

George Thompson and Richard D. Webb—whose inedited letters have likewise been used for this biography—and still we have not half enumerated the *dramatis persone*; nor all of the most important, for the manuscript collection available was a chance-meetley, no man having done less, systematically, to pave the way for his biographer than Mr. Garrison. His own letters are naturally very numerous, and, being largely quoted along with his speeches and his articles in the several newspapers which he edited, afford an opportunity of comparing his public with his private utterances. The consistency of these is unmistakable, and together they illustrate most strikingly the *measure* of his language.

This language was, from the outset of his anti-slavery career, condemned for its "barshness," but it was always scrupulously weighed and adapted, and therein lay its effectiveness, since it could not be confounded with mere abuse. The charge is again and again met in these pages by Mr. Garrison himself, and it is made clear that the real ground of offence—in him as well as in his colleagues, not a few of whom easily surpassed him in "barshness"—was the abolition doctrine, and not the phraseology with which it was advocated. Deaf ears did not wish to hear the truth about the national sin and the national danger. His voice reached them as no other had done, even when, as in the case of Bourne, the harshness was greater and the doctrine of immediate emancipation the same. "I will be heard," said the editor of the *Liberator* in his salutatory, and he was heard; the means were conformable to the end. Before him, as John Quincy Adams recorded in 1830, there was "a great mass of cool judgment and of plain sense on the side of freedom and humanity, but the ardent spirits and passions [were] on the side of oppression." In Mr. Garrison these qualities were united, while his speech remained truly dispassionate.

We have a test of this in the curious paradoxes that, as persecution increased and involved his own person, he was led the more speedily to the doctrine of Christian non-resistance; and as the churches and the clergy grew more and more openly pro-slavery, he was drawn more irresistibly than ever to the study of the Bible. This ended (toward the close of the present narrative) in his embracing "Perfectionism," as others called it, or "practical holiness," as he termed it—"the doctrine that total abstinence from sin in this life is not only commanded but necessarily obtainable." It was the outgrowth of his reflections on the subject of peace as enforced in the New Testament, and it exacted a total separation of himself from all existing human governments, as being transient institutions based on violence, and destined to disappear on the coming of Christ's kingdom. Whatever may be thought of this doctrine as a working one in our world, it was drawn from the Bible, and was modelled upon the character and teachings of Jesus. In other words, it was a Bible heresy, not an "infidel" one. So was Mr. Garrison's view of the supersession of the Jewish Sabbath, which agreed with Luther's and Tyndale's, though far less rudely expressed. His formula of duty in this regard was "to keep not one in seven, but all days holy."

These heresies, nevertheless, became grounds of division (culminating in 1840) between himself and the clergy and the sectarians, both anti-slavery and pro-slavery; and the breach was completed by a third scandalous mistake in exercising the Protestant right of private interpretation of the Scriptures: Mr. Garrison refused to oppose the speaking of women in public. It seems laughable now, but the feeling excited by the anti-slavery lecturing of the Grimké sisters begot a sham clerical anti-slavery organization in rivalry of the old, which had remained faithful to

Mr. Garrison. The controversy marks the beginning of the woman's-rights agitation in this country, and in it also the Liberty Party had one of its roots. The true history of the rise of this political organization will be sought in vain outside of these volumes. The reader will judge whether to have had a hand in laying its foundations is matter for boasting, and whether Mr. Garrison's active opposition to its inception was unnatural, short-sighted, or unjustified by the result.

More searchingly than any similar work this biography serves as a touchstone to reputations that have been labelled and catalogued and placed upon the shelf. The greatest is liable to be recalled and tried anew by the question, Which side did this man take in the vital conflict between slavery and freedom? A conspicuous example is furnished by Harrison Gray Otis, once a Senator of the United States, a most admired orator, a member of the Hartford Convention, finally, Mayor of Boston. Perhaps, all told, there is more of him in these pages than can be found in any other one place, and upon it posterity is as likely to make up its final judgment of him as upon any other source. Yet he could see nothing in the *Liberator* office but "an obscure hole," and took the lead in that Faneuil Hall meeting for discountenancing the Abolitionists which engendered "the Boston mob" *par excellence* of October 21, 1835. Mayor Lyman, too, a Boston citizen of the best type, with many local claims to remembrance, will probably owe his fame, for better or worse, to the exhaustive account of the mobbing of Mr. Garrison during his term of office, as given in the work before us. The same event is made to cast a side-light even upon Channing's character, and indeed the relations of this divine to the editor of the *Liberator* and the anti-slavery organization will surprise many of his traditional admirers. That downright opponents like Dr. Wayland and Dr. Leonard Bacon fare still more badly at the hands of the documents here mustered, was to be expected.

