

cried over him (she had come and seed him in the engine), and said she knew his mother and sister down in the country (she used to live down there); they was gentlefolks; that Jim was all they had. And when one of them old director-fellows who had been swilling himself behind there come aroun,' with his kid gloves on and his hands in his great-coat pockets, lookin' down, and sayin' something' about, 'Poor fellow, couldn't he 'a jumped? Why didn't he

jump?' I let him have it; I said, 'Yes, and if it hadn't been for him, you and I'd both been frizzin' this minute.' And the President standin' there said to some of them, 'That was the same young fellow who came into my office to get a place last year when you were down, and said he had 'run to seed.' 'But,' he says, 'Gentlemen, it was d—d good seed!'

How good it was no one knew but two weeping women in a lonely house.

PRESENT IDEALS OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIFE.

By Josiah Royce.

RECENTLY, in looking through some papers on file in our college library at Cambridge, I came upon a leaflet, dated New York, November 2, 1853, containing a report of a committee of the trustees of Columbia College, upon several matters, one of which is "The Establishment of a University System." The report also treats of proposed "Changes in the Collegiate Course," and defines, according to the ideas of the signers, "the Mission of the College." This mission is "to direct and superintend the mental and moral culture." "Mental and moral discipline, it is agreed," says the leaflet, "is the object of collegiate education. The mere acquisition of learning, however valuable and desirable in itself, is subordinate to this great work. . . . The design of a college is to make perfect the human intellect in all its parts and functions; by means of a thorough training of all the intellectual faculties, to attain their full development; and by the proper guidance of the moral functions, to direct them to a proper exertion. To form the mind, in short, is the high design of education as sought in a College Course." The report hereupon proceeds to note that, unfortunately, this sentiment, "manifest and just" though it be, "does not meet with universal sympathy or acquiescence." "On the contrary, the demand for what is termed progressive knowledge . . . and for fuller instruction in what are called the useful and practical sciences, is at variance

with this fundamental idea. The public generally, unaccustomed to look upon the mind except in connection with the body, and to regard it as a machine for promoting the pleasures, the conveniences, or the comforts of the latter, will not be satisfied with a system of education in which they are unable to perceive the direct connection between the knowledge imparted, and the bodily advantages to be gained. For this reason, to preserve in some degree high and pure education and strict mental discipline, and to draw as many as possible within its influence, we must partially yield to those sentiments which we should be unable wholly to resist." The committee therefore "think that while they would retain the system having in view the most perfect intellectual training, they might devise parallel courses, having this design at the foundation, but still adapted to meet the popular demand."

After this fashion, then, the members of the Columbia committee propose to meet the public desire of their time for some modification of the traditional college course. The report next passes on to the question of the establishment of higher "University" courses to supplement the collegiate work. The members of the committee hope the desire for such additional instruction "may in part be reached by the plan suggested by them. But they are admonished that this design is not free from serious difficulties." In conse-

quence the committee "simply report this subject as having engaged their attention." The "plan suggested" is simply the establishment of "parallel courses" as a concession to popular demands.

The situation at Columbia in the early fifties, as thus displayed, is not without decided interest even to-day. We have heard of this situation more than once since: On the one side stands the abstract ideal of something called "the perfect moral and intellectual discipline of the mind." On the other hand stands at least a portion of the public, demanding "practical and progressive knowledge." The lovers of the abstract ideal accuse this public of being "unaccustomed to look upon the mind except in connection with the body," while they of course imagine themselves, as lovers of ideals, quite able to accomplish the feat of "looking upon the mind" without any such connection whatever. They accordingly feel and express some contempt for the persons who cannot follow them in their abstractions. But these partisans of the ideal are still reluctantly forced to confess that just such "looking upon the mind in connection with the body," has somehow made the Philistine public wealthy, and socially powerful. Hence one must humor the Philistines a little, not by abandoning one's traditions about collegiate work, but by offering a few "parallel courses" of a more "progressive" sort. Meanwhile, however, in this connection, there soon appears an unexpected bearing of the new undertaking upon instruction of the higher "University" grade. The new courses, namely, will very naturally be offered to graduates of the traditional college work, whose minds having been more or less nearly "perfected" by the best system of "intellectual and moral discipline," may now be more safely supplied with "progressive knowledge." However, one feels that such an undertaking, even in case of graduate students, has its dangers. One is "admonished that this design is not free from serious difficulties." One is disposed to report the mere fact that the thing is under consideration and to wait further events. By such halting steps, in the midst of

such serious perplexities, despite such unfortunate misunderstandings of the unity of life's great business—yes, even by means of this very conflict between the lovers of the "practical and progressive" and the people who "look upon the mind" out of "connection with the body," has the cause of the American University slowly and yet happily progressed during the last forty years, until to-day there is so much to rejoice in, and still so much before us to undertake.

