

Lecture II. Theoretical and Practical Truth.

The nature and value of the ideal of Absolute Truth formed the topic of our first lecture. Our result was briefly this:—The assertions, ^{and} the ideal complexes which are equivalent to assertions; that is, the affirmations and denials, of which our thoughtful life consists, ^{form} the subjects to which the predicates true and false are to be attributed in these lectures. These affirmations and

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denials are a portion of our conduct. For to affirm and to deny are ways of acting.

Each assertion is itself a deed. The particularity

of the modes of conduct ^{that consist of} ~~which~~ ^{are} ~~assertions~~ ^{assertions} ~~indicate~~ ^{are thoughts} ~~which~~ ^{make up that} ~~portion~~ ^{of} ~~of our conduct~~ ^{which} ~~through~~ ^{interpretation and characterization of objects, gives counsel} ~~for the direction of the rest of our~~ ^{conduct.}

Thoughts are ^{the} deeds which advise or counsel other deeds. Now ~~some~~ ^{those of} ~~deeds~~ ^{which consist of} ~~the nature of~~ ^{walking, singing, speaking,} ~~deeds~~ ^{which are not thoughts,}

which are not thoughts, - differ ^{from our conduct} ~~in~~ ^{insofar as every such deed} ~~is~~ ^{is either} ~~either~~ ^{fulfills} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~does not~~ ^{accomplish what} ~~accomplish~~ ^{what} ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~intend~~ ^{intend} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~accomplish.~~ ^{That} ~~That~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{each of these deeds} ~~either~~ ^{either} ~~fulfills~~ ^{fulfills} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~does not~~ ^{accomplish} ~~what~~ ^{we} ~~intend~~ ^{intend} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~accomplish.~~ ^{That}

is ^{either} ~~either~~ ^{fulfills} ~~fulfills~~ ^{or} ~~or~~ ^{does not} ~~accomplish~~ ^{what} ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~intend~~ ^{intend} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~accomplish.~~ ^{That}

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way ~~they~~ ^{any deed} hits or misses ~~the~~ ^{its} mark depends
of course, from our side as voluntary
agents, upon what we ~~do~~ ^{intend}
when we do ~~things~~ ^{our deeds}. If a clown in the circus
ring intends to seem to do stupid things
and to be awkward, then his stumbling
and his ^{other} seeming failures constitute his
successes in his art. ~~As~~ If an actor

wants to portray a stuttering person, then
while he thus portrays the stuttering person,
his halting speech is actually ^{skillful} ~~unsuccessful~~.

And so, in general, in order to know
~~whether~~ whether ^{individual} a deed ~~is~~ ^{hit or a miss} is a ~~success~~
you must take account of the purpose
of the deed. In so far success and

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failure, hit and miss, are terms of a profoundly relative application. They are, upon one side, totally relative to the purposes of the doer. ~~But~~ But this whole

matter of ^{our} activity has ^{also} another aspect.

Each single ^{voluntary} deed is ^{once done} irrevocable. Considered in itself ^(indeed it is a voluntary deed) it is precisely ^{either} a hit or else a miss. It was what it ^{was} intended to win, or else it does not. Now whatever character, the character of a hit or the character of a miss, the single deed has, belongs to it, when it is once done, forever.

Or, at all events, the ~~character of the deed~~ view which thus regards our individual deeds is the

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view which is characteristic of our decisive moods, and of all decisive people, and has, ^{precisely} that value, as ~~an~~ ^a ~~view~~ ^{view} about the nature of conduct, which belongs to decisiveness and to decisive people and undertakings. "Act always, in ^{all} your deliberate business, as a person who never hopes ~~to~~ ^{to} undo any thing that he has once done!" This is a maxim which is part of the consciousness of every business like person, whatever his calling.

