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this idealism, though consciousness of its influence may still be wanting in many instances. Proof of this fact is the severe criticism which the "*Neue Zeit*" has passed on the book we are reviewing, and which, we may add in passing, has been chiefly provocative of the remarks to the contrary that have here been expressed.

Let the memory of Lange not be effaced nor blurred among the workingmen of all nations. As a thinker and champion of the right, he was distinguished by the cosmopolitan spirit so characteristic of the Germans, and gave a new impulse to the study of moral philosophy and of the principles of the natural sciences, bringing to bear upon his task an extraordinary receptivity, and embracing the chief branches of culture in an extensive scheme of historical investigation and characterization. In the social conflicts of to-day, however, even if the scientific formulas have not yet been sufficiently perfected, the issues at stake are becoming more and more definitely crystallized, and the chief desideratum now is no longer to shed the light of historic criticism upon the problems before us, but to grasp them firmly with the help of a dogmatic system, and thus to pave the way for their actual solution in the political arena. Nevertheless, in all practical movements the function of control will not be able to be dispensed with, and it is on the possession of historic insight that the just exercise of that function depends. Respect and love, therefore, are due to the man who, in his "*History of Materialism*," has deciphered the idealistic motives in universal history.

HERMANN COHEN.

MARBURG.

REPORT ON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

1. THE MEANING AND THE METHOD OF LIFE. A SEARCH FOR RELIGION IN BIOLOGY. By George M. Gould, A.M., M.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893. Pp. 297.
2. A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. By C. M. Williams. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xv., 581.
3. FIRST STEPS IN PHILOSOPHY (PHYSICAL AND ETHICAL). By William Mackintire Salter. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1892. Pp. 156.

1. Amongst the books named in our list the first in order is also first in the warmth, the passionate directness, of the author's appeal to experience. The present reviewer has often confessed a partiality for the philosophical essayist, be he technical student of philosophy or not, who has really visited in person those regions, in the realms of the Spirit, which he tries to describe. And it is often surprising and saddening to observe how certain men can somehow write whole books about the absolute without showing that they have ever really tried to make the latter's acquaintance "in his native wilds," or that they know of such Absolute otherwise than by more or less technical hearsay, gathered from lectures and compends. Now, Dr. Gould is a man who has personally seen the face, not to be sure of the Absolute (for thereto he makes no pretence), but of his own chosen problems as to the "meaning and method of life." It is this directness of experience, this presence of a truly passionate interest in the subject, which makes our author's work fascinating, and which ought to make it valuable for many who will not accept Dr. Gould's conclusions in his own form. These conclusions, as here stated, are embodied, indeed, rather in an excellent cosmical romance than in a reasoned philosophical doctrine. But cosmical romances are works of art that few can write, and the good cosmical romance is a fiction that is sure to veil a deeper truth than perhaps its own author imagines, especially if he himself takes his legend to be literally accurate.

The hypothesis of a finite creative being, toiling in a world of hard foreign facts,—a being conscious, active, benevolent, aiming at the highest, but partly baffled, thus far, in his ideal plans for the vitalizing and ennobling of a dead physical world, by the poverty and the stubbornness of material laws,—is an old idea. But it is an hypothesis that has never quite come to its historical rights. The motives that have led men to Theism have usually involved the idea of God's absoluteness. Dualism, in religion, has reconciled itself with such absoluteness through the hypotheses of a finite Free Will and of the fall of created spirits from their original innocence. This form of secondary dualism, as one may name it, has also absorbed, by known devices, the older and primary dualism which conceived the world as one of a contest between the good and the evil powers. An hypothesis, however, that shall regard God as finite, but as opposed, not to the Devil, or to any created rebels, but to the uncreated and blind forces of nature, these latter being not intentionally either good or evil, but being

such as to be moulded only with difficulty,—an hypothesis which regards the creative work as now in progress, and as essentially incomplete, and its pangs and shortcomings as the incidents of the struggle between a well-wishing God and the world of blind fate,—well, such a doctrine has often been suggested, but not often well worked out. For Dr. Gould it is the one intelligible scheme of things. It is more. It is the one source of ethical inspiration. For our author preaches, not a mere theory, but a practical creed. The service of God gets, in his eyes, as he writes, what he takes to be its only vital meaning. God himself gets a new name. He is “*Biologos*.” He wants life, and the best possible life. He struggles to create it. To serve him is to share his plan, to help him against the mighty, to take part in the world-fight, to help get the better of the forces of nature, to extend organization, to live, as *Biologos* does, in the love of all living things; in a word, to be like God and to struggle shoulder to shoulder, as it were, with this architect of living cells and of thinking brains. He is not infinite; but he is at once leader and comrade in the ethical warfare.

