PHILOSOPHICAL UNION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD:

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE UNION

BY

JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

TOGETHER WITH

COMMENTS THEREON

BY

SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES, PH. D.,

HEAD OF THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS,

JOSEPH LECONTE, M.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF GEOLOGY AND NATURAL HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

AND

G. H. HOWISON, M. A., LL.D.,

MILLS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE SAME.

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PROCEEDINGS AT THE MEETING OF AUGUST 30, 1895, ON OCCASION OF PROFESSOR ROYCE'S VISIT TO SUPPLEMENT HIS BOOK ON THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY.

PROGRAMME.

I. Introductory Remarks by the President of the UNION.

II. Address by Professor ROYCE, of Harvard University, on *The Conception of God.*

III. Remarks on the Address, by Professor SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES, of the University of Texas.

IV. Further Remarks on the Address, by Professor JOSEPH LE CONTE.

V. The President's Concluding Remarks.

THE Fifty-second Regular Meeting of the UNION was held in the Harmon Gymnasium, in the University Grounds, on the evening of Friday, August 30, 1895. The members, past and present, together with their invited friends, officials of the State, ministers of

religion, men of letters and of science, Regents of the University, members of all the University Faculties, graduates and undergraduates of the same, and the general public, formed an assemblage of some fifteen hundred persons, filling the auditorium to its entire capacity, even of standing-room. Numbers of those whom the unusual interest of the occasion brought to the doors were unable to gain entrance, and, much to the regret of the Executive Council, had to be turned away.

A few minutes before eight o'clock, the members of the Council, with their specially invited guests, proceeded to the platform. The President of the UNION took the chair, having on his immediate right the principal speaker of the evening, Professor ROYCE, and directly on his left the other speakers, Professor JOSEPH LE CONTE and Professor MEZES. At the right front of the platform were Dr. KELLOGG, President of the University, Regents BARTLETT and HOUGHTON, and Secretary BONTÉ. Other guests on the platform were Professor MOOAR, of the Pacific Theological Seminary; Professors BARNES and GRIGGS, of Stanford University; Superintendent WILKINSON, of the State Institution for the Deaf and the Blind; W. P. GIBBONS, M. D., of Alameda; EDWARD PROBERT, Esq., of San Francisco; Professors SOULÉ, HILGARD, STRINGHAM, SLATE, BRADLEY, CLAPP and MERRILL, and Associate Professor LANGE, of the University; Mr. W. N. FRIEND, President of the Associated Students; E. N. HENDERSON, M. A., former Fellow in Philosophy; and Mr. J. D. BURKS, ex-Secretary of the Council.

At eight o'clock, precisely, the President called the meeting to order, the exercises were begun forthwith, and were continued, with the close attention of the audience, until the adjournment at a quarter before eleven.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN FULL.

THE PRESIDENT'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

Mr. President of the University, Regents, Faculties, Graduates and Undergraduates, and Ladies and Gentlemen:

THE members of the Union, to whose meeting it is my agreeable duty to welcome you all, regard this occasion with a glad elevation of mind. And I am sure that in the presence of this great assemblage, representative of every interest that is highest and noblest in the Commonwealth of California, and come together to express its sympathy with this evening's intellectual and spiritual business, this gladness has not merely its excuse but its full justification. To the members of the Union the occasion is auspicious; it marks the beginning of fulfilment in a plan for some years cherished. This meeting is only the first in an intended series of similar assemblies; a series which we hope, perhaps somewhat fondly, may continue year after year as long as the University shall last. We hope that henceforward, at the season of each Commencement, some person of eminent attainments in philosophy will visit us, and address us upon some great theme of human concern, as our principal speaker is about to do to-night. And we are able to assure you that, in all probability, this hope will be realized at the next Commencement at least. Our next annual speaker has given us his definite acceptance, and we can assure you beforehand of his preëminent standing. Do you but second us in our undertaking, and we are certain of its permanent and successful continuance.

At a time like this, then, a word or two regarding our Union itself will be in place. It was founded some six years ago, by a group of young men and young women whom the study of philosophy in the University had so deeply interested that they wished for some medium whereby they could promote its farther pursuit by themselves and its introduction among others. They stated the objects of the Union as "the improvement of the members in the

knowledge of philosophy, the increase of its control over their aims and conduct, the formation of a definite bond among them, . . . the awakening of interest in philosophy . . . among all persons on whom they can exert an influence, and . . . the maintenance, at the seat of the University, of a central association for philosophical study and discussion." For these objects, the Union is organized with four classes of members — Corporate, Associate, Corresponding, and Honorary. The corporate and associate members are its active contributors, who do its work and supply its means. Its honorary members are "persons distinguished for their services to philosophy, either as thinkers or as benefactors," and it has thus far never had but one—the honored Founder of the chair of philosophy in the University, by whose munificent endowment alone it was that philosophical studies were set up there, and the existence and continuance of the Union itself made possible. Gratefully, therefore, do its members cherish the name and the character of Mr. D. O. MILLS,—the plain and honorable and solid man of commercial affairs who has found time and conviction to believe in the affairs of the mind, and to endow, if we may borrow his own ever-memorable words, "the studies that, in their large sense, underlie laws, manners and religion, and in effect form the public opinion of the world." It was with peculiar pleasure that we of the Union expected his presence here to-night, and our disappointment is great that a slight indisposition has prevented him from coming. Fortunately, his portrait hangs at the rear of the platform, and we are glad that this large and sympathetic company can thus look upon his features. Long life, and health and happiness, to Mr. Mills!

Corresponding members of the Union are "persons residing at a distance from the University, who have attained some distinction in philosophical studies, and whose advice and coöperation, by correspondence or otherwise, are expected from time to time." Naturally, our principal speaker of this evening, our own brilliant alumnus, was the first person appointed a Corresponding Member; though he is not the only one, but has several distinguished associates. He resides "at a distance from the University" indeed; and his coming hither is literally a pilgrimage, across three thousand miles of continent, in fulfilment of his duties, as our constitution sets them forth.

These duties are, to help the Union in its proper pursuits; that

is, in its studies of philosophy. To many of you, perhaps, that statement tells next to nothing; for you, it may be, philosophy is a barren word, possibly a repellent word,—surrounded by a cloudy uncertainty, and conveying only the vaguest meaning; perchance it is your name for impenetrable obscurity. But it need not be so; it ought not to be so. In fact, philosophy when justly put before one is a very plain and obvious business, and the most important business of all. It has been nobly and justly defined by Bishop Berkeley as *Nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth.* The definition would be quite complete if it only went on to specify, exactly, the objects, the characteristic truths, that are studied; and this is done for us, perfectly, in the famous formula of Kant—*God, Freedom, and Immortality.* The Union has pursued these themes as diligently as its time and its opportunities have permitted; though, thus far, it has been concerned almost wholly with the first and the last of them, touching upon the second only incidentally and superficially. And for the three years just passed, it has been working more and more steadily and carefully toward the sublime subject, the awful problem, that together are to occupy us to-night—the Conception of God, and the Existence of God. Never can these questions grow outworn, so long as men remain truly men; and never did they have more an enchaining or more nearly a tragic interest in any age than now they have in ours:—What is really meant by that world-old ideal called GOD? And is there—*is* there —any Real Being matching it?

And now, ladies and gentlemen, it is my fortunate privilege to present to you our chief speaker for this meeting, who has come so far to tell us his answers to these questions. He deserves our best attention, on every ground. I present him to you all, members of the Union and friends from the general public, as a writer of deserved mark on Religious Philosophy, whose words in this matter have won attention from the best qualified minds in all parts of the cultivated world.

Next, and gladly, I present him to you, citizens of California, as a Native Son,—in whom you may take a just and a secure pride; for he has really done something, to which the serious world gives weight, toward taking away the reproach so often cast upon us by those who only see us from afar—the undeserved reproach of living wholly for the senses, and doing nothing for the spiritual interests of

man. I present him to you as a son who has won the ear of philosophic Europe, as well as of America, by his subtle and penetrating thinking on the profoundest and darkest problems of life.

Last, and with chief satisfaction, I present him to you, authorities, graduates, and undergraduates of the University, as a type of the truest product of your university life and your university work. He has given his life to thought — to that study of wisdom and truth, of God, of Freedom, and of Immortality, which assuredly it is the final aim of all true university training to promote; and he has proved that your training can not only pass muster in the highest chair of the oldest and most famous seat of learning in the country, but can adorn it.

Ladies and gentlemen, — Professor JOSIAH ROYCE, of Harvard University.

THE ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR ROYCE, ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD.

I CANNOT begin the discussion of this evening without heartily thanking first of all my friend the presiding officer, and then the members of the Philosophical Union, for the kindness which has given to me the wholly undeserved and the very manifold privileges which this occasion involves for the one whom your invitation authorizes to lead the way in the discussion. It is a privilege to meet again many dear friends. It is a great privilege to be able to bring with me to my old home, as I do, the warm academic greetings of Harvard to my Alma Mater. It is an uncommon opportunity to encounter in a discussion of this sort my honored colleagues who are to-night of your company. And there is another privilege involved for me in this occasion, which I must not omit to mention. I come here as a former student, to express as well as I can, by means of my poor performance of the present academic task, my thanks to the teachers who guided me in undergraduate days. It is the simplest duty of piety to them to say how I rejoice to be able to see, in this way, those of them who are still here, and with us to-night. Nor can I forbear, in this brief word of personal confession, to express with what especial earnestness of gratitude I come to-night into the presence of one of your number,

and one of my former teachers, whose lectures and whose counsel were to me, in my student days, especially a source of light, of guidance, and of inspiration. This teacher it was, I may say, who first set before me, in living presence, the ideal, still to me so remote, of the work of the thinker; and whenever since, in my halting way, I have tried to think about central problems, I have remembered that ideal of my undergraduate days,—that light and guidance and inspiration,—and the beloved teacher too, whose living presence in those days meant the embodiment of all these things. It is a peculiar delight, ladies and gentlemen,—a wholly undeserved boon,—to have this opportunity to come face to face, in your presence, with Professor LE CONTE, and to talk with you, and with him, of questions that are indeed often called vexed questions, but that he first of all taught me to regard with the calmer piety and gentleness of the serious reason.

I.

I have been asked to address the Philosophical Union upon some aspects of the problem of Theism. During the past year the Union has been devoting a very kind attention to a volume entitled *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, which I printed more than ten years ago. Were there time, I should be glad indeed if I were able to throw any direct light either upon that little book or upon your own discussions of its arguments. But, as a fact, my time in your presence is very short. The great problems of philosophy are pressing. I can do you more service on this occasion, if I devote myself to a somewhat independent confession of how the problems of philosophical Theism look to me to-day, than I could do if I took up your time with an effort to expound or defend a text which, as I frankly confess, I have not read with any care or connectedness since I finished the proof-sheets of the book in question. A man may properly print a philosophical essay for several reasons, taken in combination; namely, because he believes in it, and also because he wants to get himself expressed, and, finally, because he wants to get freed from the accidents of just this train of thought. But, on the other hand, no philosophical student is ever persuaded of his opinions merely because he has formerly learned to believe them, or because he has once come to express them. The question for the philosophical student always is: How does the

truth appear to me now, with the best reflection that I can at present give? Past expression is therefore no substitute for present effort in philosophy. The very essence of philosophy is an unconcern for every kind of tradition, just in so far as it has become to the individual student mere tradition. For while the contents of any tradition may be as sacred as you please, the traditional form, as such, is the very opposite of the philosophical form. A tradition may be true; but only a present and living insight can be philosophical. If this is the case with any tradition—even a sacred tradition—it is above all the case with the very poor and perhaps, if you will, very profane sort of tradition that an individual student of philosophy may find in the shape of a past piece of his own writing. It is the death of your philosophizing, if you come to believe anything merely because you have once maintained it. And therefore I am not unwilling to confess that, if I had to-night to pass an examination upon the text of my book, I might very possibly get an extremely poor mark. Let us lay aside then, for the moment, both text and tradition, and come face to face with our philosophical problem itself.

The Conception of God—this is our immediate topic. And I begin its consideration by saying that, to my mind, a really fruitful philosophical study of the conception of God is inseparable from an attempt to estimate what evidence there is for the existence of God. When one conceives of God, one does so because one is interested, not in the bare definition of a purely logical or mathematical notion, but in the attempt to make out what sort of real world this is in which you and I live. If it is worth while even to speak of God before the forum of the philosophical reason, it is so because one hopes to be able, in a measure, to translate into articulate terms the central mystery of our existence, and to get some notion about what is at the heart of the world. Therefore when to-night I speak of the conception of God, I mean to do so in the closest relation to a train of thought concerning the philosophical proof that this conception corresponds to some living Reality. It is useless in this region to define, unless one wishes to show that, corresponding to the definition, there is a reality. And, on the other hand, the proof that one can offer for God's presence at the heart of the world constitutes also the best exposition that one can suggest regarding what one means by the conception of God.

Yet, of course, some preliminary definition of what one has in mind when one uses the word God is of value, since our proof will then involve a development of the fuller meaning of just this preliminary definition. For this preliminary purpose, I propose to define, in advance, what we mean under the name God, by means of using what tradition would call one of the Divine Attributes. I refer here to what has been called the attribute of Omniscience, or of the Divine Wisdom. By the word God I shall mean, then, in advance of any proof of God's existence, a being who is conceived as possessing to the full all logically possible knowledge, insight, wisdom. Our problem, then, becomes at once this: Does there demonstrably exist an Omniscient Being? or is the conception of an Omniscient Being, for all that we can say, a bare ideal of the human mind?

Why I choose this so-called attribute of Omniscience as constituting for the purposes of this argument the primary attribute of the Divine Being, students of philosophy (who remember, for instance, that the Aristotelian God, however his existence was proved, was defined by that thinker principally in terms of the attribute of Omniscience) will easily understand, and you, as members of this Union and readers of my former discussion, will perhaps especially comprehend. But, for the present, let this selection of the attribute of Omniscience, as giving us a preliminary definition of God, appear, if you will, as just the arbitrary choice of this address. What we here need to see from the outset, however, is that this conceived attribute of Omniscience, if it were once regarded as expressing the nature of a real being, would involve as a consequence the concurrent presence, in such a being, of attributes that we could at pleasure express under other names; such, for instance, as what is rationally meant by Omnipotence, by Self-consciousness, by Self-possession—yes, I should unhesitatingly add, by Goodness, by Perfection, by Peace. For, consider for an instant what must be meant by Omniscience if one undertakes for a moment to view an omniscient being as real.

An omniscient being would be one who simply found presented to him, not by virtue of fragmentary and gradually completed processes of inquiry, but by virtue of an all-embracing, direct, and transparent insight into his own truth—who found thus presented to him, I say, the complete, the fulfilled answer to every genuinely

rational question. Observe the terms used. I say, the answer to every question. The words are familiar. Consider their meaning. We mortals question. To question involves thinking of possible facts, or of what one may call possible experiences, that are not now present to us. Thinking of these conceived or possible experiences that we do not now possess, we question in so far as we ask either what it would be possess them, or whether the world is such that, under given conditions, these experiences that we think of when we question could be presented to us. In other words, to question means to have ideas of what is not now present, and to ask whether these ideas do express, or could express, what some experience would verify. I question, on the country road, "Is it four miles to the railway station, or more, or less?" In this case I have ideas or thoughts about possible experiences not now present to me. I question in so far as I wonder whether these possible experiences, if I got them—that is, if I walked or rode to yonder railway station and measured my way—would fulfil or verify one or another of these my various thoughts or ideas about the distance. To be limited to mere questions, then,—and here is the essential point about questioning,—involves a certain divorce between your ideas and their objects, between facts conceived and facts directly experienced, between what you think about and what you regard as possibly to be presented to your direct experience. In this divorce of idea or thought and experience or fact, lies the essence of the state of mind of a being who merely questions.

On the other hand, to answer to the full, and with direct insight, any question, means to get your ideas, just in so far as they turn out to be true ideas, fulfilled, confirmed, verified by your experiences. When with full and complete insight you answer a question, then you get into the direct presence of facts, of experiences, which you behold as the confirmation or fulfilment of certain ideas, as the verification of certain thoughts. Take your mere ideas, as such, alone by themselves, and you have to question whether or no they are true accounts of facts. Answer your questions, wholly for yourself, without intermediation, and then you have got your ideas, your thoughts, somehow into the presence of experienced facts. There are thus two factors or elements in completed and genuine knowing, namely: fact, or something experienced, on the one hand; and mere idea, or pure thought about

actual or possible experience, on the other hand. Divorce those two elements of knowledge, let the experienced fact, actual or possible, be remote from the idea or thought about it, and then the being who merely thinks, questions, and, so far, can only question. His state is such that he wonders: Is my idea true? But let the divorce be completely overcome, and then the being who fully knows answers questions in so far as he simply sees his ideas fulfilled in the facts of his experience, and beholds his experiences as the fulfilment of his ideas.

Very well, then, an omniscient being is defined as one in whom these two factors of knowledge, so often divorced in us, are supposed to be fully and universally joined. Such a being, I have said, would behold answered, in the facts present to his experience, all rational, all logically possible questions. That is, for him, all genuinely significant, all truly thinkable ideas, would be seen as directly fulfilled, and fulfilled in his own experience.

The two factors of his knowledge would, however, still remain distinguishable. He would think, or have ideas—richer ideas than our present fragments of thought, I need not say; but he would think. And he would experience. That is, he would have, in perfect fulness, what we call feeling—a world of immediate data of consciousness, presented as facts. This his world of feeling, of presented fact, would be richer than our fragments of scattered sensation, as I also need not say; but he would experience. Only —herein lies the essence of his conceived omniscience—in him and for him these facts would not be, as they often are in us, merely felt, but they would be seen as fulfilling his ideas; as answering what, were he not omniscient, would be his mere questions.

But now, in us, our ideas, our thoughts, our questions, not merely concern what experienced facts might come to us through our senses, but also concern the value, the worth, the relations, the whole significance, ethical or æsthetic, of our particular experiences themselves. We ask: Shall I win success? And the question implies the idea of an experience of success which we now have not. We ask: What ought I to do? And the question involves the idea of an experience of doing, which we conceive as fulfilling the idea of right. Misfortune comes to us, and we ask: What means this horror of my fragmentary experience?—why did this happen to me? The question involves the idea of an experience

that, if present, would answer the question. Now such an experience, if it were present to us, would be an experience of a certain passing through pain to peace, of a certain winning of triumph through partial defeat, of a certain far more exceeding weight of glory that would give even this fragmentary horror its place in an experience of triumph and of self-possession. In brief, every time we are weak, downcast, horror-stricken, alone with our sin, the victims of evil fortune or of our own baseness, we stand, as we all know, not only in presence of agonizing fragmentary experiences, but in presence of besetting problems, which in fact constitute the very heart of our calamity. We are beset by questions to which we now get no answers. Those questions could only be answered, those bitter problems that pierce our hearts with the keen edge of doubt and of wonder—when friends part, when lovers weep, when the lightning of fortune blasts our hopes, when remorse and failure make desolate the lonely hours of our private despair—such questions, such problems, I say, could only be answered if the flickering ideas then present in the midst of our darkness shone steadily in the presence of some world of superhuman experience, of which ours would then seem to be only the remote hint. Such superhuman experience might in its wholeness at once contain the answer to our questions, and the triumph over—yes, and through—our fragmentary experience. But, as we are, we can only question.