It is the purpose of the present paper to give a brief sketch of certain facts relating to the development of the modern American University, to suggest some of the ideals that university instruction just now has in mind in our country, and to indicate hereby some of our present problems. I shall not care to speak from the point of view of any one institution as such. The "American University," using the word as a convenient general name, is just now at a critical point in its development. A number of our leading institutions are together engaged in the work of "modifying the collegiate course," and of supplementing it by "university work." If the report of Columbia's committee in 1853 very fairly represents the situation in those days in all our most prominent colleges, the latest report of President Low is an important indication of the present tendencies at work in more places than one. Meanwhile, the general public has frequently heard of late of the office which the University ought to fill, and is familiar, although perhaps even now not too familiar, with the idea that a University is much more than the traditional American "College" of former days, and that "University work," in the stricter sense, means work above the collegiate grade. A great deal has also been written about the function of the University as a centre of original research. I should not try to add to the already extensive literature of the topic, were I not impressed by the thought that we still, most of us, imperfectly understand the forces that are just now at work to produce this modification of the character of our academic institutions. The opposition which the Columbia committee made in 1853 between the

"disciplinary" ideals of the traditional College course, and the "practical and progressive" needs of the relatively materialistic public, is still in a measure with us. But meanwhile, what many fail to understand is, that just these relatively "materialistic" demands and interests of the public, which have occasioned the call for "practical and progressive" studies, have been among the most potent factors in precisely that reform of higher study which is now making the American University daily more ideal in its undertakings, more genuinely spiritual in its enthusiasm and in its scholarship, and really far less Philistine in its concerns than was the American College of former days. This, to my mind, is the most deeply instructive feature of the modern University life. In 1853 we find a representative committee defending a really fine and ancient ideal of collegiate "discipline," against a thoughtless "practical" and "popular" demand. The history of academic life since has been in large part the history of the triumph of just that popular demand. Has the result been the degradation of our academic ideals? No, the result has been the evolution of the University ideal among us—an ideal higher, more theoretical, more scholarly, less "popular" in the evil sense of that word, and in the best sense more unworldly than its predecessor. Let us look a little at the history of the process, and see that this is so.

I.

A GREAT deal of this history I must indeed pass over here, partly because its outlines are familiar to every reader, partly because its details are too minute and too imperfectly accessible. What everybody knows is that the immense extension of the natural and physical sciences within the last half century has been of great significance in altering men's views as to the educator's business, and especially as to the business of the colleges. As the Columbia report shows, the interest in what we now call University work, was for a good while associated, in the minds both of those

who magnified and those who belittled the importance of such work, with the growth of what were regarded as materialistic opinions and ideals. Strange, and yet inevitable and most instructive, union of the spiritual and the bodily concerns of men! The traditional college course was to "fit"—yes, so far as might be in a four years' curriculum, to "perfect" a man, by "culture," for this world, and for entrance on the future life. To this end, before he entered college, one first taught him the rules of Latin grammar, and all the even remotely conceivable forms of *τύπρω*. Then, in college, one not only continued this drill, but brought him "into contact with the greatest minds of antiquity," by teaching him to analyze their written words and sentences as they never could have thought of doing themselves. This plan was indeed in its way an excellent one; but after all it did not universally succeed in bringing about the close "contact." Meanwhile, since youth is wayward, one "disciplined" the student, following his steps with constant admonition, ordering his studies as precisely as his hours, and correcting his conduct as carefully as his exercises. By the Senior year he had already become learned in Logic, and a master of the devices of Oratory; and one now showed him the *Evidences of Revealed Religion*, and refuted for him the principal errors of infidelity. One also grounded him in "Civil Polity," and even taught him something of "Science." In mathematics, too, he was by this time well versed, insomuch that he usually regarded it as the most finished and complete of the departments of human knowledge, and supposed its business and its discoveries to be ended whenever Sturm's theorem had been demonstrated, and the Conic Sections had been exhaustively treated in a single small text-book. Thus his intellectual and moral life were rounded out; he now possessed "culture." Culture was something precise, definable, transmissible. The possession of it made him great on commencement day, and he "went forth," diploma in hand, into a wicked world which is "not accustomed to look upon the mind except in connection with the body."

Far be it from one who, like the present writer, owes an incalculable debt to those who taught him a form, considerably altered and improved indeed, of this traditional course; far be it from such an one to belittle the worth of what he learned thereby. For very many American colleges, the traditional curriculum more or less modified still is, and will long remain, the substance of academic "culture." And as it has accomplished a great work in the past, so let the traditional college course continue for a season its services in its own field. I suggest its defects in my obviously too meagre sketch; but they were the defects of its admirable qualities. It could not of itself make scholars; but it has helped great numbers to become such. It could not insure true "culture." But many of its graduates have attained a noble culture. Its "discipline" was often crude, but was more often serviceable. I am glad that our most progressive institutions have modified it until it is no longer easily recognizable. I hope that in anything like its old form and methods it will in time become altogether a memory; but I am sure that as such it will be a good memory. Progress removes many old servants from office, but does not forget them, and does honor them. Classical scholarship, for the rest, will not die with the traditional college course, nor yet pine after that course is dead. Literature will not suffer by the dissolution of the old curriculum. The "greatest minds of antiquity" will still speak to our world long after the memory of those once tabulated forms of *τύπτω* has faded "like streaks of the morning cloud." "Discipline" will in the end prosper in the midst of much modified academic methods. Religion will arouse as much thought and devotion as ever, even if Seniors are no longer examined on the Evidences. And still all these great interests will look back to the days of *τύπτω* and of "discipline" with thankfulness and with affection. For the old way was indeed good in its time.

