard him discuss philosophical problems. I have been interested to hear him express, on occasion a conception of the nature of truth which he had obviously derived from his social habits, as lawyer, as judge, and as student of the history of institutions. In the universe, so he once in substance told me, we have to conceive that the ultimate truth is likely to be that which some irresistible umpire of all controversies simply requires you to believe, and to believe because the force behind that verdict is irresistible. The opinion was casually expressed, and was not intended, I suppose as a final philosophy. But it seemed to me a characteristic instance of a jurist's metaphysics.

Such then is an illustration of the various subtle and indirect ways in which our intellectual habits get colored and [typescript cut-off]

[7] II

Well if the various professions thus acquire characteristic intellectual habits of far reaching influence over all our mental attitudes and undertakings and conceptions, it becomes important for the psychologist of the intellect in what ways and for what reasons social relations mould our whole view of the universe. And in this way I define the task to which the present lecture brings us. But the question as to the deeper relations of our social life to our intellectual processes must begin by asking a little more closely about the real nature of our social ideas themselves. This is a thing for a great question. What is it to be aware that we are members of society, how does such a notion grow up in you? To live in a society and to be moulded by it implies of course in us human beings that we are aware, from a very early period that we do live in society, and amongst fellow beings, whose minds resemble our own, as well as differ from our own. And as a fact no belief, of course, is more common, more familiar, more constant amongst men than the belief that we are dealing with other minds. Our friends and our enemies are alike conscious beings, different from ourselves, independent of us, with minds in some respects inaccessible to our scrutiny; and yet we steadfastly, unquestioningly believe that these minds are their, are alive and full of meaning, as our own minds are. On the other hand this belief of ours has an origin, there was unquestionably a time in our infancy, when we had as yet acquired no such beliefs as this. The baby "new to earth and sky," all of whom Tennyson tell us in the familiar, certainly does not come into the world with any innate idea that he is member of human society. But to the grown man no belief is more fundamental, or more important than the belief that there is in the universe not his own, whether human or superhuman. Yet so far as the human mind is concerned, I believe that it has never been customary to regard man's belief in the existence of his fellow men as anything innate, or divinely implanted. Many philosophers have held, erroneously as [8] I

believe that in advance of experience man has an innate knowledge of God. Few philosophers would be disposed to maintain that man has an innate knowledge of the existence of his fellow man. Nearly every one would hope that we have derived this knowledge from this experience. It becomes therefore a very interesting problem for the psychologist to enquire: How it is that our experience has led us to this assurance. Surely in the psychology of the intellect so fundamental a fact as this our belief in the existence of our fellows, or other minds, resembling our own but wholly different from our own, is worthy of a somewhat careful study, especially in view of the far reaching influence upon all other beliefs, which, according to the foregoing this belief in our fellows appears to exert. I ask you then the question: Here in our adult life we all find a certain constant and fundamental belief, upon which all our practical doings, and all our intellectual habits in great measure depend. This is the belief that side by side with us in the world there exist other beings with conscious minds. These beings are our fellow men, Now we have never directly seen any one of us the inside of another's mind. We have never directly experienced any other man's own individual feelings, thoughts, desires or inner intentions. No man has seen his neighbor's inner life at any time. Yet every one of us feels personally an absolute assurance that these other minds exist. Moreover without believing in these other mind, one could take so to speak no single intellectual step in the world of practical affairs. Furthermore this belief, so fundamental and significant is no innate possession of the mind. It is no revelation from above. It is unquestionably derived from experience. We do not possess it in infancy. It has grown up along with us. The question is, how has it grown up? What motives have determined us to get this belief. How come we to be so sure of it. To this question so fundamental in the psychology of the intellect, I now propose to proceed, and to suggest as summarily as possible an answer.