Well, then,—if the divorce of idea and experience characterizes every form of our human consciousness of finitude, of weakness, of evil, of sin, of despair,—you see that omniscience, involving, by definition, the complete and final fulfilment of idea in experience, the unity of thought and fact, the illumination of feeling by comprehension, would be an attribute implying, for the being who possessed it, much more than an universally clear but absolutely passionless insight. An omniscient being could answer your bitter *Why?* when you mourn, with an experience that would not simply ignore your passion. For your passion, too, is a fact. It is experienced. The experience of the omniscient being would therefore include it. Only his insight, unlike yours, would comprehend it, and so would answer whatever is rational about your present question.

This is what I mean by saying that the definition of God by means of the attribute of Omniscience would involve far more than

the phrase "mere omniscience" at first easily suggests. As a fact, in order to have the attribute of omniscience, a being would necessarily be conceived as essentially world-possessing,—as the source and principle of the universe of truth,—not merely as an external observer of a world of foreign truth. As such, he would be conceived as omnipotent, and also in possession of just such experience as ideally ought to be; in other words, as good and perfect.

So much, then, for the mere preliminary definition. To this definition I should here add a word or two of more technical analysis. We mortals have an incomplete experience. This means that the ideas awakened in us by our experience far transcend what we are now able to verify. We think, then, of actual or of possible experience that is not now ours. But an omniscient being would have no genuine or logically permissible ideas of any experience actually beyond his own or remote from his own. We express this by saying, technically, that an omniscient being would possess an Absolute Experience; that is, a wholly complete or self-contained experience, not a mere part of some larger whole. Again, the omniscient being would be, as we have said, a thinker. But we, as thinkers, are limited, both in so far as there is possible thought not yet attained by us, and in so far as we often do not know what ones amongst our thoughts or ideas have a genuine meaning, or correspond to what an absolute experience would fulfil. But the omniscient being would not be thus limited as to his thinking. Accordingly, he would possess what we may call an Absolute Thought; that is, a self-contained thought, sufficient unto itself, and needing no further comment, supplement, or correction. As the union of such an Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience, our omniscient being is technically to be named simply The Absolute; that is, the being sufficient unto himself. Moreover, I should also say that the experience and thought of this being might be called completely or fully *organized.* For us, namely, facts come in a disjointed way, out of connection; and our thoughts, equally, seek a connection which they do not now possess. An omniscient being would have to have present to himself all the conceivable relations amongst facts, so that in his world nothing would be fragmentary, disunited, confused, unrelated. To the question, What is the connection of this and this in the world? the omniscient being would simply always find present the fulfilled answer. His experience, then, would form one whole. There would

be endless variety in this whole, but the whole, as such, would fulfil an all-embracing unity, a single system of ideas. This is what I mean by calling his Experience, as we here conceive it, an absolutely organized experience, his Thought an absolutely organized thought.

And now our question returns. We have defined the omniscient being. The question is: Does such a being exist? We turn from the ideal to the hard fact that we mortals find ourselves very ignorant beings. What can such as we are hope to know of The Absolute?

II.

Yes, the vast extent of our human ignorance, the limitations of our finite knowledge,—these great facts, so familiar to the present generation, confront us at the outset of every inquiry into our knowledge about God, or about any absolute issue. So little am I disposed to neglect these great facts of our limitation, that, as perhaps you will remember from the book that you studied, philosophy seems to me, primarily, to be as much the theory of human ignorance as it is the theory of human knowledge. In fact, it is a small thing to say that man is ignorant. It is a great thing to undertake to comprehend the essence, the form, the implications, the meaning, of human ignorance. Let us make a beginning in this task as we approach the problem of Theism. For my thesis tonight will be that the very nature of human ignorance is such that you cannot conceive or define it apart from the assertion that there is, in truth, at the heart of the world, an Absolute and Universal Intelligence, for which thought and experience, so divided in us, are in complete and harmonious unity.

"Man is ignorant," says one, "ignorant of the true nature of reality. He knows that in the world there is something real, but he does not know what this reality is. The Ultimate Reality can therefore be defined, from our human point of view, as something unknowable." Here is a thesis nowadays often and plausibly maintained. Let me remind you of one or two of the customary arguments for this thesis—a thesis which, for us on this occasion, shall constitute a sort of first attempt at a definition of the nature of our human ignorance.

All that we know or can know, so the defenders of this thesis assert, must first be indicated to us through our experience. Without experience, without the element of brute fact thrust upon us in

immediate feeling, there is no knowledge. Now, so far, as I must at once assure you, I absolutely accept this view. This is true, and there is no escape from the fact. Apart from—that is, in divorce from—experience there is no knowledge. And we can come to know only what experience has first indicated to us. I willingly insist that philosophy and life must join hands in asserting this truth. The whole problem of our knowledge, whether of nature, of man, or of God, may be condensed into the one question: What does our experience indicate? But, to be sure, experience, as it first comes to us mortals, is not yet insight. Feeling is not yet truth. The problem: What does our experience indicate? implies in its very wording that the indication is not the result. And between the indication and the truth that experience indicates there actually lies the whole travail of the most abstruse science.

But the partisans of our present thesis continue their parable thus: This being true,—experience being the life blood of our human knowledge,—it is a fact that our human experience is determined by our peculiar organization. In particular, the specific energies of our sensory nerves determine our whole experience of the physical world. The visual centres get affected from without only in such wise that sensations of light accompany their excitement. The auditory centres respond to sensory disturbance only in such wise that we hear sounds. The physical fact beyond us never gets directly represented in our mental state; for between the physical fact and our experience of its presence lie the complex conditions that give our sensations their whole specific character. And what is true of our sensations is true of the rest of our experience. As it comes to us, this experience is our specific and mental way of responding to the stimulations which reality gives us. This whole specific way therefore represents, not the true nature of outer reality, so much as the current states of our own organizations. Were the outer reality, as it exists not for our senses but in itself, to be utterly altered, still our experience, so long as one supposed our organization itself somehow to survive in a relatively unchanged form, might retain very many of its present characters—so many, in fact, that we need not necessarily suspect the metaphysical vastness of the change. On the other hand, if even a very slight cause, such as the inhaling of a little nitrous oxide or chloroform, chances to alter some essential process in the organization upon which our specific

sort of experience depends, then at once our whole immediate experience undergoes a vast change, and it is as if our world came to an end, and a new world began. Yet the metaphysically real alteration of the universe in such a case may be almost inappreciable.

Thus, then, our experience changes with the current states of our own organizations, rather than reveals the reality beyond; and this reality beyond, as it is in itself, remains unknowable. So far the well-known and popular argument for agnosticism, as to every form of absolute truth.

III.

This first definition of the nature of our ignorance is a very familiar one in the present day. It is a definition that contains, but also, as I must add, conceals, a great deal of truth. I do not know how many times or in how many forms you may meet with it in current literature. You often seem to be meeting it everywhere. I regard it, however, as a statement of a truth in a form so confused as to be almost useless without revision.

And first, let me ask, when one thus laments our ignorance of the supposed Absolute Reality, what it is that he desires as his unattainable goal, when he thus laments. You cannot rationally say "I lack," without being properly called upon to define, in some intelligible terms, what you suppose yourself to be lacking. And I know not how the present question can be answered, unless thus: That which man now lacks, in so far as he is ignorant of the Absolute Reality, is logically definable as a possible, but to us unattainable, sort of experience; namely, precisely an experience of what reality is. And I lay stress upon this view in order simply to point out that our ignorance of reality cannot mean an ignorance of some object that we can conceive as existing apart from any possible experience or knowledge of what it is. What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now call the Absolute Reality.

Let us remember, then, this first simple insight: That our ignorance of the Absolute Reality can mean only that there is some sort of possible experience, some state of mind, that you and I want, but

that we do not now possess. And next let us proceed to ask why it is that the foregoing popular argument for our human ignorance has seemed to us so convincing,—as it usually does seem. Why is it that when men say: "You are confined to your sensations, and your sensations never reveal to you the external physical realities as they are in themselves," this argument seems so crushing, this exposure of our human fallibility so impressive?

To this question I answer, that, as a fact, the argument just stated from the physiology of the senses convinces us of our human fallibility and ignorance so persuasively, only because, in the concrete application of this argument, we actually first assume that we have a real knowledge, not, to be sure, of ultimate truth, but of a truth known to us through a higher experience than that of our senses; namely, the experience of that very science of the physiology of the senses which is relied upon to prove our total ignorance. When compared with this assumed higher form of indirect experience, or scientific knowledge, the direct experience of the senses does indeed seem ignorant and fallible enough. For the foregoing argument depends upon the supposition that we do know very well what we mean by the physical states of our organisms, and by the physical events outside of us. And the thesis involved is, in this aspect, simply the doctrine that any given groups of sensations, e. g., those of color, of temperature, or of odor, are inadequate indications of the otherwise known or knowable physical properties of the bodies that affect us when we see or feel or smell in their presence. On this side, then, I insist, the doctrine that our sensory experience is dependent upon the physical states of our organism, is a doctrine expressive, not of our ignorance of any absolute reality (or *Ding an sich*), but of our knowledge of a phenomenal world. We happen to know, or at all events to believe that we know, concerning what our experience reveals and our science analyzes, viz., concerning the so-called physical world, so much, that we can actually prove the inadequacy of our current sensations to reveal directly, or to present to us, physical truths that our science otherwise, and more indirectly, well makes out. The relatively indirect experience of science can and does correct the existent and unconquerable momentary ignorance of our senses. Indirect insight proves to be better, in some ways, than immediate feeling. To use Professor JAMES'S more familiar terminology, we declare that we *know about* the phy-

sical world more than we can ever grasp by direct *acquaintance with* our sensations. And so, now, it is because we are supposed to know these things about the so-called reality, that we are aware of the limitations of our passing experiences. Thus viewed, the present statement of our limitations appears to be merely a correction of our narrower experience by the organized experience of our race and of our science. It tells us that we are ignorant, in one region of our experience, of what a wider experience, indirectly acquired, reveals to us.

The physiology of the senses, then, rightly viewed, does not assert that *all* our human experience is vainly subjective, including the very type of experience upon which the sciences themselves are founded. What science says, is simply that there is a sort of indirect and organized experience which reveals more of phenomenal truth than can ever be revealed to our direct sensory states as these pass by. But our popular doctrine of the Unknowable Reality uses this so-called "verdict of science" only by confounding it with a totally different assertion. The "verdict of science" is, that organized experience indicates much phenomenal truth that the senses can never directly catch. The doctrine of the Unknowable Reality asserts that no human experience can attain any genuine truth, and then appeals to that aforesaid "verdict" to prove this result. But the sciences judge the ignorance of sense by comparing it with a knowledge conceived to be actually attained; namely, the knowledge of certain indirectly known physical phenomena as they really are, not to be sure as absolute realities, but as the objects of our organized physical experience. You surely cannot use the proposition that organized experience is wiser than passing experience, to prove that no experience can give us any true wisdom.

IV.

Yet I said, a moment ago, that this popular conception of the nature of our human ignorance contains or, rather, conceals much truth. And this notion of the relative failure of every sort of merely immediate experience to reveal a truth at which it kindly hints, is a very instructive notion. Only, we plainly need to try a second time to define the nature of human ignorance in terms of this very contrast between a lower and a higher sort of experience. Let us

begin anew our analysis of this same significant problem of the nature and limits of knowledge.

The fortune of our empirical science has been, that as we men have wrought together upon the data of our senses, we have gradually woven a vast web of what we call relatively connected, united, or organized knowledge. It is of this world, in its contrast with the world of our sensations, that I have just been speaking. Now, as we have just seen, this organized knowledge has a very curious relation to our more direct experience. In the first place, wherever this organized knowledge seems best developed, we find it undertaking to deal with a world of truth, of so-called reality, or at least of apparent truth and reality, which is very remote from the actual sensory data that any man of us has ever beheld. Our organized science, as many have pointed out ever since Plato's first naive but permanently important observations upon this topic, deals very largely with conceived—with ideal—realities that transcend actual human observation. Atoms, ether-waves, geological periods, processes of evolution—these are to-day some of the most important constituents of our conceived phenomenal universe. Spatial relations, far more exactly describable than they are directly verifiable, mathematical formulæ that express again the exactly describable aspects of vast physical processes of change,—such are the topics with which our exacter science is most immediately concerned. In whose sensory experience are such objects and relationships at all directly pictured? The ideal world of Plato, the product of a more elementary sort of infant science, was made up of simpler contents than these; but still, when thus viewed, our science does indeed seem as if absorbed in the contemplation of a world of pure, yes, I repeat, of Platonic ideas. For such realities get directly presented to no man's senses.

But of course, on the other hand, we no sooner try to define the work of our science in these terms than we are afresh reminded that this realm of pure Platonic ideas would be a mere world of fantastic shadows if we had not good reason to say that these ideas, these laws, these principles, these ideal objects of science, remote as they seem from our momentary sensory experiences, still have a real and, in the end, a verifiable relation to actual experience. One uses the scientific conceptions because, as one says, one can verify their reality. And to verify must mean to confirm in sensory terms.

Only, to be sure, such verification always has to be for us men an extremely indirect one. The conceived realities of constructive science, atoms, molecules, ether-waves, geological periods, processes of change whose type is embodied in mathematical formulæ— these are never directly presented to any moment of our verifying sensory experience. But nevertheless we say that science does verify these conceptions; for science computes that, if they are true, then, under given conditions, particular sensory experiences, of a predictable character, will occur in somebody's individual experience. Such predictions trained observers can and do successfully undertake to verify. The verification is itself, indeed, no direct acquaintance with the so-called realities that the aforesaid Platonic ideas define. But it appears to involve an indirect knowledge about such realities.

Yet our direct experience, as it actually comes, remains at best but a heap of fragments. And when one says that our science reduces our experience to order, one is still talking in relatively ideal terms. For our science does not in the least succeed in effectively reducing this chaos of our finite sensory life to any directly presented orderly wholeness. For think, I beg you, of what our concrete human experience is, as it actually comes, even at its best. Here we are all only too much alike. The sensory experience of a scientific man is, on the whole, nearly as full of immediately experienced disorder and fragmentariness as is that of his fellow the layman. For the scientific student too, the dust of the moment flies, and this dust often fills his eyes, and blinds him with its whirl of chance almost as much as it torments his neighbor who knows no Platonic ideas. I insist: Science throughout makes use of the contrast between this flying experience, which we have and which we call an experience of unreality, and the ideal experience, the higher sort of organized experience which we have not, and which we call an experience of reality. Upon this contrast the whole confession of our human ignorance depends. Let us still dwell a little on this contrast. Remember how full of mere chance the experience of nearly every moment seems to be; and that, too, even in a laboratory; much more, in a day's walk or in a lecture-room. The wind that sighs; the cart or the carriage that rumbles by; yonder dress or paper that rustles; the chair or boot that squeaks; the twinge that one suddenly feels; the confusions of our associative mental process,

"fancy unto fancy linking;" the accidents that filled to-day's newspapers—of such stuff, I beg you to notice, our immediate experience is naturally made up. The isolating devices of the laboratory, the nightly silence of the lonely observatory, the narrowness of the microscopic field, and, best of all, the control of a fixed and well-trained attention, often greatly diminish, but simply cannot annul, the disorder of this outer and inner chaos. But, on the other hand, all such efforts to secure order rest on the presupposition that this disorder means fragmentariness—random selection from a world of data that our science aims to view indirectly as a world of orderly experience. But even such relative reduction of the chaos as we get never lasts long and continuously in the life of any one person. Your moments of unfragmentary and more scientific experience fill of themselves only fragments of your life. A wandering attention, the interruption of intruding sensations,—such fragments may at any time be ready, by their intrusion, to destroy the orderliness of even the best-equipped scientific experience. The student of science, like other men, knows in fragments, and prophesies in fragments. But—and here we come again in sight of our goal—the world of truth that he wants to know is a world where that which is in part is to be taken away. He calls that the world of an organized experience. But he sees that world as through a glass,—darkly. He has to ignore his and our ignorance whenever he speaks of such a world as if it were the actual object of any human experience whatever. As a fact, direct human experience, apart from the elaborately devised indirect contrivances of conceptual thought, knows nothing of it.

But let us sum up the situation now before us. It is the very situation that our first statement of human ignorance, as dependent on our organization, tried to define. We now define afresh. All our actual sensory experience comes in passing moments, and is fragmentary. Our science, wherever it has taken any form, contrasts with this immediate fragmentariness of our experience the assertion of a world of phenomenal truth, which is first of all characterized by the fact that for us it is a conceptual world, and not a world directly experienced by any one of us. Yet this ideal world is not an arbitrary world. It is linked to our actual experience by the fact that its conceptions are accounts, as exact as may be, of systems of possible experience, whose contents would be presented, in a certain form and order, to beings whom we conceive as including

our fragmentary moments in some sort of definite unity of experience. That these scientific accounts of this world of organized experience are true, at least in a measure, we are said to verify, in so far as we first predict that, if they are true, certain other fragmentary phenomena will get presented to us under certain definable conditions, and in so far as, secondly, we successfully proceed to fulfil such predictions. Thus all of our knowledge of natural truth depends upon contrasting our actually fragmentary and stubbornly chaotic individual and momentary experience with a conceived world of organized experience, inclusive of all our fragments, but reduced in its wholeness to some sort of all-embracing unity. The contents and objects of this unified experience, we discover, first, by means of hypotheses as to what these contents and objects are, and then by means of verifications which depend upon a successful retranslation of our hypotheses as to organized experience into terms which our fragmentary experience can, under certain conditions, once more fulfil.