Now the assertion which counsels the deed that is a lie, is, in so

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for as it concerns ^{just} that deed, a true judgment. The ~~deed~~ ^{assertion} that comends the deed which is a miss, is in ^{just} so far a false judgment. And truth and ^{individual} falsity are characters that belong to ^{assertions} ~~deeds~~ in the same irrevocable way in which the character of being a liar or a miss belongs to the deed which the assertion in question comends. ~~The~~ ^{of} the difference between doing and not doing a determinate deed is conceived as ^{an} absolute difference in precisely this sense, that the opportunity ~~to~~ ^{to} accomplish the single deed is unique, and can never recur, - precisely so the corresponding difference between the truth and the

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falsity of a determinate judgment, whose object and whose counsel ^{are also} ~~is~~ ~~equally~~ determinate, is rightly to be conceived as absolute. One who judges, chooses indeed his own object, and the sort of correspondence ^(his assertion to pass) with his own object that he intends; and so far ~~as~~ ^{the} truth of his assertion is indeed wholly relative to his own purposes. But he ^{also} gives counsel. His judgment includes the imperative: Act thus; do this, ^{for he interprets objects for the sake of getting adjustments to them.} Herein his judgment commits itself to its own fate; and ~~whether~~ as a counsel to do what, when done, is either a hit or a miss, the judgment ^{itself} is, from the point of view of its own purposes either a hit

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or a miss. And this its character as a giver of true or of false counsel is precisely the character ^{which} ~~that~~ our ideal of absolute truth assigns to the judgment. The ideal which ^{thus} views truth as absolute, because the decisions which are true or false are regarded as ^{individual} acts of counsel, whose character is as irrevocable as is the doing or not doing of any other determinate deed, ^{this ideal} is itself a valuable ideal. It has all the value that voluntary decisiveness can give to life. It is an ideal at once philosophical and business-like.

If, by a concrete ^{even if inadequate} illustration I may

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try to get the view that is here in mind clearly before you, I may well suggest ~~that~~ a case that constitutes, I hope, such an illustration.

Let such of our deeds as are ^{voluntary} choices, but not thoughts, be ~~illustrated~~ ^{illustrated} for the moment, by the deeds of a player in a game, where ~~under~~ the rules of the game are so precise and so well enforced that each of his deeds is, ^{for the purpose of the game,} ~~entirely~~ a hit or a miss.

It is a good rule in any game upon which definite issues depend, that the player may not at pleasure withdraw ^{any of} his deeds, and say, "I take that back, because I don't like the result". If the rules, in any game, per-

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with repeated trials of any sort, still a repeated trial is not precisely the same as

the total withdrawal of a decisive deed. ~~The~~ ^{Our ideal is that the} ~~score~~ ^{score} cannot be done twice. And in general, what goes into the score, ^{stays} ~~remains~~ there.

The score stands for the irrevocable character of the player's deed. Hereupon we may illustrate such of our deeds or are assertions that is are affirmations or denials, ^{by the} ~~by the~~ ^{supposed} utterances of some one who, under the rules of the game, is allowed to coach the player, and to tell him, ^{either before the game or} from some point of vantage, what to do, - commanding, for instance, hold it, ^{or make this attack, or} ~~do this~~, whatever it may be. Now suppose that the player ^{precisely} ~~exactly~~ ^{with precision} obeys his coach. The coaching itself may not appear on the score,

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but the player's deed appears. The ~~coach~~
coaching is as irrevocable as the playing. Now
our lives we, in one aspect, a game, ^{precisely}
in so far as they are not mere series of feelings or moods or ~~states~~
^{other more intricate conditions, but ideas which are either true or false}
Practical life, ^{is} the player, ^{the} thought is the
coach. The score-card, once filled, remains
our score to all eternity. The ideal, ^{view} that
this is the situation is the ideal view according
to which all our judgments, in case their
meaning is determinate, are either true or
false, and, when true or false at all,
are absolutely ~~true~~ or false.

We have now further to develop
the meaning of this ideal of absolute
truth. Let me conclude this intro-
ductory summary by a formal

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definition of a true judgment. A judgment or assertion is a characterization ~~of~~ or interpretation of some object of experience. The purpose of this interpretation or characterization is to guide our ^{voluntary} conduct with reference to this object of experience. A judgment is true if it so guides or counsels our conduct that ~~we therefore~~ ^{through its interpretation of the object,} the deed which it counsels meets our intent, i.e. fulfils, as far as it goes, the will that we have in mind ^{when, following this counsel we} ~~we~~ choose this deed. If we have a definite purpose guiding our will, ^{and} our judgment ~~can then~~ ^{gives} determinate counsel as to ^(what to do or not to do for the sake of) this purpose, then the

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judgment is either true or not true. If not true it is false. And the distinction thus defined is; from the point of view of ^{one} ~~deciding~~ ~~acting~~ who proposes decisive action, and who guides himself by determinate judgments, an absolute distinction.

I.