Here is surely a scheme of things well worth the trouble of thinking out to its consequences. In setting himself this task our author appears as one well equipped with empirical illustrations derived from the biological sciences. His acquaintance with a considerable mass of them is as close and fresh as his own inner experience of life. It need not be said, however, that this empirical material is here used, not technically, nor in the service of science for its own sake, but rather by way of illustrating the general cosmical hypothesis. The latter, meanwhile, is itself presented with all the naïve and charming immediacy of a divine intuition. One does not prove this intuition; one simply sees its truth. The author’s experience as to this matter is presented with all the usual characteristics that mark, in literature, the confessions of such intuitive experiences. “For twenty or more years I have despairingly ransacked the wisdom of ethnic religions, systems of philosophy, and of natural theology, and, lo! under the microscope I found God at work, and in biology revealing Himself so fast and so far as fate and his myriad difficulties allowed, self His incarnation and deputy, Duty and Intellect His pleading with the deputy to become co-partner and helper in the Divinization of the World. . . . Science and religion equally and alike await the vision and knowledge of the ever-present living and struggling God” (p. 9). This dissatisfaction with technical philosophy, this appeal to immediate

insight, determine the whole of the following discussion of those fundamental problems which interest our author. Such a doctrine needs, of course, as its background, a realistic metaphysic. This our author finds ready to hand, and accepts it without a shadow of reflective concern. "Berkeley, Hegel, Spinoza, and others" have "spun imaginative phantasmagoria" in "dreamland and wordland;" but what they said does not concern us, and is in fact apparently dangerous, if not wicked (p. 30). An extract from Mr. Salter's exposition of the idealistic analysis of reality, quoted on pp. 140, 141, seems to Dr. Gould to embody only "jugglings with words after such words have been disconnected from a vital significance and relationship with facts." "To see no difference between the objective, self-existent causes of sensation and the ultimate products of sensation is simply philosophic barbarism or monomania. It is not healthy thought. To deny objectivity and self-existence because the forces and impingements of matter must be translated into sensation before being presented to mind, is to flatter one's self that dreams and imaginations are facts; it is a lazy sort of dogmatism that contents itself with the whirr of subjective machinery."

An idealist would naturally answer this vehemence by saying that of course the only penalty for one who will not philosophize with critical considerateness concerning the nature of his knowledge of truth, and who will still love the world and write about it,—that, I say, the only penalty for such a thinker lies in the fact that he is then confined to his cosmical romances. But the present romance, as has already been said, has its charm in something else than its philosophically critical character, and one is little disposed to interrupt this man of unique experiences either here, or when, elsewhere, he summarily indicts, or with equally summary immediacy propounds, other speculative views. All proofs of God's existence are vain (p. 51). "If instinctively one have the belief in his heart, he would better never read the 'proofs.'" "Facts need no proving." And the plain facts are that the phenomena of life, from the lowest to the highest, are utter exceptions in the world of physical processes. "The simplest bit of alga, diatom, or of self-mobile protoplasm proves God's existence" (p. 54). For everything that lives embodies a purpose. And no mechanism can embody a purpose. "If you don't see and perceive God, no reasoning and proof will enable you to do so."

The "Design-argument," regarded from a critical point of view,

is never more admirable than when it is short. And our author's form is as short as any upon record. He joins it (p. 55) with an equally immediate interpretation, in his own sense, of the contrast between consciousness in any sentient being, and the physical realities about this being. "The hyperphysical, therefore, is a fact, and this hyperphysical is mental, volitional, purposive" (p. 56). As this hyperphysical element is identical in respect of its ultimate nature, in all living beings that are conscious, the unity of the living things points to some one hyperphysical source of them all.