If, however, this is the work of all our science, then the conception of our human ignorance easily gets a provisional restatement. You are ignorant, in so far as you desire a knowledge that you cannot now get. Now, the knowledge you desire is, from our present point of view, no longer any knowledge of a reality foreign to all possible experience; but it is an adequate knowledge of the contents and the objects of a certain conceived or ideal sort of experience, called by you organized experience. And an organized experience would be one that found a system of ideas fulfilled in and by its facts. This sort of knowledge you, as human being, can only define indirectly, tentatively, slowly, fallibly. And you get at it thus imperfectly,—why? Because your immediate experience, as it comes, is always fleeting, fragmentary. This is the sort of direct knower that you are,—a being who can of himself verify only fragments. But you can conceive infinitely more than you can directly verify. In thought you therefore construct conceptions which start, indeed, in your fragmentary experience, but which transcend it infinitely, and which so do inevitably run into danger of becoming mere shadows,—pure Platonic ideas. But you don't mean your conceptions to remain thus shadowy. By the devices of hypothesis, prediction, and verification, you seek to link anew the concept and the presentation, the ideal order and the

stubborn chaos, the conceived truth and the immediate datum, the contents of the organized experience and the fragments of your momentary flight of sensations. In so far as you succeed in this effort, you say that you have science. In so far as you are always, in presented experience, limited to your chaos, you admit that your sensations are of subjective moment and often delude you. But in so far as your conceptions of the contents of the ideal organized experience get verified, you say that you acquire the aforesaid indirect knowledge of the contents of the ideal and organized experience. We men know all things through contrasts. It is the contrast of your supposed indirect knowledge of the contents of the ideal organized experience with your direct and actual, but fragmentary passing experience, that enables you to confess your ignorance. Were you merely ignorant, you could not know the fact. Because you are indirectly assured of the truth of an insight that you cannot directly share, you accuse your direct experience of illusory fragmentariness. But in so doing you contrast the contents of your individual experience, not with any mere reality apart from any possible experience, but with the conceived object of an ideal organized experience—an object conceived to be present to that experience as directly as your sensory experiences are present to you.

V.

In the light of such considerations, our notion of the infinitely remote goal of human knowledge gets a transformation of a sort very familiar to all students of philosophical idealism. And this transformation relates to two aspects of our conception of knowledge, viz.: first, to our notion of what Reality is, and secondly to our notion of what we mean by that Organized Experience. In the first place, the reality that we seek to know has always to be defined as that which either is or would be present to a sort of experience which we ideally define as an organized—that is, an united and transparently reasonable—experience. We have, in point of fact, no conception of reality capable of definition except this one. In case of an ordinary illusion of the senses we often say: This object seems thus or so; but in reality it is *thus*. Now, here the seeming is opposed to the reality only in so far as the chance experience of one point of view gets contrasted with what would be or might be experi-

enced from some larger, more rationally permanent, or more inclusive and uniting point of view. Just so, the temperature of the room seems to a fevered patient to vary thus or thus; but the real temperature remains all the while nearly constant. Here the seeming is the content of the patient's momentary experience. The real temperature is a fact that either is, or conceivably might be, present to a larger, a more organized and scientific and united experience, such as his physician may come nearer than himself to possessing. The sun seems to rise and set; but in reality the earth turns on its axis. Here the apparent movement of the sun is somewhat indirectly presented to a narrow sort of human experience. A wider experience, say an experience defined from an extra-terrestrial point of view, would have presented to it the earth's revolution as immediately as we now can get the sunrise presented to us. To conceive any human belief as false—say the belief of a lunatic, a fanatic, a philosopher, or of a theologian—is to conceive this opinion as either possibly or actually corrected from some higher point of view, to which a larger whole of experience is considered as present.

Passing to the limit in this direction, we can accordingly say that by the absolute reality we can only mean either that which is present to an absolutely organized experience inclusive of all possible experience, or that which would be presented as the content of such an experience if there were one. If there concretely is such an absolute experience, then there concretely is such a reality present to it. If the absolute experience, however, remains to the end barely possible, then the concept of reality must be tainted by the same bare possibility. But the two concepts are strictly correlated. To conceive, for instance, absolute reality as containing no God, means simply that an absolutely all-embracing experience, if there were one, would find nothing Divine in the world. To assert that all human experience is illusory, is to say that an absolutely inclusive experience, if there were one, would have present, as part of its content, something involving the utter failure of our experience to attain that absolute content as such. To conceive that absolute reality consists of material atoms and ether, is to say that a complete experience of the universe would find presented to it nothing but experiences analogous to those that we have when we talk of matter in motion. In short, one must be serious with this concept of experience. Reality, as opposed to illusion, means

simply an actual or possible content of experience, not in so far as this experience is supposed to be transient and fleeting, but in so far as it is conceived to be somehow inclusive and organized, the fulfilment of a system of ideas, the answer to a scheme of rational questions.

It remains, however, to analyze the other member of our related pair of terms, viz.: the conception of this organized sort of experience itself. In what sense can there be any meaning or truth about this conception?

VI.

The conception of organized experience, in the limited and relative form in which the special sciences possess it, is unquestionably through and through a conception that, for us men, as we are, has a social origin. No man, if isolated, could develope the sort of thoughtfulness that would lead him to appeal from experience as it comes to him, to experience as it ideally ought to come, or would come, to him in case he could widely organize a whole world of experience in clear relation to a single system of conceptions. Man begins his intelligent life by imitatively appealing to his fellow's experience. The life-blood of science is distrust of individual belief as such. A common definition of a relatively organized experience is, the consensus of the competent observers. Deeper than our belief in any physical truth is our common-sense assurance that the experience of our fellows is as genuine as our own, is in actual relation to our own, has present to it objects identical with those that we ourselves experience, and consequently supplements our own. Apart from our social consciousness, I myself should hold that we men, growing up as we do, can come to have no clear conception of truth, nor any definite power clearly to think at all. Every man verifies for himself. But what he verifies,—the truth that he believes himself to be making out when he verifies,—this he conceives as a truth either actually or possibly verifiable by his fellow or by some still more organized sort of experience. And it becomes for him a concrete truth, and not a merely conceived possibility, precisely so far as he believes that his fellow or some other concrete mind does verify it.

My fellow's experience, however, thus supplements my own in two senses; namely, as actual and as possible experience. First, in so far as I am a social being, I take my fellow's experience to be as

live and real an experience as is mine. In appealing to the consensus of other men's experiences, I am so far appealing to what I regard as a real experience other than my own momentary experience, and not as a merely possible experience. But in this sense, to be sure, human experience is not precisely an organized whole. Other men experience in passing moments, just as I do. Their consensus, in so far as it is reached, is no one whole of organized experience at all. But, on the other hand, the fact of the consensus of the various experiences of men, so far as such consensus appears to have been reached, suggests to our conception an ideal—the ideal of an experience which should be not only manifold but united, not only possessed of chance agreements but reduced to an all-embracing connectedness. As a fact, this ideal is the one constantly used by anyone who talks of the "verdict of science." This significant whole and connected experience remains, to us mortals, a conceived ideal, always sought, never present. The ultimate question is: Is this conception a mere ideal?—or does it stand for a genuine sort of concrete experience? The social origin of the conception, as we mortals have come to get it, suggests in an ambiguous way both alternatives. The experience to which, as a social being, I first appeal when I learn to talk of truth, is the live actual experience of other men, which I, as an imitative being, primarily long to share, and which I therefore naturally regard as in many respects the norm for my experience. In society, in so far as I am plastic, my primary feeling is that I ought, on the whole, to experience what the other men experience. But, in the course of more thoughtful mental growth, we have come to appeal from what the various men do experience to what they all ought to experience, or would experience if their experience were in unity; that is, if all their moments were linked expressions of one universal meaning which was present to one Universal Subject, of whose insight their own experiences were but fragments. Such an ideally united experience, if it could but absolutely define its own contents, would know reality. And by reality we mean merely the contents that would be present to such an ideal unity of experience. But now, on this side, the conception of the ideally organized experience does indeed at first look like a mere ideal of a barely possible unity. The problem still is: Is this unity more than a bare possibility? Has it any such concrete genuineness as the life of our fellows is believed to possess?

Observe, however, that our question: Is there any such real unity of organized experience? is precisely equivalent to the question: Is there, not as a mere possibility, but as a genuine truth, any reality? The question: Is there an absolutely organized experience? is equivalent to the question: Is there an absolute reality? You cannot first say: There is a reality now unknown to us mortals, and then go on to ask whether there is an experience to which such reality is presented. The terms Reality and Organized Experience are correlative terms. The one can only be defined as the object, the content of the other. Drop either, and the other vanishes. Make one a bare ideal, and the other becomes equally such. If the organized experience is a bare and ideal possibility, then the reality is a mere seeming. If what I ought to experience, and should experience were I not ignorant, remains only a possibility, then there is no absolute reality, but only possibility, in the universe, apart from your passing feelings and mine. Our actual issue, then, is: Does a real world ultimately exist at all? If it does, then it exists as the object of some sort of concretely actual organized experience, of the general type which our science indirectly and ideally defines, only of this type carried to its absolute limit of completeness.

The answer to the ultimate question now before us—the question: Is there an absolutely organized experience?—is suggested by two very significant considerations. Of these two considerations, the first runs as follows:

The alternative to saying that there is such a real unity of experience is the assertion that such an unity is a bare and ideal possibility. But now there can be no such thing as a *merely* possible *truth*, definable apart from some actual experience. To say: So and so is possible, is to say: There is, somewhere in experience, an actuality some aspect of which can be defined in terms of this possibility. A possibility is a truth expressed in terms of a proposition beginning with *if*, or a hypothetical proposition,—an *is* expressed in terms of an *if*. But every hypothetical proposition involves a categorical proposition. Every *if* implies an *is*. For you cannot define a truth as concretely true unless you define it as really present to some experience. Thus, for instance, I can easily define my actual experience by expressing some aspect of it in the form of a supposition, even if the supposition were one con-

trary to fact. But I cannot believe in the truth of a supposition without believing in some concrete and experienced fact. The suitor asks for the daughter. The father replies: "I will give thee my daughter *if* thou canst touch heaven." Here the father expresses his actually experienced intention in the form of a hypothetical proposition each member of which he believes to be false. The suitor cannot touch heaven, and is not to get the gift of the daughter. Yet the hypothetical proposition is to be true. Why? Because it expresses in terms of an *if* what the father experiences in terms of an *is*, namely, the obdurate inner will of the forbidding parent himself. Just so with any *if* proposition. Its members, antecedent and consequent, may be false. But it is true only in case there corresponds to its fashion of assertion some real experience.

And now, to apply this thought to our central problem, you and I, whenever we talk of reality as opposed to mere seeming, assert of necessity, as has just been shown, that *if* there were an organized unity of experience, this organized experience *would have* present to it as part of its content the fact whose reality we assert. This proposition cannot, as a merely hypothetical proposition, have any real truth, unless, to its asserted possibility, there corresponds some actual experience, present somewhere in the world, not of barely possible, but of concretely actual experience. And this is the first of our two considerations. In fine, if there is an actual experience to which an absolute reality corresponds, then you can indeed translate this actuality into the terms of bare possibility. But unless there is such an actual experience, the bare possibility expresses no truth.

The second consideration appears when we ask our finite experience whereabouts, in its limited circle, is in any wise even suggested the actually experienced fact of which that hypothetical proposition relating to the ideal or absolute experience is the expression. What in finite experience suggests the truth that if there were an absolute experience it would find a certain unity of facts?

VII.

To this question, my answer is as follows:—Any finite experience either regards itself as suggesting some sort of truth, or does not so regard itself. If it does not regard itself as suggesting truth,

it concerns us not here. Enough, one who thinks, who aims at truth, who means to know anything, is regarding his experience as suggesting truth. Now to regard our experience as suggesting truth is, as we have seen, to mean that our experience indicates what a higher or inclusive *i.e.* a more organized experience would find presented thus or thus to itself. It is this meaning, this intent, this aim, this will to find in the moment the indication of what a higher experience directly grasps,—it is this that embodies for us the fact of which our hypothetical proposition aforesaid is the expression. But you may here say: "This aim, this will, is all. As a fact, you and I aim at the absolute experience; that is what we mean by wanting to know absolute truth; but the absolute experience," so you may insist, "is just a mere ideal. There need be no such experience as a concrete actuality. The aim, the intent, is the known fact. The rest is silence,—perhaps error. Perhaps there is no absolute truth, no ideally united and unfragmentary experience."

But hereupon one turns upon you with the inevitable dialectic of our problem itself. Grant hypothetically, if you choose, for a moment, that there is no universal experience as a concrete fact, but only the hope of it, the definition of it, the will to win it, the groaning and travail of the whole of finite experience in the search for it, in the error of believing that it is. Well, what will that mean? This ultimate limitation, this finally imprisoned finitude, this absolute fragmentariness and error of the actual experience that aims at the absolute experience when there is no absolute experience at which to aim,—this absolute finiteness and erroneousness of the real experience, I say, will itself be a fact, a truth, a reality, and, as such, just the absolute truth. But this supposed ultimate truth will exist for whose experience? For the finite experience? No, for although our finite experience knows itself to be limited, still, just in in so far as it is finite, it cannot know that there is no unity beyond its fragmentariness. For if any experience actually knew (that is, actually experienced) itself to be the whole of experience, it would have to experience how and why it were so. And if it knew this, it would be *ipso facto* an absolute *i.e.* a completely self-possessed experience, for which there was no truth that was not, as such, a datum,—no ideal of a beyond that was not, as such, judged by the facts to be meaningless,—no thought to which a presentation did not correspond, no presentation whose reality was not luminous to

its comprehending thought. Only such an absolute experience could say with assurance: "Beyond my world there is no further experience actual." But if, by hypothesis, there is to be no such an experience, but only a limited collection of finite experiences, the question returns:—The reality of this final limitation, the existence of no experience beyond the broken mass of finite fragments,—this is to be a truth,—but for whose experience is it to be a truth? Plainly, in the supposed case, it will be a truth nowhere presented—a truth for nobody. But, as we saw before, to assert any absolute reality as real is simply to assert an experience—and, in fact, just in so far as the reality is absolute, an absolute experience—for which this reality exists. To assert a truth as more than possible, is to assert the concrete reality of an experience that knows this truth. Hence, —and here, indeed, is the conclusion of the whole matter—the very effort hypothetically to assert that the whole world of experience is a world of fragmentary and finite experience is an effort involving a contradiction. Experience must constitute, in its entirety, one self-determined and consequently absolute and organized whole.

Otherwise put: All concrete, or genuine, and not barely possible truth, is, as such, a truth somewhere experienced. This is the inevitable result of the view with which we started when we said that without experience there is no knowledge. For truth *is*, so far as it is *known*. Now this proposition applies as well to the totality of the world of finite experience as it does to the parts of that world. There must, then, be an experience to which is present the constitution (*i.e.*, the actual limitation and narrowness) of all finite experience, just as surely as there is such a constitution. That there is nothing at all beyond this limited constitution must, as a fact, be present to this final experience. But this fact that the world of finite experience has no experience beyond it could not be present, as a fact, to any but an absolute experience, which knew all that is or that genuinely can be known; and the proposition that a totality of finite experience could exist without there being any absolute experience thus proves to be simply self-contradictory.

VIII.

Let us sum up, in a few words, this whole argument. There is for us, as we are, experience. Our thought undertakes the interpretation of this experience. Every intelligent interpretation of an

experience involves, however, the appeal from this experienced fragment to some more organized whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place. To talk of any reality which this fragmentary experience indicates, is to conceive this reality as the content of the more organized experience. To assert that there is any absolutely real fact indicated by our experience, is to regard this reality as presented to an absolutely organized experience, in which every fragment finds its place.

So far, indeed, in speaking of reality and an absolute experience, one talks of mere conceptual objects,—one deals, as the mathematical sciences do, with what appear to be only shadowy Platonic ideas. The question arises: Do these Platonic ideas of the absolute reality, and of the absolutely organized experience, stand for anything but merely ideal or possible entities? The right answer to this question comes if one first assumes, for argument's sake, that such answer is negative, and that there is no organized, but only a fragmentary experience. For then one has to define the alternative that is to be opposed to the supposedly erroneous conception of an absolute experience. That alternative, as pointed out, is a world of fragmentary experiences, whose limited nature is not determined by any all-pervading idea. Such a world of finite experiences is to be merely what it happens to be,—is to contain only what chances here or there to be felt. But hereupon arises the question: What reality has this fact of the limitation and fragmentariness of the actual world of experiences? If every reality has to exist just in so far as there is experience of its existence, then the determination of the world of experience to be this world and no other, the fact that reality contains no other facts than these, is, as the supposed final reality, itself the object of one experience, for which the fragmentariness of the finite world appears as a presented and absolute fact, beyond which no reality is to be viewed as even genuinely possible. For this final experience, the conception of any possible experience beyond is known as an ungrounded conception, as an actual impossibility. But so this final experience is by hypothesis forthwith defined as One, as All-inclusive, as determined by nothing beyond itself, as assured of the complete fulfillment of its own ideas concerning what is,—in brief, it becomes an absolute experience. The very effort to deny the abso-

lute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an absolute experience.

Our result, then, is: There is an absolute experience, for which the conception of an absolute reality, *i. e.*, the conception of a system of ideal truth, is fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this experience. This absolute experience is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest thought can rationally conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its definition as an Absolute. For the absolute experience, as for ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these contents, express, for the absolute experience, its own meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it possesses, the absolute experience knows to be, in genuine truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed particular,—a selection from the world of bare or merely conceptual possibilities,—but they form a self-determined whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life.

IX.

The conception now reached I regard as the philosophical conception of God. Some of you may observe that in the foregoing account I have often, in defining the Absolute, made use of the terms lately employed by Mr. BRADLEY,[1] rather than of the terms used in either of my two published discussions of the topic, *i. e.*, either in the book that you have been studying, or in my *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Such variation of the terms employed involves indeed an enrichment, but certainly no essential change in the conception. The argument here used is essentially the same as the one before employed. You can certainly and, as I still hold, quite properly define the Absolute as Thought. But then you mean, as in my book I explicitly showed, a thought that is no longer, like ours in the exact sciences, concerned with the shadowy Platonic ideas, viewed as conceptional possibilities, but a thought that sees its own fulfilment in the world of its self-possessed life,—

[1] F. H. BRADLEY: *Appearance and Reality*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

in other words, a thought whose Ideas are not mere shadows, but have an aspect in which they are felt as well as meant, appreciated as well as described,—yes, I should unhesitatingly say, loved as well as conceived, willed as well as viewed. Such an Absolute Thought you can also call, in its wholeness, a Self; for it beholds the fulfilment of its own thinking, and views the determined character of its living experience as identical with what its universal conceptions mean. All these names: Absolute Self, Absolute Thought, Absolute Experience, are not, indeed, mere indifferent names for the inexpressible truth; but, when carefully defined through the very process of their construction, they are equally valuable expressions of different aspects of the same truth. God is known as Thought fulfilled; as Experience absolutely organized, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with idea; as Selfhood eternally obtained. And all this the Absolute is in concrete unity, not in mere variety.