Whoever has followed this account of the nature of the truth-relation may at this point ask: In what way does this view of truth differ from the pragmatism of Professor James, or from the various forms of instrumentalism and of humanism which are more or less familiar to

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the readers of recent discussion. My answer to this question cannot ^{here} be complete, and as you know, I do ~~not~~ ^{not} intend to make this answer more polemical than the necessity of the case requires. Let me sketch a few of the common features of current pragmatism sufficiently to indicate where, as I think, the principal differences lie. As you well know, the ~~principal~~ main point at issue is whether the distinction between truth and error is usually to be regarded as, ^{in ideal}, an absolute distinction, so that, given a determi-

make judgment whose intention is precise, either the predicate true or ^{else} the predicate false belongs to that assertion, while ~~and~~ there is no proper intermediate between these two predicates. I assert that this ideal ~~is~~ ^{is} quite distinct in ^{between} the predicates true and false from the foregoing lecture, ^{you call it know,} that ^{is} ^{sharply} distinguish between ^{this} asserting the value ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{and} reasonableness of this absolute difference between ~~the~~ the predicates true and false, and deciding ^{on the other hand} whether, in an individual case, a proposed assertion is ^{known} ^{to us} ^{actually} to be true, or is ^{known} ^{to us} ^{actually} to be false. When I assert that a given judgment is doubtful, or is merely probable my predicate ^{belongs to the judgment solely when viewed in the light of} ^{relates to} the present state

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of my personal knowledge, or of our human knowledge. Therefore, to call a judgment doubtful or merely probable is, in my opinion, not to say that it is neither true nor false, ^{and is not to say} ~~that~~ ^{stands} that it ^{stands} ~~is~~ somewhere between truth and falsity. In asserting doubt or probability I ^{doubtfully} admit that I do not know at present which of the two predicates, true or false actually belongs to ~~that~~ ^{the} judgment ^{in question}. I do not thereby deny that one of these two predicates does belong to ~~the~~ this judgment, while the other does not so belong. ^{Under the} ~~the~~ main issue between current pragmatism and my own view is thus far one regarding the basis and the value of the ideal

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of absolute truth. Our closing lecture will deal with the accessibility of this ideal.

But next, ^{speaking} solely as to the ideal of truth, unabstracting for the time from any question as to our ^{present} certainty regarding ~~the~~ ^{whether} to call a given judgment true or false, let me recall a few of Professor James's theses regarding the nature of truth, as well, ^{as} some of the other now familiar expressions employed by one or another pragmatist: —

"The truth of an idea consists in its agreement with its expected workings".
An idea or assertion "is true if it works".
A true assertion or idea is one that "leads us towards or into the neighborhood of that experience to which it aims to

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lead us". "Truth is not a static but a dynamic character of ideas." "Truth ~~is~~ is not a fixed character of ideas or of assertions; it happens to them; they become true by virtue of their leadings." "True is that which, when put to the test, meets our anticipations." "The true is the expedient in our ideas, as the right is the expedient in our conduct". "Truth changes". "Experience boils over". "What was true may become untrue, and conversely what was untrue may become true." What is the relation of my own view of the ideal of truth to all these various ^{now, or in the future} ~~definitions~~ statements?

II.
My answer must depend upon emphasizing the topic that I have mentioned in the title to this lecture. I have fully ~~clearly~~ set forth

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the thesis that all truth is in one aspect practical, since true assertions are acts, ^{of counsel} whereby we ^{guide and} direct our conduct. I must now ~~repeat~~ in the foregoing lecture I ^{also} carefully stated my opinion that there is no such thing as purely theoretical truth, and that the pure intellect is a myth. But, over against the foregoing assertions I must now ^{with} ^{equally} insist that the ^{nature of} truth ~~is~~, precisely because ^{truth} it can be defined only in terms of the decisive will, involves an ~~the~~ aspect which we may call its genuinely theoretical aspect. This theoretical aspect of the nature of truth is inseparable

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from its practical aspect. In my view, the foregoing assertions of current pragmatism misinterpret this theoretical aspect of the nature of truth, and are ^{therefore} inadequate ~~to the~~ accounts of ~~the~~ what truth is.