Next after the Boston mob, the fiftieth anniversary of which is close at hand, the episode of the founding of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833 will probably most fix the attention. But, in truth, there was no important gathering or occasion in the period under review from which Mr. Garrison was absent, or concerning which he has not left some description in his familiar correspondence. Thus, we do not know where there exists so full a report of the memorable meeting of the "Seventy Agents" in New York in November, 1833. The burning of Pennsylvania Hall in 1838 is similarly narrated at first hand, while numerous autograph letters epitomize the London World's Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840. A special interest attaches to incidents which are not absolutely new to print, though practically out of sight. Such are the interviews with Wilberforce and Clarkson in England, and with Harriet Martineau in this country; the sittings to the painter Hayden in London; the "temptation" of Garrison by Aaron Burr. When one has turned the thousandth page of the ever-changing story, it seems as if the hero of it were long past his prime. The running-tide, however, abhors, as we have said, but thirty-five years to the play upon which the curtain drops. More of life has seldom been compressed into so brief a span.

The typography of these handsome volumes, from the De Vinne Press, is beyond praise. The notes and references are abundant if not superabundant. There is a minute index of forty pages. Scattered through the chapters are portraits of Mr. Garrison and his nearest friends, and sundry facsimiles, by which the reader is helped into the very spirit of

the time. Among the portraits, which number no less than twenty, and have been engraved (many for the first time) by the best artists of the *Century*, we remark those of Benjamin Lundy, Arthur Tappan, Arnold Buffum, Isaac Knapp, Oliver Johnson, S. E. Sewall, E. G. Loring, S. J. May, Wendell Phillips, Theodore D. Weld, Francis Jackson, George Thompson, Charles Follen, Prudence Crandall, the Grimké sisters, Abby Kelley, Mrs. M. W. Chapman, etc. The whole work is a key to the files of the *Liberator* and to the contemporary anti-slavery literature, including the manuscript sources, which it is announced will be deposited with the Boston Public Library in perpetuity.

MARTINEAU'S TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY.

Types of Ethical Theory. By James Martineau, D.D., LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. 1, pp. xxiv + 479; Vol. II., pp. viii + 530.

ONE must speak hesitatingly about the historical importance of a new book; and yet we should not wonder if, in the end, Doctor Martineau's present work were to come nearer than any other English ethical treatise so far published in this age, to filling a place beside the standard English ethical discussions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Surely, at all events, this book, viewed with reference to the needs of its own time, reminds us, despite its diffuseness and its lack of literary unity, of the kind of work that was for their own times done by Hobbes or Shaftesbury or Smith or Butler. And this we say without meaning thereby to express our own agreement with Doctor Martineau's doctrine, any more than we intend to express agreement with Hobbes or with Shaftesbury or Smith or Butler. Our judgment is for the first a purely formal judgment, based on the quality of the work done. Of the doctrine we shall speak further very soon. But at all events the book is, in every respect save one, abreast with the learning of its time. This one great lack lies in the direction of a closer knowledge of modern German thought, and few ethical writers could better dispense with this knowledge than Doctor Martineau. The defect is, even for him, however, serious; yet in compensation therefor we have a very wide range of historical study and appreciation, a definite and significant positive doctrine, and an enthusiastic affection for human nature. These are enough to constitute a more considerable contribution to philosophical ethics than this generation in English thought has so far otherwise known.

In a literary point of view, the book plainly suffers from its origin in the author's lectures. It suffers yet more, artistically, from the author's naturally genial and infinitely diffuse flow of learned discourse. His estate is wide, full of winding roads, of pleasant views, of gardens and of thickets. He has certain fine outlooks, certain especially beautiful meadow-lands and mountain summits that he wants you to see. So he takes you to them: but first, by the way, numberless paths open, and must be followed here and there, to show you whither they lead. At last the heights are reached and the views seen; but then you must be taken home again by another road, through more groves and thickets. When you are done you know not exactly why just this route has been followed; and your guide, confident that you have been at all events well instructed, refuses to give you any further explanation, save that he has willed it so, and likes that road best himself.

