

Systematic Philosophy in America in the Years 1893, 1894, and 1895

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The study of philosophy in America at the present time is under the influence of certain general tendencies which must be borne in mind in every consideration of the particular symptoms and products of this study. Of these general tendencies the most general is the movement towards the expansion and organization of the American Universities which has affected so profoundly all our natural science and scholarship during the past twenty years. Of the history of the movement the present paper can give, of course, no account. It must suffice here to say that, since the beginning, or at all events since the middle of the seventies, the academic life of America has been deeply influenced by a tendency towards the alteration of our institutions of higher learning, partly in the direction of the German Universities, partly in somewhat independent fashions, but in general in the direction of more thorough and liberal scholarship, of more untrammelled and minute scientific investigation, and of a favoring of the functions of research in addition to the functions of instruction. Our older American colleges were institutions devoted to a decidedly conservative type of teaching, and were very rarely disposed to encourage or to make prominent the office of original investigation. Nor does our modern movement itself in the least make light of the teaching function of the university. The demands upon the modern academic teacher are indeed higher than ever, and are increasing. The American college professor is today still selected, not alone for his reputation as an investigator, but also, and in general very decidedly, because

of his supposed skill as a teacher. Yet the change in our modern university life has largely consisted, not in making less of the functions of the academic teacher, but in making much more than in former times of the functions of the academic investigator. Our modern university must not only transmit learning, but also add to the sum of human knowledge; and one of its prominent ends must be, not merely the discipline of young minds, and the imparting of valuable knowledge, but the production of advanced and independent investigators. To this end there have been rapidly developed, in the modern American university, very elaborate courses of study and research for students who have already obtained our traditional first degree, *i. e.*, the degree of Bachelor of Arts. These higher courses lead to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, — a degree to which our more progressive institutions now attach a value such as tends to set the standard of attainment demanded of candidates for this degree decidedly higher than anyone anticipated at the beginning of our academic revival. The Doctor's degree now tends to become, with us, not merely an evidence of scholarly attainment, but like the German Habilitation, a certificate that the holder is fully ready for his professional work.

This development of academic life, and of the doctor's degree, has influenced the study of many sciences amongst us, — and of none more than of philosophy. Philosophy demands, in especial measure, freedom from theological trammels. This freedom, almost absent from our academic life a generation ago, has now been obtained, in an unexpected measure, although of course to an unequal degree, in the various parts of our large and complex nation, and in our various academic institutions. The struggle towards this academic freedom of philosophical teaching has been, despite occasional controversies, remarkably silent. Success has been attained, in a relative but often surprising measure, in places where it might least have been expected. The vigorous hunt for heresies and for heretics which only a few years since might have been expected as the inevitable accompaniment and enemy of any independent philosophical teaching, thinking, or writing, has of late been extraordinarily absent from our more prominent universities, or has been calmed into a discreet attitude of vigilant half-

tolerance. Our theological seminaries, — especially when they are separate institutions, out of connection with universities — still suffer from heresy-hunters, and from ecclesiastical „trials for heresy“. But in our universities, and in the presence of the academic study of philosophy, the modern heresy-hunter is becoming more and more transformed after the fashion long since exemplified in the evolution of the pointer-dog. He no longer leaps upon the prey, but contents himself with cautiously pointing.

The result has been a rapid increase in the number of philosophical teachers, in the list of our philosophical publications, and in the importance attached by our public to the study of philosophy. At our larger universities the number of advanced students who are intending to make the teaching of philosophy their profession, is extraordinary, in view of the unpractical nature of the topic, the reputed materialism of our national spirit, and the neglect of philosophy which did indeed prevail amongst us a generation since. But, as a fact, our national life and problems especially call for philosophical insight, the spirit of our people is not at all essentially materialistic, and our former neglect of philosophy was merely due, to the predominance, in academic life, of philosophy's dogmatic rival and counterpart, — theology.

Apart from our academic revival, the influences which have most affected our study of philosophy, in recent years, have been: the modern discussions of the doctrine of evolution, the interest in the German philosophy from Kant to Hegel, and the advance of Experimental Psychology. The doctrine of evolution obtained its influence over our general philosophical tendencies still more through the medium of Herbert Spencer than through the direct effect of the teachings of Darwin. To the continental public of Europe, the doctrine of evolution seems to be often popularly identified with what is called „Darwinism“. Our public, on the contrary, would, perhaps, oftener be found identifying the general doctrine of evolution with „Spencerianism“. Both terms are inadequate, as everyone knows; and the modern doctrine of evolution is no one man's property; but the absence of the term „Darwinism“ (as a synonym for the general doctrine of evolution), from our popular philosophical vocabulary, and the prominence of Spencer's name in our discussions