The word theory is widely, and often vaguely used. In its more exact meaning a theory is the portrayal of some coherent system of ideas and of relations of ideas, - a portrayal such that some of the properties of the system in question can be deduced, by logical processes, from the other properties. Thus, by the theory of numbers, ~~concepts~~ we mean a portrayal of the constitution of the number-system such that, given certain principles whereby the numbers are defined, the other

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properties of the numbers ~~are~~, so far as the theory considers them, are deducible from these principles. Now any set of facts or any system of relations may be said to have a theoretical aspect, in case, and just in so far as, a theory can be constructed which portrays ~~the~~ certain properties of these facts, or of these relations, ^{by} deducing some of the properties in question from ^{other properties, i.e. from} principles which ~~are~~ are used to define the constitution of the system. Thus, once more, there exists a theory of the motions of the planets, just in so far as certain of the properties of these ^{planetary} motions, - for instance ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{approximate} ~~orbits~~ ^{or their positions at a given time} ~~or their positions at a given time~~, can be deduced ^{from the} ~~the~~ ^{the} assumption that ~~the~~ ^{the} Newtonian formula

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of gravitation would be true of the movements and masses that are in question. So much for the general meaning of the words theory and theoretical. Now ~~assert~~ ^{my thesis is} that ~~all~~ truth belongs to assertions in so far as these assertions stand in certain determinate relations to objects. What these relations are, the ^{decisive} will of the maker of the assertions indeed determines. But a general theory of ^{certain aspects of the decisive} ~~the~~ will, and of what ^{the will} ~~it~~ intends, and of the way in which it is guided by judgments, is in my opinion possible. The result is that all truth has certain theoretical aspects; and I believe that these aspects are definable, and that current pragmatism, in the foregoing statement, ^{inadequately} ~~is~~ defines them. Let me

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tell you ^{more of} what I mean.

III
First let me illustrate the inadequacy of the foregoing theses of pragmatism by pointing out that they are too vague to enable us thereby to define what it is which any decisive will undertakes to accomplish, and what counsel our judgments give to our will, and what is meant by those "workings" of a judgment which constitute its truth. In contrast with this ~~clear~~ more or less deliberate vagueness of ^{such} ~~the~~ current pragmatic theses, let me illustrate the sharpness of the theses whereby, to my mind, the ^{position} ~~thesis~~ of absolutism can and should

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He stated [¶] "An idea is true if it agrees with its expected workings" — what is meant by expected workings? What ^{is} agreement with my expectations? Expectation is a name for mental states which exist in ~~more~~ ^{very various} degrees of definiteness. ^{Amide} A man goes to a holiday festival with a more or less vague expectation of being amused, ^{or sitting home looking} ~~looking~~ out of the window with a general expectation that something worth looking at may belong, pass by in the street, or lounge ^{on a hotel piazza} ~~together~~ in summer time wondering what it is that he is looking for, but expecting ~~well~~ as he says, that "something will happen". The very preciousness of such seasons of idleness lies in the fact that they relieve us for the time from

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the strain of the decisive will. We expect, at such times, without sharply defining what we expect. ^{at such times} We are deciding, no definite conduct. We are committing to no precise assertions. Of course the idle moments slip irrevocably by, but their fatal flight is at such times not raised as the flight of our opportunities for decision;— ~~only~~ for our action is reduced to a minimum, and we have, ^{just then} little at stake. At the end of such a season of idleness, have our expectations been met or not? Yes, or no, or both. For we have made ^(during this time) few assertions, have ^{perhaps} forgotten what they were, have done little in the way of conduct, and so ~~have~~ been committed to ^{few or perhaps to} no sharp antitheses between yes and no? On the other hand we had, in a way ideas. Our ideas in their idle way "worked." ~~They~~ We expected to pass the time. Our expectations were fulfilled. Yet what have we found out about the truth of our ideas? Little or nothing.

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Bare "expectation" ^{then} is not enough. Vague ^{moods} of expectation and fulfillment are not sufficient. What is needed for truth is an issue and a decisive counsel. The word "expectation" is too deliberately vague. An ^{in my opinion} idea is true if it agrees with the object ^{with which} ~~it~~ ^{it} intends to agree, ^{just} in ^{that} ^{determinate} way in which it intends to agree. ^{therecurth.} Such agreement is ^{in my present sense} determinate, when the idea counsels doing or not doing a determinate ^{(or set of deeds and when} proposed deed, ~~or set of deeds~~ ^{this deed, if} done, will constitute a definite hit or miss in a ^{decisive} ~~determinate~~ course of ¹ conduct. The idle man has expectations of all degrees of indeterminateness, & they are met or disappointed with all degrees of indecisiveness. But truth and falsity are present only ^{in case} ~~when~~ issues are sharply joined, - yes or no.