By this figure we may express the impression produced by the curious and original arrangement of this work, and by the fact that you can

find such things as biographical details about Spinoza or Comte, philological excursions concerning Plato, an exposition of the Cartesian physics, and numerous other irrelevant outbursts of ardent scholarship, scattered all through what aims to be a united argument concerning the difference between right and wrong. Yet Doctor Martineau is never pedantic, and never quite garrulous. You hear much from him, and the effect is, at worst, still good. As for the mentioned curious arrangement, the author begins with an historical sketch of certain selected "non-psychological theories" of ethics. These theories, such as Plato's, Spinoza's, or Comte's, seek for the origin and truth of moral distinctions in the world without, and then bring into man's nature the moral law thus physically deduced. They are in so far all alike wrong; for, according to Doctor Martineau, the moral law is only to be spiritually discerned—that is, the true theory must be "psychological," and so must first find the moral distinctions in man's own mind and nowhere else. But when you resolve to get your moral doctrine psychologically, your troubles are not done. For you may still get, by mistake, not an "idiopsychological" ethical theory, as Doctor Martineau's terminology runs, but an "heteropsychological" theory. And that would be disastrous. For only "idiopsychological" ethics, seeking the origin of the moral distinctions in a moral faculty proper, *i. e.*, in Conscience, can satisfy the conditions. "Heteropsychological" ethics may hunt for the moral nature in the love of pleasure, or in the abstract reason, or, with Shaftesbury, in an aesthetic sense of the fitness of things. But such a search is one for a false unity. The Conscience can be reduced to nothing simpler than itself. Conscience proper Doctor Martineau treats at the opening of his second volume, thus discussing the "idiopsychological" theory in between the "non-psychological" theories, set aside in the first volume, and the "heteropsychological" theories, whose refutation concludes his work. The truth is thus sandwiched between two generous layers of error, and so this philosophical titbit is prepared.

Conscience, however, is an old friend in ethics. The theory of Doctor Martineau is made in the fear of old objections, and is a revised version of Butler's doctrine. Conscience for him is not merely a storehouse of dogmatic moral maxims, but a perceptive faculty. And what it perceives is the existence of a graded moral scale of active principles, *i. e.*, "incentives" or "springs" of action, in our nature. In this scale we perceive a regular series, from lowest "dispositions" or "springs of action," through the higher to the highest. In estimating conduct, our conscience applies itself, not to our acts directly, nor to their consequences as such, but to their incentives. The incentives once graded, an act is good in proportion as, in presence of any lower incentive, it involves a choice of a higher. And so, in general, our lives ought to express our higher rather than our lower springs of action. Yet the lower cannot be wholly excluded. The judgments of conscience are thus not passed upon the consequences of the acts as such. Yet, by a process that Doctor Martineau does not make very clear, the computation of consequences (vol. ii, p. 255) "is already more or less involved in the preference of this or that spring of action; for in proportion as the springs of action are self-conscious, they contemplate their own effects, and judgment upon them [*i. e.*, upon the effects] is included in our judgment on the disposition." However this may be, Doctor Martineau's method of defining conscience obviously escapes some of the traditional theoretical difficulties about that rather pretentious faculty. Conscience, in his view, does not set out with a mass of querulous "thou shalt

not" maxims, but only excludes relatively, declaring that when a higher incentive can be followed, then a lower must, by comparison, be rejected. But if the incentive A is rejected by comparison with B, when the two happen to conflict, the incentive B is rejected by comparison with its own higher incentive C, when the conflict is between these; and conscience thus has, in general, no absolute respect for the incentives, but only a relative interest in them. Exception is to be made in favor of the highest and lowest incentives in the known scale. Reverence, as the highest incentive, has for us an absolute moral value among motives, and acts that are necessary to express it have the highest possible warrant as against all opponents. On the other hand, Vindictiveness, being on the lowest grade among our motives—for lower, for instance, than mere natural Antipathy—has for us an absolute moral worthlessness, being rejected as against any other motive that may move us, and so rejected altogether. Even at the highest extreme of the scale, however, the mentioned absolute value of Reverence must be practically limited by the fact that our nature does not permit us always to be revering, but forces us to be often eating or fighting; and that, in fact, an effort to be continually reverential, and nothing else, would make us all vile pigs, and so would defeat its own aim. The complexity of our nature must thus be regarded in giving its due place to even our highest motive.

This theory of conscience is not only more liberal than many past theories, but it escapes that repeated objection of the opponents of intuitional moral theories, according to which the actual variations of moral judgment among men exclude the possibility of a conscience as an authoritative and uniform faculty. When men differ in moral judgment, they are, in fact, according to our author, judging different things. For acts are practically so complex, and incentives so numerous, that we seldom take all things into account. A wrong analysis of the facts may bring to conscience a false case, which this highest judge, who knows only the law, and accepts the evidence as he finds it, must then estimate incorrectly.