of evolution, is a fact worth mentioning. Through the support of several prominent and enthusiastic disciples, Spencer has had decidedly more influence in America than in England. On the other hand, the influence of German idealism upon our American thought, both within and without the universities, is notorious, and considerable. As is also generally known, this has been more the influence of Hegel than of any other one amongst the heroes of the great German period of speculation. We have studied Kant a good deal; but we have had no neo-Kantian movement. On the other hand, it would be easy to misunderstand the sort of influence which Hegel has exerted, and is exerting, upon American thought. The Hegel whom the modern German student of philosophy very generally rejects, is the Hegel who undertook to form a closed school, and rejoiced to impose his whole list of categories upon it, the Hegel whose conservative politics, arrogant polemical intolerance, despotic use of *a priori* constructions, and indifference to certain of the empirical sciences, produced in the end a wholesome and vehement reaction, which has led to an almost entire neglect of his work in Germany. Now this Hegel, — the scholarch, the dogmatist, the apriorist, — is indeed an historical person; but it is not Hegel in this aspect that those of us in this country who are fond of German idealism are accustomed to follow. There was, to our minds, another Hegel, — another equally historical aspect of this many-sided thinker — and this is the aspect that interests us. Hegel, viewed in this aspect, is not a mere system-maker, but one who united, in extraordinary measure, an extremely merciless, subtle, and thorough-going critical method, whereby he dissected out certain of the problematic elements of human experience, with an ideal of the re-unification of philosophical thought, of the conquest over these problems, such as, despite his failure to reach his ideal, makes his effort momentous. The critical method, the merciless analysis, and the special ideal of a coming synthesis which were peculiar to Hegel, make him, to our minds, permanently interesting and valuable. We can enjoy this interest and value without becoming *apriorists*. Some of us take ourselves to be pretty pure empiricists. Hegel merely seems to us to throw some light, not upon the *apriori* construction of experience, but

upon the significance of experience now that the empirical world is there.

In any case, it must be remembered that Hegelianism in America is in general very highly modified, and that a repetition of the system as Hegel taught it is very remote from most of those who, in this country, are called, with more or less accuracy, Hegelians.

The influence of empirical psychology upon the pursuit of philosophy in America is not only great, but rapidly increasing. The deserved reputation of Prof. Wm. James's *Psychology* (published in two volumes in 1890) has made this prominence of Psychology in our national thought comparatively familiar to many European readers. The several treatises of Professor Ladd, whereof one is to be considered hereafter in this paper, have also gained the attention of students beyond our borders. The activities of our psychological laboratories are, however, in a sense, still more significant than any individual books can be of what seems to be the destined line of our advance in the immediate future. American philosophy may long remain, upon one side, Hegelian; it is sure however to become also psychological in its interests and in its methods.

If one passes from these general considerations to the more special and external symptoms of our national movement in philosophy, one must mention, in the first place, the periodicals devoted to philosophy and to allied topics. These are, above all: *The Philosophical Review*, published under the auspices of Cornell University, at Ithaca, New York; *The Monist*, published under the editorship of Dr. Paul Carus, in Chicago; the *American Journal of Psychology*, published at Clark University, and edited by the well-known President of that Institution, Dr. C. Stanley Hall; *The Psychological Review*, edited by Professor Baldwin of Princeton, New Jersey, and by Professor Cattell of Columbia College, in New York; and *The International Journal of Ethics*, edited by Mr. S. Burns Weston, and published at Philadelphia. The pioneer amongst our philosophical periodicals, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, has ceased to appear with any regularity, although there are some hopes of its revival.

Of the periodicals just named, *The Philosophical Review* is our most representative and academic organ of systematic philosophy as such. It opens its pages to a great variety of opinions, is very careful and useful as to its book-reviews, and gives in every number a valuable summary of the current magazine literature of philosophy. The *Monist*, whose admirable editor is well known in Germany, is, as its name implies, rather committed to a particular line of discussions and opinions. Moreover, it has always given a larger space than do most of our journals to contributions from foreign sources. Yet the editor interprets his monistic programme liberally, gives his own personal views a prominent, but not unwelcome space in his pages, reviews current literature extensively and fairly, and preserves on the whole a very judicial attitude. *The American Journal of Psychology* avoids on principle the more general speculative discussions, and devotes itself to special psychological researches. Yet the editor is himself the representative of strong, although rather obscurely avowed speculative tendencies, and his personality is felt throughout most of the work published in his Journal, which is itself, in consequence, a periodical of decidedly philosophical tendency. *The Psychological Review*, on the other hand, is under the control of no one personality, encourages a large variety of theoretical opinions, and is always open to papers of a speculative tendency. *The International Journal of Ethics* enjoys a good deal of foreign cooperation, and has an editorial board that includes English, German, French, and Italian representatives. But its contributors are also frequently American. Its scope is theoretical Ethics, practical Ethical problems, and social questions, as well as reviews of current ethical literature.