Over against this traditional curriculum, however, stood, during the sixties and early seventies, the new "Science curriculum," a still undefined thing, whereof, as many people imagined, Mr.

Spencer had given the best general suggestion in his essays on Education, but of whose precise content nobody could speak with assurance. Its ideals were understood to be, as I have suggested, both "practical" and "materialistic." Meanwhile, in giving expression to these ideals, its partisans were fond of using a formula as amusingly abstract and meaningless as that of their opponents, who wanted to "look upon the mind out of connection with the body." This favorite abstract statement of the partisans of the "new" method was, that they, for their part, were minded to study "things," not "words."

It is curious to observe how fond educational theories have often been of such false abstractions. Herein, to be sure, they only follow the fashion of many political theories. Just as "freedom," or "balance of trade," or "money," have often come to be talked of as if all these were names for things that could exist all alone by themselves, and could be estimated without any reference to other social facts, or to anything else in the universe, so in educational matters, men love purely abstract catch-words, and love judgments founded upon such terms. Which would you rather study, "words" or "things?" Which would you rather possess, "money" or "credit?" Do you prefer the "law," or would you be more content with "freedom" instead? All such questions persist in reminding me of an illustration that I have written down, I believe, more than once before. It is, in case of them all, as if the soul of some still indefinite animal, not yet embodied here on earth, were to be asked, in some pre-existent state, "When you come to be incarnated on earth, which of the two organs would you prefer to have in your body, a great toe, or a tail?" Well, even so it is with that favorite contrast between "words" and "things." Just as the Columbia committee regretted that people would not "look upon the mind" out of "connection with the body," so the partisans of the so-called "science-curriculum" in education used to ask us defiantly whether or no we preferred studying "words" to studying "things." Well, if that meant the

same as asking us whether we preferred *τύπτω* and its forms to anything else in heaven or earth, the question might be faced and pretty easily answered. But if it meant to suggest that we could become rationally conscious of things without all the while reflecting upon our own words and the sense of them, the suggestion became too near the absurd for serious criticism. Is science to cultivate in us a sort of aphasia? Or is reflective self-consciousness to be discouraged as we grow in insight into nature's truth?

Meanwhile, the partisans of the traditional linguistic and literary training, somewhat disturbed in mind by this flippant accusation that their own task was merely a study of "words," were not slow to respond that they were really studying, in their classics and in their literary exercises, not words, but human life. The spirit, they said, is after all the concretest of "things," the most real, the most complex, the deepest-natured. Since this spirit is revealed to us in the history of humanity, we learn the wealth of its laws, the significance of its problems, the profound meaning of its facts whenever we wisely study a great literature. Life is not mere "words." The soul of the classics is more than their language. The minds of antiquity are the objects of a science as serious in its undertakings, as objective in its appeal to matters of fact, as extended in its field as any natural science. Continental scholarship has long since furnished us the example of scientific method applied to this world of truth that is embodied in literature. The science which studies life as it is thus embodied, is called Philology, using that word in Boeckh's sense, and after the fashion already sanctified, since his time, by more than one generation of long-lived and inquiring Germans. The moral, however, of this observation was, that if classical studies were to retain their strong hold on the academic public, they must become themselves more scientific. Classical Philology must transcend the traditional lore of the older college curriculum. The traditional course itself must be the first to modify its own ideals, and to break down its own limitations. Serious

scholarship must be set as an ideal before the minds of even young college students. A higher learning must join itself to the old "discipline." The deadness of the old drill in memorized grammar must be quickened by an endeavor really to bring about that "contact with the true mind of antiquity" which earlier generations of college students had so often missed. Classical study, if it ever was a study of *mere* words, must learn a lesson from the example of natural science, and become indeed a study of the things of the spirit.

So, for the past twenty-five years, many of our best teachers have reasoned, and thus the "materialistic" interests that were once so feared, the "parallel courses" that were once so unwillingly tolerated, have proved to the lovers of true literature and of human life the most inspiring of rivals, the friendliest of allies, although disguised as enemies. The result of this "conflict" between the two ideals of academic work, has been the union of both in the efforts of all concerned to build up a system of University training, whose ideal is at once one of scholarly method, and of scientific comprehension of fact. For the scholar as such, be he biologist or grammarian or metaphysician, the exclusive opposition between "words" and "things" has no meaning. He works to understand truth, and the truth is at once Word *and* Thing, thought *and* object, insight *and* apprehension, law and content, form and matter. You understand it when you both conform your opinions to the facts and comprehend the force and the meaning of your opinions; when you get hold upon realities, and at the same time interpret your own knowledge of them. There is no science unexpressed; there is no genuine expression of truth that ought not to seek the form of science.