Yet our purpose here is not religious but speculative. It is not mine to-night to declare the glory of the divine being, but simply to scrutinize the definition of the absolute. The heart of my whole argument, here as in my book, has been the insistence that all these seemingly so transcendent and imprudent speculations about the absolute are, as a fact, the mere effort to express, as coherently as may be, the commonplace implications of our very human ignorance itself. People think it very modest to say: We cannot know what the absolute reality is. They forget that to make this assertion implies, unless one is using words idle and without sense, that one knows what the term Absolute Reality means. People think it easy to say: We can be sure of only what our own finite experience presents. They forget that if a world of finite experience exists at all, this world must have a consistently definable constitution, in order that it may exist. Its constitution, however, turns out to be such that an absolute experience—namely, an experience acquainted with limitation only in so far as this limitation is determined by the organized and transparent constitution of this experience—is needed as that for which the fragmentary constitution of the finite world of experience exists. The very watchword, then, of our whole doctrine is this: All knowledge is of something experienced. For this means that nothing actually exists save what is somewhere experienced. If this be true, then the total limitation, the determina-

tion, the fragmentariness, the ignorance, the error,—yes (as forms or cases of ignorance and error), the evil, the pain, the horror, the longing, the travail, the faith, the devotion, the endless flight from its own worthlessness,—that constitutes the very essence of the world of finite experience, is, as a positive reality, somewhere so experienced in its wholeness that this entire constitution of the finite appears as a world beyond which, in its whole constitution, nothing exists or can exist. But, for such an experience, this constitution of the finite is a fact determined from an absolute point of view, and every finite incompleteness and struggle appears as a part of a whole in whose wholeness the fragments find their true place, the ideas their realization, the seeking its fulfilment, and our whole life its truth, and so its eternal rest,—that peace which transcends the storms of its agony and its restlessness. For this agony and restlessness are the very embodiment of an incomplete experience, of a finite ignorance.

Do you ask, then: Where in our human world does God get revealed?—what manifests his glory? I answer:—Our ignorance, our fallibility, our imperfection, and so, as forms of this ignorance and imperfection, our experience of longing, of strife, of pain, of error,—yes, of whatever, as finite, declares that its truth lies in its limitation, and so lies beyond itself. These things, wherein we taste the bitterness of our finitude, are what they are because they mean more than they contain, imply what is beyond them, refuse to exist by themselves, and, at the very moment of confessing their own fragmentary falsity, assure us of the reality of that fulfilment which is the life of God.

The conception of God thus reached offers itself to you, not as destroying, but as fulfilling, the large collection of slowly evolving notions that have appeared in the course of history in connection with the name of God.

The foregoing definition of God as an Absolute Experience transparently fulfilling a system of organized ideas, is, as you all doubtless are aware, in essence identical with the conception first reached, but very faintly and briefly developed, by Aristotle. Another definition of God, as the Absolute (or Perfect) Reality, long struggled in the history of speculation with this idea of God as Fulfilled Thought, or as Self-possessed Experience. The inter-relation of these two central definitions has long occupied philosophic

thinking. Their rational identification is the work of recent speculation. The all-powerful and righteous World-creator of the Old and New Testaments was first conceived, not speculatively, but ethically; and it is to the rich experience of Christian mysticism that the historical honor belongs, of having bridged the gulf that seemed to separate, and that to many minds still separates, the God of practical faith from the God of philosophical definition. Mysticism is not philosophy; but, as a stage of human experience, it is the link that binds the contemplative to the practical in the history of religion, since the saints have taken refuge in it, and the philosophers have endeavored to emerge from its mysteries to the light of clearer insight. To St. Thomas Aquinas belongs the credit of the first explicit and fully developed synthesis of the Aristotelian and the Christian conceptions of God. The Thomistic proofs of God's existence—repeated, diluted, and thus often rendered very trivial, by popular apologetic writers—have now, at best, lost much of their speculative interest. But the conception of the Divine that St. Thomas reached, remains in certain important respects central, and in essence identical, I think, with the definition that I have here tried to repeat; and that, too, despite the paradoxes and the errors involved in the traditional conception of the creation of the world.

For the rest, let me in closing be perfectly frank with you. I myself am one of those students whom a more modern and radical scepticism has, indeed, put in general very much out of sympathy with many of what seem to me the unessential accidents of religious tradition as represented in the historical faith; and for such students this scepticism has transformed, in many ways, our methods of defining our relation to truth. But this scepticism has not thrown even the most radical of us, if we are enlightened, out of a close, a rational, a spiritually intelligent relation to those deep ideas that, despite all these accidents, have moulded the heart of the history of religion. In brief, then, the foregoing conception of God undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not pantheistic. It is not the conception of any Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of an Universal Substance, in whose law our ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore. On the contrary, every ethical predicate which the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God, is capable of exact interpretation in terms of our present view. For

my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy.

REMARKS IN CRITICISM OF THE ADDRESS, BY PROFESSOR SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES.

WELL worthy of note, in the exercises of this evening, is the fact that nearly all the participants have stood to each other in the relation of teacher and pupil. Not very many years ago, the meeting of such persons in a public discussion would have been nearly impossible; or, at all events, the key-note of the meeting would most probably have been an entirely genuine and yet somewhat monotonous agreement. But a frank independence of thought is the informing spirit of modern teaching in this country. Teachers care comparatively little to have students agree with them, but insist very strongly that they shall think out their own thoughts for themselves. Students are not merely informed of old solutions. They are rather trained and encouraged to think out new solutions, on the chance that the new may supplement some of the imperfections of the old. Some modern teachers even carry this so far as positively to distrust such students as agree with them. Now, Professor ROYCE is a typical modern teacher; and, indeed, in what I have just said, I am doing little more than repeat what I have often heard him say to his classes. For a long time, as I will now confess, it was desperately difficult to disagree with him and yet seem to oneself at all reasonable. For he has a way of mounting his facts in a setting of stringent logic, and of driving home his conclusions with the persuasive power of a finished rhetoric. But by dint of long and strenuous effort to look at things for myself, I have succeeded in meeting his requirement that I should disagree with him, and I have some hope of persuading you, and, possibly, Professor Royce too, that my disagreements are solidly founded. But of that you shall now judge.

In considering Professor Royce's position, as outlined in the address we have just heard, I shall limit myself to two criticisms. My first, in a word, is this: I cannot agree with the Professor that the Being whose existence, as I freely admit, he has fully established, has been *proved* by him to be a being possessing worth and dignity. When he says, that, under pain of self-contradiction, we must assert that an Ultimate Being exists, that he is fully conscious, that his experience is organized, or, what amounts to the same thing, that within his experience there are to be found no unanswered questions and no unsatisfied desires, I find the reasoning compulsory, inevitable. A confusion, an unanswered problem, a thwarted desire, in order to be such, holds in solution its own clarification, answer, or satisfaction, as the case may be. All this Professor Royce has expounded at some length, far more convincingly than I can, and I need not repeat it. But what I miss is, his promised *proof* that there is a real being worthy of the exalted name of GOD.

The difficulty I experience with his view may be stated in the form of a question:— How does he find out what facts, what problems, confront the Absolute?

To this question, the answer is not far to seek. Professor Royce accepts such facts and problems at the hands of current belief and science. That we all do the same, and must do so, is of course true, as a few words would make clear. But the important question, to be considered presently, is: Upon how many facts, thus attained, does philosophy, or rather Professor Royce's philosophy, set its stamp of approval? At the present moment, my words, possibly a few thoughts and problems suggested by them, and what we feel and see, are the only facts directly present to us; and, as you will readily admit, the other moments of our lives are just about as meagerly supplied with directly verified data. That vast sum-totals of facts have existed in past ages, and that others are existing now in the distant stretches of space, we all confidently believe; but, observe, only on *indirect* evidence. We get at absent facts by means of memory, sympathetic thinking of the thoughts of others, and reasoning founded on these two, combined with personal observation. The existence of such a fact as the Crocker Building, we now get at by memory; we get to know the experiences and beliefs of our friends, acquaintances, and scientific co-workers who verify our results, largely by sympathetic thought; while the scientific

historian reconstructs the Napoleonic period by very elaborate processes of reasoning and observation. And so we project idea after idea out of the present into the past, the distant, and the future, holding each to be a fact there, gradually peopling our previously empty world, and extending its bounds in thought till we come to believe in the complicated immensity of the universe of reality.

But observe, once more, that all except the meagre present is reached indirectly, *i. e.*, by means of inference. These inferences no doubt are *justifiable*, as we all most certainly believe; but my present point is, that they must be *justified;* that nothing can be held to be a part of the inclusive experience of the Absolute, till its existence is fully proven. Now, it is not the business of philosophy to prove the existence of individual facts; but, on the other hand, it *is* the business of philosophy to establish the truth of such *principles* as are indispensable for proving the existence of any and every individual fact not directly observed. Further, it is a commonplace of philosophy, that the principle of Causality is the supreme principle of the kind just described. Accordingly, wherever Professor Royce holds this principle to have validity, just there, and nowhere else, can he seek for the items of fact to set in the experience of the Absolute. Now, as readers of his second book, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, will remember, he holds that the principle of Causality is true in the outer world of our senses and of natural science, but is not true in the world of inner experiences, nor in inferences from the former to the latter and *vice versa*; and, so far as I know, he nowhere offers any other principle to *justify* such inferences, though he has a theory of their origin.

Let us now remind ourselves, once again, that our fellow-beings' inner experiences are among the facts never directly presented to us. When a man speaks to us, we hear his words, but merely infer his thoughts; when another cries out or writhes in pain, we hear the cry or see the writhing, but the pain, once more, is only inferred. And in like manner, aspiration, hope, doubt, despair,— the whole of the inner life of others, is reached indirectly only. Add to this, that his inner life completely exhausts and fathoms what we mean by our fellow-being, and we see that in failing to offer any principle that justifies inferences from observed facts to inner experiences Professor Royce fails to give any philosophic reason for belief in the existence of our fellow-beings. Let us suppose, now,

that the outer or physical universe, in which according to Professor Royce the principle of Causality does obtain—and whose facts are therefore attainable—let us suppose, for argument's sake, that its reality is not destroyed by the philosophic annihilation of other beings. What sum-total of firmly established facts is left over to us? At best, the whole outer world and so much inner experience as the present moment affords. Just *now* you can at the utmost assert —and all assertion is in some now—that Reality is composed of so much outer fact as science establishes, *plus* your present feelings, thoughts, puzzles, and aspirations.

And now let us consider the experience-contents of that sort of Absolute whose existence Professor Royce has *proved.* These consist, once more, of the outer world of science, of your present feelings, thoughts, puzzles, and aspirations, and, in addition, of the answers to your present puzzles and the satisfaction of your present aspirations. Now, a being with such an experience, as I should maintain, is not deeply spiritual. His experience consists of a vast physical universe with its myriads of mechanically whirling atoms, and, tucked away in one corner, the least bit of spiritual life, which, to be sure, has its questions answered and its desires gratified.

My only contention, observe, is that unless the gaps I have pointed out in Professor Royce's argument are filled, we are left with the slightly spiritual Ultimate Being I have just described. I maintain that Professor Royce's two books and his address of to-night do not justify us in introducing any more spirituality into the experience of the Inclusive Self. I do not maintain, of course, that he has in reserve no considerations capable of establishing a larger measure of spirituality; still less do I contend that no such considerations exist. On the contrary, I very firmly believe that there are facts at our disposal which will give philosophical justification for the assertion of the completest conceivable spirituality of the Ultimate Being, conceived of in the terms so clearly outlined in this evening's address.

Passing now to my second point, let us recall what Professor Royce said about the attributes of the Supreme Being; or, rather, let us recollect two of those attributes. I refer to Absoluteness and Goodness. In calling God the Absolute, we mean that he is quite *complete*—is a rounded whole; has, so to speak, no ragged edges,

no internal gaps. Sleep is a chasm in each day of *our* lives; while, from time to time, we have gaps of unconsciousness. Again, if we try to tear our lives from their setting in the world, we find that the line that bounds them is jagged and broken throughout. At times one feels that his life is exhaustively summed up in relations to other lives, and that what is left over when those bonds are snapped is too poor to be worth saving. Not so the Absolute. His life is completely finished, rounded and whole, and has no relations to any beyond. And now I will ask you to look at this attribute of Absoluteness or Completeness under the conception of time. For, temporally speaking, Completeness is eternal existence.

According to Professor Royce, as readers of his books will readily remember, the whole universe is present to the Supreme Being in one moment, and that moment is eternal. There is for the Supreme Being nothing whatever in the least analogous to what we call the past and the future. What occurred yesterday in your experience or in mine, what will occur to-morrow for us, or for any other human being whatever, is just as really, vitally, vividly, distinctly present to God as the gentlemen now sitting on this platform are to you at the present moment. And in all eternity this is, for God, true of all facts, whether called by *us* past, present, or future. It is as if all of us were cylinders, with their ends removed, moving through the waters of some placid lake. To the cylinders the *water* seems to move. What has passed is a memory; what is to come is doubtful. But the lake knows that all the water is equally real, and that, in fact, it is quiet, immovable, unruffled. Speaking technically, time is no reality; things *seem* past and future, and, in a sense, non-existent to us, but in fact they are just as genuinely real as the present is. Is Julius Cæsar dead and turned to clay? No doubt he is. But in reality he is also alive, he is conquering Spain, Gaul, Greece, and Egypt. He is leading the Roman legions into Britain, and dominating the envious Senate, just as truly as he is dead and turned to clay,—just as truly as you hear the words I am now speaking. Every reality is eternally real; pastness and futurity are merely illusions. You look into a stereoscope, and two flat cards variously shaded appear to be a large city spread out before your eyes. But that seeming city is not a *fact*. The two cards variously shaded are the reality. Babylon and Tyre, on the other hand, seem unreal to us; but *those* cities are real, and the throb of life

pulses through the veins of their citizens, even now, just as truly and strongly as it does through yours. I do not know how many of you have caught this view,—this idea of the eternal existence of everything real; but those of you who have, will bear me out that it is perfectly comprehensible, realizable, natural. The illusory unreality of pastness and futurity is an entirely reasonable doctrine; and I have dwelt on it only in order to contrast with it another sense of the word Eternal, also necessary if it is to be synonymous with Completeness, as maintained by Professor Royce. For there are two senses essential to the notion of Eternity, if it is to be synonymous with the notion of Completeness. In the sense already developed, it contradicts the notion of time in asserting that past or future experience is as real as present experience. In the second sense, it also contradicts the notion of time, in a way that will presently appear.

And now, if you will kindly give me your very sharp attention for a minute or two, I will try to develop this second sense quite plainly. I will do so by showing that, though past and future coexist, time has not been entirely done away with; the full meaning of Eternity, and therefore of Completeness, has not been attained. Even if past and future are equally real with the present and with each other, does it follow that there is no *distinction* between the past and the future? Does it follow that what we call the completion of a process is in *no* wise different from what we call its beginning? To put it somewhat graphically, could we begin at the end of a symphony, play the notes backwards, and get the same results as if we had begun at the beginning and played them forwards? Of course, the same facts would be there in the former case as in the latter, and we have already maintained that first and last and intermediate notes are to be coexistent. The first do not cease to exist, the next come into existence, ceasing in turn, and giving place to those that follow. They all exist at once; that has been admitted. The question I am now considering is the possibility of reversing any significant process without utterly destroying its significance; or, if reversing be too strong a word, the possibility of conceiving any whole of facts that appear to us as a succession quite indifferently as regards their order,—backwards quite as truly as forwards. Ordinarily, you see, we view the end as if it were the product of the beginning. The facts are looked upon as having a true order, from A to Z, say,

while the order from Z to A is declared unreal. Now, if we are right in maintaining that in some true sense the movement of things is in one direction, we have not done away with time entirely. The full meaning of Eternity is not attained. We still admit a difference between past and future. This difference is not one of *existence;* it is not that the past no longer *is*, and the future *is not* yet. Both past and future most really *are;* and yet, if our ordinary view is correct, the past is not the *same* as the future.

But suppose our ordinary view is *not* correct; what is the penalty for its incorrectness? I answer, in a word, it is death to all significance. The world, as a whole, is emptied of meaning:—Art is no longer real; morality ceases to be. For morality is victory achieved over temptation, and not temptation following upon victory. Temptation does succeed to victory in our experience, but the growth of temptation out of victory is not morality. The very life of morality is toil, struggle, *achievement;* we must *overcome* difficulties; the stream of morality must rise higher than its source. Take progress away, and you destroy morality. This, after all, is very obvious, nor would I be understood to say that Professor Royce denies this. On the contrary, he is at considerable pains to assert and illustrate it. He maintains that the Supreme Being is moral for the very reason that he hates and conquers immorality. He maintains that evolution gives a truer view of reality than does descriptive science, for the reason that evolution asserts progress, apprehends the significance of progress, reads the beginning in the light of the end, would, as a completed doctrine (which it is not), uphold what Mr. JOHN FISKE might call Cosmic Morality. But I venture to suggest that Goodness *requires* progress, and of the whole. That there is progress in *bits* of the Inclusive Self, Professor Royce does maintain; but if the Inclusive Self is to be moral, he must be in his *totality* progressive. The *whole* of him must advance without limitation towards some goal. If the universe is moral, it points in one direction; it has grown from a germ, budded out more and more widely, grown ever higher, at no time fully satisfied, ever striving onwards and upwards. But once admit movement in one direction, and all the antinomies—all the irreducible contradictions—of time are upon us with undiminished force. The arbitrariness inherent in both beginning and end is not diminished by their coexistence. No real beginning or end can be rationally estab-

lished; for whatever one we may hit upon as real, the problem *Why this rather than another?* must always, as Lord Bacon would say, be left abrupt.

What I venture to suggest, as you will now see, is that the attribute of Goodness demands progress, growth; and that progress, even though past and future coexist, comes into collision with Completeness, because of the inherent arbitrariness of beginning and ending, of germ and fruition. If this position is well taken, either one or the other attribute, either Goodness or Completeness, as Professor Royce conceives Completeness, must be abandoned. I am far from saying that there is no possible way of so conceiving Completeness that it shall be in harmony with Goodness; nor would I even imply that Professor Royce may not have in reserve some mode of proving the existence of a Complete Reality that would avoid a conflict between its Completeness and its Goodness. What I halt at, is simply the mode of proof that he has actually employed to-night, as well as in his book. Upon that, it certainly seems to me that the Completeness established is quite destitute of consistency with Goodness.

REMARKS ON THE ADDRESS, AND ON ITS SUBJECT, BY PROFESSOR JOSEPH LE CONTE.

I CAN only admire, not criticise, the subtle method of Professor ROYCE in reaching the conclusion of the Personal Existence of God. I have my own way of reaching the same conclusion, but in comparison it is a rough and ready way. His is from the point of view of the philosopher; mine, from that of the scientist. I am not saying that his is not the best and most satisfactory, but only that it is a different way. He has given you his; I now give you, very briefly, mine—as I have been accustomed to give it.

Suppose, then, I could remove the brain-cap of one of you, and expose the brain in active work,—as it doubtless is at this moment. Suppose, further, that my senses were absolutely perfect, so that I could see everything that was going on there. What would I see? Only decompositions and recompositions, molecular agitations and vibrations; in a word, *physical* phenomena, and nothing else. There is absolutely nothing else there to see. But *you*, the subject

of this experiment, what do *you* perceive? You see nothing of all this; you perceive an entirely different set of phenomena, viz., consciousness,—thought, emotion, will; *psychical* phenomena; in a word, a self, a *person*. From the *outside* we see only physical, from the *inside* only psychical phenomena.