Amongst the periodicals that are noteworthy allies of philosophical study, without being specially devoted to philosophy, one must mention, first, our principal pedagogical journal, *The Educational Review*, published in New York, and edited by Prof. Butter of Columbia College; and *The New World*, an organ of liberal theology, published in Boston. The various denominational reviews of a theological character devote considerable space to philosophical articles. A number of academic publications, — series of Monographs,

reports of psychological Laboratories, and the like — constantly add to the list of our philosophical productions.

In consequence of this activity in the publication of philosophical papers, and in view of the transitional stage through which our whole national life of learning is passing, the number of original treatises which appear amongst us is not an adequate measure of our current interest in philosophy. An indication — also inadequate — of the seriousness of this interest is furnished by the constant appearance of translations of German and French works from our press. Quite recently Windelband's, Falckenberg's, and Weber's histories of philosophy, Külpe's Psychology, and Wundt's Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, are amongst the books that translation has rendered accessible to our public. J. E. Erdmann's and Ueberweg's histories of philosophy have long been amongst our familiar translated texts, the latter since 1874. All these works are pretty widely used as academic textbooks, and tend to influence, in various measures, the whole training of our philosophical youth.

These few introductory explanations as to our situation in general, seem necessary in introducing the philosophical literature of the last few years to the readers of the Archiv. It is well to remember that, in philosophy, we stand, in this country, quite as much under the direct influence of Germany as under English influences, and that meanwhile, we are making our way towards a reasonable national independence of method and of spirit in philosophy.

To pass to the most noteworthy books of the years now under review, one may well begin with the two volumes of Professor Ladd¹). Of these the first, as especially a psychological treatise, concerns us here less, and we are especially called upon to consider the *Philosophy of Mind*. This latter treatise, the culmination, so far, of the series of contributions to Psychology which the author

1) 1. Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory. A treatise of the Phenomena, Laws, and Development of Human Mental Life. By George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. pp. XIII, 676. 2. The Philosophy of Mind. An Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology. (By the same author). 1895. pp. XIX. 414.

has produced within the last decade, belongs amongst those discussions of the fundamental questions of psychological theory which, of late, have been taking a prominent place in the literature of several nations. Like Rehmke's *Allgemeine Psychologie*, this volume intends, not to aid one to become acquainted with the empirical facts, but rather to instruct the reader as to the philosophical relations of psychology. Upon the basis of a carefully remodelled conception of the term „real Being“, or, in other words, by the aid of a revised *Substanzbegriff*, Professor Ladd endeavors, first, to vindicate for the mind the characters of such a „real being“, and to separate this reality of the mind from the reality of the body, without falling back into the older doctrines of the substantiality of the mind. Professor Ladd's notion of this „real being“ is not the Herbartian concept of the soul, and is also not at all the Aristotelian concept. A certain similarity to the Lotzean conception appears; but Professor Ladd's view is again different from Lotze's. The „real being“ of the soul is revealed in and through consciousness, (1) by virtue of the unity of consciousness at any moment, (2) by virtue of the validity of the memory, and of the metaphysically real identity expressed in memory, and (3) by virtue of the effective „self-activity“ of the conscious subject. The facts revealed are facts existent not apart from the conscious process; nor are they valid because they reveal the existence of an entity behind or beyond the conscious process; on the contrary, the entity whose existence is revealed is known as effectively present in and with the conscious process, or as the Ego itself, and not as the soul behind or beyond the Ego. On the other hand, it is not right to reduce the Ego, as such, to the mere series of its states, or even of its acts. The unity, the memory, and above all the effective activity of the Ego, give us a right to define it as a real source of effects, as a really permanent being in time, as more than a mere *Geschehen*, as more than a point of view, or a group of contents. In contradistinction to Wundt, Professor Ladd seeks, when he has occasion to contrast the reality of the mind with the reality of material substances, to assimilate the physical *Substanzbegriff* to the already established psychical *Substanzbegriff*, rather than to lay stress upon the ultimate contrast between the

two. „The real identity of anything“, he says, „consists in this, that its self-activity manifests itself, in all its different relations to other things, as conforming to an immanent idea“. While the essence of external things, i. e., of physical objects, is a problem for general metaphysics, and is but lightly touched upon in this work, it is thus plainly Professor Ladd's disposition to conceive of physical realities in accordance with a definition formed by reflection upon the nature of „self-active“ mental beings. The *Substanzbegriff* that Professor Ladd rejects, when he deals with the reality of mind, is the concept formed by a more or less abstract application to mental life of that notion of a *substratum* which originally played so large a part in speculations concerning the physical world. But the concept of a „real being“ which he deduces from the study of mind, he is obviously ready to generalize in some form which shall ultimately make it apply to the metaphysics of the external world. The inner and outer worlds, he often insists, must be kept sharply distinguished; but when one talks of „real beings“, one better states their nature by using the psychical categories to interpret the physical, than by using the physical conception of substance to assimilate the mental.