"Of course," continues our author, "no Infinite or Omnipotent is gained by this road, but none such is desirable. We reach, however, a working and actual God, of very satisfying proportions and powers." Meanwhile, our author regards the doctrine of the infinity and omnipotence of God as not only an unproved, but an impious doctrine, since it would put "the reason and ground" of "evil and imperfection in the very being of God, instead of in a condition outside of Himself," "which He is successfully and progressively overcoming. Waste worlds, incomprehensible mechanicalism, glaring evil, deadness, uselessness, are everywhere the distinguishing characteristics of the mechanical universe. If God did all this, He is an incomprehensible God, and covers in Himself such hideous contradictions that I prefer blank atheism as being far more truthful and comforting both to the intellect and to the heart" (p. 31). "Monism" (p. 28) "is muddleism. It is the sole system of religion or philosophy without any truth whatever as a basis."

Enough, perhaps, of these intuitive proclamations. Their only significance lies in the fact that our author is above all ethical in his concern, and feels precisely that opposition between the ethical and the all-powerful characteristics, in the God of tradition, which has so divided in twain the religious consciousness of the ages. The worth of the present intuition lies then in the fruits that spring from it. And there is something delightful, as one reads Dr. Gould's glowing pages, in watching this fervent student of current medical and of general biological lore, who, inspired by a moral devotion, "sees," "under the microscope," the workings of a God whom he now has to conceive with attributes quite pathetically, yes, tragically, human. This, for him, is a God who struggles with death (*i.e.*, with "the problem of nutrition") and who hates death as we do, but who, owing to the unsolved "problem of nutrition," cannot yet make cells or bodies that will be able to escape it. The

problem of evil is not our problem alone, but "Biologos" is toiling at it. We may yet help him on the road towards the solution. One's relation to Biologos is once more very similar to Abraham's relation to his God. One takes counsel with him, as it were, concerning Sodom and Gomorrah. Meanwhile, such thoughts make very concrete to our author the notion that the business of man's life is to "imitate God; to do what God is doing, and to be what he is" (p. 243). Since God is the essentially biological being, the study of biology becomes, for our author, as for Spencer, but with much more warmth of meaning, a part of ethics. The respect for all living things thus gets a very definite formulation. Buddhistic ethics ought even to be extended. The vegetable world ought to be included within the range of the objects of our duty. There should be "a society for the prevention of cruelty to trees" (p. 243). The highest and the lowest virtues are alike to get formulated in biological terms. The fault of the former doctrines that have made natural laws the basis of ethics, has been that such doctrines have not known what part of nature to select as the model for virtue. The heavens do not of themselves declare the glory of God. In the author, of old, before he found his insight, these "useless worlds" used to arouse only "cosmic horror" (p. 7). Not the telescope but the microscope is the religious instrument. It is the study of the processes of life that alone shows us in nature the models for our conduct. The author is sure that these models can be made very definite. The "Kingdom of God" must include "the subhuman part of the incarnation process" (p. 246), for in all living things the purpose of Biologos is incarnate, and is to be observed. "The extension and perfection of healthy life over the globe is undoubtedly the plainest aim and the most primary work of Biologos. Whatever aids in that is right and whatever opposes it is wrong" (p. 248). To the working out and application of this practical doctrine, whose simplicity, directness, and purity of motive our author constantly insists upon, much of his space is devoted, in chapters which are full of the very manly and vital experience of the concrete issues of life upon which stress has been laid in the foregoing. Here it is that what we have called our author's cosmical romance gets its moral expressed, and, in its own way, will make its influence felt.

The air of what we have called "unique experience" in this volume can be but faintly suggested by such a review. These propounders of intuitions will always be welcome guests in philoso-

phy. For the rest, our author's "twenty years" of search among the religions and philosophies have indeed left him singularly unaware that his romance of the "struggling God," "incarnate" in a time world, and unable there to do his perfect work until the fulfilment of times, is not only a familiar idea of traditional theology (as our author does indeed fully recognize), but is also the symbol of a very deep metaphysical truth, which the so much abhorred "Monism" of philosophy has not only recognized, but has expressed to the full, and without any loss of its Monism, either. That the Eternal, without hurt to his Eternity, appears and must appear in time as the struggling and incomplete One, beladen with dualism, with evil, with unattained ideals, surrounded with a world of uncomprehended fragments,—well, this for "monistic" philosophy, of the sort now referred to, is most decidedly an old story. To be sure, it takes more than the intuitive glance of one who believes only in the immediate "facts," to conceive how these things may be. And herewith enough, in this place, of our author's most admirable personal confession. We commend this book to all lovers, not only of Biologos, but of vigorous temperament.

