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VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Analytic Psychology. By G. F. STOUT, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. In two volumes. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896. Vol. i., pp. xv., 289; vol. ii., pp. v., 314.

IT seems superfluous to undertake, for the readers of MIND, any mere report of the opinions of the author of the present volumes. On the other hand, the task of estimating Mr. Stout's contributions to his science is one which cannot be very briefly accomplished, at least by the present reviewer. For these contributions relate to some of the most central of the problems of psychological theory. They are marked by originality of method, even where they appear as defending well-known doctrines. And the present writer finds that they arouse in his mind a somewhat complex union of assent and dissent. In fact, one of the reasons for the long and unwilling delay of this review has been the difficulty that I have felt in clearly distinguishing between the features of Mr. Stout's treatment that call forth my admiring agreement, and the very closely related features that I find myself unable to accept. I do not believe this difficulty wholly subjective. Nor, on the other hand, do I believe Mr. Stout to be at all individually responsible for it. I take it that the present position of psychological theory, the current controversies as to the nature of "psychical causation" and as to the constitution of the "stream of consciousness," are such as demand of us, when we consider them, some very subtle and delicate distinctions. Personally I thank Mr. Stout, whose whole treatment of his subject is so subtle and so delicate, for help in making these needed distinctions clearer in my own mind. But when I turn to the task of commenting upon his highly important discussions in the light of these distinctions, in so far as I at present possess such light, I find myself simply unable to be as brief as I could wish. This is my fault; but at all events I hope that the length of these comments may be taken as a measure, however awkward, of my interest in our author's work.

I.

Mr. Stout distinguishes between "Analytic Psychology," the topic of the present volumes, and "Genetic Psychology," to which he intends to devote later volumes. Analytic Psychology has two divisions. The first deals with the "general analysis of consciousness". It is concerned (vol. i., p. 36) to "ascertain the number and nature and mutual connexion of those ultimate contents of consciousness and modes of being conscious which do not admit of genetic derivation, but at most only of definition and description. This department of Psychology is purely analytical and largely introspective. The point of view proper to it is statical, not dynamical. It is not concerned with the transition between one state of consciousness and another; its aim is to discover the ultimate and irreducible constituents of consciousness in general." The second division of Analytical Psychology has to investigate "the general laws and conditions according to which change takes place in consciousness". This division is still analytic, since its method is an "analysis of what takes place in the fully developed mind". A Genetic Psychology would undertake the further task of expounding the stages in the development of the individual mind. Of the two divisions thus indicated in our author's work, the first considers, in book i., chapter i., the principle of division of ultimate mental functions. In chapter ii., the "Analysis of Presentations," in chapters iii. and iv., the forms of "Apprehension," in chapter v., "Belief," in chapter vi., "Feeling and Conation," are defined and illustrated. The second part depends, in a measure, upon the theory of the nature of mental activity expounded in the opening chapter of book ii. But the most noteworthy and original developments of our author's theories concerning the dynamics of the mental process occur in the later chapters of book ii., which fill the second volume.

Of the line of discussion thus sketched one is first disposed to remark, not indeed by way of objection, that the first of these sections certainly does not contain as much detailed study of the mere contents of consciousness, apart from their dynamical relations, as the opening statement might lead one to anticipate, especially in view of the usual customs of psychologists. We find no elaborate accounts of the distinctions of the various classes of sensations, no extended dialectics regarding the relations of "intensity" to "quality," and the like. On the contrary, our author confines himself to a general discussion rather of the fundamental "modes" of being conscious, in the sense in which Brentano distinguished such modes, than of the details of the contents of consciousness. But brevity in this region of psychology is not unwelcome, and Mr. Stout has done well to avoid repeating familiar matter. On the other hand, it may at once be said that the second or "dynamical" section of Mr. Stout's work is by no means wholly devoted to the laws of mental sequence, but continues the work of the first part by adding many valuable analyses of the contents and modes of consciousness. And, as a fact, it is in this aspect of the second part of the treatise that the present reviewer finds what he most prizes in Mr. Stout's work. Our author's conception of psychical causation, and of the dynamics of consciousness, arouses the present writer's frequent dissent. On the other hand, Mr. Stout's analysis of the "noetic" states of consciousness, viewed just *as* an analysis of the structure and the significance of momentary and of serial conscious facts and processes, appears, as far as it goes, almost altogether admirable, except indeed in the analysis of Belief, with which I disagree. Moreover, the aspects of the knowing process upon which Mr. Stout lays stress have been far too much neglected. This makes their just recognition the more welcome. The significance of the more formal aspects of the conscious process, the importance, for knowledge, of the consciousness of mental wholes, or unities, the thesis that the consciousness of any such a mental whole does not depend upon a detailed consciousness of the parts, the allied thesis that the noetic process cannot be reduced to a mere series of mental images, the elaborate analysis of the processes whereby we become aware of the "meaning" of a train of thought—all these are features of great importance in the chapters before us. Especially must the student of logic thank Mr. Stout for the light he has thrown upon the descriptive psychology of the thinking process. And in so far as Mr. Stout, in these analyses, opposes the traditional "association" doctrines of the constitution of the conscious stream the present writer rejoices in the confusion of the associationists.

But description is not causal explanation. A study of mental structure is not a dynamical theory. Psychical causation is not identical with psychical significance. And here, if I must speak for myself, begins my chief dissent from Mr. Stout's procedure. In the matter of the "dynamics" of consciousness, Mr. Stout takes sides with the partisans of "mental activity," while giving, to be sure, his own definitions of what constitutes mental activity and of what is the evidence for its existence. Here he necessarily comes upon especially controversial ground—ground where the psychologist has to take account of general logical and metaphysical theses as to the nature of causation, before he can make sure of his own right to assert the existence of causal connexions. Believing, as I myself do, that no introspective study of the contents, or of the sequences, or of the significance of conscious states, can determine the true nature of any causal link which binds them together, holding, as I do, that the conception of causation is one that logically forbids the verification of a causal connexion by any *one* observer of any series of facts, inner or outer, I am unable at present to accept the thesis that the psychologist can find in "mental activity," or in any aspect of the inner life, however significant, the warrant for a theory of the dynamics of consciousness. It is not then that I prize "association" more, but that I trust introspection in general less as to all dynamical questions of psychology. It is this fact which leads me to dissent from Mr. Stout's theories of psychical causation, while in the main, accepting nearly all his analyses of the purely noetic states of consciousness.