Meanwhile, however, the psychologist finds, in experience, that whatever „real physical beings“ are in themselves, they are at all events numerically other than the mind. Accordingly, the philosophy of mind must be, as it were, provisionally dualistic. Materialism, psychophysical parallelism, the idealistic denial of the reality of the physical world, and that now favorite monism which views psychical and physical processes as „aspects“ or „phases“ of one substance: all these views Professor Ladd rejects, and subjects, in this treatise, to a minute and skilful polemic. His own ultimate metaphysical view is merely indicated as a monistic Theism, decidedly different from the monism of the double aspect. Mind and body are different „real beings“; or rather, while the mind is one „real being“, defined as above, the body is a vast complex of „real beings“, whose relation to the whole of nature are lost for us, in inaccessible complexity. The two types of beings differ, in that, while we know, essentially, by the light of consciousness, what the real being called the mind is, it is not given us to

know matter from the inside, although the definition of real identity, quoted above, applies to both types of beings. Meanwhile, the relations between mind and body are known to us, in both directions, as strictly causal. Causality, like substantiality, is indeed known to us better in and through the self-active mind than through purely physical experience; but that mind and body are causally related, and are not parallel aspects of one common substance, Professor Ladd here argues with the fullest consciousness of the current arguments for the opposing views. Very interesting, for instance, is, in this connection, our author's review of Höfding. On the other hand, it is not possible, in our author's eyes, to deny or to make light of the influence of physical over even the highest mental conditions; and he devotes a considerable space to a summary of those facts concerning the physical conditions of mental processes, which he has more extensively described in previous treatises. The one theory which can meet all these facts is, he holds, a dualism that separates the natures of the real beings of the two worlds, while recognizing the inseparability, the interwoven complexity, of their mutual causal relations.

But beyond all this dualism, a remote but still profound unity is in prospect. The world of real beings of all grades, is dependent upon the „World-Ground“, the one Real Being, whose character both as mind and as *ens realissimum* Professor Ladd promises to treat in a future volume.

The learning, and the elaborate studies of our author in empirical psychology, give to these discussions a weight which the mere expressions of a pure metaphysician's opinions could not so easily obtain. The book has from the first a somewhat sternly polemical tone, and is full of patient and skillfull dialectic. One awaits with interest the promised sequel.

Next on our list is the decidedly original, but somewhat capriciously composed treatise of Professor Ormond¹). Metaphysical doctrines are, in this day, seldom expounded apart from their epistemological presuppositions. Professor Ormond, in this treatise,

1) Basal Concepts in Philosophy. An Inquiry into Being, Non-Being, and Becoming. By Alexander T. Ormond, Ph. D. Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. pp. X, 308.

begins at once with the most central metaphysical concept, that of the Absolute, with the highest category, as he himself points out. He leaves to the history of philosophy, whose drift he briefly indicates on an opening chapter, the general explanation and defence of any such conception. He proposes, in this book, to sketch the consequences of one important modification of that conception of the absolute which Aristotle and Hegel, as two of the most important of previous thinkers, have transmitted. The question then, in this book, is not of a critical study of our power to know, or of our right to define the Absolute, but rather of the inner completeness of our conception of the Absolute, now that we have won the idea. To this inner completeness of our conception Professor Ormond proposes to contribute his own, relative original, modification, and in a series of chapters he surveys the consequences of his view with reference to the various problems of metaphysics. A late chapter in the book deals with the problem of knowledge, but in the closest relation to the already announced metaphysical views.

Viewing, in his introductory sketch, the outcome of the history of speculation, our author declares that „The great lesson the masters have to teach is that philosophy reaches its highest category in the notion of being as, in its essence, self-activity“. This latter term is a synonym both for the Absolute as self-determined source of being, and for the Absolute as the rationally self-possessed „Logos“. The Absolute of Aristotle and of Hegel involves both elements. But the problem of all the philosophy that has accepted this view has been the undertaking to explain the existence of relative, imperfect, mutable, finite and evil forms of being. One had to put the origin of such forms either within the Absolute, so that the perfect contrained, involved, or willed the imperfect and the evil; or else without the Absolute, and then one tended to conceive of some positive and evil principle, dualistically opposed to the Absolute. Both views have proved unsatisfactory. Our author, starting as he does with a prominent theological interest, proposes to develop a thought hinted in the Augustinian theory of evil, but so far never developed without a considerable ambiguity. This thought is: (1) That the very existence of a self-con-

scious or self-active being, a „Logos“, necessarily implies for its completion, the assertion that the Absolute must contrast itself with „its own Other“; (2) that this „Other“ is not an absolute Non-Being, but a more concrete negative principle, defined by our author as an „A-logos“; (3) that this negative datum, this eternally actual, although not positive logical opponent of the Logos, must be „symbolically“ defined as a tendency to unreason, to passivity, inner division, and absence of consciousness; and (4) that, finally, the existence of a relative world, where finitude, mutability, evolution, contingency, and, as an incident of all this mutability of the creature, evil, can and do exist, is explicable as a consequence of this fundamental relation of the Absolute to its negative „Other“.