2. As one passes to the quiet atmosphere of the study where Mr. C. M. Williams does his laborious and scholarly tasks, the scene and one's sensations decidedly alter. The author of "A Review of Evolutional Ethics" is engaged in critical portrayal. He is deeply in earnest, but his mood is cool, and he gives us comparatively little in the way of personal confession. He is deeply interested in his subject, and expects his reader to be so too. He may overestimate the average reader's patience, but such overestimate is itself a compliment, and Mr. Williams undertakes very seldom to bid for our attention by even the most innocent allurements of style.

This volume consists of two parts. In the first, which is expository of the various doctrines of "Evolutional Ethics," Mr. Williams begins with the views of Darwin on instinct, and on the origin of the social, and in particular of the moral instincts. Next follows a statement of Wallace's discussions of the same general questions. A sketch of Haeckel's opinions, in so far as they bear in the direction of Evolutional Ethics, concludes this preliminary glance at the "special theories by which the great original authorities paved the way for a system of Evolutional Ethics" (p. 28). With Spencer, the list of "the more purely philosophical writers" begins. Spencer himself is expounded (pp. 28-76) by following

the general growth of his views from the "Social Statics," to the appearance of Vol. I., of the "Principles of Ethics," in 1892. Mr. Fiske next receives a half-dozen pages. The book "Biologische Probleme," by W. H. Rolph, stands next in order of exposition (pp. 82-106), and is followed by an account of Barratt's "Physical Ethics" (pp. 107-120). Thereafter Leslie Stephen's "Science of Ethics" is summarized (pp. 120-143); and then follow in order Carneri's "Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," and the same author's other ethical studies (pp. 143-175), Höffding's "Ethik" (pp. 175-200), Gizycki's "Moralphilosophie" (pp. 200-224), and Alexander's "Moral Order and Progress" (pp. 225-263), with an appendix on Paul Ree's "Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen" and "Entstehung des Gewissens" (pp. 264-268). The scope and laboriousness of the expository work is only suggested by this catalogue.

These summaries are to a very small degree accompanied with critical observations. Mr. Williams considers it here his duty to give his various authors in succession the word, and he seldom interrupts them even to characterize or to recapitulate any of the views once set forth at length. But the whole of the second part of our treatise, on the contrary, is devoted to the exposition of the author's own views upon the Ethics of Evolution. Here, too, as in the first part, the book shows evidences of wide reading, and, in general, of a decidedly judicial frame of mind, at least as regards the current and recent ethical issues. Where our author comes, as on page 520, *et seq.*, to touch upon a distinctly historical problem, such as that of the relation of modern ethics to the religious ideals of the past, he does indeed temporarily lose this judicial frame of mind, and uses speech that reminds one of the old tone of crude liberalism, which was customary before the historical movement, and the higher criticism, taught us how to try to understand the religion of our fathers, without merely condemning it in a lump. On the whole, however, our author appears as a many-sided man, who carefully weighs conflicting claims, and who takes account of the organic unity that lies beneath most great issues.

Technically considered, the structure and method of the book are meanwhile disappointing. In case of so complex a piece of expository and critical work, the absence of an index is inexcusable. One never knows when a given author, expounded in the first part of the work, will come in for his share of criticism and estimate in the second part. A citation or a critical observation once

noted in our author's pages, but not accurately placed in the reader's mind, becomes at once lost, as if in the sea. The historical and positive divisions of the subject remain, moreover, without definite relations. The first part contains what Hegel would have called a *Vorrath von Meinungen*, the second a series of independent expressions of opinion and of critical observations, intermingled in a complicated fashion, whose results are neither to furnish us a connected history of opinion, nor yet to give us a clean and transparent statement of a theory. As for the expositions of the first part, they are not only made unnecessarily tedious reading, but are rendered in a great measure unenlightening, by their too frequent omission of general surveys and recapitulations, and by the fact that most, although indeed not all of them, tell us too little about how each author himself divides his subject and chooses the titles and headings by which he guides himself and his readers. These summaries, in fact, proceed, on the whole, with a dead level monotony of bald restatement of each author's views one after another, so that one easily loses his way, as on a treeless prairie.