Dissent such as this concerns matters whose full study would lead us far into the realms of the general logic and metaphysics of causation. I may premise, however, in general, that, to my mind, whoever says "Experience proves that A causes B" is logically committed to certain assertions both about the nature of the A and the B of which the relation in question is affirmed, and about the nature of the experience to which the assertor of the proposition appeals. And these assertions are in substance as follows: First, A and B have to be conceived as facts of a universally verifiable, of a public, of a socially tested character and type. Physical facts are *conceived as* of this character, namely, as *common* objects for *many* possible observers. Secondly, the experience to which one appeals, as proving the causal relation, is not the experience of any one observer as such, but a certain *conceived common* experience of scientific observers in general. In consequence of this logical condition of the very conception of a causal connexion, I conceive that no observer can say: "I have introspectively discovered a causal connexion existent within my consciousness".

This assertion as to the logical significance of the conception of causation will doubtless call forth objection. I have no time to defend it at length here. I can only say, in brief, that I hold it because it seems to me that the whole history of the explanation of nature by men warrants this definition. Explanation of nature has always been a social affair. Men have taught one another to think about nature. The categories of human thought about nature are consequently ethnological products. In particular, the spirit of natural science grew out of two essentially social sources: the first was the commercial spirit, which taught men exactness in the definition of facts, and especially in the *quantitative* definition of facts, since commerce, as a social process, forced men to measure and weigh goods, and to define contracts; the second was the spirit of industrial art, whose traditions, in order to be passed on from generation to generation, demanded exactness in the definition of processes. Now both commerce and art deal with socially common objects, in so far as they are common. And both the industrial and the commercial spirit require the agreement of various men about facts *conceived as* common to them all, and, therefore, as relatively independent of any one of them. The things bought and sold, the contracts executed, the processes of an art taught by the master to the apprentice, are all viewed as exact, as definable and as subject to law, precisely in so far as they are also matters of tradition, of agreement, of social community. Thus first developed the conception of fact subject to natural law. The exactness of the law was the obverse aspect of its socially common character. The conception still bears the marks of its origin. Science inherited and developed this conception. As a fact, no student of physical science conceives natural fact as properly the exclusive object of any one observer's experience. He conceives such fact *as* fact that *can* be observed in common by many. And the laws of such facts are conceived as laws precisely in so far as they are conceived as objects of a possible social agreement, valid for all men.

But if we thus define natural law in general, then we must carry over this concept into psychology. What an observer can, as psychologist, hope to say about the natural laws of mind is, substantially, that our common experience of human nature, as observed within and as *also* expressed without, in the words, gestures, deeds, conduct and rational life of men, proves, upon the basis of the general postulates of science, that certain causal relations exist. But the objects of such a common and social experience of human nature are never mental states alone, observed by introspection. For the introspective observer is, as such, watching what, by hypothesis, nobody else can ever observe, namely, his own inner states. The objects of our general social knowledge of the ways of human nature are always conceived as psycho-physical processes, that is as mental phenomena *expressed in* physically observable words, deeds, gestures, blushes, laughter, tears, and other such processes. Only of these *psycho-physical wholes* can causal or "dynamical" relations be psychologically predicated. Hence, as I should maintain, introspection, as such, has no right to discover any "dynamical" connexions —not because introspection is vain, nor yet because the "associationists" are right, but because the causal concept forbids the purely introspective, that is the essentially immediate and lonely discovery of any causal relations. For causation "marries universals," and universals of a peculiar type, namely, universals conceived as the *common* objects of the experience of many.

It is this general logical scruple that determines my own inability to follow Mr. Stout's dynamical explanations of conscious processes, or to believe in "mental activity" as anything essentially causal. On the other hand, I can follow the discussions of the so-called "active" processes with a full sense that the author is everywhere analysing the inner and genuine significance of conscious events in a profoundly important way.

So much for purely general comments. They may serve to determine the plan of the following observations, which will be devoted first to the dynamic, and secondly to the more strictly analytic aspect of our author's psychology. That we thus begin with the aspect which will provoke our principal dissent, may serve to enable us to do all the more justice to the other aspect, when we express later our agreement.

II.

If we view psychology as a science that deals with the "laws of mind," precisely as a physical science deals with the laws of nature, we find Mr. Stout, in his opening chapter in volume i., discussing, with agreeable brevity, the general scope and methods of our science. The psychologist (p. 4) has a right to take account of any uniformities that can be observed or inferred in the course of mental events themselves; and is not forced to proceed to physiological or other extra-conscious explanations, except in so far as (p. 20) the "existence and inter-connexion of conscious states is most distinctly and intelligibly formulated by the introduction of physiological links and co-operating conditions". The psychologist may, however, also legitimately make use of the hypothesis of the so-called "psychical dispositions," either with or without a reference to their physiological aspect. In this way it becomes clear that the psychologist, as such, is primarily interested in detecting, if possible, uniformities *within* the field of consciousness. Where these uniformities fail him, he proceeds to fill up the gaps by appealing to "psychical dispositions" whose nature is so far more or less hypothetical, and then, on occasion, to the physiological bases of these dispositions. In order to discover his facts, the psychologist appeals to "introspection," to "retrospection," and to communication with other minds. Of these three methods, Mr. Stout considers (p. 14) that the third is a "derivative method which presupposes the other two, although they do not presuppose it". He continues by observing that "there is no such a thing as direct observation of other minds; all that is immediately perceptible consists of sensible signs and tokens of inward events; and these sensible signs and tokens are interpretable only through knowledge attained by introspection or retrospection". Physiological knowledge in its present states of development is (p. 26 *sqq.*) of secondary importance for the psychologist; and (p. 34) "it is clear that psychology must do the main body of its own work on its own lines"; and (p. 35) "it is idle to require psychology to wait for the progress of physiology".