Now, take external Nature—the Cosmos—instead of the brain. The observer from the outside sees, and can see, only physical phenomena; there is absolutely nothing else there to see. But must there not be in this case also, on *the other side*, psychical phenomena —consciousness, thought, emotion, will?—in a word, a Self, a Person? There is only one place in the whole world where we can get behind physical phenomena—behind the veil of matter; viz., in our own brain; and we find there—a self, a person. Is it not reasonable to think that if we could get behind the veil of Nature we should find the same, *i. e.*, a Person? But if so, we must conclude, an Infinite Person, and therefore the only Complete Personality that exists. Perfect personality is not only self-conscious but *self-existent*. *Our* personalities are self-conscious, indeed, but not self-existent. They are only imperfect images and, as it were, separated fragments of the Infinite Personality—GOD.

So much for my habitual preference, as contrasted with Professor Royce's, in the matter of proving God to exist; and there seem to be differences between us on other matters too, though perhaps these are more apparent than real.

For instance: Professor Royce accounts it best to state the essential nature of God in terms of Omniscience, and with this my customary preference of thinking would hardly seem to accord. For Professor Royce, God is *Thought;* conscious, indeed, but passive, powerless, passionless Thought; omniscience alone is fundamental, and all else flows from that. And yet I cannot but think that the difference between us here is more apparent than real. For example, when he denies God *power*, is it not a power like that of man that he is talking about?—that is, an action or energy going out and terminating on something external and foreign? God's power, I grant, is not like that; for there is nothing external or foreign to Him. And when he denies Him *love*, at least as a fundamental and essential quality, is it not the human form of love that he is thinking of?—that which stirs the human blood, and

agitates the human heart? Doubtless the Infinite Benevolence of God is different from that; but is there not a similar difference in the matter of *thought* also? Is it not equally true that "*His thoughts are not as our thoughts*"? All we can say is, that there is in God something which *corresponds* to all these things in man. The formula of St. John, *God is Love*, or the popular formula *God is Power*, is as true as the philosophic formula *God is Thought.* All of these are truths, but partial truths. A more fundamental formula than either is the formula of the Divine Master, *God is Spirit.* For Spirit is essential Life, and essential Energy, and essential Love, and essential Thought; in a word, essential Person.

Again, on the great question of Evil,—its nature, its origin, its reason,—a question inseparably connected with the conception of God,—there are apparent differences between Professor Royce and myself; and yet these, too, may be less than they seem. In a general way, certainly, I agree with his explanation of the dark enigma of Evil. Evil cannot be the true meaning and real outcome of the universe; on the contrary, it is the means, the necessary means, of the highest good; and thus it is, in a legitimate sense, nothing but *good in disguise.* This is a necessary postulate of our moral nature. Professor Royce has admirably shown this, in his chapter entitled "The World of the Postulates." Our moral and religious nature is just as fundamental and essential as our scientific and rational nature. As science is not simply passionless acquisition of knowledge, but also *enthusiasm for truth*, so morality is not passionless rules of best conduct, but impassioned *love of righteousness.* And this last is what we call Religion; for religion is morality touched and vivified with noble emotion. Now, the necessary postulate of science, without which scientific activity would be impossible, is a Rational Order of the universe; and, similarly, the necessary postulate of religion, without which religious activity would be impossible, is a Moral Order of the universe. As science postulates the final triumph of reason, so religion must postulate the final triumph of righteousness. Science believes in the Rational Order, or in law, in spite of apparent confusion; she knows that disorder is only apparent, only the result of ignorance; and her mission is, to show this by reducing all appearances, all phenomena, to law. So also Religion is right in her unshakable belief in the Moral Order, in

spite of apparent disorder or evil; she knows that evil is only apparent, the result of our ignorance and our weakness; and her mission is, to show this by helping on the triumph of moral order over disorder. We may, if we like,—as many indeed do,—reject the faith in the *Infinite Goodness*, and thereby paralyze our religious activity; but then, to be consistent, we must also reject the faith in the *Infinite Reason*, and thereby paralyze our scientific activity.

So much for a rational justification of the indestructible faith Religion has in the Infinite Righteousness, even in the presence of abounding evil. It is founded on the same ground as our indestructible faith in the Reign of Law in the natural world, and is just as reasonable. Why is it, then, it may be asked, that every one is willing to admit the postulate of science, while so many doubt that of religion. I answer: Partly because of the feebleness of our moral life in comparison with our physical life; but mainly because the steady advance of science, with its progressive conquest of chaos, and its extension of the domain of order and law, is a continual verification of the postulate of science, and justification of our faith therein; while, on the contrary, the progress of morality and religion is uncertain and often unrecognized, the increase of righteousness and decrease of evil doubtful and even denied. In the presence of such uncertainty, our faith is often sorely tried. We cry out for some explanation—for some philosophy which shall show us *how* evil is consistent with the Infinite Goodness. We know it *is*, for that is a necessary postulate. But—*How?*

In regard to moral evil, or sin,—which, I need not say, is the really dreadful form,—Professor Royce's explanation (which, by the way, is the same as that given in the last chapter of my book entitled *Evolution and Religious Thought*) is, I believe, the true one. It is, that the existence or at least the possibility of what we call Evil is the necessary condition of a moral being like that of man. There are some things which God himself cannot do, viz., such things as are contrary to his essential nature, and such things as are a contradiction in terms and therefore absurd and unthinkable. Such a thing would be *a moral being without freedom to choose right or wrong*. God could not make man eternally and of necessity sinless, for then he would not be man at all. To make him incapable of sin would be to make him also incapable of virtue, of righteousness, of Holiness; for he must acquire these for himself by free choice, by

struggle and conquest. Professor Royce brings this out admirably; but it seems to me this view is singularly emphasized by the evolutional account of the origin of man. For if humanity gradually emerged out of animality, then it is evident that man's higher nature—his distinctive *humanity*—was at first very feeble, and that the whole mission of man is the progressive conquest of the animal by the distinctively *human* nature. It has been a long and hard struggle, and even yet, as we all know and feel, is far from complete.

As already said, then, I believe Professor Royce gives a true answer so far as moral evil is concerned, although he misses the emphasis which evolution gives that view. But other evil—physical evil—he gives up, in his book, in despair. And yet, from the point of view of evolution, this is exactly the form of evil that is most explicable. For as moral evil is a necessity for a progressive *moral* being, just so, and far more obviously, is physical evil a necessity for a progressive *rational* being. As the one form of evil is closely connected with our *moral* nature, so is the other indissolubly connected with our *intellectual* nature. Let me explain: The necessary condition of *any* evolution is a struggle with an apparently inimical environment. For example, the end and goal, the significance, the only *raison d' être*, of organic evolution in general, is the achievement of a rational being—man. The necessary condition of that achievement was the struggle with what seemed at every stage an inimical *i. e.* evil environment. But looking back over the course in the light of its glorious result—the achievement of man—we at once see that what seemed evil is really good. Now it is equally the same with *human* evolution in relation to physical evil. The goal and end, the *raison d' être*, of social progress is the achievement of the *ideal* man—perfect both in knowledge and in character. But the attainment of perfect knowledge is impossible except in the presence of what seems at every stage an evil environment, and by conflict with it. But, evidently, such an environment is evil only through ignorance of the laws of Nature. Evil is therefore the necessary spur that goads us on to increase of knowledge. We are but foolish little children, at school. Nature, our schoolmistress, chastises us relentlessly until we get our lessons. It is quite evident that without the scourge of Evil humanity would never have emerged out of animality, or, having emerged, would never have advanced beyond the lowest stages. It is also evident that perfect knowledge

of the laws of Nature would remove every physical evil. Looking back over the course, then, from the elevated plane of perfect knowledge, and perceiving that the attainment of that plane was conditioned on the existence of evil—on punishment for ignorance—shall we any longer call it evil? Is it not really good in disguise?

But it may be answered: "Yes, this is all true if we accept evolution by struggle as a necessary process; but why may not the same result have been attained in some less expensive and distressing way?" I answer: Because, as already seen, no other process is conceivable that would result in a moral being, and achievement of such a being is the purpose of all evolution. One law, one process, one meaning and purpose, runs through all evolution, and that purpose is only revealed at the end. As in biology the laws of *form and structure* are best studied in the lowest organisms, where these are simplest, but those of *function* are studied best in the highest organisms, because only there clearly expressed, just so the laws of *process* in evolution are best understood in its lower and simpler stages, but the *end*, the *purpose and meaning* of the whole process from the beginning, is not fully declared *until* the end. That end is the achievement of a moral being; and a moral being without struggle with evil is impossible because a contradiction in terms, and the same law must run throughout.

Finally, the true conception of God, as this appears to me, and especially in his relation to us, is closely bound up with the absorbing question of Immortality. And on this, I surmise that Professor Royce and I differ; though I am less sure that we do, judging by his hints of what is coming in his more esoteric lectures next week. But in his book he gives up the question of Immortality as insoluble by philosophy. Well,—perhaps it is; but upon this question, as upon that of Evil, I think a great light is thrown by the evolutional view of the origin of man.

Until recently, man's mind was studied wholly apart from mind as appearing in all the rest of Nature. Thus an elaborate system of philosophy was built up without the slightest reference to the psychic phenomena of animals. The grounds of our belief in immortality were based largely on a supposed separateness of man from brutes—his complete uniqueness in the whole scheme of Nature. This is now no longer possible. If man came by a natural process

from the animal kingdom—his *spirit* from the *anima* of animals—then the psychical phenomena of man should no longer be studied apart from those of animals nearest approaching him. As anatomy, physiology and embryology became scientific only by becoming comparative anatomy, comparative physiology and comparative embryology, so psychology can never become scientific and rational until it becomes comparative psychology—until the psychical phenomena of man are studied in comparison with those foreshadowings and beginnings of similar phenomena which we find in animals most nearly approaching him. Evolution is not only a scientific theory; it is not only a philosophy; it is a *great scientific method*, transforming every department of thought. Every subject must be studied anew in its light. The grounds of belief in immortality must be thus studied anew. It is well known that I have striven earnestly to make such a study. I know that many think that this method of study destroys those grounds completely and forever; but I also know that those who think so take a very superficial view of evolution and of man. At the risk of tediousness, I will bring forward, once more, an outline of my view, but in a different way, which I hope will be readily understood by those who have followed my previous writings.

I assume, then, the immanence of Deity in Nature. Furthermore, as you already know, I regard *physical* and *chemical* forces, or the forces of dead Nature, as a portion of the omnipresent Divine Energy in *a diffused, unindividuated state*, and therefore *not self-active* but having its phenomena determined directly by the Divine Energy. Individuation of energy, or self-activity, begins, as I suppose, with Life, and proceeds, *pari passu* with organization of matter, to complete itself as a Moral Person in man. Mr. UPTON,[1] in his Hibbert Lectures, given in 1893, takes a similar view, except that he makes all force—even physical force—in some degree self-active; and thence it goes on with increasing individuation and self-activity to completion in man,—as in my view. The difference is unimportant. To use his mode of expression, God may be conceived as self-sundering his Energy, and setting over against himself a part as Nature. A part of this part, by a process of evolution, individuates itself more and more, and finally completes its individua-

[1] C. B. UPTON: *Bases of Religious Belief*. Hibbert Lectures for 1893. London: Williams and Norgate, 1894.

tion and self-activity in the soul of man. On this view, spirit—which is a spark of Divine Energy—is a potentiality in dead Nature, a germ in plants, a quickened embryo in animals, and comes to birth into a higher world of spirit-life in man. Self-consciousness—from which flows all that is distinctive of man—is the sign of birth into the spiritual world. Thus an effluence from the Divine Person flows downward into Nature to rise again by evolution to recognition of, and communion with, its own Source.

Now observe, and this is the main point: The sole purpose of this self-sundering of the Divine Energy is thereby to have something to contemplate. And the sole purpose of this progressive individuation of the Divine Energy by evolution is finally to have, in man, something not only to contemplate but also to love and to be loved by, and, in the ideal man, to love and to be loved by supremely. Thus God is not only necessary to us—but we also to Him. This part of God, self-separated and, as it were, set over against himself, and including every visible manifestation or revelation of himself, may well be called a Second Person of the Godhead which by eternal generation develops into sons in man, and finally into fulness of godhead in the ideal man—the Divine Man—as His well-beloved Son. By this view, there is a new significance in Nature. Nature is the womb *in* which, and evolution the process *by* which, are generated sons of God. Now,—do you not see?—*without immortality, this whole purpose is balked—the whole process of cosmic evolution is futile.* Shall God be so long and at so great pains to achieve a *spirit*, capable of communing with Him, and then allow it to lapse again into nothingness?

CONCLUDING COMMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT,[1] PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON.

A TASK now falls to me, ladies and gentlemen, and fellow-members of the Union, which for its difficulty I would gladly decline, but which the Union will expect me at least to undertake. As younger students of philosophy, you my associates in the Union have called upon me to be your elder adviser; and on such an occasion as the present, which marks an epoch in your philosophical intercourse, you naturally look for me to put at your service any larger experience than your own that I may chance to possess in these fields, however insufficient it may prove when compared with the wide and deep reaches over which your speakers have carried you to-night.

The impressive close of the argument by the venerated man who has but just now ceased addressing you, is such as must awaken a deep response in every human heart not touched with apathy. It is one of those rare outbreaks of accumulated expectation, hope, and longing, into which, at the contemplation of the reason that is apparently struggling to get a footing in the world, human nature pours forth all its commingled doubt and faith. Such is the impassioned force of the argument from analogy, fortified, as it can be in these later days, by the doctrine of evolution. As Dr. LeConte has so eloquently and so forcibly shown, it does seem clear, through the long and agonizing path of evolution,—through struggle, and death, and survival,—that a rational, a moral, a *self-active* being is on the way toward realized existence; and it is true that, unless there is immortality awaiting it, this long and hard advance through Nature will be balked, and the whole process of evolution turn futile. As surely as there is a GOD,—as surely as eternal Reason and Justice is really at the heart of things,—it is certain, on this showing, that there is everlasting continuance for the Being, whatever it may be,

[1] Intended for delivery, but omitted on account of the late hour, and much enlarged for printing.

that forms the goal toward which evolution is pressing. If in very deed and truth there is a GOD, then that He "shall be so long and at so great pains to achieve a *spirit*, capable of communing with Him, and then allow it to lapse again into nothingness," is indeed incredible,—nay, it is impossible. And I doubt not that your undulled human hearts are so roused by the pathos-laden question with which Dr. Le Conte closed his reasonings—a question almost appalling in its outcry to Justice and to Pity—that it will require all your poise of philosophic will to bring yourselves back into the region of collected thought once more, and look the great problem of to-night steadily in the face again, with what Professor Royce has so fitly named "the calmer piety and gentleness of the serious reason."

For, in sober truth, the central awe of all such faith-compelling questions and analogies is just this: that we see the whole matter hangs on the slender thread of the query whether there is indeed a GOD. If there is, then immortality—yes, the immortality of each particular soul—is certain, by God's own immutable nature; and evolution, though it cannot ascertain it, nevertheless gives premonition of it then, and supports the real proof. But—*what if there is not?* The goal of evolution, as really verifiable by observation, is unfortunately not the preservation and completion of any *single* life, but only of a *kind*,—only of a human *family*,—ever made up, I beg you will notice, of new and wholly different members; a family, moreover, whose abode is only on this globe, and on this side of the grave, with no indication whatever that this its home will or can last forever;—nay, with all the *observed* indications steadily against this, and all the metaphysical necessities of physical existence declaring it impossible.

And so we are brought back, perhaps somewhat sternly, to the great questions of our meeting. We have had, from men of such eminence as to command serious attention everywhere, two high efforts to set forth the Conception of God and the proofs of his existence; and we have listened to a keen criticism of the first of them by the young but highly qualified pupil of all three of us,—a criticism fascinating by its speculative and almost dreamy subtlety. Now let us gather our calmness and our wits together as best we may, and, during the short period that is left to us, try to discover what abiding store we ought to set by these endeavors. What I

say must be, I fear, all too brief—too brief, that is, to do these arguments the justice that their intricacy, their remoteness, and the long and deep studies which have gone to their making, would in reason demand. But I will set before you as clearly as I can the main points on which I think the evening's discussion turns, adding such comments on the conceptions and arguments as my own way of thinking suggests.

I.

I am glad I can tell you, first of all, that there is a profound agreement among all the previous speakers in the important matter of the foundation on which all of this evening's reasonings rest;—yes, I am confident I may go farther, and say that we are *all* agreed upon this, and, further, as to the entire foundation of philosophy itself. I agree with all three of the previous speakers in the great tenet that evidently underlies their whole way of thinking. Our common philosophy is Idealism—that explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is Mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from Mind, from Consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to consciousness are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality and entire existence. But this great foundation-theme may be uttered in very various ways; and your other speakers, while they go on in agreement with each other very far, at length diverge; and they diverge at a very early point from the way of interpreting idealistic philosophy that I have myself learned to use.

And, if I am not unaccountably mistaken, you have already had presented here to-night two considerably varying *systems* of Idealism, albeit they still go on together far beyond the broad foundations of all idealistic philosophy. I say *two;* for, unless I mistake Professor Mezes, his view accords so nearly with that of Professor Royce as to permit us to neglect the differences and count the pair as one, setting it in contrast to the system of Dr. Le Conte. I speak here with hesitancy, however, and only with such positive evidences as our evening's work has afforded; and I accordingly leave room for the supposition that Professor Mezes covers in his thinking a further variety of Monistic Idealism, though holding with Professor Royce to Monism. For the Professor has

exercised such a fine reserve as to speak without much exposure of what his own philosophy is; he has confined himself very rigorously to a criticism of Professor Royce's apparatus of *argument*, and said next to nothing that tells what is his own conception of the Absolute Reality. Still, when he freely admits that Professor Royce's argument *inevitably* proves an Ultimate Reality, and employs as an engine of criticism the premise that the inner *life* of our fellow-men —their aggregate of inner experiences, their feelings, thoughts, puzzles, aspirations; in short, their successive or simultaneous *states* of mind — "exhausts and fathoms what we mean by our fellow-being," we naturally put this and that together, and conclude that he, too, holds the central doctrine of his latest teacher — the doctrine that all existence is summed and resumed into the enfolding consciousness of one single Inclusive Self; that human selves, and other selves, if others there be, are not selves in at all the same sense that the Inclusive Self is, nor in the meaning that moral common-sense attaches to the word. *They* are mutually exclusive groups of empirical *feelings* — merely summaries, more or less partial and fragmentary, of separate items of experience, at best only partially organized. It is *He* that gives vital unity and real life to all, He alone that embraces all, penetrates and pervades all, and is genuinely organic; He alone is integral and one. Yet He is just as unquestionably all and many; his unity is not in the least excludent, not in the least repellent, but, on the contrary, is infinitely inclusive, absolutely *all*-embracing. Literally, "His tender mercies are over *all* his works;" and whatever is at all, is his work, his act, *directly*. His being encompasses alike perfection and imperfection, evil and good, joy and anguish, the just and the unjust. His is the Harmony of discords actually present, but also actually dissolved; the Peace of conflicts at once raging and stilled; the Love that bears in the bosom of its utterly infinite benignity even malice itself, and atones for it with infinite Pity and by infinite Benevolence; his, finally, is the Eternal Penitence that repents of his sin in its very act, — nay, in its very germination, — and provides the Expiation as the very condition on which alone his offence is possible and actual. Such is the conception of absolute reality that has been set forth to us this evening with such resources of subtlety, of acuteness, of comprehensiveness, of possessions in weighty material, of almost boundlessly flexible expression; and we

are asked to receive it as the philosophic account, the only account genuine and authentic, of the Conception of God. God, we are told, is that one and sole Absolute Experience, the utter union of Absolute Thought and Absolute Perception, of ideal and fact, in which all relative and partial experiences are directly taken up and included, though indeed reduced and dissolved, and to be some part of which is all that existence or reality means, or can mean, for anything else that claims to be, whether it be called material or mental. And that the God thus conceived is the only authentic God of philosophy is declared on the ground — or, rather, on the claim — that upon this conception alone can God be proved real. The conception — so our chief speaker's implication runs — may indeed be far different from what under an experience less organized than the philosophic, less brought to coherence, we had fancied the name God to mean; but what that name does mean must be exactly this, no more and no less: — *That which rigorous thought, penetrating to its inevitable and final implications, can and does make out to be not merely Idea but Reality.* Our master-question about it, Professor Royce would say, must not be whether we like it, nor whether it agrees with something we had supposed, but whether it is demonstrably true, and alone so demonstrable.

