

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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remembered that these signs were certainly covered over with plaster, as some of them still partially are. The Italian excavators of Phaistos regard them as literary signs; they all, or nearly all, occur on gems. Several, including the double axe, occur on the literary tablets of Knossos, and are interpreted as writing by Evans himself.¹ They are probably masons' marks; and some of them, including the double axe, have been noticed on stone blocks, apparently used for masons' marks, in other places, as the old Hellenic blocks used to build the mediæval fortress of Cos,² and the stones of Heriot's Hospital, Edinburgh.³

The above is enough to show that the double axe is not necessarily sacred, or necessarily connected with Zeus. But this is no reason why the axe should not have been the object of worship. Axe-worship is, of course, not fetish-worship, as some have loosely called it; but instances are not uncommon of weapons being worshipped, whether as weapons or as iron. Evans, in his paper on 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,'⁴ has alluded to the subject; and A. B. Cook has collected evidence for axe-worship outside Crete.⁵ The evidence for Crete is of varying value: the most weighty piece of evidence is the representation on the Hagia Triadha sarcophagus: a priestess is pouring some red liquid into a jar between two double axes.⁶ The other evidence, such as axes set between horns, held in the hands of god or priestess, or visible on the ground of engraved seals, is indeterminate; but these may strengthen the case for worship, if it be established otherwise. Cook publishes a cut of a priest sacrificing before a number of objects, including an ibex, a star, a crescent moon, and two knobbed sceptres with a (one-flanged) axe set upright upon a stool (Assyrian); a Persian seal shows a worshipper before a stool with similar objects upon it. A coin of Tenedos⁷ shows an axe upright standing on steps between two supports; another, an axe connected with a jar by a fillet. These seem to be the most significant facts that bear on an axe-cult; it is impossible here to recount all that has been brought in evidence to prove it, or to discuss the far-reaching and often fanciful inferences that have been drawn from them. The reader, however, may be reminded that there are several distinct questions, which have been often confused: (1) Was there an axe-cult? (2) Was the axe specially connected with Zeus? (3) Was the axe a symbol of Zeus, that is, was it treated as Zeus because associated with Zeus? (4) Is *λαβύρινθος* derived from *λαβρυς*? (5) Is the Knossian palace the Labyrinth?

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article.
W. H. D. ROUSE.

AXIOM.—I. Meanings of the term.—The various senses in which the term 'axiom' is used are easily confused, and require to be carefully distinguished. We may mention five senses of the term, all of which are historically important. (1) Axiom in a predominantly *epistemological* sense: a proposition whose truth is self-evident; an immediately certain, objective truth. (2) Axiom in a predominantly *psychological* sense: a proposition of whose truth the man who calls it an axiom feels a fixed persuasion, while he regards the proposition as indemonstrable, and his faith as something fundamental and, for him, necessary; a proposition

held to be true with an unwavering faith. (3) Axiom in a predominantly *logical* sense: a first principle which, itself not demonstrated, can be used as a basis for demonstrations. (4) Axiom in a predominantly *social* sense: an opinion which is, as a fact, accepted by all who are competent to understand its import. (5) Axiom in a predominantly *psycho-genetic* sense: an opinion which the innate constitution and the original instinctive tendencies of the mind lead us to accept, and which we therefore do not derive merely from our experience.

1. From the point of view of sense (1) all our knowledge is supposed to be either 'mediate' or 'immediate.' An axiom is a proposition known to be true, not 'mediately,' but 'immediately.' For this view, 'intuitive knowledge,' 'immediate insight,' 'direct assurance,' or 'evidence' is presupposed, as a possible form of knowledge and of consciousness. The criterion of an axiom is said to be that, when we consider the import of a given axiomatic proposition, this state of consciousness, this direct assurance, arises, and makes wholly unquestionable the truth of the particular axiom which comes under our observation. Here the stress is laid, therefore, first upon the *immediacy* of the insight in question. To think the axiom, and to know it to be true, are supposed to be simply inseparable acts. The assurance or 'intuitive knowledge' in question is further regarded according to sense (1) as *objective*. One does not mean by the term 'axiom,' when thus used, merely to point out the fact that a given person *feels sure* that this axiom is true. Sense (1) implies that whoever accepts the truth of the axiom 'intuitively knows,' that is, directly observes, the perfectly objective fact that the axiom is true.