That this conception is only relatively original, is of course obvious enough. From Schelling's similiar negative principle in the Absolute, from Hegel's dialectical negative, also in the Absolute, our author distinguishes his own principle by the fact that this other is not, for him, at all internal to, or involved in, the Absolute, but is an external datum, contrasted, by the Absolute, with its own selfhood. The dualistic Other of the absolute thus, however, tends to acquire a Manichean opposition to the „Logos“. Another Princeton theologian, Mr. A. L. Frothingham, to whom Professor Ormond acknowledges some indebtedness, has already stated a somewhat similar doctrine, in a work on „Christian Philosophy“; but Professor Ormond carefully avoids giving the opposition between the Absolute and its other the degree of dualism, almost indistinguishable from Manicheanism, which his predecessor asserts. For Professor Ormond the „Alogos“ is simply that which, by contrast, sets off the fullness of being of the Absolute, and which, accordingly, gives the Absolute an opportunity for a creative activity — for an endless will to transform this „Other“ into its own likeness. In consequence, however, this negative Other determines the sphere where creation is possible; and, by virtue of the fact that every created thing must involve both principles (the positive expression of rationality, and the negative tendency to divide and negate rationality), this presence of the negative ensures, and explains, the imperfection of the created world. Evil, to be sure, is only a contingent result of the mutability of the creature; and

the original negative principle is not a positive source of evil. But the possibility of evil is thus to be explained.

The ingenious application of this theory to a long series of metaphysical problems, Space, Time, Evolution, Knowledge, Morality, Religion, renders the book worthy of more attention that is possible within the limits of this brief summary.

The third volume on our list deals with psychological problems, but in a philosophical spirit, and with the intent to reach philosophically important results¹⁾. Professor Baldwin, also of Princeton, and well-known by his published psychological treatises, undertakes, in this work, speculations upon the Evolution of Habit, and especially the formation of new habits through Accomodation, and makes especially prominent the significance of Imitation in the evolution of Mind. The most of the details of the discussion would need for their consideration an other place than this. Suffice it here to say that our author's work is obviously intended as an introduction to further cosmological speculations, and that his views of the evolution of mind, so far as they shall prove to be empirically defensible, must have an important bearing upon the philosophy of evolution.

Next on our list, although printed in the year 1892, the volume²⁾ of Mr. Salter deserves a place here by virtue of its independence and of its admirable method. The author of „Ethical Religion“ is already known, through translations, to German readers. In this book a careful epistemological analysis of the conceptions of „Matter“ and of „Duty“ fills the two sections into which the discussion is divided. The point of view in the first section is that of an epistemological idealism as to all the properties of matter. „Matter is not the cause of our sensations, not a metaphysical substratum behind them, but a general name for the sensations viewed on their objective side“. „Force is not a

1) Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes. By James Mark Baldwin. Professor of Psychology in Princeton University. New York, MacMillan and Co. 1895. pp. 16, 492.

2) First Steps in Philosophy (Physical and Ethical). By William Mac Kintire Salter, Author of „Ethical Religion“. Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and company. 1892. pp. 156.

mystical entity behind material phenomena, but it is these phenomena themselves viewed in certain relations to one another“. „The revealer and real enemy of illusions is not any so-called reality outside and independent of us, but experience itself“. On the other hand, Mr. Salter reserves for further consideration the validity of the doctrine of absolutely transcendent reality, behind all phenomenal matter, and implies that his „Sensible or Physical Idealism“ has, at its correlate, a „Supersensible or Metaphysical Realism“, which he is disposed to define in Kantian terms. The section on „Duty“, in this volume, reaches the conception of Duty as the demand for self-realization. „True virtue is not any single and special finite act or habit, but the voluntary dedication of ourselves to the total idea of our being“. Mr. Salter's essay, as pointed out above, is principally valuable for its careful method, and its freedom both from prejudice and from self-assertion, in any undue measure, on the part of the author.

In „Pan-Gnosticism“ the author, „who desires for the present to conceal his name“¹⁾, contends against the conception of reality as in any sense „unknowable“. „Inscrutability is a delusion“. „Knowledge is possible of anything concerning which there is a possibility of Ignorance“. The author's contention is thus, in part at least, directed against Herbert Spencer, whose method has much influenced his own, and whose favorite phrases are frequent in his pages. The original feature of the book consists in a theory of what our author calls „ante-phenomenal consciousness“, a form of consciousness which he conceives as antedating all that consciousness in which the distinction of external object and internal knowledge becomes fixed. The „ante-phenomenal consciousness“ is to be conceived, like the „*reine Erfahrung*“ of Avenarius, as a series of actual and experienced processes, whose result is the kind of differentiation that now gives us the world-problem. Behind the „ante-phenomenal consciousness“ one cannot go. But its result, the phenomenal contrast between „things“ and the „knowledge of things“ has an evolution which one can trace in such wise as to be sure that *neither* an idealistic reduction of the phenomenal

1) Pan-Gnosticism. A Suggestion in Philosophy. By Noel Winter. New York, The Transatlantic Publishing Company. 1895. pp. 184.

things to the subjective processes, *nor* an absolute separation of things as „unknowable“ from knowledge as subjective, is defensible. The outcome of the argument, while in no wise comparable in detail or in skill to the theory of Avenarius, appears to belong to the same general category as the doctrine of the *Reine Erfahrung*. The author's train of thought has obviously had an original development in his own mind. The book is obscure, but stimulating.