With this last statement every mind sufficiently disciplined in philosophy to appreciate its true nature will of course agree. The philosophical conception of *anything* is the conception of it that thought attains when it takes utter counsel of its own utmost deep. For philosophy, accordingly, utter ideality and utter reality are reciprocal conceptions; complete and final agreement with thought, as thought sees itself *whole*, is the only test of reality, and, reciprocally, that alone is sanely and soundly ideal which can be *proved*, — that is, to the total insight turns real. But in another and still more important reference, the definitive question is still to come; in fact, arises directly out of that great first question about every conception. That first, controlling question undoubtedly is: Can we prove the conception *real*, and thus alone show it is the *right* conception? but the all-important question beyond will be: Are we now at length certain that we take the *ideal* view of the conception? — that the light in which we see it is indeed the light of the *whole*, the final unit-vision under which alone our ideal can turn real? Not until we are able to aver securely that this is so, have we a right to

assert the conception as philosophic, and the only philosophic conception. Above all must they who have come to the insight that philosophy means Idealism — that mind is the measure of all things, and *complete* ideality the only sure sign of reality — hold themselves rigorously to this criterion.

II.

And, now, what I have to say about the conception of God that we have had so imposingly set forth this evening, — a conception in which all the previous speakers, varying as they do, seem largely to agree, — what I have to say, at a stroke, is this: It does not seem to me to meet this criterion. As professed idealists, its advocates have come short of their calling. The doctrine is not idealistic *enough*. No doubt it has long gone by the name of Absolute Idealism, the name conferred upon it by Hegel, the weighty and justly celebrated thinker who first gave it a well-organized exposition. But I venture to contest the propriety of the name, and maintain, rather, that an idealism of this character is not Absolute Idealism at all; that its exact fault is, not waiting for thought to take the fruitful roundness of its entire Ideal before declaring its equivalence to the Real.

In short, greatly as I admire all that has been said here to-night, gladly and gratefully as I recognize the genuinely philosophic temper and the authentic philosophic place it all most certainly has, I am still moved to say that my honored colleagues, in this their common underlying conception, have to my mind all "missed the mark and come short of the glory of God." They have not seized nor expressed the *Ideal of the Reason*. I agree with them, that this Ideal is the sole measure and the certain sign of what reality is; I agree with Professor Royce, and with Hegel before him, that reality, in its turn, must be the test of the genuine Ideal, — that "*whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real;*" I agree that the Ideal is *ipso facto* the Real; but I insist that the vital question is, *Have we stated the Ideal?* I insist, further, that the conception of God expounded with such lucid fulness by Professor Royce, and in various implications accepted by Professor Mezes and Dr. Le Conte, in its fundamental aspect at least, — that of the immanence of God in the world, — I insist that this falls fatally short of our rational Ideal, and is therefore, happily, only so far real as its limitations permit it

to be; for, by every idealist of course, *some* truth, *some* reality, must be accorded to all genuine thought,— it is all true, all real, *as far as it goes*. But the great concern is, just how far such a thought as has been offered us this evening does go on the lofty way to the Ideal; just what *relative* truth, what measure of *partial* reality, we shall assign it. And so I may restate my comment on this conception of God by saying that, while on the one hand I see it come as far short of God's verity and God's existence as earth comes short of Heaven, as the creation comes short of the Creator, nevertheless, on the other hand, when expressed as Professor Royce expresses it, it does attain to the real nature of the real *creation*, and, when expressed as Dr. Le Conte would express it, to the real nature of *the phenomenal aspect* in the real creation, besides.

In other words, the conception is a philosophical and rea account of the nature of an *isolated human being*, the numerical unit in the created universe, viewed as he appears in what has well been called his *natural* aspect; that is, as the organizing subject of a *natural-scientific* experience, characterized by fragmentariness that is forever being tentatively overcome and *enwholed*,—if I may coin a word to match the excellent German one *ergänzt*. The *supernatural* (that is to say, the *completely* rational) aspect of this being is here left out,—the aspect under which it is seen as the subject and coöperating organic cause of a moral *i. e.* completely rational or *metaphysical* experience; in which context the word Experience has suddenly changed its meaning *in kind*,[1] and the human consciousness is seen to have, in its total unity, the all-encompassing form of a CONSCIENCE,—that Complete Reason, of a truly infinite sphere, in which the primal self-consciousness of the being actively posits (and so makes attainable in *experience*, by reflective discovery) the Ideal which is its real self; sees itself as indeed a *person*—a self-active member of a manifold *system* of persons, all alike self-active in the inclusive unit of their being; all independent *centres of origination*, so far as *efficient* causation is concerned; all moving from "within," *i. e.*, from *thought*, and *harmonized* (not consolidated or mechanized) in a society of accordant free-agents, by the operation of what

[1] The principle here involved is a signal one in language, of vast significance philologically as well as philosophically, and deserves a study which it has never received. By it, words have a power of coming to mean the very opposite of what they were first used to denote. I believe it to be a fundamental law of vocabulary, imbedded in the very nature of language.

has been called, since Aristotle, *final* causation — the attraction of an Ideal Vision, the vision of that *City of God* which they constitute, and in which, reciprocally, they have their being; a vision immortalized by Dante as the *Vision Beatific*, by which no one is driven, but by which, to borrow the meaning of Goethe's famous line, the Eternal, womanlike, *draws* us onward,—

"*Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan.*"

Now, it is greatly worth your notice, that this ideal is not merely the passing vision or phrased fancy of some poet, nor of some group of human beings in an accidental mood of rapt imagination. On the contrary, it is a great and solid matter of fact, of no less compass of reality than to deserve and require the name of historic. It constitutes the key-conception of historical progress, and is the very life of that highest stage of this, which we designate and praise by the name of Western Civilization. It is at the mental summons of this ideal, that the West as a stadium in historic progress emerges from the hoary and impassive East; and the entire history of the West as divergent from the oriental spirit, as the scene of energetic human improvement, the scene of the victory of man over Nature and over his mere natural self, has its controlling and explanatory motive in this ideal alone. It is the very life-blood of that more vigorous moral order which is the manifest distinction of the West from the Orient. Personal responsibility and its correlate of free reality, or real freedom, are the whole foundation on which our enlightened civilization stands; and the voice of aspiring and successful man, as he lives and acts in Europe and in America, speaks ever more and more plainly the two magic words of enthusiasm and of stability—*Duty* and *Rights*. But these are really the signals of his citizenship in the ideal City of God. By them he proclaims: We are many, though indeed one; there is one *nature*, in manifold *persons;* personality alone is the measure, the sufficing establishment, of reality; *unconditional* reality alone is sufficient to the being of persons; for that alone is sufficient to a Moral Order, since moral order is possible for none but beings who are mutually responsible, and no beings can be responsible but those who *originate* their own acts. The entire political history of the West is a perpetual progress of struggle toward a system of law establishing liberty, and a liberty habilitated and filled with stable contents by law. The

emergence of western religion from oriental is similarly marked by the rise of this consciousness of individual and unconditional reality; we hear its presaging voice in that Hebrew prophet who declares: "*Ye* have said, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; but *I* say unto you, The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die." And the whole history of western theology, broken and incomplete and apparently tragic as it looks in the stage whither it has now at length come, is but the sincere and devout response of the human spirit to that inward ideal voice which announces the supremacy of reason and declares the unconditional reality and majesty of human nature as possessing it. Remove this supreme vision of this Republic of God, and western civilization,—nay, the whole of human history, which but culminates in it, is without intelligibility, having neither explanatory source nor goal. The central and real meaning of the Christian Religion, in which the self-consciousness of the West finds its true era, and which thus far has found no home except in the West, lies exactly in the faith that the Creator and the creature are reciprocally and equally real, not *identical;* that there is Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of men; that God recognizes *rights* in the creature and acknowledges *duties* toward him; and that men are accordingly both unreservedly and also indestructibly real,—both free and immortal. In that religion alone, I venture to assert, is the union of this triad of faiths to be found—faiths that, while three, are inseparably one, since neither can be stated except in terms of the others.

III.

This brings me to notice Professor Royce's interesting statement, marked by such candour, at the close of his address. He traces briefly the philosophical and theological genealogy of his view, and expresses his belief that this view is at heart the thought really intended by the faith of the fathers, and in due time formulated in the conception of God set forth by that greatest and most accredited Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas. This raises a nice question of exegesis, into which we cannot go with any fulness; but I will say, in passing, that if the statement is correct it only shows how far men's efforts to analyze and to formulate their highest and deepest practical insights fall short of the facts. It is

too true that much of the theology which professes and aims to be Christian, perhaps most of it, is in reality only the clothing or wrapping of Christianity in the pre-christian garments that have descended to the West as heirlooms from the East, or to the converted West as inheritances from its paganism. And we ought never to forget, therefore, that the real test of the *faith* of Christians is the implications in their religious *conduct*, and not at all their attempts, most likely unsuccessful, or at least unhappy, to analyze those implications and set them formally forth. In these attempts, transmitted beliefs quite below the Christian level, accepted and continued habits of ritual, and modes of feeling, that are nothing but survivals from the faiths which the new vision in Christ would forever put away, will inevitably play a large part. They have in fact played too large a part; a part so large, that the thought which Jesus imparted to mankind, and which has survived and flourished in spite of them, has been hidden quite from view in the wrappages compacted out of these pre-christian materials,—materials for the most part drawn from the Orient, whence they came from the religions and philosophies the very remotest from the Glad Tidings proclaimed by Christ. The spirit of all these was pantheistic, in the truly unchristian sense of that word: they were all preoccupied with the sovereign majesty of the Almighty, the mystery of the Impenetrable Source, and knew nothing of the infinite Graciousness or the everlasting Love. Their monotonous theme was the ineffable greatness of the Supreme Being and the utter littleness of man. Their tradition lay like a pall upon the human spirit,—nay, it lies upon it to this day,—and it smothers now, as it smothered then, the voice that answers there to the call of Jesus: *Son of Man, thou art the son of God. Rouse, heart! put on the garments of thy majesty, and realize thy equal, thy free, thy immortal membership in the Eternal Order!* Under the suffocating burden of the old things that should have passed away, the Christian consciousness forgets, at least in part, that all things are become new, and that man is risen from the dead.

It is not enough, then, for vindicating as Christian the conception of God offered us to-night, to show, for instance, that St. Thomas held it, if so be he did. In my own opinion, which you must take for what you will, he quite escapes its objectionable traits in some regards, and, were he here to explain himself, would disclaim

that interpretation of the Divine immanence in the world, and the reciprocal immanence of the world in God, which is characteristic of both the philosophies expounded here this evening. At the same time, his resting his own conception of God on the foundations of Aristotle, in the form which the great Greek succeeded in giving them,—a form which comes so short of Aristotle's greatest philosophical hints,—is occasion enough for thinkers like Hegel and our chief speaker to see a great resemblance between St. Thomas's view and theirs, and to overlook the contradiction between these aspects of his doctrine and those in which he reflects the Christian *aperçu* of genuine *creation*, and the consequent distinctness of the world from God. This *ought* to carry as a corollary the unqualified freedom of men in the City of God; and if St. Thomas fails to draw that corollary, the explanation must be sought in his prepossession by the older and pre-christian tradition. Aristotle, after justifiable criticism of Plato's course with the world of Ideas, unquestionably struck into a new path more thoroughly idealistic. Had he explored this far enough, and with close enough scrutiny, it must have led him beyond pantheistic idealism. But his doctrine that the criterion of deity is Omniscience, and that creation is simply the divine Still Vision — *θεωρία* — had its discussion arrested too early to admit of that achievement. The descent of the doctrine we have heard to-night is correctly traced from Aristotle's; and the doctrine does not get essentially beyond his, nor attain any distinction between the Creator and the creation sufficient to make out creation as *creation* at all.

I venture, you see, to dissent from Professor Royce when he claims that the conception of God—if God we may name it—afforded by his monistic idealism is distinctly theistic instead of pantheistic. Unquestionably, "it is not the conception of any *Unconscious* Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of an Universal *Substance*, in whose law our ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore." But we do not escape pantheism, and attain to theism, by the easy course of excluding the Unconscious, or the sole Substance, or an inscrutable Mystery, from the seat of the Absolute. We must go farther, and attain to the distinct reality, the full *otherhood*, of the creation; so that there shall be no confusion of the creature with the Creator, nor any interfusion of the Creator with the creature. Above all, we

must attain to the *moral* reality of the creature, which means his self-determining freedom not merely with reference to the world of sense, but also with reference to the Creator, and must therefore include his imperishable existence. The conception set forth to-night is certainly not that of an Unconscious; it is certainly not that of a mere Substance, to which our independence is subjected by sheer *physical* law; and it is certainly not a Mystery, in the sense of having a nature made up of traits wholly strange to our human cognition. For its essence is intelligence, and that omniscient; and hence its activity is not by transmission in space; and, finally, consciousness (or, as Professor Royce would apparently prefer to say, experience) is the very thing we are most experienced in, and so best acquainted with. But if the Infinite Self *includes* us all, and all our experiences, — sensations and sins, as well as the rest, — in the unity of one life, and includes us and them *directly;* if there is but one and the same final Self for us each and all; then, with a literalness indeed appalling, He is we, and we are He; nay, He is *I*, and *I* am He. And I think it will appear later, from the nature of the argument by which the Absolute Reality as Absolute Experience is reached, that the exact and direct way of stating the case is baldly: *I am He.* Now, if we read the conception in the first way, what becomes of our ethical independence? — what, of our *personal* reality, our righteous *i.e.* reasonable responsibility — responsibility to which we *ought* to be held? Is not He the sole real *agent?* Are we anything but the steadfast and changeless modes of his eternal thinking and perceiving? And if we read the conception in the second way, what becomes of *Him?* Then, surely, He is but another name for *me;* or, for any one of *you*, if you will. And how can there now be talk of a Moral Order, since there is but a single mind in the case? — we cannot legitimately call that mind a *person.* This vacancy of moral spirit in the Absolute Experience when read off from the end of the particular self, is what Professor Mezes pertinently strikes at in the first of his two points of criticism. Judging by *experience* alone, — the only point of view allotted by Professor Royce to the particular self, — judging merely by that, even when the experience is not direct and naive but comparatively organized, there is no *manifold* of selves; the finite self and the Infinite Self are but two names at the opposite poles of one lonely reality, which from its isolation is without possible moral significance.

This is doubtless a form of Idealism, for it states the Sole Reality in terms of a case of self-consciousness. When read off in the second way, it has been known in the history of philosophy as Solipsism.[1] To read it so is a harsh *reductio*, and rather unfair, as it can equally well be read in the other way. But that other way is the only way of escape from what our moral common-sense pronounces an intolerable absurdity. It bears the more dignified name of Monistic Idealism, or Idealistic Monism. If it is to be called a conception of God at all, it is the conception that presents God as *All and in all.* If the syllables *theism* can be affixed to it at all, they can only be so as part of the correcter name Pantheism. And so it seems to me that we can by no means assent when Professor Royce is disposed to insist that every ethical predicate which the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of his view. Where is the attribute of Grace, the source of that Life Eternal which alone knows God as *true* God, according to the Fourth Gospel, and which is freedom and immortality?

IV.

But, after all, what we have now for some minutes been saying amounts only to a contrast between different conceptions, and, at last, to a mere dispute over names. For philosophy, nothing is settled by settling any number of such things. The real question is, not whether we like or dislike the view before us; not whether it is Christian, or Thomistic, or Aristotelian; but simply, is it true? Professor Royce or Hegel might well turn upon us and ask: Is not God a name for the Ultimate Reality; and is it not demonstrable that the conception in question is the Ultimate Reality?—has it not been so demonstrated here and to-night? If this is the conception of the Absolute; if the Absolute must be the Omniscient, or, in other words, the Absolute Experience; has not this ideal of an Absolute Experience demonstrated itself to be *real*, by the clear showing that the supposition of its unreality, if affirmed *real*, commits us to its reality?—in short, that the real supposition of its unreality is a self-contradiction, and therefore impossible to be made?

To this, I will venture to say, as the first step in a reply: The

[1] From *solus ipse* (he himself alone), as the appropriate name for the theory that no being other than the thinker himself is real.

gist of the proof is the proposition, that a supposition which turns out to be impossible, or, in other words, which cannot really be made,—and hence never is *really* made,—affords no footing for a dispute; in such case, the opposite supposition is the only one tenable; we are in presence of a thought which our mind thinks in only one way, so that it cannot, and in reality *does* not, have any alternative or opposed thought at all. Such a thought is sometimes called *necessary;* and then the question will inevitably arise: Is the necessity *objective*, or is it merely *subjective?*—is such a thought the infallible witness of how *reality* has to *be*, or merely the unimpeachable witness of how the *thinker* has to *think?*—is it the sign of real *power* and genuine *knowledge*, or only of *limitation* and impenetrable *ignorance?* Here, the agnostic says it is the latter; the idealist, it is the former; and then the idealist undertakes to show, once more, that the supposition of thought being really limited and merely subjective is a flat self-contradiction, a proposition inevitably withdrawn in the very act of putting it. Then, to clinch the case finally, if his idealism is only of the type here emerging, he makes haste to add: *The fact is*, you see, *the thinker, to think at all, unavoidably asserts his thinking to be the exhaustive and all-embracing Reality, the Unconditioned that founds all conditions and imparts to things conditioned whatever reality they have, the Absolute in and through which things relative are really relative and relatively real, the immutable IS that is implied in every IF.* In short, reality turns out to be, exactly, the thinker *plus* presentation to the thinker; but, then, *and let us not forget it*, says this species of idealist, the thinker is reciprocally in immutable relation to this presentation, this detail, this fragmentary serial experience, these contents of sense. Thus we come to what Hegel called the Absolute Idea, as the absolute identity of Subject and Object, and the inseparable synthesis of the single Omniscient Mind, and its system of ideas, with its multiplicity of fragmentary *i. e.* sensible objects. And so the inevitable and everlasting truth is, not Agnosticism, but Absolute Idealism—the *ism* of the Absolute Idea; not the Unknowable Power, but the Self-knowing Mind who is at once one and all, the one Creator inclusive of the manifold creation.