2. Sense (2), on the contrary, lays stress upon what may turn out to be the *subjective necessity* with which some one *feels convinced* of the truth of the proposition. When such a feeling of necessity attends a conviction, and when no demonstration of the truth of the conviction can be given beyond the mere observation that, so long as one conceives the meaning of the proposition, one feels thus convinced, sense (2) requires one to call the proposition an axiom. Sense (2) therefore makes the criterion of an axiom *relative to the subject who feels the necessity*, and who is unable to give other reason for his conviction.

Sense (1) is present in the mind of Descartes when he speaks of propositions which we 'clearly and distinctly perceive to be true.' Sense (2) is emphasized if one lays stress upon some sort of 'unswerving' and, as one conceives, necessary 'faith' or 'assurance.' Aristotle maintains that the 'principle of contradiction' is immediately evident in sense (1). But in sense (2) various subjects, appealing each to his own subjective necessity, may regard as axioms propositions which other thinkers are known to regard as false. Thus the proposition that 'water cannot turn solid' might be regarded as an axiom in sense (2) by a dweller in the tropics, who, hearing for the first time a story of frosty weather in high latitudes, rejected it as essentially incredible, and found his unbelief wholly insurmountable.

Senses (1) and (2) are often confused. The question as to the relation between objective 'evidence' and subjective 'certainty' is central in the theory of knowledge, and only a thoroughgoing sceptic will deny that there is indeed a close connexion between at least some of our 'assurances' and the objective truth. But the danger of confounding mere 'conviction' with objective 'evidence' is manifest throughout the history both of science and of religion.

3. Sense (3) makes the use of the term 'axiom' *relative to a given or proposed theory or system*, consisting of propositions and of reasonings. In this third sense an axiom is a proposition which is not demonstrated in the course of the development of the system in question, but is assumed or accepted at the outset, and used as a basis for demonstrations that form parts of that system. If the system in question constitutes, or is regarded as constituting, the *whole* of the possible system of knowledge, then the axioms in sense (3) appear as

¹ *JHS* xvii. 39-46, xxi. 273; *BSA* vi. pl. II.

² *Arch. Anzeiger*, xvi. 133.

³ *Heriot's Hospital* (Edinburgh), plates facing p. 174.

⁴ *JHS* xxi. 106 ff.

⁵ *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, 1908, II. 184-194; A. B. Cook, *Cretan Axe-Cult outside Crete*.

⁶ *Cook*, p. 180.

⁷ *ib.* p. 184, figs. 2, 4; p. 191, fig. 14.

'absolutely first principles,' since, by hypothesis, they are essential to the rational demonstration of the truths of this system, and are nowhere to be proved in the course of any investigation that we can make. But if one is explicitly confining one's attention to some more or less *limited* province of knowledge, or to some special system of propositions, axioms in sense (3) may be entirely relative to that special system, and are then merely the principles presupposed, used, but not demonstrated, by the system in question.

Axioms in sense (3) might therefore be neither self-evident truths nor yet necessary convictions of anybody, but merely 'assumptions' or 'postulates.' On the other hand, sense (3), in so far as it requires an axiom to be a 'first principle,' emphasizes a character which we are all especially accustomed to connect with the term, namely, that character of logical *universality* which a majority of axiomatic propositions are very commonly regarded as possessing. Senses (1) and (2) could be satisfied by particular, or even by individual, propositions. Thus the proposition 'I suffer,' uttered by one who has toothache, may be viewed by the sufferer either as a necessary persuasion of his own or as a 'self-evident' objective truth. Various theories of knowledge have used such 'intuitive evidence' of present experience as the very type of axiomatic knowledge. But particular propositions and reports of experience can be used as the principles of a set of demonstrations only when they are asserted along with universal propositions. And therefore at least some axioms, in sense (3) of the term, must be universal assertions. It especially belongs to sense (3) to emphasize this universal character of at least part of the axioms of any theories.