When one has such a conception as this of the means by which the psychologist is to discover the laws of mental processes, we naturally inquire what types of laws one believes oneself to have discovered by those methods which, beginning with introspection and retrospection, regard all other psychological methods as secondary to these. We shall probably not be mistaken in asserting that Mr. Stout finds these uniformities especially exemplified, in so far as they are accessible to direct introspection, in the early chapters of his second book, especially in the chapter on "The Concept of Mental Activity," and in the chapter on "The Process of Attention". Numerous, and decidedly valuable, generalisations as to the laws of mental life appear in volume ii., and fill a considerable portion of our author's text. But one is especially concerned to observe that precisely where these laws are most definitely stated, they, for the most part, cannot be stated as the results of *mere* introspection. When, for instance, our attention is called to the laws of apperception, as illustrated by the processes of language (and this is what is frequently done in the second volume of our author's work), the author cannot say that the laws as then stated are the results of anybody's introspection. For language, as such, is an externally observable and physical record of how minds in general work. Its processes (for instance the processes indicated by its grammatical form) may be interpreted by the individual by the aid of his own introspection. But the interest of these processes, as indicating psychological laws, depends upon the assumption that the processes of language do record, not how my mind in particular just now works, but how the minds of people in general have worked. If the law that one announces thus depends for its discovery upon an interpretation of certain socially significant doings of other people, the psychologist is in so far using, not his supposed primary method of introspection, but the methods above declared to be secondary, namely, those methods of social interpretation of the expressions of other people's minds to which we are all accustomed. In reading our author's later chapters, we are, therefore, constantly disposed to note that the laws which he announces as laws of mental life, whether true or not, are not laws which he has detected merely by introspection, nor laws which any one of us can verify solely by his introspection. One is thus led to inquire whether our author, or any other psychologist, is ever able to say in *purely* introspective terms: "I have observed for myself, individually, without reference to other minds, that there is occurring in me a process subject to the law that something, a state or series of states A, is always, or even very generally, followed by a state or series of states B". Very frequently, as one can see, the practical logic of the psychologist, whether he be our author or anybody else, really runs thus: "Various expressions of various people, as, for instance, the expressions that are crystallised in our language, prove that, on the whole, states of the kind A tend to be followed by the states of the kind B in a way such as to indicate a more or less exact and uniform law of sequence, although *if* any one of us were left to his own momentary introspection, and to his memory merely, he could not be sure of enough cases of such a sequence to be warranted, by the tests of inductive logic, in affirming any general law, even for himself, or for his own mind". Every man knows, of course, introspectively, a great deal about the mere routine of his own customary trains of consciousness. But such routine is so far like the arrangement of the inside of one's own house. When one knows one's own house, one can scarcely say that one has thereby learned "laws of physics". Just so when one knows, in a common-sense way, the mere routine of one's own private trains of conscious states, one has not yet learned "laws of mind". And the question is whether, by mere looking within, the psychologist ever learns true laws, even of his own mind. For introspection is subject to the peculiar defect that its facts are momentary. "Retrospection" is also subject to the defect that it can bring to mind but a few cases at a time. And both of them seem to exclude the application of rigid inductive methods. We may then, from the start, be sceptical as to whether the psychologist can *ever* discover, in terms of mere introspection, any general laws whatever. The confidence that our author, or that any other psychologist, has in his power to state any of the results of his introspection, as general laws, verifiable even for his own mind, actually depends upon his common-sense assurance that what he says is so far in agreement with the records and reports and expressions, or with the behaviour of other people, that, even if his supposed law has never been formally stated before, it is such as ought to be viewed as a fair account of the workings of our common human nature. Were he left to his own observation and memory, he could recall too few facts to warrant a law.

Now this fact, namely, that introspection, viewed apart from the interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people, can very seldom, if ever, be relied upon to present to the individual psychologist any uniformities worthy to be called laws of psychology, or even laws of his own mind, is of such vast significance for the whole logic of "dynamic" psychology, and consequently for the very meaning of the term law as used in psychology, and for the whole interpretation of the nature of mental causation, that we may fairly bear in mind, as we consider the laws of mental life which our author believes himself to have discovered, the question whether he has anywhere overcome the natural limitations of introspection, or has discovered, by mere introspection, any genuine psychical law whatever. As a fact, I myself do not believe that he has done so, or that any psychologist can do so. My own belief is that mere introspection can discover no psychical law, not even a law of the observer's own mind. It can only analyse current conscious states. And, for that very reason, mere introspection can throw no light upon the true nature of psychical causation. However, this is plainly not our author's view, and, as pointed out above, the chapters where there is most prospect of finding him successful in this respect, that is of finding him able to discover by direct introspection true psychical laws, or true psychical causation, are the chapters on mental activity and attention; and to these chapters we may, therefore, briefly appeal.