More serious, however, from an historical point of view, appears an objection to our author's general plan which grows upon us as we read his work, and which the present reviewer had not anticipated on first becoming acquainted with this plan as announced in the table of contents. The idea of treating in one place the evolutionary doctrines of ethics, and of writing their critical history, seems one eminently justified by the large place that evolution has played in recent discussion. Yet when one actually comes to consider the list of names brought together in the first part of this work, one begins to see how impossible it is to make, amongst recent writers, a distinct category of "evolutional" ethical thinkers, without hopeless perplexity. Höffding appears in the list, and justly. But Paulsen's and Wundt's treatises, and Von Ihering's unfinished but admirable *Zweck im Recht*, are excluded. Shall one say that none of these writers make sufficient use of the doctrine of evolution? And is Wundt then to be excluded for the sins against evolutionary ethics for which the author chastises him on p. 513? But surely to choose thus would be to risk mere sectarianism. For whatever Wundt thinks of the Spencerian method and results, he is not only himself an evolutionist in belief, but has devoted a section of his treatise to an elaborate study of the social evolution of the ethical ideas on human levels. What reason, except our author's disagreement with certain of Wundt's opinions, can be found for ex-

cluding his book from this list, and including that of Stephen, which was long ago criticised by certain followers of Spencer as being after all, notwithstanding its free use of evolutionary ideas, still not sufficiently informed by the doctrine of evolution? It is easier to omit Paulsen's book from the list of evolutionary ethical writers, yet if one brings Paulsen and Stephen side by side, without prejudice, it is hard to say why they should not after all be classed, despite differences, as representatives of the same general tendency in ethics. The fact is that, despite the unquestionable importance of the doctrine of evolution for modern ethical inquiry, the sole "natural class" which can well be formed, and which will be adequate to include the modern evolutionary ethical writers, is that of "Recent Ethical Realists." As distinct from writers of the very various types which Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and Green respectively represent,—that is, as distinct from the writers who may roughly be grouped together as "Ethical Idealists," despite the varieties of their idealism,—these Ethical Realists may be defined as those who, in recent times, seek, not in general reflections upon the logic of moral ideals, but in the study of the actual constitution and of the evolution of human nature, for guidance as to the moral law. What part the technical researches of the biological doctrine of evolution shall play in this realistic study of the laws of human nature as it is, the individual writer must determine for himself. No modern Ethical Realist can wholly ignore the doctrine of evolution, because he is looking for the facts as to man's structure and functions as giving a basis for the law of duty, and because the doctrine of evolution throws light on these facts. The mere fact that, like Wundt, an author doubts or denies that moral conceptions can arise, *as* moral conceptions, out of "tendencies stored up in the nervous system," does not exclude him from the present category, so long as for him the study of man's actual psychological nature and growth, and of "the social tissue" (to use Stephen's phrase), throws a genuine light on the fundamental ethical problem. The opposing class of thinkers, the ethical idealists, look to some inner and reflective source for rational guidance, or found ethics upon a metaphysic, rather than upon an empirical study of the natural history of man. Here, as one must hold, is the true issue of recent ethics, and one to which all others are subordinate.

In the positive section of the book, our author makes his foundations broad. The ethics of evolution must be founded on a study

of the general "Concepts of Evolution." Fechner's speculation concerning the "tendency to stability" as first criticised, and then with modification, accepted in an essay by Petzoldt, entitled "Maxima, Minima, and *Ökonomie*," in the "Vierteljahresschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie," is first recognized as an important central concept of the general theory of evolution; and Mr. Williams later returns from time to time to the same matter, whose relation, however, to the ethical problem is somewhat obscurely treated. The Heredity problem, that burning question, so dangerous for any but the professional biologist to handle, is then somewhat cautiously taken up, as bearing on the question of the origin of conscience, nor is our author satisfied with one treatment of it, but has it often afterwards ready to his hand as he proceeds. If the present reviewer has understood the reasons that have led not only biologists like Weissman and Wallace, but psychologists like James, to doubt the traditional theory of the heredity of acquired characters (a theory which, by the way, whether it ever proves to be scientifically verifiable or not, certainly has an origin in folk-lore), Mr. Williams is decidedly mistaken in supposing that the facts which he cites from Ribot, on pp. 402-3, concerning the heredity of alcoholism, could to-day offer any difficulties whatever either to Weissman or to such a "Weissmanian" as James is.