Sense (3), in contrast with, and sometimes to the exclusion of, senses (1) and (2), has been made prominent in various modern logical discussions of the principles of theoretical science. Thus, by the 'axioms' of a given mathematical theory, recent writers mean, in many cases, propositions which one uses simply as the 'fundamental hypotheses' of the theory in question (e.g., of the theory of some one of the 'non-Euclidean' or 'non-Archimedean' geometries, or of the Cantorean 'Theory of Assemblages'). One need not assert such hypotheses to be true, except in the sense that one treats them, at least provisionally, as self-consistent assumptions about a logically possible state of things, and uses them as 'principles' or as 'primitive propositions' in some statement of a theory. An axiom, in this sense, is often opposed to a *theorem*, which is a proposition that is shown to follow from the principles, and that is, in this sense, demonstrated in the course of the theory in question. In two different statements of a theory (e.g. in two different theoretical developments of geometry or of number-theory) decidedly different sets of 'hypotheses' or 'postulates' may be used as the axioms of the theory. In such cases what is an axiom in one statement of a theory may appear as a theorem in another statement, and conversely; and the concept of a 'first principle' becomes then relative, not merely to the theory in question, but to a particular way of stating that theory, and of showing that certain propositions follow from certain other propositions.

If one insists, as Aristotle did, upon sense (3) as applying to certain propositions which are said to form the indemonstrable principles of *all* science, so that, without these absolutely first principles, no system of knowledge whatever is possible, then indeed, *unless* one is a philosophical sceptic, one has to assert that the absolutely first principles are also axioms in sense (1). For if all science rests upon a determinate set of absolutely first principles, and if no science can demonstrate these principles, then either all science is uncertain or some principle is 'immediately evident.' Hence for Aristotle, and for those who follow his way of treating the theory of knowledge, there are propositions which are axioms both in sense (1) and in sense (3). In consequence of the Aristotelian tradition, senses (1) and (3) have therefore come to be viewed by many philosophers as actually inseparable; so that the 'first and fundamental truths' and the 'self-evident' or 'immediately known' propositions are, in discussions of the problems relating to axioms, not

infrequently simply identified. But the logically important distinction between the relatively first principles of a given theory and the intuitively evident propositions (if such there be) has been brought afresh to light, especially by the modern logical investigations of scientific theories, and should never be forgotten in dealing with the topic. If a proposition is to be called an axiom both in sense (1) and in sense (3), special reasons (such, for instance, as those of Aristotle) should be advanced for asserting that this is the case. As a fact, it can never be 'self-evident' that a proposition is an axiom in sense (3); for one can ascertain that a principle is indeed a logical basis for certain demonstrations only by taking the trouble to go through the demonstrations themselves—a highly 'mediated' procedure.

4. Sense (4) uses as the criterion of an axiom the 'universal assent,' the 'consensus' of 'all rational beings,' or sometimes the consensus of all the 'competent,' of all the 'normal,' or of the 'wise,' or of some class of knowing beings whose common opinion in the matter is treated as the standard opinion. The criterion here in question has frequently been emphasized, and its history forms part of the long annals of the doctrine of Nature, or of 'the natural,' or of the 'Law of Nature,' and the 'consensus of humanity' as the standard whereby both opinions and deeds are to be judged. Criterion (4) becomes an exact one only for those who hold that, as a fact of human nature, there are indeed propositions which *nobody* denies, or which *all* who understand their import affirm. In practice, however, those who appeal to 'universal assent' as the warrant for an axiom usually render their criterion somewhat inexact, by the very fact that they employ this criterion in arguments directed against opponents, who, as appears, call in question either the truth, or the evidence, or the interpretation, of the axiom that is under consideration. If the opponent himself does not wholly assent, one can hardly appeal to 'universal assent' as an evidence against him, without modifying the sense in which one calls the assent 'universal.' Such modification occurs if one regards the consensus in question as that of the 'wise,' or of the 'competent,' or if one insists, in a well-known polemic fashion, that 'nobody who is in his senses' doubts the supposed axiom. Thus, in practice, an axiom in sense (4) is usually conceived in some close connexion with senses (1) and (2)—the connexion being often much confused in controversy. Not infrequently a thinker first explicitly asserts that a proposition is, for himself personally, an axiom in sense (2); then he draws the conclusion that it therefore must be an axiom in sense (1); and thus he proves, by a more or less lengthy mediate course of reasoning, that the proposition, being 'immediately evident,' cannot be proved. Since, perhaps, some opponent still remains unconvinced, and declines to admit the 'immediate evidence,' the defender of the proposition in question hereupon makes use of sense (4), and now undertakes quite convincingly to silence the objector by assuring him that nobody objects to the proposition, since it is 'known to all.' Or, if the opponent even yet persists in calling attention to the 'immediately evident' truth that at least he himself objects, the defender of the axiom finally confuses sense (4) itself by a convenient definition of the 'assent of all,' whereby the opponent is excluded from the 'all' who are worthy of consideration; and hereupon the matter becomes, of course, quite clear, although not to the opponent.