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And next, as current pragmatism asserts, our ideas are true in so far as they "work". Yes, but in what way can a true or false idea "work". Only by giving counsel, that is, by implying that for a given purpose, a determined deed should be done. The implications of an idea, not its other results are psychologically, or physically, ^(direct and indirect) an idea may "work" in all sorts of ways. Some fool in a crowded building cries out, expressing any uncomfortable idea that you please, - an idea that has anyhow got into his head. A panic may result from the psychological workings of this idea. Does the panic involve any testing of the ~~assertion~~ truth or falsity of ~~the~~ ^{in question} idea? Not necessarily. ^{For the} idea may have involved no definite assertions. The ^{idea and the} panic may have been due to mere associations, to dim fears, to anything but the decisive choice of anybody. On the other hand, you may tell us if you will that Newton's theory of gravitation "works" because, as you

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may say, computations based upon that theory, and upon its fundamental principles, have been verified in case of some latest refinement of lunar tables, ^{and observation} ~~and experiment~~, or by means of the ^{recorded} movements of a binary ^{stellar} system. Yes, but to what "workings" do you now refer?

I answer, to ^{logical} deductions from the Newtonian principles, - to deductions ^{many of} which ^{Newton} ~~it ever occurred~~ himself would have been quite unable to make, ^{and which} ~~it has~~ taken centuries of progress in mathematical analysis to work out, - to deductions which nobody would ever have thought of making who was not guided by the ideal of absolute truth. These deductions, ^{logically result in giving} ~~once made~~ counsel the student of Newtonian theory to enter in certain tables certain ^{numerical} values, and then to predict an approximate agreement between these values and certain ~~observed~~ measurements

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that can be made by observing certain objects with instruments of precision ~~the~~ derived wholly in the interest of deciding ~~the~~ ^{highly defined issues.} The prediction proved to be, within the permissible limits of the errors of measurement, a hit and not a miss. In this case it remains irrevocably and eternally true that Newton's theory was this time tested with approximate success. As to the result for the theory as a whole, no such single success ^{can} prove Newton's ~~the~~ principles absolutely true; ~~but~~ nor can any number of such successes prove this. But that is because, guided by the ideal of absolute truth, Newton so defined ~~that~~ his principles that, if true they would counsel ^{a "non denumerable"} an infinite number of possible acts of prediction to be made, and no human being can ever completely test such a set of predictions. It is here the very ^{generosity of the truth in question that limits our power to make any verification complete} ~~the~~ ^{in this case suggest}, that relation between a judgment and its consequences

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which constitutes, for the purposes of the
decision will, one aspect of the truth of any idea,
is ^{what is called a} logical relation. ^(that is relation subject to logical truth) At this point our former analogy between ^{the} player and ^{the} coach on the one hand, and the will and the judgment on the other hand, does indeed prove defective. For the coach may give counsel, and the player, making a mis of his next deed may say: "You ^{could!} made me ^{to} make that blunder". The coach may reply: "You hadn't your wits about you, ^{or} ~~and~~ didn't make out what I meant, and so you were to blame for the blunder". Here both may be right. For what the player does may be ^{indeed} the "working" of the coach's counsel, but the awkward or blundering working of a ^{to whom the error was most due may then remain indeed} ratted player. Not so is it however with the only "workings" of an idea that count in determining its truth. The question as to how a given deed is related to the counsel defined by a given judgment, is

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itself a logical issue, and is one purely
of ^{the logical part regarding intentions} fact, with an answer, ^{predetermined by facts} yes or no. Does that
judgment imply that this deed was to be
done? This issue is, for the decisive will,
absolute. For a decisive will is one that is
^{consciously} guided by grounds, by reasons for a
choice. These reasons are stated in judgments.
These judgments are themselves deeds. And
the ideal of the decisive will is that these
deeds of counsel, - these rationally conscious
ideas, - should be themselves precise and
determinate. In so far as I act from impulse,
and without conscious purpose, I may possibly
neither hit nor miss, but simply act ^{at random}.
But if I act knowing what I intend by my act, then
I can so define my will as to make either
a hit or a miss. And just so too, if I know