On page 144 of volume i. we begin a general discussion of the meaning of the term Activity. The popular use of "Activity" often makes it a mere synonym of Causality in general. But activity means for our author, as for Mr. Bradley, something more definite, namely (p. 145), "self-caused change," or "self-determining process". The thesis that in consciousness there is activity discoverable is (p. 147) coincident with the doctrine that conscious life "has a current of its own," is "always in some degree self-sustaining," and "tends by its intrinsic nature in a certain direction or towards a certain end". In consequence, the active processes of consciousness are contrasted with the passive processes in so far as, in the passive processes, such as mere perception, there is no reason within consciousness for the transition from the perception of one object to that of another (p. 148). "Mental activity exists when and so far as process in consciousness is the direct outcome of previous process in consciousness." Furthermore (p. 149) "in mental striving there is a tendency towards a state which remains relatively unrealised, so long as the conation continues". Processes of this sort, in so far as they have (p. 152) their "starting point and terminal point in the current of consciousness," are mental activity. To be sure (p. 155), mental activity is never pure. "All mental self-determination is indirect." For the mental process determines changes which occur outside of consciousness, say in the brain, and these changes in their turn react upon the conscious process. But (p. 156) "the impossibility of isolating immanent or direct self-determination constitutes no reason for regarding it as a fiction". For no change within consciousness is entirely determined from without. Furthermore, the conscious activity thus defined is "selective," and "adaptive". That is, what occurs in consequence of mental activity is such as to meet a mental or conscious end. Meanwhile, if mental activity is never pure, and is purely indirect, one can still say (p. 160) "mental activity exists in being felt. It is an immediate experience. The stream of consciousness feels its own current." Or (p. 166) "the process of consciousness is as such a *felt* process". And within what is felt, in the process, is included "the antithesis between the process in so far as it contributes to its own self-sustainment and development, and in so far as it is determined by conditions extraneous to itself". In addition "there is an immediate experience," in the conscious process "of its effectiveness or ineffectiveness, its freedom or constraint". And finally (p. 168) "to be mentally active is identical with being mentally alive or awake. According to this view, therefore, there can be no such thing as purely passive consciousness."

It will be seen at once that this very frank statement of the thesis that consciousness is active, contains one very curious difficulty. The activity whose existence is asserted, is admitted to be always partly indirect. Consciousness never does directly and wholly determine the sequence of its own states. What consciousness does is to determine something outside of consciousness, which something, in turn, determines a process or state within consciousness. Yet what thus *occurs* indirectly is somehow *felt* directly. That consciousness is active is immediately known. Yet the activity of consciousness is itself never quite immediate. If the rest of the psycho-physical organism failed, for extra-conscious reasons, to co-operate with consciousness, the activity would not act; nothing would be accomplished. Yet consciousness feels its own efficacy, and feels this immediately. Moreover this difficulty is by no means the only one in the theory advanced. One who has introspectively discovered the conscious activity knows thus, directly or indirectly, that something, namely, A, with or without the co-operation of an extra-conscious factor, is the cause which produces something else, B. Now one who knows such a truth as this must surely be knowing something universal, a law or principle, if indeed he knows anything worthy to be called causal connexion. He must know that whenever A occurs under conditions definably similar to those which are here present, be these conditions themselves wholly in or partly outside of consciousness, B must follow. Unless one knows such a general principle, one has discovered no sort of causation. But at once, we may ask, how can introspection, which shows us merely that here and now, or retrospection, which shows us merely that on a number of remembered occasions, A, or something similar to A, is or has been succeeded by B, or by something resembling B, how can either of these assure us of any such general law? But if, going further, the psychologist's induction, following ordinary empirical methods, has taken account of cases sufficiently numerous to establish such a general principle, in what possible sense could such an induction, indirect, and considerately comparative of many different cases as it would be—in what possible sense, I repeat, could it any longer be called an expression of immediate feeling? Immediate consciousness can tell only that B here follows A. The immediate facts A and B, and their sequence, however momentous, are, for introspection, merely facts of the moment. They have, as facts here present to introspection, nothing but the connexion here felt. Any inductive basis for the principle that A tends, in a definable way, to be in general followed by B, must be sought outside of this moment, and cannot be here felt, as any immediate fact. But, perhaps, by the immediately felt efficacy of A, as the producer or active begetter of B, one means nothing that can be expressed, as yet, in terms of a general principle or law. One means only that A is here efficacious in producing B, whether A would ever again be thus efficacious or not. However, if this is all that the immediately felt activity, the immediately present efficaciousness of A means, *then* it seems entirely unfair to speak of such connexions as in the least parallel to those which physical science regards as causal connexions. The causal connexions of physical science, whatever you may say of their warrant, whatever theory, Humean or Kantian, you may have of our knowledge of them, are all of them conceived as universal connexions, or as connexions linking classes of facts. In consequence such connexions, by definition, are excluded from being objects of anybody's immediate experience. They cannot be felt, they must be conceived. Experience can verify them indirectly, but never present them at one time. They are objects, not of immediate experience, but of indirect knowledge. And this they are, not because the physical objects are, as such, things in themselves, but because the connexions in question are, as such, universal, are facts whose *esse* must be, not their *percipi*, from the point of view of any one observer or moment, but their universal validity for all experience, for all observers, for all times. We are not here concerned with the question how such universally valid connexions can be asserted to be true. We are only concerned with their logical character as causal connexions. This character distinguishes them, by the breadth of the whole logical heaven, from the contents of any immediate experience as such. And consequently, if the connexions introspectively observed are connexions immediately felt, they are simply not causal connexions, unless causation is no longer to mean what it does in the world where universal types of sequence are defined.