Such we understand to be Doctor Martineau's position. Its agreement with one whole growth of ethical tradition is perfectly manifest and admitted; but its statement is frequently original, and is accompanied by a very keen psychological analysis of human acts and motives.

That this psychological theory includes a belief in our moral freedom of will, and is also not disconnected from theological considerations, every reader of Doctor Martineau's previous publications will know without being told. Man is constantly in the presence, says Doctor Martineau, of Nature and God, *i. e.*, of the perceptible world, and of its eternal cause. To understand them, however, we do best to begin with our own soul; "to believe what the soul says of them," rather "than what they have to say about the soul." We thus obtain a "volitional theory of nature," and escape what Doctor Martineau especially abhors, "a naturalistic theory of volition." In relation to ethics, the two methods of philosophizing thus indicated are evidently identical respectively with Doctor Martineau's "psychological" method, and with his great opponent, the "non-psychological" method. The same tendency that leads him to look within for the moral distinctions, leads him to assume, as the complement and support of his ethical doctrine, a "volitional theory of nature." The human conscience demands that we should be in a world worthy of our reverence, and capable of understanding our graded scale of inner excellence. We must interpret the outer world by our knowledge of our own inner nature, and especially of our moral nature. But hence the need, Doctor Martineau

thinks, of supplementing our ethics by a theism. In defining this theism, his moral doctrine pursues him to the end. God, in order to be such a God as our conscience reveres, cannot be simply immanent in the world, but must transcend it. What is realized in the world cannot be simply and absolutely necessary; there must be personal freedom still in God, something that might be and is not chosen, something more than any phenomenal world can manifest. For, after all, in Doctor Martineau's way of thinking, one of the most noteworthy characteristics of a person obviously is, that as person he is "not all there," and might be other than he is.

This is the outline of our author's doctrine. We admire the exposition, and think very highly, as the reader sees, of the historical influence that it may hope to have. As against the naive and stubbornly unprogressive hedonism of some of the recent ethical theorists among the evolutionists, it has great logical advantages. It is free from their Philistinism, and yet it does not despise their facts. But still we cannot in the least disguise our fundamental disagreement with our author—a disagreement that expresses itself at once in our feeling that his lack of appreciation for modern German thought is a serious defect, even in so wealthy a thinker as he. There are some lessons to be learned from the historical outcome of the critical philosophy, and one of these lessons is, that no graded scale of incentives, intuitively and dogmatically established by any independent moral faculty, can be in the least adequate to the vast undertakings of ethical doctrine. Every such scale thus arbitrarily established is a mere personal whim on its very face, a caprice of the man who makes it. Conscience, defined as a private intuitive faculty, is once for all defined as a mere individual prejudice. The mere chance fact that two men or many men have or may have the same caprice, gives no logical universality to the moral perception. By the very definition, any logical universality is thus excluded from morals, and ethical questions become for such a system mere questions of taste. With another private scale of gradation, we should have another code; and this scale is, after all, an accidental system of pig-on-holes, useful in our own studies. To assure us that, meanwhile, it is of divine origin, and that God arranges incentives in just such an order of pigeon-holes, would be to give up the whole case, and make our ethics depend on our physics. Yet to confine ourselves to our own minds, and to say, "Such is the scale, because we find it given in our own souls," is to abandon universality for a confessedly private preference. How to look successfully for universality in ethics is another matter. Doctor Martineau's method will always be, we doubt not, of great historical importance, and expounded as he here expounds it, with all the liveliness of controversial and psychological illustration and observation that distinguishes his thought, the result is a really great book. But our historical success in philosophical writing is, fortunately or unfortunately, not coincident with our success as mere logicians, or even as correct expounders of the fundamental difficulties of our chosen problems. Philosophy is valuable, as a social force, in quickening men to wrestle with life-problems for themselves; and incomplete theoretical success is often, from this social point of view, immanently important. Hence our admiration for this book, despite our objections.

