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only kept the pigs from straying, but actually taught them for the first time to walk" (p. 188). Now, just as every pig-driver knows that pigs do move and that the problem is to get them to move the way you wish, so every evolutionist knows that organisms vary (look at the flowers on the same plant, the puppies of the same litter!); but the problem for Darwin was how to explain the relative fixity of species, given the facts of variation and heredity; and the problem for the sociologist is how to explain the diversity among the social and moral institutions of mankind, given the tendency to strike out new lines ("invention") and the tendency to follow existing usage ("imitation"). And to these problems natural selection—"weeding out"—seems a very good answer, though it most certainly leaves the *facts* of variation and heredity unexplained.

Any detailed account, however, of the various ways in which the law of natural selection comes to be modified, complicated, or restricted by the exercise of more or less conscious choice, would occupy a good deal of space, and cannot be attempted here.

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A MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout, M.A., LL.D. (The University Tutorial Series). University Correspondence College Press: London, W. B. Clive; New York, Hinds & Noble. 1899. Pp. xvi., 643.

The Editor of *Mind* and the author of the well known "Analytic Psychology" (London, 1896) here presents a text book of Psychology, intended for beginners, and specially adjusted to the purpose of preparing students for examinations, yet of solid interest to properly prepared readers of all grades. The general point of view of the author is known from his previous work. The method of this book has also the features for which his former publications have prepared us. A wide acquaintance with the literature of Experimental Psychology, and a recognition of the most permanently valuable tendencies of the older English Psychology, a frequent use of anthropological illustrations of mental processes, and a strong interest in the philosophical bearings of the problems of Psychology, all appear as auxiliaries to the main special interest that the author takes in the problems of mental development. This main interest lies in a

relatively teleological interpretation of mental processes in terms of the the theory of conation which the author set forth in the "Analytic Psychology." While this theory is here by no means one-sidedly emphasized, it is still throughout very prominent, despite the judicial discussion which all the various fundamental problems of Genetic Psychology receive, whether or no they directly bear upon the author's main interest.

After the Introduction (in three chapters), Book I. proceeds to a "general analysis." Here, in Chapter I. (p. 56 sqq.), a threefold division of the facts of consciousness is accepted: the "cognitive attitude"; the "feeling attitude," and the "conative attitude." The first, cognition, is defined as covering "all modes and degrees of being aware of or cognizant of an object"; and cognitive consciousness is carefully distinguished from its object, with which Dr. Stout refuses, under any circumstances, to identify it. Thus a sensation is cognitive of a sensible quality, and must not be confounded with the latter. The "feeling attitude" is that of pleasure or displeasure with the object cognized. The "conative attitude," that of longing, desire, endeavor, wish, or will, needs a fuller characterization. In all conation (p. 63) "there is an inherent tendency to pass beyond" the desire, wish, or endeavor, and to "become something different." This tendency "is not only a fact but an experience; and the peculiar mode of being conscious, which constitutes the experience is called *conation*." The process of consciousness, with its incessant change "is partly self determining." "The stream of consciousness has a current; and its course is determined not merely by external conditions, but by its own drift at any moment. Considered in relation to the presented object, conation is a tendency to alter it, or make some difference in it, to expel it from consciousness, or to bring it more vividly before consciousness." "The end to which" conation (p. 64) is directed "is always some change in consciousness itself." Conation includes all activities of attention (p. 64). It has for its "end" such a passage to a different state as, satisfying the conation, will lead it to disappear; so that the term "end" has a literal as well a metaphorical meaning (p. 66).

Each of these three aspects of consciousness finds of course its place in our author's further treatment of Psychology; and the prominent place which Experimental Psychology has given

to the elementary phenomena of the cognitive aspect of mental life, insures that this book should devote many pages to Sensation and Perception. But the peculiar interest of our author's procedure lies in the way in which his account of all aspects of mind is colored by the general view of conation just suggested. Consciousness has its "conative unity" and its "conative continuity" (p. 73, p. 77, sqq.), the unity and continuity, namely, which characterize conscious processes that tend towards some one goal (as when one plays a game or fashions a work of some art, or thinks over a problem). "In the development of mental life, conative unity and continuity is of altogether predominant importance. Such psychical relations as depend on mere proximity in time are subsidiary, and may, in a broad view of mental evolution, be neglected. Thus, in what follows, we shall almost entirely confine our attention to those mental connexions which arise from the combination of mental elements as constituent parts of the same conative process" (p. 76). When facts of consciousness form part of a conative whole, the way in which retentiveness keeps the traces of them, and revives these traces, is such as to give, in the end, every state of consciousness a "meaning" with reference to the whole of which it is a part. This meaning may be "primary" or "secondary," but it is by virtue of such meaning that every mental fact comes to get its relation to the entire process of mental development. Cognitive values are therefore, in general, for Dr. Stout, secondary to conative values; in other words, our sensations, perceptions, ideas, mean objects, or enable us to know objects, only through the relation of such cognitive data to our conscious conative activities. Perceptual processes are guided by impressions, but are mental activities "directly worked out in bodily movements" (p. 393). Ideational processes "reach their end through mental images succeeding each other in a series independently of actual perception." But both the perceptual and the ideational trains "have in general a certain unity and continuity of interest" (p. 418). In consequence, the laws of association, so far as they have explanatory value, are, for Dr. Stout, related to conation. "The fundamental principle of association is not *contiguity* in the strict sense of the word, but rather *continuity of interest*" (p. 422). "Ideational activity," involving "conceptual analysis and synthesis" (p. 448), is the characteristic form

of the intellectual life. The External World comes to be known as such by virtue of its relation to the control and to the adaptation of our activities (p. 321, sqq.; and p. 490, sqq.), both direct, as in case of the perceptual world, and indirect, as in case of our more ideal constructions. The Self also is an "ideal construction." Belief is both "conditioned by mental activity" and also involves "restriction of mental activity" (pp. 547 sqq.). As for the whole life of Feeling, the most general theory, for Dr. Stout, is (p. 234) that "whatever conditions further and favor conation in the attainment of its end, yield pleasure. Whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of its end, are sources of displeasure."

Mental life thus comes to centre around conation, and this member in the threefold division assumes a significance to which the other aspects of mental life are distinctly contributory, rather than merely coordinated. This view is, of course, not peculiar to Dr. Stout, but is here developed with all the skill of the author of the "Analytic Psychology." Any discussion of its theoretical value for the work of Psychology as a science is here out of place. But the interest of such a conception of mental life for the student of Ethics is obvious, and warrants a special notice of this decidedly important work in this place. The range of the treatment, the compendious form, and the admirable use of illustrations combine to give the book importance for both teacher and student.

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ELEMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. Vol. II. By C. P. Tiele. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1899. Pp. 286.

In this valuable and interesting second series of his Gifford Lectures Professor Tiele discusses in outline what he calls the ontological part of the science of religion. The previous series of lectures dealt with the morphology or development of the religious consciousness; the present ontological inquiry has for its aim to ascertain and examine the permanent elements which constitute the essence of religion. In this inquiry, however, Professor Tiele wishes to adhere strictly to the scientific point of view. His aim is neither apologetic nor dogmatic, although naturally the scientific conclusions as to the psychological nature