And now let me continue such reply to this as I would make, by saying, next, how altogether acute and sound I think it is as a supplement to that phase of merely subjective idealism which now goes by

the name of Agnosticism—a supplement exposing the misnomer in virtue of which such agnostic idealism calls the Ultimate Reality the Unknowable, when yet it has no footing upon which to affirm the reality of the Inscrutable Power except the self-asserted authority of thought,—the "*inconceivability* of the opposite," as Mr. Spencer calls it,—by which he undoubtedly means, as we all see after his famous discussion of this Axiom with Mr. Mill, the *unthinkableness* of the opposite. The real meaning of the situation is,—as I believe Professor Royce to have shown unanswerably, and more lucidly than anybody else has ever shown it,—that the thinker is just unavoidably affirming his own all-conditioning reality as critic, as judge, as organizer, and as appraiser of values, in and over the field of his possible experience; the thinking self is seen to be the very condition of the possibility of even a fragmentary and seemingly incoherent or isolated experience, and the all-coherent unity of its inevitable reality passes ceaseless sentence on the mere phenomenon, declares the isolation and fragmentariness of this to be *only* apparent, supplants the incoherence of its immediate aspect by coherence that marches ever wider and higher, and so places the phenomenon in a real *system* that takes it out of the category of illusion by giving it a continual and endlessly ascending approximation to unqualified reality. Thus the Ultimate Reality actually posited and possibly positable by this procedure is, indeed, the Unconditioned Conditioner with reference to a possible *experience*, but is unwittingly miscalled when called the Unknowable, for it is in precise fact just the Self-knowing Knower,—the comprehensive and *active* Supreme Judgment in whose light alone the things of experience are as they are, since they are, *as they are*, only as they are presented at its bar and there get ever more and more *known*.

But now I ask you to notice, next, how this argument, unanswerable as it is for displacing the phantom of the Unknowable and discovering the idealism concealed in the philosophy that calls itself Agnosticism, nevertheless leaves us unrescued from an idealism still merely subjective, though subjective in another and a somewhat higher sense. I mean, that the argument, taken strictly *in itself*, supplies no reason for reading off the resulting Reality from the point of view of its infinite inclusiveness, its supposed universal Publicity, rather than from that of its finite exclusiveness, its undeniable particular Privacy. Here I agree, as I have already once indicated, with the

brunt of the first criticism made on the argument by Professor Mezes, and with his ground for the criticism: the argument is so cast and based, that no provision is made for a *public* of thinkers. In terms of this form of Idealism, no *manifold* of selves is provided for, or can be provided for; and this I would conclude, not only as Professor Mezes does, from the limited scope assigned by such idealism to the illative principle of Causality, but also from the incompatibility of Self-completeness, as the argument has to conceive of this, with the Goodness that it would fain vindicate for its Absolute. In short, I agree with Professor Mezes again, in his second criticism,—that the Self-completeness reached by the argument cannot amount to Goodness; though I may say, in passing, that I would not argue this on that fascinating but dreamy ground of the illusion declared inherent in time, the validity of which I very much doubt, but on the ground, once more, that the Self-completeness fails to provide for any manifold of selves either phenomenal or noumenal, and that the very meaning of Goodness, if Goodness is *moral*, depends on the reality of such a public of selves. While I should dissent, too, from Professor Mezes in his implication that absolute Goodness must have the trait of progressive improvement, I hold that its very meaning is lost unless there is a *society* of selves, to every one of whom Goodness, to be *Divine*, must allot an unconditional reality and maintain it with all the resources of infinite wisdom. I repeat: My point against Professor Royce's argument, and against the whole post-Kantian method of construing Idealism, summed up by Hegel and supplied by him with organizing logic, is this: By the argument, —as by many another form of stating Hegel's view,—reading off its result as Idealistic Monism (or Cosmic Theism, if that name be preferred) rather than as Solipsism, is left without logical justification. The preference for the more imposing reading, it seems to me, rests on no principle that the argument can furnish, but on an instinctive response to the warnings of moral common-sense. No matter what show of logic may drive us into the corner, our instinctive though unfathomed moral sense prohibits us from entertaining the theorem that the single self who conducts the argument, albeit he is its cause, its designer, its engineer, and its authority, is the sole and absolute Reality,—the only being in existence having such compass, such sovereign judgment, such self-determining causality. By spontaneous moral sense we doubtless believe, indeed, that we are each

entirely real, and a seat of inalienable rights; but this feeling of rights, though it be no more than a resentment at invasion, points directly to our belief that there are other beings as unreservedly real as we, with rights alike inalienable, who lay us under *duty*. Still, this uncomprehended instinct, ethical though it be, is not philosophy. Until we shall have learned how to give it in some way the authority of rational insight, we have no right to its effects when we are proceeding as thinkers; so far as we merely accept them, we do not *think*, we only feel.

Moved by this feeling, I say, we evade reading the result of this strange but striking dialectic as Solipsism, and, reading it from the reverse direction, we are fain to call it Cosmic Theism, under the silent assumption that its real contents are thus enlarged so that its embrace enfolds a universe of *minds*. And yet these so-called persons are rightly designated as only *finite* selves, mutually relative and phenomenal merely, since the reality of the unifying Organic Experience, as reached by the argument, requires that it shall be strictly one and indivisible, and that the supposed manifold of finite selves shall none of them have any real and changeless Self but this. One single Infinite Self, the identical and sole active centre of all these *quasi* selves, which are severally made up of specific groups of experiences more or less fragmentary, as the case may be, none of them with any inner organic unity of its *own*, — this is the theory; and even for this hollow shell of a personal and moral order we have no logical warrant, but have silently carried it in, over our argument, on the hint of moral sense that of course there are manifold centres (or, at any rate, manifold groups) of experience besides our own.

You will not, I hope, mistake my point. Like Professor Mezes, I am by no means saying that Professor Royce may not have somewhere in the rich and crowded arsenal of his thinking some other means of dealing with this question of the moral contents of the Absolute than the means presented in his address and his books; I am only saying that, so far as I can see, they are not provided anywhere in those; and especially not in the curiously impressive argument which he has now restated so lucidly for us, and which makes, one may say, the very life of the philosophy that he sets forth in print.

V.

And now let us look for a moment at the exact structure of that argument, and determine, if we can, precisely what it *does* make out. It may be put in two quite different ways, each brief and telling:—

(1) Our human *ignorance*, once confessed to be real, brings with it the reality of an Absolute Wisdom, since nothing less than that can possibly declare the ignorance *real;*—if the ignorance is *real*, then Omniscience is real.

(2) Our human *knowledge*, that indirect and organized experience which constitutes science, once admitted to be real, brings with it the reality of an Absolute Experience, since nothing less than that can possibly give sentence that one experience when compared with another is *really* fallacious, and this is exactly what science does;—if the "verdict of science" is *real*, then an Absolute Experience is real.

Now, the question that unavoidably arises, on exactly considering these two unusual reasonings, is this: *Whose* omniscience is it that judges the ignorance to be *real?*—*whose* absolute experience pronounces the less organized experience to be *really* fallacious? Well,—whosesoever it may be, it is certainly acting in and through *my* judgment, if I am the thinker of that argument; and in every case it is *I* who pronounce sentence on myself as really ignorant, or on my limited experience as fallacious. Yes,—and it is *I* who am the authority, and the only direct authority, for the connection put between the reality of the ignorance or of the fallacious experience on the one hand and the reality of the implicated omniscience on the other. We can perhaps see the case more clearly as it is, if we notice that the argument is cast in the form of a conditional syllogism, and runs in this wise: If my ignorance is *real*, then Omniscience is real; but my ignorance assuredly *is* real; and, therefore, so also is Omniscience. Now we ask, Who is the authority for the truth of the hypothetical major premise, and who is the authority for the truth of the categorical minor? *Who* conjoins, in that clutch of adamant, the reality of the ignorance with the reality of the omniscience? And *whose* omniscience makes the assertion valid that my ignorance *is* real? Is it not plain that *I* who am convincing myself by that syllogism am the sole authority for

both the premises? Though there were a myriad other omnisciences, they were of no avail to *me*, in the lone inward struggle to my own conviction through that argumentative form, unless they interpenetrated *my* judgment, and so became literally *mine;* or, if you prefer, unless my judgment vanished upward and was annulled into that Infinite Judgment. In using either premise as *proof* of the conclusion, and *a fortiori* in using both, I implicate myself in actual omniscience; I am verily guilty of that effrontery, if effrontery it really be. So must the great argument of this evening be read, it seems to me, or else it must mean nothing. In short, it is the introversive act of a reasoning being, discovering the real infinity that lies implicit in his seeming finitude. It is just *I* in my counter aspect — my reverse instead of my obverse, my other-side of infinite judicialness — coming forward to execute my proper act of infallible certainty. In such an "affectation of omniscience," unquestionably, does any and every least assumption of *certainty* in a judgment involve the thinker who makes it. This, to my mind, is the exact and whole meaning of Professor Royce's proof, unless we grant him the gratuitous assumption of an indefinite multitude of simultaneous or successive thinkers; and this, surely, we must not do when we are professing the philosophical temper of "proving all things."

There are those, no doubt, who would see in the phase that the argument is now made to assume, only a fine occasion for very knowing smiles. Chief among such, of course, are the agnostics in whose especial behoof the argument was contrived out of their own chosen materials, with the benign intent of disciplining them out of their scepticism, through chastening supplied by exposed self-contradiction. They are likely now saying to themselves: "The argument has proved a little too much; it reinforces our point very happily: he who would not cut the absurd figure of claiming omniscience must take the lowly rôle of our humble philosophy—the rôle of confessed ignorance and incurable uncertainty." But such is not the way in which I would read the lesson. Indeed, I hear in fancy, even now, the author of this singular argument saying to these jubilant doubters: "Well, — *confessed* ignorance, and uncertainty *really* incurable it is, is it? Here's at you again, then! And there you go round in the resistless dialectical whirligig once more! And so will your cheerfully obdurate negative send you whirling on perpet-

ually!" And in that saying I should quite agree, and I am sure that you would, also. It is not to the force or validity of the argument that I object, but to the misinterpretation of its scope. It is a clinching dialectical thumbscrew for the torture of agnostics; yes, with reference to them and their unavoidable stadium of thinking, it is even a step of value in the struggle of the soul toward a conviction of its really infinite powers and prospects; but I cannot see in it any full proof of the real being of God. Strictly construed, it is, as I have just endeavored to show, simply the vindication of that active sovereign judgment which is the light of every mind, which organizes even the most elementary perceptions, and which goes on in its ceaseless critical work of reorganization after reorganization, building all the successive stages of science, and finally mastering those ultimate implications of science that constitute the insights of philosophy. If I call that active all-illumining judgment,—which is indeed *my* life and my light, and which shines, and will shine, unto my perfect day, and is for me in all the emergencies of experience an ever-present and practicable omniscience, or fountain of unfailing certainty,—if I call that God, then assuredly I am employing the mood of the mystic; nay, I am taking literally what he took *only* mystically; I am translating into the cold forms of logic, where it becomes meaningless, what his religious poesy and enthusiasm made a practical medium of exalted religious feeling, though it was philosophically nought. This light within may indeed prove to be the *witness* of God in my being, but it is not God himself.

It is often said of the mystics, whether within Christendom or in Egypt or in the elder Orient which was and still remains their proper home, that they have the high religious merit of bringing God *near* to us,—as if they met the saying of St. Paul: *Though He be not far from every one of us: for in Him we live, and move, and have our being.* But nearness may become *too* near. When it is made to mean absolute identity, then all the worth of true nearness is gone,—the openness of access, the freedom of converse, the joy of true reciprocity. These precious things all draw their meaning from the *distinct* reality of ourselves and Him who is really other than we. When mysticism plays in high poesy on the theme of the Divine Nearness, in the mood that "sees God in clouds and hears Him in the wind," it quickens religious emotion, but affords no genuine illumination in theology. When we turn that mood into

literal philosophy, and cause our centre of selfhood to vanish into God's, or God's to vanish into ours, we lose the tone of religion that is true and wholesome. For true religion is built only on the firm foundations of duty and responsibility; and these, again, rest only on the footing of freedom. Hence the passing remark of Dr. Le Conte on the nature of religion, though indeed beautiful and noble, is yet, I think, neither noble enough nor beautiful enough. It certainly ascends beyond the famous saying by Matthew Arnold, of which as a ladder it makes happy use,—that "religion is morality touched with emotion;" for Dr. Le Conte rightly reminds us that the emotion which is religious must not merely touch and kindle but must vivify, and must be not simply emotion but noble emotion. But it seems to me that his saying, like Arnold's, still leaves the true relations inverted. Yes, as much as inverted; because, in truth, religion is not morality touched and vivified by noble emotion, but, rather, religion is emotion touched by morality, and at that wondrous touch not merely ennobled but actually raised from the dead—uplifted from the grave of sense into the life eternal of reason. For life eternal is life germinating in that true and only Inclusive Reason, the supreme consciousness of the reality of the City of God,—the Ideal that seats the central reality of each human being in an *eternal* circle of Persons, and establishes each as a free *citizen* in all the all-founding, all-governing Realm of Spirits. So is it that religion can only draw its breath in the quickening air of moral freedom, and our great poet's word comes strictly true,—

> "So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near is God to man,
> When duty whispers low, *Thou must*,
> The youth replies, *I can*."

And thus I am led to repeat, that the main argument of this evening, striking as it is, does not establish any Reality sufficingly religious,—does not establish the being of GOD. This will continue true of it, for the reasons just pointed out, even if we grant that the Infinite Self is a unity inclusive of an indefinite multitude of *quasi* selves. Accordingly, for the sake of argument, this grant shall be made during the rest of the discussion.

VI.

And now, in view of the phase last assumed by our question, we naturally turn to the other system of Idealism offered us — that of Dr. LE CONTE; for its very object seems to be, to provide for the desired world of freedom. It certainly accepts one aspect of the theory from which we have just parted — the immanence of God in Nature; interpreted, too, pretty much in the way that Professor Royce and other Hegelians interpret it. But, this accepted, Dr. Le Conte's view is apparently an attempt to supplement it by such a use of the theory of evolution as shall establish a conception of the Ultimate Reality which will thoroughly answer to the Vision Beatific — the conception of a World of Spirits, all immortal, and all genuinely real because themselves centres of origination and thus really free; not that they *now* are so, in the present order of Nature where we see them, but that the evolutional account of their origin clearly indicates that they will become so. Characteristic of this new form of Idealism, is its effort to unite the Hegelian form with the form that I have been trying to set before you, — the monistic form with the pluralistic. Its means for this union is, the method it takes to prove the coming reality of the City of God — the Realm of Ends. This is presented as the goal toward which cosmic evolution is seen unmistakably to tend; and its reality is argued partly by induction, partly by appeal to that moral reason which would pronounce evolution futile, should its indicated goal not be fulfilled in an endless life whereby the self-activity only presaged here could be realized in the hereafter. This large reconciling office is what I suppose Dr. Le Conte to intend; and before taking our final look at the theory of Professor Royce, we must pause to see whether this attractive new scheme may not have supplanted it; or, perchance, whether this, too, is to prove disappointing.

I confess that by the lucid force of Dr. Le Conte's reasonings, and the great beauty of his conclusions, I am constantly tempted to yield him my entire assent. It is only by the low murmurs of half-suppressed conviction, that I am roused from that state of fascination, to take up again the task of rigid thought. But if I may venture at all upon criticism of a thinker so justly distinguished, whose mind I sincerely revere, then I will say that the stability of his system depends, I think, on two things: (1) Whether it provides a

sufficient proof that the Immanent Energy which is the cause of evolution is indeed a Cosmic Consciousness; (2) whether a Cosmic Consciousness, even if real, having—as it must have—the attribute of immanence in Nature, is compatible with the freedom and the personal immortality at which the system aims.

Regarding the first of these, I feel bound to say that the proof offered for the Cosmic Consciousness seems to me insufficient. All I am able to make of it is this: The analogy in the case of each of us, who knows that he is conscious, though to the outside observer there is nothing of him discernible but phenomena purely physical; — still more, the analogy of the reasoning by which each extends this assurance of his own reality, to interpret similar physical phenomena into the existence of other persons, animating bodies like his own;— these analogies would, in all reason, lead us to say that there *might well be* a Cosmic Mind animating all Nature, but by no means that there *is* such a Mind. True enough, there is the same *kind* of reason for believing in such a Mind as for believing in the minds of our fellow-men,— if, indeed, the real warrant for this belief *be* only the warrant of analogy. But, even on that warrant, the value of the analogy will finally depend on the *degree* to which we can match, in Nature as a whole, the test phenomena that prompt us to conclude the existence of human minds besides our own. The chief of these tests are speech and purposive movement; and, Bishop Berkeley's captivating metaphors about them notwithstanding, the literal fact is that Nature answers to neither; or, rather, we have no means of ascertaining, *from her*, whether she does or not.