It is plain, however, that our author, in common with most partisans of mental activity, believes that the connexions immediately felt in the conscious stream are capable of being stated in terms of universally verifiable principles. In other words, he doubtless believes, as appears from his whole discussion, that when you go beyond the immediately felt connexions, and compare your own experiences with those of other people, you can indirectly make out that such connexions do stand for a sort of efficaciousness which we can express in universal terms, and verify by ordinary inductive methods. Thus, I attend, and am said immediately to feel my attention to be efficacious in guiding the stream of consciousness. So far I have immediate fact, and not yet general principle. But I compare notes with others, and am supposed to discover reports that agree with mine as to the nature of this immediate feeling about attention. Moreover, in observing people, I note all sorts of indirect expressions of this "efficacy of attention". I thus verify my own impressions, and become assured that mental activity is something of a universally valid meaning. But now, as one must still insist, What is it that I discover when I thus compare notes, and observe the general indications amongst men regarding the causal relations of attention? And one must answer, In case of such comparison I discover, upon the basis of ordinary inductive methods, certain generally verifiable uniformities, certain objective regularities of scientific experience. But what are these uniformities? Are they uniformities in the sequence of purely internal or mental states? Answer, No. Every mental state is, by hypothesis, observable, introspectively, by one observer only. But inductive science is, logically speaking, always concerned with what is *conceived as* the universally observable. And now what is, on the basis of the presuppositions of ordinary inductive logic, universally observable about the mental sequences? I answer, with the use of the formula that has lately been employed, in a slightly different way, by Avenarius: What is universally observable is that, at the time when men, viewed as physical or psycho-physical organisms, either "behave as if they attended," or "report" that they are attending, that is, express, in what Avenarius calls their *Aussagen*, that they "do attend," *then* there uniformly follow certain other observable phenomena, which may be described as reports or expressions of "clearer and clearer comprehension," or of "improving acquaintance with objects," or of "better adjustment to the environment," according as the attention has appeared to be long continued or minute. Now one who asserts this inductively verifiable law, asserts the efficaciousness of attention in the only sense in which such efficaciousness can become a principle in psychological science. What ultimate epistemological warrant anybody can have for such inductions belongs elsewhere for consideration. It is enough here that the assertions of all inductive psychologists, including our author, in so far as they are assertions of general principles about attention, or about any other "active process," are just such inductive assertions about human nature in general, about the behaviour of mankind, viewed as a universally legible psycho-physical expression of mental states. But all such assertions are indeed "indirect". Nobody's immediate introspection can give them any direct logical warrant. They stand or fall with the validity of the social consciousness, and of the general process of induction. The causal connexion that they assert is, as it stands, not a connexion observable within the field of introspection, but a connexion *between one psycho-physical total and another*. Viewing human nature in such wise that certain expressions, reports, gestures, words, or other manifestations, are regarded as inseparable from certain more or less definitely legible mental states, whose presence is assumed to be well known, and whose interpretation is assumed to be upon general social grounds valid for all psychologists, the psychologist inductively makes out that the psycho-physical complex A (an enormously complicated total of physical activities, of nervous conditions of these activities, and of accompanying psychical states) is connected, according to definable principles, with another psycho-physical complex, B. And thus, and thus alone, can an empirical psychologist define in universal terms, causal connexions. Now connexions thus defined cannot be identical in contents with connexions immediately observable by the introspective student of the conscious stream. It is useless to try to discover the causal laws in immediate experience, when the laws, just as soon as they become laws, refer to what is not and cannot be immediate, namely to the conceived objects of a universally valid scientific experience of complex psycho-physical uniformities. On the other hand, in so far as such uniformities are discovered, they cannot verify what immediate experience discovers, because they refer to different objects from those present in immediate experience. In brief, then, in so far as mental activity is an object of direct introspection, it has nothing to do with the causal laws of mind. And, on the other hand, in so far as causal laws are discovered by the psychologist as universal principles, they cannot be used as proving that one has observed rightly the nature of the mental activity said to be present in immediate experience.

I regret the somewhat recondite nature of the foregoing reference to the general logic of the causal conception. While I have developed this conception more or less independently in certain previous papers of my own on the general problems of knowledge, the conception of psychical causation here concerned has close relations to some of the analyses of Avenarius; and I may refer to the latter's observations on the nature of psychological experience as, at least, helping to make my own notions, even in this rough statement, somewhat intelligible, despite the differences between the two theories of causation. And the prominence given by Mr. Stout to his own conception of mental activity, and to its logic, must be my warrant for referring at such length to first principles as I criticise his views. For Mr. Stout makes the experience of mental activity, and of its various hindrances, the source of the most essential features of feeling, of belief, of conation, and, in a large measure, of knowledge. If my criticism is well founded all the essentially "dynamical" aspects of his theory must be seriously modified, as a brief consideration will still further show.

For if I am right, psychological laws of a causal nature are, like the causal laws of physics, all of them the objects of a certain highly indirect and "conceptual" type of experience, the experience of "the psychologists" or of the "students of human nature," viewed as the observers to whom are present the essentially "common" facts of their world of scientific knowledge. And these common facts which the psychologists are conceived as knowing, are not the mere sequences of mental states in any one observer's immediate field of introspective knowledge, but the uniformities of the psycho-physical realm called, in general, the "realm of human nature". My proof, so far as the present case goes, may lie in the fact that Mr. Stout, like any other psychologist, devotes himself, almost altogether, in concrete cases of psychological induction, to reporting and to commenting upon just such common facts; and he uses introspection, for the most part, only to illustrate here and there what is viewed by him as commonly observable. Whenever he announces any definite laws, apart from the general existence of "mental activity" itself, he appeals to language, to pathology, to childhood, to mankind in general, as furnishing the proofs for his inductions; and he feels sure of these latter because he gets such social verification. But now what I further assert is that any thus socially verified psychological law is, *ipso facto*, never a law about merely mental facts, but always a law about psycho-physical processes. To state it as a purely mental law is to state it in a false abstraction. And this is true, not merely because the mental processes contain "gaps," or are inwardly "incomplete," but still more because social verification, as such, faces series of psycho-physical facts. State completely your socially verified psychological uniformities, and they run not thus: "All men, after feeling A, feel B"; but rather thus: "Whenever men physically express or report that they feel A, thereafter they report, or otherwise physically express, that they feel B". For example, if we wish to state the whole of a familiar psychological induction, we ought not to say merely that: "Violent emotions, in normal minds, lead to feelings of weariness"; but rather that, as our whole "common experience" of normal mankind shows: "Violent expressions of emotion, in case of people who are otherwise normal, are ere long followed by symptoms of exhaustion, amongst which are, normally, symptoms that the sufferer feels exhausted". To state the case thus gives us the causal linkage as known to the observers of human nature. And exceptions to such empirical laws, as in case of abnormal nervous conditions, are thus placed in the right light for later study and explanation. If this, however, be the case, our entire conception of psychical causation must be altered accordingly. The physiological facts and the psychical dispositions do not merely serve to fill out gaps in the series of inner or mental causes and effects, but they are an essential part of every causal series known to the psychologist. We cannot, for instance, maintain, as our author does, that, since we are primarily conscious of the efficaciousness of our will, we are able to arrive at a belief in physical reality, or in other sorts of reality, in so far as we become aware of limitations to this efficaciousness of consciousness, and so of conditions imposed upon our will and alien to it. For our will can be viewed as causally efficacious only after we have already formed the conception of physical and of psycho-physical causes. With the alteration of our author's theory, thus rendered necessary, would change very much indeed of his doctrine as to the dynamics of consciousness.