Now, such being the ideal of the scholar's business that has gradually grown up among us, in our best institutions of learning, one result has of course been, that however we have differed as to what we ought to teach to undergraduates, we have all come to feel that the work of the undergraduate

course ought to be supplemented by higher courses, wherein the scholar as such should have a chance to say his say, to present his truth, to indicate the recent advance of his science, whether that science were Geology, or Sanskrit, or Latin Grammar, or Mathematics. Thus, then, the coming of the natural sciences, with their high demands upon the learner, and their strong assertion that they taught truth about "things," had seemed at first to threaten the purity and authority of the collegiate course of former times. To prevent such evil effects the device of "parallel courses" suggested itself; and in many Western Colleges this device has developed the system of the various so-called "Colleges"—departments of one large institution, whose concurrent courses all lead to degrees, while the degrees themselves have different names, according as the courses have more or less of the traditional character of the classical course in them. But this system of parallel courses, with or without differently named degrees at the end of the courses, could not suffice, in the larger institutions, to meet all the needs of the new situation. Such organization of natural history work as Agassiz initiated at Cambridge, demanded room for a higher sort of instruction. Other departments could not remain behind where natural science led. And thus it was that the call for what used to be called "post-graduate" study became general. And so, once more the "materialistic" interests, in getting a hearing for themselves, brought to pass the beginning of a revolutionary change. Those whom the Columbia committee accused of thinking only of the "body," began a process that is now transforming with the highest purpose the training of the soul. Such was the origin of the modern American University.

II.

A FRIEND and colleague of mine has given me a look into an interesting note-book of his own, written out in the first year of his graduate life, and, as it chances, in the first year of President

Eliot's administration at Harvard. The notes are an evidence of the state of "post-graduate" work at Cambridge in the academic year 1869-70. A series of "philosophical lectures" was then offered to graduates, and formed, I believe, the first course of formal graduate instruction in metaphysical topics at Harvard. The lecturers were Professor Bowen, Mr. John Fiske, Mr. Charles Peirce, Mr. Cabot, Dr. Hedge, and—last and greatest name—Emerson. The lecturers followed in series, filling the winter with what constituted one long course. Examinations were held upon all the courses but Emerson's. The whole series, as represented by my friend's note-book, is a decidedly impressive one. Mr. Fiske's lectures, on "Positivism," afterward took shape in the "Cosmic Philosophy." Professor Bowen's and Dr. Hedge's contributions to the work were also substantially repeated in later publications. Mr. Cabot, now Emerson's biographer, broke on this occasion a silence that he has in general maintained far too rigidly. Emerson himself read those papers on the "Natural History of the Intellect" which have since been seen, in the original manuscript or in copy, by a few students, but which have so far not been published—papers in which, as he said, he was "watching the stream of thought, running along the banks a little way, but only seeing a little, knowing that the stream is hollowing out its own bed." Mr. Charles Peirce, on the contrary, expounded, in the highly technical form that he has since so much developed, that "Algebra of Logic" whereof he is still easily the first master among us in this country. Stronger and more interesting contrasts in thought and method could hardly have been presented to young graduates of philosophical ambitions. The courses, however, were regularly attended, I believe, by three students. Such was one beginning of a department of University instruction.

By this same year, however, the custom of offering some sort of "post-graduate" work, however little it might be in amount, was comparatively common throughout our country wherever there were ambitious teachers. Columbia College had taken definite action

looking to the establishment of "University courses" as early as 1857, four years after the time of the report above referred to. As the organization of the higher work in science by Agassiz at Cambridge suggests, scientific specialties were from the first generally well in advance of the literary branches. Where laboratories and museums existed, graduate instruction was often a matter not only of choice, but of necessity. On the other hand, the unformed state of graduate instruction in other departments as late as 1870, is well suggested by the lectureship course in metaphysics at Cambridge, as above described. Everywhere graduate instruction suffered from the fact that, except in immediate connection with museums and similar enterprises, where research was a necessary adjunct of administration, courses for graduates were still of necessity looked upon so far as merely supplementary tasks. Either lecturers from without must be summoned, or else the time of already very busy college instructors must be taken for tasks which they might indeed love very much, but which seemed in conflict with their duties as disciplinarians, who were to "perfect" by an established system of "culture" the minds of undergraduates.