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what I mean by my judgment, I know whether this judgment does or does not really counsel a given deed. The intent of its counsel is not identical with the psychological or physical consequences of its mere presence in my mind. The logical consequences of a judgment are a ^{matter} ~~matter~~ ^{for logical theory to determine,} (not ^{next} ~~next~~), since what a judgment counsels is not necessarily at all identical with ~~its~~ ^(or even with the "expected" workings) the workings, that follow its mere occurrence in our life, we cannot say that the truth of an idea is ~~not~~ determined by, or consists of, any series of events viewed merely as events. ^{Logical} ~~Logical~~ ^{implications} are simply not events. They are theoretical aspects of our ^{intelligible} ~~intelligible~~ ^{world.} take a great historical instance as an example. There can be no ^{ordinarily plausible doubt,} ~~doubt~~, in the mind of any fair common sense student of the history of Christianity that the recorded sayings which the Gospels attribute

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to Jesus ~~have~~ express ideas that have had great and manifold "workings" in the history of mankind. Some of those ideas you find ^{recorded} in the Sermon on the Mount, some in the parables. Suppose one proposes to test the truth of any of these ideas by their "workings." Suppose one ^{further} speaks of the resulting "workings" as "happening" to these ideas. Now all ^{merely} historical "workings" viewed as sets of events, are of course very complex affairs. All historical happenings ^{seem to be} ~~are~~ due to numerous factors. But so long as you have no test of the "workings" but the historical one, you are bound to take such complications as they come, ^{and} ~~glance~~ to unravel them as you can. Glance at ~~all~~ certain well known "workings" of the teachings of Jesus. His sayings, or at all events the reports of them, early convinced

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Some people that ^{his teaching teaches} ~~the~~ ^{such people} ~~believed~~, some
of divine source. Part of the reason why
people thought thus seems to have been
the ^{seeming} majesty of the sayings, and the ^{apparent} authority
with which ^{the teacher} ~~he~~ is said to have spoken. ~~At~~
at all events the reported miracles would hardly
have produced ^{the success of} Christianity had no such
sayings or teachings of Jesus been reported;
and so the sayings and ideas attributed
to Jesus ^{surely} had their share in bringing about
the later ^{history of} Christian ^{and religion} theology. It happened
to these ideas, then, that their author came
to be supposed to be divine. and for this
result the ideas, as historical factors, had
their share of responsibility. Now what
"workings" has this idea of Christ's divinity
in its turn, ^{brought about?} ~~and~~ many workings, - you
know how varied they were. The Crusades

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the persecutions of heretics, the Holy Roman Empire, the later religious wars, the ^{contests} strifes of the sects, the harrying of the Jews, centuries of bloodshed and hatred, - these, along with vast blessings to humanity that I need not enumerate, because they do not here concern my illustration, - these, I say, are amongst the "workings" that have "happened to" the ideas of Jesus. Shelley thought of these sad "workings" when, ~~in the previous passage~~ ~~he~~ he said:

"See his mild and gentle ghost
Mourning for the faith he kindled"
Of course my picture is at the moment de-
liberately one sided. I mention only
sad "workings". But I do so only to
ask this plain question, Would it be
in the least fair to judge the ethical

truth or the real value of the reported sayings of Jesus even if, in fact ^{these sad events, - these wars, cruelties, and so on,} they were the only discoverable historical workings of Christianity?

No, - any fair minded person would say, the sayings must be judged by the counsel that they ^{themselves} ~~mean~~ intend to give. ~~What~~ ^{What} kind of ~~counsel~~ ^{counsel} is ~~implied~~ ^{implied} by the reported ideas of the founder of Christianity?

~~What~~ ^{is what} you must ask before you judge the truth of these ideas, Now the question as to the real intent of Christ's reported sayings is, in one respect a question of ethical, and in part of logical theory. ^{What did these sayings imply?} One cannot escape from this argu-

ment by retreating to the position that the truth of the ideas of Jesus must be tested solely by their "expected workings,"

as the founder himself ^{expected} ~~meant~~ these ^{to be sure, he presumably did not expect the Crusades or the other religious wars,} But ~~that~~ ^{it} apparently he conceived these

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"expected ^{of his ideas} workings" in intimate relation to ~~the~~ some anticipated early end of the world.

~~And~~ And so much of his ideas would seem to have been erroneous. Yet not thus ~~is~~ the truth of his ethical sayings to be fairly tested. The only workings by which it would be fair to test the original

Christian ethical assertions, would ~~be~~ consist of the ^{implications} of the teachings, ^{regarding} ~~the~~ ^{Jesus} the right way of life, ~~which~~ When fairly interpreted, ~~those~~ ^{Jesus} seems, as an ethical teacher, to have really intended ~~to~~ ^{to} counsel a certain plan of living. Suppose that plan carried out as he intended it to be carried out, - what would be the result?