Meanwhile, however, as our author may well insist, the facts of consciousness, expounded in his chapter on Mental Activity, remain. There *is* attention in consciousness; there *is*, what all men agree to call, striving for ends; there is, unquestionably, the mode of consciousness which he denominates conation. What account shall one give of this mode unless one regards it, with our author, as an instance of the efficaciousness of the conscious process, which thus shows itself as at least partly "self-sustaining"? Must one fall back upon the position of the associationists? Must one define all this as due to a mere "passive" sequence of states?

I reply by saying that our author comes very often so near to what seems to me the truth in this matter that I wonder to find him caring for that mere bauble, that mere abstraction of indirect experience, called "efficaciousness," when the rich inner life which he is analysing furnishes to him the characters that he so elaborately defines, that, as against the associationist, he so admirably characterises, and that constitute, after all, what really makes conscious life worth living to all of us. Efficacy we do indeed all of us desire in the abstracter scientific sense of causal efficacy; but not one of us, as natural man amongst men, cares in the least, apart from artificial theological concerns, or from psychological and philosophical theories, whether his causal efficaciousness, in his empirical world, is ever purely psychical, or is always psycho-physical. It is the man, the whole man, body and consciousness together, whose causal efficacy in the sight of gods and men, we desire, in so far as we ever think of that aspect of our nature that science more abstractly defines as our causal aspect. On the other hand, quite within our own consciousness, we do, indeed, in so far, "immediately" follow with intense interest, our hopes, strivings, ideals, in general our conation, or what our author calls our activity. This "activity," empirically speaking, does normally pass through stages, very much such as our author so well defines—stages of vagueness, of growing differentiation, of a more definite apperception of our systems of means and ends, and, finally, of the dying away of each particular striving in the attainment of its ends. All this any one of normal skill can observe introspectively, for this is what all men are found actually expressing in speech and in deed, as the sense of their inner life. But now, *What* is this activity immediately observed to be when viewed through introspection? Causally effective? If I am right in my definition of causation, that is logically impossible, since introspection cannot observe the genuinely causal conditions and consequences of inner states and processes. What then? I answer that what is introspectively observed is precisely this, that the inner life is normally full of significance, of meaning, of success, and of defeat (as contents of experience, not as cases of causation), of hoping and of the sense of striving, of longing, of desire,—yes, and of insight too, of judgment, of conception, of rationality—in short of whatever gives consciousness, taken in brief or in long stretches, its inner value, its total presence as something that expresses, embodies and possesses worth and good sense.

Now I repeat that consciousness has this directly or immediately teleological quality, this essential meaning, is a fact whose importance seems to me to be rather obscured than illumined by confusing concrete meaning with abstract efficacy, good sense with causal power, rationality with capacity to accomplish the causal production of deeds, and sustained significance with "self-sustaining process". Yet the whole tradition of the partisans of psychological activity seems to me to involve just such a confusion. What the psychologist has a perfect right to say is: That the causal processes which he finds in his essentially psycho-physical world, a world of minds whose inner states are outwardly expressed in physical states and movements, that these causal processes, I say, are *such as* to render possible, and (so far as experience indicates the fact) to sustain, precisely those psycho-physical conditions whose inner aspects are significant conscious processes. This the psychologist must say, because such is the fact, in so far as the psycho-physical processes are normal. But to say this is not to say that introspection discovers any causal laws, or that the significance of consciousness is, as such, the causal efficacy of consciousness, or that you can explain how consciousness comes into being, or how it sustains itself in being, by analysing the profoundly interesting inner fact that while consciousness normally goes on, it always means something.

What interests me, therefore, I confess, about the facts grouped together by our author as facts illustrating mental activity, is not that they prove any causal efficacy, but that they introduce us to the descriptive analysis of what goes on in the mind when one means something, or when a meaning grows clearer, or when a reasoning process occurs. It is precisely this analysis which has heretofore been so neglected by psychologists, and which our author expounds in that portion of his discussion to which I must next turn. Here our disagreement, as stated above, will give place to an assent which is very frequently almost entire.

III.

Viewed, not dynamically, but in the light of an analysis of its contents and modes, consciousness is subject to the general principle that its facts normally mean something, and that, since the meaning of past experience constantly tends to be taken up into the present meanings, and to be recombined in new fashions, consciousness normally tends towards what one may term the "evolution of meanings". This teleological character of normal consciousness is comparable to that teleological character of the vital processes which is so fundamental a datum in biology. To this our author, like Avenarius, makes frequent reference. Precisely as the biologist, however, makes little of the attempt to explain such teleology by means of "vital forces," conceived as self-sustaining causes, precisely so I myself should maintain that the parallel conception of "mental activity," or of the "self-sustaining" causality of the conscious process, is of little service in comprehending the causal relations of mind—relations which, logically speaking, must have psycho-physical totals for their least possible units. But, on the other hand, the psychologist is as interested as the biologist in considering, in analysing, and in interpreting the teleological character of his facts and processes. Since, in the psychologist's world, this teleological character belongs to the conscious aspect of the process, the psycho-physical nature of the outward expressions of the inner process does not now stand in the way of an effort to interpret what happens when inner meanings develop. To interpret what happens, to follow it through its successive stages, to study the laws of the evolution of meanings, and the laws that govern the growth of the significant series of states that, in their wholeness, constitute conation, just in so far as these series embody the fulfilment of aims, and the success of intentions—all this, to my mind, is something which is wholly different from any causal explanation of mental processes. And just such a descriptive psychology of the processes whereby meanings and purposes get conscious evolution and inner expression, constitutes that aspect of our author's work with which I find myself in harmony.