Such processes have played a great part in the history of controversy. A famous example is furnished by the controversies which have been suggested by Locke's revival, in

the First Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, of the ancient questions as to whether all men possess in common a knowledge of logical, of mathematical, and of moral truths. Especially in the case of moral principles has the interest in making out whether there is any agreement amongst all men regarding the distinction between Right and Wrong been prominent in controversy ever since Locke. Numerous defenders of an axiomatic basis for morals have sought in Anthropology for the evidence that, regarding some moral opinions, all men agree, and have conceived their principles as definable in terms of sense (4).

5. Finally, in sense (5) of our list, an axiom is defined by reference to the famous doctrine of 'innate ideas.' This doctrine is one which Locke's equally famous attack upon it, in the First Book of his *Essay*, long made central in controversy; and the partisans of innate ideas, in the various forms which this doctrine has since assumed, have frequently connected, in many often conflicting ways, senses (1), (2), and (4), and to a certain extent sense (3), with the use of the criterion for an axiom which sense (5) emphasizes. From the point of view of sense (5) it is essential to an axiom that it should come to our consciousness by reason of the very 'constitution' or 'original nature' of the mind. Since the modern evolutionary view of the mind emphasizes the importance of our instinctive tendencies and inherited aptitudes as psychologically determining our whole intellectual life, evolutionists of the type of Spencer have been led to favour a theory of the innateness of those predispositions which, when developed through our individual experience, lead us to regard some propositions as certainly true, and as true far beyond the range of our personal experience. For Spencer an axiom is, in general, an expression in an individual of the results of the 'experience of the race,' and is in so far, indeed, innate in the individual. Such a doctrine has established new connexions between senses (4), (5), and (2), and has to some extent connected senses (1) and (3) with (5).

Nevertheless, it is at least possible that an axiom in sense (5) might prove to be an actually false proposition, for the 'innate constitution of the mind' might involve one or another aptitude to believe error. In fact, an evolutionary view, closely resembling Spencer's, might lead, in a thinker less optimistic about human nature than is Spencer, to the doctrine that certain instinctive tendencies, determined by evolution, are still such as to deceive the individual. Thus the innate hostility and resentfulness which form one aspect of human nature may be viewed, by an evolutionist, as a necessary result of the conditions of conflict under which humanity has developed. And such tendencies might easily lead, in a civilized man, to a belief regarded by the individual as axiomatic in sense (5), and probably also in sense (2). This belief might take the form of the principle that one ought to avenge all injuries, and to destroy, if possible, all enemies. As a fact, however, this belief, although dependent upon the very 'constitution' of the mind of one whose ancestors have lived by war and have enjoyed blood revenge, may be, and is, a false principle of ethics. Or again, a lover's beliefs about his beloved are deeply affected by the innate constitution of his mind, and may appear to him to be, not only in sense (5) but also in sense (2), axiomatic. Yet they may be in many respects false. A pessimist, such as Schopenhauer, is fond of emphasizing the innate 'illusions' which, according to him, characterize human nature. Buddhist doctrine is equally emphatic in characterizing the most cherished and innate convictions of common sense as both logically false and morally destructive. Salvation for the Buddhist depends upon discovering axioms in sense (1) which are extremely hard to discover, so that only the Buddhas ever attain to them. But, when once seen, these axioms are for the enlightened indeed

'self-evident.' And the knowledge of them sets aside those axioms in sense (2) which are also axioms in sense (5), and which, according to Buddhism, are due to the innate deceitfulness of desire. So little, for some men, does either innateness or subjective necessity imply self-evidence and truth.

Axioms in sense (5), furthermore, need not always be axioms in sense (2); for, as partisans of innate ideas generally admit, any individual may remain unaware of some of his inherited aptitudes for conviction. On the other hand, there is no reason why a *new* assurance, or an axiom in sense (2), may not appear in the life of somebody whom revelation or a sudden growth or 'mutation' (such as may occur in the course of evolution) endows with a faith which, just because it is novel, does not constitute an axiom in sense (5).