Coming to the second question, I find myself in still greater difficulties. I cannot see how a Cosmic Consciousness, with its intrinsic immanence in Nature, can be reconciled with real freedom at all; and its consistency with an immortality truly personal is to me beset with obscure alternatives, between which either the certainty or else the value of the life to come vanishes away. Whether we take the immanence of God in Nature to mean his omnipresence *in* and *throughout* Nature,—which is something unintelligible,— or whether we say, in consonance with Idealism, that Nature is immanent in God, the doctrine implies that God operates evolution, including the evolution of man in every aspect of his being, by *direct* causation—by his own immediate *efficiency*. Any secondary causes that may operate—though according to the

theory of evolution these are indeed real and infinitely complex—are only mediate or transmissive, and are not *true* causes; God must ever remain the only *real* agent. In short, we have again a system of Monism; and all the hostilities to the strict personality of created minds that we found in the doctrine of Professor Royce are on our hands once more. And if it be said that just here it is that the philosophic virtue of evolution displays itself, by showing us that the world of *efficient* causation is only a means to an end coming beyond it, to whose realization it surely points,—showing us that full self-activity, real freedom, is the plain goal, which moreover can only be won through immortality,—then I am led to ask: How will the goal be attained? I ask myself: So long as man remains a term in Nature, how can he ever escape from that causal embrace in which Nature is held immanent in God? This very immanence in God will no doubt maintain in existence some form of Nature, as long as God himself exists; and thus I can easily conceive of the human spirit as going on in its share of the everlasting existence of Nature. But I also see that this must be at the cost of its freedom. For in the one and only life of the Cosmic Consciousness, brooding upon Nature and upon all her offspring alike, there is after all but one real agent, and that is the Consciousness itself. On the other hand, were I to suppose—as some of Dr. Le Conte's writings have at times seemed to mean—were I to suppose that death is the sublime moment in which our connection with Nature at length comes to a close, and is thus in its truth the moment of birth for the freed spirit, so that by death the long toil of spirit-creation is completed, I should indeed be at first rapt away by this surprising suggestion; especially by the Platonic afterthought, that now the soul, set forth in her self-sufficing independence, is proof against all assaults forever, and has become indeed imperishable. But a second afterthought would follow, and I should ask: What must be the nature of this life dissevered from Nature,—bodiless, void of all sense-perception? What would be left in it except the pure *elements* of reason, the pure *elements* of perception, the pure *formularies* of science, and pure *imagination?* But what are these, altogether, but the common equipment, not of *my* mind or of some other individual mind, but of the universal human *nature?* And what is that universal nature but just the nature of the eternal Cosmic Consciousness? Yes, my personality has vanished; and death, in dissolving

the tie to Nature under the alluring prospect of an existence for me wholly self-referred and self-sustaining, has resolved me back into the infinite Vague of the Cosmic Mind, as this might, perchance, be fancied to be *in itself*, apart from Nature and creation,—

> "—— that which came from out the boundless Deep
> Turns again home."

Shall I ever issue forth again from that Inane? Will that unfathomable Void ever create again?—ever again enfold an embosomed Nature, to repeat again through her fertility the stupendous drama of evolution? To ask such questions is to realize how utterly we have left the native regions of our occidental thinking; how lost we are among the most shadowy conceptions of the Orient. And no matter which alternative we take; no matter whether we maintain Nature everlastingly, and as parts of Nature win an endless continuance, but remain forever destitute of freedom, mere aggregates of "inherited tendency" organized and moved by some new and heightened touch from the ever-immanent God; or, on the other hand, by severance from Nature win the empty name of freedom, and vanish in a nominal immortality that only means absorption into the Eternal Inane;—in either case the so-called God is not a Personal God, since in neither does he stand in any relations of mutual responsibility and duty with other real agents. Thus I cannot see that this Evolutional Idealism makes any secure advance beyond the Monism which it seeks to amend. We appear to be left to that, after all; and for proof of it, to some such argument as that of our evening's chief speaker.

VII.

And what, now, are we to say of this, finally? What are we to say to the claim that the surprising but in some sort irresistible conception reached by that argument must be accepted as the *philosophical* conception of God, be our spontaneously *religious* conception of that Being as different from this as it may? This claim is rested on the two premises, (1) that no conception of God can have any philosophical value unless it can be proved real, or, in other words, unless it is the conception that of itself proves God to exist; and (2) that the conception discussed before us is the only conception that can thus prove its reality. The first of these, as I have already said to you earlier, nobody with a proper training in philos-

ophy would deny. The second has a very different standing, and I take but little risk, I am sure, when I question its truth entirely.

Why, then, should such an assumption be made? I answer: Because of a still deeper assumption; namely: that, since the thinking of Kant, the sole terms on which thought can be objectively valid are settled beyond revision. The thinking being, it is here said, cannot possibly get beyond *itself;* there is no way, therefore, by which thought can reach reality; — unless, indeed, reality is something within the whole and true compass of the thinker's own being, as contrasted with its merely apparent and partial compass. Thought, this view goes on to say, must either surrender all claims to establish reality and to know it, or else it must cease to regard reality as a *thing-in-itself;* so things-in-themselves are dismissed from critical philosophy, and henceforth thought and reality must be conceived as inseparably conjoined. But how alone is such a conjunction *conceivable?* — how alone is the validity of thought *specifically* possible? To this it is answered: There is no way of having the required conjunction but by presupposing the unity of the thinker's self-consciousness to be intrinsically a *synthetical* unity — a unity, that is, conjoining *in itself* two correlated streams of consciousness. These are, the abstractly ideal and the abstractly real, mere thought and mere sense, mere idea and dead fact. Torn from the life-giving embrace of this true unity of self-consciousness, neither of these correlates has any true reality at all, — any meaning, any growth, any *being*. And, reciprocally, there can be no real unity of self-consciousness apart from its living expression in this pair of correlates. No *knowledge* — no objective certainty — is possible, if once this magic bond be broken. The price of knowledge, the price of certitude, is this inseparable union of concept with percept, of thought with *sense*. Sever the idea from its sensory complement, and it vanishes in the inane. The only true Ideal is the Real-Ideal, is the unity presupposed in this correlation, and embracing it, — the unity implied in every item of *experience*, which is always just a case of this synthesis, — the unity still more profoundly implicated in every colligated group of experiences and in that progressively organized experience which ascends the pathway of science by perpetual criticism of experience less organized, and perpetual detection of ignorance. The Real-Ideal thus turns out to be that Omniscience which is the eternal clutch holding together

the two sides of experience, and holding all possible forms and stages of experience in its life-giving, knowledge-assuring, reality-building grasp. Grant the accuracy and the necessity of the fundamental premise, — grant the truth of this inseperable union of pure thought with sense, of this interdependence of the rational and the sensory, — and the case is closed. The immanent Omniscience *is* then made real, in this overspanning meaning of that word, and nothing but such an *immanent* Omniscience can be made out real.

There is the whole anatomy of the argument in brief. *If* its fundamental premise is true, it is certainly unanswerable; and we shall be compelled to put up with this as the true account of the Absolute, whether we choose to give it the title of God or not; nay, we shall have perforce to call it God, or else confess that this name has nothing answering to it but a baseless figment of fantasy. And yet I think it not too much to say, that, while this conception is thus made to appear as the only sound result of reason, its real meaning is no sooner realized than reason disowns it. By some slip, through some oversight, a changeling has been put into the cradle of Reason, but Reason, when she sees it, knows that it is none of hers. Professor Royce rightly says that it is not the conception of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore. For, in very fact, it is not the conception of a being that we can adore at all. The fault of it at the bar of the religious reason is, that by force of the argument leading to it all the turmoil and all the contradictions and tragic discords belonging to experience must be taken up directly into the life of the Absolute; they are *his* experiences as well as ours, and must be left in him at once both dissolved and undissolved, unharmonized as well as harmonized, stilled and yet raging, atoned for and yet all unatoned. Contradiction is thus not only introduced into the very being of the Eternal, and left there, but its dialectic back-and-forth throb is made the very quickening heart of that being. It is impossible for the religious reason to accept this, no matter what the apparently philosophical reason may say in its behalf.

VIII.

Is there really, then, an impassable chasm between the logical consciousness and the religious consciousness? Can the *ought to be* ever yield its autonomous authority to the mere *is?*—can the mere

is, simply because it *is*,—nay, can the *must be*, simply because it *must be*,—ever amount to the *ought to be*? Is the religious judgment *Whatever is, is right*, a merely *analytical* judgment, so that the *is* is right merely because it *is*, and the predicate *right* is merely an idle other name for what is already named by its true and best name *is*? Or is it a *synthetic* judgment, whose whole meaning lies in the complete transcending of the subject by the predicate, of the *is* by the *right*, and in the shining of the *Right* by its own unborrowed radiance? There can be no question how the religious reason will answer. And there will be, and will ever remain, an impassable gulf between the religious consciousness and the logical, unless the logical consciousness reaches up to embrace the religious, and learns to state the absolute *Is* in terms of the absolute *Ought*.

And whether this upward and all-embracing reach can be made by the logical consciousness, depends entirely—as I said a few moments ago—upon whether that fundamental premise brought into philosophy by Kant is true or not. If it *is* true,—if there is no knowledge transcendent of sense, and can be none,—then the absolute *Is* is tied up in the Being that Professor Royce has described to us, and no refuge is left to the unsatisfied Conscience but the refuge of faith: the religious consciousness will fain still believe though it cannot know, and will maintain a stainless allegiance to the City of God though this be a city without foundations. It was in this attitude of faith as pure fealty to the moral ideal, that Kant left the human spirit at the close of his great labors. It was the only solution left him, after his thesis of the absolute limitation of knowledge to objects of sense. But surely that thesis has a strange sound, coming from the same lips that utter with equal emphasis the lesson of our really having cognitions that are independent of *all* experience. This is neither the place nor the time to expose the oversight and confusion by which Kant fell into this self-contradiction; I must content myself with saying that the contradiction exists, and that I think the oversight is exactly designable, and entirely avoidable. There is a truth concealed in Kant's thesis of the immutable conjunction of thought and sense, but there is a greater falsehood conveyed by it. And there is a stranger contradiction still, between his two main philosophical doctrines—between his *Primacy of the Practical Reason* and his *Transcendental Ideality of Reason* as an account of Nature and of science. Let it be as true as it

may—and I suppose it is demonstrably true—that a predictive science of Nature is *impossible* unless Nature is construed as strictly phenomenal to the cognizing mind and is consequently taken entirely out of the region of *things-in-themselves*, it by no means follows that such a science becomes *possible* by that supposition alone. The withholding of the supposition *prevents* science; but the greatest question is, Can the granting of it *establish* science? May not far other conditions have to be met, besides the required synthesis of sense with Space and Time and the Categories, before we can declare science to be a *real* possibility? Or, again, because a concentration of reason upon its pure sense-forms and their sense-contents is *prerequisite* to science, does it follow that this is *sufficient* for science? May not the non-limitation of the Categories be requisite before science is made out, quite as unquestionably as their concentration upon perceptions, and even more significantly?

Suppose they do have to be "schematized" in Time, or else be useless for science: does it follow that they will *produce* science just by being schematized?—may not an added use of them in an utterly unrestricted meaning be needed before we can establish judgments of absolutely universal and necessary scope over even the course of Nature? But what are the Categories, taken thus without restriction, but just the elements of the moral and religious consciousness? Kant himself can find no better name for the moral reason than *Causality with freedom*, nor any fitter name for primary creation. In short, the question really is, Can science be shown in *secure* possibility, *can* the logical consciousness ever reach objective reality even in the natural world, without the direct aid of the moral and religious consciousness?—without this consciousness adding itself into the very circuit of logic, as the completing term by which alone the circuit becomes solid, self-sustaining, and incapable of disruption? For if it *can*, then the asserted primacy of moral reason is merely nominal, and only means that moral reason has an ideal province of its own, out of all organic connection with any world determinably real. But if it *cannot*, then moral reason is really primate, the reality of the scientific thinker as a moral being becomes the supreme condition and the demonstrating basis of science and of Nature itself, the world of the Vision Beatific becomes the one inclusive all-grounding Fact, and a real God amid his realm of real Persons becomes the absolute reality. Kant, in his

provisory *Thing-in-itself*,—set aside as a problem for further determination, on the solid psychological evidence that we have not within ourselves a complete explanation of sensation,—left open the door for answering this question of the total conditions essential to science. But he did not use that door. Yet, of course, he could not aver that the reality of science was made out, and the order of Nature securely predictable, so long as the nature of that co-agent *Thing-in-itself* was undetermined. He also warned the philosophical world that there was no secure path to the realm of religion, his Realm of Ends, the realm of God and souls, of freedom and immortality, except by the way of the moral reason. But he made no further use of that warning than to declare the absolute autonomy of that reason. He should have followed the path he indicated, and he would have found in its course the solution for the unknown nature of his *Thing-in-itself*. This would have been done as soon as he had noted the gap still remaining in the logic of science, and had seen, as he might have seen, that nothing but filling the void of the *Thing-in-itself* with the World of Spirits, the sum of the postulates of the Practical Reason, could close that gap.

When we shall have gone back to where he paused, and have completed the work he left unfinished, then fealty will be translated into insight, our faith will have a logical support, our moral common-sense will receive its philosophic confirmation, and the reality of the World of Persons, and of God as its eternal Fount and Ground and Light, will be made out. Then genuine and inspiring religion—the religion not of submission but of aspiration, not of bondage but of freedom, of Love rather than of Faith and of Hope—will have passed from its present stage of anxious conjecture to the stage of settled fact.

DISCUSSION RECAPITULATED IN QUESTIONS.

For the sake, particularly, of the members of the Union, I may here recapitulate my criticisms of the evening's addresses, suggest a few others, and hint a little more fully at my own answers to the problems discussed, by means of the following questions:

I. ON PROFESSOR ROYCE'S ADDRESS.

1. Does a Supreme Being, or Ultimate Reality, no matter how assuredly proved, deserve the name of GOD, simply by virtue of its Reality and Supremacy? Is simple Supremacy divine, even if made out in idealistic terms—in terms, say, of Omniscience?

2. Can the attribute of Omniscience amount to a criterion of Deity, until we determine the nature of the objects contained in the total sphere of its recognition, and find there real *persons* as the supreme and all-determining objects of its view?

3. To put the preceding question in another way, Can an Omniscient Being amount to a Divine Being unless the core and spring of this Omniscience be proved to be a *Conscience?*

4. Does the argument to an Omniscient Reality from human ignorance, taken in its precise reach, provide for *persons* as the prime objects of Omniscience, or for Conscience as its central spring? —does this argument make Omniscience involve Love, in any other sense than that of Content with its own action, and with its self-produced objects, merely as forms of that action?

5. Is it reasonable to speak of God as having an *experience*, even an Absolute Experience? Or, if it is, what change *in kind* in the meaning of Experience is involved?—is not Experience, thus taken, a name for the self-consciousness of pure Thought and pure Creative Imagination? In the natural and unforced sense of the words, can there be an Absolute *Experience?*—an absolute *feeling one's way along tentatively*, or any absolute *i. e.* wholly self-supplied contents *received*,—facts of *sense?*

6. Is the reasoning to an Absolute Experience and an Absolute Thought by means of the implications inevitable in asserting our limitation to be *real*, capable (1) of making out an Ultimate Reality in any other sense than that of an *Active Supreme Judgment* as the grounding or inclusive being of the single thinker who frames the argument; (2) of combining this ultimate reality of this single thinker with that of other thinkers equally real?

7. To put the foregoing question in less cumbrous, though less explanatory terms, Can an argument like Professor Royce's prove an Absolute Mind *distinct* from each thinker's mind, or an Absolute Mind coexisting with other genuine *minds*, unquestionably as real as itself? What is the true test of *reality?*—and how alone can finitude coexist with unabated reality? Is not the former *free* (i. e. *self-active*) *intelligence?*—and, in order to the latter, must not Nature be thought as conditioned *by* human nature, instead of *conditioning* it?

8. To put the question in still another way, Must not the convincing force of every such method of reasoning to the Absolute be necessarily confined to a *Monistic* view of existence? That is, will not the method of proof confine us to a single and sole Inclusive Infinite Self, and reduce all particular so-called selves merely to modes of his Omniscient Perceptive Conception? Does the argument not require us to accept God (so called) as the one and only real *agent*—the *vera causa sola?*

9. Is such a view of existence compatible with the true *personality* of human beings, or with a *true* personality of God?

10. What is the real test of *personality?* Is it just *Self-Consciousness*, without further heightening of quality, or must it be self-consciousness as *Conscience?* What *is* Conscience? Is it not the immutable recognition of *persons*—the consciousness of self and of other selves as alike unconditional ENDS, who thereby have (1) *Rights*, inalienable, and (2) *Duties*, absolutely binding?

II. ON PROFESSOR MEZES' CRITICISM.

1. Is it true that the relativity of pastness and futurity must be taken to mean that they are illusions? Is Cæsar *really* dead and turned to clay, and also *really*, in the one Eternal Moment, now conquering Gaul and Britain, and dominating the envious Senate?

2. Can Eternity be adequately stated in terms of time at all? Is there not an Eternal Order, and *also* a Temporal? — a Noumenal *and* a Phenomenal?

3. Must the *ideal* being answering to the moral conception contain the trait of progressive improvement? Is not this the characteristic of minds marked with *finitude?* — that is, having in their consciousness an aspect that is finite?

III. ON PROFESSOR LE CONTE'S ADDRESS.

1. Does Dr. LeConte's argument to God from the footing of science show that there *is* a Cosmic Consciousness, or only that there *might well enough* be such a Consciousness?

2. Is not a Cosmic Consciousness, reached by such an argument (*if* reached by it), necessarily to be taken as having a *Monistic* relation to the Cosmos? Does not its Omnipresence, too, take the form of a universal pervasion of Space as well as of Time? — and is there any meaning in the statement, taken literally, that a Mind *pervades* Space, and *fills* Time? Besides, in the *strict* sense, has Space any extent to be pervaded, or Time any duration to be filled?

3. Is such a doctrine of the "Divine Immanence in Nature" compatible with the *real* freedom of human beings? If not, does it leave such beings truly *real?* Does it not make the so-called God the sole real *agent?* If so, does it not make a Moral Order impossible?

4. Can a Being without a Moral Order and a *moral* government — that is, without associates *indestructibly free* — be a person at all? — much more, an Infinite Person, a GOD?

5. Can God, the *Ideal of the Reason*, the Being whose essence is *Moral* Perfection, be adequately conceived as being immanent in the creation, or as having the creation immanent in *him*, if this be taken to mean, in the one case, pervasively present and directly active within the entire creation, and, in the other case, directly embracing or enfolding it in his own life?

6. In what sense, only, can God rightly be said to be immanent in his creation? — is it not in this, that his Image, his *nature* or *kind*, not his own *Person*, is ever present there, as the effective result of his Creative Omniscience, so that his creation, too, in its inclusive unity, *proceeds of itself*, as well as He?

7. Can a process of evolution, through nature and in time, possibly give rise to a being really free, and personally immortal?—to a creation indeed *self-active*, and therefore indestructible?

8. Is an evolutional origin of man, then, compatible with a *Divine* creation? If so, in what sense of the word Man only? Is it not man the *phenomenon* merely—the experience-contents, physical (governed by Space) on the one hand, and psychical (governed by Time) on the other, of the completely real (or *noumenal*) man who is the Inclusive Active Unit that embraces and grounds all its being in its own *active* self-consciousness?—in short, just the human *body* and the human *states* of mind?

9. What can the fact be, that has caused so many of the prominent minds of our time to stumble at the notion of an Infinite Person, as involving a self-contradiction?—is it not the difficulty of reaching the true conception of Real Infinity?

10. Ought we not to discriminate between two vitally different meanings of this ancient word Infinite?—which is primary and determinative, and which only derivative? Is not *every* Person infinite in this first and profound sense?