The question before us is fundamental enough, and is in so far difficult. On the other hand the facts involved are so familiar that we need not despair of getting some result from even a very superficial consideration. I must begin by mentioning a theory upon this subject I find myself forced to reject, although it seems to be very commonly held. This theory is, that the fundamental reason why each one of us believes that his fellows exist as conscious minds different from his own, is that every man observes that his fellows' bodies resemble his own, and behave in ways similar to the ways in which he himself behaves. Now according to this theory every man observes in his own individual case that when he feels certain sentiments or thinks certain thoughts he gives this or this bodily expression to what is going on within him. By analogy it is said, when a man observes these similarities between his fellow and himself, he reasons that what he feels within when he makes given movements, uses certain gestures or otherwise expresses himself must be similar to feelings existent in his fellows when they make similar movements or gestures. From this point of view of my belief in my fellow's mind is due merely to my reasoning from analogy, in so far as I observe the similarities between his body and behavior, and mine. Such analogies according to the theory are endlessly repeated. When I laugh I feel amused. My fellow laughs, therefore he feels amused. His act

of laughing is not mine. Therefore his inner feelings of amusement is another feeling than the one that I observe in myself. When I walk, I experience the voluntary determination to direct my steps thus and thus. My fellow's walking resembles after a fashion my own. Therefore by analogy, I reason that he walks because he wants to walk, and that his will is in so far like mine. When I am mournful I [10] pull a long face. By analogy I reason that a similar appearance in my fellow betokens a similar gloom. Thus I not only read this or that emotion or volition, or other inner state of my fellow in this fashion, but construct thus, namely by analogy, my whole conception of my neighbor's inner life. Did I not thus reason by analogy, so the theory says, I should regard myself as alone, in a dead world of more or less curious mechanisms, some of which would then look to me like my own body, but would be viewed by me as I now view mere machines. In brief, the whole social consciousness of a man, depends upon the general formula; these observed bodies behave as I do, therefore they are alive and feel, just as I feel.

Now I do not doubt for a moment that such reasoning by analogy takes place, and that it enters into our social consciousness. It is true that we are able with greater or less force to form the idea of other peoples' experience by virtue of mere analogies with our own. It is true that we sometimes call judging others by ourselves plays a very real part in our developed intercourse with our social fellows but it is also true that we have to make two comments upon this reasoning by analogy from our own experience to that of our others. First, the minds, not our own, are such as to forbid such arguments from mere analogy to have much weight, whether as conscious reasoning processes, or as unconscious motives in the child's mind. For the child, when learning to walk, to talk, and to play, gradually comes in a way obvious to anybody who deals with him, first to feel, and then more clearly to believe to know that he is dealing with minds beyond his own but as this process goes on, the child cannot well observe that other beings are doing as he does, and that other organisms resemble his own; [11] or rather such observation cannot be the principal motive in his intellectual life; for the very good reason that he learns most of his acts by a process of imitation which depends upon observing that he wants to do what the other people doing. So in his intellectual life the order must be on the whole reversed. On the whole he must feel that since these live people are so interesting, he wants to find out what they mean, and accordingly tries to make his acts like theirs, rather than merely to observe, that their acts are like his. At the outset he early gets feelings which in a more or less conscious way refer to what he will later believe to be other minds. And he gets these feelings in advance of any very notable power either to act as other people are doing or to observe that he is so acting, or that other people are like him. The social consciousness must therefore have other roots besides the mere analogy so far defined. Our second comment is that this judgment [glitch problem] on the whole the less important of our social life and judgment. To reason from the analogy of our individual case is a comparatively tame way of realizing the contents of another's mind. It is the fashion characteristic of prosaic people and moments. Thus Polonius judges the mind of Hamlet "I too in youth suffered much from

love, very near this.” One feels sure however that Polonius does not understand Hamlet, just because Polonius is confined to this method. It is true that sympathetic are made so in part by their own richer inner experience. They have felt much and therefore by analogy can interpret much. But this is not the whole, nor the best part of the sympathetic nature. The sympathy that we most prize is the kind sometimes called intuitive, which enters into the experience of another even when this experience is novel, and perhaps foreign to the sympathizer himself. In such cases [12] one judges not “I have felt thus myself”, but “This is new to me, but I see what it means in and for you”. That this is possible, the highest sort of sympathy in social relations often seems to prove. Your truly sympathetic person can enlarge his experience to meet a new case. If he is your friend he follows your new experience, not by the mere analogy of his own, but by some sort of fresh insight. Our problem is in part, whence can such insight spring.

But apart from any more sentimental sympathy, our comprehension of the any new idea, as belonging to and expressing the mind of another, constantly goes beyond any mere repetition of our own former ideas, and so beyond any reasoning from the mere analogy of our experience of ourselves. Where I am merely reminded by what a man says of my own vast ideas, I am likely to conceive these expressions of his as expressions of my own ideas, rather than his. I tend to say, “You have got that idea from me,” sooner than to say, “This is your idea.” Hence my comprehension of my fellow’s ideas as his own cannot be derived from a mere reasoning by analogy.