Another original book is that of Dr. Gould ¹⁾. The author, a physician, maintains, in an untechnical and decidedly unconventional fashion, a teleological dualism, upon a professedly empirical basis. The physical world, as such, is empirically known to us as a realm of mechanism, of necessity, and of absolute indifference to every ideal end. The origin of this mechanical world is unknowable, and is of no interest to us. On the other hand, experience reveals to us, in the whole realm of the biological processes, the workings of a finite, intelligent, and teleological principle, whose nature is best conceived as personal, whose aims are ideal, whose processes are evolutionary, but whose existence and methods stand in the sharpest dualistic opposition to the nature and processes of the mechanical world. This principle is the one usually called God. Only it is absurd to conceive God as either an Absolute Being or a creator. Another name than the name God is in fact needed to distinguish this being, as Dr. Gould conceives him, from the traditional God of theology. Dr. Gould proposes the name „Biologos“. „Biologos“ is a finite being, who wants life, and who struggles, as opportunity offers, with and in a hostile and mechanical physical order, to produce the most perfect forms of life. His methods have to be gradual, like ours in our efforts to control nature. Hence not creation, but evolution, is the form of his manifestation. The necessity which makes the evolutionary process so slow is the enormously difficult „problem of nutrition“, which „Biologos“ has not yet completely solved, despite the numberless devices of which he has made use. As for

1) *The Meaning and Method of Live. A Search for Religion in Biology.* By George M. Gould, A.M., M.D. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893. pp. 291.

evils, of all grades, they are „the expenses of the process“, forced upon „Biologos“ and his incarnate creatures by the hostility and indifference of the mechanical order. Death itself is no part of the plan of „Biologos“, but a hateful necessity imposed upon him by the problem of nutrition itself.

This dualism of a finite intelligent principle and a dead mechanical order is worked out with manifold empirical illustrations of a type similar to those employed, for teleological purposes, by Schopenhauer or by Von Hartmann. In strong contrast to these writers, Dr. Gould conceives, however, of Monism as the absolute enemy of the ideal, and makes much of the ethical significance which his own dualism gives to life, in so far as we men thus take part with „Biologos“ in a common struggle with a common enemy, i. e., with Nature's mechanism.

In contrast to the foregoing highly interesting but relatively untechnical work, we may mention at once, several treatises bearing upon the philosophy of evolution, but the productions of men who are technical experts in their various fields. For the discussion of these volumes there is here no place, in view of the special character of the questions that are involved. First comes here the treatise of our philosophical Sociologist, Mr. Lester F. Ward¹⁾. The problem in this book is as to the relation of feeling and intellect, on the one hand to the physical processes of organic nature, and on the other hand, to one another and to human progress. The method is here, indeed, very different from Dr. Gould's, and the speculations are upon the lines of current scientific opinion, although not without the originality of one of our most learned and capable students of social evolution. Professor Hudson, as a disciple of Herbert Spencer, has undertaken the task of introducing students to the latter's philosophy²⁾. Professor Osborn has undertaken to trace from a biologist's point of view, the antecedents of the doctrine of evolution in the history of philosophy, and to

1) *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*. By Lester F. Ward, author of *Dynamic Sociology*. Boston, Ginn & Co., 1893, pp. XXI. 369.

2) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*. By W. H. Hudson. New York. Appleton & Co. 1894. pp. IX. 234.

estimate their significance ¹). Professor Jordan, of the new Stanford University in California, publishes a syllabus of lectures bearing upon the general problems of evolution ²).

In the general field of systematic philosophy belong also the works mentioned in the note below, works to which I regret to be unable to give more space here ³). The first, *Genetic Philosophy*, is a series of essays upon fundamental problems, founded upon the conception that philosophy has, as its function „that of an intellectual clearing-house“, whose business is „to equate the deposits and indicate the deficits of the special sciences“. The second, *An Historical Interpretation*, is a review of the history of speculative problems in a very conservative spirit. The third is one of the numerous contributions of the devoted editor of the *Monist* to public education in philosophy.