In the subsequent discussion from Chapter II. to Chapter VI. of the second part, Mr. Williams, in considering, in detail, the evolution of the factors of our complex moral consciousness, shows an admirable disposition to reject simple explanations. In dealing with the organic, as he holds, we must not look for simple forces. To be sure, this very respect for complexities does not render his book any easier reading. The most important definitions are postponed until disappointingly late. Mr. Williams's exposition shares with the "mystery" romances the one feature of keeping the reader in suspense. "Our analysis," he says in Chapter VI. (p. 443), "has hitherto omitted all definition of morality and conscience," whereupon he proceeds to observe that "morality, as we ordinarily define it, has a very intimate connection with the relations of individuals to each other," and adds, on p. 444, concerning the supposed opposition of egoism and altruism, that "we begin to suspect that we are making a mistake in separating, in a definition, things which must be indissolubly united in actual practice." It is this "beginning to suspect" which keeps the reader

of this most conscientious book in a doubtless very salutary, if occasionally somewhat exasperating condition of indecision of judgment, which Mr. Williams is never in any haste to relieve. At length, on p. 449, "we come finally to the definition of conscience." "In humanity as a whole, and in the single societies of which it is composed, a certain moral evolution may be perceived which we have found reasons for believing to be internal as well as external, a matter of heredity as well as instruction. In this internal sense, conscience, as innate capacity, may be said to be an instinct. . . . That which, when we become capable of reflection, we term conscience, consists in pleasure in forms of action furthering the welfare of society,—forms gradually moulded to habit with the development of social relations,—and in a corresponding pain at the realization of having failed of such action; the knowledge of the demand, by society as a whole, or by a part of society, of action in accord with the general welfare, and the sense of the justice of this demand, constituting the feeling of obligation and duty. . . . Our whole analysis of the course by which conscience is developed tends to show the truth of that which Darwin claimed,—namely, that the moral instinct is a development and organization of many instincts."

The following chapter, the seventh, discusses, on rather familiar lines, "The Moral Progress of the Race as shown by History." In the next chapter, on the "Results of Ethical Inquiry," we learn at last that the "work of Evolution for Ethics" "has unified and clarified the attempts made to discover a basis for moral principles, and has rendered that foundation for the first time secure; it has cleared away with one sweep the rubbish of ancient superstition, made exact methods possible, and raised Ethics to the plane of a science" (p. 515). After the display of opinions in the first part, and the elaborately cautious and often extremely hesitant analyses of the text up to this point, the possibly breathless reader, thus relieved at last as to what we have called the "mystery" of the tale, can only joyously recognize how all is well that ends well. An interesting chapter on the Ideal and the Way of its Attainment concludes the book, on p. 581, the last words being lines from George Eliot's "Choir Invisible."

Mr. Williams has certainly not lost his labor. One can only wish that so careful a scholar could have given his monograph a more permanent form and sharper outlines. In any case our author, through his modesty, industry, and patience, gives a noble example,

in all his work, of the ethics of self-restraint and self-sacrifice. One ventures to add that his book may even tend also to cultivate these virtues in his readers.

3. Mr. Salter's too modestly entitled book discusses two fundamental problems of philosophy,—the idealistic analysis of the nature of physical reality, and the logical problem of the definition of the moral ideal. As for the first problem, the idealistic analysis of the sensible world soon brings us to a point (p. 22) where "the material" of this world "does not indeed cease to be, but its manner of existence is found to be subjective." "So far as sensible phenomena are concerned" (p. 24), "nothing is left; the whole sensible world is but an effect upon ourselves. But because nothing sensible or material is left, it would be a hasty inference to say that nothing whatever is left. If we are asked, What? We answer, All that causes sensations." . . . "Our search for causes" (p. 25) "has proved unsuccessful. But though we know of no causes, we have an inextinguishable faith that there *are* such causes." "It only remains to us then, in the absence of knowledge, to think, conjecture or speculate,—by which I mean to form some kind of hypothesis which we cannot hope to (in the strict sense of the word) verify." "This position" (p. 27, *note*) "might be called Sensible or Physical Idealism, and is nowise inconsistent with, but rather implies a Supersensible or Metaphysical Realism. . . . Absolute Idealism, as I understand it, takes a step further and involves the causes of sensible phenomena in the same subjective relationships (whether in a human or absolute mind) in which we have found sensible phenomena themselves to be involved." Such absolute idealism lies, however, beyond Mr. Salter's present meaning. "Metaphysics" (p. 68), being concerned with the causes of our experience, and not with "the last elements of the sensible world," "cannot become science—*i.e.*, verified speculation—in the present state of human faculties."