Nevertheless, as a recent report of the President of Yale University (that for 1889) points out, there were already in those early days symptoms at New Haven, as there were elsewhere, of a strong drift toward something better. As early as 1871, the movement at New Haven "for the securing of what is called the Woolsey fund" was, according to this report, an expression of the appreciation of the "need of the central or University life in our institution, which was then beginning to show itself." Similar movements in various places in those years show the same tendency. The real need, however, was for a change of the general policy, such as should tend toward much more than the mere offering of supplementary "post-graduate courses." As the President of Yale says, in the report just cited, "We look backward to a time which is within the remembrance of the older officers of instruction and many

graduates, and we see very little of this which we may call the central or common life"—i.e., of organized University management as such. "The several departments," that is, the college and the various schools, "moved along their own way, and in a large measure independently of one another. They accomplished their work, each one of them by and for itself But within the last quarter of a century the University life has come into being, and it has brought its peculiar demands with itself." And the University thus began at New Haven to ask for special funds for its own peculiar tasks, and to seek a higher organization. A similar growth of a general desire for the coming transformation of the College into the University dates in Cambridge from the early years of President Eliot's administration. "Post-graduate" instruction, regarded as a merely supplementary matter, was thus but a small part of the needed undertaking. It was not enough to offer opportunities. They must be united, brought into close relation to one another, knit together by organic ties. The professional schools, which had long flourished side by side with the colleges, must be drawn into closer co-operation with one another, and with the new ideals. The graduate department itself must find instructors, laboratories, and libraries, adapted to its needs. Funds at all sufficient for such tasks were in the early seventies not forthcoming, either at New Haven or at Cambridge; and the ideals of University life were still necessarily very vague everywhere in our country.

It was in those days, however, that the rapidly growing interest in higher learning among our academic youth found vent in a positively passionate enthusiasm for the methods and the opportunities of the German Universities. Still it is the case, and long will it remain so, that a longer or shorter course of work abroad will be an ideal for the American student. But in those days there was a generation that dreamed of nothing but the German University. England one passed by. It was understood not to be scholarly enough. France, too, was then neglected. German scholarship was our

master and our guide. In 1877, at the new Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore, I heard Professor Sylvester say that when he dealt with young American scholars he found them feeling as if not England, but Germany, were their mother-country. The admirable hospitality of the German University toward the foreign student fostered this enthusiasm. A little travel and expense, a little necessary pains with the language—and then the American student found himself able to come into immediate contact, as it were, with the great minds of the German world of scholarship. Lotze, or Helmholtz, or Mommsen, was his master. He could hear and read his fill, in a world of academic industry, and amidst elsewhere unheard of treasures of books. The air was full of suggestion. To one who personally knew nothing of the rigid studious discipline of the German gymnasiast, through which the native German student had passed, there was little in the freedom of the German University to remind him of the old and narrow “disciplinary” ideals of his home. The quality of study seemed no longer “strained.” The air of it seemed one of absolute blessing and power. One went to Germany still a doubter as to the possibility of the theoretic life; one returned an idealist, devoted for the time to pure learning for learning’s sake, determined to contribute his *Scherflein* to the massive store of human knowledge, burning for a chance to help to build the American University.

Some sort of study abroad was indeed an ideal with our best students very long ago; and, as I have said, it still remains an ideal. But this enthusiasm for the German University reached its flood in the seventies. When, nowadays, I receive letters from our students abroad, I do not find their ardor so hot, their gratitude to Germany so enthusiastic, as it seems to me that our own used to be in the generation of young graduates to which I chanced to belong. One has opportunities on both sides of the water now; and one looks to other countries also, as well as to Germany. No doubt academic enthusiasm is all the while broadening. But the intensity of its one highest purpose of those

days—to study in Germany—has somewhat diminished.

It was upon this well-prepared basis that the Johns Hopkins University began its epoch-marking work. The present writer enjoyed the kindly privilege of being one of its first company of twenty Fellows (graduate students receiving a stipend) in the years from 1876 to 1878. Here at last, so we felt, the American University had been founded. The academic life was now to exist for its own sake. The “conflict” between “classical” and “scientific” education was henceforth to be without significance for the graduate student. And the graduate student was to be, so we told ourselves, the real student. The undergraduate was not yet quite clear of the shell; but the graduate could imagine himself to have grown at least his pin-feathers. The beginning of the Johns Hopkins University was a dawn wherein “’twas bliss to be alive.” Freedom and wise counsel one enjoyed together. The air was full of rumors of noteworthy work done by the older men of the place, and of hopes that one might find a way to get a little working-power one’s self. There was no longer the dread upon one lest a certain exercise should not be well written, or a certain set examination not passed. No, the academic business was something much more noble and serious than such “discipline” had been in its time. The University wanted its children to be, if possible, not merely well-informed, but productive. She preached to them the gospel of learning for wisdom’s sake, and of acquisition for the sake of fruitfulness. One longed to be a doer of the word, and not a hearer only, a creator of his own infinitesimal fraction of a product, bound in God’s name to produce it when the time came. In all this, as one may be sure, a raw youth might indeed find temptations to hasty efforts at “original work,” and some of us doubtless found them. And then again, the true academic freedom is a thing hard to acquire. With a great price one attains this liberty. Some of us did attain it only slowly. Graduate study, and halting efforts to produce this or that for one’s self, involved one