The works thus far noticed belong to the general department of theoretical philosophy. But the department of Ethics is not neglected by our writers. Very much, in fact, of our purely popular philosophy belongs in the region of practical ethics. The influence of our liberal theologians, of our Ethical societies, of our pedagogical reformers, and of our numerous students of social problems, constantly appears in the form of a large quasi-philosophical literature which can find no place in the present survey of technical philosophy, although the very existence of this popular philosophical movement is one of the most noteworthy symptoms of our present national concern for deeper problems. Nor does the present survey undertake to enumerate the relatively numerous contributions to the History of Philosophy which have appeared

1) From the Greeks to Darwin. An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea. By Henry Fairfield Osborn. Sc. D. New York, MacMillan & Co. 1894. pp. VII, 259.

2) The Factors of Organic Evolution. A Syllabus of a Course of Elementary Lectures Delivered in the Leland Stanford Jr. University by David Starr Jordan. Boston. Ginn & Co. 1894. pp. 149.

3) Genetic Philosophy. By David Jayne Hill. New York. MacMillan & Co., 1893. pp. XIII, 382. An Historical Interpretation of Philosophy. By John Bascom. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893. pp. XIII, 518. Primer of Philosophy. By Dr. Paul Carus. Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Company. 1893. pp. VI, 232.

within the period named in our title, and which have been in several cases especially valuable for the history of Ethics. We must limit ourselves, in the present connection, and in speaking of Ethics, to the mention of some noteworthy contributions to ethical doctrine treated from the technically philosophical point of view.

Laborious, careful, and intelligent, as well as ambitious, is the book of Miss Williams, who has made known only the initials of her Christian name, and whom, most of her reviewers, including the present writer, fully supposed at first, to be a man. Only later have we learned that this studious volume is a woman's work ¹). The author summarizes, in about 270 pages, the ethical theories of those writers who, in her opinion, have made the doctrine of evolution sufficiently important, in their views, to warrant their classification under the rubric that her title defines. These writers are Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel, Spencer, Fiske, Rolph, Barratt, Stephen, Carneri, Höffding, Gizycki, Alexander, and Ree. In Part II, in some 300 pages, the author deals independently both with the general theory of evolution, and with its application to ethical problems. The point of view is that of the fully persuaded evolutionist, who endeavors, in the modern spirit, and with complete emancipation from theological prejudices, to solve the principal ethical problems, by the use of evolutionary presuppositions, and with a strong interest in the social and practical applications of the theory.

A different position is occupied by Professor James Seth ²), brother of the well-known English philosopher, Andrew Seth, but himself now identified, as a teacher, with our American academic life. Professor Seth announces in his preface that, as ethical student, he has been „anxious, in particular, to recover, and, in some measure, to restate, the contribution of the Greeks, and especially of Aristotle, to moral philosophy“. „For“, he continues,

1) *A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution.* By C. M. Williams. New York. MacMillan & Co. 1893. pp. XV, 581.

2) *A Study of Ethical Principles.* By James Seth, M. A. Professor of Philosophy in Brown University. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. pp. XVI, 460.

„in many respects the ancient statement of the questions seems to me more instructive than the modern“. An opening chapter states the general ethical problem; a second and third are devoted to the method and to the psychological basis. Part I of the body of the work, filling rather more than one third of the volume, critically studies the moral ideals: Hedonism, Rigorism, and Eudæmonism. Part. II, in some 80 pages, considers „the Moral Life“. Part. III, examines „the Metaphysical Implications of Morality“, with theistic conclusions. The spirit of the book is serious and tolerant, and the volume, while technical, is decidedly readable.

Professor Hyslop has contributed to Ethics a text-book for college lectures ¹⁾, a treatise notable for the extended analysis given to certain of the fundamental concepts, and for the elaborate discussion of the problem of Freedom. Professor John Dewey, formerly of Michigan University, at Ann Arbor, now of the new Chicago University, has printed an extremely interesting Syllabus of his lectures on Ethics ²⁾, in which, with great compactness, he brings a considerable number of fundamental problems under review.

The realm of psychological literature, in so far as it does not include systematic philosophical discussions, is, like the realm of the History of Philosophy proper, excluded from this review. In both of these regions, as has already been observed, much activity is at present existent amongst us. It is proper to mention, however, in this connection, certain publications which, although directly speaking rather psychological in their character, still have an express bearing upon general questions. Here belong, in the first place, the two books of Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall ³⁾, whose bearing upon the problems of philosophical aesthetics makes them decidedly

1) *The Elements of Ethics*. By James H. Hyslop, Ph. D. Instructor in Ethics, Columbia College in New York. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. pp. X, 467.

2) *The Study of Ethics. A Syllabus*. By John Dewey. Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1894. pp. 151.

3) *Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics. An Essay concerning the Psychology of Pain and Pleasure, with Special Reference to Aesthetics*. By Henry Rutgers Marshall. M. A. New York. MacMillan & Co. 1894. pp. X. 364. *Aesthetic Principles*. (By the same author and from the same publisher). 1895. pp. X, 201.

noteworthy, and whose skill and learning have won them wide recognition.