Doctor Martineau's graded scale of springs of action has another very serious defect, besides the capricious and accidental basis upon which it all rests. Most of the steps, namely, by which it is reached, involve processes of false abstraction, which all the author's concrete interest in human nature cannot render other than obviously unfruitful. After all, who can decide whether, ab-

abstractly and in themselves, viewed wholly apart from their consequences, compassion is higher than gratitude, or fear morally higher than the tendency to spontaneous activity? Yet just such questions Doctor Martineau's conscience undertakes to answer for him. In fact, of course, he never really answers as abstract questions as he puts to himself. Suppressed and concrete considerations really decide. Yet his problems, as they are stated, are often merely amusing in their unreality. He is, for instance, studying the *Love of gain*, in its moral relations in the scale, and at the moment is comparing it with *Antipathy* or *Hatred*, considered as a primary passion or as an instinctive "movement of self-protection." He is courageous enough to assume an ideal case much in this way: Banish all consideration of consequences, concentrate attention on the one moment of action, and suppose a purely abstract and momentary man, "who has an intense horror of blood," and "receives an offer of an abattoir with a good butcher's business attached." Ought he, leaving out altogether for the moment his family and friends and position in life, and balancing only his primary passion of blood-hatred against his love of gain, to accept or not? Doctor Martineau's conscience is equal to this bit of abstraction, and decides that "to me it appears certain that we should look with contempt upon the suppression of even such aversion by hire." Much more, of course, if one's antipathy is felt toward a person, say a negro, it is obvious to Doctor Martineau that this primary "self-protecting" antipathy ought not to yield to a mere love of gain, however it may properly yield to compassion, or possibly to reverence, if these come into play. Californians who employ the hated Chinese for cheap labor's sake will please take notice of Doctor Martineau's conscience on this matter, as indicated by this remark.

Now, such abstraction as this is plainly impractical, not to say immoral. There is a true scientific abstraction, giving us unreal, or even physically impossible cases, which, with the abstraction itself, are still useful. Such an abstraction is that of the mathematical physicist, who studies the disposition of the heat conducted from a given source along a homogeneous bar, of a given shape and conductivity, immersed in a perfectly non-conducting medium, after the lapse of a given time from the beginning of the process. Such cases do not occur in nature; but they are valuable for the study of nature. But a false abstraction it would be to discuss in biology whether, in case a living animal consisted only of a great toe and a tail, it would find the toe more valuable than the tail. Yet just such an abstraction is Doctor Martineau's in the case mentioned. Even a butcher's life-work is an organic whole, and he is a member of a social order, with family, friends, and endless social duties. His love of gain is itself no quality capable of being understood by abstraction. Like the great toe or the tail of an animal, its nature is determined by the total of the organism, viz., here, of the character to which it belongs. And even so with the butcher's antipathy for blood. Hence the answer to Dr. Martineau's question is as indeterminate as would be the answer to the supposed biological question—as indeterminate and as worthless. A man is no more made of "springs of action," in Doctor Martineau's sense, than he is of quiddities or of second intentions.

Morality is, after all, what Aristotle made it, a science of gradations among Ends. The determination of the worth of Ends, and the consequent gradation of motives, cannot be made from any capricious and purely subjective examination of abstract "springs of action," but must find some other rational basis. If, for instance, the "greatest happiness of the greatest number"

is the highest End, then we shall have one possible gradation of the motives of men. But if the social order as such, the organization of civilized humanity, is our highest End, motives will get some other sort of judgment. Conscience, merely as something in us, is unauthoritative, and may be wicked. And so we find Doctor Martineau's ethical doctrine fundamentally defective, deeply as we admire the learning, the keen observation, and the hard-won personal wisdom with which the venerable teacher has adorned his work. We repeat, this book will live long and prosper; yet not because its fundamental doctrines are very novel, or logically satisfactory, but because a true man wrote it, and because his generous learning vivifies and warms its dust, and clothes the old body with precious and enduring garments.

TWO BOOKS ON THE VOICE.

The Child's Voice: Its Treatment with regard to After-Development. By Emil Belnke and Lennox Browne. Chicago: A. N. Marquis & Co. 1885.

Voice Use and Stimulants. By Lennox Browne. Chicago: A. N. Marquis & Co. 1885.

THE authors of these two brief treatises have adopted a plan of composition which has been used before, and which threatens to become a literary fashion that has, no doubt, its advantages, though it will add one more terror to the martyrdom of being a famous man. In order to determine some disputed points regarding the use of the voice at certain periods of life, and regarding the effects of alcohol and tobacco on the vocal organs, they sent circulars with questions to hundreds of well-known singing teachers and vocalists, in order to secure their opinions, as well as a brief account of their personal experiences. The names of all who responded to the call are printed in the appendix of each book, besides being in many cases quoted in the preceding pages.