His opponents are here the "associationists". To my mind the latter are just as wrong in their causal explanations as is the doctrine of mental activity when this doctrine appears as a causal theory. For the associationists, in the stricter sense, more or less completely ignore the psycho-physical aspect. But laying aside causation altogether, the associationists are wrong in their analysis of the teleological aspect of consciousness, and are wrong in fashions that our author very skilfully exposes. They are wrong in so far as they try to reduce the mental wholes which constitute meanings to mere sums or series of elements. They are wrong in so far as they try to reduce all mental values to variations in the quality and intensity of mental images. Hence they have no theory adequate to describe what our author calls "apperceptive systems"; and they are unable to define the nature of our consciousness of relationships. Our author meets them with great success by means of his theory of "noetic synthesis," and of the related conscious processes.

For this theory he prepares the way in chapters iii. and iv. of book i., where he deals with "The Apprehension of Form," and with "Implicit," and "Schematic," "Apprehension". The "Form" of a mental whole or series of states is something that, as in the case of a melody, or any other typical whole of conscious states, is relatively independent of the particular constituents of the whole. The whole can be apprehended with very various degrees of clearness as to the plan of its constitution, and as to the precise relations which it involves. The whole cannot be analysed into any sum of elements or of relations. In consequence, the nature of any whole can be, to any degree, "implicitly" apprehended. A typical example (p. 79 *sqq.*) is that of the meaning of a word, which can be apprehended apart from imagery, and (p. 86) "without discernment of the multiplicity it really comprehends". Thus it is in such cases, as if (p. 95) "the multiplicity were somehow wrapped up in the distinctionless unity and were struggling to unfold itself". If we dwell upon such a whole, it tends to get expressed in a more explicit apprehension of its parts, and (p. 96) in "so far as the implicit idea or perception of a whole determines the successive emergence of its parts in consciousness, we may apply to it the term of 'schematic apprehension'".

Our author is not the first to take note of this aspect of consciousness; but his development and application of his principles is peculiarly minute and consistent. The principal cases are considered in the second volume. "Noetic synthesis," in general, is defined as the union of presentational elements in so far as they relate to a single object, or in so far as they are "specifying constituents of the same thought" (vol. ii., p. 1). Such synthesis appears already in simple, still more in complex, perception, where no mere union of presented and revived partial experiences constitutes the total perception. "The percept of the whole is not the sum of the percepts of the parts" (p. 20). When we perceive what we get is a whole object "schematically apprehended" through various, and often through successive, presentations of some of its parts. The inexperienced parts of the whole we do not necessarily image. We know in advance *how to hunt for them.* We thus schematically anticipate them. Our sense of what the whole object is, is like our sense of the meaning of a word. The parts presented *mean* the whole, over and above any mere association of part with part. A good example of this sense of the whole is given by our unvisualised apprehension of the insides of objects (p. 24). In general, in perception, one has a "premonition of the whole object" before proceeding to observe or to image the parts. One knows that: "I can if I choose" find or image this or that part not yet presented. This is noetic synthesis (p. 25). It is involved on a higher level in "ideal revival" (p. 31). Combined with retentiveness, noetic synthesis gives us "apperception" (p. 40). For "when we consider a noetic synthesis not merely as involved in this or that conscious process, but as a mode of mental grouping which persists as a disposition when it has ceased to operate in actual consciousness, we have the idea of an apperceptive system". In other words, when we have a revivable system of ideas, or of dispositions that determine ideas, and when this system is such that (p. 115) "its constituents are partial apprehensions of one and the same whole, so that their relation to each other is conditioned by their relation to the central idea of this whole," such a system is called an apperceptive system. Examples are: mentally conceived plans of action, which are capable of being long held, revived at pleasure, and adapted to various circumstances; or, again, conscious definitions of classes; or fashions of intelligent behaviour, such as are involved in speaking French or German instead of English. In all such cases whatever detailed ideas or images are in consciousness form but parts of one total mental attitude towards some real or ideal whole of objects or ends. The process of apperception itself is the process whereby such an apperceptive system "appropriates a new element or otherwise receives a fresh determination" (vol. ii., p. 112). Such appropriation involves an assimilation of the new elements to the constitution of the whole system, but cannot be reduced to assimilation (p. 118 *sqq.*); and herein Mr. Stout rightly differs from those Herbartians who conceive that apperception may sometimes be purely assimilative.

Meanwhile, all such synthetic apprehension of total meanings not only embodies systems of ideas, but fulfils the purposes of conative processes. To know involves willing. To will involves knowing ends. To develop a process of conation means to become aware of an apperceptive system wherein means are considered as in relation to an end, and partial acts are apprehended as parts of one whole action, whose schematic apprehension constitutes the unity of one's voluntary plans. The parallel life of cognition and conation (chap. vii., pp. 82-109) is at once a life of seeking ends, of becoming conscious of what they are, and of determining special acts and insights by reference to the whole whereof they form part, and whose implicit apprehension precedes and teleologically determines the apprehension and the existence of the partial volitions and cognitions. All this our author (p. 82) takes to be a verification of his own theses as to the causal efficacy observable within the conscious stream. For my own part I accept it all in so far as it is a description of that rich life of meanings, and of the evolution of meanings, which constitutes the very essence of both intellect and will; but I find in all this nothing but the brute fact that consciousness, as it comes, finds itself full of meaning, and normally grows in meaning as it flows. The causal explanation of all this, in so far as there is one at all, belongs elsewhere. But the actual union of knowing and striving, of conation and cognition, of meaning as the attainment of insight, and of meaning as the fulfilment of hope and desire —all this union I fully accept, and I also fully agree that, in the determination of all such unions and of all such meanings, the idea of the whole is always prior to the parts—prior logically, prior teleologically, and prior just because if there is to be any meaning at all in consciousness the whole must appear there *as* prior to the parts.