Amongst the numerous contributions to our pedagogical literature may next be named, as a work that involves both philosophical and ¹⁾ psychological questions, the volume on *Number* named below; and written by Professor Dewey in conjunction with the principal of a school of pedagogy. An important treatise on psychological evolution, which might also have found place in the list of general contributions to the philosophy of evolution named above, is the work of Mr. Stanley ²⁾. Of our monographic special literature on psychology, and of the numerous experimental contributions, nothing can be said here, beyond the two titles added below.

It remains, in concluding this inadequate summary, to mention a few of the more important papers upon philosophical topics which have appeared in our philosophical journals during the years in question, omitting any reference to the numerous papers, from British and continental sources, which have found their places in the same periodicals.

In the *Monist*, the editor, Dr. Paul Carus, exhibits, in his own papers, an astonishing and varied activity. Besides a series of studies of Buddhism, and numerous reviews, controversial papers, and other occasional productions, he has printed „The Metaphysical X in Cognition“ (*Monist* for July, 1895) and „The Message of Monism to the World“ (*Id.* July, 1894). In the January number of the same Journal for 1893, Mr. Charles Peirce, the leading logician amongst our philosophical students, and the author of investigations in the „Algebra of Logic“ which Schroeder on Ger-

1) *The Psychology of Number, and its Applications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic.* By James A. Mc Lellan, and John Dewey, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago. New York, Appleton & Co. 1895. pp. XV, 309.

2) *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling.* By Hiram M. Stanley, Member of the American Psychological Association. New York, Macmillan & Co. 1895. pp. VIII, 392. — *Association.* By Mary Whiton Calkins. pp. VII, 56. New York. Mac Millan & Co. — *Our Notions of Number and Space.* By Herbert Nichols, Ph. D. Late Instructor in Psychology in Harvard University. Boston. Ginn & Co. 1894. pp. VI, 201.

many has extensively cited and developed, completed for the time a series of papers containing a very original set of cosmological speculations, with their applications to various psychological and ethical problems. While the most of these papers do not come within the range covered by this report, it is proper to say that Mr. Peirce, in the course of the series, had entered upon extremely novel paths of speculation, with empirical basis, but with results that, if accepted, would certainly appear epochmaking in the theory of the nature of the concept of physical law. Major J. W. Powell, in an article on „The Nature of Motion“ (Id. October, 1894) opened an exposition of doctrines, also cosmological, which he has since continued in other periodicals. In the *Monist* for July, 1895, Professor Joseph Le Conte, of the University of California, wrote upon „The Theory of Evolution and Social Progress“, and Professor E. D. Cope, the biologist, upon „The Present Problems of Organic Evolution“. Both writers are known as philosophical students of Evolution, besides being specialists of eminence in their own fields.

In the *Philosophical Review* for July, 1893, one may note: a paper on „The Meaning of Truth and Error“ by Professor Dickinson S. Miller (in part a friendly, but vigorous polemic against some of the present writer's published views); „Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal“ by Professor John Dewey (November, 1893); „The Feelings“, by Dr. Herbert Nichols (September, 1895: a study on evolutionary psychology, with hypotheses of considerable general interest); „The consciousness of Moral Obligation“ by President Schurman of Cornell University (November, 1894); „The Morality that Ought to Be“, by Mr. Alfred L. Hodder (a study of the bases of ethics in a spirit of keen theoretical scepticism); „The Priority of Inner Experience“, by Dr. Warner Fite (March, 1895: a critical study of views of Wundt and of James, with a resulting denial of the supposed „priority“).

In the *International Journal of Ethics*, amongst the philosophical papers by American writers, may be noted: „The Ethics of Social progress“, by Professor F. H. Giddings (January, 1893); „The Ethics of an Eternal Being“, by Mr. Thomas Davidson (April 1893); „Freedom: Its Relation to the Proof of Determinism“ by

Professor Sidney E. Mezes (April, 1893); „Ethics and Biology“, by Mr. Edmund Montgomery (October, 1894), „The Teleology of Virtue“ by Professor Walter Smith of Lake Forest University in Illinois (January, 1895); „Automatism in Morality“ by Professor John Grier Hibben of Princeton University; and finally, the highly interesting paper entitled „Is Life worth Living?“ (October, 1895) by Professor Wm. James, a paper which has since appeared in book form.

A general review like the present must limit itself to a survey of the variety of the philosophical tendencies represented in our national life, and can attempt neither completeness nor thoroughness of estimate. As a last word, I am led to mention the final book of the man who, at the time of his death, was the principal surviving representative of the earlier tendencies of our American philosophy. I refer to the venerable president of Princeton University, whose death, falling within the period covered by this survey, gives one reason to express our general appreciation for that energetic and earnest spirit which he and a few others formerly represented, and which, in the last generation of our academic life, formed the foundation for the now manifold and vigorous activity of our new movement in philosophy¹).

1) Philosophy of Reality. Should it be favored by America? By James McCosh, LL. D., D. D., Lit. D. Ex-President of Princeton college. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. pp. 78.