The "absolute idealist," as the present reviewer understands his position, would of course accept the substance of Mr. Salter's excellent exposition of "sensible idealism," and would only insist upon further considerations. As to the ultimate problem of "metaphysic," however, such an idealist would decline to admit that "metaphysic" is concerned with the "causes" of our experience. Causation belongs to the concepts whereby we describe the connections of events in the world of "sensible experience," when this world is regarded as an object of human science; and the very

essence of "absolute idealism" consists in its implicit denial of the ultimate validity of the concept of causation, if applied beyond the field of sensible experience itself. Our experience, viewed not as an event occurring to this or that physical organism in the natural world, but as that total collection of data which constitutes this phenomenal natural world itself, is in need of no "causal" explanation. One cannot tell, as even Lotze used to say, what external cause makes any world at all exist, "*und nicht lieber gar nichts.*" The only genuine question is, What is the *true* world? and absolute idealism consists in the assertion that the "true" world is essentially a "truth-world," existent as the Object of the insight of a logically complete subject or truth-knower, not as the unknown external producer of sensations in us finite subjects, or in the true "Subject" of knowledge himself. "We know something" (namely, the decidedly fragmentary objects of human experience), "and for logical, not for causal reasons, this fragmentary experience of ours must be an organic part of a complete experience." Herein lies the thesis of "absolute," or, if one prefers the word, of Complete Idealism, for which the real is not the "cause of sensations," but the truth that is the present and immanent object of a final insight,—the existence of such a final insight being logically implied, according to such Idealism, in the very failures and inadequacies and errors of our human and finite insight. A "cause of experience," would, as cause, be either an object of somebody's knowledge, or else would be nothing, precisely as an odor, for Mr. Salter's analysis, can exist only in so far as somebody smells it. One has only to be thorough in one's analysis, and to treat "cause" as one treats pains and odors. Hence not "Cause," but "Object of Insight," must be the final name for the reality at the bottom of things. If one still calls this object "cause," one must do so only in a logical or teleological, not in a physical sense. Whether, again, there is indeed a sense in which teleological (although not physically causal) concepts are also still applicable to the absolute Subject, so that he may indeed be called a "creator" in so far as, even in the act of knowing the eternal truth, he yet knows only what he finds it most worth while to know,—this is another question, and belongs not here. But in the physical sense of the word "causation," the phenomenal motion of the moon "causes" the equally phenomenal movement of the tides; and in this physical sense *nothing* causes or can cause the whole phenomenal world of "objects of insight" to come into being, since such "cause"

could itself be only another object of insight, another phenomenal thing. Herein lies the true difference between Mr. Salter's admirably analyzed "Sensible Idealism" and that "Absolute Idealism" which he regards only as an hypothesis about the nature of the causes of experience.

The second part of this little treatise discusses the nature of ethical truth with much ingenuity. The "ought," so Mr. Salter first teaches us (pp. 72-100), must be a truth, and must still be different from a physical fact or from a mere psychological disposition. Here are precisely the considerations of the sort which really lead in the direction of absolute idealism. There is more metaphysic in ethics than men of Mr Williams's type know, and Mr. Salter is to be thanked for bringing out the fact afresh, and in his own way. It is to be hoped that our honored friend, Dr. Paul Carus, will take Mr. Salter's book into account when next he is disposed to assert that the leaders of the "Ethical Movement" in this country are not sufficiently alive to the logical dependence of ethics upon fundamental philosophical considerations. But Mr. Salter, near as he is to the absolutely idealistic tendencies just indicated, still preserves, in this second part of his "First Steps," the caution and philosophical reserve of the first part of his volume. He approaches the promised land of the idealist, but declines to enter. "The realization of the nature of each being" is, according to his definition, "the end to be striven for." The conception of a real "capacity," existent in each moral agent as a potentiality, whose present incompleteness is to be so far as possible completed, is for Mr. Salter the somewhat tentatively defined theoretical solution of the ethical problem.

There is no time here to discuss at any length a notion which is old in ethical theory, but which deserves a critical study as cautious as that of Mr. Salter, and yet more under the influence of an explicitly and "absolutely" idealistic doctrine than his view is here permitted to be. Mr. Salter's result is in substance closely related to the fundamental ethical doctrine at the basis of Aristotle's theory concerning this same problem. But, although Aristotle was a stranger to our modern issues, the truth of Aristotle is, as a fact, the world of absolute Idealism. And this too, in the present reviewer's opinion, is the partly unconscious drift of Mr. Salter's present philosophy.

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