Very brilliant seems to me, furthermore, the vindication of similar principles in the descriptive analysis of the series of conscious states in the cases where the revival of former "dispositions" is a condition of the present rational meaning of conscious states. Here (in chap. vi., pp. 43-81), under the title "Relative Suggestion," we learn that the reproduction of former states, *if* it is to serve the present ends of rationality, must be such as to be not, so to speak, literal, but rather formal, so that recalled wholes become capable of formal adaptation to present conditions, and so that new wholes can get formed through such adaptation of old forms (rather than of old contents) to the needs which present experiences determine. Examples of such revival of relative wholes, and of such adaptation of these wholes to new cases, we have in the power to sing an old melody in a new key, or otherwise to transfer a "pre-existing form of combination to new matter," matter with which the old form then, on occasion, blends, producing sometimes a result which may be very original, as a new poetic composition is original, although it retains the author's former style. This adaptive type of recall, whereby the past dispositions are not so much literally revived as plundered of their significant wealth for the sake of current conscious needs, belongs once more to the most teleological aspect of the conscious process. From this point of view present consciousness appears, in relation to past consciousness, as a present construction through the use of former syntheses. That such is the character of the recall in case of rational trains of consciousness is well made out by our author, although, once more, the causation of the process is not to be made clear by any study of its meaning.

On the basis of such analyses, our author proceeds to a study of the thinking process proper, in its relation to language. Into this latter study I should be indeed very glad to enter did the limits of this paper permit. But the opportunity given to me has already been far too extensively used; I cannot venture to trespass further. There is space only for a summary statement of my attitude towards all such analyses. On the whole I accept them thoroughly and admiringly, precisely in so far as they are analyses of the immanent teleological constitution of the stream of consciousness, and of its various momentary and serial parts and regions. Such analysis is, moreover, of importance far beyond the range of psychology proper. It is a relief to meet with a psychologist who thoroughly appreciates that consciousness is not a mere flight of more or less associated contents, but is normally an organised system, or a series of such systems. To be sure, our author, in these days, is not alone, but his companions are still none too numerous; and there is certainly room for just such Analytic Psychology. But all such analysis is like a critical study of the actual constitution of a work of art; it is essentially immanent and teleological analysis; it does not and cannot furnish us with causal explanations. It cannot tell how the work of art is causally produced or sustained. Its laws, although socially verifiable, are here still laws of the inner conditions which make meaning possible. They are, therefore, essentially conditional laws. *If* meaning is to be possible, *then* consciousness has to be such, in its moments and in its series, that the whole appears as furnishing a *schema* that gets implicit expression through the parts. *If* consciousness is to possess such meaning, consciousness cannot be merely a series of associated images. *If* consciousness is to express personal life, cognition must be the embodiment of conation, ends must appear in consciousness as progressively attained, and conscious life must be *viewed as* an evolution of plans, and as a pursuit of ideals. A thorough-going analysis of mental life from this point of view is not only possible; it is one essential part of the work of a complete descriptive psychology. Yet I cannot believe that this one reaches an insight into the causal laws of mind.

Yet I may, nevertheless, go further, and may say plainly that I fully believe that one does thus reach truth, that is, metaphysically speaking, much deeper than any truth expressible in causal terms. In trying to sunder the two aspects that our author, to my mind, seems to confuse, I have really meant to vindicate what seems to me the most valuable aspect of his work. Speaking as a student of philosophy, I hold that the category of causation is, metaphysically speaking, a relatively superficial category of what Mr. Bradley would call the world of "Appearance," and that the categories of Meaning go very much deeper into the heart of the Real than any psycho-physical or other causal explanations can ever do. Hence I regard our author's analyses as concerned with the descriptively psychological aspects of the really most vital truths about mind; and when I say that he seems to me mistaken in regarding his psychological theories as concerned with mental causation proper, I desire only the more earnestly to insist that his account of consciousness seems to me to describe, so far as that is possible, something far deeper than mental causation, and to give us what, for philosophical purposes, is much more important than causal explanation. In the last analysis Reality is not causally explicable, and causal explanation is nothing ultimately real. On the contrary, the Real is essentially something that has meaning; and the best account that we can give of it will always be teleological. Hence an Analytic Psychology, in our author's sense, can only gain in wealth by declining to undertake to pay the debts of causally explanatory psychology. As for the latter, its realm will always be psycho-physical; its methods will be those of socially verifiable inductions about the laws of human nature; and it will make little, in the long run, of "mental activity"; while, in its turn, "mental activity," if interpreted as a name for the significant structure and process of consciousness, viewed as a fact, will refer to something much nearer to the absolute reality than is the world of psycho-physical appearance.

Herewith must close this inadequate effort to distinguish in general between what arouses my dissent and what calls forth my assent in this strong, independent, and extremely subtle treatise. There remains very much interesting detail, into which I cannot here enter. May these volumes find the readers that they so well deserve.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Eine Darstellung der Geschichte der Philosophie von dem Ende der Renaissance bis zu unseren Tagen, von Dr. HARALD HÖFFDING. Ins Deutsche übersetzt von F. BENDIXEN. Band II. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1896. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 677.

DR. HÖFFDING closed the first volume of his *History of Philosophy* with Rousseau and the French Illumination; he begins the second with a short book on the German Illumination and Lessing, after which he proceeds to Immanuel Kant. Next he