easily in controversy; exposed one to sharp criticism; and it is hard to learn how to bear criticism, even of the sharp sort, without feeling personally wounded; to hear that one's work is so far a failure, without imagining the statement a reflection upon one's moral character. The ideal of the truly academic person is of one who can criticise and be criticised, as to scholarly work done, wholly without mercy as to the scholarship that is in question, wholly without malice toward the person of his opponent. Among the little company at the Johns Hopkins University there was in general the best of friendly feeling; but I remember some signs and experiences of sensitiveness that indicated how slowly the purely academic traditions formed in our minds—and how much they were needed by us all. And I mention the matter here because it suggests one of the most important offices that a University has to fulfil, that of teaching its scholars, and through them the general public, how to bear without malice and without rebellion, the plainest of parliamentary speech in matters that concern the truth. Only the academic life can teach a nation the true freedom of enlightened controversy.

There used to be a tale, doubtless mythical, current among us at Baltimore, concerning one of our number, a certain X, a decidedly young man, who, according to this tale, had expressed opinions, on a particular matter of scholarship, such as did not meet the approval of his academic senior, a very popular professor, N. Hereupon, as it chanced, N very pleasantly announced his intention of reading, before a University Society (composed of specialists) a paper refuting the expressed views of X. The latter, as very decidedly the junior, was at once elated and terrified by his novel situation. Just before the meeting where the paper was to be read, N, who was the soul of hospitality, and who invited us young men often to his table, approached X, and, in his accustomed informal fashion, asked the latter to dine with him on the following Sunday. "Sir," replied the proud and blushing young scholar, in a tone of great self-control and earnestness, "I

shall be delighted to dine with you, in case, at the conclusion of the controversy to-day, I find that we are still upon terms of cordial friendship."

Yes, the University spirit was in more ways than one a hard thing to acquire! The life of learning that was to be more than mere "discipline;" of love for truth that was to be also a love for seeking new truth; the life of academic freedom that was to involve at once the most loyal mutual friendliness of scholars, and the sternest justice toward all lapses in scholarship—this was still a somewhat new thing, after all, in America. I do not imagine that Baltimore had in those days any monopoly in the pursuit of this spirit. I know that it had not. But I speak of the hopes that used to bloom in those first days in Baltimore, because, after all, they must have been fairly typical; and if I have ventured for the moment upon what seems mere gossip, it is because I have fancied that it has some suggestions about it of the nature of the genuine academic ideal.

III.

I SUPPOSE that there can be no doubt of the great influence of the Johns Hopkins University upon what has happened since. The growth of the University spirit was in any case a matter foreordained; but the popular prominence not unjustly given to the admirable Baltimore enterprise has affected the remotest corners of the land. The endowment and beginning of three highly noteworthy Universities within the last few years, all of them with programmes of an ambitious character, and with ideals of a nobly academic elevation, has shown how much the public interest has now been aroused. These three institutions, Clark University at Worcester, the new University to be begun at Chicago, the Stanford University in California, are all of them indeed only buckling on the armor which, as one may warmly hope, they will never be obliged to take off. But if good resolutions are not everything, we are none of us yet free from the necessity of making our good resolutions go a great way toward determining our academic standing.

The American University is still in its storm and stress period. The rapidity of its changes is often almost appalling. Yet one has every reason to believe that these changes are, for the most part, healthy.

If one asks for signs that the new movement is not a forced or an artificial one, the strongest sort of evidence is suggested by such experience as that of the last few years at Cambridge, in respect to our relations to the country at large. The philosophical department, in which I am a teacher, surely stands for something that one might call, in this "materialistic" age and country, an academic luxury, if any department deserved such a name at all. When I began to teach at Cambridge, nine years ago, philosophy still seemed to be generally regarded as such a mere luxury, at least outside of Cambridge. If ambitious students consulted one as to their chances of getting employment somewhere as teachers of philosophy, in case they should continue their academic studies with that intent, one had to tell them that the chances were poor. One had rather to discourage their ambition. Within these few years, how much the scene has changed! Now we hear with comparative frequency of new and still vacant places for which our advanced students have an opportunity to apply; and ambitious students of philosophy no longer timidly ask advice, but courageously demand an opportunity for advanced work, and often come from a great distance, from the Provinces, from the South, from California, to get it. Other departments have had similar experiences. The increase of the numbers, of the hopefulness, and of the academic ambitions of graduate students here at Cambridge is, however, in no wise an exceptional fact. The President of Yale makes mention of a similar increase in all his recent reports. In 1886-87, Yale University had fifty-six graduate students, in the following year sixty-nine; in 1888-89, eighty-one students, and at the beginning in 1890-91, one hundred and four, of whom "one-half of the whole body," as President Dwight tells us, are from other institutions of learning. Our own catalogue at Cambridge shows this year one hun-

dred and ten resident students in the Graduate School, of whom a goodly proportion are from other institutions. Nearly all these persons aim to make teaching a part of their future career. Many of them hope with just confidence for high academic success.