As for senses (4) and (5), they very frequently coincide in their denotation, but need not do so. Although what 'the very constitution of the human mind determines us to believe' is, *ipso facto*, 'believed by all,' in case the constitution in question is precisely the constitution 'common to all human minds,' there is no reason why the innate might not also be the individual, the congenital *variation* of this or of that mind. The individual may possess an aptitude for conviction which belongs to his 'constitution,' but which no other man, or nobody who has preceded him, possesses or has possessed. This is as possible as is a new individual revelation due to any other source than the inherited temperament of the individual. Prophets, Buddhas, poets, geniuses generally, have often been credited with such aptitudes for forming out of the depths of their own natures new convictions, which they have then taught to other men. On the other hand, as Locke and other empiricists have frequently insisted, those convictions which in sense (4) are more or less common to many or even to all men need not on that account be regarded as mainly determined by our innate constitution. They may be supposed to be due to experience, which moulds men to common results.

The foregoing survey shows us that the five senses of the term 'axiom' here in question are in a large measure independent of one another, so far as their logical intension is concerned, while by virtue of their various applications, now to the same, now to different sets of propositions, these five meanings of the term 'axiom' have become painfully confused in the history of controversy and of the theory of knowledge. The result is that the term 'axiom' is a very attractive and a very dangerous term, which should never be employed by a careful thinker without a due consideration of the sense in which he himself proposes to employ it.

II. History of the term.—As to the history of the term 'axiom' and of its uses, the ancient sources are above all: (i.) Aristotle's theory of the axioms as propositions conforming both to our sense (1) and to sense (3); (ii.) Euclid's actual use of his axioms in his geometry, especially in sense (3), and in union with certain propositions called 'postulates' (which were also theoretical principles in our sense (3)). The treatment of the principles of science and of morals in sense (4) as principles 'known to all,' or as known to the 'wise' or to the 'competent,' has its beginnings in pre-Socratic philosophy, plays an important part in the Platonic *Dialogues*, and is in various special cases and passages carefully considered by Aristotle; but becomes especially prominent in the Stoical theory of knowledge and of ethics. While sense (2) plays a part throughout the history of ancient thought, it becomes especially important in Christianity and in modern discussions of the psychological aspects of the problem of knowledge.

Sense (5), implied by the Platonic theory of reminiscence, but long put into the background by the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, has come to play a very great part in modern discussion. Its completest classic expression is probably the one to be found in Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*.

The later discussion of the nature, the existence, the various senses, and the use of axiomatic truths, has been dominated since 1781 by three great movements: (1) the critical philosophy of Kant; (2) the various forms of modern Empiricism, Positivism, 'Pragmatism'; (3) the modern logical investigations of the principles of science—investigations which were especially stimulated by the famous inquiry into the axioms of Euclid's geometry, and which have since extended to the whole range of the foundations of mathematics, and also to the principles of theoretical physics, and to still other branches of scientific theory.

III. Significance for modern philosophy.—In the attempt to deal with the extremely complex philosophical problems which are suggested by the foregoing five senses of the term 'axiom,' there are one or two guiding considerations which any student of the topic may well bear in mind.

(a) First, not every philosophy which tries to avoid scepticism is forced to admit the existence of axioms in sense (1). The necessity of such an admission as the sole alternative to scepticism exists, indeed, for one who holds the opinions ascribed in the foregoing sketch to Aristotle. If all science depends upon a determinate set of absolutely 'first principles' (in sense (3)), then, unless these principles are also axioms in sense (1), our result would remain sceptical, for all scientific theory would lack basis. But the Aristotelian theory of scientific procedure is not the only possible one. That theory depends upon conceiving the structure of scientific theory as necessarily linear, with chains of syllogisms leading from determinate beginnings to the conclusions that constitute the scientific theory. But for a thinker such as Hegel, the ideal form of the totality of scientific theory is cyclical rather than linear. Truth may be, as a whole, a system of mutually supporting truths, whose absoluteness does not depend upon any one set of first principles, but consists in the rational coherence and inevitableness of the totality of the system. To assert such a doctrine involves considerations which cannot be developed here. It is enough that such a thesis has been attempted. From the point of view there would indeed be axioms in sense (3), viz., in relation to certain partial systems, such as this or that mathematical or logical doctrine, whose theoretical development would indeed depend upon chains of deductive reasoning. And there would also be necessary truth, both in the parts and in the whole system. But there would be no absolutely first principles, and there would also be no immediate certainties—nothing, in fact, that is purely immediate in the whole system of truth. The whole would be mediated by the parts, and conversely.