The monograph on the *Child's Voice* is by far the more valuable of the two, and should be consulted by all parents who wish to cultivate the voices of their children, but do not know when to begin. The decision of this question should rarely be left to a vocal teacher, for the obvious reason that it is his advantage to begin as soon as possible. That singing lessons should be given to all young people who have the least gift for it, is a point which cannot be sufficiently recommended to parents. For, aside from the æsthetic pleasure to be derived from music, the exercise of the vocal organs often has a most remarkable effect on health. Dr. Martin, of St. Paul's Cathedral in London, who has had twenty years' experience in training an average of forty choir boys, states that he has never witnessed any pulmonary delicacy engendered, and that the health of many boys of consumptive disposition has improved under his training. Moreover, "it is very rare to see children trained in singing suffering from that very common defect in this country, of breathing through the mouth instead of through the nostrils"; and the full respiration required in singing also has a beneficial influence on digestion: singing engenders hunger, and "singing boys have often lusty appetites."

Although a few of the vocalists who replied to the questions sent them by our authors, state that voice-training may safely and advantageously begin at a very early age, by far the best and most copious evidence is to the opposite effect. Coupling this with their own experience, the authors "are bound to say we think the advantages of early training have been greatly overrated." There is, however, a great difference between the natural and the artistic use of the voice, which is well

expressed by Mme. Antoinette Sterling: "A girl may commence singing as early as possible. *Cultivation* of the voice should not commence till after the change to womanhood, ordinarily." Doctor Stainers says: "Little girls should not be taught to sing at all, as their tender voices are often *permanently* injured by premature efforts. A female voice should not go through any *serious work or training* until womanhood has been reached." And Mrs. Curwen gives her personal testimony thus: "When I was a child, singing was not taught in schools, . . . so I escaped the habit of shouting and straining, so common now with children who go to school. And I never had singing lessons till nearly nineteen years of age." Provided the natural voice is only used, avoiding all strain and loudness, children cannot easily sing too soon and too much. For, as Mme. Sherrington says, "Early training sharpens the sense of hearing, and early use of the vocal cords stretches and strengthens them. Children should therefore from earliest childhood be taught little songs and dancing to acquire rhythm."

In the case of boys, complete rest at the period of puberty is much more important than in the case of girls, and the common neglect of such rest in the case of choir boys is probably the principal reason why "the number of boy choristers with fine voices who attain to eminence as singers in after life is very small." Mr. Turpin also touches upon a cause of the rarity of good voices: "Rough play in noisy streets, attended by loud shouting, I find to be, through forcing the tones of the lower register, the most frequent cause of failure in training boys' voices"; and the objection that interference with such sport would lessen the manliness and cheerfulness of boys, is met by the reply that complete suppression is not called for, but only moderation. Many interesting points regarding the differences between boys' and men's and girls' and women's voices are noticed, and a separate chapter considers the cause of the greater change of the male than the female voice, without coming to any satisfactory conclusions.

Dr. Lennox Browne's *Voice Use and Stimulants*, though comprising only 110 pages of text, contains a good deal of "padding," including a twenty-page disquisition on the question, "Was Mme. Malbran a Drunkard?" If she, one of the world's greatest vocalists, had been a drunkard, the Doctor's thesis that alcohol is injurious to vocalists would have received a serious blow; and he therefore determines this mooted and mysterious question to his satisfaction as well as he can. Mr. Sims Reeves, too, who had been named as a case refuting his theory, is quoted as having written in 1876 regarding stimulants, that "by long experience I find it better to do without them entirely. A glycerine lozenge is preferable; on very rare occasions a small quantity of claret and water may be necessary; but all alcoholic stimulants are detrimental." Of 380 vocalists who were questioned regarding their drinking habits, almost 70 per cent. admitted that they drank regularly or occasionally; but 75 per cent., on the other hand, refuse to take any stimulant either immediately before or during use of the voice, as an aid to its exercise. Spirits are used by only 8 per cent., "while a much larger number take the trouble to especially condemn" their use. Doctor Browne, however, is sufficiently liberal to admit that after work, at meal time, such a small amount of alcohol as is contained in a pint of claret is harmless, and may even be useful by its effects on digestion. The best way of taking wine for vocalists, however, would seem to be "in pills," as Theodore Hook puts it; for one vocalist writes that he has "found good dried raisins a nice stimulant to the voice, eaten fasting or shortly before singing"; and the author adds: "I learn also that Mme. Lind-Goldschmidt has