And this leads me to a first statement of my own view as to the central and most important motive of our social consciousness. Putting the case in an untechnical way, I should say in general that we believe in an another mind, the mind of our fellow, primarily because, another mind is a permanent and often an unfailing source of ideas, of information about the world, of knowledge, of new plans, in short of meanings. And accordingly I assert that what one mind actually communicates to another is rather ideas than any other mental states. What I intend by this view, and the reason why I hold it, may be briefly indicated by calling your attention to a few familiar facts. First, as a fact, it is new ideas rather than new feelings that you often get from other people, you have many more means of judging what your fellow’s ideas are than of judging what are his actual emotions or other inner states in so far as in his kind they are mere experiences. Feelings, are notoriously hard to describe. The sensations of the various senses can not be defined in any exhaustive terms. You cannot a blind man [sic] what you [13] mean by color. Accordingly it is always hard to be sure how far we agree as to our fundamental experiences. That when you see color you experience within the same sensation that I experience when I observe color is something that we can indeed only make our by analogy and therefore rather ill. On the other hand, wha we can be aware of is our agreement, and this agreement is not about direct experiences, but about ideas. Thus, it is much easier, upon the basis usually assumed by common sense, to compare the way in which various experiences *are related* within my mind, with the way in which various experiences *are related* within your mind. Thus it is hard to find out what a

color blind man sees, that is what sensations he has when he confuses red and green,- when for instance he fails to see easily the right strawberries growing upon the strawberry plants because he confuses the berries with the leaves in color. The actual sensations of a color blind man thus easily escape us; but the relations between his sensations are easier to make out. For if you apply the worsted test you find that certain shades of green and certain shades of red, very distinct to you, are not discriminated by him. Hence you know that he gets the same sensations, in case where you get two very different sensations. Here you fail to know what his sensations are, but can learn what is their relation to one another within his mind. And now of relations we ideas. Similarly with feelings. A child and a grown person hear some loud, harsh and rather piercing sound. The grown person declares that this sound tortures him, makes him shudder, sets his teeth on edge, or something of the sort. The child listens to the same noise with rapture, wants more of it, repeats it if he can. The question may arise, have these two, the child and the adult, the same sounds present to them or not. That as a question about the inner life admits of no direct answer. But what you are certain of is that in the grown person this noise stands in a different relation to the rest of his conscious experience than the relation in which the noise that the child hears stands to the rest of his inner life. In general, if a man [14] has some simple experience A, and some other simple experience B, it is impossible for him to communicate to me what the experience A by itself is, or what the experience B by itself is; but he can in general communicate to me the relation in which the experience A stands to the experience B, that it is like B, or unlike B; oppose to be, or harmonious with B, and so on. Not our experiences therefore, but the relations between our experiences are the common matters of social communication. But when we are aware of the relations between our experiences, we have what are called ideas, - namely states of mind that enable us to get and to express, a knowledge of these experiences or of the things for which they stand in the outer world. The consciousness of ideas, and the consciousness of the relationships amongst our experiences are very properly regarded as very nearly identical. It follows that if the relationships of our various experiences are the socially communicable side of our inner life, and if to be aware of these relationships is to have ideas, then the part of our inner life which, from a common sense point of view we do most directly communicate, is precisely the ideal side of this mental life. And accordingly when we catch the meaning of another's experience, we are likely to say, "I understand you, I catch your idea." Even sympathy with another's feelings has to be on the whole of this ideal sort. You comprehend another's feelings in so far as we learn to share and to apprehend his attitude towards the objects which arouse his feelings, the sense of his inner life, the way in which one of his feelings is linked to another feeling, resembles or it differs from it, harmonizes with it, or opposes it. And this is true of the most intuitive as of the most indirect and artificial forms of sympathy.