(b) Second, the traditional alternative: either this proposition is self-evident or else it is dependent upon some other proposition from which it is deduced, or else it remains uncertain, does not exhaust the logical possibilities regarding the rational discovery of truth. Omitting here the complex problem as to the relation between our experience of particular facts and the general truths which our scientific theories aim at establishing, we may point out that there are propositions such that to deny them implies that they are true. As Aristotle already observed, the principle of contradiction is itself a proposition of this type. Euclid's geometry contains more than one instance

where a proposition is demonstrated by showing that the contradictory of the *probandum* implies the truth of this *probandum*. The proof that this is, in fact, the case may be no easy one, and may involve elaborate mediations. But any proposition A, such that the contradictory of A implies A, is, *ipso facto*, a true proposition, although nobody may yet have come to feel its necessity.

When we prove a proposition, however, by showing that its contradictory implies it, we do not make this proposition 'self-evident.' Nor yet do we demonstrate the proposition merely by reference to other propositions which we have to assume as prior certainties. What we find, in such cases, is not so much 'self-evidence,' as 'self-mediation'—an essentially cyclical process of developing the inter-relations which constitute the system of truth. In case, then, there are no axioms in sense (1), we need not abandon either the ideal or the hope of the attainment of rational truth.

(c) Third, axioms in sense (2) we need and use wherever and whenever we are engaged in practical activities, or are absorbed in contemplations, such as require a laying aside of the critical sense and a limitation of the business of reflexion. But the assertion 'I am sure of this' is never logically equivalent to the assertion 'This is true.' And it is no part of the business of science or of philosophy to seek, or to remain content with, merely private 'convictions' or 'persuasions,' however 'necessary' the subject feels them to be.

(d) Fourth, axioms in senses (4) and (5) interest the anthropologist, and the student of society, of history, of religion, of psychology; they can never satisfy the student of philosophy, or in particular, of logic, and of truth for its own sake.

(e) Finally, sense (3), interpreted not absolutely but relatively, so that an axiom is a principle which lies at the basis of a certain selected system of propositions, and which is not demonstrated in the course of that system, remains the sense in which the term 'axiom' is still most serviceably employed in modern theory. Philosophy seeks not absolute first principles, nor yet purely immediate insights, but the self-mediation of the system of truth, and an insight into this self-mediation. Axioms, in the language of modern theory, are best defined, neither as certainties nor as absolutely first principles, but as those principles which are used as the first in a special theory.

LITERATURE.—A complete view of the literature of the problems regarding axioms is impossible, since the topic is connected with all the fundamental philosophical issues. A few sources are:—Aristotle, *Analyt. Post.* i. 2, 3, *Metaphys.* iii. 2, iv. 3, 4; see also Zeller, *Philos. d. Griechen*³, ii. ii. 234-240. Of works bearing on the topic we may specially name:—Descartes, *Discourse on Method, and Meditations*; Spinoza, *Tract. de Emenda. Intellectus, and Ethics*, especially pts. i. and ii.; Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, esp. bks. I. and iv.; Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*; Reid, *Inquiry into the Human Mind*⁷, 1814, and *Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind*³, 1812; Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; J. S. Mill, *Logic*⁸, 1872; Hegel, *Logic*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*², 1870-72. Bertrand Russell's *Foundations of Geometry*, 1897, and *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, and L. Couturat's *Logique mathématique*, contain summaries of the principal problems and results regarding the mathematical 'first principles' which are of philosophical importance. JOSIAH ROYCE.

AZAZEL.—When the word 'Azazel' was first introduced into a Western Bible or language is unknown to the present writer. It does not occur in the Concordances of the Greek, Latin, and German Bibles; it found a place in AVm at Lv 16^{8, 10, 26} for the 'scapegoat' of the text, and in the text of the RV, 'dismissal' being its interpretation on the margin. In Greek it seems to have appeared first in print in Montfaucou's *Heczapla*, 1713, at Lv 16²⁶, from Cod. X (Coislinianus, now M). It is found a second time, according to Field, in the text of that Codex at v.¹⁰, εἰς ἀζάηλ εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τὴν ἀποκομτὴν; this reading