The changes of organization and administration that in several of the old institutions have accompanied this increasing interest in higher graduate work, are too minute and complex in their details to admit of any fair discussion here. The most noteworthy transformation that has attracted public attention seems to be the reorganization at Columbia, attendant upon the new administration of President Low. Of this President Low's own Report, of October, 1890, gives us a full general account. The matter is one of representative interest. Up to the time of the change, as President Low tells us, the various "schools" at Columbia, including the Collegiate department proper, with its supplementary graduate courses, the "School of Political Science," and the Schools of Law and Mines, had each "its own faculty; and each school was administered without any reference to the others, almost without any consciousness of the others." In consequence, the true University spirit was of necessity lacking to the organization. Individual instructors might possess such a spirit or not. Yet "the attitude of the institution toward the student was one of multiplied opportunities, but opportunities held more or less out of relation to each other." The reorganization has been, then, first of all a unification under the influence of University ideals. One who has had any opportunity to learn of the progress of the discussion at Columbia which terminated in the reorganization, must observe with satisfaction how, despite considerable doubt and opposition, the University ideal finally triumphed, and that too at a moment almost precisely contemporaneous with an academic reorganization with us at Cambridge—a change much more limited in extent than the one at Columbia, but inspired by the same general ideals. What is common to our recent changes and to those at Columbia is, that they aim finally to free the Graduate department

from its old bondage to the ideals and the paramount influence of the collegiate course, and to make it all the sooner what in time it is sure to be—*the most important department in the University.*

I have thus spoken of two characteristic recent movements: that toward the direct enlargement of the Graduate departments of our Universities, and that toward such a reorganization of the University life as shall put these departments obviously and prominently where they ought to be—at the head. Cornell University, which has also been prominent in the foregoing movements, has just given us a striking illustration of another and *third* tendency, whereof we can all of us show some examples, although few indeed among these examples could rival this of Cornell's. This tendency is one of the most important of all.

The University, as we have now seen, grows toward oneness of life, which is its great glory. It grows, too, toward academic freedom, which means the subordination of so-called "disciplinary" ends to the true goal of scholarship (namely, the advance of human learning). It also grows toward what one might call cephalization (whereby I mean the setting of the highest work prominently at the head, and the making of graduate instruction not a supplementary, but a paramount thing). But now, while all this goes on, the organism that is thus unifying as a whole, is at the same time sharply differentiating in its parts. If any tendency besides the two heretofore illustrated is characteristic of recent years among us, it is the high development and the clear distinction of the various "departments" in the strict academic sense of the word—such departments, I mean, as that of history or of philosophy. The cultivation and encouragement of original work by advanced students, the growth of laboratory and of "seminary" methods of doing such work, or of getting ready to do it, the academic interest in "specialties," the needs of well-defined elective courses for higher degrees—all these things have tended to force the various departments into a relatively distinct and independently self-conscious life, such as

the old days of the collegiate course never knew. In historical instruction—as was shown by the elaborate government report on "Instruction in History in American Universities," prepared not long since by Dr. Herbert Adams, of Baltimore—the organization of departmental work has been for a number of years very progressive and elaborate. In the natural sciences also, which in this, as in so many other matters of University life, took the initiative, laboratories and museums have long since been natural centres of departmental organization. But in the other departments organization has grown in a very unequal fashion. Nowadays, however, the constant tendency is toward equality of organization in all directions. The department of philosophy, owing to the varieties of opinion and method prevalent among its teachers, seems an especially hard one to organize on a large scale, and still with a due respect for the freedom of teaching. However, we ourselves have tried to solve the problem at Cambridge, with six instructors in the department, and a considerable variety of opinions represented. And now appear the announcement of the "Susan Linn Sage School of Philosophy" at Cornell University, with eight teachers, with a *Journal of Philosophy*, with courses covering both undergraduate and professional work up to a decidedly high grade, and with attention given to the History of Philosophy, to Philosophical Theory, to Ethics, to Psychology, and to Pedagogy. And thus the cheerful emulation in well-doing goes on. By this step, meanwhile, Cornell gives the most brilliant illustration, easily possible, of the whole departmental tendency of the time.

To these three noteworthy tendencies of recent academic life must be added as fourth a constant increase in the number of University publications—journals of special science, monographs, and minor contributions to advancing knowledge. To the importance of this function of the modern University a separate paper would be needed to do justice. And this function is still in its infancy.