It follows that what I understand of my fellow's inner life belongs as such to the world of his ideas rather than to the world of [15] his experiences viewed as mere brute facts of feelings. And here comes in

the limitation of that judgment by analogy of which we spoke before. My fellow has experiences A and B. In the common sense world, what he usually appears to communicate to me, pretty directly is his view, or consciousness of the relations between A and B, - his idea about A and B. When I grasp this relation, I in general do so apart from any thought of analogy. This is his idea and I grasp it. But as I do so, I myself bring into a similar relation experiences of my own. Call these experiences C and D. Then by analogy, I may conclude that since I catch his idea or comprehend the relationship in which he finds his experiences, my experiences C and D themselves must be, in their separate character, like his experience A and B. This conclusion I often draw. But this last conclusion is always more or less doubtful. The idea, that is the knowledge of how A is related to B, or C to D, is always much more communicable, is always surer as a social topic than are the contents of experience with which the ideas are bound up. A Frenchman can understand an Englishman's ideas, can grasp the relationships which go to make up the Englishman's world; but there may be much doubt as to how far the inner life of a Frenchman agree in its elements, in its simple sensations or feelings with the inner life of an Englishman. In social life, men and women find great interest in communicating ideas to one another. These ideas have many socially interesting and more or less characteristic differences, as between men and women. In the different ways in which men and women view the same world lies in fact one principle basis for the social interest of their conversation together. Despite this difference, each can understand up to a certain limit the other's ideas, while recognizing, all the time their contrast and the novelty of what is communicated. But when it comes to the feelings which lie behind these ideas the differences as social social obstacles, as barriers to communication, are much more stubborn. [16] A man can comprehend a woman's ideas, even when he cannot make them his own, or realize just why these ideas are such for her. But there remain elements of feeling of elementary experience, of fundamental emotion which neither a man nor a woman can communicate to the other when the two converse together. Emotionally the sexes accordingly remain in some respects, as it were, each color blind from the point of view of the other. Each feels differences where the other feels none, and confuses what the other discriminates in the world of inner values. In consequence since each finds such differences up to a certain point inevitable and natural, there is a constant effort to grasp in terms of ideas, of communicable relationships, facts which elude perfect communication. Communication, always baffled, remains still sure that it is worth while to try. And herein lies as said, one of the fascinations of social intercourse between thoughtful men and women.

So much for the illustration of the thesis that what my fellow communicates to me is on the whole not his inner experience as such, but rather his relation, his idea, his meaning, his view of his place in the world, and of his relationships, both to things and to the facts of his inner life; while the similarity of the experiences of the feelings or other inner states in which these ideas get embodied, is indeed a matter of more or less uncertain reasoning by analogy, precisely as the color blind man can communicate his idea of

the similarity of red and green, but leaves us for the first to uncertain judgements by analogy as to how he sees either red or green, as sensations. But if my fellow principally communicates to me ideas, acquaints me with the form and meaning of his inner world, rather than with its separate contents, one would expect to find that the source of the my belief in my fellows existence lies precisely in the fact that I discover him to be, in the long run, an unfailing source of new ideas. I hold accordingly [17] that where so much meaning is expressed, this same meaning on the whole must be realized by and in the source were it is expressed. Such reasoning cannot be regarded as being more reasoning by analogy. The order is not this: "When I move thus or speak thus, I feel thus or think thus; my fellow moves or speaks thus, and therefore feels or thinks thus," On the contrary, my fellow's acts are most likely to attract my attention, when I do not recognize them as like mine. The reasoning used runs rather thus: "Here are ideas not mine. They come from yonder source - that body yonder, seen moving about and speaking. Yonder is where those ideas belong. They are the ideas of that being." A repetition of reasoning of this sort from infancy up, a constant enrichment of the terms involved in the reasoning process, a constant enlargement of the meaning involved in referring to my fellow as that being yonder, - all this gives to this reasoning the significance which it very slowly acquires, the significance of our developed social life. But as I say in germ, such reasoning must be present, although still unconsciously in the mind of the infant, as soon as toward the end of the first year of life, he becomes keenly observant of the behavior of the people about him and disposed to imitate this conduct, and in general, to catch the meaning of it by any means at his disposal. At this age has certainly a very ill developed rudiment of self-consciousness; but he certainly has a very keen interest in the doing of live creatures, and especially of human beings. And his interest very early shows itself as an interest in what they mean by their doings.

I conclude then, thus far, that usually speaking we directly communicate ideas rather than feelings or other mental contents, and that the source of our belief in our fellow's existence lies in the fact that our fellow are sources of ideas.