That is the only fair question regarding the truth of his moral teachings. And now such truth, if truth ^{these teachings} ~~there~~ have,

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such defect, if they are in any way inadequate to ^{our} moral needs, - ^{this truth or error is} not anything that merely happens to the teachings of Christ, as the Crusades or as the sectarian persecutions happened to ~~the teaching of~~ of course, on the other hand this ^{of Jesus} same truth of the moral teaching, is not some mere "static" abstraction, divorced from life. It is as "concrete" as life itself. Jesus counselled a very decisive plan of living. If, with just the will about life that you have, or that ^{many of} the rest of us have, you or we followed those counsels in individual cases, ~~would~~ ^{would} the result be, from our own point of view, and in any one instance, or in some or all instances, a hit or a miss? That is a perfectly fair question about a perfectly concrete matter. But, as you

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See it is ~~no~~^a question that ~~can~~^{cannot} possibly be answered merely by enumerating the historical "workings" of the ideas of Jesus. And the true answer to this question is no mere event that happens to the ideas in question. It is a relation discovered only by means of fair inferences from the concepts of Jesus. The sayings are indeed practical. But just for that very reason they have deep theoretical aspect. They state a theory of life.

And hereupon I come to the very core of my difference with current pragmatism. The truth-relation, we are told is not "static", but "dynamic". You get at it by "looking forwards", not "backwards". It is "temporal", not "eternal." Truth "changes", "flows", ~~and~~ is "dramatic". What it "will be" in future we know not. We know only its "present" status. And all this, we

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learn, is an inevitable consequence of our ~~own~~ situation as men dwelling in a fluent realm of experience, learning what we can from the data of sense and of feeling as they fly. Any other view is a "false abstraction" a flight from the "concrete" into the realm of ~~abstractions!~~ Now I am still speaking only of the ideal of truth, and not ^{yet} of ~~the~~ accessibility ^{of truth}. What I have ^{so far} pointed out however is that we do not make life less but more "concrete" in its interests when we view both our ^{decisive} deeds and our ^{determinate} counsels as facts each of which ^(in its individual character) is irrevocable. You certainly do not make the issues of Christian history less dramatic, ^{or more barren} when you raise the now so familiar question whether any man has ever lived up to the real intent of the counsels contained in the sayings attributed to Jesus, ^{and which would be the result if any man did so live.} ~~Yes~~ Nor do you resort to barren abstractions

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When you simply refuse to test ideas merely by their "workings" viewed as events, but on the contrary insist upon testing them ~~by~~ ⁱⁿ ^(light of the) the genuine implications of their own intent. It is customary for some of our leading ^{thinkers} nowadays, to denounce "mere logic". But logic is concerned, amongst other things, with clearness as to what one intends, counsels, plans, and chooses. And such clearness is the most concrete of states, ^{of mind} whenever one is concerned with decisive choices. Now let someone, - let us say a sage of old, or a ^{modern} man of science, or a man in the market place, give certain counsel as to how we are to adjust ourselves to any object in the world that you please, or to any sort of business whatever. Let the question arise, What, for a given purpose

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is the truth of this counsel? Let the question be answered by showing how the counsel is indeed in agreement with ^{the nature of some object, in so far as} ~~an~~ ~~object~~ ~~wherein~~ this object is sought for some determinate end. The answer ~~identifies~~ ^(genuinely logical) points out ~~the~~ relation between an idea and its object, - a relation which in so far constitutes the truth of the idea. Now is this relation itself merely a passing event? Or on the other hand is it "static"? Is it an "occurrence". Or, on the other hand is it something "timeless".

I answer: from the point of view of any will that is concerned with choosing a "course of life", or with carrying out coherent "plans of ^{action} ~~life~~" in series of individual deeds, this ^{truth} relation is neither an "event", nor an "occurrence", nor yet something "timeless", nor yet merely "static". It is a relation whereby various possible or real objects

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events, ideas, counsels, and deeds
are joined, in ideal at least, into one sig-
nificant whole. ^{This} whole ~~is~~ is no one
event, it is a connected life process. ~~It is no~~
mere set of ^{successive} events. It is a significant unity of many events.
None can, even in ideal, define its character, who
does not in some sense, ^{view himself as} looking down, as it were
from above, upon the stream or course of time,
and view ^{coherent} the sense of ^(a number of) previous events.