Fifth and finally, as a significant but still problematic tendency, indicated by more than one recent discussion, one

may mention a disposition to re-examine the basis upon which the traditional degrees have been given. The proposed shortening of the course for the Bachelor's degree—the "Three-Years Course" (so-called) which the Harvard Faculty devised a year since, and which the Overseers have now set aside, was no entire anomaly among recent proposals, but only a suggestion of one fashion at least in which, in future, the development of the University in its wholeness is likely to react upon undergraduate life, namely, by altering for general and organic reasons the somewhat arbitrary lines of classification that tradition has adopted. The growth of the elective system at Cambridge is already an expression of this reaction of the developing University spirit upon the traditional college course. The permission of the substitutes for one ancient language in the admission requirements, is another instance of the same sort. The new plan was merely an effort to alter, mainly in the interests of the higher academic work, the conventional boundaries that separate the undergraduate from his more advanced brother. In its form as adopted by the Faculty, this plan now belongs to "ancient history." But similar alterations of classification are sure to be offered in the future, and, in one form or another, to succeed.

IV.

SUCH are some of the tendencies of the University life of to-day in this country. To sum it all up, desires that were often called by their enemies merely "materialistic" and "popular," mere cravings for the basely "practical;" and studies that were often rather unwisely praised by their admirers as being solely devoted to "things," and not at all, like literary studies, to "words:" these began to affect the American College of the second quarter of the century. The stimulus of these new interests broadened and intensified our national life, reacted advantageously upon literary study itself, sent our young men abroad for guidance, and at length prepared us to try in earnest for a higher

University life of our own. This new life is just now in the midst of a most rapid growth, in which a large number of institutions share. Noteworthy is throughout the fact that the modern University does not tend to be either "materialistic," or merely "practical," but is daily growing more idealistic, more a cultivator of pure and noble theory, more devoted to truth for its own sake. No department is just now prospering with a more rapid progress in attracting students than is the department of philosophical study, notoriously the least "practical" of all. And yet, in all this, the modern University is not losing its hold upon the life of the nation. The old College was indeed a thing apart. The new University, with all its high devotion to theory, is yet, in a deeper sense, wisely near to the people, and is on the whole, as numerous generous endowments show, most cordially supported by them. Its labors, although in the highest degree theoretical, are losing more and more the false abstraction which has been too often characteristic of the learned. The modern University study of Political Science is educating the public for that serious time of grave social dangers which seems to be not far off. Academic work in Natural Science is constantly opening new fields to the industrial arts, and giving new insights into the business of life. Academic study of Philosophy is preparing the way for a needed spiritual guidance in the religious crisis which is rapidly becoming so serious. All these matters are of the office of the University. They were *not*, in former days, a prominent part of the work of the College.

If, in view of all this growth, one still asks, What is the Ideal of the modern University? then I venture to answer: The traditional college had as its chosen office the training of individual minds. The modern University has as its highest business, to which all else is subordinate, the organization and the advance of Learning. Not that the individual minds are now neglected. They are wisely regarded as the servants of the one great cause. But the real mind which the University has to train is the mind of the nation, that concrete

social mind whereof we are all ministers and instruments. The daily business of the University is therefore, first of all, the creation and the advance of learning, as the means whereby the national mind can be trained.

But perhaps some reader may still ask the question: What, in all this growth of higher University life, is to become of the undergraduate? Will he not be made too subordinate a being, in view of these lofty ideals of the University? As a matter of fact, the great numbers and the large significance of the undergraduates, in every university, insure and always will insure the closest attention to their needs and interests, however much the ideal of the University grows upon us, however lofty the more organic and national purposes of our academic work become. Of undergraduates and their specific wants, of the relative merits of "disciplinary" and "elective" courses, this paper has not to speak. Yet of the proper place of the undergraduate in the organism of a great University I have a pretty decided notion, which I should like to express as I close. It is this: In the true University the undergraduate ought to feel himself a novice in an order of learned servants of the ideal—a novice who, if in turn he be found willing and worthy, may be admitted, after his first degree, to the toils and privileges of this order as a graduate or, still later, as a teacher; but who, on the other hand, if, as will most frequently happen, he is not for this calling, will be sent back to the world, enriched by his undergraduate years of intercourse with his fellows,

and with elder men, and progressive scholars. The ideal academic life then is *not* organized expressly for him. And yet he will gain by the very fact that it *is* organized for higher aims and upon more significant principles than his individual interests directly involve. It is a mistake to think *first* of "disciplining" the undergraduate mind, and *then* of higher academic purposes. First let us seek the highest, which is organized scholarship. Then let us give ample time, teachers, and oversight to the undergraduates, but let what we do for them be informed by the true University spirit; that is, let us treat them just *as* novices preparing to enter the higher scholarly life in some one of the multitudinous departments of modern research, and let us train them *as if they were* all known to be worthy of such a calling. Most of them will not be worthy, and will return ere long to the outer world, or else, in the more "practical" of the learned professions will keep nearer to the world of research, but will not dwell in it. To such we shall have given our best if we have regarded them for the time as possible future colleagues, as beginners in constructive wisdom, and have tried to give them our best ideals as to how one labors when one is a scholar. For what is scholarship but spiritual construction. And what better "discipline" can a mind get than the contagion of the enthusiasm for serious, toilsome, and spiritual constructiveness, as he may get it in three or four years hard work under wise masters in any of the liberal Arts and Sciences?