When have the sayings of Jesus,
or the counsels of Marcus Aurelius, or
the assertions of arithmetic, or the reports of scientific observation,
or the propositions of the Newtonian theory,
or the assertions about objects that
you and I may now make, their ~~true~~
actual intent, their genuine implications,
their real character as counsels
to action? I answer: They have their
real meaning, not merely when they happen
to be uttered, nor yet ~~at~~ merely when

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they happen to produce, through physical or through psychological "workings", this or that effect. Nor yet do they possess their meaning in a merely "timeless" sense.

The alternative "temporal" on the one hand "timeless" on the other is ^{a division of the possibilities} false, ~~there~~ there is a third possibility. The intent, ~~etc~~ the genuine implications of a ^{determinate} statement, hold, are valid, obtain neither statically nor yet dynamically, neither timelessly nor yet merely when the statement is uttered, nor yet merely at any one time, but precisely "for all time". In other words the truth = relations obtain neither temporally alone nor timelessly, but supra-temporally

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VI.

The conception of a realm of facts to which the ~~true~~ predicate supra-temporal can be truthfully applied, is a conception that ~~concerns~~ many people seem to find very difficult. But I know of no more concrete realities than are the supratemporal realities. I am here of course making no effort to present a systematic metaphysic; and I am still dealing ^{only} with ^(ideas and) our ^{ideas and} ideals, not with any decision as to what access we mortals have ^{to} ^{the objects of} such ideas and ideals. But the mere ^{idea} ~~concept~~ of a supra-temporal reality is an extremely familiar idea, although few of us attempt to formulate it very sharply. By a supratemporal fact or reality I mean

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a reality whose nature and whose ^{character and sense} ~~essence~~, could
be ~~thus~~ inadequately observed or experienced
only by ^{an observer} ~~him~~, who could grasp at once, could
hold before him in one unity of conscious-
ness, ~~as~~ the contents of a number of
successive moments ~~of~~ or stages of
some temporal process. My simplest
instance ^{of a supratemporal reality} is any musical unity that you
please, - a theme, ~~a movement~~, a sequence
of themes, a movement, a sonata, a symphony.
When is the sonata played? When the first
chord is struck, or when the last one sounds?
Or is the sonata grasped or experienced in its
real musical meaning, only ~~when~~ in so far
as one hears ^(first one phrase and then another) the mere succession of chords,
~~words~~ bars, phrases? No the sonata, when
played, - e.g. Beethoven's Sonata Appassionata,
appears to the appreciative hearer

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not as a mere sequence of tones, but as something whose musical sense he grasps only in so far as he approaches a power to hold at once in consciousness the whole contents of the temporal sequence of ^{the} movements and of ^{the} parts of ^{each} movements. The sonata exists, as a musical entity, only in the totality which its successive chords, phrases, themes, parts, movements constitutes. Time-inclusion in, in so far as you can get the experience of including many successive instants in one survey, - this alone gives you the power to experience the real sonata. In a word, the sonata itself is neither a ^{mere} sequence of events in time, nor yet a "timeless" fact; it is a supra-temporal, a time-inclusive reality. Only a synoptic experience can grasp it. It is not merely a "temporal"

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affair of successive stages, and it is still less a "static" fact. It is simply supra-temporal. That is, it is a significant unity of many time sequences in one ^{significant} whole.

Now I assert that whatever object of experience you can make an object of your judgments when you aim at truth, is conceived by you not only ^{as} temporally, but ^{also} supra-temporally. That is, it is conceived as an object that could be fully grasped and exhaustively experienced only by one who could actually grasp at once, and hold ^{before} his attention, the contents of widely separated temporal sequences of experience. Think of any object you please, and consider how you view it as related to the rest of the world. You will find that the object,

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if ~~asserted~~ completely known at all, would have to be known by one who assigned to it its ^{real} place in the whole of experience, and who consequently had before him at once the whole sequence of experience. Your idea of any objective fact whatever is therefore, ~~itself~~ an idea of an object that, however temporal it is, is also supra-temporal. If the real object of which you make assertions were fully experienced by you in its real place in the world, you would be in possession of a synoptic view of the whole time sequence in which this object has its place.

And now, I assert, the truth or falsity of your intent when ^{by your judgments} you give counsel as to how one should adjust himself to this fact, is itself a supra-temporal truth or falsity.